MR. RANVIR DEWANversusMRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.

                              [?Oi 7] Li S.C.R. 542


                            MR. RANV!R DEWAN
                                        v.
                     MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.
                        (Civil Appeal No.21784 of2017)
B                            DECEMBER 12, 2017
       [R. K. A<(;RAWAL AND ABHAY MAHOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
           Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s.14(1) ands. 14 (2) r/w s.30-
  0ne BRD w<11s the owner of the house in question - Appellant is the
c son of BRD. while respondent no.I is the daughter - Through his
   Will, BRD gpve his wife (mother of appellant) a "life interest" to
   reside in the house till her death - While, the ground floor and first
  floor of the house were given exclusively to appellant and respondent
   no. 1. respectively - Di>putes arose between the parties - Joint suit
  filed by appellanr and his mother against the respondent no. 1. inter
D alia praying/or declaration that appellant's mother Wa> the absolure
   owner of the said house as her "life interest" in the property had
   enlarged and ripened into an absolute interest by virtue of s.14(1),
   on the death of her husband - Suit dismissed by Single Judge of
   High Court ·- Division Bench upheld the judgment of Single
E Judge - On appeal. held: Case of appellant's mother does not fall
   u/s.14 ( l) but it squarely falls uls.14 (2) - It is clear from the contents
   of the Tf!ill that BRD intended to give only "life interest" to his wife
   in the suit house - Such "life interest" neither enlarged nor ripened
   into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life
   interest", i.e. "restricted estate" uls.14(2). till her death - It was the
F appellant and the respondent no. I who were given absolute
   ownership of the suil house while appellant:~ mother was given on~v
    "'life interest·· in the suit house - Such disposition was made by
   virtue of s.14 (2) rlw s. 30 of the Act - No error in the impugned
  judgment.
G        Hindu Succession Act. 1956 - s.14(2) - Scope and ambit a/-
    Discussed.
           Will - intention of testator - Interpretation of - Held: What
    the testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will. has to
    be gathered primarily by reading the recitals of the Will only.
H
                                       542
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                           543


       Words & Phrases - "Life Interest" - Meaning of - Held: "Life A
interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of
life - It is incapable of being tramferred to others being personal
in nature.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1 It is not in dispute that the suit house was the         B
self-acquired property of late Mr. BDR, appellant's father. It is
also not in dispute as one can take it from reading the contents of
Will that Mr. BDR had intended to give only "life interest" to his
wife (appellant's mother) in the suit house, which he gave to her
for the first time by way of disposition of his estate independent        c
of her any right. It is also not in dispute that it was confined to a
right of residence to live in the suit house during her lifetime and
to use the income earned from the suit house to maintain herself
and the suit house. It is also not in dispute that the testator gave
to his son (appellant) ground floor of the suit house and first floor
to his daughter (respondent no.I) with absolute right of ownership.       D
The testator also permitted both of them to get their names
mutated in the municipal records as absolute owners and also
get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax assessment cases.
[Para 34] [551-C-E]
       1.2 It is a settled principle of law that what the testator        E
intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will has to be
gathered primarily. by reading the recitals of the Will only. On
facts, reading of the Will would go to show that it does not leave
any kind of ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to
how and in what manner and with what rights, the testator wished          F
to give to three of his legal representatives his self acquired
properties and how he wanted to make its disposition. [Paras 36,
37] . [551-G-H]
      1.3 The ambit of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 must be confined to cases where property is acquired            G
by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-
existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or
award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the
property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female
at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a
                                                                          H
544            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 13 S.C.R.


A     pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within
      the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the
      instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property
      prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property. The case of
      plaintiff No.2 (appellant's mother) does not fall under Section 14
      (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act.
B
      A/ortiori, plaintiff No.2 (appellant's mother) received only "life
      interest" in tile suit house by the Will from her late husband and
      such "life inte1rest" neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute
      interest in tile suit house and remained "life interest", i.e.,
      "restricted estate" till her death under Section 14(2) of the Act.
c     This is for following factual reasons. [Paras 41-43) (556-B-FJ
            V Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs.
            (1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977) 3 SCR 261 - relied on.
        1.4 First, the testator-BDR being the exclusive owner of
  the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he
D liked because it was his self earned property. Second, the testator
  gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the
  daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same
  time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in
  the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such
E disposition, th~ testator could make by virtue of Section 14 (2)
  read with Section 30 of the Act. Third, such "life interest" was in
  the nature of !•restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act
  which remain¢d a "restricted estate" till her death and did not
  ripen into an "absolute interest" under Section 14(1) of the Act.
  In Miler words, once the case falls under Section 14(2) of the
F Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in Jaw because
  Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. Fourth,
  the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of
  testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership
  in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife
G became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other
  words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live
  in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive.
  If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled
  to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it.
  However, such was not the case here. Fifth, the testator had also
H
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                             545



given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled             A
her to maintain herself. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that
the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the
termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such
person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore,
could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which          B
is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her
"life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death
on 12.09.2016. [Paras 44-49] [557-A-C, D]
      Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. (2006)
      8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799- held applicable.
                                                                            c
      Gullapalli Krishna Das v. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya
      & Am: (1978) l SCC 67; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v.
      Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 300 :
       (1979] 3 SCR 291; Thota Sesharathamma & Am: v.
      Thota Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1991) 4
      SCC 312 : [1991] 3 SCR 717 - referred to.                             D

                        Case Law Reference
(1978) 1 sec 67                  referred to                Para 38
(1979] 3 SCR 291                 referred to               Para 38          E
[1991] 3 SCR 717                 referred to                Para 38
[1977] 3 SCR 261                 relied on                 Para 41
[2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799          held applicable           Para 50
                                                                            F
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 21784
of2017
      From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2016 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA (OS) No. 147 of 2013.
     Guru Krishan Kumar, Sr. Adv., Krishna Kumar, Sharad Cahndra            G
Nanda, Nirdj Kumar Mishra, Vinodh Kanna B., Siba Prasad, Ms. Srujuna
Suman Mund. Bipin Bihari Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Anil Mittal, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Dr. Kailash Chand, S. S. Jauhar,
Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                            H
546             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 13 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. Leave granted.
            2. This appeal is filed by plaintiffNo.I against the final judgment
      and order dated 13.07.2016 passed by the Division Bench of the High
      Court of Delhi at New Delhi in R.F.A.(OS) No.147 of2013 whereby
 B    the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by PlaintiffNo.2 (since dead)
      and the appellant (plaintiff No. I) herein and confirmed the judgment
      and order dated 11.10.2013 of the Single Judge of the High Court in
      C.S.(O.S.) No.1502 of2010.
            3. In order to appreciate the controversy involved in the appeal, it
C     is necessary to set out the facts of the case.
            4. The appellant is plaintiffNo. l whereas the respondents are the
      defendants in a suit out of which this appeal arises. The appellant is the
      brother whereas respondent No. I is the appellant's sister.
            5. The dispute in this appeal is essentially between the mother,
D     brother(son) and the sister(daughter). It relates to a residential house
      consists ofbasement and two floors situated at D- 246, Defense Colony,
      New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the "suit house").
            6. Mr. B.R. Dewan was the sole owner of the suit house. He had
      two wives-Mrs. Katnla Devi and second- Mrs. Pritam. Out of wedlock
 E    with first wife - Mrs. Katnla Devi, a son -Ashok was born whereas out
      of wedlock with second wife-Mrs. Pritam, a son- Ranvir-appellant and
      a daughter-Rashmi- respondent No.I were born. Mr. Dewan owned
      moveable and immovable properties,
             7. On 24.06.1984, Mr. Dewan executed a Will of his properties
 F    (movables and immoveable). So far as the suit house with which we
      are concerned in this appeal, Mr. Dewan gave its ground floor to his
      son-Ranvir Dewan exclusively whereas the first floor, he gave exclusively
      to his daughter-Rashmi Khanna.
             8. So far as wife-Pritam was concerned. he gave to her a "life
 G    interest" to reside in the suit house till her death and also to recover the
      rent and utilize the income earned by way of rent to maintain herself and
      the suit house. He also gave her a right to evict the tenants and induct
      the new ones.
            9. The Will, in clear terms, recited that the wife - Mrs. Pritam is
H     given "life interest" in the suit house and she will act as a trustee of its
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                               547
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
                         (:~

legal owners (son and d~ughter) and utilize the income earned out of it       A
and on her death, by his son and daughter to whom the suit house was
given exclusively.
       I 0. The Will also recited that Ranvir and Rashmi would be free to
get themselves assessed as owners of their respective shares in the suit
house in their wealth tax assessment cases on the death of Mr. Dewan.         B
        11. Mr. Dewan then gave his share in HUF property - B.R. Dewan
& sons which consists of a plot at Ghaziabad, bank balances, shares,
debentures, fixed deposits and all household articles exclusively to his
wife -Mrs. Pritam. He also made provision for his first wife-Kamla
Devi for her maintenance to pay Rs.500/- per month to her during her          c
life time.
       12. In this manner, Mr. Dewan made disposition of his entire
moveable and immoveable property in the Will. In the last, he expressed
that he has executed the Will with a hope that there would be no dispute
and litigation amongst his family members qua the properties on his           D
death.
       13. On 16.09.1984, Mr. Dewan expired. Mrs. Pritam - second
wife of late Mr. Dewan then applied for grant of probate of the Will
dated 26.04.1984. The Competent Court granted the probate on
12.10.1987. lt was followed by the consequential order dated 05.01.1989       E
to enable the parties to give effect to the Will. The son and daughter
accordingly got their names mutated in the municipal records as owners
of their respective shares in ij{e suit house.
       14. Contrary to the testator's hope, soon after his demise, the
~isputes started between the mother and son on one side and the daughter      F
OJl the other side. Initially, parties sat together and decided to develop
the suit house by making some additions/alterations and accordingly
entered in family settlemc.Jtt followed by an agreement with the
developers/builders to develop the suit house.
        15. However, the disputes could not be settled amicably and instead   G
got precipitated. The disputes were essentially centered around to their
inter se ownership rights over the suit house including its nature, their
shares, income earned from the suit house and the newly constructed
3"' floor and who should receive it and lastly, ownership rights over the
3'' floor.
                                                                              H
548             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 13 S.C.R.


A           16. Mrs. Pritam-mothcr and Ranvir-son then jointly filed a suit
      being O.S. No.1502/2010 against the daughter/sister -Rashmi and the
      developer on the original side of the High Court at New Delhi out of
      which this appeal arises and claimed following reliefs:
         "(i) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of
B             perma11cnt injunction restraining the Defendants, their
              agents, successors and any third party claiming through
              them from creating any/any further third party rights In
              respect of the 2"" and 3'" floors of the property bearing
              No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi.
C        (ii) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of
              declaration that the alleged tenancy agreement dated 7'"
              July, 2010 executed by Defendant No.OJ in favour of
              Defendant No.02 are illegal, null and void and of no effect.
         (iii) That this Hon 'blc Court be pleased to pass a decree of
D             declaration that the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental,
              the security deposit all other incomes accruing from the
              2"' floor of the property bearing No.D-246 Defence Colony,
              New Delhi.
         (iv) That this Hon'blc Court be pleased to pass a decree of
E             declaration that the Plaintiff No.02 is entitled to the rental,
              the security deposit and all other income accruing front
              the 3'' floor of the property hearing No.D-246, Defence
              Colony, New Delhi.
         (v) That this Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass a decree of
F            declaration that the Plaintiff No.01 is entitled to absolute
             rights over the 3'' floor and roof rights of the 3"' floor
             apart front the Basement and Ground Floor of the property
             bearing No.D-246, Defence Colony, New Delhi."
             17. Though the plaint runs into several pages and seeks to claim
      five reliefs but, in substance, the controversy centered around lo relief
G
      No.(v) only.
              18. According to the plaintiff, Mrs. Pritam (wife) was entitled to
      seek a declaration that she is the absolute ownerofthc suit house including
      its 3"' floor. It was alleged that her "life interest" was enlarged and

H
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                                  549
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, .J.]

ripened into an absolute interest by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu       A
Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the death of
her husband. Though the plaint contains several other avennents but
they need not be stated herein being unnecessary to examine the issue
relating to grant of relief No. (v).
       19. Respondent No. I (defendant No. I) filed the written statement.       B
While denying the plaintiffs' claim, it was contended that plaintiffNo.2-
Mrs. Pritam did not acquire absolute interest in the suit house and nor
her "life interest" was enlarged and ripened into an absolute interest by
virtue of Section 14 (I) of the Act. It was contended that plaintiffNo.2
received only "life interest" to 1ive in the suit house during her lifetime in
tcnns of the Will and, therefore, such right squarely falls under Section        c
14(2) of the Act. It was contended that so far as respondent No.I is
concerned, she acquired an absolute ownership right in the first floor of
the suit house on the strength of clear recitals in the Will.
      20. The Single Judge framed the issues. Parties adduced their
evidence. By judgment/decree dated 11.10.2013, the suit was dismissed.           D
It was held that Mrs. Pritam received only "life interest" in the suit
house. In other words, it was held that the plaintiffs' case falls under
Section 14 (2) of the Act.
       21. Felt aggrieved, plaintiffs filed first appeal bearing R.F.A. (OS)
No.147 of 2013 before the Division Bench of the High Court. By                   E
impugned judgment dated 13.07.2016, the Division Bench dismissed the
appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Single Judge giving rise to
filing the present appeal by way of special leave by plaintiff No. I in this
Court.
      22. Heard Mr. Guru Krishan Kumar, learned senior counsel for               F
the appellant and Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned counsel for respondent
No. I and Mr. S.S. Jauhar, learned counsel for respondent No.2.
      23. Mr. Guru Krishan Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellant while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned
judgment reiterated the same submissions, which were urged                       G
unsuccessfully before the Courts below.
       24. His main submission was that the appellant's case squarely
falls under Section 14(1) of the Act, which confers on Mrs. Pritam the
absolute right of ownership over the suit house.
                                                                                 H
550             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 13 S.C.R.


A            25. Elaborating the submission, learned counsel urged that since
      the wife is entitled in law to claim maintenance from her husband even
      prior to and also after coming into force of the Act, it is in recognition of
      this pre-recognized right when the husband gave a "life interest" through
      Will, the same got enlarged and ripened into an absolute right by virtue
      of Section 14 (I) of the Act. It is essentially this submission, which was
B
      elaborated by the learned counsel with reference to decided cases.
            26. In reply. Mr. K. Ramamoorthy, learned senior counsel for
      respondent No. I while supporting the reasoning and the conclusion arrived
      at by the two Courts below contended that the same is in accordance
      with the law and does not cal1 for any interference.
c
           27. According to learned counsel, as rightly held by the two Courts
      below, the appellant's case squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the
      Act.
             28. Having 11.:ard the learned counsel forthe parties and on perusal
D     of the record of the case, we find no merit in the appeal. In our view, the
      reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the two Courts is just and
      proper and being in accordance with law does not call for any interference.
             29. Before we proceed to decide the appeal on merits, we may
      take a note of one subsequent event, which occurred during the pendency
 E    of this litigation. It is the death of wife-Mrs. Pritam (plaintiffNo.2) on
      12.09.2016. She left behind her two legal representatives, namely,
      appellant, i.e., son and respondent No. I, i.e., daughter. Both being Class
      I heirs would succeed to their mother's estate in equal share, if she has
      died intestate. However, if she has made any testamentary disposition
      of her estate in favour of any person then subject to proving the claim in
 F    accordance with law by the person(s) concerned, the disposition of her
      estate would take place accordingly.
            30. We, however, express no opinion on any of these issues
      because, in our view, it is not the subject matter of this appeal and leave
      the parties to work out their inter se rights, if any, in accordance with
 G    law in the estate of Mrs. Pritam in appropriate forum as and when
      occasion so arises.
            31. The main question, which arises for consideration in this appeal,
      is whether two Courts below were justified in holding that the case of
      appellant, i.e. Mrs. Pritam falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act thereby
 H    she continued to enjoy only the "life interest" in the suit house.
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                                   551
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      32. In other words, the question arises for consideration ill this          A
appeal is, what is the true nature of the right received by Mrs. Pritam in
the suit house through Will dated 24.08.1986 from her husband, viz.,
"absolute" by virtue of Section 14 (I) of the Act or "life interest" by
virtue of Section 14 (2) of the Act.
      33. In order to decide the question as to whether the appellant's           B
case falls under Section 14 (I) or (2) of the Act, it is necessary to first
examine as to what is the true nature ofthe·estate held by the testator.
Second, what the testator had intended and actually bequeathed to his
wife by his Will; and lastly, the right in the property received by Mrs.
Pritam, viz., absolute interest by virtue of sub-section (I) or "life interest"
by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act.
                                                                                  c
       34. Coming now to the facts of the case, it is not in dispute that
the suit house was the self-acquired property of late Mr. Dewan. It is
also not in dispute as one can take it from reading the contents of Will
that Mr. Dewan had intended to give only "life interest" to his wife in the
suit house, which he gave to her for the first time by way of disposition D
of his estate independent of her any right. It is also not in dispute that it
was confined to a right of residence to live in the suit house during her
lifetime and to use the income earned from the suit house to maintain
herself and the suit house. It is also not in dispute that the testator gave
to his son ground floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter · E
with absolute right of ownership. The testator also permitted both of
them to get their names mutated in the municipal records as absolute
owners and, also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax
assessment cases.
      35. So far as other properties, viz., one plot at Ghaziabad, share in       F
HUF and moveable properties were concerned, Mr.· Dewan gave these
properties to Mrs. Pritam-his wife absolutely.
      36. It is a settled principle oflaw that what the testator intended to
bequeath to any person(s) in his Will has to be gathered primarily by
readingthe recitals of the Will only.                                             G
       37. As mentioned above, reading of the Will would go to show
that it does not leave any kind of ambiguity therein and one can easily
find out as to how and in what manner and with what rights, the testator
wished to give to three of his legal representatives his self acquired
properties and how he wanted to make its disposition.
552             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 13 S.C.R.


A            38. Law relating to interpretation of Section 14 (J) and (2) of the
      Act is fairly well settled by series of decisions of this Court. However,
      the discussion on the interpretation of Section 14 (I) and (2) of the Act
      can never be complete without mentioning the first leading decision of
      this Court in V. Tulasamma & Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) by L.Rs.
      ( 1977) 3 SCC 99. In this decision, Their Lordships (Three Judge Bench)
B
      interpreted succinctly sub-sections ( l) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act
      and then on facts involved in that case held that the case falls under
      Section 14( l) of the Act. This decision is referred by this Court in every
      subsequent case dealing with the issue relating to Section 14 of the Act
      and then after explaining its ratio has applied the same to the facts of
c     each case to find out as to whether the case on hand attracts Section
      14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. Indeed, we find that attempts were made in
      past for reconsideration of the law laid down in V. Tulasamma (supra),
      but this Court consistently turned down the request. (see-Gullapalli
      Krishna Das vs. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Anr. (1978) I SCC
      67, Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors.,
D
      (1979) 3 SCC 300 and Thota Sesharathamma & Anr. vs. Thota
      Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 312 ).
            39. In the case ofV. Tulasamma(supra), tl1e learned Judge. Justice
      S. Murtaza Fazal Ali. speaking for the Bench, succinctly and in a lucid
      manner while an~lyzing the true scope of Section 14( !) and (2) of the
E     Act held as under :
              "Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu
              Succe~'Sion Act, I 956 provide that any property possessed
              by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the
              commencement of the 1956 Act, shall he held by her as
F             full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that
              'property' includes both movable and immovable property
              acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition,
              or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by
              1,>ift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before,
G             at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion,
              or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner
              whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as
              stridhana immediately before the commencement of the
              1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms
              and must be liberally construed in favour of the females
H
MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                      553
          [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

   so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the          A
   socio-economic ends, nameiy, to cnlai-ge her limited
   interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the
   changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by
   such a long legislation.
        Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in           B
   Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way
   of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a
   decree or order of a civil court or under an award where
   the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree,
   order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such
   property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of   c
   its own without interfering with the operation of Section
   14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in
   a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision
   or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so
   as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.      D
        Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees,
   awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles
   in favour of the females for the first time and has no
   application where the instrument concerned merely seeks
   to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing E
   rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a
   female is legally permissible and section 14(1) will not
   operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument
   merely declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such
   as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which
   the female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no F
   application and the female's limited interest would
   automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of
   Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the
   document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a
   property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of G
   maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is
   taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be
   governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed
   on the powers of the transferee.

                                                                   H
554            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017) 13 S.C.R.


A                The use of terms like 'property acquired by a female
             Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance', or 'arrear~
             of maintenance' etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1)
             clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these
             categories which have been expressly excepted from the
             operation of sub-section (2).
B
                 Tl1e words 'restricted estate' in Section 14(2) are wider
             than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they
             include not only limited interest but also any other kind of
             limitation that may be placed on the transferee."
c           40. Similarly, while explaining the ratio ofV. Tulasamma (supra)
      and how one has to read the ratio for being applied to the facts of a
      particular case, this Court in the case of Sadhu Singh vs. Gurudwara
      Sahib Narike & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 75 again succinctly discussed the
      applicability of Section 14 (I) and (2) of the Act and on facts involved
      therein held that the facts involved would attract Section 14(2) of the
D     Act. Justice Balasubramanyan speaking for two Judge Bench held in
      paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under:
             "13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal
             with that property including the right to devise or bequeath
             the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament.
E            Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect
             this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu
             male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When
             he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded
             and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence,
 F           when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the
             properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of
             the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found
             invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects
             the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by
             providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow.
G            The Act docs not stand in the way of his separate
             properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His
             will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.
              14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by
              providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife
H
MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                     555
          [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

   or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction A
   on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It
   provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case,
   the widow is bound hy the limitation on her right and she
   cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of
   the Act. In other words; conferment of a limited estate
                                                                 B
   which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by
   the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding
   the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that
   provision is held to he attracted in the case of a succession
   under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in
   the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after c
   the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or
   otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression
   "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in
   Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to
   such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there D
   is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation.
   Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies
   in a case where the female had received the property prior
   to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if
   the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law
   or the right to maintenance.                                  E
   15. Dealing with the legal position established by the
   decisions in Tulasammal and Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai
   Chelabhai13 the position regarding the application of
   Section 14(2) of the Act is summed up in Mayne on Hintlu
   Law thus:                                                      F
     "Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments,
     decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent
     and new title in favour of females for the first time and
     has no application where the instruments concerned
     merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise        G
     pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate
     in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section
     14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is
     allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance
     or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the
                                                                  H
556             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] 13 S.C.R.


A               ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by
                Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the
                powers of the transferee."(See p.1172 of the 15th Edn.)"
             41. Reading of the aforementioned principle of law laid down in
      the cases ofV. Tnlasamma and Sadhu Singh (supra), it is clear that
B     the ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act must be confined to cases where
      property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant
      without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order
      or award. the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the
      property. WhQre, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a
      partition or in lleu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a pre-existing
c     right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of
      Section 14(2) of the Act. even if the instrument, decree, order or award
      allotting the property prescribes a ''restricted estate" in the property.
             42. Applying the principle laid down in the aforementioned two
      cases to the fac:s of the case on hand, we are of the considered opinion
D     that the case ofplaintiffNo.2-Mrs. Pritam does not fall under Section
      14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act. In
      other words, in our view, in the facts of this case, the law laid down in
      Sadhu Singh's case(supra) would apply.
             43. Afortorari, plaintiffNo.2-late Mrs.Pritam received only "life
E     interest" in the snit house by the Will dated 24.06.1986 from her late
      husband and such "life interest" was neither enlarged nor ripened into
      an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e.,
      "restricted estate" till her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This we
      say for following factual reasons arising in the case.
 F          44. First. the testator-Mr.Dewan being the exclusive owner of the
      snit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because
      it was his self earned property.
              45. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership
      to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership.
G     At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to
      live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition.
      the testator could make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section 30
      of the Act.
            46. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of "restricted
H     estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act whic". remained a "restricted
  MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.                                 557
            [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" under      A
Section 14( I) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls under Section
14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1 ). It is pcnnissible in law
because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.
      47. Fourth, the effect ofthe Will once became operational atler
the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute               B
ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the
wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words,
the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit
house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. Iffor any reason,
she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right
qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case              C
here.
       48. Fifth, the testator had also given his other properties absolutely
to his wife which enabled her to maintain herself. Moreover, a right to
claim maintenance, if any, had to be enforced by the wife. She, however,
never did it and rightly so because both were living happily. There was,        D
therefore, no occasion for her to demand any kind of maintenance from
her husband.
      49. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest"
means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is
incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal          E
in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only
during his/her lifetime which is extinguished on his/her death. Such is
the case here. Her "life interest" in 1he suit house was extinguished on
her death on 12.09.2016.
       50. Seventh, as mentioned above, the facts of the case on hand           F
and the one involved in the case of Sadhu Singh (supra) are found.to be
somewhat similar. The facts of the case of Sadhu Singh were that the
husband executed a Will in favour ofhis wife of his self-acquired property
in 1968. Though he gave to wife absolute rights in the properties
bequeathed but some restrictions were put on her right to sell/mortgage         G
the properties and further it was mentioned in the Will that the said
properties after wife's death would go to testator's nephew. Due to
these restrictions put by the testator on his wife's right to sell/mortgage,
it was held that the wife received only the "life interest" in the properties
by Will aud such "life interest", being a "restricted estate" within the
meaning of Section 14(2) of the Act, did not enlarge and nor ripen into         H
                           •
558             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 13 S.C.R.



A     the absolute interest under Section 14(1) but remained a "life interest"
      i.e. "restricteq estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act. It was held that
      such disposition made by the husband in favour ofhis wife was pennissible
      in law in the light of Section 14(2) read with Section 30 of the Act. In
      our view, the facts of the case on hand are similar to the facts of Sadhu
      Singh's case( supra) and, therefore, this case is fully covered by the law
B
      laid down in Sadhu Singh 's case.
             51. In vjew of foregoing discussion, we are of the considered
      opinion that th¢re is no error in the impugned judgment, which has rightly
      held that the case of Mrs. Pritam (PlaintiffNo.2) falls under Section 14 (2)
      of the Act insofar as it relates to the suit house.
 c
             52. We, therefore, find no merit in the appeal, which thus fails and
      is accordingly dismissed.


      Divya Pandey                                               Appeal dismissed.