MONICA BEDIversusSTATE OF AP.

                [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 522


A                         MONICA BEDI
                                 V.
                          STATE OF AP.
                (Criminal Appeal No. 782 of 2007)
                       NOVEMBER 9, 2010
B
      [8. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
                     NIJJAR, JJ.)

       Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 120-B, 419, 420, 465 and 468 -
C Accused entering into a conspiracy with other co-accused,
  namely, Head Constable, Revenue Inspector and Postman,
  to secure passport in the assumed name to enable her to
  leave the country and travel abroad - Submission of false
  documents - Framing of charges - Plea of double jeopardy
D by accused that she was tried and convicted by Lisbon court
  for being in possession of fake passport - Conviction of
  accused for the offences punishable u/ss. 120-B, 419 and
  420; Head Constable ulss 120-B, 4191109, 4201109, 468 and
  ss. 13(1){d) rlw. 13(2) of the 1988 Act; Revenue Inspector ul
E s. 468; and Postman u/ss. 120-B, 420, 4191109, 4201109 and
  ss. 13(1 ){d) r!w. 13(2) of the 1988 Act - High Court upholding ·
  conviction of accused persons, however modifying the
  sentence - On appeal, held: Same set of facts can constitute
  offences under two different laws - Bar to punishment to the
F offender twice over for the same offence would arise only
  where the ingredients of both the offences are the same - On
  the basis of the judgment passed by the Constitutional Court,
  Lisbon and the facts of the case, plea of double jeopardy not
  sustainable - Accused was involved in conspiracy at both pre-
G passport application stage and post-passport application
  stage - Thus, her conviction is upheld, however sentence is
  reduced to the period already undergone while fine amount
  is maintained - Evidence on record established that the
  Postman participated in the conspiracy in securing the

H                                522
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                    523

passport for accused in the assumed name; and the Head             A
Constable submitted a false report in order to enable the
accused to secure a passport for herself in the assumed
name - Thus, their conviction is upheld however, the
sentence is reduced while fine amount is maintained - As
regards Revenue Inspector, ingredients for the offence of          B
forgery not satisfied, thus, he is acquitted of the offence u/s.
465 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 20(2) - Rule of
double jeopardy - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 -
s. 13(1 )(d) rlw 13(2) - Sentence/Sentencing.

    Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 20(2) - Protection C
against a second trial and conviction for the same offence
under Article 20(2) - When applicable - Explained - R_ule of
double jeopardy - General Clauses Act, 1897 - Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s. 300:
                                                                   D
     Maxim - 'Nemo de/set bis vexari pro eadem causa' -
Meaning of- No one should be put on peril twice for the same
offence.

     According to the prosecution case, 'M' (A 3) entered E
into a conspiracy with A 5 - Head Constable, A 7 -
Revenue Inspector, Kurnool and A 8 - Postman, Head
Post Office, Kurnool to secure second passport in the
assumed name of 'SM' from the Regional Passport Office,
Secunderabad by submitting false documents like
residence certificate, educational certificate. 'M' entered · F
Portugal with the aid of passport standing in the name
of 'SM', and was prosecuted and punished by a
competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. In India, the
charges were framed against the accused persons under
various provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 and the G
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A-3 raised a plea of
double jeopardy that she was tried and convicted by
Lisbon court for being in possession of fake passport ..
The trial court convicted A 3 under sections 120-8, 419
                                                              H
    524   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A and 420 IPC but acquitted her of the charge under
  Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967. A 5 was convicted
  under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC
  and Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of
  Corruption Act, A 7 under Section 468 IPC, and A 8 under
B Sections 120-B, 420, 419r/w109, 420 r/w 109 and Sections
  13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The
  High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence confirmed
  the conviction but modified the sentence. Therefore, the
  appellants filed the instant appeals.
c       Allowing the appeal filed by the Revenue Inspector
    and partly allowing the appeals filed by others, the Court

       HELD: 1.1 Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India,
  1950 provides that no person would be prosecuted and
D punished for the same offence more than once. It
  embodies a protection against a second trial and
  conviction for the same offence. The well known maxim
  'nemo de/set bis vexari pro eadem causa' embodies the
  well established common law rule that no one should be
E put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental
  right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in
  common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari. If a parson is
  charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a
  complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is
F technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict.
  The principle has been recognized in the existing law in
  India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses
  Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal
  Procedure, 1973. [Paras 13, 14 and 15) [539-F-H; 540-A-
G E]
       1.2 What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the
  second prosecution and conviction must be for the same
  offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question
  of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. The
H test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same,
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                 525

and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of    A
the ingredients of the offences. Thus, it is clear that the
same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and
punishment and in such an event the protection afforded
by Article 20 (2) is not available. A person can be
prosecuted and punished more than once even on                 B
substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both
the offences are totally different and they did not form the
same offence. [Para 17] (541-D-E; 543-B-D]

    Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR
730; S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & Anr. (1954)    C
SCR 1150; Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail,
Amritsar (1958) SCR 822; The State of Bombay vs. S. L. Apte
(1961) 3 SCR 107; Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of Maharashtra
AIR 1965 SC 682; State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh and Ors.
(2003) 2 sec 152- referred to.                                 D

     United States vs. Rabinowitf] (1915) 238 US 78; T. W.
Morgan vs. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine (1915) 237
U.S.1153; United States vs. Vito Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 314
- referred to.                                                 E

     1.3 The submission that the facts based on which 'M'
was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of
jurisdiction at Lisbon and the facts based on which
prosecution was initiated resulting in conviction are the
                                                               F
same and, therefore, the conviction of 'M' is in the teeth
of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is not well founded since the
same set of facts can constitute offences under two
different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and
constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time           G
constitute an offence under any other law. The bar to the
punishment to the offender twice over for the same
offence would arise only where the ingredients of both
the offences are the same. [Para 21] [545-C-E]
                                                               H
    526    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.


A        1.4 Th.er!'! is no factual foundation laid as such by 'M'
   taking the plea of double jeopardy before the trial court.
   Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to
   any 9f the witnesses that she is sought to be prosecuted
   and punished for the same offence for which she was
B charged and convicted by a competent court of
   jurisdiction at Lisbon. She did not even make any such
   statement in her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
   The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of
   the Constitution is in the nature of an injunction against
c the State prohibiting it to prosecute and punish any
   person for the same offence more than once but the
 · initial burden is upon the accused to take the necessary
   plea and establish the same. [Para 23] [545-H; 546-A-C]

       Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn, Volume-IX -
D referred to.

       1.5 Having regard to the nature of the guaranteed
  right, the judgment passed by the Constitutional Court,
  Lisbon (a typed copy) was examined and the same does
E not support the plea of 'M'. In the light of the findings and
  conclusions reached by the Constitutional Court at
  Lisbon and on a careful consideration of the entire matter
  and the facts, plea of double jeopardy is wholly untenable
  and unsustainable. [Paras 25 and 26] [547-A-B; 549-G-H]
F      2. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
  Article 136 of the Constitution of India normally does not
  interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived at
  by the courts below on proper appreciation of evidence.·
  It is not the function of this Court to re-appreciate the
G evidence and substitute the findings for that of the courts
  below unless it is clearly established that the findings and
  the conclusions so arrived at by the courts below are
  perverse and based on no evidence. [Para 27] [550-B-C]

H         3.1 There is no controversy whatsoever that 'M'
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                527

travelled abroad on the strength of the passport secured      A
by her in the assumed name. She entered Portugal with
the aid of passport standing in the name of 'SM' for which
she had to face the prosecution and suffer conviction
and sentence in Portugal. [Para 28) [550-E-F]
                                                              B
     3.2 It is evident from the record that the involvement
of the appellants is at two stages. Stage one is where 'M'
(A-3) and A-7 were involved in the pre-passport
application at the threshold and even before the
preparation of application seeking the passport in the        C
assumed name. Stage two is the involvement of A-3, A-5
and A-8 after the submission of passport application
before the authorities. The passport application was
submitted in the assumed name of 'SM' which contained
the photograph of 'M'. The essential requirements for
obtaining the passport are: passport application; proof       D
of residence; and date of birth certificate as spoken to by
PWs. 2, 3, 21 and 31. The evidence of number· of
witnesses which remained unimpeached brought on
record as to how these documents were obtained for the
benefit of 'M'. [Para 29) [550-F-H; 551-A-B]                  E

     3.3 A-7, Mandal Revenue Inspector verified the
residence particulars of 'SM' on the instructions of PW-
5, Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool and submitted a false
verification report based on which residence certificate      F
was issued by PW-5. PW-37, Investigating Officer and PW-
17 issued certificate to the effect that no person by name
'SM' resided in the house as earlier submitted by A-7. It
is based on the said evidence, the trial court and
appellate court came to the right conclusion that the         G
prosecution established its case that A-7 gave false
verification based on which residence certificate was
issued by PW-5 in the name of 'SM'. The trial court
convicted A-7 for the offence under Section 468 IPC. The
High Court held that in submitting the false verification
                                                              H
    528   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A report in respect of residence of 'SM' he may not have
  been aware and known that the certificate so obtained
  would be used for the purpose of securing the passport
  in the assumed name of 'SM'. There is no evidence on
  that aspect. The High Court also concluded that by the
B time A-7 submitted a false verification there was nothing
  on record that he was hand in glove with the other
  accused for the purpose of cheating. The High Court
  upheld the acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section
  120-B IPC. The High Court found that the proper offence
c made against him would be one for making forged
  document simplicitor punishable under Section 465 IPC.
  The High Court was not justified in convicting A-7 at all
  for it had found no case against the appellant made out
  under Section 120-B IPC. There was no evidence that A-
D 7 prepared false document with intent to cause damage
  or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any
  claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property,
  or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with
  intent to commit fraud. The ingredients of Section 463 are
  not satisfied. In such an event the conviction of the
E appellant under Section 465 IPC is unsustainable. A-7 is
  acquitted for the offence under Section 465 IPC and
  sentence awarded is set aside. [Paras 29, 30 and 35) [551-
  A-E; 552-B-G; 557-B]

F      3.4 Regarding A-8, the Postman, Head Post Office,
  Kurnool, there is a clear evidence which was properly
  appreciated by the courts below that A-8 took the envelop
  containing the passport addressed to 'SM' from PW-11
  representing that he knew the addressee and would
G deliver the same. The said article was actually entrusted
  to PW-11 for its delivery but A-8 took the same from PW-
  11 for delivery to 'SM' assumed name of 'M'. The courts
  below found that A-8 was aware of the contents of the
  article. It is under those circumstances the courts below
H rightly concluded that the evidence available on record
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                   529

clearly established that he participated in the conspiracy       A
in securing the passport for 'M' in the assumed name of
'SM'. Thus, the conviction of A-8 for the offences charged
is upheld. There is no reason to interfere with the view
taken by the High Court. However, the sentence of one
year rigorous imprisonment under each count awarded              B
by the trial court is reduced to that of 6 months rigorous
imprisonment under each count while maintaining the
fine amount. [Paras 31 and 35] [552-G-H; 553-A-D; 557-
D-E]

     3.5 A-5, the Head Constable, submitted exhibit P15
                                                                 c
 report. PW-7, Junior Assistant in the District Police Office,
Kurnool, PW-8, Inspector of Police, District Special
 Branch, Kurnool and PW-14, Sub-Inspector, District
 Special Branch, Kurnool were the material witnesses
examined by the prosecution to prove the accusations             D
leveled against A-5. 'The courts below held that the
evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 is cogent and
consistent which in clear and categorical terms has
proved the fact that A-5 is the person who verified the
passport application particulars of 'SM' and submitted           E
exhibit P15 inquiry report along with exhibit P16 and
exhibit P17 enclosures. There cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that A-5 submitted a false report in order to
enable 'M' to secure a passport for herself in the assumed
 name of 'SM'. His conviction for the offences charged is        F
 upheld. However, the High Court reduced the sentence
awarded by the trial court to one year rigorous
 imprisonment under each count while mai.ntaining the
fine imposed by the trial court. Having regard to the facts
and circumstances of the instant case, the conviction of         G
A-5 under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and
468 IPC and as well as under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2)
of the Prevention of Corruption Act is upheld. However,
the sentence is reduced to that of six months rigorous
imprisonment under each count while maintaining the              H
    530   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A fine imposed by the trial court and the sentence to suffer
  imprisonment, in default, of payment of fine. The
  sentences are directed to run concurrently. [Paras 32 and
  35) [553-E-H; 554mA-E; 556-F-H]

B      3.6 It is proved that 'M' was involved in the conspiracy
  at both pre-passport application stage and post-passport
  application stage. The conspiracy itself was hatched only
  with a view to secure a passport for 'M' in the assumed
  name of 'SM'. It cannot be said that there was no evidence
C whatsoever against 'M' to prove her involvement for the
  offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 419 and 420
  IPC. It is for her benefit that the entire conspiracy was
  hatched involving more than one individual in order to
  secure a passport for her benefit enabling her to travel
  abroad in the assumed name of 'SM'. There is no material
D on the basis of which this Court would differ with the
  findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by the
  courts below. [Para 33) [554-F-H; 555-A-B]

       3.7 The original of exhibit P50 is the passport issued
E by the competent authorities in India and, therefore,
  Section 78 (6) is not applicable to the facts of the instant
  case. The issuance of original of exhibit P50 passport is
  clearly proved. It is based on that passport that 'M'
  travelled abroad and entered Portugal for which she had
F to face a prosecution and suffer conviction and
  sentence. The prosecution cannot be held to be vitiated.
  The conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable
  under Sections 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC is upheld.
  However, the High Court reduced the sentence of
G imprisonment imposed on 'M'. The High Court also held
  that she is entitled for set off of the periods of detention
  suffered by her in Lisbon, from 18.9.2004 to 4.6.2005 and
  3.11.2005 to 10.11.2005. Having regard to the facts and
  circumstances of the case and the fact that she has
  undergone more than 2 % years of sentence, the
H
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                 531


sentence awarded under each count directed to run              A
concurrently is reduced to that of the period already
undergone by her, while maintaining the sentence of fine
awarded by the courts below. [Paras 33 and 35) [555-E-
H; 556-A-B; 556-D-E]
                                                               B
                    Case Law Reference:
    (1953) SCR 730           Referred to          Para 16
    (1954) SCR 1150          Referred to          Para 16
    (1958) SCR 822           Referred to          Para 17      c
    (1915) 238US 78          Referred to          Para 17
    (1961) 3 SCR 107         Referred to          Para 17
    AIR 1965 SC 682          Referred to          Para 17      D
    (2003) 2 sec 152         Referred to          Para 18
    (1915) 237 U.S. 1153     Referred to          Para 19
    (1922) 260 U.S. 314      Referred to          Para 20
                                                               E
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 782 of 2007.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 08.03.2007 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No.
1434 of 2006.                                                  F

                           WITH
Crl. A. Nos. 783, 784 & 1357 of 2007.

    P.P. Malhotra, ASG, I. Venkata Narayana, Gaurave           G
Bhargava, Niraj Gupta, V. Sridhar Reddy, V.N. Raghupathy, V.
Sudeer, M.B.R.S. Raju, S. Sunita, Balaji Srinivasan, Madhu
Smita Bora, Raghenth Basant, Balaji Subramanian, Arvind
Kumar Sharma, D. Mahesh Babu, Ramesh Allanki for the
appearing parties.                                             H
    532     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J. 1. These criminal appeals
    which are to be disposed of by a common order are directed
    against the common judgment of the High Court whereunder
    the High Court confirmed the conviction of the appellants under
8
    Section 120-8, 419 and 420 IPC and other provisions including
    under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the Prevention of
    Corruption Act. We shall later notice in detail the conviction and
    sentence as awarded by the courts below.

C      2. The Central Bureau of Investigation, SPE, Hyderabad,
  laid charge sheet against altogether 10 accused persons
  before the Special Judge for C.8.1. cases, Hyderabad in which
  Abu Salem Abdul Qayoom Ansari @ Abu Salem(A-1 ),
  Sameera Jumani w/o Abu Salem(A-2), Monica Bedi {A-3),
0 Chamundi Abdul Hameed (A-6) and Faizan Ahmed Sultan (A-
  10) were shown as absconders. The learned Special Judge
  took the charge sheet on file as C.C. No. 3 of 2005 and issued
  non-bailable warrants against A-1, A-2, A-3, A-6 and A-10.
  Case against A-1, A-2, A-6 and A-10 came to be separated
E and case proceeded against A-3, A-4, A-5, A-7, A-8 and A-9.

         3. The learned Special Judge upon consideration of the
    material made available framed the following charges against
    the accused persons:

F          (i)     for the offence under Section 120-8 IPC against A-
                   3 to A-5, A-7 to A-9;

           (ii)    for the offence under Section 419 IPC against A-
                   3;
G          (iii)   for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC
                   against A-4, A-5 and A-7 to A-9;

           (iv)    for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-
                   5;
H
              MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                   533
               [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
     (v)      for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-      A
              8;

      (vi)    for the offence under Section 468 IPC against A-
              7;

      (vii)   for the offence under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2)    8
              of the Prevention of Corruption Act against A-4, A-
              5, A-7 and A-8;

      (viii) for the offence under Section 12 of the Passports
             Act, 1967 against A-3;                                 C

      (ix)    for the offence under Section 420 IPC against A-
              3;

      (x)     for the offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC
              against A-4, A-5, A-7 to A-9.                         D

    4."The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges
examined altogether 38 witnesses and proved 79 documents.
Exhibit D-1 to Exhibit D-4 were marked on behalf of the
defence.                                                            E

     5. The learned trial judge upon appreciation of the
evidence and material available on record found Monika Bedi
(A-3) guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 120-8,
419 and 420 IPC but acquitted of the charge under Section 12
of the Passports Act, 1967; Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) guilty of      F
the offences under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109,
468 IPC and Sections 13(1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act; Mohammed Yunis (A-7) guilty of the offence
under Section 468 IPC and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) guilty of the
offences under Section 1208, 420, 419 r/w 109 IPC, 420 r/w          G
109 IPC and under Sections 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. A-3 was accordingly sentenced
to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine
of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one
month for the offence under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous             H
    534   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- in
    default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the
    offence under Section 420 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three
    years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple
    imprisonment for one month and for the offence under Section
B   419 IPC; A-5 to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years
    and to pay a fine of Rs: 500/-, in default, to suffer simple
    imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 120-
    B IPC; rigorous imprisonmerif for three years and to pay a fine
    of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one
c   month for the offence under Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous
    imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in
    default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the
    offence under Section 420 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment
    for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer
    simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under
0
    Section 468 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment for one year and
    to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple
    imprisonment for one month for the offence under Sections 13
    ( 1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A-7 to
E   suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine
    of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one
    month for the offence under Section 468 IPC; A-8 to suffer
    rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.
    500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month
    for the offence under Section 120-B IPC; rigorous imprisonment
F   for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer
    simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under
    Section 419 r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years
    and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple
    imprisonment for one month for the offence under Section 420
G   r/w 109 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay
    a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for
    one month for the offence under Section 420 IPC and rigorous
    imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in
    default, to suffer simple imprisonment for one month for the
H   offence under Sections 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of the Prevention
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                       535
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
of Corruption Act. All the substantive sentences were directed       A
to run concurrently.

     6. On appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh upon re-
appreciation of evidence available on record confirmed the
conviction of A-3 for the offences punishable under Sections
                                                                     B
120-B, 419 and 420 IPC but reduced the sentence from three
years rigorous imprisonment to two years rigorous
imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 1208
IPC, from five years rigorous imprisonment to three years
rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section       C
420 IPC and from three years rigorous imprisonment to two
years rigorous imprisonment for the offence punishable under
Section 419 IPC while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial
court. The High Court also confirmed the conviction of A-5 under
each count but reduced the quantum of imprisonment from
three years to one year for offences under each count under          D
Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC. However,
his conviction and sentence imposed for the offences
punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with 13 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act was confirmed. That so far as A-
7 is concerned the High Court while partly allowing the appeal       E
modified the conviction from Section 468 IPC to that of one
under Section 465 IPC and accordingly sentenced to suffer
rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.
500/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for three months.
That so far as A-8 is concerned the High Court confirmed his         F
conviction under all counts but reduced the quantum of
imprisonment from three years to one year for offences under
each count under Section 120-B, 420, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w
109, 468 IPC. However, his conviction and sentence imposed
for the offences punishable under Section 13(1) (d) r/w 13 (2)       G
of the Prevention of Corruption Act was confirmed. Hence,
these appeals.

Case of Prosecution:

     7. In order to consider as to whether the High Court            H
    536    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   committed any error in convicting and sentencing the appellants
    as noted herein above, it may be just and necessary to briefly
    notice the case of the prosecution. The allegation against
    Accused No. 3 (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 782/2007) is
    that she obtained a second passport in the assumed name of
B   Sana Malik Kamal from the Regional Passport Office,
    Secunderabad by submitting false documents like residence
    certificate, educational certificate with the help of A-4 to A-9.
    She used the passport to travel Lisbon, Portugal. The owner
    of Mis. Faizan Enterprises, Mumbai (A-10) is involved in the
c   business of recruiting people for jobs in foreign countries. He
    gave 10 passport size photographs of A-1 to A-3 and fake
    names and documents to A-9 to secure passports falsely
    showing them as residents of Kurnool in the State of Andhra
    Pradesh. A-9 has relatives in Kurnool. He visited Kurnool in the
    month of March, 2001 and entrusted the work of securing
0
    passports of A-1 to A-3, to A-6 an unauthorized passport agent.
    At the instance of A-6, A-7 Mohammed Yun is, Manda I Revenue
    Inspector of Mandal Revenue Office, Kurnool issued a false
    residential certificates in the assumed names intended for the
    benefit of A-1 to A-3. A-6 procured fake transfer certificates
E   purported to have been issued by the Headmaster, Zila
    Parishad High Court, Peddapadu, Kurnool District in the name
    of Ramil Kamil Malik and two fake memorandum of marks
    sheets in the names of Neha Asif Jafari and Sana Malik,
    purported to have been issued by the Headmaster, Higher
F   Elementary School, Kurnool, as a proof in support of date of
    birth. One Abdul Gaffar (PW-1) filled up three passport
    applications of A-1 to A-3 at the instance of A-6 and they were
    accordingly submitted in the Regional Passport Office,
    Secunderabad. The authorities accordingly sent the particulars
G   mentioned in the forms to the office of Superintendent of Police,
    Kurnool which were received in the office on 16.5.2001 vide
    exhibit P-28 covering letter. A-5 (appellant in Criminal Appeal
    No. 784/07) at the relevant time was working as Writer-Head
    Constable in special branch. He submitted fake verification
H   reports along with statements of six persons in support of
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                      537
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
character and conduct of A-1 to A-3 by portraying them as if        A
they were the neighbours of A-1 to A-3. On receipt of reports,
A-4 despatched them to Regional Passport Office,
Secunderabad. It is on the basis of these reports, passports
were accordingly issued to A-1 to A-3 in their assumed names
and they were despatched by speed post to their respective          B
address at Kurnool as indicated in the passport applications.
The passports were received at the Head Post Office, Kurnool
through speed post. On 23.8.2001 two speed post articles
addressed to the assumed names of A-2 and A-3 were
entrusted to PW-11 Babu Miah, a postman of Beat 2, for              c
delivery of the same to the addressees. A-8 (D. Gokari Saheb
 appellant in criminal appeal no. 783/07) Postman, Head Post
 Office, Kurnool, approached PW-11 Babu Miah and collected
 the two speed post articles by giving his acknowledgement on
 the delivery slip list falsely representing that he knew the       D
 addresses and he would personally deliver the articles. On
 27.8.2001 another speed post article containing passport in the
assumed name of A-1 was entrusted to A-8 for delivery who in
turn delivered it to one Aslam Khan, Cashier of Hotel Elite,
Kurnool where A-6 was also working. A-6 sent two covers to          E
A-9 on 23.8.2001 and 27.8.2001 in courier service.

      8. We shall notice further details only so far as the
 appellants before us are concerned. Exhibit P1 is the index card
of Sana Malik Kamal. (assumed name for Monika Bedi). PW-
 1 is the author of exhibit P1. PW-1 filled up exhibit P1 at the    F
request of C:A. Hameed (A-6). PW-4 is the Superintendent in
the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. He speaks of
issuance of the passports in pursuance of passport application
in the name of Sana Malik. PW-5 P. Krishna Mohan Reddy was
the Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool Mandal who issued               G
residence certificate dated 9.4.2001 in the name of Sana Malik
Kamal based on false verification reports submitted by A-7
Mohammad Yunis. That as per exhibit P9 residence certificate,
Sana Malik Kamal (assumed name of Monica Bedi) is stated
to be residing at Babu Gounda Street, Kurnool. PW-6 at the          H
    538   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A relevant time was working as Deputy Educational Officer,
  Nandyal, Kurnool District who stated that there was no school
  by name of Hanuman Higher Elementary School, Kurnool
  wherein Sana Malik Kamal was alleged to have studied. PW-
  7 M. Lakshminarayana at the relevant time was the Junior
B Assistant in the District Police Office, Kurnool and he speaks
  of receiving applications for verification of contents therein.
  According to him, A-4 ( G. Srinivas) who attended to passport
  inquiries, received the passport application of Sana Malik
  Kamal. After receipt of exhibit P15 enquiry report along with
c exhibits P16 and P17 statements submitted by A-5 S.A. Sattar,
  A-4 prepared the relevant report and forwarded the same to
  the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad. Exhibit P18 is
  the letter addressed by the Superintendent of Police to the
  Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad reporting no objection
D for the grant of passport to the applicant. Rest of evidence
  relates to handing over of speed post articles relating to Babu
  Miah as per the instructions of the Head Post Master, Kurnool
  from whom A-8 Gokari Saheb took the speed post articles from
  him for being delivered to the addressees. PW-13 is the owner
E of the residential apartment wherein Monica Bedi (A-3) is
  alleged to have resided as tenant during the years 1995-1997.
  Rest of the details are not required to be noticed.

       9. The learned Special Judge for C.8.1. on a careful and
  meticulous appreciation of the evidence and material made
F available on record convicted the appellants as noted herein
  above. The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence
  confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence as noted
  herein above.

G Submissions:

      10. Now we shall proceed to consider the submissions
  made by the learned senior counsel Shri K.T.S. Tulsi appearing
  on behalf of the appellant - Monica Bedi (A-3). The learned
  senior counsel submitted that the appellant has been tried and
H convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon for
            MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                       539
             [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
being in possession of fake passport and, therefore, her trial        A
and conviction for possessing the same passport before the
C.8.1. Court at Hyderabad amounts to double jeopardy and in
violation of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India and as well
under Section 300 Cr.P.C. The learned senior counsel further
submitted that there is no evidence of appellant's involvement        B
in any of offence whatsoever. His further submission was that
the appellant has been denied the benefit of Section 428 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, in as much as she has neither
been given the benefit of the period of sentence undergone by
her in Portugal nor has she been given the benefit of the             c
complete period pursuant to sentence in Portugal i.e. after 18th
September, 2004, which she is legally entitled to.

    11. We have also heard the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5), Mohd. Yunis (A-7) and D.
Gokari Saheb (A-8).                                                   D

     12. Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned Additional Solicitor General
and Shri I. Venkata Narayana, learned senior counsel
supported the impugned judgment. Both of them have
submitted that Article 20 (2) has no application whatsoever to        E
the facts on hand.

Double Jeopardy

     13. Now we shall take up the first contention of Shri Tulsi
as to whether the appellant's guaranteed fundamental right            F
under Article 20 (2) has been infringed? Article 20 (2) of the
Constitution provides that no person shall be prosecuted and
punished for the same offence more than once.

       14. Article 20 (2) embodies a protection against a second      G
trial and conviction for the same offence. The fundamental right
guaranteed is the manifestation of a long struggle by the
mankind for human rights. A similar guarantee is to be found
in almost all civilised societies governed by rule of law. The well
known maxim 'nemo de/set bis vexari pro eadem causa'                  H
    540   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL) S.C.R.


A embodies the well established common law rule that no one
  should be put on peril twice for the same offence.
  BLACKSTONE referred to this universal maxim of the common
  law of England that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of
  his life more than once for the same offence.
B
        15. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2)
  has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari - a
  man shall not be brought into danger for one and the same
  offence more than once. If a person is charged again for the
  same offence, he can plead. as a complete defence, his former
C conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of
  autrefois convict. This in essence is the common law principle.
  The corresponding provision in the American Constitution is
  enshrined in that part of the Fifth Amendment which declares
  that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice
D put in jeopardy of life or limb. The principle has been recognised
  in the existing law in ·India and is enacted in Section 26 of the
  General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Criminal
  Procedure Code, 1973. This was the inspiration and
  background for incorporating sub-clause (2) into Article 20 of
E the Constitution. But the ambit and content of the guaranteed
  fundamental right are much narrower than those of the common
  law in England or the doctrine of 'double jeopardy' in the
  American Constitution.

F       16. In Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay1, this
  Court explained the scope of the right guaranteed under Article
  20 (2) and as to what is incorporated in it as "within its scope
  the plea of autrefois convict as known to the British
  jurisprudence or the plea of double jeopardy as it known to the
G American Constitution but circumscribed it by providing that
  there should be not only a prosecution but also a punishment
  in the first instance in order to operate as a bar to a second
  prosecution and punishment for the same offence." That in
  order for the protection of Article 20 (2) to be invoked by a

H 1. (1953) SCR 730
             MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                    541
              [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
person there must have been a prosecution and as well as            A
punishment in respect of the same offence before a court of
law of competent jurisdiction or a tribunal, required by law to
decide the matters in controversy judicially on evidence. That
the proceedings contemplated therein are in the nature of
criminal proceedings before a court of law or a judicial tribunal   B
and the prosecution in this context would mean an initiation or
starting of the proceedings of a crirhinal nature in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the statute which creates the
offence and regulates the procedure. This principle is reiterated
in S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & Anr. 2, wherein       c
this Court observed that the words "prosecuted or punished"
are not to be taken distributively so as to mean prosecuted or
 punished. Both the factors must co-exist in order that the
operation of the clause may be attracted."

      17. What is the meaning of expression used in Article 20      D
(2) "for the same offence"? What is prohibited under Article 20
(2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the
same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question
of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. In Leo Roy
Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail, Amritsaf3, petitioners       E
therein were found guilty under Section 167 (8) of the Sea
Customs Act and the goods recovered from their possession
were confiscated and heavy personal penalties imposed on
them by the authority. Complaints thereafter were lodged by the
authorities before the Additional District Magistrate under         F
Section 1208 of the Indian Penal Code read with provisions
of the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1947 and the Sea
Customs Act. The petitioners approached the Supreme Court
for quashing of the proceedings pending against them in the
court of Magistrate inter alia contending that in view of the       G
provisions of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution they could not
be prosecuted and punished twice over for the same offence

2.   (1954) SCR 1150.
3.   (1958) SCR 822.                                                H
    542    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (~DDL.) S.C.R.


A and the proceedings pending before the Magistrate violated the
  protection afforded by Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. This
  Court rejected the contention and held that criminal conspiracy
  is an offence under Section 1208 of the Indian Penal Code but
  not so under the Sea Customs Act, and the petitioners were
B not and could not be charged with it before the Collector of
  Customs. It is an offence separate from the crime which it may
  have for its object and is complete even before the crime is
  attempted or completed, and even when attempted or
  completed; it forms no ingredients of such crime. They are,
c therefore, quite separate offences. The Court relied on the view
  expressed by the United States, Supreme Court in United
  States vs. Rabinowith 4. In The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte 5,
  this Court laid down the law stating that if the offences were
  distinct there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy
  as embodied in Article 20 (2) of the Constitution being
0
  applicable. It was the ¢ase where the accused were sought to
  be punished for the offence under Section 105, Insurance Act,
  after their trial and conviction for the offence under Section 409,
  Penal Code, this Court held that they were not sought to be
  punished for the same offence twice but for two distinct offences
E constituted or made up of different ingredients and therefore
  the bar of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution or Section 26 of the
  General Clause Act, 1897, was not applicable. This Court
  made it clear that the emphasis is not on the facts "alleged in
  the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute
F the two offences with which a person is charged." The ratio of
  the case is apparent from the following:

          "To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the
          consequential punishment thereunder, must be for 'the
G         same offence'. The crucial requirement therefore for
          attracting the Article is that the offences are the same, i.e.,
          they should be identical. If, however, the two offences are

    4.   (1915) 238 us 78.
H   5.   (1961) 3 SCR 107.
              MONICA BEDl-:Y. STATE OF A.P.                       543
               [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
      distinct, then notwithstanding that the allegations of fact in      A
      the two complaints might be substan)ially similar, the
      benefit of the ban cannot be invok9d. It is, therefore,
      necessary to analyse and compare not the allegations in
      the two complaints but the ingredients of the two offences
      and see whether their identity is made out."                        B

 That the test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same
 and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the
 ingredients of the offences.

       It is thus clear that the same facts may give rise to different    C
  prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the
  protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. It is settled
  law that a person can be prosecuted and punished more than
  once even on sµbstantially same facts provided the ingredients
  of both the offences are totally different and they did not form        D
  the same offence. In Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of
  Maharashtra 6, the accused was convicted with regard to a
  conspiracy to commit criminal breach of trust in respect of the
  funds of one Jupiter company. There was another prosecution
  against the accused for the conspiracy to lift the funds of             E
  another company, though its object was to cover the fraud
. committed in respect of the Jupiter company. This Court held
  that the defalcations made in the Jupiter may afford a motive
  for new conspiracy, but the two offences are distinct ones.
  Some accused may be common to both of them, "some of the                F
  facts proved to establish the Jupiter conspiracy may also have
  to be proved to support the motive for the second conspiracy.
  The question is whether that in itself would be sufficient to make
  the two conspiracies the one and the same offence. The
  ingredients of both the offences are totally different and do not       G
  form the same offence within the meaning of Article 20 (2) of
  the Constitution and, therefore, that Article has no relevan~e_."

       18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh & Ors. 7 , this Court
 6.   AIR1965 SC 682.
 7.   (2003) 2 sec 1s2.                                                   H
    544     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A held that the Rajasthan Sati (Prevention) Act, 1987 provided
  for different offences and punishment for glorification of sati and
  for violation of prohibitory order against glorification of sati. They
  are not the same offences. While Section 5 of the said Act
  makes the commission of an act an offence and punishes the
B same; the provisions of Section 6 are preventive in nature and
  make provision for punishing contravention of prohibitory order
  so as to make the prevention effective. The two offences have
  different ingredients. This Court held:

          "It is, therefore, concluded that in a given case, same set
c         of facts may give rise to an offence punishable under
          Section 5 and Section 6 (3) both. There is nothing
          unconstitutional or illegal about it."

       19. This appears to be the consistent view of the Supreme
D Court of the United States. In T. W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J.
  Devine@ Ollie Devine 8 , the U.S. Supreme Court observed that
  the court has settled th.at the test of identity of offences is
  whether the same evidence is required to sustain them; if not,
  then the fact that both charges relate to and grow out of one
E transaction does not make a single offence where two are
  defined by the statutes.

         20. In United States vs. Vito Lanza 9, it is held that an act
    with respect to intoxicating liquor which is denounced as a
    crime by both the National and State sovereignties may be
F   punished under the law of each sovereignty without infringing
    the provision of the 5th Amendment to the Federal Constitution
    against double jeopardy for the same offence. It is observed:

          "An act denounced as a crime by both National and State
G         sovereignties is an offence against the peace and dignity
          of both, and may be punished by each ..... We have here
          two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,

    8.   (1915) 237 U.S. 1153.
H 9.     (1922) 260 U.S. 314.
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                       545
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
    capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the       A
    same territory. Each may, without interference by the other,
    enact laws to secure prohibition, with the limitation that no
    legislation can give validity to acts prohibited by the
    Amendment. Each government, in determining what shall
    be an offence against its peace and dignity, is exercising       B
    its own sovereignty, not that of the other."

     21. Shri K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel in the present
case before us mainly contended that the facts based on which
the appellant (Monica Bedi) was prosecuted and punished by           C
a competer1t court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and ~he facts based
on which prbsecution has been initiated resulting in conviction
are the same and, therefore, the conviction of the appellant is
in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300
of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The submission is not well
founded for the simple reason that the same set off facts can        D
constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an
omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC
and at the same time constitute an offence 'Jnder any other law.
It needs no restatement that the bar to the punishment to the
offender twice over for the same offence would arise only where      E
the ingredients of both the offences are the same.

     22. The question that falls for our consideration is, whether
the appellant can be said to have satisfied all the conditions
that are necessary to enable her to claim the protection of          F
Article 20 (2) of the Constitution. The charges upon which the
appellant has been convicted now, for the charges under the
Indian Penal Code, we will presume for our present purpose
that the allegations upon which these charges are based,
proved, resulting in conviction and punishment of the appellant      G
are substantially the same which formed the subject matter of
prosecution and conviction under the penal provisions of
Portugal law. But we have no doubt to hold that the punishment
of the appellant is not for the same offence.

     23. Be that as it may, there is no factual foundation laid      H
    546    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A as such by the appellant taking this plea before the trial court.
  Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to any of
  the witnesses that she is sought to be prosecuted and punished
  for the same offence for which she has been charged and
  convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. She
B did not even make any such statement in her examination under
  Section 313 Cr.P.C. It is true that the fundamental right
  guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution is in the
  nature of an injunction against the State prohibiting it to
  prosecute and punish any person for the same offence more
c than ones but the initial burden is upon the accused to take the
  necessary plea and establish the same.

          24. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edition, Volume-
    IX; the law is succinctly summarised on this aspect of the matter
    as:
D
          "If the defendant pleads autrefois convict or autrefois
          acquit, the prosecution replies or demurs. If the
          prosecution replies, which is the usual course, a jury is
          sworn to try the issue(x). The onus of proving the plea is
E         on the defendant (a). He may prove it by producing a
          certified copy of the record or proceedings of the alleged
          previous conviction or acquittal (b), and showing by such
          copy or by other evidence, if necessary, that he has been
          convicted or acquitted of the same, or practically the same,
F         offence as that on which he has been arraigned (c), or that
          he might on his former trial have been convicted of the
          offence on which he has been arraigned (d). The question
          for the jury on the issue is whether the defendant has
          previously been in jeopardy in respect of the charge on
          which he is arraigned (e}, for the rule of law is that a person
G
          must not be put in peril twice for the same offence. The
          test is whether the former offence and the offence now
          charged have the same ingredients in the sense that the
          facts constituting the one are sufficient to justify a
          conviction of the other, not that the facts relied on by the
H
            MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                      547
             [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
    Crown are the same in the two trials (f)."                        A

     25. However, having regard to the nature of the guaranteed
right we have examined the judgment passed by a
Constitutional Court, Lisbon ( a typed copy of the same made
available by the learned senior counsel for the appellant -
                                                                      B
Monica Bedi which we believe to be a true copy) does not
support the plea of the appellant. The Constitutional Court while
considering the issue of extradition of the appellant and the
nature of the trial undergone by her in Portugal observed:

     [*]                                                              c
     "It is a fact that the appellant has been trialled in Portugal
     for committing an offence provided and punishable under
     article 256 of the penal code. However, should any facts
     be found in that process and in that trial that would release    D
     her of any guilt regarding offences based upon which she
     is wanted by the requesting state, then it is not acceptable
     by means of a restrictive and formal interpretation of a
     principle which is deemed to assume wider configurations
     to authorize her extradition to trial her for facts strongly
                                                                      E
     linked and which may even coincide with those same
     offences.

     In other words, it is not acceptable and it cannot be
     admitted that the appellant has been trialled and convicted
     in Portugal for the commission of the offence of use of          F
     forged documents, namely in a decision which revealed
     in the analysis of the facts regarding the attainment of such
     documents (allegedly subsumed by India in the offences
     of corruption and association) that the appellant was not
     involved in those fact. Furthermore, it cannot be admitted       G
     that her extradition is authorized in order to trial her for
     committing such act.

     Extradition process which brings in contact a variety of
     legal systems and different forms of legal classification
                                                                      H
    548     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2.010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         and of behaviour punishments. but which does not allow
          going deeper in those laws, as well as in the evidence
          based upon which the requests for extradition were made
          requires a wider interoperation of the principle of ne bis
          idem."
8
    It is further observed:

          "The Indian Union claims extradition of the appellants to
          trial her for the commission of an offence of criminal
          conspiracy. We consider that this offence has no
c         correspondence in our legal and penal system and that it
          is not the object of an autonomous incrimination. As a
          matter of fact, it constitutes a from that could be classified
          as joint authorship;

D          ... As a matter of fact, we consider that such arguments
          have no legal basis. Because the requesting state wants
          at any cost the appellants extradition, it is clear that it is
          justifying its request by stating that criminal conspiracy as
          opposed to what the person to be extradited claims
          constitutes an autonomous incrimination.
E
          However, careful analysis of the original version of article
          120 B of the Indian Penal Code (included in the records,
          but attached herewith as documents no. 1 and which is
          incorrectly translated into Portuguese) allows one to
F         conclude, with safety, that the type of conspiracy described
          therein as being the conduct of someone who commits an
          offence associated with someone else (complicit), is not
          coincident with the incorporation of a stable organization.
          hierarchically defined and whose object is the commission
G         of offences.

          ... Given that our judiciary authorities are convinced that the
          question under consideration is the charge against the
          appellant regarding offence subsumable under an offences
H
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                           549
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]

    of criminal association which does not correspond to the              A
    Indian charges .

    . . . it is not up to the constitutional court to interpret and set
    out the meaning of any provisions contained in the Indian
    Penal Code and establish on a final basis the scope of                8
    criminal conspiracy, given that this would transcend the
    object of constitutional rules control.

    Taking into consideration the reasons stated in the
    appealed decision, one cannot accept the argument that
    the appealed courts interpretation of article 31, no. 2 of law        C
    144/99 of 31st August was in the sense that the judge is
    not obliged to substantiate and explain (in the decision to
    extradite someone claimed for the commission of offences
    which do no fall within the range of offences provided under
    our legal system) the reasons why the offence should .be              D
    appealed decision, the appellant could not have raised this
    unconstitutionality based on the different of legal
    qualification of the offences that the was charged with by
    both legal systems in concurrence. As a. matter of fact, the
    question under consideration is the charge with different             E
    offences, one should note that, besides the fact that this
    statement does not faithfully reproduce what is said in the
    summary decision, the two subsequent paragraphs
    demonstrate that the real problem does not involve the
    facts but rather the different legal classification thereof."         F

[* There are number of typographical errors and mistakes in
construction of sentences and we did not correct 'the same
and extracted as it is from the copy supplied.]

     26. In the light of these findings and conclusions reached           G
by the Constitutional Court at Lisbon and on a careful
consideration of the entire matter and the facts placed before
us, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant's plea
of double jeopardy is wholly untenable and unsustainable. This
point is accordingly answered against the appellant.                      H
    550   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A Merits:

        27. Now we shall proceed to consider as to whether the
  courts below committed any error in convicting and sentencing
  the appellant for the charged offences? Is there no evidence
  against the appellant as contended by the learned senior
8
  counsel? It is fairly settled that this Court in exercise of its
  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India normally
  does not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived
  at by the courts below on proper appreciation of evidence. It is
C not the function of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and
  substitute the findings for that of the courts below unless it is
  clearly established that the findings and the conclusions so
  arrived at by the courts below are perverse and based on no
  evidence.

D      28. The simple case of the prosecution is that all the
  appellants entered into a conspiracy in order to secure a
  passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal, for the
  benefit of Monica Bedi so as to enable her to utilize the same
  to leave the country and travel abroad. There is no controversy
E whatsoever that Monica Bedi travelled abroad on the strength
  of the. passport secured by her in the assumed name. She
  entered Portugal with the aid of passport standing in the name
  of Sana Malik Kamal for which she has to face the prosecution
  and suffer conviction and sentence in Portugal.
F      29. It is evident from the record that the involvement of the
  appellants is at two stages. Stage one is where Monica Bedi
  (A-3) and Mohd. Yunis (A-7) are involved in the pre-passport
  application at the threshold and even before the preparation of
  application seeking the passport in the assumed name. Stage
G two is the involvement of Monica Bedi (A-3), Shaik Abdul Sattar
  (A-5) and D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) after the submission of
  passport application before the authorities. Exhibit P2 is the
  passport application submitted in the assumed name of Sana
  Malik Kamal which contains the photograph of Monica Bedi (A-
H 3). Essential requirements for obtaining the passport are: (1)
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                     551
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
passport application; (2) proof of residence and (3) date of birth A
certificate as spoken to by PWs. 2, 3, 21 and 31. How these
documents are obtained for the benefit of Monica Bedi has
been clearly brought on record through a number of witnesses
whose evidence remained unimpeached. It is Mohd. Yunis (A-
7), the Mandal Revenue Inspector who verified the residence B
particulars of Sana Malik Kamal on the instructions of PW-5,
Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool and submitted a false
verification report based on which exhibit pg residence
certificate was issued by PW-5. PW-17 on requisition from
C.B.I officials once again got verified and issued exhibit P30     c
certificate to the effect that no person by name Sana Malik
Kamal resides in the house as earlier submitted by Mohd. Yunis
(A-7). PW-37 is the Investigating Officer who in his evidence
stated that he verified the particulars of occupants of the said
house in the presence of PW-27 (D.V. Ratnamaiah), Assistant D
Superintendent of Post Offices, Kurnool and found no such
person named Sana Malik Kamal ever resided therein. It is
based on this evidence the trial court and appellate court came
to the right conclusion that the prosecution established its case
that it is Mohd. Yunis (A-7) who gave false verification based
on which exhibit pg residence certificate was issued by PW-5 E
in the name of Sana Malik Kamal. The trial court convicted
Mohd. Yunis (A-7) for the offence under Section 468 IPC which
reads as under:

    "468. Forgery for purpose of cheating. - Whoever               F
    commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic
    record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating,
    shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
    for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also
    be liable to fine."                                            G

Section 463 defines forgery, which reads as under:

    "463. Forgery.- Whoever makes any false documents or
    false electronic record or part of a document or electronic
    record, with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public   H
    552     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R


A         or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to
          cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any
          express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud
          or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery."

         30. The High Court came to the conclusion that in
8
    submitting the false verification report in respect of residence
    of Sana Malik Kamal he may not have been aware and knew
    that the certificate so obtained would be used for the purpose
    of securing the passport in the assumed name of Sana Malik
    Kamal. At any rate there is no evidence on that aspect of the
C   matter. The High Court also came to the conclusion that by the
    time Mohd. Yunis (A-7) submitted a false verification there is
    nothing on record that he was hand in glove with the other
    accused for the purpose of cheating. Be it noted that the High
    Court confirmed the acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section
D   1208 IPC. The High Court, accordingly, found that the proper
    offence made against him would be one for making forged
    document simplicitor punishable under Section 465 IPC. In our
    considered opinion, the High Court was not justified in
    convicting Mohd. Yunis (A-7) at all for it had found no case
E   against the appellant made out under Section 1208 IPC and
    further found that there is no evidence to assume that he was
    hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of
    cheating. That there is no evidence that A-7 prepared false
    document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public
F   or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause
    any person to part with property, or to enter into any express
    or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud. The
    ingredients of Section 463 are not satisfied. In such an event
    the conviction of the appellant under Section 465 IPC is
G   unsustainable.

         31. That so far as D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) is concerned there
    is a clear evidence which has been properly appreciated by
    the courts below that he who took the article (envelop contained
    the passport) addressed to Sana Malik Kamal from PW-11
H
            MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                      553
             [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
representing that he knew the addressee and deliver the same.        A
The said article was actually entrusted to PW-11 for its delivery
but D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) took the same from PW-11 for
delivery to Sana Malik Kamal - assumed name of Monica Bedi
(A-3). The courts below found that D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) was
aware of the contents of the article. It is unde; those              B
circumstances the courts below came to the right conclusion
that evidence available on record clearly establish that he
participated in the conspiracy iri securing the passport for
Monica Bedi in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal. Thus
the conviction of D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) for the charged              c
offences is accordingly upheld. We do not find any reason
whatsoever to interfere with the view taken by the High Court.
However, the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment
under each count awarded while maintaining the fine imposed
by the trial court is reduced to that of 6 months rigorous
                                                                     D
imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine
amount.

     32. Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) is the Head Constable who
submitted exhibit P15 report. PW-7, PW-8 and PW-1_4 are the
material witnesses examined by the prosecution to_ prove the         E
accusations leveled against A-5. PW-7 at the relevant time was
Junior Assistant in the District Police Office, Kurnool who
speaks about entrustment of the verification of the passport
application in respect of Sana Malik Kamal to A-5. He also
speaks about A-5 submitting Exhibit P15 inquiry report               F
together with statements of persons purported to have been
recorded by him in exhibit P16 and P17. There is absolutely
nothing on record to disbelieve the evidence of PW-7 who
stated in his evidence that A-5 submitted exhibit P15 report
knowing it to be a false one apart from certifying that Sana Malik   G
Kamal was residing at that particular house in Kurnool and was
not involved in any civil and criminal cases and there was
nothing adverse against her. PW-8 was working as Inspector
of Police, District Special Branch, Kurnool who prepared
exhibit P18 letter on the basis of exhibit P15 inquiry report
                                                                     H
    554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A submitted by A-5. PW-14 is the Sub-Inspector, District Special
  Branch, Kurnool who testified that A-5 submitted exhibit P15
  report and it bears signature of A-5. The courts below held that
  the evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 is cogent and
  consistent which in clear and categorical terms prove the fact
B that A-5 is the person who verified the passport application
  particulars of Sana Malik Kamal and submitted exhibit P15
  inquiry report along with exhibit P16 and exhibit P17
  enclosures. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that A-5
  submitted a false report in order to enable Monica Bedi to
C secure a passport for herself in the assumed name of Sana
  Malik Kamal. His conviction for the charged offences is
  accordingly upheld. The High Court however, reduced the
  sentence awarded by the trial court to one year rigorous
  imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine
  imposed by the trial court. The sentence awarded under
D Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act
  has been confirmed. Having regard to the facts and
  circumstances of the present case, we however, reduce the
  sentence to that of six months rigorous imprisonment under
  each count while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court
E and the sentence to suffer imprisonment, in default, of payment
  of fine. Sentences are directed to run concurrently.

    Case of Monica Bedi - Appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
    782/2007:
F
       33. So far as the appellant - Monica Bedi is concerned
  she is involved in the conspiracy as proved at both stages i.e.
  pre-passport application stage and post-passport application
  stage. The conspiracy itself has been hatched only with a view
  to secure a passport for Monica Bedi in the assumed name of
G Sana Malik Kamal. We do not find any merit in the submission
  of Shri Tulsi, learned senior counsel that there is no evidence
  whatsoever against Monica Bedi to prove her involvement for
  the offence punishable under Sections 1208, 419 and 420 IPC.
  The sequence of events as unfolded by the evidence, which we
H
           MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                      555
            [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
do not want to recapitulate once again as we have noticed the        A
same in detail in the preceding paragraphs, clearly prove the
charges levelled against Monica Bedi. It is for her benefit that
the entire conspiracy has been hatched involving more than one
individual in order to secure a passport for her benefit enabling
her to travel abroad in the assumed name of Sana Malik Kamal.        8
There is no material based on which this Court is to differ with
the findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by the
courts below.

     Shri Tulsi, however, reiterated the submission which he
made before the High Court that exhibit P50 is a Photostat copy      C
of the passport in the name of Sana Malik Kamal and the same
is inadmissible document as it is not authenticated by legal
keeper as provided under Section 78 (6) of the Indian Evidence
Act. The submission was that based on such inadmissible
document no prosecution could be launched and once it is to          D
be held that the said document is not admissible the whole
case of the prosecution collapses like a pack of cards. The High
Court after elaborate consideration of the matter came to the
right conclusion that Section 78 (6) of the Evidence Act, 1872
deals with public document of any other class in a foreign           E
country. In the present case, the original of exhibit P50 is the
passport issued by the competent authorities in this country
and, therefore, Section 78 (6) has no application whatsoever
to the facts of this case. The issuance of original of exhibit P50
passport is clearly proved. It is based on that passport Monica      F
Bedi travelled abroad and entered Portugal for which she has
to face a prosecution and suffer conviction and sentence. The
prosecution cannot be held to be vitiated. We accordingly reject
the contention and uphold the conviction of the appellant for the
offence punishable under Sections 1208, 419 and 420 IPC.             G
The High Court, however, reduced the sentence of
imprisonment imposed on the appellant - Mohica Bedi (A-3)
as noticed in the preceding paragraphs. The High Court also
held that she is entitled for set off of the periods of detention
suffered by her in Lisbon i.e. from 18.9.2004 to 4.6.2005 and
                                                                     H
    556      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   3.11.2005 to 10.11.2005.

         However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of
    the case and the fact that she had undergone more than 2 %
    years of $entence, we consider it appropriate to reduce the
    sentence to that of already undergone by her while maintaining
8   fine amount imposed by the courts below.

         34. In the view we have taken it is not necessary to go into
    the question as to the interpretation of Section 428 Cr.P.C and
    her entitlement to set off against the sentence imposed on her.
c Conclusion:
           35. Criminal Appeal NO. 782 of 2007 ( Monica Bedi -
    A-3)

D      For all the aforesaid reasons, we confirm the conviction
  of Monica 8edi (A-3) under Sections 1208, 419 and 420 IPC.
  The sentence awarded under each count directed to run
  concurrently is reduced to that of the period already undergone
  by her while maintaining the sentence of fine awarded by the
E courts below. The bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

           The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.

    Criminal Appeal NO. 784 of 2007 ( Shaik Abdul Sattar -
    A-5)
F
        The conviction of Shaik Abdul Sattar (A-5) under Sections
   1208, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and as well as
   under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of
   Corruption Act is, accordingly, upheld. However, the sentence
G awarded under each count is reduced to that of six months
   rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine imposed by
 . the courts below. Sentences are directed to run concurrently.
   He shall surrender before the trial court to serve the remaining
   sentence, if any.
H
              MONICA BEDI v. STATE OF A.P.                  557
               [B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
       The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.                 A

Criminal Appeal NO. 1357 of 2007 ( Mohd. Yunis - A-7)

    Mohd. Yunis (A-7) is acquitted for the offence under
Section 465 IPC and sentence awarded is set aside. The bail
bonds shall stand cancelled.                                       B

       The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

Criminal Appeal NO. 783 of 2007 ( D. Gokari Saheb - A-
fil                                                                c
     The conviction of D. Gokari Saheb (A-8) under Sections
1208, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and as well as
under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act is, accordingly, upheld. However, the sentence
awarded under each count is reduced to that of six months          D
rigorous imprisonment while maintaining the fine imposed by
the courts below. Sentences are directed to run concurrently.
He shall surrender before the trial court to serve the remaining
sentence, if any.
                                                                   E
       The appeal is, accordingly, partly allowed.

N.J.                                      Appeals disposed of.