MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRAversusROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.

                      [2017] 12 S.C.R. 231



                  MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA                                    A
                                  v.
                   ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 19977 of 2017)
                       DECEMBER 11, 2017                                  B
          [A.K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
       Order VT rule 17 - Amendment of pleadings - Permissibility -
Suit for partition of property - After framing of issues, application
for amendment of pleadings - Seeking share in sale proceeds of            C
another property - The court instead of deciding the application
asked the parties tlJ lead evidence - Evidence was led and suit was
fixed for fi11ul disposal -- Court ordered that the application would
be considered at final hearing of suit - Application for amendment
of issues dismissed - Pursuant to direction of Superior Court,            D
amendment application was considered and rejected on the ground
that the amendment application was time barred because limitation
for suit for recovery of money is three years from the date of the
sale - Writ petition dismissed by High Court - On appeal, held:
Proviso to r. 17 of Order VT prohibits entertainment of amendment
application after commencement of trial - Trial of a suit commences       E
after issues are framed and case is fixed for hearing and the party
having right to begin, is to produce evidence - In the present case
though technically the trial had commenced, but actually the
application was filed before the evidence was led - No prejudice
can be said to have been caused to defendant because evidence             F
was led subsequent ·to filing of the application - Thus, in the present
case no bar was created by the proviso to consider the application
- The determination as to whether the claim could be held to be
barred by time could have been decided only after considering the
evidence - It was too early to come to the conclusion that limitation
 was only three years and not twelve years as claimed by the plain-       G
tiff - Amendment application allowed - Limitation Act, 1963 - Art.
110.
       Allowing the appeal, the Court
    HELD: 1.1 Although Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. permits
amendment in the pleadings "at any stage of the proceedings",             H
                               231
232           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A     but a limitation has been engrafted by means of Proviso to the
      effect that no application for amendment shall be aliowed after
      the trial is commenced. Reserving the Court's jurisdiction to order
      for permitting the party to amend pleading on being satisfied that
      in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the
      matter before the commen~ement of trial. [Para 9] [239-C-D]
B
             1.2 Order XVIII of the C.P.C. deal with "Hearing of the
      Suit and Examination of Witnesses". Issues are framed under
      Order XIV. Order XV deals with "Disposal of the Suit at the first
      hearing", when it appears that the parties are not in issue of any
      question of law or a fact. After issues are framed and case is
c     fixed for hearing and the party having right to begin is to produce
      his evidence, the trial of suit commences. [Para 9] [239-E-F]
            Vidyabai & Ors. v. Padmalatha & Anr., (2009) 2 SCC
            409 : [2008] 17 SCR 505 - relied on.
D            1.3 In the present case, issues were framed and case was
      fixed for recording of evidence of plaintiff. Plaintiff did not pro-
      duce the evidence and took adjournment and in the meantime
      filed an application under Order VI Rule 16 or 17. Thereafter
      the Court granted four week's time as the last opportunity to file
      the examination-in-chief. Thus technically trial commenced when
 E    the date was fixed for leading evidence by the plaintiff but actu-
      ally the amendment application was filed before the evidence was
      led by the plaintiff. The parties led evidence after the amendment
      application was filed. [Paras 10 and 11] [240-B-C, F]
            1.4 The Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 prohibited entertain-
 F    ment of amendment application after commencement of the trial
      with the object and purpose that once parties proceed with the
      leading of evidence, no new pleading be permitted to be intro-
      duced. The present is a case where actually before parties could
      lead evidence, the amendment application had been filed and from
 G    the order dated 14.02.2014, it is clear that the plaintiff's case is
      that parties had led evidence even on the amended pleadings and
      plaintiff's cases was that in view of the fact that the parties led
      evidence on amended pleadings, the allowing the amendment
      was mere formality. The defendant in no manner !.'"!I. be said to
      be prejudiced by the amendments since plaintiff led
 H
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                           233



his evidence on amended pleadings also, as claimed by him. [Para A
13] [241-E·F]
      1.5 Looking to the object and purpose by which limitation
was put on permitting amendment of the pleadings, in substance,
in the present case no prejudice can be said to have caused to
the defendant since the evidence was led subsequent to the filing B
of the amendment application. Thus, present was a case where it
cannot be held that amendment application tiled by the plaintiff
could not be considered due to bar of the Proviso. [Para 15] [242-
C·D]
       Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. 1~ Union of India,
       (2005) 6 SCC 344 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR 929 ; Rajesh               c
       Kumar Aggarwal & Ors. 1~ K.K. Modi & Ors. (2006) 4
       SCC 385 : [2006] 3 SCR 175 ; Chander Kanta Bansal
       v. Rajinder Singh Anand (2008) 5 SCC 117 : [2008] 4
       SCR 748 - relied on.
       1.6 Taking into overall consideration of the facts of the         ·o
present case and specially the fact that evidence by the parties
was led after the filing of the amendment application, justice
could have been served in allowing the amendment application.
[Para 21] [244-F-G]
       2. Present is not a case of simple recovery of money.             E
Plaintiff's claim is to enforce a right to share in another property,
which was sold in the year 2000 and according to plaintiff, the
limitation is twelve years as per Article 110 of Limitation Act.
The High Court refrained from expressing any final opinion on
the question of limitation but observed that the view taken by
the Additional District Judge is correct. In the facts of the present    F
case, final determination as to whether the claim could be held to
be barred by time could have been decided only after considering
the evidence led by the parties. Whether plaintiff had any share
in the property, which was sold in the year 2000 and what was the
nature of his share and whether he can claim recovery of his share       G
within twelve years were all the questions on which final
adjudication could have been made after considering the evidence
and at the stage of considering the amendment in the facts of the
present case, it was too early to come to a conclusion that limitation
was only three years and not twelve years as claimed by the
plaintiff. [Paras 17 and 18] [243-A-B, E-G]                              H
234              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2017) 12 S.C.R.


A           Mahila Ramkali Devi & Ors. v. Nandram (Dead)
            through Legal Representatives & Ors. (201S) 13 SCC
            132 : [201S] 4 SCR 974 - relied on.
                                ~a12e Law Befer~nce

      [200S] 1 Suppl. SCR 929           relied on                 Para 7
B
      [2006) 3    SCR 17S               relied on                 Paras
      [2008) 17 SCR SOS                 relied on                 Para9
      [2008) 4    SCR 748               relied on                  Para 14
      [201Sl 4    SCR 974               relied on                 Para 19
 c
           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19977
      of2017.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2017 of the High Court
 D    of Delhi at New Delhi in CM (M) No. 815 of2017.
            Ms. Shobha, Ms. Joyshree Borman, Ad vs for the Appellant.
             Rana S. Biswas, Sunil Kr. Sharma, Shrikant Deshmukh,
      Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, S. B. Upadhyay, Nishant, Avijit Roy, Gurmehar
 E    S. Sistani, Vijay Kumar, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Ad vs for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against
      the judgment of Delhi High Court dated 02.08.2017 by which judgment,
      the Writ Petition filed by the appellant challenging the order of Additional
 F    District Judge dismissing the application of the plaintiff under Order VI
      Rule I 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as "C.P.C.")
      has been dismissed. Facts in brief necessary to be noted for deciding
      the appeal are:-                                        ·
             The appellant and respondent No.5 are sons of respondent No.1.
 G    Respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are wife, son and daughter of another
      brother of appellant. The appellant's father Late Shri O.P. Mehra
      alongwith his wife and three minor sons came to Delhi from Lahore
      after Partition. Shri 0.P. Mehra died in 195 I. The respondent No.1 and
      her sons were held entitled to compensation under Order of Settlement
 H    Commissioner, New Delhi dated 14.08.1956. The respondent No. 1
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                              235
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

was declared as highest bidder in a public auction for a House No. D-4,     A
Lajpat Nagar, area measuring 300 sq. yds. which amount was adjusted
from the claim to which the respondent No. I and her sons were held
entitlted.  ·
       Another property was also allotted in the name of respondent
No. I of area measuring 200 sq. yds. at G-11, Nizamuddin, New Delhi.        B
The property G-11, Nizamuddin was sold by respondent No. I in the
year 2000. On 04.11.2009, the appellant filed a Suit No. 2082 of 2009
against the respondents seeking partition of the suit property described
in Appendix A. In Appendix A, only property mentioned was Plot No.D-
4, Lajpat Nagar, Part-II, New Delhi.
                                                                            c
        Written statement \Vas filed by the respondent and on 17 .05.2010,
issues were framed by the Court. 10.08.2010 was fixed for recording
the evidence of the plaintiff. The plaintiff prayed for time for producing
evidence. On 17.01.2011, plaintiff filed an application under Order VI
Rule 17 praying for amendment of the plaint. By the application plaintiff
sought to add certain pleadings and a prayer claiming share in the sale D
proceeds received by defendant No. I from sale of the property of
Nizamuddin. Application filed by the plaintiff was objected by the
defendants by filing a reply. It was pleaded that several opportunities
were given to the plaintiff to lead evidence and last opportunity was
given on 08.12.2010 to file his evidence by 28.01.2011. It was further E
pleaded that in the sale document ofNizamuddin property, plaintiff himself
was a witness. The relief which is sought to be amended is barred by
time and is altogether a separate cause of action. Plaintiff filed a rejoinder
in which it was stated that plaintiff came to know that plaintiff had
undivided share in the property at Nizamuddin only in November, 2010.
He further stated that he informed all the facts to his earlier counsel but F
in the plaint the mention ofNizamuddin property was not made by earlier
counsel and while preparing for evidence in the suit, the fact was noticed
by the plaintiff only in November, 2010 and hence application for
amendment has been filed. The Court passed on order on 26.07.2011
granting the plaintiff four week's time as a last opportunity to file the G
examination-in-chief of his witnesses subject to payment.ofRs.5,000/-,
with regard to I.A. No.1001 of 2011, it was stated "Needless to say in
Case I.A. No.1001/2011 is allowed, appropriate orders for evidence of
the plaintiff would be made." Parties led evidence and suit was fixed for
final disposal. On 14.02.2014, an order was passed directing that
                                                                            H
236            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] I2 S.C.R.



A     amendment application shall be considered at the time of final hearing of
      the suit. Plaintiff filed an application for amendment of issues, which
      was rejected by the High Court on 09.02.20I5. The plaintiff filed a
      FAO (OS) No.I96 of2015, in which Division Bench of the High Court
      by order dated 28.04.2015 directed the learned Single Judge to decide
      the amendment application I.A. No. I OOI of 2011. In the meantime on
B
      account of pecuniary jurisdiction of the case, the suit was transferred to
      the Court of Additional District Judge, Saket. The Additional District
      Judge took up the amendment application and vide order dated 24. I 0.2016
      rejected the amendment application. The trial court took the view that
      the suit for recovery of money of his share could have been filed by
 c    plaintiff within three years from the date of sale. The trial court held
      that the amendment sought is barred by time, hence the application was
      rejected.
             A Writ Petition under Article 227 was filed by the plaintiff in the
      High Court challenging the order dated 24.10.2016, which has been
 D    dismissed by the High Court by the impugned judgment, against which
      this appeal has been filed.
             2. We have heard Ms. Shobha, learned counsel for the appellant.
      Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel was heard for respondent No. I,
      Shri Rana S. Biswas and Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, has been heard for
 E    respondent No.5. Learned counsel for respondent No.5 having adopted
      the submissions raised on behalf of respondent No. I, we shall hereinafter
      refer to the submissions of respondent No. I and respondent No.5 as
      submissions on behalf of respondents.

              3. Learned counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal
 F    contends that the application filed by the plaintiff for amendment under
      Order VI Rule 17 was not barred by time. Relying on Article 110 of the
      Limitation Act, 1963, learned counsel submits that the limitation for
      enforcing a right to share in a joint family property is twelve years, hence
      the claim was not barred by time. The High Court on one hand refrained
      itself from saying anything on the issue oflimitation on Article 1 IO of the
 G    Limitation Act and on the other hand has given an appr9val to the view
      of the learned Additional District Judge that suit is barred by time. The
      High Court has failed to appreciate that parties have already led evidence
      relating to proposed amendment which fact was recorded by the High
      Court on 14.02.20I4 and only a formal order of allowing amendment _
 H
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                                 237
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

was required, which would not have caused any prejudice to the                 A
defendant. The High Court on technical grounds has rejected the
amendment application whereas it is well settled that amendment
applications are to be liberally considered and unless any prejudice is
shown to be caused to the defendant, the applications are allowed.

        4. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the submission of B
the appellant contends that amendment application filed by the appellant
could not have been allowed in view of Proviso tc Order VI Rule 17
C.P.C. It is submitted that trial in the suit has already commenced and
plaintiff failed to show that in spite of due diligence, he could not raise
the matter earlier, hence the trial court has right! y rejected the amendment C
application. It is further stated that claim was barred by time. The
amendment sought to be made related to claim for recovery of money
for which limitation is only three years, as has been rightly held by the
trial court. There is no substance in the case of the plaintiff that due to
mistake of earlier counsel, the Nizamuddin propetty could not be included
in the plaint. Plaintiff himself has verified the plaint and cannot be allowed D
to take any such plea. The Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 does not permit
any such amendment as now prayed by plaintiff. It is submitted that
there was no due diligence at all on the part of the appellant-plaintiff so
as to enable the Court to allow the amendment exercising the power
reserved to the Court under Proviso. The appellant in ~is repllication has E
stated that Lajpat Nagar property was the one and the only joint family
property. By allowing the amendment, the very nature of the suit shall
be changed, causing great prejudice to respondent No. I. Learned counsel
for the respondents have also raised submissions regarding the merits of
the claim of the plaintiff.
                                                                               F
       5. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and have perused the records.

       6. Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. as it now exists is as follows:-

       17. Amendment of Pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of G
       the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings
       in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such
       amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose
       of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties:

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238            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017) 12 S.C.R.


A           Provided that no application for amendment shall be allowed
            after the trial has commenced, unless the court comes to the
            conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have
            raised the matter before the commencement of trial.
              7. By AmendmentAct46of1999 with a view to shortage litigation
B     and speed of the trial of the civil suits, Rule 17 of Order VI was omitted,
      which provision WdS restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 with a
      rider in the shape of the proviso limiting the power of amendment to a
      considerable extent. The object of newly inserted Rule 17 is to control
      filing of application for amending the pleading subsequent to
      commencement of trial. Not permitting amendment subsequent to
C     commencement of the trial is with the object that when evidence is led
      on pleadings in a case, no new case be allowed to set up by amendments.
      The proviso, however, contains an exception by reserving right of the
      Court to grant amendment even after commencement of the trial, when
      it is shown that in spite of diligence, the said pleas could not be taken
D     earlier. The object for adding proviso is to curtail delay and expedite
      adjudication of the cases. This Court in Salem Advocate Bar
      Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 has noted
      the object of Rule 17 in Para 26 which is to the following effect:
            "26. Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code deals with amendment of
E           pleadings. By Amendment Act 46 of 1999, this provision was
            deleted. It has again been restored by Amendment Act 22 of2002
            but with an added proviso to prevent application for amendment
            being allowed after the trial has commenced, unless the court
            comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party
            could not have raised the matter before the commencement of
 F          trial. The proviso, to some extent, curtails absolute discretion to
            allow amendment at any stage. Now, if application is filed after
            commencement of trial, it has to be shown that in spite of due
            diligence, such amendment could not have been sought earlier.
            The object is to prevent frivolous applications which are filed to
G           delay the trial. There is no illegality in the provision."
            8. The judgment on which much reliance has been placed by
      learned counsel for the appellant is Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal & Ors.
      Vs. K.K. Modi & Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 385. This Court had occasion to
      consider and interpret Order VI Rule 17 in Paragraphs 15 and 16, in
 H    which following has been held:-
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                               239
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      "15. The object of the rule is that the courts should try the merits   A
      of the case that come before them and should, consequently, allow
      all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real
      question in controversy between the parties provided it does not
      cause injustiCe or prejudice to the other side.
      16. Order 6 Rult; 17 consists of two parts. Whereas the first part     B
      is discretionary (may) and leaves it to the court to order amendment
      of pleading. The second part is imperative (shall) and enjoins the
      court to allow all amendments which are necessary for the purpose
      of determining the real question in controversy between the
      parties."
                                                                             c
       9. A!though Order VI Rule 17 permits amendment in the pleadings
"at any stage of the proceedings", but a limitation has been engrafted by
means of Proviso to the effect that no application for amendment shall
be allowed after the trial is commenced. Reserving the Court's jurisdiction
to order for permitting the party to amend pleading on being satisfied
that in spite of due diligence the parties could not have raised the matter D
before the commencement of trial. In a suit when trial commences?
Order XVIII of the C.P.C. deal with "Hearing of the Suit and Examination
of Witnesses". Issues are framed under Order XIV. At the first hearing
of the suit, the Court after reading the plaint and written statement and
after examination under Rule 1 of Order XIV is to frame issues. Order E
XV deals with "Disposal of the Suit at the first hearing", when it appears
that the parties are not in issue of any question of law or a fact. After
issues are framed and case is fixed for hearing and the party having
right to begin is to produce his evidence, the trial of suit commences.
This Court in Vidyabai & Ors. Vs. Padmalatha & Anr., (2009) 2
SCC 409 held that filing of an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of F
the witnesses amounts to commencement of proceedings. In Paragraph
11 of the judgment, following has been held:-
      "11. From the order passed by the learned trial Judge, it is evident
      that the respondents had not been able to fulfil the said precondition.
      The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is as to G
      whether the trial had commenced or not. In our opinion, it did.
      The date on which the issues are framed is the date of first hearing.
      Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure envisage taking of
      various steps at different stages of the proceeding. Filing of an
                                                                             H
240            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A           affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief of the witness, in our
            opinion, would amount to "commencement of proceeding"."
          10. Coming to the facts of the present case, 'it is clear from the
  record that issues were framed on 17.05.2010 and case was fixed for
  recording of e'vidence of plaintiff on 10.08.2010. Plaintiff did not produce
B the evidence and took adjournment and in the meantime filed an
  application under Order VI Rule 16 or 17 on 17.01.2011. Thereafter the
  Court on 26.07.2011 has granted four week's time as the last opportunity
  to file the examination-in-chief. It is useful to quote Paragraph 4 of the
  Order, which is to the following effect:-
C           4. In view of the above, it is directed as follows:-
            (i) Having regard to the delay which has ensued, subject to the
            plaintiff paying costs ofRs.5,000/- each to the contesting defendant
            No.1 and 5 within a period of one week, the plaintiff is permitted
            four weeks time as a last opportunity to file the examination-in-
D           chief of his witnesses on affidavit.
            (ii) The matter shall be listed before the Joint Registrar for
            recording of plaintiffs evidence on 29'h August, 2011.
            (iii) The case shall be listed before court for direction on 1S'h
            January, 2012.
 E
            (iv) Needless to say in case IA No. 1001/2011 is allowed,
            appropriate orders for evidence of the plaintiff would be made."
           11. Thus technically trial commenced when the date was fixed
   for leading evidence by the plaintiff but actually the amendment application
   was filed before the evidence was led by the plaintiff. The parties led
 F
   evidence after the amendment application was filed. In this context, it is
   necessary to notice the orderofthe High Court dated 14.02.2014, which
   records that evidence of both the parties have been concluded. Most
   important fact to be noticed in the order is that the Court recorded the
   statement of plaintiff's counsel that parties have led evidence in view of
 G the amendment sought in the plaint. Order dated 14.02.2014 is to the
   following effect:-
            "The evidence of both the parties has been concluded. The matter
            has been listed for final disposal. Learned counsel for the plaintiff
            has pointed out the order dated 26'h July, 2011 wherein observation
 H          was made that in case I.A. No. 1001/2011 under Order VI Rule
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                                  241
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      17         CPC for amendment of the plaint is allowed, appropriate        A
      order for evidence of the plaintiff would be made. As a matter of
      fact, plaintiffs counsel stated that the parties have also led evidence
      in view of amendment sought in the plaint and the same covered
      in the evidence produced by the parties. The defendants, however,
      alleged that the said amendment was unnecessary and was                   B
      opposed by the defendants and issue inv01ved in the said
      circumstances be considered at the time of final hearing of suit as
      defendant No. l is more than 85 years old lady, the suit itself be
      decided.
      List this matter in the category of Short cause on 22 May,
      2014 ...... "                                                             c
       12. By same order dated 14.02.2014, the Court directed
amendment application be taken at the time of final hearing. As noticed
above, when plaintiff sought for framing additional issues which application
was rejected, the matter was taken before the Division Bench and the
Division Bench ultimateIy has directed the learned Single Judge to consider     D
the amendment application. Subsequently, the amendment application
was rejected on 24.10.2016.
       13. The Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 prohibited entertainment of
amendment application after commencement of the trial with the object
and purpose that once parties proceed with the leading of evidence, no          E
new pleading be permitted to be introduced. The present is a case
where actually before parties could lead evidence, the amendment
application has been filed and from the order dated 14.02.2014, it is
clear that the plaintiff's case is that parties have led evidence even on
the amended pleadings and plaintiff's cases was that in view of the fact        F
that the parties led evidence on amended pleadings, the allowing the
amendment was mere formality. The defendant in no manner can be
said to be prejudiced by the amendments since plaintiff led his evidence
on amended pleadings also as claimed by him.
     14. This Court in Cha11der Ka11ta Ba11sal Vs. Raji11der Si11gh G
Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 has noted the object and purpose of
amendment made in 2002. In Para 13, following has been held:-
      "13. The entire object of the said amendment is to stall filing of
      applications for amending a pleading subsequent to the
      commencement of trial, to avoid surprises and the parties had             H
242                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         (2017] 12 S.C.R.



A              sufficient knowledge of the other's case. It also helps in checking
               the delays in filing the applications. Once, the trial commences on
               the known pleas, it will be very difficult for any side to reconcile.
               In spite of the same, an exception is made in the newly inserted
               proviso where it is shown that in spite of due diligence, he could
               not raise a plea, it is for the court to consider the same. Therefore,
B
               it is not a complete bar nor shuts out entertaining of any later
               application. As stated earlier, the reason for adding proviso is to
               curtail delay and expedite hearing of cases."
             15. Looking to the object and purpose by which limitation was put
      on permitting amendment of the pleadings, in substance. in the present
c     case no prejudice can be said to have caused to the defendant since the
      evidence was led subsequent to the filing of the amendment application.
      We thus are of the view that looking to the ;-.... pose and object of the
      Proviso, present was a case where it cannot be held that amendment
      application filed by the plaintiff could not be considered due to bar of the
D     Proviso.
              16. Now, we come to the one of the main reason given by the trial
      court in rejecting the application that the claim was barred by limitation.
      The Nizamuddin property, which property was sought to be added in the
      suit for partition was a property, which was sold by respondent No. I in
E     the year 2000, in which the plaintiff was also one of the witnesses. The
      trial court took the view that the suit was simplicitor for recovery of
      money for which limitation is only three years from the date of sale and
      not twelve years as claimed by the applicant. With regard to the limitation,
      the plaintiff-appellant relies on Article 110 of the Limitation Act, which is
      to the following effect:-
 F
       · Article     Description of Suitt    Period of       , Time from which
       ' No.                                 Limi talion     . period begins to
                                                               run

       ' 110       , By a person             Twelve Years     When the exclusion
G                  : excluded from a                          becomes known to
                   ; joint family property                    the plaintiff
                   : to enforce a right to
                   , share th ere in.


H
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                                 243
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       17. Present is not a case of simply recovery of money. Plaintiff's      A
claim is -to enforce a right to share in the Nizamuddin property, which
was sold in the year 2000 and according to plaintiff, the limitation is
twelve years as per Article 110. The High Court has also noted the
order of Additional District Judge holding that claim is barred by time.
The High Court refrained from expressing any final opinion on the question     B
of limitation but observed that the view taken by the A ...01tional District
Judge is correct. It is relevant to refer to Para 28 of the judgment,
which is to the following effect:-
      "The learnedAdJitional District Judge in the impugned order has
      also accepted the contention of the counsel for the respondents/
      defendants of the relief sought to be added by way of amendment          C
      being barred by time and Articles 106 and 110 of the Schedule to
      the Limitation Act being not applicable. The counsel for the
      petitioner/plaintiff has been unable to show any precedent that a
      claim for a definite share in the sale proceeds of, a property would
      be governed by Articles 106 and Article 110 supra. However, the          D
      same being in the nature of entering into the merits of the
      amendment, I refrain from dealing with the said aspect, though
      the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge appears
      to be reasonable and plausible."
       18. In the facts of the present case, final determination as to         E
whether the claim could be held to be barred by time could have been
decided only after considering the evidence led by the parties. Whether
plaintiff had any share in the property, which was sold in the year 2000
and what was the nature of his share and whether he can claim recovery
of his share within twelve years were all the questions on which final
adjudication could have been made after considering the evidence and           F
at the stage of considering the amendment in the facts of the present
case, it was too early to come to a conclusion that limitation was only
three years and not twelve years as claimed by the plaintiff. The High
Court on the one hand refrained from expressing any opinion and on the
other hand has expressed his agreement with the view taken by the              G
Additional District Judge rejecting the application as barred by time.
      19. While considering the prayer of amendment of the pleadings
by a party, this Court in the case of Mallila Ramkali Devi & Ors. Vs.
Nandram (Dead) tllrougli Legal Representatives & Ors., (2015)
13 SCC 132 has again reiterated the basic principles, which are to be          H
244            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 12 S.C.R.


A     kept in mind while considering such applications in Paragrpahs 20, 21
      and 22, which is quoted as below:-
            "20. It is well settled that rules of procedure are intended to be a
            handmaid to the administration ofjustice. A party cannot be refused
            just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence,
B           inadvertence or even infraction of rules of procedure. The court
            always gives relief to amend the pleading of the party, unless it is
            satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fide or that by
            his blunder he had caused injury to his opponent which cannot be
            compensated for by an order of cost.
c           21. In our view, since the appellant sought amendment in Para 3
            of the original plaint, the High Court ought not to have rejected
            the application.
            22. In Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material
            Supply3, this Court held that the power to grant amendment to
D           pleadings is intended to serve the needs of justice and is not
            governed by any such narrow or technical limitations."
            20. Although, learned counsel for the parties in their submissions
            have raised various submissions on the merits of the claim of the
            parties, which need no consideration by us since the only issue
 E          which has to be considered is as to whether the amendment
            application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be allowed or not. We
            make it clear that we have neither entered into merits of the claim
            nor have expressed any opinion on the merits of the claim of
            either party and it is for the trial court to consider the issues on
            merits while deciding the suit.
 F
         21. Taking into overall consideration of the facts of the present
  case and specially the fact that evidence by the parties was led after the
  filing of the amendment application, we a1e of the view that justice could
  have been served in allowing the amendment application. We thus allow
  the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court as well as the order
G of the Additional District Judge. The amendment application I.A.
  No. 1001 of2011 stand allowed. Both the parties have led their evidences
  and case has already been fixed for hearing, however, to avoid any
  prejudice to the parties, justice will be served in giving a limited opportunity
  to the parties to lead additional evidence, if they so desire.
 H
MOHINDER KUMAR MEHRA v. ROOP RANI MEHRA & ORS.                                  245
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

        22. We thus direct that the parties may file this order before the      A
trial court within two weeks from today, on receipt of the order, the trial
court shall consider on framing of additional issue, if necessary and shall
thereafter grant opportunity to the parties to lead additional evidence, if
any. The entire exercise shall be completed within three months and
thereafter suit be decided finally. The parties shall bear their own costs.     B
We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on merits of
the case including on the question of applicability of Article 110 of the
Limitation Act and all the issues shall be decided on the basis of materials
on record without being influenced by any observation made by us.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                           Appeal allowed.