MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS.versusKHUSHNUMA IBRAHIM & ORS.

                     [2013] 3 S.C.R. 359


              MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS.                             A
                               v.
               KHUSHNUMA IBRAHIM & ORS.
               (Civil Appeal No. 678 of 2013)

                     JANUARY 24, 2013
                                                                   B
       [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.)

     Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s. 6 - Scope of - Held: The
proceeding u/s. 6 is summary proceeding to afford immediate
remedy in cases of illegal dispossession - Questions of title      C
or better rights of possession does not arise for adjudication.

     Interim Order: Grant of interim order - Principles, the
courts must follow in this regard, explained - Held: The interim
relief granted to the plaintiffs by the appellate court, in the    0
instant case is a mandatory direction to handover possession
to the plaintiffs - Grant of mandatory interim relief requires
highest degree of satisfaction, much higher than a case
involving grant of prohibitory injunction - When trial court, on
a consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the
documents was of the view that the entitlement of the plaintiffs   E
to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in serious
doubt, the appellate court could not have interfered with the
exercise of discretion by the trial judge unless such exercise
was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable - Interim
Mandatory Injunction.                                              F

    Appeal - Against discretionary order - Jurisdiction of
appellate court - Explained.

     Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 filed a suit uls. 6 of Specific        G
Relief Act, 1963. They took the plea that their possession
of the suit flat and suit office was forcibly taken by
defendants 2, 3 and 4. The court appointed a Receiver.
As per report of the Receiver, defendant Nos. 5 to 9 were
                             359                                   H
    360      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A found in possession of the suit flat. Formal possession
  of the flat was taken by the Receiver, but he could not
  take possession of the suit office. The plea of the
  defendants was that the plaintiffs were not in possession
  of the suit properties. Trial court declined the interim relief
B to put the plaintiffs back in possession of the suit
  properties, in view of the inconsistencies and
  improbabilities in the plaintiffs case, which needed to be
  established in the trial. Appellate Court granted interim
  relief to the plaintiff reversing the order of trial court.
c Therefore, instant appeal was filed.
          Disposing of the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1. A proceeding u/s. 6 of the Specific Relief
  Act, 1963 is intended to be a summary proceeding, the
D object of which is to afford an immediate remedy to an
  aggrieved party to reclaim possession of which he may
  have been unjustly denied by an illegal act of
  dispossession. Questions of title or better rights of
  possession do not arise for adjudication in a suit u/s. 6
E where the only issue required to be decided is as to
  whether the plaintiff was in possession at any time six
  months prior to the date of filing of the suit. The
  legislative concern underlying s. 6 is to provide a quick
  remedy in cases of illegal dispossession so as to
F discourage litigants from seeking remedies outside the
  arena of law. The same is evident from the provisions of
  s. 6(3) which bars the remedy of an appeal or even a
  review against a decree passed in such a suit. [Para 12)
  [370-D-G]
G       P. S. Sathappan (Dead) by Lrs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd. and
    Ors. (2004) 11 SCC 672: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 188 -
    referred to.

      2. Given the ground realities of the situation, it is
H neither feasible nor practical to take the view that interim
  MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                    361
              IBRAHIM & ORS.
matters, even though they may be inextricably connected           A
with the merits of the main suit, should always be
answered by maintaining a strict neutrality, namely, by a
refusal to adjudicate. Courts, therefore, will have to
venture to decide interim matters on consideration of
issues that are best left for adjudication in the full trial of   B
the suit. In view of the inherent risk in performing such
an exercise, which is bound to become delicate in most
cases, courts must follow certain principles in this regard,
though such principles cannot be entrapped within any
straitjacket formula or any precise laid down norms.              c
Courts must endeavour to find out if interim relief can be
granted on consideration of issues other than those
involved in the main suit and also whether partial interim
relief would satisfy the ends of justice till final disposal
of the matter. The consequences of grant of injunction            0
on the defendant, if the plaintiff is to lose the suit
alongwith the consequences on the plaintiff where
injunction is refused but eventually the suit is decreed
has to be carefully weighed and balanced by the court
in every given case. Interim reliefs which amount to pre-         E
trial decrees must be avoided wherever possible.
Though observations and clarifications to the effect that
the findings recorded are prima facie and tentative, meant
or intended only for deciding the interim entitlement of the
parties have not worked well and interim findings on
issues concerning the main suit has had a telling effect          F
in the process of final adjudication, it is here that strict
exercise of judicial discipline will be of considerable help
and assistance. The power of self-correction and
comprehension of the orders of superior forums in the
proper perspective will go a long way in resolving the            G
dangers inherent in deciding an interim matter on issues
that may have a close connection with those arising in
the main suit. [Para 13] [371-C-H; 372-A-B]

                                                                  H
    362      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A     3. The interim relief granted to the plaintiffs by the
  Appellate Bench of the High Court in the instant case is
  a mandatory direction to handover possession to the
  plaintiffs. Grant of mandatory interim relief requires the
  highest degree of satisfaction of the Court; much higher
B than a case involving grant of prohibitory injunction.
  [Para 14) [372-C-D]

          Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and
    Ors. (1990) 2 sec 117: 1990 (1) SCR 332 - relied on.

C       4. In a situation where the trial court, on a
  consideration of the respective cases of the parties and
  the documents laid before it, was of the view that the
  entitlement of the plaintiffs to an order of interim
  mandatory injunction was in serious doubt, the appellate
D court could not have interfered with the exercise of
  discretion by the trial judge unless such exercise was
  found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The reasons
  that weighed with the trial judge, in the instant case, did
  not indicate that the view taken is not a possible view.
E The appellate court, therefore, should not have
  substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground
  that in its opinion the facts of the scase call for a different
  conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter
  for exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal
F against a discretionary order. As long as the view of the
  trial court was a possible view the appellate court should
  not have interfered with the same, following the virtually
  settled principles of law in this regard. [Para 15] [373-F-
  H; 374-A-B]
G         Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 1990 (Supp) SCC
    727 - relied on.
                        Case Law Reference:
          2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 188      Referred to    Para 13
H
  MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                        363
              IBRAHIM & ORS.
     1990 (1) SCR 332                  Relied on     Para 14         A
     1990 (Supp) sec 121             Relied on       Para 15
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 678
of 2013.
                                                                     B
    From the Judgment & Order dated 09.10.2012 of the High
Court of Bombay in Appeal (Lodging) No. 412 of 2012.

    V. Krishnamurthy, Subodh K. Pathak, Shashi Ranjan,
Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the Appellants.
                                                                     c
    Shyam Divan, Atul Y. Chitale, Sanyukta Mukherjee, R.K.
Kenanda Singh, Abhijat P. Medh for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Leave granted.                              D

     2. Aggrieved by the grant of interim relief by an Appellate
Bench of the Bombay High Court in a suit under Section 6 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (hereinafter for short the "SR
Act"), the present appeal has been filed by the defendants 5,        E
10 and 11 in the suit. More specifically, by the impugned order
dated 09.10.2012 the Receiver of the suit properties appointed
by the learned Single Judge has been directed to remain in
possession and hand over the same to the respondent Nos.1
and 2 (plaintiffs) who are to be in possession as agents of the      F
Receiver.

     3. Before embarking upon the necessary discussion of the
factual matrix of the case, an identification of the contesting
parties in the manner indicated below would be necessary.
                                                                     G
 Name                   Relationship        Status in the Trial
                                            Court
Khunshnuma Ibrahim Wife of Deceased           Plaintiff No.1
Khan               Ibrahim Khan                                      H
      364     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A     Raghib Ibrahim Khan Son of Deceased       Plaintiff No.2
                          Ibrahim Khan

      Shri Asadullah Khan   Younger Brother of Defendant No. 1
      @ Sameer Khan         Deceased Ibrahim
                            Khan
B
      Shri Najmuzzaman      Elder Brother of Defendant No.2
      Khan                  Deceased Ibrahim
                            Khan

c Smt. Tara Begum           Wife of Defendant   Defendant No.3
                            No.2

      Shri Sheheryaar Khan Son-in-law of        Defendant No.4
                           Defendant Nos. 2
                           &3
D
      Mohd. Mehtab Khan     Son from 1st wife   Defendant No.5
                            of deceased

      Mohd. llyas Khan      Brother of          Defendant No.6
E                           Defendant No.3

      Mohd. Dayan Khan      Unrelated           Defendant No.7

      Smt. Shehzadi         Wife of Defendant   Defendant No.8
                            No.12
F
      Miss Rani             Unrelated           Defendant No.9
      Tabish Ebrahim Khan Son from 2nd wife     Defendant No.10
                          of Deceased

G     Kamran Khan           Son from 1st wife   Defendant No.11
                            of Deceased
      Zakarullah Khan       Son from 1st wife   Defendant No.12
                            of Deceased
H l
    MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                       365
       IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
        4. The plaintiff No. 1 claims to be the 3rd wife of one A
  Ibrahim Khan whereas the plaintiff No. 2 is the son of the first
  plaintiff and Ibrahim Khan. According to the plaintiffs,· 1brahim
  Khan and the first plaintiff were married in the year 1993 and
 out of the said wedlock the plaintiff No. 2 was born some time
  in the year 1996. The plaintiffs claim that they alongwith Ibrahim B
  Khan were residing in flat No. A-505, Noor-e-Jahan Complex,
  Pipe Road, Kurla (West), Mumbai and that they were also in
  occupation of an office being 201/202, 2nd floor in the Big 3
. Building, 88, Anandilal Poddar Marg, Marine Lines, Mumbai
  from where the first plaintiff was carrying on her profession of c
  advocate and solicitors in the name of M/s. K.K. Associates.
  It is the case of the plaintiffs that both the aforesaid properties
  were the self-acquired properties of Ibrahim Khan and that the
  suit flat was gifted in favour of the first plaintiff whereas a general
  power of attorney was executed in favour of the first plaintiff D
  insofar as the suit office is concerned.

       5. The further case of the plaintiffs is that Ibrahim Khan had
 gone to Delhi on 28.11.2011 to attend a wedding. On
 1.12.2011 the first plaintiff could come to know that Ibrahim Khan
 had suffered a brain hemorrhage and was admitted in the                E
 hospital. According to the plaintiffs, they took an early morning
 flight to Delhi on the very next day. However, at about 9.30/
 10.00 O'Clock in the morning, Ibrahim Khan died. Thereafter,
 at the insistence of the first defendant (brother of the deceased)
 the body of the deceased was taken to Bhagalpur, Bihar which           F
 was the native place of Ibrahim Khan. The plaintiffs
 accompanied the body of the deceased to Bhagalpur and the
 last rites were performed at the said place in the afternoon of
 4.12.2011. On 5.12.2011 the plaintiff No. 1 received a call from
 her next door neighbour, one Nadeem, that the lock of the suit         G
 flat was broken and a new lock had been placed by some
 unknown persons. According to the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff
 called her house help Niranjan who informed her that the
 defendants 2, 3 and 4 had forcibly taken possession of the suit
 flat. It is also the case of the plaintiffs that when she had          H
     366      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.

 A   contacted her office she was informed that the defendant No.
     4 had gone to the suit office and had snatched the keys from
     the office staff and had locked up the premises.

           6. According to the plaintiffs, they reached Mumbai on
      6.12.2011 and on going to the suit flat they found that new locks
 8
      had been put thereon. They, thereafter, lodged a complaint to
      the police on 6.12.2011 and thereafter on 12.12.2011 instituted
      Suit No. 27 of 2012 under Section 6 of the SR Act. On
      14.12.2011, when the matter was taken up by the Court, the
.C    defendant Nos. 1 to 4 informed the Court that they are not in
      possession of the suit flat but it is the defendants 5, 11 and 12
     who are in possession. The Court by order dated 14.12.2011
     appointed a Receiver and directed him to make an inspection
     of the suit flat and suit office and report back to the Court. Such
     inspection was made by the Court appointed Receiver on
D     16.12.2011. The report of inspection was submitted to the
     Court to the effect that the defendant Nos. 5 to 9 were found to
     be in possession of the suit flat. Formal possession thereof was
     taken over by the Court Receiver in terms of the order dated
      14.12.2011. In the report of the Court Receiver, it was further
E    mentioned that the defendant No. 10 had produced the keys
     of the suit office. However, the Court Receiver did not succeed
     in opening the doors of the office premises as there were
     further locks fixed thereon and inquiries did not indicate as to
     who was in possession of the keys. Accordingly, the Court
F    Receiver informed the Court that formal possession of the suit
     office could not be taken. In the aforesaid circumstances, at
     the instance of the plaintiffs, defendants 5 to 12 were
     impleaded in the suit.

G         7. At this stage the specific case of the defendants as
     advanced before the learned Trial Judge, may be taken note
     of. The fact that the first plaintiff was the 3rd wife of Ibrahim
     Khan and the second plaintiff was the son born out of the said
     marriage is not disputed by the defendants. The death of
     Ibrahim Khan in the circumstances stated in the plaint is also
H
  MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                          367
     IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
not in dispute. According to the defendants, the appellants were         A
residing in the suit premises with the deceased Ibrahim Khan
till the middle of the year 2009 when the first plaintiff separated
from the deceased. Thereafter, according to the defendants,
the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit flat and, instead,
were staying in the house of the father of the first plaintiff at Mira   B
Road. The second plaintiff was studying in a school located
on Mira Road. It is the specific case of the defendants that the
deceased, at the relevant time, was residing in the suit flat
alongwith his son from the first wife (defendant No. 5) and that
the defendants had inherited the suit flat on the death of Ibrahim       c
Khan. Insofar as the suit office is concerned, it is the specific
case of the defendants that the plaintiff No. 1 was not in
possession of the said premises and that the said plaintiff No.
1 had been functioning from an office located at another place,
i.e., shop No. 32/33 Ashoka Centre, 2nd floor, L.T. Marg,                0
Mumbai.

      8. Alongwith the respective pleadings of the parties
elaborate documents had been laid before the learned Trial
Judge on the basis of which contentions were advanced by the
respective parties each claiming to be in possession of the suit         E
flat and suit office on the relevant date in order to justify the
reliefs that the respective parties were seeking from the Court.
As would be evident from the order of the Appellate Bench of
the High Court, insofar as the suit flat is concerned, the plaintiffs
had produced as many as 50 documents details of which has                F
been catalogued in a chronological order in the order dated
9.10.2012. Insofar as suit office is concerned, similarly, the
plaintiffs had relied on as many as 31 documents to show their
claim of possession. Likewise, the defendants had also relied
on an equally long and elaborate list of documents to show that          G
the plaintiffs were not in possession of the suit flat and suit office
at the relevant point of time, as claimed. As the details of the
said documents have been minutely taken note of by both the
Benches of the High Court it is not necessary for this Court to
traverse the said aspect of the case once again. Instead, we             H
    368       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A   may briefly notice the reasons which had weighed with the
    learned Trial Judge to refuse interim relief to the plaintiffs and
    those that had prevailed upon the Appellate Bench to reverse
    the said order of the learned Trial Judge.

B         9. Both the learned Trial Judge as well as the Appellate
     Court considered the very same documents brought on record
     by the contesting parties to arrive at their respective
     conclusions with regard to the entitlement of the plaintiffs.
     Specifically, the learned Trial Judge had discussed the
     narration of the events of dispossession pleatted by the
C    plaintiffs and held the same to be somewhat unreliable and
     inconsistent in view of the fact that the defendant No. 1 (son of
     the deceased Ibrahim Khan) who is alleged to have been
     instrumental in dispossessing the plaintiffs was at the relevant
     point of time in Bhagalpur in connection with the cremation of
D    the deceased, Ibrahim Khan. In this regard the claim of
     defendants 2 to 4 that they were also in Bhagalpur at the
     relevant time was considered by the learned Trial Judge. The
     versions of the occurrence allegedly narrated to the plaintiff No.
     1 by her neighbours and her domestic aid were also found to
E    be somewhat contradictory. The learned Trial Judge took into
    account the fact that the plaintiffs' version with regard to
     prosecution of studies by the second plaintiff in the school at
     Mira Road and his residing with the parents of the plaintiff No.
     1 at Mira Road was brought on record in the rejoinder and d:d
F   not constitute the part of the plaint case. In coming to his
    conclusions in the matter the learned Trial Judge also took into
    account the fact that the visiting card of the plaintiff No. 1
    showed an address other than of the suit office and also the
    fact that the communication conveying the temporary
G   membership of the plaintiff No. 1 in the Bombay Bar
    Association sent to the suit flat address was returned with the
    remarks "shifted". The fact that the visiting card of the plaintiff
    showing the office address at Ashoka Centre contained the
    same telephone numbers of the plaintiff that were mentioned
H   in certain communications of the bank were duly taken note of
   MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                    369
      IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
by the learned Trial Judge. In the above context the claim of the A
plaintiff No.1 that the said visiting card is a forged and
fabricated document was held to be an issue fit for decision in
the trial of the suit. The learned Trial Judge took into account
the passports of both the plaintiffs issued in the year 2009
showing the address of the suit premises as well as the B
vouchers/memos showing payment by the plaintiff No.1 for the
household and electronic goods which were found in the suit
flat. On an overall consideration of the aforesaid facts and the
documents laid in support thereof, the learned Trial Judge was
of the view that there were inconsistencies and improbabilities    c
in the case of the plaintiffs which needed to be established in
the trial of the suit. Accordingly, the interim relief of direction
to be put back in possession, as claimed by the plaintiffs, was
declined.

      10. The Appellate Court understood the very same D
documents considered by the learned Trial Judge in a wholly
different manner. Specifically, it was held that the various
household and electronic goods found in the suit flat during the
inspection carried out by the Receiver on 16.12.2011 were
proved to have been purchased by the plaintiffs on the basis E
of a invoice/voucher dated 22.8.2008 and the said fact pointed
to the possession of the suit flat by the plaintiffs and, in fact,
demolished the case of the defendants that the first plaintiff and
th~ deceased had separated some time in the middle of the
calendar year 2009. The passports issued to the plaintiffs in F
2009 recording the address of the suit flat; the HDFC bank
statement of plaintiff No. 1; the ICICI bank Credit Card
Statement of plaintiff No. 1 during the relevant time, all indicating
the address of the suit flat were duly relied upon by the Appellate
Court in coming to its conclusion. The Appellate Court also G
relied on an application form submitted (before the Appellate
Court) by the second plaintiff on 11.8.2011 for admission in the
11th standard in H.R. College of Commerce and Economics
at Dinshaw Vachcha Road, Church Gate, Mumbai which was
                                                                   H
    370      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   f2013] 3 S.C.R.

A   signed by the deceased Ibrahim Khan himself giving the
    address of the suit office and the suit flat. The version of the
    plaintiffs that the visiting card showing her office at Ashoka
    Centre was a forged document and also the claim that the
    plaintiff had used the said premises temporarily as the suit
B   office was under renovation was accepted by the learned
    Appellate Court as sufficient explanation to counter the stand
    taken by the defendants. On the aforesaid basis the order of
    the learned Trial Judge was found fit for reversal and refusal of
    interim relief to the plaintiffs was held to be unjustified.
c   Accordingly, interim relief(s) was granted in the appeal.

          11. We have heard Mr. V. Krishnamurthy, Senior Advocate
    for the appellants and Mr. Shyam Divan, Senior Advocate for
    respondents No. 1 and 2.

o        12. A proceeding under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
    Act, 1963 is intended to be a summary proceeding the object
    of which is to afford an immediate remedy to an aggrieved
    party to reclaim possession of which he may have been unjustly
    denied by an illegal act of dispossession. Questions of title or
E   better rights of possession does not arise for adjudication in
    a suit under Section 6 where the only issue required to be
    decided is as to whether the plaintiff was in possession at any
    time six months prior to the date of filing of the suit. The
    legislative concern underlying Section 6 of the SR Act is to
F   provide a quick remedy in cases of illegal dispossession so
    as to discourage litigants from seeking remedies outside the
    arena of law. The same is evident from the provisions of
    Section 6(3) which bars the remedy of an appeal or even a
    review against a decree passed in such a suit.

G        13. While the bar under Section 6(3) of the SR Act may
    not apply to the instant case in view of the initial forum in which
    the suit was filed and the appeal arising from the interim order
    being under the Letters Patent issued to the Bombay High
    Court, as held by a Constitution Bench of this Court P.S.
H
     MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                        371
        IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
Sathappan (Dead) by Lrs. v. Andhra Bank Ltd. & Ors. 1, what               A
is ironical is that the correctness of the order passed in respect
of the interim entitlement of the parties has reached this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution. Ordinarily and in the
normal course, by this time, the suit itself should have been
disposed of. Tragically, the logical conclusion to the suit is no         B
where in sight and it is on account of the proverbial delays that
have plagued the system that interim matters are being
contested to the last court with the greatest of vehemence and
fervour. Given the ground realities of the situation it is neither
feasible nor practical to take the view that interim matters, even        c
though they may be inextricably connected with the merits of
the main suit, should always be answered by maintaining a strict
neutrality, namely, by a refusal to adjudicate. Such a stance
by the courts is neither feasible nor practicable. Courts,
therefore, will have to venture to decide interim matters on              0
consideration of issues that are best left for adjudication in the
full trial of the suit. In view of the inherent risk in performing such
an exercise which is bound to become delicate in most cases
the principles that the courts must follow in this regard are
required to be stated in some detail though it must be made               E
clear that such principles cannot be entrapped within any
straitjacket formula or any precise laid down norms. Courts
must endeavour to find out if interim relief can be granted on
consideration of issues other than those involved in the main
suit and also whether partial interim relief would satisfy the ends       F
of justice till final disposal of the matter. The consequences of
grant of injunction on the defendant if the plaintiff is to lose the
suit alongwith the consequences on the plaintiff where injunction
is refused but eventually the suit is decreed has to be carefully
weighed and balanced by the Court in every given case. Interim
reliefs which amount to pre-trial decrees must be avoided                 G
wherever possible. Though experience has shown that
observations and clarifications to the effect that the findings
recorded are prima facie and tentative, meant or intended only

1.   c2004) 11 sec 672
    372       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A for deciding the interim entitlement of the parties have not
  worked well and interim findings on issues concerning the main
  suit has had a telling effect in the process of final adjudication
  it is here that strict exercise of judicial discipline will be of
  considerable help and assistance. The power of self-correction
B and comprehension of the orders of superior forums in the
  proper perspective will go a long way in resolving the dangers
  inherent in deciding an interim matter on issues that may have
  a close connection with those arising in the main suit.

         14. There is yet another dimension to the issues arising
C ·in the present appeal. The interim relief granted to the plaintiffs
   by the Appellate Bench of the High Court in the present case
   is a mandatory direction to handover possession to the
   plaintiffs. Grant of mandatory interim relief requires the highest
   degree of satisfaction of the Court; much higher than a case
D involving grant of prohibitory injunction. It is, indeed, a rare
   power, the governing principles whereof would hardly require
   a reiteration inasmuch as the same which had been evolved
   by this Court in Dorab Cawasji Warden vs. Coomi Sorab
   Warden and Others2 has come to be firmly embedded in our
E jurisprudence. Paras 16 and 17 of the judgment in Dorab
   Cawasji Warden (supra), extracted below, may be usefully
   remembered in this regard:

          "16. The relief of interlocutory mandatory injunctions are
F         thus granted generally to preserve or restore the status
          quo of the last non-contested status which preceded the
          pending controversy until the final hearing when full relief
          may be granted or to compel the undoing of those acts that
          have been illegally done or the restoration of that which
          was wrongfully taken from the party complaining. But since
G         the granting of such an injunction to a party who fails or
          would fail to establish his right at the trial may cause great
          injustice or irreparable harm to the party against whom it
          was granted or alternatively not granting of it to a party who
H 2. (1990) 2 sec 111.
  MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                       :373
     IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
    succeeds or would succeed may equally cause great                 A
    injustice or irreparable harm, courts have evolved cert£ in
    guidelines. Generally stated these guidelines are:

            (1) The plaintiff has a strong case for trial. That is,
            it shall be of a higher standard than a prima facie       8
            case that is normally required for a prohibitory
            injunction.

            (2) It is necessary to prevent irreparable or
            serious injury which normally canno1 be
            compensated in terms of money.                            C

            (3) The balance of convenience is in favour of the
            one seeking such relief.

     17. Being essentially an equitable relief the grant or refusal
                                                                      0
    of an interlocutory mandatory injunction shall ultimately rest
    in the sound judicial discretion of the court to be exercised
    in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case.
    Though the above guidelines are neither exhaustive nor
    complete or absolute rules, and there may be exceptional
    cfrcumstances needing action, applying them as                    E
    prerequisite for the grant or refusal of such injunctions
    would be a sound exercise of a judicial discretion."

     15. In a situation where the learned Trial Court on a
consideration of the respective cases of the parties and the          F
documents laid before it was of the view that the entitlement of
the plaintiffs to an order of interim mandatory injunction was in
serious doubt, the Appellate Court could not have interfered with
the exercise of discretion by the learned Trial Judge unless such
exercise was found to be palpably incorrect or untenable. The         G
reasons that weighed with the learned Trial Judge, as already
noticed, according to us, do not indicate that the view taken is
not a possible view. The Appellate Court, therefore, should not
have substituted its views in the matter merely on the ground
that in its opinion the facts of the case call for a different        H
    374       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A conclusion. Such an exercise is not the correct parameter for
  exercise of jurisdiction while hearing an appeal against a
  discretionary order. While we must not be understood to have
  said that the Appellate Court was wrong in its conclusions what
  is sought to be emphasized is that as long as the view of the
B Trial Court was a possible view the Appellate Court should not
  have interfered with the same following the virtually settled
  principles of law in this regard as laid down by this Court in
  Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 3 Para 14 of the aforesaid
  judgment which is extracted below would amply sum up the
c situation:
          "14. The appeals before the Division Bench were against
          the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge. In such
          appeals, the appellate court will not interfere with the
          exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and
D         substitute its own discretion except where the discretion
          has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or
          capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored
          the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of
          interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of
E         discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate
          court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a
          conclusion different from the one reached by the court
          below if the one reached by that court was reasonably
          possible on the material. The appellate court would
F         normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of
          discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had
          considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come
          to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been
          exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial
G         manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken
          a different view may not justify interference with the trial
          court's exercise of discretion. After referring to these
          principles Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore)
          Private Ltd. v. Pothan Joseph: (SCR 721)
H   3.   1990 (Supp) sec 727
  MOHD. MEHTAB KHAN & ORS. v. KHUSHNUMA                      375
     IBRAHIM & ORS. [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
           " ... These principles are well established, but as has   A
    been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osenton &
    Co. v. Jhanaton ' ... the law as to the reversal by a court of
    appeal of an order made by a judge below in the exercise
    of his discretion is well established, and any difficulty that
    arises is due only to the application of well settled            B
    principles in an individual case'."

          The appellate judgment does not seem to defer to
    this principle."

     16. Though the above discussions would lead us to the           C
conclusion that the learned Appellate Bench of the High Court
was not correct in interfering with the order passed by the
learned Trial Judge we wish to make it clear that our aforesaid
conclusion is not an expression of our opinion on the merits of
the controversy between the parties. Our disagreement with the       D
view of the Division Bench is purely on the ground that the
manner of exercise of the appellate power is not consistent with
the law laid down by this Court in the case of Wander Ltd.
(supra). Accordingly, we set aside the order dated 09.10.2012
passed by the Appellate Bench of the Bombay High Court and           E
while restoring the order dated 13.04.2012 of the learned Trial
Judge we request the learned Trial Judge, or such other court
to which the case may, in the mean time, have been transferred
to dispose of the main suit as expeditiously as its calendar
would permit with the expectation that the same will be possible     F
within a period of six months from the date of receipt of this
order. The appeal shall stand disposed of in terms of the above.

K.K.T.                                     Appeal disposed of.