MOHD. IMRAN KHANversusSTATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)

                    [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1030


 A                       MOHD. IMRAN KHAN
                                    v.
                  STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 1516 of 2010)
                          OCTOBER 10, 2011
 B
         [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

           Penal Code, 1860- s.376 - Rape - Age of prosecutrix
     -Margin of error in age ascertained by radiological
 c   examination - Held: The medical report and the deposition
     of the Radiologist cannot predict the exact date of birth, rather
     it gives an idea with a long margin of 1 to 2 years on either
     side.
         Penal Code, 1860 - s.376 - Rape - Testimony of
  D prosecutrix - Appreciation of - Held: The statement of
    prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable,
    requires no corroboration - The court may convict the
    accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix - On facts,
    the trial court found no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix -
· E The evidence of rape stood fully corroborated by the medical
    evidence - Conviction of accused-appellants accordingly
    upheld - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.114(b) and s.118.
        Penal Code, 1860 - s.376 rlw s.34 - Conviction under,
   for rape of minor - Issue of sentencing - Trial Court had
 F sentenced the accused-appellants to RI for 7 years - High
   Court after taking into consideration all the circumstances
   including that the incident took place in 1989; the appeal
   before it was pending for more than 10 years; the prosecutrix
   had willingly accompanied the appellants to another city and
 G stayed with them in the hotel; and she was more than 15 years
   of age when she eloped with the appellants and the
   appellants were young boys, reduced the sentence to 5 years
   which was less than the minimum prescribed sentence for the
   offence - Held: As the High Court itself awarded the sentence

H                                 1030
  MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GdVT. OF NCT OF 1031
                   DELHI)
. less than the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence       A
  recording special reasons, it is not a fit case to reduce the
  sentence further - Sentence/Sentencing.
       Criminal Trial - Investigation - Role of the Investigating
  Officer - Held: The investigation into a criminal offence must
  be free from all objectionable features or infirmities which B
  may legitimately lead to a grievance to either of the parties
  that the investigation was unfair or had been carried out with
  an ulterior motive which had an adverse impact on the case
  of either of the parties - The Investigating Officer is supposed
  to investigate an offence avoiding any kind of mischief or c
  harassment to either of the party - He has to be fair and
· conscious so as to rule out any possibility of bias or impartial
  conduct so that any kind of suspicion to his conduct may be
  dispelled and ethical conduct is absolutely essential for
  investigative professionalism.
                                                                   D
        The prosecution case was that the prosecutrix, a
  fifteen year old girl, was raped by the two appellants. The
  trial court convicted the appellants under Section 366 IPC
  rlw Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to undergo RI for
  4 years. Both the appellants were further sentenced under E
  Section 376 IPC to RI for 7 years. On appeal, the High
  Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants under
  Section 376 IPC, however, set aside their conviction
   under Sections 366/34 IPC and further reduced the
  sentence from 7 years RI to 5 years RI.
                                                                  F
       In the instant appeals, the appellants challenged their
  conviction under Section 376 IPC inter alia on grounds
  that the prosecutrix was over 16 years of age on the date
  of incident and that she was a willing partner in the entire
  episode.
                                                                  G
      Dismissing the appeals, the Court
      HELD:1. The incident statedly occurred on or about
  25-11-1989. Both the courts below had laboured hard to
  find out the age of the prosecutrix for the reason that
  defence produced certificate from Safdarjung Hospital,          H
     1032 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A New Delhi to create confusion and the 1.0. in order to help
  the accused-appellants had made a statement that the
  certificate on record did not belong to the prosecutrix.
  The Birth Certificate issued under Section 17 of the
  Registration of Birth & Death Act, 1969 reveals that a
B female child was born on 2.9.1974 by the wedlock of
  Prabhu Dass and Devki, the parents of the prosecutrix.
  This certificate has been duly proved by the Medical
  Record Officer, Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi (PW.9).
  Similar evidence had been given by the C.M.O., N.D.M.C.,
  Delhi (PW.7). These documents have thoroughly been
C examined by the courts below and there is no cogent
  reason to examine the issue further. [Para 14] [1042-C-H;
  1043-A-B]
        1.2. The medical report of the Radiologist issued by
  Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi revealed that
0
  age of the prosecutrix was between 16 and 17 years.
  However, the medical report and the deposition of the
  Radiologist cannot predict the exact date of birth, rather
  it gives an idea with a long margin of 1 to 2 years on either
  side. [Para 14] [1043-C]
E
         1.3. From the original records, it is clear that the
    prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age on the date of
    incident. [Para 14] [1043-E]
       Jaya Mala v. Home Secretary, Government of J & K &
F Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1297; Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh
  @ Chhotu Singh & Anr. (2009) 6 sec 681: 2009 (7) SCR
  451 and State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chhotey Lal (2011) 2 SCC
  550: 2011 (1) SCR 406 - relied on.
      Mussauddin Ahmed v. State of Assam (2009) 14 SCC
G 541 and Alamelu & Anr. v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385 - cited.
    EVIDENCE OF PROSECUTRIX:
       2.1. It is a trite law. that a woman, who is the victim of
  sexual assault, is not an accomplice to the crime but is a
H victim of another person's lust. The prosecutrix stands
 MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1033
                  DELHI)
  at a higher pedestal than an injured witness as she A
  suffers from emotional injury. Therefore, her evidence
  need not be tested with the same amount of suspicion .
  as that of an accomplice. The Indian Evidence Act, 1872
  nowhere says that her evidence cannot be accepted
  unless it is corroborated in material particulars. She is B
  undoubtedly a competent witness under Section 118 of
  Evidence Act and her evidence must receive the same
  weight as is attached to an injured in cases of physical
  violence. The same degree of care and caution must
  attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of
  an injured complainant or witness and no more. If the C
  court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act
  on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law
   or practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar to
   illustration (b) to Section 114 which requires it to look for
   corroboration. If for some reason the court is hesitant to D
   place implicit reliance on the testimony of the prosecutrix
   it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her
· testimony short of corroboration required in the case of
   an accomplice. If the totality of the circumstances
   appearing on the record of the case disclose that the E
   prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to falsely
   involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily
   have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court
   must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while
   dealing with cases involving sexual molestations. Rape
                                                                 F
   is not merely a physical assault, rather it often distracts
   the whole personality of the victim. The rapist degrades
   the very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the
   testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in the
 ··background of the entire case and in such cases, non-.
   examination even of other witnesses may not be a G
   serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly
   where the witnesses had not seen the commission of the
    offence. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the
    effect that statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy
    of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The H
        1034 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


    A court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of
        the prosecutrlx. [Para 15] [1043-F-H; 1044-A-G]
          2.2. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that there
      was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix, as no self·
      respecting girl would level a false charge of rape against
    B anyone by staking her own honour. The evidence of rape
      stood fully corroborated by the medical evidence. The
      MLC of the prosecutrix Ext.PW2/A was duly supported by
      the Dr. (PW.2). [Para 16] [1044-G-H]
            State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewatchand
    c Jain AIR 1990 SC 658; State of U.P. v. Pappu @Yunus &
      Anr. AIR 2005 SC 1248; Vijay@ Chinee v. State of M.P.
      (2010) 8 sec 191: 2010 (8) SCR 1150; State of Punjab v.
      Gurmit Singh & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393 and Wahid Khan v.
      State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 2 SCC 9: 2009 (15) SCR
    D 1207 - relied on.
           3.1. In the instant case, the 1.0. (PW.15) unfortunately
      made an attempt to help the accused/appellants, though
      in the examination-in-chief the witness has deposed that
      the Birth Certificate providing the date of birth as 2.9.1974
    E was genuine. [Para 19] [1046-A-B]
             3.2. The investigation into a criminal offence must be
        free from all objectionable features or infirmities which
       may legitimately lead to a grievance to either of the parties
       that the investigation was unfair or had been carried out
    F with an ulterior motive which had an adverse impact on
       the case of either of the parties. The Investigating Officer
       is supposed to investigate an offence avoiding any kind
       of mischief or harassment to either of the party. He has
       to be fair and conscious so as to rule out any possibility
    G of bias or impartial conduct so that any kind of suspicion
       to his conduct may be dispelled and the ethical conduct
       is absolutely essential for investigative professionalism .
     . [Para 21] [1046-F·H; 1047-A]

•          State of Kamataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy AIR 2000 SC
    H
MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1035
                 DELHI)
185; Jamuna Chaudhary & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1974 A
SC 1822; State of Bihar & Anr. etc. etc. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr.
AIR 1991 SC 1260; Babubhai v. State of Gujarat & Ors.
(2010) 12 sec 254: 2010 (10 ) SCR 651 - relied on.
    Javed Masood & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 3
sec 538: 2010 (3) SCR 236 - referred to.                    B
     4. In the instant case, the High Court after taking into
consideration all the circumstances including that the
incident took place in 1989; the appeal before it was
pending for more than 10 years; the prosecutrix had
willingly accompanied the appellants to Meerut and C
stayed with them in the hotel; and she was more than 15
years of age when she eloped with the appellants and the
appellants were young boys, reduced the sentence to 5
years which was less than the minimum prescribed
sentence for the offence. As the High Court itself has D
awarded the sentence less than the minimum sentence
 prescribed for the offence recording special reasons, it
 is not a fit case to reduce the sentence further in a proved
 case of rape of a minor. [Para 23] [1047-E~F]
    Baldev Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab AIR 2011 SC       E
1231 - referred to.
                    Case Law Reference:
     (2009) 14 sec 541         cited              Para 13
     (2011 > 2 sec 385         cited              Para 13    F
     AIR 1982 SC 1297          relied on          Para 14
     2009 (7) SCR 451          relied on          Para 14
     2011 (1) SCR 406          relied on          Para 14
     AIR 1990 SC 658           relied on          Para 15    G
     AIR 2005 SC 1248          relied on          Para 15
     2010 (8) SCR 1150         relied on          Para 15
     AIR 1996 SC 1393          relied on          Para 17
      2009 (15) SCR 1207       relied on          Para 17
                                                             H
     1036 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A        2010 (3) SCR 236            referred to          Para 18
         AIR 2000 SC 185             relied on            Para 20
         AIR 1974 SC 1822            relied on            Para 21
         AIR 1991 SC 1260            relied on            Para 21
B        2010 (10) SCR 651           relied on            Para 21
         AIR 2011 SC 1231            referred to          Para 22
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
    No. 1516 of 2010.
C       From the Judgment & Order dated 8.12.2009 of the High
    Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal No. 311 of 1999.
                                 WITH
    Criminal Appeal No. 1517 of 2010.
D       P.P. Malhotra, ASG, Amrendra Sharan, Abhay Kumar,
    Sujeet Kr. Murty, Somesh Jha, S. Islam Anis Ahmed, Balraj
    Dewan, P.K. Dey, Rajaja Narayana, Anil Katiyar for the
    appearing parties.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E      DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Both these criminal appeals
  have been preferred against the common impugned judgment
  and order dated 8.12.2009 of the High Court of Delhi passed
  in Criminal Appeal Nos.311 of 1999 and 312of1999, by which
  the High Court has affirmed the conviction of the appellants
F under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
  called 'IPC'), however, set aside their conviction under Sections
  366/34 IPC and further reduced the sentence from 7 years RI
  to 5 years RI with a fine of Rs.10,000/- each and in default to
  undergo further punishment for 3 months.
G        2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals
    are unfolded by the statement of Shri Prabhu Dass (father of
    prosecutrix Monika) dated 28.11.1989 made before the Police
    Station, Vinay Nagar, New Delhi to the effect that his daughter
    Monika, aged about 15 years, studying in standard 9th in Green
H
MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1037
        DELHI) [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Field School, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi had left her house     A
on 24.11.1989 for going to school. She informed through
telephone that she would stay in the house of her friend Arnita
for the night. On 25.11.1989 at about 8.30 a.m. Monika
telephoned her cousin Salish Anand that she was going to
Pragati Maidan along with her school friends and asked him         B
to reach there so that she would come back with him. Monika
asked Salish Anand to -meet her at Ahmed Food Restaurant,
 U.P. Pavilion, where Mohd. lmran Khan and Jamal Ahmed
 (appellants) used to work. Salish Anand went to Pragati
 Maidan at the pointed place, but he could neither meet Monika     C
 nor either of the appellants, but he came to know that Monika
was roaming inside Pragati Maidan along with the appellants.
 As she did not come back till evening, the complainant Prabhu
 Dass went to Pragati Maidan on 26.11.1989 and on enquiry
 he came to know that Monika was seen roaming with the
 appellants. The appellants were known to Monika as Prabhu         D
 Dass, complainant was having a stall of readymade garments
 at shop no.11 in Anarkali Bazar, Pragati Maidan in front of the
 food stall where the appellants were working. Complainant's
 wife Devki and daughter Monika used to come to work there
 also. Complainant searched for his daughter at many places        E
 but could not find.
     3. On the basis of his statement, a case under Section 363
IPC was registered and investigation ensued. It was during the
investigation Monika, prosecutrix was recovered. The
appellants-accused Mohd. lmran Khan and Jamal Ahmed were           F
also arrested. Offences under Sections 366 and 376 IPC were
added. Monika was examined under Section 164 of Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called 'Cr.P.C.') on the
basis of which the appellants-accused were arrested. After
having further investigation, offences punishable under Sections   G
342/506 IPC were also added.
      4. Monika, prosecutrix was medically examined to
 determine her age and to find out the possibility of commission
 of rape. The appellants were also examined medically. After
 conclusion of the investigation, the matter was committed to      H
     1038 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A Sessions Court and trial commenced. Prosecution examined
  as many as 16 witnesses in support of its case. The defence
  examined 4 witnesses. Mohd. lmran Khan, first appellant also
  examined himself under Section 315 Cr.P.C. After conclusion
  of the trial, the Trial Court vide judgment and orders dated
B 29.5.1999 and 31.5.1999 convicted the appellants under
  Section 366 IPC read with Section 34 and sentenced them to
  undergo RI for 4 years and a fine of Rs.2,000/- each. In default
  of payment of fine, they would undergo SI for two months. Both
  the appellants were further sentenced under Section 376 IPC
  to RI for 7 years and a fine of Rs.3,000/- each. In default of
C payment of fine, they would undergo SI for 3 months. However,
  both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
       5. Being aggrieved, both the appellants preferred separate
  Criminal Appeal Nos.311of1999 and 312of1999 which have
  been disposed of by the common impugned judgment and
0
  order dated 8.12.2009, by which the High Court acquitted both
  the appellants of the charges under Sections 366/34 IPC, but
  maintained their conviction under Section 376 IPC. However,
  the sentence under Section 376 IPC was reduced from 7 years
  to 5 years each and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each failing
E which to undergo SI for 3 months.
        Hence, these appeals.
        6. Shri Amrendra Sharan, learned Senior counsel. for the
  appellant Jamal Ahmed in Criminal Appeal No.1517 of 2010
F has submitted that the prosecutrix Monika was over and above
  16 years of age. The Investigating Officer deposed in the court
  that the Birth Certificate produced in the court did not relate to
  her. The prosecution did not cross-examine him after declaring
  hostile. In such an eventuality the appellant is entitled for the
  benefit of his statement. The appellant Jamal Ahmed had no
G physical connection with the prosecutrix. She had an affair with
  Mohd. lmran Khan and had gone with him voluntarily. She had
  been taken from Delhi to Meerut by bus. She met with an
  Advocate for planning her marriage with Mohd. lmran Khan.
  She stayed in the hotel. Thus, she had ample opportunity to
H
  MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1039
          DELHI) [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
  raise hue and cry or inform some body at some place that she       A
  had been subjected to some threat or coercion. The courts
· below erred in placing reliance on her statement.
     7. Shri Anis Ahmed, learned counsel appearing for
 another'!lf>pellant in Criminal Appeal No.1516 of 2010 has also
 assailed the impugned judgment on similar grounds.                  B
       8. Per contra, Shri P.P. Malhotra, learned ASG appearing
 for the State of Delhi has opposed the appeals contending that
 Monika, prosecutrix was below 16 years of age on the date of
 incident. She remained under persistent threats from the
 appellants. Therefore, she could not raise hue and cry. The         C
 concurrent finding of facts regarding rape by both the appellants
 does not warrant any interference. The appeals lack merit and
  are liable to be dismissed.
      9. We have considered the rival submissions made by the        D
 learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
       10. The Trial Court has meticulously scrutinised and
 appreciated the evidence of the prosecution as well as of
 defence. Shri Prabhu Dass, father of the prosecutrix died on
 10.11.1995 during trial before his statement could be recorded. E
 Som Wati, Lady Constable (PW.1) deposed that she was in
 the team which recovered the prosecutrix on 29.11.1989 and
 taken her for medical examination. She has also recovered the
 underwear of the prosecutrix and was handed over to 1.0. Dr.
 Reeta Rastogi (PW.2) proved the M.L.C., Ext.PW2/A of the
 prosecutrix and deposed that the same was prepared by her F
 according to which there was no sign of external injury. The
 hymen of the prosecutrix was inflame and there was slight
 bleeding. Her vagina admitted two fingers tightly. Prosecutrix
 was not habitual of intercourse but there was evidence of
 intercourse. Its witness was not cross-examined by the defence G
  as to whether the evidence of intercourse was recent one or
  not. Monika, the prosecutrix (PW.3) had given full version of the
  incident as to how she had been picked up by the appellants
  from Pragati Maidan. She knew both the accused as they had
  been working in the stall near the stall of her father. When H
     1040 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


 A prosecutrix was waiting for her cousin, the accused persons
     showed her a knife and told her in case she tried to run away
     or raise noise, they would kill her. Both the accused persons
     forcibly took her to ISBT in a three wheeler and from there to
     Meerut by bus. The accused kept their respective knives on the
 B back of the prosecutrix in such a manner that neither the
     passengers nor the bus conductor could notice of their activity.
    She was taken to Hotel Ajanta in Meerut where the appellant
    Jamal Ahmed made the entry in the Hotel register and took her
    to room no.101. At the time of making entry in the Hotel register
    by accused Jamal Ahmed, accused Mohd. lmran Khan stayed
C with the prosecutrix throughout. Both the accused persons
    committed rape upon her in that room. Next day in the morning
    she was taken by the accused persons to the house of the sister
    of one of them and from there she was brought to Delhi to the
    house of elder brother of appellant Jamal Ahmed. Both the
D accused persons committed rape upon her in that house. They
   ·had put their knives on her back in such a manner that other
    persons could not notice them. She could not raise hue and cry
    while coming from Meerut to Delhi as she was totally in a
    position of shock and the accused appellants threatened to kill
E her in case she raises voice or tries to run away. On 27 .11.1989
   she had been locked inside the house as the appellants had
   gone away and after coming back in the evening she was raped
    by both of them. On 28.11.1989 both the appellants left the
   house and returned in the evening along with elder brother and
   brother-in-law of accused lmran. These two persons had taken
F the prosecutrix to a flat behind G.B. Pant Hospital where she
   found both the appellants present. After sometime, police
   recovered her from that place and she was sent for medical
   examination. Her statement was recorded under Section 164
   Cr.P.C. on 29.11.1989.
G
         11. Shri Babu Lal (PW.11), the then Metropolitan
    Magistrate proved the statement of the prosecutrix recorded
    under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Other witnesses also supported the
    case of the prosecution. Both the appellants denied their
    involvement while their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
H
 MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1041
         DELHI) [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
were recorded. Some defence witnesses were examined, A
however, relevant witness had been appellant lmran Khan who
has examined himself as DW.5 under Section 315 Cr.P.C.
According to him Monika, prosecutrix met him on 25.11.1989
at 3 p.m. at his restaurant and told him that her mother had
turned her out so she would not go to her house and if he B
refused to keep her she would die. It was on the insistence of ·
the prosecutrix that he along with another appellant and
prosecutrix went to Meerut to consult Shri Mustafa, Advocate
who was known to other appellant, however, the lawyer told her
to bring the Birth Certificate etc. as it was to be produced in C
the court for getting married and court would issue one month's
 notice.
     12. All the prosecution witnesses have faced grilling cross-
examination but nothing could be elicited to discredit any part
of their evidence. This part of the prosecution has been            D
accepted by both the courts and we do not see any cogent
reason to interfere with the same.
       13. Learned counsel for both the parties have emphasised
 on the question as to whether the conduct of the prosecutrix had
 been such that the appellants could not be held responsible as E
 she had voluntarily gone with them to Meerut and, in spite of
 the fact, that she had ample opportunity to raise hue and cry or
 inform any person, she did not do so. It is submitted on behalf
.of the appellants that it was a case of consent as the
 prosecutrix had voluntarily accompanied the appellants to F
 Meerut. In order to buttress his argument, Shri Amrendra
 Sharan, learned senior counsel, placed reliance upon the
 judgments of this Court in Mussauddin Ahmed v. State of
 Assam, (2009) 14 SCC 541; and A/ame/u & Anr. v. State
 represented by Inspector of Police, (2011) 2 SCC 385, wherein
 after appreciating the evidence on record, the Court held that G
  the prosecutrix had been a willing partner in the entire episode.
  The conviction accorded under Section 376 IPC by the courts
  below has been set aside by this Court in similar
  circumstanees.
                                                                    H
     1042 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


 A        In our considered opinion, such arguments may be relevant
     in case we reach the conclusion that the findings of fact
     recorded by the courts below on the issue of age of the
     prosecutrix and commission of rape could not be factually
     correct and were liable to be set aside.
 B        In view of the fact that the High Court has acquitted the
     appellants for the offences under Sections 366/34 IPC the issue
     of kidnapping is not required to be considered further.
     AGE:
c       14. Both the courts below have laboured hard to find out
   the age of the prosecutrix for the reason that defence produced
   certificate from Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi to create
   confusion and the 1.0. in order to help the appellants had made
   a statement that the certificate on record did not belong to the
D prosecutrix. The medical report of the Radiologist issued by
   Ram Manohar Lohia Hospital, New Delhi revealed that age of
   the prosecutrix was between 16 and 17 years. The Birth
   Certificate issued under Section 17 of the Registration of Birth
   & Death Act, 1969 reveals that a female child was born on
   2.9.1974 by the wedlock of Prabhu Dass and Devki, residents
E of Sector 12/69, R.K. Puram, New Delhi and its registration
   number had been 4840. It also reveals that number of live
  children including this child had been two. However, this
  certificate has been duly proved by Vijay Kumar Hamal,
  Medical Record Officer, Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi
F (PW.9), who explained that one female child was born in
  Safdarjung Hospital at 7.15 a.m. on 2. 9.1974. Her mother's
  name was Devki, wife of Prabhu Dass and her address was
  R.K. Puram, New Delhi. He also explained that the other Birth
  Certificate produced by the defence according to which a
G female child was born on 12.9.1971 was of a different female
  child who was born to one Devi Rani, wife of Prabhu Dayal,
  residents of Kotla Mubarakpur and thus, it did not belong to
  Monika, prosecutrix. Similar evidence had been given by Dr.
  R.K. Sharma, C.M.O., N.D.M.C., Delhi (PW.7). According to
  him, the female child was born with Registration No.4840 on
H 2.9.1974 and he further explained that the name of the parents
MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCJ OF 1043
        DELHI\ [DR. 8.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
and address of another female child born on 27.9.1971 bearing A
different registration no.4502 had been totally different, i.e.
Prabhu Dayal and Devi Rani, residents of Kotla Mubarakpur .
The number of living children with that family is also different
from that of the prosecutrix. These documents have thoroughly
been examined by the courts below and we do not see any 8
cogent reason to examine the issue further.
     The medical report and the deposition of the Radiologist
cannot predict the exact date of birth, rather it gives an idea
with a long margin of 1 to 2 years on either side. In Jaya Mala
v. Home Secretary, Government of J & K & Ors., AIR 1982           c
SC 1297, this Court held:
    "However, it is notorious and one can take judicial notice
    that the margin of error in age ascertained by radiological
    examination is two years on either side."
    (See also: Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh @ D
Chhotu Singh & Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 681; and State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Chhotey Lal, (2011) 2 SCC 550)
     In view of the above as we have seen the original record
produced before us, we are of the considered opinion that the     E
prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age on the date of
incident.
EVIDENCE OF PROSECUTRIX:
      15. It is a trite law that a woman, who is the victim of sexual
assault, il? not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of F
another person's lust. The prosecutrix stands at a higher
pedestal than an injured witness as she suffers from emotional
injury. Therefore, her evidence need not be tested with the same
amount of suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called 'Evidence Act'), nowhere G
says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a
 competent witness under Section 118 of Evidence Act and her
evidence must receive the same weight as is attached to an
 injured in cases of physical violence. The same degree of care H
     1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A and caution must attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in
   the case of an injured complainant or witness and no more. If
   the court keeps this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act
   on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there is no rule of law or
   practice incorporated in the Evidence Act similar lo illustration
8 (b} to Section 114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If
  for some reason the court is hesitant to place implicit reliance
  on the testimony of the prosecutrix it may look for evidence
  which may lend assurance to her testimony short of
  corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. If the
  totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case
C disclose that the prosecutrix does not have a strong motive to
  falsely involve the person charged, the court should ordinarily
  have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. The court must
  be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with
  cases involving sexual molestations. Rape is not merely a
D physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole person,ality
  of the victim. The rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless
  female and, therefore, the testimony of the prosecutrix must be
  appreciated in the background of the entire case and in such
  cases, non-examination even of other witnesses may not be a
E serious infirmity in the prosecution case, particularly where the
  witnesses had not seen the commission of the offence. (Vide:
  State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewa/chand Jain,
  AIR 1990 SC 658; State of U.P. v. Pappu@Yunus & Anr. AIR
  2005 SC 1248; and Vijay@ Chinee v. State of M.P., (2010)
F a sec 191).
         Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that
    statement of prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and
    reliable, requires no corroboration. The court may convict the
    accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix.
G         16. The Trial Court came to the conclusion that there was
    no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix, as no self-respecting
    girl would level a false charge of rape against anyone by staking
    her own honour. The evidence of rape stood fully corroborated
    by the medical evidence. The MLC of the prosecutrix Ext.PW2/
H . A was duly supported by Dr. Reeta Rastogi (PW.2}.
 MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1045
         DELHI) [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

      17. This view of the Trial Court stands fortified by the A
judgment of this Court'in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh &
 Ors. AIR 1996 SC 1393, wherein this Court observed that "the
 courts must, while evaluating evidence remain alive to the fact
 that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come
 forward in a court just to make a humiliating statement against B
 her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on
 her."
    Similarly, in Wahid Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2010) 2 sec 9, it has been observed as under:
     "It is also a matter of common law that in Indian society C
     any girl or woman would not make such allegations against
     a person as she is fully aware of the repercussions flowing
     therefrom. If she is found to be false, she would be looked
     at by the society with contempt throughout her life. For an
     unmarried girl, it will be difficult to find a suitable groom. D
     Therefore, unless an offence has really been committed.
     a girl or a woman would be extremely reluctant even to
     admit that any such incident had taken place which is likely
     to reflect on her chastity. She would also be conscious of
     the danger of being ostracised by the society. It would E
      indeed be difficult for her to survive in Indian society which
      is, of course, not as forward-looking as the western
      countries are."
      18. Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for
 the appellants on the judgment of this Court in Javed Masood          F
 & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2010) 3 SCC 538, wherein it
 had been held that in case the prosecution witness makes a
 statement and is not declared hostile, he is supposed to speak
 the truth and his statement is to be believed.
        It is in view of this fact in the instant case that Puran Singh, G
  1.0. (PW.15) has deposed in the court that the "birth certificate
. of the prosecutrix did not relate to the prosecutrix. I did not verify
  about the birth certificate from the NDMC. I do not remember
  if at the time of bail application I had submitted that the birth
  certificate is genuine but does not relate to prosecu\rix."            H
      1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


 A      19. Thus, the question does arise as to what extent the
   court is under an obligation to accept the statement of Puran
   Singh, 1.0. (PW.15) particularly in view of the birth certificate
  available on the record. In view of our finding in respect of the
  date of birth we are of the view that Puran Singh, 1.0. (PW.15)
B unfortunately made an attempt to help the accused/appellants,
  though in the examination-in-chief the witness has deposed that
  the Birth Certificate providing the date of birth as 2.9.1974 was
  genuine.
           Be that as it may, by now Puran Singh (PW.15) might have
c    retired as the incident itself occurred 22 years ago. Therefore,
     we do not want to say anything further in respect of his conduct.
         20. In State of Karnataka v. K. Yarappa Reddy, AIR 2000
     SC 185, this Court while dealing with a similar issue held:
         "It is well-nigh settled that even if the investigation is illegal
D        or even suspicious the rest of the evidence must be ·
         scrutinized independently of the impact of it. Otherwise the
         criminal trial will plummet to the level of the investigating
         officers ruling the roost. The court must have predominance .
         and pre-eminence in criminal trials over the action taken
E        by investigating officers. Criminal justice should not be
         made a casualty for the wrongs committed by the
         investigating officers in the case. In other words, if the court
         is convinced that the testimony of a witness to the
         occurrence is true the court is free to act on it albeit the
F        investigating officer's suspicious role in the case."
        21. The investigation into a criminal offence must be free
  from all objectionable features or infirmities which may
  legitimately lead to a grievance to either of the parties that the
  investigation was unfair or had been carried out with an ulterior
G motive which had an adverse impact on the case of either of
  the parties. Investigating Officer is supposed to investigate an
  offence avoiding any kind of mischief or harassment to either
  of the party. He has to be fair and conscious so as to rule out
  any possibility of bias or impartial conduct so that any kind of
H suspicion to his conduct may be dispelled and the ethical
 MOHD. IMRAN KHAN v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF 1047
         DELHI) [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

conduct is absolutely essential for investigative                   A
professionalism. The investigating officer "is not merely to
bolster up a prosecution case with such evidence as may
enable the court to record a conviction but to bring out the real
unvarnished truth." (Vide: Jamuna Chaudhary & Ors. v. State
of Bihar, AIR 1974 SC 1822; State of Bihar & Anr. etc. etc. v.      8
P.P. Sharma & Anr., AIR 1991 SC 1260; and Babubhai v.
State of Gujarat & Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 254)
     22. Shri Amrendra Sharan, learned senior counsel has
placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Baldev Singh
& Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 2011 SC 1231, wherein the            c
convicts of gang rape had been sentenced to 10 years RI and
a fine of Rs.1000/- each had been imposed and served about
more than 3 years imprisonment and incident had been very
old, this Court in the facts and circumstances of the case
reduced the sentence as undergone, directing the appellants         D
therein to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/- of fine to be paid to the
victim and prayed for some relief.                ·
     23. The High Court after taking into consideration all the
circumstances including that the incident took place in 1989;
the appeal before it was pending for more than 10 years; the        E
prosecutrix had willingly accompanied the appellants to Meerut
and stayed with them in the hotel; and she was more than 15
years of age when she eloped with the appellants and the
appellants were young boys, reduced the sentence to 5 years
which was less than the minimum prescribed sentence for the
offence. As the High Court itself has awarded the sentence less     F
than the minimum sentence prescribed for the offence recording
special reasons, we do not think it to be a fit case to reduce
the sentence further in a proved case of rape of a minor.
     The appeals lack merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.
                                                                    G
 B.B.B.                                     Appeals dismissed.