Holding

A divorced Muslim woman who cannot maintain herself is entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, and this provision does not conflict with Muslim Personal Law; mahr is not payable on divorce.

Summary

The appellant, a Muslim advocate, divorced his wife Shah Bano Begum by irrevocable talaq and argued that under Muslim Personal Law he owed no further maintenance beyond the iddat period, having paid dower (mahr). The wife filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) seeking maintenance, which the trial court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld, increasing the amount. The Supreme Court examined whether Section 125 applies to Muslim divorced women, whether it conflicts with Muslim Personal Law, and whether mahr is payable "on divorce" under Section 127(3)(b). The Court held that Section 125 is secular and applies to all wives, including divorced Muslim women who are unable to maintain themselves, and that there is no conflict with Muslim Personal Law. It further held that mahr is a mark of respect payable on marriage, not on divorce, and therefore does not trigger Section 127(3)(b). Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, confirming the maintenance order.

Issues considered

Whether Section 125 CrPC applies to a divorced Muslim wife.
Whether Section 125 CrPC conflicts with the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) regarding maintenance of a divorced wife.
Whether mahr/dower is payable "on divorce" within the meaning of Section 127(3)(b) CrPC, thereby extinguishing the maintenance order.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 125(1)(a), s. 125(3), s. 127(3)(b)
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898s. 488
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937s. 2

Subjects

MaintenanceSection 125 CrPCMuslim Personal LawMahrIddatDivorceUniform Civil CodeCriminal Procedure CodePersonal Law vs Statutory LawWomen's rights

Judgment

A

MOHD. AHMED KHAN

v.
B
SHAH BANO BEGUM AND ORS.

April 23, 1985

[Y.V.CHANDRACHUD, C.J., D.A. DESAI, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY,
C E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]
;r-
Mus/im Personal Law-Concept of dfrorce-Whether, oii the pronounce- -.. ,
ments of "taliq" and on the expiry of the period ofiddat 'fl divorced wife
ceases to be a wife,

Codeo/Crimina!Procedure Code, 1973 (Act ]/Of 1974) Sections 125(1)
D
(a) and Explanation (b) thereunder, Section 125 (3) and the Explanation, under the
proviso thereto and section 121 (3) (b), scope and interpretation oi-Correctness of
three Judges.' Bench decision reported in (1979) 2 SCR 75 dnd (/980) 3 SCR
1127 to the effect that section 12.5 of the code applies to Muslims and divorced
Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance-Whether there is any conflict between
the provisions of section 125 and that of the Muslitn Personal Law on the
E liability of the Muslim husband to provide for the maintenance of his divorced
wife.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, section 127 (3) (b) tead with .eclion
2 ofrhe Shariat Act XXVI of 1937-Wliether section 127 (3) (b) debars payme •. t
of n1ai11tenance to a divorced wife, once the Mahr or dower is paid-Whether the
liability of the husband to majntain a divroced wife is limited to the period of
F "iddat".

Nature of Mahr or dower-WheJher Mehr is maintenance.

Under section 125 (1) (a), if any person, having sufficient means neglects
'
or refuses to maintain bis wife, unable to maintain herself, a Magistrate of the
G First class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal order such person to make
a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife at such monthly rate not
exceeding five hundred rupees in the whole. Under Explanation {b) thereunder
'·wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce
from her husband and has not remarried. Under the explan(!.tion below sub·
section 3 of section 125, if a husband has contracted marriage with another
woman or keeps a mistress it shall be considered to be a just ground for his
Ii wifes' refusal to live with him. Keeping this in view, if in the trial arising out of
i.ioito. A. ItHAN v. SHAH !11\NO BBGUM 84s
an application made under section 125, and if the husband offers to maintain
his wife on condition of living with him, the Magistrate may consider any of the A
grounds of the wife's refusal to live with her husband before ordering the mainte-
nance. Under section 127 (3) (b), the Magistrate shall cancel the order passed
by him under section 125, in favour of a woman who has been divorced by, or
has obtained a divorce from her husband if the woman who has been di\.·orced
by her husband has recdved, whether before or after the date of the said order,
the whole of the sum, which, under any customary or personal law applicable to
the parties was payable on such divorce. B

The appellant, who is an ajvocate by profession was married to the
respondent in 1932. Three sons and two daughters were born of that marriage
In 1975, the appellant drove the respondent out of the matrimonial home. In
April 1978, the respondent filed a petition against the appellant under section
125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, irr the Court of the Judicial Magistrate
(First class) Indore, asking for maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month,
c
ia view of the professional income of the appellant which wa!I about Rs. 60,000
per annum. On November 6, 1978, the appellant divorced the respondent by an
irrevocable "talaq" and took up the defence that she had ceased to be his wife
by reason of the divorce granted by him ; that he was, therefore, under no obJi.
gation to provide maintenance for her ; that he had already paid maintenance
for her at the rate of Rs. 200 per mo'nth for about two years, and that, he had D
deposited a sum of Rs. 3,000 in the court by way of "dower or Mahr" during
the period of ''iddat". In August 1979, the Magistrate directed the appellant
to pay a princely sum of Rs. 25 per month to the respondent by way of mainte-
nance. In a revisional application filed by the respondent the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh enhanced the amount of maintenance to Rs. 179.20 per
month. Hence the appeal by special leave by the husband. The view taken in
the earlier two three Judges' Benches of the Supreme Court presided over by E
Krishna Iyer, J. and reported in (1979) 2 SCR 750 and (1980) 3 SCR 1127, to
the effect that section 125 of the Code applies to Muslims also and that there..
fore, the divorced muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance was doubted,
by the Bench consisting of Fazal Ali and Varadarajan, JJ., sinc.c in their opi..
nion the said decisions required reconsideration by a larger Bench consisting of
more than three judges as the decisions arc.not only in direct contravention of
the plain and unambiguous language of section 127 (3) (b) of the Code which
far from overriding the Muslim law on the subject protects and applies the same
in case where a wife has been divorced by the husband and the dower specified
has been paid and the period of iddat has been observed but also militates
against the fundamental concept of divorce by the husband and its consequen~s
under the Mus.Jim law which has been expressly protected by section 2 of the
Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937-an Act which was not
noticed in the said two decisions.
G

Dismissing the appeals, the Court Held : (Per Chandrachud, C. J.)

l. The Judgments of the Supreme Court in Bal Tahira (Krishna Iyer, J.t
Tulzapurkar, J. and Pathak, J.) and Faz/unbi (Krishna llyer, J, Chinnappa
H
846 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3s.c.R..
Reddy, J. and A.P. Sen, J.) are correct, except to the extent that the statement
A at page 80 of the report in Bal Tahira made in the context of sectio.n 127 (3) (b)
namely, ''payment of Mahr money, as a customary discharge is within the
cognizance of that provision". Justice Krishna Iyer who spoke for the Court in
both these cases, relied greatly on the teleological and schematic method of
interpretation so as to advance th.:: purpose of the law. These ~nstructional
techniques have their own importance in the interpretation of statutes meant to
B ameliorate the conditions of suffering sections of the. society. A divorced
rnuslim wife is, therefore, entitled to apply for maintenance under SffCtion 125 of )
the Code. [86SH, 866A-CJ

2.1 Clause (b) of the Explanation to section 125 (I) of the C::ode, which
defines "wife" as including a divorced wife, contains no words of :limitation to
justify the e~clusion of Muslim women from its scope. Wife, means a wife as
c .defined, irrespective of the religion professed by her or by h:er husband.
Therefore, a divorced muslim woman so long as she has not married, is a wife
for the purpose of section 125. [8SSA-B; 854B]

2.2 Under section 488 of the Code of 1893, the wife3' right to maintenance
depended upon the continuance of her married status. Therefore, that right
D could be defeated by the husband by divorcing her unilaterally a:s under the
Muslim Personal Law, or by obtaining a decree of divorce against her under the
other systems of law. It was in ord~r to remove this hardship that the Joint
Committee recommended that the benefit of the provisions regarding mainte-
nance should be el(tended to a divorced wOn1an, so long as she has not re-
married after the divorce. That is the _genesis of clause (b) of the Explanation
to section 125 (1). Section 125 of the Code is truly secular ip. character.
E Section 125 was enacted in order to provide a quick and summary· remedy to a
class of persons who are unable to maintain themselves. Whether. the spouses
are Hindus or Mus!ims, Christians or Parsis, Pagans or Heathens, is wholly
irrelevant in the application of these provisions. The reaso!1 for this is axio·
matic, in the sense that section 125 is a part of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
not of the Civil Laws which define and govern the rights and obligations of the
parties belonging to particular relations, like the Hindu Adoptions and Mainte-
F nance Act, The Shariat, or the Parsi Matrimonial Act. It woUld make no
differenre as to what is the religion professed by the neglected Wife, child or
parent. [8340-E: 8SSE·G]

2.3 Neglect by a person of sufficient 1neans to maintain these and the
inability of these persons to maintain themselves are the objective criteria
which determine the applicability of section 125. Such . provisions, which are
G essentially of a prophylactic nature, cut across the barriers of religion. True,
that they do not supplant the personal: law of the parties but, equally, the -reli-
gion professed by the parties or the state of the personal law by which they are
governed, cannot have any repercussiOn on the applicability of such laws un·
less, within the framework of the Constitution, their application is restricted to
a defined category of religious groups or classes. The liability imposed by sec-
tion 125 to maintain close relatives who are indigent is founded upon the indi·
H
~IOHD. A. KHAN v. SHAH DANO BEGUM

viduals' obligation-·to the society to prevent vagrancy and destitution. That is
the moral edict of the law and morality cannot be clubbed With relation. A
[834G-H]

That the right conferred by section 125 can be exercised irrespective of
the personal law of the parties, is fortified, especially in regard to Muslims, by
the provision contained in th-:: Explanation to the second provise to section
125 (3) of the Code. The explanation confers upon the wife the right to refuse
to live with her husbahd if he contracts another marriage leave alone, three or B
four other marriages, which a Mohomedan may have under the Islamic Law.
Further it shows uninistakably, that section 125 overrides the personal law, if
there is any conflict between the two [836B-C,F-G]

Jagir Kaur v. Jaswant Singh, (1964) 2 SCR 73,84; Nanak Chand v. Shri
Chandra Kishore Agarwala, [1970] 1 SCR 565 applied.
c
3.1 The contention that, according lo Muslim Personal Law the husband's
liability to provide for the maintenance of bis divorced wife is limited to th:! ·
period of iddat. despite the fact that she is unable to maintain herself cannot be
accepted, since that law does- not contemplate or countenance the situation
envisaged by section 125 of the Code. Wh~ther a husband is liable to maintain
his wife, which includes.a dlvorce~ wire, in all circumstances, and at all events D
is· not the subject matter of section 125. Section J25 deals with cases in which
a person who is possessed of sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain,
amongst others, bis wife who is unable to maintain herself. [838H, 851A-B

3.2 One must have regard to the entire conspectus of the Muslim Personal
Law in order to determine the extent, both in quantu1n and in duration, of the
husband's liability to provide for the maintenance of an indigent wife who has
E
been divorced by him. Under that law, the husband is bound to pay Mahr to
the wife as a mark of respect to her. ·True, that he may settle any amount he
likes by way of dower upon his wife, which cannot be less than 10 Dirhams
which is equivalent to three or four rupees. But one must have regard to th~
rCalities of life. Mahr is a m1rk of respect to the wife. The sum settled by way
of Mahr is generally expected to take care of the ordinary requirements of the F
wife, during the marriage and after. Bui these provisions of the Muslim Perso-
nal Law do not countenance cases in which the wife is unable to maintain her-
self after the divorce. ;:The application of those statements of law to the contrary
in text-books on Muslim Law must be restricted to that class of cases, in which
• there ·is no possibility of vagrancy or destitution arising out of the indigence of
the divorced wife. [8580-G]
G
3.3 The true position is that, if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself,
the husband's liability to provide maintenance for her ceases with the expiration
of the period of iddat. If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to
take recourse to section 125 of the Code. Thus there is no conflict between the
provisions of section 125 and those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question
of the Muslim husband's obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife
H
8411 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS [t9SSJ 3 s.c.a.
who is unable to maintain herself. Aiyat No. 241 and 242 of 'the Hol)' Koran'
A fortify that the Holy Koran imposed an obligation on the Muslim husband to
make provision for or to provide maintenance .to the divorced wife. The cont-
rary argument does less than justice to the teachings of Koran.
[859C-D; 862C-D]

3.4 Mahr is not the amount payable by the husband to the wife on divorce
B and therefore, does not fall within the meaning of section 127 (3) {b) of the
Code and the facile answer of the All India Muslim Law Boa.rd that the
Personal Law has devised the system of Mahr to meet the requirements of
women and if a woman is indigent, she must look to her relations, including
nephews and cousins, to support her is a most unreasonable view of law as well
as of life. [863E·F, 866E-F]

3.5 It is true under the Muslim Personal Law, the amount of Mahr is
c usually split into two parts, one of which is called ''prompt" whicl). is payable
on demand, and the other is called "deferred'', which is payabJe on :the disso1u·
>-
tion of the marriage by death or by divorce. But, the fact that defefred Mahr is
payable at the time of the dissolution of marriage, cannot justify th.at it is pay·
able 'on divorce'. Even assuming that, in a given case, the entire amount of
Mahr is of the deferred variety payable on the dissolution of marriage by
divorce, it cannot be said that it is an amount which is payable on divorce.
[8638-Q]

3.6 Divorce may be a convenient or identifiable point of time at which
the deferred amount has to be paid by the husband to the wife. But, the pay·
ment of the amount is not occasioned by the divorce, which is what is meant by
the expression 'on divorce', which occurs •.n section 127 (3) (b) of the Code. If
E Mahr is an amount which the wife is entitled to receive fro1n the husband in
consideration of the marriage, that is the very opposite of the amoua.t being pay-
able in consideration of divorce. Divorce dissolves the marriage.· Therefore.
no amount which is payable in consideration of the marriage can· possibly be
described as an amount payable in consideration of divorce. The alternative
premise that Mahr is an obligation imposed upon the husband as a mark of res-
pect for the wife, is wholly detrim,~ntal to the stance that it is an amount payable
111 to the wife oo divorce. A man may marry a woman for Jove, looks, learning or
nothing at alJ. And, he may settle a sum upon her as a mark of respect for her.
But he does not divorce her as a mark of respect. Therefore, a sum payable to
the wife out of respect cannot be a sum payable 'on divorce'. lhus, the pay-
ment of Mahr may be deferred to a future date as, for example, death or
divorce. But, that does not mean that the payment of the deferred dower is
occasioned by these events. ]863D·G
.G Similarly, the provision contained in section 127 (3) (b) may have been
introduced because of the misconception that dower is an amount payable 'on
divorce.' But, that again cannot convert an amount payable as a ma~k of respect
for the wife into an amount payable on divorce. [863HJ

Hamira Bibi v. Zubaida Bibi, 43 Indian Appeal 294 ; Syed Sabir Hussain
v. Farzand Hasan, 65 Indian Appeal l 19 <:ind 127 referred to,
l.!oab. A. KHAN v. SHAH BANO BEGUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 849
OBSERVATION: A
(Article 44 of our Constitution has remained a dead letter. There is no
evidence of any official activity for framing a comrnon civil code for the country.
A common Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing
disparate loyalties to Jaws which have conflicting ideologies. It is the State
which is charged with the duty of securing a uniform civil code for the citizens
of the country and, unqut.sLionably, it bcts the 1egi-;lative competence to do so. B
A beginning bas to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning. Inevi~
tably, the role of the reformer bas to be assumed by the courts because, it is be.-
yond the endurance of sensitive minds to allow injustice to be suffered when it
is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts of courts to bridge the gap between per-
sonal laws cannot take the place of a common Civil Code. Justice to all is a
far more satisfactory way of dispensing_justice than justice from case to case.)
c
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 103 of
1981.

From the Judgment and Order dated I. 7. 1980 of the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Cr!. Revision No. 320 of 1979. o
P. Govindan Nair, Ashok Mahajan, Mrs. Krip/ani, Ms. Sangeeta
and S.K. Gambhir for the Appellant.

Danial Latifi Nafess Ahmad Siddiqui, S.N. Singh and T.N. Singh
for the Respondents. ·

Mohd. Yunus Salim and Shakeel llhmed for Muslim Personal
Law Board.

S.T. Desai and S.A. Syed for the] Intervener Jamat-Ulema- F
Hind.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CHANDRACHUD,C.J. This appeal does n~t involve any question
of constitutional importance but, that is not to say that it does not G
involve any question of importance. Some questions which arise
under the ordinary civil and criminal law are of a far-reaching
significance to large segments of society which have been traditio-
nally subjected to unjust treatment. Women are one such segment.
' Na stree swatantramarhati" said Manu, the Law giver : The woman
does not deserve independence. And, it is alleged that the 'fatal H
Mo SdPRBMB c01.iRr RE10Rfl [t98SJ 3s.c.il.

A point in Islam is the 'degraJation of woman'('). To the Prophet is
ascribed the statement, hopefully wrongly, that 'Woman was made
from a crooked rib, and if you try to bend it straight, it will break ;
therefore treat your wives kindly.

B ,
This appeal, arising out of an application filed by a divorced
Muslim woman for maintenance under section 125 ·Of the Code of )
Criminal Procedure, raises a straightforward issue which is of
common interest not only to Muslim women, not only to women
generally but, to all those who, aspiring to create an equal society
c of men and women, lure themselves into the belief that mankind
has achieved a remarkable degree of progress in that direction.
The appellant, who is an advocate by profession, was married to the
respondent in 1932. Three sons and two daughters were born of
that marriage. In 1975, the appellant drove the respondent out of
the m~trimonial home. In April 1978, the respondent filed aipetition
D
against the appellant under section 125 of the Code in ttle court
of the learned Judicial Magistrate (First Class), Indore asking for
maintenance at the rate of Rs. 500 per month. On November
6, 1978 the appellant divorced the respondent by an irrevocable
talaq.His defence to the respondent's petition for maintenance was
that she had ceased to be his wife by reason of the divorce granted
E
by him, to provide that he was therefore nuder no obligation
maintenance for her, that he had already paid maintenance to her at
the rate of Rs. 200 per month for about two years and that, he had
deposited a sum of Rs. 3000 in the court by way of dowe,r during
the period the of iddat. In August, 1979 the learned Magistrate
F directed appellant to pay a princely sum of Rs. 25 peti month
to therespondent by '.way of maintenance. It may bem antioned
that the respondent had alleged that the appellant earns a
professional income of about Rs. 60,000 per year. In July, 1980, in
a revisional application filed by the respondent, the High Court of
Madhya Pradesh enhanced the amonnt of maintenance to Rs. 179.20
. per month. The husband is before us by special leave.
G

Does the Muslim Personal Law impose no obligati<;>n upon
the husband to provide for the maintenance of his. divorced wife?
Undoubtedly, the Muslim husband enjoys the privilege of being

(1) 'Selections from Kuran'-Edward William Lane 1843. Reprint J982, page xc
1l (Introduction)
MOHD. A. KHAN v. SHAH DANO BEGUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 851

able to discard his wife whenever he chooses to do so, for reasons
A
good, bad or indifferent. Indeed, for no reason at all. But, is the
only price of that privilege the dole of a pittance during the period of
iddat? And, is the law so ruthless in its inequality that, no matter
bow much the husband pays for the maintenanee of his divorced
wife during the period of iddat, the mere fact that be has paid
something, no matter how little, absolves him for ever from the duty· B
of paying adequately so as to enable her to keep her body and soul
together? Then again, is there any provision in the Muslim Personal
Law under which a sum is payable to the wife 'on divorce'? These
are some of the important, though agonising, questions which arise
for our decision.
c
The question as to whether section 125 of the Code applies to
Muslims also is concluded by two decisions of this Court which are
reported in Bai Tanira v. Ali Hi1ssain'Fidaalli Chothia(1) and Fazlunbi
v. K. Khader Vali.(') Those decisions took the view that the divorced
Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under section 0
125. But, a Bench consisting of our learned Brethren, Murtaza
Fazal Ali and A. Varadarajan, JJ. were inclined to the view that
those cases are not correctly decided. Therefore, they referred this
appeal to a larger Bench by an order dated Febru1ry 3, 1981, which
reads thus :
E
"As this case involves substantial question• of law
of far-reaching consequences, we feel that the decisions
of this Court in B.1i Tahira v. Ali Hu,sain Fidaalli Chothia &
A11'. and Fuzlun;; v. K. Khader Vali & Anr. require reconsi-
deration because, in our opinion, they are not only in
F
direct contravention of the plain and an unambiguous
language of s. l 27(3)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 which far from overriding the Muslim Law on the
subject protects and applies the same in case where a wife
has been divorced by the husband and the dower specified
has been paid and the period of iddat has been observed. G
The decision also appear to us to be against the fundamental
concept of divorce by the husband and its consequences

(l) 1979 (2) SCR 75
(2) 1980 (J)SCR IJ27
H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 3 S.C.R.

A under the Muslim law which has been' expressly protected
by s. 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application
Act, 1937-an Act which was not noticed by the
aforesaid decisions. We, therefore, direct that the matter
may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for being
heard by a larger Bench consisting of more than three
B Judges."

Section 125 of the Code of Crirr.inal Procedure which deals
with the right of maintenance reads thus :

"Order for maintenance of wi ·es, children and parents
c
125. (I) If any person having sufficient means neglects
or refuses to maintain-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain herself,
D
(b) ..... .

(c) ······

(d) ---...
E
a Magistrate of the first cl~ss may, upon proof of such
neglect or refusal, order such porSJn to make a monthly
allowance for the maintenance of his. wife .......•• ,at such
monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in the
whole as such Magistrate think fit ......
F

Explanation-For the purposes of this Chapte1-,-

(a) ... ,_ ....

(b) "Wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by,
G
or has obtained a divorce from, her husband has not
remarried.

(2) ..... .

"
MOHD. A. KHhN v. SHAN BANO BEGUM ( Chandrachud, C.J.) 853

(3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient c·ause A
to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for
every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying
the amount due in the manner provided for levying ·fines,
and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part
' of each month's allowance remaining unpaid after the
B
execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner
made:

Provided .........
c
Provided further that if such person offers to maintain
his wife on condition of her living with him. and she refuses
to live with him; such Magistrate may consider any
grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order
under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is
satisfied that there is just ground for so doing. D

Explantion- If a husband has contracted marriage with
another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to
be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him."
E
Section 127(3)(b), on which the appellant has built up the
edifice of his defence reads thus:

"Alteration in allowance

127. (I)
F
(2)

(3) Where any order has been made nnder
section 125 in favour of a woman who has been divorced
by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband, the
Magistrate shall, if he is satisfied that- G

(a) ......

(b) the woman has been divorced by her
husband and that she has received, whether before or after
the date o'. the said order, the whole of the sum which, H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (19S5] 3 'S,C.R.
_,
under any customary or per;onal law applicable to the
A parties, was payable on such divorce, cancel such order,-

(i) in the case where such sum was paid before
such order, from the date on which such order was made. •
B (ii) in any other case, from the date of expiry of
the period, if any, for which maintenance has been actually •
paid by the husband to the woman."

Under section 125(J)(a), a person who, having sufficient means,
C neglects or refuses to maintain his wife who is unable to maintain >-
herself, can be asked by the court to pay a monthly mai(ltenance to
her at a rate not exceeding Five Hundred rupees. By clause (b) of
the Explanation to section 125(1), 'wife' includes a divorced woman
who has not remarried. These provisions are loo clear and precise to
D admit of any doubt or refinement. The religion prof6ssed by a
spouse or by the spouses has no place in the scheme of these provi-
sions. Whether the spouses are Hindus or Muslims, Christians or
Parsis, pagans or heathens. is wholly irrelevant in the application
of these provisions. The reason for this is axiomatic, in the sense that
section 125 is a part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, not of the
E Civil Laws which define and govern the rights and obligations of the
parties belonging to particular religions, like the Hindu Adoptions
and Maintenance Act, the Shariat, or the Parsi Matrimonial Act,
Section 125 was enacted in order to provide a quick and summary
remedy to a class of persons who are unable to m iintain themselves.
What difference would it then make as to what is the religion profes-
F sed by the neglected wife, child or parent? Neglect by a person of
sufficient means to maintain these and the inability of these persons
to maintain themselves are the objective criteria which determine the
applicability of section 125. Such provisions, which are essentially
of a prophylactic nature, cut across the barriers of religion. True,
that they do not supplant the personal law of the parties but, equally
G the religiod professed by the parties or the state of the personal law
by which they are governed, cannot have any repercussion on the
applicability of such Jaws unless, within the framework of the
Constitution, their application is restricted to a defined category
of religious groups or classes. The liability imposed by section 125
to maintain close relatives who are indigent is founded upon the
ff individual's obligation to the society to prevent vagrancy and
MOHD. A. KHAN v. SHAN DANO BEGUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 855

destitution. That is the moral edict of the ·law and morality cannot A·
be clubbed with religion. Clause (b) of the Explanation to section
12S(i), which defines 'wife' as including a divorced wife, contains no
words ·of limitation to justify the exclusion of' Muslim women from
its scope. Section 125 is truly secular in character.

B
Sir James FitzJames Stephen who piloted the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1872 as a Legal Member of the Viceroy's Council,
desc.ribed the precursor of Chapter IX of the Code in which section
125 occurs, as 'a mode of preventing vagrancy or at least of
preventing its consequences. In Jagir kaur v. Jaswant Singh,(') Subba
Rao, J. speaking for the Court said that Chapter XXXVI of the c
Code of 1898 which contained section 488, c0rresponding to section
liS, "intends to serve a social purpose". In Nanak Chand v. Shri
Chan.dra Kishore Agarwa/a.(2) Sikri, J., while pointing out that the
scope of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act •. 1956 and that
,.
of section 488 was different, said that section 488 was "applicable to
all persons belonging to all religions and has no relationship with D
tlie personal law of the parties".

Under secton 488 of the Code of 1898, the wife's right to
maintenance depended upon the continuance of her married status.
Therefore, that right could be defeated by the husband by divorcing
E
her unilaterally as under the Muslim Personal Law, or by obtaining
a decree of divorce a_gainst her under the other systems of law. It
was in order to remove this hardship that the Joint Committee
recommended that the benefit of the provisions regarding mainte-.
nance should be extended to a divorced woman, so long as she has
not remarried after the divorce. That is the genesis of clause (b) of F
the Explanation to section 125(1), which provides that 'wife' inclu-
des a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce
froi'n' her husband and has not remarried. Even in the absence of
this· provision, the courts had held under the Code of 1898 that the
provisions regarding m 1intenance were independant of the personal
law governing the parties. The induction of the definition of 'wife, G
so'as to include a divorced woman lends even greater weight to that

(I) 1964 (2) SCR 73, 84.
(2) 1970 (1) SCR 565.

H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 S.C.R.

A conclusion. 'Wife' means a wife as defined, irrespective of the
religion professed by her or by her husband. Therfore, a divorced
Muslim woman, so Jong as she has not remarried, is a 'wife' for the
purpose of section '125. The statutory right available to her under
that s~ction is unaffected by the provisions of the personal Jaw
B applicable to her.

The condusion that the right conferred by section 125 can be
exercised irrespective of the personal law of the parties is fortified,
especially in regard to Muslims, by the provision contaiped in the
Explanation to the second proviso to section 125(3) of .the Code.
c That proviso says that if the. husband offers to maintain his wife
on condition that she should live with him, and she refuses to live
with him, the Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal
stated by her, and may make an order of maintenance notwith·
standing the offer of the husband, if he is satisfied that there is a
D just ground for passing such an order. According to the Explanation
to the proviso :

"If a husband has contracted marriage with ;mother
woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just
ground for his wife's refusal to live with him."
E
It is too well-known that "A Mahomedan may have as many
as four wives at the same time but not more. If he marries a fifth
wife when he has already four, the marriage is not void, but merely
irregular". (See Malia's Mahomedan Law,18th Edition, paragraph
F 255, page 285, quoting Baillie's Digest or Moohummudati Law; and
Ameer Ali's Mahomedan Law, 5th Edition, Vol. II, page 280).
The explanation confers upon the wife the right to refuse to live
with her husband if he contracts another marriage, leave alone 3
or 4 other marriages. It shows, unmistakably,. that section 125
overrides the personal law, if is any there contlict between
G the two.

The whole of this discussion as to whether the righl conferred
by section 125 prevails over the personal law of the parties, has
proceeded on the assumption that there is a conllict between the
provisions of that section and those of the Muslim Personal Law.
H The argument that by reason of section 2 of the Shariat Act,
.4
\
•

p.,!Jf!I). A. l((JA'I v. Sf!A'I BANO BEGUM (Chan1rachud, C.J.) 857

XXVl of 1937, the rule of decision in matters relating, inter a/ia, A
to maintenance "shatl be the Muslim Personal Law" also proceeds
upon a similar assumption. We embarked upon the decision of the
question of priority between the Code and the Muslim Personal
• Law on the assumption that there was a conflict between the two
because, in so far as it lies in our power, we wanted to set at rest,
once for all, the question whether section 125 would prevail over B,
the personal law of the parties, in cases where they are in conflict.

The next logical step to take is to examine the question, on
which considerable argument bas been advanced before us, whether
•"- there is any conflict between the provisions.of section 125 and those c
/ , of the Muslim Personal Law on the liability of the Muslim husband
to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife.

The contention of the husband and of the interveners who
support him is that, under the Muslim Personal Law, the liability
of tlie husband to maintain a divorced wife is limited to the period D
of iddot.jln support of this proposition, they rely upon the statement
of law on the point contained in certain text books. In Mulla's
Mahomedan Law (18th Edition, ·para 279, page 301), there is a
statement to the effect that, "After divorce, the wife is entitled to
maintenance during the period of iddat". At page 302, the learned
author .says : E

"Where an order is made for the maintenance of a
wife under section 488 of the Criminal Procedure Code
and the wife is afterwards divorced, the order ceases to
operate on the expiration of the period of iddat. The result F
is that a Mahomedan may defeat an order made against
him under secton 488 by divorcing his wife immediately
\.
after the order is made. His obligation to maintain his
• wife will cease in that case on the completion of her
iddat,''
G

Tyabji's Muslim law (4th Edition, para 304, pages 268-269).
contains the statement that :

"On the expiration of the iddat after talaq, the wife's
ri•ht
~
to maintenance ceases, whether
I
based on the Muslim
.
H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [198513 s.c.R.

A Law, or on an order under the Criminal Procedure Code·"

According to Dr Paras Diwan :

"'When a marriage is dissolved by divorce the wife is
entitled to maintenance during the period of iddat. ..• On
B the expiration of the period of iddat, the wife is not entitled
to any maintenance under any circumstances. Muslim Law
does not recognise any obligation on the part of a man to •
maintain a wife whom he had divorced."

(Muslim Law in Modern India, 1982 Edition, page 130)
c
These statements in the text book are inadequate to establish
the proposition that the Muslim husband is not under an obligation
to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife, who is unable
to maintain herself. One must have regard to the entire conspectus
of the Muslim P~rsonal Law in order to determine the extent both,
D in quantum and in duration, of the husband's liability to provide
for the maintenance of an indigent wife who has been divorced by
him. Under that law, the husband is bound to pay Mahr to the wife
as a mark of respect to her. True, that he may settle any amount he
likes by way of dower upon his wife, which cannot be less than 10 Dir-
hams, which is equivalent to three or four rupees (Mulla's Mahome·
E dan Law, 18th Edition, para 286, page 308).But, one must have regard
to the realities of life Mahr is a mark of respect to the wife. The
sum settled by way of Mahr is generally expected to take care of the
ordinary· requirements of the wife, during the marriage and after.
But these provisions of the Muslim Personal Law do not counte-
F nance cases in which the wife is unable to maintain herself after
the divorce. We consider it not only incorrect but unjust, to extend
the scope of tho statements extracted above to. cases in which a
divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. We are of the opinion
tliat the application of those statements of law must be restricted to
that class of cases, in which there is no possibility of vagrancy or •
G destitution arising out of the indigence of the divorced wife. We are
not concerned here with the broad and general question whether a
husband is liable to maintain his wife, which includes a divorced
wife, in all circumstances and at all events. That is not the subject
matter of section 125. That section deals with cases in which, a
person who is possessed of sufficient means neglects or refuses to
maintain, amongst others, his wife who is unable to maintain
ff
MOHD. A. KHAN v. SHAN BANO BEGUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 859
h~rself. Since the Mnslim Personal Law, which limits the husband's A
liability to provide for the maintenance of the divorced wife to the
period of iddat, does not contemplate or countenance the situation
envisaged by section 125, it would be wrong to hold that the
Muslim husband, according to his personal law, is not under an
obligation to provide maintenance, beyond the period of iddat, to B
' his divorced wife who is unable to maintain herself. The argument
of the appellant that, according to the Muslim Personal Law, his
liability to provide for the maintenance of his divorced wife is
limited to the period of iddat, despite the fact she is unable to ma!n·
tain herself, has therefore to be rejected. Th'e true position is that, if
the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband's liability to
c
."'
/ '
· provide maintenance for her ceases with the expiration of the period
of iddat. If she is unable to maintain herself, she is entitled to tak.e
recourse to section 125 of the Code, The outcome of this discussion
is that there is no co~flict between the provisions of section 125 and
those of the Muslim Personal Law on the question of the Muslim
husband's obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife D
who is unable to maintain herself.

There can be no greater authority on this question than the
Holy Quran, "The Quran, the Sacred Book of Islam, comprises
in its 114 Suras or chapters, the total of revelations believed to
have been communicated to Prophet Muhammed, as a final expres· E
sion of God's will''. (The Quran-Interpreted by Arthur J. Arberry).
Verses (Aiyats) 241 and 242 of the Quran show that according to
the Prophet, there is an obligation on Muslim husbands to provide
for their divorced wives. The Arabic version of those Aiyats and
their English translation are reproduced below :
F
Arabic version English version
Ayal No. 241 For divorced women
WA LIL MOTALLAQATAY Maintenance (should be
MATA UN Provided)
BILMAAROOFAY On a reasonable (Scale)
HAQQAN This is a duty G
ALAL MUTTAQEENA On .the righteous.
Ayat No. 242
KAZALEKA YUBAIYY ANULLAHO Thus doth God ·H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ti 98SJ 3 s.c.il..
A LAKUM AYATEHEE LA ALLAKUM Mab clear His Signs
TAQELOON To you : in order that
ye may undcntand.

(See 'The Holy Quran' by Yusuf Ali, Page 96).
;

B Tbe correctness of the translation of these Aiyats is not in
dispute except that, the contention of the appellant is that the word
'Mata' in Aiyat No. 241 means 'provision' and not 'maintenance'.
That is a distinction without a difference. Nor are we impressed by
the sbufiling plea of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board that,
in Aiyat 241, the exhortation is to the 'Mutta Queena', that is, to
c the more pious and the more God-fearing, not to the general run of
the Muslims, the 'Muslminin'. In Aiyat 242, the Quran says: "It is
expected that you will use your commonsense".

The English version of the two Aiyats in Muhammad Zafrul-
[) lah Khan's 'The Quran' (page 38) reads thus:

"For divorced women also there shall be prov1s1on
according to what is fair. This is an obligation binding on
the righteous. Thus does Allah make His commandments
clear to you that you may understand."
E
The translation of Aiyats 240 to 242 in 'The Meaning of the
Quran' (Vol. I, published by the Board of Islamic Publications,
Delhi) reads thus ;

F "240-241.

Those of you, who shall die and leave wives behind
them, should make a will to the effect that they should be
provided with a year's maintenance and should not be
turned out of their homes. But if they leave their homes of
G
their own accord, you shall not be answerable for whatever
they choose for themselves in a fair way ; Allah is All-
Powerful, All-wise. Likewise, the divorced women should
also be given something in accordance with the known
fair standard. This is an obligation upon the God-fearing
H people.
Mollo. A. KHAN v. SHAN DANO BEGUM (Chandrachud,)J.J.) 861
242. A

Thus Allah makes clear His commandments for you :

It is expected that you will use your commonsense."
B
•
In "The. Running Commentary of The Holy Quran" (1964
Edition) by Dr. Allamah Khadim Rahmani Nuri, Aiyat No. 241 is
translated thus :

"241
c
And for the divorced woman (also) a provision (should
be made) with fairness (in addition to her dower) ; (This is)
a duty (incumbent) on the reverent."

In "The Meaning of the Glorious Quran, Text and Explana-
tory Translation", by Marmaduke Pickthall, (Taj Company Ltd., o
karachi), Aiyat 241 is translated thus :

"241.

For divorced women a provision in kindness : A
duty for those who ward off (evil)." E

Finally, in "The Quran Interpreted" by Arthur J. Arberry.
Aiyat i41 is translated thus :

"241. F

There shall be for divorced women provision honour-
able-an obligation on the godfearing."

So God makes clear His signs for you : Happily you
will understand." G
Dr. K.R. Nuri in his book quoted above : 'The Running
Commentary of the Holy Quran", says in the preface :

"Belief in Islam does not mean mere confession of the
existence of something. It really means the translation of H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS t19ssj 3 S.C.R.
the faith into action. Words without deeds carry no
A meaning in Islam. Therefore the term "believe and do
good" has been nsed like a phrase all over the Quran.
Belief in something means that man should inculcate the
qualities or carry out the promptings or guidance of that
thing in his action. Belief in Allah means that besides
B
acknowledging the existence of the Author of the Universe,
•
we are to show obedience to His commandments ... "

These Aiyats leave no doubt that the Quran imposes. an obliga-
tion on the Muslim husband to make provision for or to provide
c maintenance to the divorced wife. The contrary argument does less
than justice to the teaching of the Quran. As observed by Mr. M.
Hidayatullah in his introduction to Mulla's Mahomedan Law, the
Quran is Al·furqan' that is one showing truth from falsehood and
right from wrong.
D
The second plank of the appellant's argument is that the res-
pondent's application under section 125 is liable to be dismissed be-
cause of the provision contained in section 127 (3) (b). That section
provides, to the extent material, that the Magistrate shall cancel the
order of maintenance, if the wife is divorced by the husband and,
E she has received "the whole of the sum which, under any custom~ry
or personal Jaw applicable to the parties, was payable on such
divorce". That raises the question as to whether, under the Muslim
Personal Law, any sum is payable to the wife 'on divorce' .. We do
not have to grope in the dark and speculate as to which. kind of a
sum this can be because, the only argument advanced before us on
F behalf of the appellant and by the interveners supporting him, is that
Mahr is the amount payable by the husband to the wife on divorce.
We find it impossible to accept this argument.

In Mulla's principles ofMahomedan Law (18th Edition, page .•
308\ Mahr or Dower is defined· in paragraph 285 as "a sum of
G money or other property which the wife is entitled to receive from
the husband in consideration of the marriage." Dr. Paras Diwan in
his book, "Muslim Law in Modern India" (1982 Edition, page 60),
criticises this definition on the ground that Mahr h not payable "in
consideration of marriage" bnt is an obligation imposed by law on
H the husband as a mark of respect for the wife, as is evident from the
MORD. A. KHAN v. ~HAR BA.NO BEG'JVl (Cha•1drachud, C.J.) 863
fact that non-specification of Mahr at the time of marriage does not A
affect the validity of the marriage. We need not enter into this
controversy and indeed, Mulla's book itself contains the further
statement at page 3J8 that the word 'consideration' is not used in •
the sense in which it is used in the Contract Act and that under the
Mohammedan Law, Dower is an obligation imposed upon the hus-
tand as a mark of respect for the wife. We are concerned to find B
whether Mahr is an amount payable by the husband to the wife on
divorce. Some confusion is caused by the fact that, under the
Muslim Personal Law, the amount of Mahr is usually split into two
parts, one of which is called "prompt", which is payable on de-
m1nd, and the other is called "deferred", which is payable on the
dissolution of the marriage. by death or by divorce. But, the fact
c
' .
that deferred Mahr is payable at the time of the dissolution of
.marriage, cannot justify the conclusion that it is payable 'on di-
vorce'. Even assuming that, in a given case, the entire amount of
Mahr is of the deferred variety payable on the dissolution of mar-
riage by divorce, it cannot be said that it is an amount which is D
payable on divorce. Divorce may be a convenient or identifiable
point of time at which the deferred amount has to be paid by the
husband to the wife. Bµt, the payment of the am.aunt is not occa·
sioned by the divorce, which is what is meant by the expression 'on
divorce', which occurs in cection 127 (3) (b) of the Cocle. If Mahr
is an amount which the wife is entitled to receive from the husband E
in consideration of the marriage, that is the very opposite of the
.amount being payable in consideration of divorce. Divorce
·dissolves the Marriage. Therefore no amount which is payable in con-
·sideration of the marriage can possibly be described as an amount
payable in consideration of divorce. The alternative premise that
.Mahr is an obligation imposed upon the husband as a mark of F
respect for the wife, is wholly detrimental to the stance that it is an
amount payabie to the·wife on divorce. A man may marry a woman
for love, looks, learning or nothing at all. And. he may settle a sum
upon her as a mark of respect for her. But he does not divorce her
as a ·mark of respect. Therefore, a sum payable to the wife out of
respect cannot be a sum payable 'on divorce'. G

In an appeal from a Full Bench decision of the Allahabad
A igh Court, the Privy Council in Hamira Bibi v. Zubaide Bibi(') sum-

(I) 43 I. A. 294. I1
H
SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS [!9S5] 3 s.c.k
A med up the nature and character of Mahr in these words :

"Dower is an essential incident under the Muslim
Law to the status of marriage; to such an extent that is so
that when it is unspecified at the time the marriage is cont-
B ract~d, the law declares that it must be adjudged on definite >
principles. Regarded as a consideration for tile marriage,
it is, in theory, payable before consummation; but the law
allows its division into two parts, one of which is called
"prompt" payable before the wife can be called upon to
enter the conjugal domicil; the other "deferred", payable
c on the dissolution of the contract by the death of either of
the parties or by divorce." (p. 300-301)

This statement of law was adopted in another decision of the
Privy Council in Syed Sabir Husain v. Farzand Hasan.( 1) It is not
quite appropriate and. seems invidious to describe any particular
0 Bench of a court as "strong" but, we cannot resist the temptation of
mentioning that Mr. Syed Ameer Ali was a party to the decision in
Hamlra Bihi while Sir Shadi Lal was a party to the decision in Syed
Sabir Husain. These decisions show that the payment of dower may
be deferred to a future date as, for example, death or divorce. But,
that does not mean that the payment of the deferred dower is occa-
E sioned by these events.

It is contended on behalf of the ~ppellant that the proceedings
of the Rajya Sabha dated December 18, 1973 (volume 86, column
186), when the bill which led to the Code of 1973 was on the anvil;
would show that the intention of the Parliament was to leave the
provisions of the Muslim Personal Law untouched. In this behalf,
reliance is placed on the following statement made by Sbri Ram
Niwas Mirdha, the then Minister of State, Home Aftiiirs :

"Dr. Vyas very learnedly made certain observations ,
that a divorced wife under the Muslim law deserves to be
G treated justly and she should get what is her. equitable or
legal due. Well, I will not go into this, but say that we
would not like to interfere with the customary law of the
Muslims through the Criminal Procedure Code. If there is

8 (I) 6S I. A. 119, 127
MORD. A. KRAN v. SRAH BANO BEGUM (Chandrachud , C.J.) S6S
a demand for change in the Muslim Personal Law,it should
actually come from the Muslim Community itself and we A
should wait for the Muslim public opinion on these matters
to crystalise before we try to change this customary right
or make changes in their personal law. Above all, this is
hardly, the place where we could do so. But as I tried to
explain, the provision in the Bill is an advance over the B
previous situation. Div0rced women have been included
and brought within the ad.nit of clause US, but a limi-
tation is boing imposed by this amendment to clause 127,
namely, that the maintenance orders would ceases to oper-
ate after the amounts due to her under the personal law
are paid to her. This is a· healthy compromise between c
what has been termed a conservative interpretation of law
or a concession to conservative public opinion and liberal
approach to the problem. We have made au advance and
not tried to transgress what are the personal rights of
Muslim women. So this, I think, should satisfy Hon.
Members that whatever advance we have made is in the D
right direction and it should be welcomed."

It does appear from this speech that the Government did not
desire to interfere with the personal law of the Muslim through the
Criminal Procedure Code. It wanted the Muslim community to take
the lead and the Muslim public opinion to crystalise on the reforms E
in their personal law. However, we do not concerned with the ques-
tion whether the Government did or~did not desire to bring about
changes in the Muslim Personal. Law by enacting sections 125 and
127 of the Code. As we have said earlier and, as admitted by the
Minister, the Government did introduce such a change by defining
the expression 'wife' to include a divorced wife. It also introduced F
another significant change by providing that the fact that the hus-
band bas contracted marriage with another woman is a just ground
for the wife's refusal to live with him. The provision contained in
section 127 (3) (b) may have been introduces because of the miscon-
ception that dower is an amount payable "on divorce". But, that
G
.cannot convert an amount payable as a mark of respect for the wife
into an amount payable on divorce.

It must follow from this discussion, unavoidably a little too
long, that the judgments of this Court in Bai Tahlra (Krishna H
866 SUPREME Comn REPORTS l1985] 3 s.c.ii.

A Iyer J., Tulzapurkar J. and Pathak J.) and Faz/unbi (Krishna Iyer,
J.,) one of us, Chinnappa Reddy J. and A. P. Sen J.) are correct.
Justice Krishna Iyer who spoke for the Court in both these cases,
relied greatly on the teleological and schematic method of interpre-
tation so as to advance the purpose of the law. These constructional
B techniques have their own importance in the interpretation of sta-
tutes meant to ameliorate the conditions of suffering sections of the
society. We have attempted to show that taking the language of
the statute as one finds it, there is no escape from the conclusion
that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to apply for maintenance
under section 125 and that, Mahr is not a sum which, under the
C Muslim Personal Law, is payable on divorce.

Though Bai Tahira was correctly decided, we would like, res-
pectfully, to draw attention to an error which has crept in the judg-
ment. There is a statement at page 80 of the report, in the context
of section 127 (3) (b), that "payment of Mahr money, as a custo-
D mary discharge, ia within the cognizance of that provision". We have
taken the view that Mahr, not being payable on divorce, does not
fall within the meaning of that provision.

It is a matter of deep regret that some of the interveners who
supported the appellant, took up an extreme position by displaying
E
an unwarranted zeal to defeat the right to maintenance of women
who are unable to maintain themselves. The written submissions of
the All India Muslim Personal Law Board have gone to the length
of asserting that it is irrek vant to inquire as to how a Muslim
divorce should maintain herself. The facile answer of the Board is
(that the Personal Law has devised the system of Mahr to meet the
F
requirements of women and if a woman is indigent, she must look
to her relations, including nephew and cousins, to support her.
This is a most unreasonable view of law as well as life. We appre-
ciate that Begum Temur Jehan, a social worker who has been work-
ing in association with the Delhi City Women's Association for the
uplift of Muslim women, intervened to support Mr. Daniel Latifi
G who appeared on behalf of the wife.

It is also a matter of regret that Article 44 of our Constitution
has remained a dead letter. It provides that "The State shall endea-
vour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the
territory of India". There is no evidence of any official activity for
H
l.!mio. A. KHAN v. SHAH BANO BEGUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 867
A'
framing a common. dvil code for the country. A belief seems to
have gained ground that it is for the Muslim community to t~ke a
lead in the matter of reforms ol their personal law. A common
Civil Code will help the cause of national integration by removing
• disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies. No
. - ~I
community is likely to bell the cat by making gratuitous concess10ns 8
.in this issue. It is the State which is charged with the duty of secur-
ing a uniform civil code for the citizens of the country and, unques- ·
tionably, it has the legislative competence to do so. A counsel in
the case whispered, somewhat audibly, that legislative competence is
one thing; (he political courage to use that competence is quite
another. We understand the difficulties involved in bringing persons
of different faiths and persuasions on a common platform. But, a
c
beginning has to be made if the Constitution is to have any meaning.
Inevitably, the role of the reformer has to be assumed by the courts
because, it is beyond the endurance of sensitive minds to aHow in-
justice to be suffered when it is so palpable. But piecemeal attempts
of courts to bridge the gap between personal laws cannot take the D
place of a common Civil Code. Justice to a II is a far more satis-
factory way of dispensing justice than justice from case to case.

Dr. Tahir Mahmood in his book 'Muslim Personal Law' (1977
Edition, pages 200-202), 1,as made a powerful plea for framing a
uniform Civil Code for all citizens of India. He says : "In pursuance
E
of the goal of secu 1arism, the State must stop administering religion-
based personal laws". He wants the lead to come from th' majority
community but, we should have thought that, lead or no lead, the
State must act. It would be useful to quote the appeal made by the
author to the Muslim community :
F
"Instead of wasting their energies in exerting theologi-
cal and political pressure in order to secure an "immun-
ity" for their traditional personal law from the state's legis-
lative jurisdiction, the Muslim will do well to begin explor-
ing and demonstrating how the true Islamic laws, purged
of their time-worn and anachronistic inte~pretations, can G
enrich the common civil code of India."

At a Seminar held on October 18, 1980 under the auspices of
the Department of Islamic and Comparative Law, Indian Institute
of Islamic Studies, New Delhi, lie also made an appeal to the
ff
868 SUPREMS COURT RSPORTS (1985) 3 S.C.R.
A
Mu11im community to display by their conduct a correct understand-
ing of Islamic concepts on marriage and divorce (See Islam and
Comparative Law Quarterly, April-June, 1981, page 146).

B Before we conclude, we would like to draw attention to the
Report of the Commission on marriage and Family Laws, which '
was appointed by the Government of Pakistan by a Resolution dated
August 4, 1955. The answer of the CJ nmiS>ion to Question No.5
(page 1215 of the Report) is that

"a large number of middle-aged women who are being
c divorced without rhyme or reason should not be thrown' on
the streets without a roof over their heads and without any
means of sustaining themselves and their children."

The Report concludes thus :

D "In the words of Allama Iqbal, "the question which is
likely to confront Muslim countries in the 'near future, is
whether the law of Islam is capable of evolution-a ques-
tion which will require great intellectual effort, and is sure
to be answered in the affirmative."

E For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal and confirm the judg-
ment of the High Court. The appellant will pay the costs of the
appeal to respondent I, which we quantify at rupees ten thousand.
It is needless to add that it would be open to the respondent to make
an application under section 127 (l) of the Code for increasing the
allowance of maintenance granted to her on proof of a change in the
F
circumstan~es as envisaged by that section.

S.R. .Appeal dismissed
G