Holding

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to appeals against acquittal under Section 378 of the CrPC unless the special provision expressly excludes it, and no such exclusion exists.

Summary

The appellants were acquitted under Section 135(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962, and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence filed an appeal against the acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, after a 72‑day delay, seeking condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Delhi High Court allowed the condonation, but the appellants later moved the High Court under Section 482 seeking recall, arguing that Section 5 could not apply because the limitation period for an appeal against acquittal is prescribed in Section 378(5) of the CrPC. The Supreme Court examined earlier precedents, notably Kaushalya Rani (which dealt with the 1908 Limitation Act) and Mangu Ram (which distinguished Kaushalya Rani on the basis of the 1963 Limitation Act), and held that Section 5 of the 1963 Act is applicable unless expressly excluded by the special law. Since Section 378 of the CrPC contains no exclusionary clause, the benefit of Section 5, read with Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, can be availed in an appeal against acquittal. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s order allowing condonation of delay.

Issues considered

Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to condone delay in filing an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Whether the special provision of Section 378(5) of the CrPC excludes the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378, s. 482
Customs Act, 1962s. 135(1)(b)
Limitation Act, 1963s. 2, s. 3, s. 5

Subjects

Exclusionary provisionBenefit of Section 5 of Limitation ActAppeal against acquittalLimitationCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

[2024] 2 S.C.R. 638 : 2024 INSC 125

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr.
v.
Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence
(Criminal Appeal No. 1056 of 2024)
20 February 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether benefit of s.5 r/w. ss. 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963
can be availed in an appeal against acquittal.

Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 378 – Limitation Act,
1963 – s. 5 r/w. ss.2 and 3 – Appellant herein faced trial u/s.
135(1)(b) of the Customs Act – Acquitted – Appeal against the
acquittal u/s. 378 of Cr.P.C. was filed before the High Court
along with an application for condonation of delay – The
said application was allowed – Against the said order, the
appellant moved u/s. 482 of Cr.P.C. on the grounds that s.5
of the Limitation Act would not apply in case of an appeal
against acquittal since the period of filing an appeal against
acquittal, has been prescribed u/s. 378(5) of CrPC itself, where
there is no provision for condonation of delay – Propriety:
Held: There is no doubt that where a special law prescribes a period
of limitation, s.5 of the Limitation Act would have no application,
subject only to the language used in the special statute – The
language prescribing a period of limitation is an important factor as
well – In the instant case, there is no such exclusionary provision
u/s. 378 of CrPC, or at any other place in the Code – The benefit
of s.5 r/w. ss.2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can therefore be
availed in an appeal against acquittal – There is no force in the
contentions raised by the appellants as regards the non-application
of s.5 of the Limitation Act in the present case. [Para 11]

Case Law Cited
Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982;
Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, [1976]
2 SCR 260 : (1976) 1 SCC 392 – referred to.
* Author
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 639

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence

Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, [1974]
3 SCR 31 : AIR 1974 SC 480; Gopal Sardar v. Karuna
Sardar, [2004] 2 SCR 826 : 2004 (4) SCC 252 – held
inapplicable.
Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao Dudhe ILR (1961)
Bom 135 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Limitation Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Exclusionary provision; Benefit of s. 5 of Limitation Act in appeal
against acquittal.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1056
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.01.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMA No. 13802 of 2016 and CRLLP No.
330 of 2013
Appearances for Parties
Md. Shahid Anwar, Vijay Agarwal, Chetan, Mukul, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Vikramjit Banerjee, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Mrs. Priyanka
Das, Nachiketa Joshi, Mrs. Merusagar Samantaray, Ishaan Sharma,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.
Leave granted.
1. The present appellant was one of the four accused in a case instituted,
inter-alia under Section 135(1)(b) of Customs Act, 1962. He faced
trial (S.C. No. 33 of 2009) where he was ultimately acquitted by the
Additional Sessions Judge, North, Delhi vide order dated 06.10.2012.
640 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

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2. Against the order of acquittal, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence
filed an appeal before the High Court on 27.06.2013. That appeal
against acquittal filed under Section 378 of CrPC was accompanied
by a delay condonation application, since the appeal was belated
by 72 days. The delay condonation application was allowed by the
Delhi High Court on 18.05.2016.
3. An application was then moved by the present appellant before
the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC for recalling of the said
order on grounds that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply
in case of an appeal against acquittal since the period of filing an
appeal against acquittal, has been prescribed under Section 378(5) of
CrPC itself, where there is no provision for condonation of delay. By
order dated 20.01.2017 the Delhi High Court nonetheless dismissed
the application for recall filed by the appellant, although no reasons
were assigned while dismissing the application under Section 482.
4. This order has been challenged before us on the grounds that the
High Court has committed a patent error in allowing the belated appeal
against acquittal filed by public servant as the High Court has no
powers to condone the delay since the provisions of the Limitation
Act would not be applicable as Section 378 is a self-contained Code
as far as limitation is concerned since there is no period prescribed
in the Limitation Act for filing a appeal against acquittal.
5. In support of his argument, the learned counsel for the appellant Mr.
Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, has relied upon the judgment of this Court
in Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh [1964] 4 SCR 982. The facts
of Kaushalya Rani are as follows: Kaushalya Rani had filed a case
against one Gopal Singh under Section 493 IPC and alternatively
under Section 496 IPC, alleging that Gopal Singh had deceitfully
made her believe that he is her lawfully married husband and thus
had sexual intercourse with her. Gopal Singh faced a trial in which
he was acquitted by the Trial Court and an appeal against acquittal
was filed by Kaushalya Rani under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 (hereafter referred to as the “old CrPC”), under Section 417.
The appeal was filed beyond the period of 60 days as provided
under sub-section (4) of Section 417, i.e., the then prevailing
Criminal Procedure Code. The appeal was dismissed on grounds
of limitation by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. This matter was
thus taken by Kaushalya Rani before this Court. The case was filed
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 641

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence

before this Court on a certificate of fitness granted by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court and the question for determination before this
Court was whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to
an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal
under sub-section 3 of Section 417 of the old CrPC.
6. This Court on its interpretation of sub-section 4 of Section 4171 of old
CrPC and Section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act i.e. Indian Limitation
Act, 1908 held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not apply
in an application for leave to appeal under sub-section 3 of Section
417 of the old CrPC before High Court, in as much as Section 417
is a special code in itself and the limitation prescribed therein is 60
days and the court has no power to relax such a limitation to condone
the delay. Relying upon a full Bench judgment of the Bombay High
Court [Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao Dudhe ILR (1961)
Bom 135] which held that Section 417(4) was special law within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Thus, the appeal was
dismissed while relying on Section 29(2) of the old Limitation Act.
For ready convenience of this Court, Section 29(2) of the old Limitation
Act is reproduced below:
“(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from
the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the
provisions of Section 3 shall apply, as if such period were
prescribed therefor in that schedule, and for the purpose
of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any

1 Section 417 of the old CrPC is as follows:
417 (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the
Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of a acquittal
passed by any Court other than a High Court.
(2) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case in which the offence has been investigated by the
Delhi Special Police Establishment constituted under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946
(XXXV of 1946), the Central Government may also direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to
the High Court from the order of acquittal.
(3) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon the complaint and the High Court,
on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the
order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
(4) No application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal
shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal.
(5) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (3) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an
order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1).
642 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

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suit, appeal or application by any special or local law—
(a) the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18,
and Section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the
extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply.”
A perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly shows that where there
is a special or local law prescribing the period of limitation in any
suit, appeal or application which is different from the period of
limitation prescribed in the first schedule of the Limitation Act, the
applicability of the Limitation Act will be only as regarding Section 4
and Sections 9 to 18 & 22 of the Limitation Act. The meaning thereby
afforded is that Section 5 of the old Act was expressly excluded
in cases where special law or local law provides for a period of
limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant would argue that
although in the present case, we are dealing with present Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 and the new Limitation Act, 1963 however,
the provisions in the present Code for appeal against acquittal
i.e., under Section 378 of CrPC are of similar nature regarding
the prescription of a period of limitation for filing an appeal and
therefore the law as laid down by Kaushalya Rani (supra), would
apply in the present case as well.
7. This submission of the learned counsel is not correct. Subsequent
to the decision of this Court in Kaushalya Rani (supra), this Court
in Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1976) 1 SCC
392, while dealing with a similar problem of limitation (in an appeal
against acquittal), distinguished Kaushalya Rani as Kaushalya Rani
was dealing with the old Criminal Procedure Code,1898 and the
old Limitation Act, 1908, where provisions were differently worded.
Under Section 378 of the new CrPC read with Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act, 1963 though a limitation is prescribed, yet Section
29(2) of 1963 Act, does not exclude the application of Section 5.
Section 29(2) of Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under:-
“(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
appeal or application a period of limitation different from
the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 643

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence

prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall
apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they
are not expressly excluded by such special or local law.”
(emphasis supplied)
The crucial difference here is of applicability of Section 5 of Limitation
Act. In both the Limitation Acts, i.e. Limitation Act of 1908 and the
present Limitation Act of 1963, the provision of extension of time
of limitation is given in Section 5 of the two Acts. Whereas 1908
Act specifically states that Section 5 will not apply when the period
of limitation is given in special Acts, the 1963 Act makes Section
5 applicable even in the special laws when a period of limitation is
prescribed, unless it is expressly excluded by such special law. A
comparative provision of Section 29(2) in the two Acts is given below:-

Section 29(2) of the Old Section 29(2) of the new
Limitation Act of 1908 Limitation Act of 1963
(2) Where any special or local law (2) Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation application a period of limitation
different from the period prescribed different from the period prescribed
therefor by the first schedule, the by the Schedule, the provisions
provisions of section 3 shall apply of section 3 shall apply as if such
as if such period were prescribed period were the period prescribed
therefor in that schedule and for by the Schedule and for the
the purpose of determining any purpose of determining any period
period of limitation prescribed for of limitation prescribed for any
any suit, appeal or application by suit, appeal or application by any
any special or local law: special or local law, the provisions
(a) the provisions contained in contained in sections 4 to 24
section 4, sections 9 to 18, and (inclusive) shall apply only in so
section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which,
far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by
they are not expressly excluded such special or local law.
by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this
Act shall not apply.
644 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

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As Kaushalya Rani (supra) was decided under provisions of old
Limitation Act of 1908, this Court in Mangu Ram (supra) distinguished
Kaushalya Rani and held as under:
“There is an important departure made by the Limitation
Act, 1963 insofar as the provision contained in Section
29, sub-section (2), is concerned. Whereas, under the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Section 29, sub-section (2),
clause (b) provided that for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or
application by any special or local law, the provisions of the
Indian Limitation Act, 1908, other than those contained in
Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22, shall not apply and, therefore,
the applicability of Section 5 was in clear and specific terms
excluded, Section 29, sub-section (2) of the Limitation
Act, 1963 enacts in so many terms that for the purpose
of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application by any special or local law the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, which would
include Section 5, shall apply insofar as and to the extent
to which they are not expressly excluded by such special
or local law. Section 29, sub-section (2), clause (b) of
the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 specifically excluded the
applicability of Section 5, while Section 29, sub-section
(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, in clear and unambiguous
terms, provides for the applicability of Section 5 and the
ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Rani case can, therefore,
have no application in cases governed by the Limitation
Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis
that the applicability of Section 5 was excluded by reason
of Section 29(2)(b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since
under the Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 is specifically
made applicable by Section 29, sub-section (2), it can
be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of
limitation prescribed by a special or local law, if the applicant
can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting
the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the
special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of
Section 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed
out by this Court in Kaushalya Rani case the time limit of
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 645

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence

sixty days laid down in sub-section (4) of Section 417 is
a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in
this special law which expressly excludes the applicability
of Section 5. It is true that the language of sub-section
(4) of Section 417 is mandatory and compulsive, in that it
provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant
of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall
be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of sixty
days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would
be the language of every provision prescribing a period of
limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an
application beyond the period of limitation is created by a
special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke
the aid of Section 5 in order that the application may be
entertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of
limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language
is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5.
The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that in a case
where an application for special leave to appeal from an
order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the
Limitation Act, 1963, Section 5 would be available to the
applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause
for not preferring the application within the time limit of
sixty days prescribed in sub-section (4) of Section 417, the
application would not be barred and despite the expiration
of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have
the power to entertain it.
(emphasis supplied)
8. Mr. Vijay Kumar Aggarwal, learned counsel would then rely upon two
cases, namely, Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra
[AIR 1974 SC 480] and subsequently Gopal Sardar v. Karuna
Sardar [2004 (4) SCC 252].
9. Both the above mentioned cases were dealing with special laws where
a period of limitation was prescribed. Whereas Hukumdev Narain
Yadav (supra) relates to Election matter where Section 81 of the
Representation of People’s Act, 1951, prescribes a limitation of 45
days for filing an Election Petition, Gopal Sardar (supra) dealt with
the right of pre-emption under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land
646 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

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Reforms Act, 1955 which again prescribed three months limitation
for a bargadar and four months for a ‘raiyat’ to make an application
for pre-emption to the concerned authorities.
10. There can be no quarrel with the argument that where a special
law prescribes a period of limitation, Section 5 of the Limitation Act
would have no application, subject only to the language used in
the special statute. The language prescribing a period of limitation
is an important factor as well. For example, in the Representation
of Peoples Act, 1951 Section 81 prescribes limitation for presenting
an election petition as under :-
“81. Presentation of petitions.—(1) An election petition
calling in question any election may be presented on one
or more of the grounds specified in 207 [sub-section (1)]
of Section 100 and Section 101 to the 208 [High Court]
by any candidate at such election or any elector 209
[within forty-five days from, but not earlier than the date
of election of the returned candidate or if there are more
than one returned candidate at the election and dates of
their election are different, the later of those two dates].
Explanation.—In this sub-section, “elector” means a person
who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election
petition relates, whether he has voted at such election or not.
(2) [Omitted]
(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as
many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned
in the petition [* * *] and every such copy shall be attested
by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy
of the petition.”
Section 86(1) further says that in case an election petition is filed
beyond a period of 45 days it shall be dismissed. Section 86(1)
reads as under:-
“86. Trial of election petitions.—(1) The High Court shall
dismiss an election petition which does not comply with
the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117.
Explanation.—An order of the High Court dismissing an
election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed
to be an order made under clause (a) of Section 98.”
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 647

Mohd Abaad Ali & Anr. v. Directorate of Revenue
Prosecution Intelligence

The election statute thus expressly bars filing of an election petition
beyond 45 days. The language of the statute, leaves no ambiguity
in this regard. “The High Court shall dismiss an election petition”,
is the language given in the statute. Simply put the Court has no
choice but to dismiss an election petition, which is filed beyond a
period of 45 days.
There is no scope for condoning the delay in an election matter.
Therefore in Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra) it was stated as under:-
“17. Though Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act has been
made applicable to appeals both under the Act as well
as under the Code of Criminal Procedure, no case has
been brought to our notice where Section 29(2) has
been made applicable to an election petition filed under
Section 81 of the Act by virtue of which either Sections
4, 5 or 12 of the Limitation Act has been attracted. Even
assuming that where a period of limitation has not been
fixed for election petitions in the Schedule to the Limitation
Act which is different from that fixed under Section 81
of the Act, Section 29(2) would be attracted, and what
we have to determine is whether the provisions of this
Section are expressly excluded in the case of an election
petition….. In our view, even in a case where the special
law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24
of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether
and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the
nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special
law exclude their operation. The provisions of Section 3
of the Limitation Act that a suit instituted, appeal preferred
and application made after the prescribed period shall be
dismissed are provided for in Section 86 of the Act which
gives a peremptory command that the High Court shall
dismiss an election petition which does not comply with
the provisions of Sections 81, 82 or 117.
(emphasis supplied)
11. Later, while dealing another special statute viz West Bengal Land
Reforms Act, 1955 this Court in Gopal Sardar (supra) had an
occasion to comment on Mangu Ram (supra) where it says that the
648 [2024] 2 S.C.R.

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decision of Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra) was not brought to
the notice of this Court when Mangu Ram (supra) was decided (we
have discussed Mangu Ram in the preceding paragraphs). Much
reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant
Shri Agarwal on this observation of the Court.
Hukumdev Narain Yadav as we have already discussed above
relates to election laws which falls in an entirely different category,
as far as period of limitation is concerned. A bare comment of this
Court that a case was not considered would not mean that the entire
findings of the court arrived in Mangu Ram (supra) are wrong. We
must appreciate Gopal Sardar for what it decides and the facts and
the context on which this decision is based. What were the facts of
Gopal Sardar and what were the findings of this Court? In Gopal
Sardar, this Court was again dealing with the period of limitation
relating to West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and the application
of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 8 of the West Bengal
Land Reforms Act, 1955 gave certain right to a “raiyat” for transfer
of land of co-sharer, exercising his right of pre-emption but this
right had to be exercised “within a period of 4 months of the date
of cause of action”. The same Act in its Section 14-‘O’ and Section
19 while discussing the period of appeal provides that Section 5 of
the Limitation Act would apply. This Court thus came to a finding
that though Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply in the case
of appeal but it will not apply in a case when the proceedings itself
had to be initiated in form of suit under Section 8 of the Act which
had to be done within a period of 4 months.
Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 reads as under:
“8. Right of purchase by co-sharer or contiguous
tenant.—(1) If a portion or share of a plot of land of a
raiyat is transferred to any person other than a co-sharer
of a raiyat in the plot of land, the bargadar in the plot of
land may, within three months of the date of such transfer,
or any co-sharer of a raiyat in the plot of land may, within
three months of the service of the notice given under
sub-section (5) of Section 5, or any raiyat possessing land
adjoining such plot of land, may, within four months of the
date of such transfer, apply to the Munsif having territorial
jurisdiction for transfer of the said portion or share of the
[2024] 2 S.C.R. 649

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Prosecution Intelligence

plot of land to him, subject to the limit mentioned in Section
14-M on deposit of the consideration money together with
a further sum of ten per cent of that amount.
This is what this Court said on these two provisions:
“19. We conclude that Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot
be pressed into service in aid of a belated application made
under Section 8 of the Act seeking condonation of delay.
The right of pre-emption conferred under Section 8 is a
statutory right besides being weak; it has to be exercised
strictly in terms of the said section and consideration of
equity has no place. On the facts found in these appeals,
applications under Section 8 were not made within four
months from the date of transfer but they were made four
years and six years after the date of transfer respectively
which were hopelessly barred by time. Benefit of Section 5
of the Limitation Act not being available to the applications
made under Section 8, Section 3 of the Limitation Act
essentially entails their dismissal.”
Neither Hukumdev Narain Yadav nor Gopal Sardar would help the
case of the appellant as both these cases deal with special laws which
prescribed a period of limitation and the expression of the language
contained in the law is very clear that under no circumstances can
such a limitation be condoned. The relevant provisions have already
been discussed earlier.
In the present case, there is no such exclusionary provision under
Section 378 of CrPC, or at any other place in the Code. The benefit
of Section 5 read with Sections 2 and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963
can therefore be availed in an appeal against acquittal. There is
no force in the contentions raised by the appellants as regards the
non-application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the present case
and the appeal is therefore dismissed.
12. The interim order dated 20.03.2017 passed by this Court is hereby
vacated. The Registry is hereby directed to apprise these proceedings
to the Delhi High Court so that the matter may continue.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:
Appeal dismissed.