Supreme Court of India
MOHAN SINGHversusLATE AMAR SINGH THROUGH THE LRS.
- Citation
- 1998 INSC 335
- Decided
- 1 September 1998
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- A S ANAND
Holding
Objections to a Section 21 permission must be raised immediately upon discovery of fraud, and the tenant’s belated challenge after the tenancy expired was not permissible.
Summary
The tenant, Mohan Singh, obtained two successive permissions for a limited tenancy under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. After the second limited period expired, the landlord sought possession and the tenant alleged that the second permission was procured by fraud and that he was absent from the court on the date it was granted. The Additional Rent Controller allowed the tenant to lead evidence, but the Rent Control Tribunal set aside that order. The Supreme Court held that objections to a Section 21 permission must be raised immediately upon discovery of fraud and cannot be entertained after the tenancy expires except in exceptional circumstances; the tenant failed to prove fraud or his alleged absence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the tenant was ordered to pay costs and vacate the premises, with a direction to initiate criminal proceedings for tampering with records.
Issues considered
- The appropriate time for a tenant to raise an objection to the validity of a Section 21 permission under the Delhi Rent Control Act.
- Whether an order of the Additional Rent Controller granting permission for limited tenancy is interlocutory and can be challenged before the appellate tribunal.
- Whether the tenant proved fraud, misrepresentation, and his alleged absence from the court on 30 June 1981.
- Whether the records (rejoinder, visa document) were tampered with and the consequent criminal liability.
- Whether the landlord's appeal under Section 38 of the Act is maintainable given the timing of the tenant's objection.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
- Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 21, s. 38, s. 56
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 101, s. 102
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 192, s. 196
Subjects
rent controllimited tenancySection 21fraudmisrepresentationinterlocutory orderadditional evidencetampering of recordscriminal proceedingsprocedural lawDelhi Rent Control Act
Judgment
A MOHAN SINGH
.• v.
LATE AMAR SINGH THROUGH THE LRS.
SEPTEMBER 1, 1998
B [DR. A.S. ANAND AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]
Rent Control and Eviction :
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 : Section 21.
c Tenancy-For a limited period-Pennission f 01~Tenant raised objec-
tion after expi1y of limited pe1iod of tenancy that landlord obtained pemiis-
sion by fraud and misrepresentation-Held : Such objection should be raised
before the Rent Colllroller/Additional Rent Controller before expiry of limited
pe1iod of tenancy and not after its expiiy-171e 'tenant should raise such an
D objection immediately after he comes to know of the landlord's fraud and
misrepresentation-171ere must be exceptional circumstances for allowing the
tenant to raise such a plea after expby of the limited pe1iod of tenancy-Bur-
den to prove fraud, collusion, misrepresentation etc. lies on the person alleging
it-Jn the facts of the case, no exceptional circumstances made out by the
E tenant to enable him to challenge the order of Additional Rent Controller
granting pennission for limited pe1iod of tenancy.
Tenancy-For a limited pe1iod-Pennission f01~Landlord filed ap-
plication for recove1y of possession after expi1y of limited period of tenan-
cy-Tenant raised objection at that stage that landlord obtained pe1111ission
F for limited pe1iod of tenancy by fraud and misrepresentation-Additional
Rent Controller (ARC) granted pennission to the tenant to lead evidence in
suppo1t of his objection and allowed the landlord to repudiate such evidence
and stayed dispossession of Jhe tenant till the decision on the objec-
tion,--Held: Order of ARC is interlocuto1y in nature which would not prevellt
G the landlord from contending before the Appellate Tribunal that the tenallt
was not entitled to raise objection to the validity of the pem1ission after the
expiry of limited period of tenancy.
Sections 21 and 38-Tenancy-For a limited period-Pemiission
for--Granted initially for two years-After its expiiy landlord and tenant filed
H a joint application for a ftuther limited period-Additional Rent Controller
252
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH 253
.
(A.R. C.) granted the second pennission after recording statements of landlord A
and tenant-Landlord filed application under S.21 after expiry of limited
peliod of tenancy for recove1y of possession-Tenant raised objectio11 that the
second pe11nissio11 was obtained by la11dlord by fraud and misreprese11ta-
tion-ARC held that pem1issio11 was without julisdiction and· could not be
enforced--!11 the appeal. by landlord under S. 38 before Re11t Control Tlibunal
tenant raised a new plea in his application for additio11al evidence that on
B
the date of grant of the second pennission on the basis of his alleged
statement, he had left the cowwy for Gennany which showed that the
pem1issio11 for limited tenancy was obtained by lai'ldlord by fraud and mis-
representation-Held: Burden is on the tenant to prove he· was not present in
cowt on the day when the second pennission was granted but tenant failed c
to discharge this burden-Fwther, rejoindei"filed by the tena11t before the ARC
is tampered with at a later point of time and in all probability when the matter
was pe11ding before the Appeilate Tlibzmal i11 order to support the new plea
raised by the te11ant for the first time-Moreover, records ofARC and Tlibunal
are tampered with by the tenant; visa alleged to have bee11 is.sued by Gennan
D
Embassy to the te11ant and immigration stamp found thereon is not genui11e;
tenant also made an attempt to hoodwink the Supreme Cowt and succeeded
in getting special leave and order staying dispossession---Registrar of Supreme
Court directed to file a complaint before the appropliate cowt and set the
e1iminal law in motion against the tenant-Evidet1ce Act, 1872, Ss. 101 and
102-Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 192 and 196. E
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Eviction suit-Rejoinder-Filing of-By tenant-Additional
evidence-Taking of-Tampe1ing of records--Prevention of-Held: Directio11 F
with regard to proceedings under Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 a11d regular
civil cowts issued-Delhi High Court should frame appropliate mies of
practice to be obse1Ved by all subordinate cowts--Provision of the statute,
~ules a11d CPC should be stlictly complied with-Procedure for filing ~f
rejoinder and application for additional evidence by a party laid down-Prac-
tice. and Procedure.. G
- The appellant-tenant was granted perm1ss10n for tenancy for a
limited period of two years in respect of the premises belonging to the
respondent-landlord under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
Before expiry of this limited period of tenancy a joint application by the H
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A appellant and the respondent was filed before the Additional Rent Con-
troller (ARC) for permission to create a limited tenancy for a further
period of two years. After recording the statements of the appellant and
respondent permission was granted for a further limited period of three
years.
B On the expiry of the .second limited period the appellant did not
vacate the premises and, therefore, the respondent filed an application for
recovery of possession. The appellant raised objection at that stage that
the second permission for the limited period was obtained by fraud and
misrepresentation by the respondent. The ARC granted permission to the
C appellant to lead evidence in support of his objection and allowed the
landlord to repudiate the evidence led by the appellant and stayed dispos-
session of the appellant till the decision on the objection. The ARC held
that the second permission granted under Section 21 of the Act was
without jurisdiction and could not be enforced. Accordingly, the objections
of the appellant were upheld and the respondent's application for recovery
D of possession was dismissed.
Being aggrieved the respondent filed an appeal under Section 38 of
the Act before the Rent Control Tribunal where the appellant raised a new
plea in his application for additional evidence that on the date of grant of
E the second permission on the basis of his alleged statement, he had left
the country for Germany which showed that the second permission for
limited tenancy was obtained by the respondent hy manipulation and fraud
played on "1e court. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on the ground that
the appellant did not raise the plea about his absence before the ARC. The
appellant's revision before the High Court was dismissed. Hence this
F appeal:
On behalf or the appellant it was contended that the appellant was
not present in court when the second permission was granted as he had
left the country for Germany; and that the order passed by the ARC
G granting permission to the appellant to lead evidence was final and it was
not open to the respondent to conte>id before the Tribunal that the
respondent was not entitled to raise objecL 'n to the validity of the second
permission after expiry of the limited period of tenancy.
On behalf of the respondent it was contended that the rejoinder filed
H by the appellant before the ARC was tampered with at a later point of time.
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH 255
Dismissing the appeal, this Court A
HELD : 1.1. The objection t!1 the validity of the permission for
limited tenancy should be made immediately on the tenant becoming aware
of the fraud; collusion etc. and that the tenant may be permitted to raise
objections after the expiry of lease in exceptional circumstances only. Such
an objection cannot normally be allowed to be raised when the landlord B
makes an application for recovery of possession after expiry of the limited
period of tenancy. Further, the burden to prove fraud, collusion, mis-
representaion etc. is on the person alleging it. In the instant case, no
exceptional circumstances have been made out to enable the tenant to
challenge the order of the Additional Rent Controller granting permission C
for tenancy for a limited period. [276-B-E]
Pankaj Bltargava v. Mo/tinder Nath, [1991) 1 SCC 556 andJ.R. Vohra
v. Indian &port House Pvt. Ltd., [1985) 1 SCC 712, followed.
Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986) 3 SCC, relied on. D
Shrisltt Dhawa11 v. Shaw Bros., [1992) 1 SCC 534, held inapplicable.
Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Chaudhry, AIR (1957) SC 540,
referred to.
E
1.2. The order passed by the Additional Rent Controller granting
permission to the tenant to lead evidence on the objection raised by him
was of an interlocutory nature, which would not prevent the landlord from
contending before the Appellate Tribunal that the tenant was not entitled
to raise objections to the validity of the permission after the expiry of the
tenancy. [276-E-F] F
- Pankaj Bhargava v. Mo/tinder Nath, [1991) 1 SCC 556 and J.R. Vohra
v. Indian Export House Pvt. Ltd., [1985) 1 SCC 712, followed.
2. The burden is on the tenant to prove his absence from the court on
the day of grant of the second permission for limited tenancy but the tenant G
failed to discharge his burden. Further, rejoinder filed by the tenant before
the Additional Rent Controller had been tampered with at a later point of
time and in all probability when the matter was pending before the Appel-
iate Tribunal in order to support a new plea raised for the first time by the
tenant. Moreover, the records of the Additional Rent Controller and the H
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A Rent Tribunal have been tampered with. The visa alleged to have been
issued by the German Embassy to the tenant and the Immigration Stamp
found thereon are not genuine. The tenant has also made an attempt to
hoodwink this Court and succeed in his appeal. He was successful in getting
the Special Leave and an order staying dispossession. The Registrar of this
Court is directed to file a complaint before the appropriate court and set
B the criminal law in motion against the tenant. (276-H; 277-C]
3.1. There is no procedure regarding filing of rejoinder by a· party.
Therefore, a rule should be made that papers intended to be filed in Court
in matters in which the other side has entered appearance should be served
C . on the opposite party under acknowledgement endorsed thereon. A rule
should also be made that any paper served on the counsel for the opposite
side must bear the endorsement that it is a true copy of the original filed
in the Court and it should be signed by the counsel or the party. The
Presiding Officer should take care to see that any paper filed in Court
bears the date-stamp clearly on every page aud he should put his initials
D and date on each page clearly. Such a procedure would ensure to some
extent that papers filed in Court are not tampered with.
[277-F; 277-H; 278-C]
3.2. Regarding filing of application for additional evidence by a party
it would have been better if the application had been given a separate
E number and an order had been passed thereon separately. But that is not
:
a matter of grave concern. It is absolutely necessary that every application
for permission to file additional evidence should contain a list of docu-
ments giving full particulars thereof as date, parties thereto and descrip-
tion. Apart from that each document should also bear a certificate of
F endorsement made by the counsel or the party that the said document was
the one referred to in the affidavit or application of the party. The
application must also specily the number of pages of each document filed
therewith. Whenever, such applications are filed in pending matters, the
copies thereof and copies of the documents sought to be filed as additional
G evidence should be served on the other side after being duly certified as
true copies by the applicant or his counsel. Appropriate rules have to be
framed in this regard also. (278-E-H]
4.1. In addition to the above matters there are se' ;ral other matters
also relating to practice and procedure which require proper attention. In
H so far as the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is concerned, Section 56 enables
MOHANSINGHv. LATEAMARSINGH[SRINIVASAN,J.] 257
the Central Government to make Rules. Rule 23 of the Rules framed under A
the Act provides that the Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal are as
far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908. It is absolutely necessary for the Controller and the Rent
Control Tribunal to see that the provisions of the Statute, Rules and the
Code of Civil Procedure are strictly complied with in all the proceedings
before them. [279-A-B]
B
4.2. It has been brought to the notice of this Court that even for the
civil courts in the Union Territory of Delhi, no rules of practice have been
framed by the High. Court. It is a sad state of affairs that the High Court
of Delhi has not given its thought in this regard. It is high time that the C
High Court framed appropriate rules of practice to be observed by all the
courts in the territory subordinate to it. The Registry is direded to send
copies of this judgment to the concerned department of the Central
Government as well as the High Court of Delhi so that appropriate rules
" may be made by them respectively with regard to the proceedings under
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and the proceedings in the regular civil D
courts. The High Court is requested to give its immediate attention to this
matter and also cause periodic inspection of the courts subordinate to it
and issue such circulars as may be necessary in order to plug the loopholes
then and there. [279-C-E]
, E
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14918 of
~ 1996.
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.10.96 of the Delhi High
Court in C.M.(M) P. No. 438 of 1996.
F
Aseem Mehrotra and Maninder Singh for the Appellant.
A. Mariarputham & Mrs. Aruna Mathur for M/s. Arputham Aruna
& Co. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
SRINIVASAN, J. The appellant became a tenant under Amar Singh
the grand-father of the present respondents with respect to premises
situated in E-222, East of Kailash on 29.6.1979. For the sake of con-
venience, the parties will be referred to as tenant and landlord herein. A
joint application was filed before the Additional Rent Controller (for short H
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A A.R.C.), Delhi under Section 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
hereinafter referred to as the Act for permission to let the premises.for a J
limited period of two years. The same was granted on 3.7.1979. On
29.6.1981 another joint application under Section 21 was filed for permis-
sion to create a limited tenancy for two years. On 30.6.1981 statements of ,-,
B landlord and tenant were recorded by the A.R.C .. Permission was granted
for a period of three years. On the expiry of that period the tenant did not
vacate the premises and the landlord filed an application for execution.
Notice was issued to the tenant returnable on 25.1.85. As he was not served,
fresh notice was ordered for 19.4.85. On that day, the tenant did not appear
' served on 24.3.85. The court directed issue of warrant but in the
though
C afternoon, the tenant appeared before court and filed his objections. An
application was also moved for cancellation of warrant of posses~ion. By
order dated 29.4.85 the A.R.C recorded that there was no justification for
issuance of ex-parte stay to stop the execution of warrant of possession and
ordered notice of the application to the counsel for the landlord. The
D warrant could not be executed and when the matter came up before court
on 31.5.85 the landlord was given time to file reply to the objections filed
by the tenant till 2.8.85. On the latter date, the landlord filed his reply, and
the appellant was given time to file re-joinder till 6.9.1985. No re-joinder
~was filed on 6.9.1985 and the case was fixed for hearing arguments on the
objections and posted to 11.10.1985. On that date, the tenant filed replica-
E tion and served a copy thereof on the landlord's counsel. Arguments were
heard and the matter was posted for orders to 18.10.1985. The A.R.C.
passed an order on 18.10.1985 that the objections filed by the tenant could
not be dismissed without recording the evidence and granted permission
to the tenant to lead evidence in support of the objection. The landlord
F was permitted to repudiate the evidence led by the tenant. The dis-posses-
sion of the tenant was stayed till the decision on the objections.
2. In the objections filed by the tenant it was contended that the grant
of permission under Section 21 of the Act on 30.6.1981 was wholly vitiated
by fraud and misrepresention and it was contrary to the provisions of
G Section 21 of the Act. It was alleged that the Landlord had misled and
misrepresented the relevant facts at the time of grant of permission that
his family will shift from Amritsar where he was residing but his family was
never living at Amritsar and the premises in question were not required by
the landlord for his residence after the expiry of three years as alleged by
H him. It was also stated that the landlord owned a property bearing number
MOHANSINGHv. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN,J.] 259
E-3, East of Kailash, where he and his family were living throughout. It was A
further stated that the tenant was in occupation of premises since 29.6.1979
and had continued and remained in possession of the premises in question
and he had never vacated the same since that date. It was alleged that the
landlord wanted to enhance the rent to Rs.3000 per mensem which the
tenant had refused to agree and therefore the petition for execution was
filed. It was also stated that the order under Section 21 was liable to be set
B
aside and quashed and no warrant of possession in respect of the premises
in question could be issued against the tenant. No plea was raised then by
him that he was not present in the court of A.R.C. on 30.6.81.
3. In the reply filed by the landlord, it was contended that the tenant c
being a signatory to the permission granted by the A.R.C. and a party to
the proceedings could not challenge the permission so granted by the
Court. The allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were denied. It was
also stated that the landlord was not living in E-3, East of Kailash as alleged
by the tenant.
D
4. In the re-joinder filed by the tenant on 11.10.85 though it was dated
2.9.85 the earlier allegations were repeated. According to the tenant, a plea
was raised that he did net appear before the A.R.C. on 30.6.81. and was
not a party to the proceedings. According to the landlord such a plea was
not raised in the said rejoinder. Evidence was recorded in the proceedings. E
The matter was being adjourned periodically for various reasons and
ultimately an order was passed by A.R.C. on 22.10.94 only. In that order
there was no specific reference to the contents of the rejoinder filed by the
tenant. It was found by the A.R.C that as there was no dispute that the
premises were not vacant and available for letting out when the second F
permission was taken, the Court had no jurisdiction to grant permission
under Section 21 of the Act. It was held that a fraud was played on the
Court concealing the facturn of tenant being in possession of the premises
and the permission was obtained on such concealment. Consequently the
A.R.C. held that the permission granted under Section ·21 of the Act was
without jurisdiction and could not be enforced. Accordingly, the objections G
of the tenant were upheld and the landlord's application for execution was
dismissed.
5. An appeal was filed by the landlord under section 38 of the Act
before the Rent Control Tribunal, Delhi. The counsel for the landlord H
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A addressed his arguments on 16.2.95 and the matter was posted to 22.5.95
for the arguments of the counsel for the tenant. From then onwards, the
matter was being adjourned from time to time and on several occasions at
the request of the counsel for the tenant. On 18.12.95 the arguments were
heard and concluded. On that day, an application was moved on behalf of
B the tenant for permission to file additional evidence. The counsel for the
landlord represented that he did not want to file any reply but advanced
his arguments orally on the application also. The matter was posted to
16.1.96 for orders but the case was being adjourned repeatedly and ul-
timately the order was passed on 21.9 .96. The Tribunal allowed th,e appeal
and set aside the order of the A.R.C. The Tribunal directed the landlord
C to approach the Trial Court for issuance of warrant of possession in
accordance with law.
6. In the application for additional evidence filed before the Tribunal
it was stated by the tenant that on 29 .6.81 he was busy in Embassys for
D obtaining visas and on 30.6.81 he left the country and purchased the tickets
in Germany for his onward journey and that the photo copies of the
passport and the tickets were enclosed to prove that the alleged limited
tenancy under section 21 of the Act was obtained on 30.6.81 from the court
by the landlord on manipulation and fraud played on the Court. Referring
to the said application for additional evidence, the Tribunal observed in its
E order as follows: ·
"During the pendency of the appeal an application was made on
behalf of the respondent praying for permission to file additional
evidence with regard to permission under section 21 of the Act
F having been obtained by the appellant in absence of the respondent
as according to him on 29.6.1981, ·the respondent was busy in
Embassys for obtaining visas and on 30.6.1981 he left the country
and purchased a ticket for Germany for his onward journey which
would be evident from the entries in his Passport and Visa. That
may or may not be so but the present application appears to be
G quite vague and in any case it appears to me an afterthought device
on the part of the respondent inasmuch as no such plea about his
absence before the Rent Controller was taken up by him in the
objection filed in response to the execution application. In any
case, this evidence would be wholly irrelevant in view of my finding
H that the respondent was not within his rights to maintain the
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 261
objection petition after expiry of the period of limited tenancy. The A
application has, therefore, no merit and is accordingly dismissed''.
7. The Tribunal found that the A.R.C. erred in entertaining the
objections of the tenant at the late stage of execution and allowing the same
in view of the settled position. of law that such objections could not be
raised after the expiry of the period of tenancy. There was also an objection R
by the tenant that the landlord's appeal was not maintainable in view of
the amended provision in section 38 of the Act which permitted appeals
only on questions of law. That objection was overruled by the Tribunal on
the ground that the petition for execution was filed long before the said
amendment was introduced and the landlord's vested right of appeal could c
not be affected by the subsequent amendment of 1988. The Tribunal relied
upon the judgment of this court in Gwikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Chaudhry and _Others, AIR (1957) S.C. 540. On the above findings the
Tribunal had allowed the appeal of the landlord.
D
8. The tenant filed a revision petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution before the High Court. The only contention urged before the
High Court was that the order dated 18.10.85 passed by the A.R.C.
permitting the appellant to raise objections to the execution had become
final and it was not open thereafter to the landlord to challenge before the
appellate court the maintainability of the objection on the ground that it E
,,,., was filed after the expiry of the period of tenancy. That question was
answered against the tenant by the High Court on the ground that the
entire matter was at large before the Appellate Tribunal and it was
competent to decide the entire controversy. Consequently, the revision
petition filed by the tenant was dismissed. p
9. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant prayed for Special Leave which was
granted. Thus this appeal has come on file. The most i~portant plea raised
by the tenant in this appeal is that he was not in Court on 3Q.6.81 as he
had left the country in the intervening night of 29th and 30th June, 1981
for Germany from where he was to travel to two other European countries. G
According to him the signature on his alleged statement was not his. When
leave was granted, notice was taken on behalf of the landlord and time was
granted to file objections to the application for stay. Alongwith the counter
affidavit to the. application for stay, the landlord filed an application I.A. 3
of 1997 for revocation of the Special Leave granted. There was also an H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C:.R.
A application to bring the respondents on record as the legal representatives
of the deceased landlord Amar Singh. It was numbered as I.A. 4 of 1997.
The lat~er application was ordered on 10.3.97. In I.A. 3of1997 it was stated
that several false and misleading averments were made in the petition for
Special Leave including the plea that the appellant was not present in India
B on 30.6.81 and that he did.not appear before the A.R.C.
10. On 8.11.97 an additional affidavit was filed on behalf of the
landlord in which it was stated that a copy of the rejoinder filed by the
tenant as Annexure to the Special Leave Petition and found in the paper
book (Pages 67 of 73 as at present) was not a correct copy and there was
C a deliberate tampering of the same. Alongwith that affidavit a copy of
rejoinder said to have been served on the counsel for the landlord in the
Trial Court was filed as annexure R-1. It was also stated in that affidavit
that a document had been interpolated among the records of the Tribunal
as Page 79-A th~ugh it was not produced before the Tribunal and a copy
D of the. said document had been filed by the appellant in this court and
found at Page 167 of the Paper Book at present.
n The matter came before the Court on 29.1.98. An order was
passed rt.erring to the copy of the rejoinder produced as Annexure R-1
by the landlord and an opportunity was given to the tenant to file a detailed
E affidavit in reply to I.A. 3 of 1997 as well as to the additional affidavit. A
direction was issued to the Registry to call for the records from the Court
of A.R.C Delhi. Then the matter came up again on 27.3.98. The relevant
passport of the tenant was shown to the court but taken away immediately
as xerox copies had been filed. The Court passed an order that the appeal
F would itself be finally disposed and posted the same lo August 1998. On
12.8.98 the appeal was heard in part and adjourned to 13.8.98 for further
hearing. The tenant was directed to produce the passport containing
various visa entries. A direction was also issued to the Rent Control
Tribunal to send records of the case R.C.A. No.749 of 1994 through a
special messenger and the matter was posted for 13.8.98 for further hear-
G ing. On that day, the arguments were concluded and judgment was
reserved as the counsel for the appellant prayed for some more time to
produce the passport. The matter was posted to 20.8.98 in Chamber at l.30
p.m. The counsel for the parties were permitted to supplement the argu-
ments by submitting two page written submissions. On 20.8.98 counsel for
H the tenant submitted that the passport was not traceable by his client. In
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 263
the written submissions filed on behalf of the tenant it was stated that A
inspite of the best efforts the old passports which were joined together
were not traceable and the photo copies thereof filed earlier may be
treated as court record.
12. Learned counsel for the tenant has put forward the following
contentions: B
(a) The order of the A.R.C. dated 30.6.81 in null and void as it was
procured by the landlord by playing fraud on court.
(b) The Rent Tribunal was absolutely wrong in holding that the
tenant's objections were belated and not entertainable over looking the fact
c
that such a plea was not available to the landlord since it had been
negatived by the A.R.C. in his order passed on 18.10.85 which became final
as it was not challenged by the landlord.
13. The first contention has two limbs. One is that the tenant had left D
India around 2.00 a.m. on 30th June, 1981 for Germany and he did not
appear before the A.RC. and give any statement. The signature at the
bottom of the statement was not his and it was forged. Learned counsel
invited us to compare that signature with the admitted signatures of the
tenant. According to him the disparity is so glaring that anybody would say
that the disputed signature is not that of the tenant. He pointed out that E
even before the Tribunal, his client sought for examination of a handwriting
expert in order to ascertain the authenticity of the signature but the
Tribunal did not consider the application.
14. We have already pointed out that the tenant did not in his
objections to the execution filed on 19.4.85 raise the plea that he was not F
present in the Court of A.R.C. on 30.6.81. Nor did he contend that the
signature in the statement recorded by the A.RC. was not his. An explana-
tion for this omission has been attempted in the S.L.P. In para 5 thereof it
is averred as follows:-
"The petitioner was served on 19.4.85 and immediately on the same
G
date at 2.30 P .M. he got filed the objection petition in haste and
at the time he was not aware of the details of his visit during the
year 1981". The averment that he was served on 19.4.85 is false as
he was served on 24.3.85 (vide A.R.C's order dated 29.4.85).
Further, the explanation is hardly satisfactory. The tenant claims H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A to be having business connections in several countries and is
undoubtedly worldly wise. If he was not party to the order, he
would have put forward the plea in the forefront. The failure to
raise the plea in the earliest opportunity is a definite pointer against
the genuineness of the version.
B 15. Assuming for a moment that his explanation is acceptable, did he
raise the plea in the second opportunity which he got when he filed a
rejoinder on 11.10.85? Our answer to this question is undoubtedly in the
negative and we proceed to give our reasons immediately. The rejoinder
bears the date 2.9.85. We had earlier set out the chronology where from it
C will be seen that the A.R.C posted the matter to 6.9.85 for filing rejoinder.
If the rejoinder was ready on 2.9.85 there was no reason why it was not
filed on 6.9.85. The A.R.C. posted the matter for arguments on 11.10.85 on
which date the rejoinder was filed in Court and obviously it was served on
the counsel for the landlord only at that time in Court. It is claimed by the
D tenant that in Para V thereof the following plea was raised.
"The respondent was inducted as a tenant under the permission
granted in Misc. Petition No. 304 of 1979 executed between the parties and
the respondent has not appeared before the Additional Rent Controller .
and is not a party to the limited period of tenancy created under Section
E 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act on 30.6.81".
According to learned counsel for the landlord the above sentence
was differently worded in the rejoinder originally when it was filed in Court
as could be ~een from the copy of the rejoinder served on his counter -
F part before the A.R.C. The relevant sentence in para V in the said copy
reads as follows:
"The respondent was inducted as a tenant under the permission
granted in Misc. Petition No. 304 of 1979 executed between the
parties and the respondent has continued in possession of the
G premises even after the expiry ·of the limited period of tenancy
created under Section 21 of Delhi Rent Control Act".
The portion "not appeared before the Additional Rent Controller and
is not a party to" is found in the former while the latter contains the words
H "colllinued in possession of the premises even after the expiry of" Further the
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 265
portion "on 30.6.81" is also not found in the latter. A
16. A mere look at the original record shows even to the naked eye
that the aforesaid portion was a later interpolation after erasing the matter
which was already typed. It is also clear that the last portion "on 30.6.81,
had also been typed much later and it was not there originally. It is quite
evident that the rejoinder filed in Court had been tampered with by the
B
tenant at a later point of time in order to enable him to raise a plea that
he wa"s not present in Court on 30.6.81. The sentence as it is found in the
copy of the rejoinder served on the counsel for the landlord in open court
0n 11.10.85 is quite in accord with syntax and the context. The sentence
begins with a reference to what happened in 1979. The statement that he c
continued in possession even after that tenancy expired is in natural
sequence. There was no occasion in that sentence to refer to the absence
of the tenant from Court on 30.6.81. The sentence in the original record as
it reads now is very clumsy and unnatural. Obviously the entire sentence
as it is found in the landlord's copy was intended to be and is a reiteration D ·
of the statement made in para 5 of the objections filed on 19.4.85 that "the
respondent/objector is in occupation and possession of the premises since
29.6.1979 and has continued and remained in possession of the premises
in question".
E
17. If really the tenant had raised the plea that he was not present in
Court in 30.6.81 and his signature had been forged, it would not have been
done in this insignificant manner in a portion of a sentence which may
easily go unnoticed. On the other hand such a plea would have been put
forth prominently in the fore front of the rejoinder and the tenant's
advocate would have lost no time to bring it to the notice of the Court. The
F
order of the A.R.C. dated 18.10.85 does not indicate the raising of such a
plea.
18. A more important circumstance is that there was no whisper by
- the tenant in his deposition rendered as late as on 10.10.86. At that time,
the petitioner was not in any haste or hurry. By then, he had all the time
in the world to gather all the details of the tours undertook by him in 198:
and stated them in his evidence. Nothing prevented him from stating on
oath that he was not in India at the relevant time and no statement was
G
made by him before the A.R.C. on 30.6.81. Far from saying so, the tenant H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A admitted his presence in court on 30.6.81 in the following words in his
deposition:
"When the second permission u/s 21 was obtained then I knew
that the petitioner had never shifted Amritsar. I never told the
Court that the petitioner had never shifted to Amritsar because I
B wanted the house on rent".
19. Admittedly the tenant was represented by a lawyer in the said
proceedings. If there had been a plea in the rejoinder that he had not
appeared before the A.R.C. and was not a party to the limited period of
C tenancy created on 30.6.81 even a junior most lawyer would have elicited
the said fact at the beginning of the chief-examimtion itself. Even if the
lawyer had failed to do so, the tenant would have volunteered such a
statement in the course of his evidence. The fact that there was no such
statement by the tenant in his deposition shows not only that there was no
D plea in the rejoinder to that effect when the evidence was recorded by the
A.R.C. but also that the plea raised later is false.
20. It is also significant to note that the abovesaid sentence in the
rejoinder is a~ vague as possible. It stops with merely referring to the
non-appearance of the tenant before the A.R.C and does not go to the
E extent of saying that the tenant was out of the country at that time. The
plea that the tenant had left India in the night of 29th/30th June 1981 was
not raised at any time before the A.R.C or before the Appellate Tribunal
till 18.12.95 when an application was moved by the tenant for permission
to file additional evidence. For the first time in the proceedings, the tenant
F raised the plea in the said application that he had left the country on
30.6.81. Even at that stage the tenant did not choose to give the details of
his alleged flight to Germany from India. Neither the name of the airline
nor the time of the flight was disclosed to the Court. Alongwith the said
application for additional evidence the tenant claimed to have produced a
photo copy of the passport and a tickd alleged lo have been purchased in
G Germany for his onward journey to other countries.
21. If there was a plea in the rejoinder that the tenant did nol appear
before the A.R.C and was not a party to the proceeding, the A.R.C. who
passed an order on 22.10.94 in favour of the tenant would certainly have
H referred to the same and given it as his first reason for holding that the
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 267
order dated 30.6.81 was not enforceable. For the first time, reference is A
made to the said plea as having been raised in Para 5 of the rejoinder in
the written submission filed on behalf of the tenant before the appellate
Tribunal on 15.1.96. Obviously, the interpolation in the rejoinder was made
some time prior to that. It is also worthy of notice that in the application
-. for additional evidence there was no statement that a plea had already been
raised in the rejoinder filed before the A.R.C. We have no hesitation
B
therefore to hold that the rejoinder filed by the tenant before the A.R.C
had been tampered at a later point of time and in all probability when the
matter was pending before the appellate Tribunal in order to support a
new plea raised for the fust time by the tenant.
c
22. Learned senior counsel for the tenant has submitted that the copy
of the rejoinder produced before the l~ndlord's counsel does not contain
any initial of the tenant's counsel and it cannot be considered to be
genuin<:. According to him, the said copy was not the one served on the
landlord's counsel in the court of the A.R.C. The argument is obviously D
one in despair. A comparison of the copy filed by the landlord's counsel
with the rejoinder in the Court record shows that certain corrections had
been made in in:; in paragraphs I and II at pages 1 and 2 thereof. The
hand-writing is the same in both and we have no doubt that whoever
corrected the original rejoinder carried oul the correction in the copy E
before serving it on the counsel for the landlord. So also, some corrections
are typed. They also correspond with each other. In this connection it is
interesting to read the version of the tenant in his affidavit filed in this
Court on 20.3.98. In para 3-4 (p.189 of the paper book) it is stated as
follows:-
F
"However, the petitioner cannot say for sure which copy was
delivered on the other side since that is done by the counsel
generally. However, the petitioner now faintly remembers that
some corrections might have been by the counsel before signing
and filing the rejoinder in trial court on 2.9.1985 and! :; had signed G
a number of copies of the rejoinder and ordinarily his signatures
or the counsel's signatures would have been there on the copy as
supplied/given to the landlord".
The above explanation is palpably false and is hereby rejected. We are H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A convinced that the copy produced by the landlord's counsel is none other
than that served on his counter-part in the court of the A.R.C.
23. Irrespective of the existence of the plea in the rejoinder, we would
consider the question whether the tenant has proved his absence from the
B court of the A.R.C on 30.6.81. The burden is on him to prove the same.
He has miserably failed to do so. We have seen the original record of the
A.R.C. in which the statements of the landlord and the tenant were
recorded on 30.6.81. The paper has been torn exactly across the signature
of the tenant and pasted with a cellotape. We have a grave suspicion that
it was deliberately torn and pasted like that so that it will become difficult
C to compare the signature of the tenant in that statement with his admitted
signatures. Significantly in the copy of the proposed agreement filed by the
landlord and the tenant jointly before the A.R.C. the portion containing
their signatures has been completely torn and not available at all. The
tenant has admittedly signed the proposed agreement and he was a party
D thereto; The impossibility of comparing the disputed signature with the
admitted signatures is one reason for our not granting the prayer to have
the disputed signature examined by a handwriting expert.
24. It is not the case of the tenant that he was in India but did not
E attend the court. His only case is that he had gone out of India and was
not in a position to attend the Court. Such a plea could easily have been
proved by producing the relevant official documents such as passport and
visa as well as a copy of the air ticket. The plea was itself raised only at
the appellate stage but the relevant documents were not produced even
F then. In the application for additional evidence the tenant claimed to have
produced photo copies of the passport and the ticket purchased in Ger-
many for onward journey. The said ticket even if genuine would not prove
in any manner that he was in Germany on the relevant date. The ticket
could have been purchased by any person on his behalf. Even the said
photo copy of the ticket did not relate to the year 1981. That fact is
G admitted by the tenant in his affidavit filed in this Court on 20.3.98. In
paragraph 7 it is stated thus:
"That it is further submitted that the copy of the tic~et, which is
enclosed at page 167 of the Paper Book is not unfortunately the
H ticket which was used by the petitioner for going out of the
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 269
Germany by mistake some other ticket relating to previous travel A
in the year 1980 has been annexed. The confusion created because
the dates in the ticket are of the same date but of different year.
This therefore can be ignored."
The only other document which was filed before the Appellate Tribunal
was the xe-rox copy of some pages of the passport. Initially the relevant
B
page which contained the visa issued by the German Embassy was not filed
before the Tribunal. It is evident from the records as rightly pointed out
by the learned counsel for the landlord that the relevant page may have
been introduced into the records of the Tribunal on a later date. That page
bears the number 79A and it finds place between 77 and 79. We find that C
all the pages in the record of the Tribunal are numbered serially by taking
both sides of each paper into account. Even if the reverse side is blank it
is counted for numbering and on the next page the next number is given.
The numbers written actually are only odd numbers such as 1,3,5,7 and so
on. There is no page in the entire record excepting the aforesaid one D
bearing a number containing an alphabet in addition to numerical. If the
document had been filed alongwith the other document filed with the
application for additional evidence it should have been numbered as 79
and the next paper should have borne the number 81 and so on. There is
no reason why the paper after 77 should be numbered as 79A. Even so it E
should have been numbered as 77A or 78A as it is placed before 79. In the
affidavit filed by the landlord on 8.11.97 it is emphatically stated that before
the counter-affidavit dated 27.1.97 was filed in this court he had inspected
the records of the Appellate Court (wrongly mentioned as Trial Court) and
at that time the said paper was not in the court records and that the tenant
had got the same interpolated in the court records thereafter as Page 79A. F
In our opinion this accusation made by the landlord appears to be well
founded. In the absence of any explanation for the number 79A found on
the said page, an inference can be drawn that the same was interpolated
in the records of the Tribunal at a later point of time and was not filed
alongwith the application for additional evidence. G
25. The aforesaid document now found at page 79A of the records
of the Tribunal is the same as that found on page 167 of the paper book
in the appeal in this court. It purports to be a visa issued by the German
Embassy at New Delhi on 26th June, 1981. It is for the period 30th .lune, H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A 1981 to 20th July, 1981. At the top there is a rectangular seal which reads
as follows:
Bundesrepublik
Deuischland
A-30-June 1981
B Flugshafen
Frankfurt/Main 14
After a copy of the said document was served on the landlord it appears
that the latter approached the German Embassy at New Delhi in order to
C verify the authenticity and correctness of the same. In Paragraph 6 of the
affidavit filed by the landlord on 8.11.97, it is stated thus:
"Further in order to verify the authenticity of the said document,
the answering respondent sent a photocopy of the same to the
German Embassy in Delhi for verification of the same. The com-
D munication dated 15.4.1997 received from the German embassy
clearly" shows that the said document is not genuine and is a forged
document. The petitioner has relied upon the immigration stamp
in the said document to claim that he arrived in Germany on
30.6.1981 whereas 'A' in the Immigration Stamps stand for Aus-
E reise = Departure and not arrival. Further the name of the country
Deutsch land in Immigration Stamp is spelt incorrectly and the
date is not from a rotating stamp which is used by the Customs
authorities. It is submitted that the appellant has resorted to forgery
to mislead this Hon'ble Court and it is submitted that it is a fit case
where apart from revoking the special leave granted, criminal
F proceedings should be initiated against the appellant. A copy of the
letter dated 15.4.1997 is annexed hereto as Annexure R-2."
26. In the letter filed as Annexure R-2 referred to above, it is stated
thus:
G "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
The genuineness of the Visa/Immigration Stamp of the Federal
Republic of Germany in Indian passport No.~-244359 enclosed
herewith look doubtful, since it shows the follow111g deficiencies:
H Spelling Mistakes
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 271
(a) name of the country "Deutschland" is spelt incorrectly as A
"Deuischland" in the Immigration Stamp;
(b) In the Visa Stamp "Gebuhr" means Fee, it is spelt incorrectly
as "Gebchr"
(c) Name of the city "Frankfurt" in the Immigration Stamp appears B
to be incorrectly spelt as "Frankfort".
"A" in Immigration Stamp indicates departure (A= Ausreise) but
not arrival. Arrival is indicated by "E" (E = Eimeise ).
The date (30 Juni 1981) in the Immigration Stamp is not from a C
rotating stamp. Customs used rotating stamps.
The round embassy seal in the bottom left corner appears faked
and requires further investigation.
(Signed) D
Rehienbeck
AITACHE
27. Learned senior counsel for the tenant vehemently argued that no
reliance should be placed on the aforesaid letter which was written on the
basis of a photo copy and the proper course to be adopted by the court is E
to sent the passport in which the original visa is entered to. the Embassy
and get its opinion as to the authenticity thereof. When the matter was
being argued on 12.8.98 he offered to produce the original passport on the
next date. We adjourned the matter to 13.8.98 at 2.00 P.M. but learned
counsel wanted further time. We granted one week therefrom for produc- F
tion of the passport and posted the matter to 20.8.98 in the chambers at
1.30 P.M. But as stated earlier, the passport is not forthcoming. It is very
strange that the passport which w~s flashed before the court on an earlier
occasion before the matter was heard is now missing after the court is fully
apprised of the facts of the case. This is eminently a fit case to draw an
adverse inference against the tenant from the non-production of the G
passport. If it had been produced, there is no doubt that it would have been
found out that the Visa/immigration stamp of the Federal Republic of
Germany was not genuine but a fabricated one. We have already pointed
out that the tenant had tampered with the records in Court more than once
and has been developing his case stage by stage. The plea that he was not H
272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A in the country was raised for the first time in December 1995 i.e. nearly 11
years after the warrant of possession was issued against him by the A.R.C.
Further, we find that in the photo copies of the two other visa stamps made
by the German Embassy with reference to other periods the immigration
stamps are not only different in shape but the spellings of the relevant
B words are correct. The spelling mistakes found in the disputed visa are not
found in the photo copies of the other visas of the same country. In such
circumstances we hold that the tenant has not proved the genuineness of
the visa/immigration stamp of the Federal Republic of Germany. Nor has
he proved that he was not in India on the relevant date and the relevant
time. Hence the first limb of the contention that the order of the A.R.C.
C dated 30.6.81 was vitiated by fraud fails and is rejected.
28. The second limb of the contention is that on 29.6.81 and 30.6.81
the premises was not vacant as it was occupied by the tenant and the
application under Section 21 was not maintainable. According to the tenant
D the said jurisdictional fact was concealed from the ARC and his permission
for creating a limited tenancy was obtained. It is also the contention of the
tenant under this limb that the landlord was never the resident of Amritsar
and always living in another premises !n New Delhi and that he did not
require the premises at the expiry of the limited tenancy. According to the
tenant the aforesaid facts were also concealed from the A.R.C. It is with
E respect to this limb of the contention that the learned counsel for the
landlord has submitted that it was not open to the tenant to raise such a
plea of fraud after the expiry of the tenancy and if there was any such fraud,
he should have approached the A.R.C. with an appropriate application
before the expiry of the tenancy. In support of the said contention learned
F counsel for the landlord has cited some of the recent rulings of this Court.
Before considering the said aspect of the matter it is better to clear the
facts in this regard.
29. The contention that there was 'a subsisting tenancy on 29.6.81 and
-
30.6.81 is factually fallacious. The tenant has in more than one place in the
G objection filed by him before the A.R.C and in his deposition dated
10.10.86 stated that the earlier limited tenancy "Ommenced on 29.6.79.
What is relied on at present is that the first order granting permission for
limited tenancy was passed on 3.7.79. The records and the proceedings
relating thereto are not available. In the absence of such records and on
H the face of the express admission made by the tenant that the tenancy
MOHAN SINGH, v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 273
commenced on 29.6.79 we have to proceed on the footing that the permis- A
sion granted on 3.7.79 was post facto and the tenancy expired on 28.6.81.
Hence, when the application was filed on 29.6.81 for permission under
Section 21, there was no subsisting prior tenancy. Now that we have found
that the tenant has failed to prove his alleged absence from the court on
30.6.81, it follows that both the landlord and the tenant were present before
the A.R.C. and made statements as recorded on 30.6.81. Factually, there
B
is no concealment or suppression. of the facts and much less fraudulently
by the landlord before the A.R.C. There was nothing wrong in the A.R.C.
accepting the statements of landlord and tenant made before him.
30. On the above facts we will consider the relevant rulings m C
chronological order. In J.R. Vohra v. Indian Exp01t House Pvt. Ltd., [1985]
1 S.C.C. 712, a Bench of three Judges held that when the landlord applies
for eviction after expiry of limite1 period of tenancy, the Rent Controller
must issue warrant for recovery of possession as a matter of course and is
not obliged to issue a prior notice to the tenant or before issuing a notice
make an enquiry into allegations of fraud, collusion or mechanical applica- D
tion of mind in granting permission for creation of a limited tenancy made
by the tenant.
31. In Smt. Dhanwanti v. D.D. Gupta, [1986] 3 S.C.C 1 it was held
that obtaining permission for letting out the premises to the same tenant
E
for limited periods more than once after expiry of each such period would
not by itself be sufficient to prove that the premises were available for being
let out for the indefinite period without actually showing the absence of
the landlord's intention to occupy the premises. It was held that such
successive grants of permission were not vitiated.
F
32. In Pankaj Bhargava and Another v. Mohinder Nath and Another,
[1991] l S.C.C. 556 a Bench of Three Judges considered the matter at some
length. After referring to Dhanwanti's case (supra) the bench observed that
in one sense successive grants of permission would share the characteristic
of post facto grant. The Bench referred to the ruling in J.R. Vohra (supra) G
and quoted extensively therefrom. It will be advantageous to extract the
following passage from the judgment of the Bench:
"... In Vohra case this Court laid down that a tenant who assails the
permission under Section 21 on the ground that it was procured
by fraud - a ground not dissimilar to the one urged in the present H
274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A case - must approach the Rent Controller during the currency of
the limited tenancy and for an adjudication of his pleas as soon as
he discovers facts and circumstances which, according to him,
vitiate the permission. It was held that whether it was a 'mindless'
order or one procured by fraud practised by the landlord or was
the result of a collusion between landlord and tenant there was no
B justification for the tenant to wait till the landlord made his
application for recovery of possession but there was every reason
why the tenant should have made an immediate approach to the
Rent Controller to have his pleas adjudicated as soon as facts and
circumstances giving rise to such pleas comes to his knowledge.
c
The reason why this requirement was built in working the rights
and obligations under Section 21 was the need to reconcile and
harmonise certain competing claims that arise in administering the
scheme of Section 21. This Court, referring to those competing
claims observed:
D
"What then is the remedy available to the tenant in a case where
there was in fact a mere ritualistic observance to the procedure
while granting permission for the .creation of the limited tenancy
or where such permission was procured by fraud practised by the
E landlord or was a result of a collusion between the strong and the
weak?. Must the tenant in such cases by unceremoniously evicted
without his plea being enquired into? The answer is obviously in
the negative. At the same time must he be permitted to protract
the delivery of possession of the leased premises to the landlord
on a false plea of fraud or collusion or that there was a mechanical
F
grant of permission and thus defeat the very object of the special
procedure provided for the benefit of the landlord in Section 21?.
The answer must again be in the negative ..."
The manner in which the court harmonised and reconciled
G these competing and conflicting claims and interests was by insist-
ing upon the tenant to approach the Rent Controller for adjudica-
tion of his pleas as soon as he discovered that the initial grant of
permission stood vitiated. This was evolved as part of policy of law
for the reconciliation of divergent and competing claims. It was
H held:
MOHANSINGHv. LATEAMARSINGH(SRINIVASAN,J.] 275
".. .In our view these two competing claims must be harmonised A
by insisting upon his approaching the Rent Controller during the
currency of the limited tenancy for adjudication of his pleas no
sooner he discovers facts and circumstances that tend to vitiate ab
i11ito the initial grant of permission. Either it is a mechanical grant
of permission or it is procured by fraud practised by the landlord
or it is the result of collusion between two unequals but in each
B
case there is no reason for the tenant to wait till the landlord makes
his applicatio!l for recovery of possession after the expiry of fixed
period under Section 21 but there is every reason why the tenant
should make an immediate approach to the Rent Controller to
have his pleas adjudicated by him as soon as facts and circumstan- c
ces giving rise to such pleas come to his knowledge or are dis-
covered by him with due diligence ... "
The court proceeded to point out that any appeal to the remedy based on
concept of nullity and collateral attack is inappropriate and that in a D
collateral challenge the exercise was not the invalidation of a decision, but
only to ascertain whether the decision existed in law at all and rely upon
incidents and effect of its non-existence. It was held that the permission
granted under Section 21 must be presumed to be valid till set aside and
the doctrine of collateral challenge will not apply to a decision which is
valid ex hypothesis and which has some presumptive existence, validity and E
effect in law. The Bench pointed out the distinction between nullity sterh-
ming from lack of inherent jurisdiction or a proceeding that wears the
brand of invalidity on its forehead on the one hand and on the other a
dispute as to existence or non-existence of facts which require investigation
into and adjudication upon their existence or non-existence on the basis of F
evidence. The Court said:
"...If the parties before the Rent Controller admitted that the fact
or the event which gives the Controller jurisdiction is in existence
and there was no reason for the Controller to doubt the bona fides
of that admission as to a fact or event, the Controller is under no G
obligation to make further enquiries on his own as to that factual
state. The test of jurisdiction over the subject- matter is whether
the Court or Tribunal can decide the case at all and not whether
the Court has authority to issue a particular kind of order in the
course of deciding the case". H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A 33. The above ruling is sufficient to negative the contention of
the tenant in the present case. It is, therefore, not open to him to
challenge the validity of the permission granted on 30.6.81 after the
expiry of the tenancy.
34. Learned counsel for the tenant placed reliance on Shrisht
B
Dhawan (Smt.) v. Mis. Shaw Brothers, [1992) 1 S.C.C. 534. In that case, the
Bench has in fact relied on the ruling in Pankaj Bhargava's case (supra).
The Bench has clearly held that the objection to the validity of the permis-
sion for limited tenancy should be made immediately on the tenant becom-
ing aware of the fraud, collusion etc. and that the tenant may be permitted
C to raise objections after the expiry of lease in exceptional circumstances
only. It has also been held that the burden to prove fraud or collusion is
on the person alleging it. No exceptional circumstance has been made out
in this case to enable the tenant to challenge the order dated 30.6.81 after
the expiry of the tenancy. The ruling in Shrisht Dhawan (supra) does not
D help the tenant in this case.
35. There is no merit in the second contention that the order dated
18.10.85 had become final and, therefore, it was not open to the landlord
to argue before the Appellate Tribunal that the tenant was not entitled to
E raise objection to the validity of the permission after expiry of the tenancy.
The order dated 18.10.85 was of interlocutory nature and on a p1ima facie
view it permitted the parties to adduce evidence after holding that the
objections of the tenant required consideration. That would not prevent
the landlord from contending before the appellate Tribunal that the tenant
F was not entitled to raise objections to the validity of the permission after
the expiry of the tenancy as per the law laid down in J.R. Volira and Pankaj
Bhargava (supra). Thus, both contentions of the tenant deserve to be
rejected and the appeal has to suffer dismissal.
36. But the matter does not end there. We have found that the
G records of the A.R.C. and the Rent Tribunal have been tampered. We have
also drawn an inference· that the visa alleged to have been issued by the
German Embassy on 26.6.81 to the tenant and the Immigration Stamp
found thereon are not genuine. Prima f acie, the circumstances indicate that
the tenant had committed the aforesaid offences. The tenant has also made
H an attempt to hoodwink this Court and succeed in his appeal. He was
MOHAN SINGH v. LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 277
successful in getting the Special Leave and an order staying dispossession. A
Tampering with the record of judicial proceedings and filing of false
affidavit, in a court of law has the tendency of causing obstruction in the
due course of justice. It undermines and obstructs free flow of unsoiled
stream of justice and aims at striking a blow at the rule of law. The stream
of justice has to be kept clear and pure and no one can be permitted to B
take liberties with it by soiling its purity. Since, we are prima f acie satisfied
that the tena~t has filed false affidavits and tampered with judicial record,
with a view to eradicate the evil of perjury, we consider it appropriate to
direct the Registrar of this Court to file a complaint before the appropriate
court and set the criminal law in motion against the tenant, the appellant
in this case namely, Mohan Singh.
c
37. Before parting with this case, we have one more observation to
make. On a study of the records in this case, we find that a very distressing .
state of affairs prevails in the court of A.R.C. and Rent Tribunal. We are
told by learned counsel that the situation is the same, if not worse in D
subordinate courts on the regular civil side. We found that the rejoinder
of the tenant said to have been filed in the Court on 11.10.85 does not
contain any endorsement by the counsel for the landlord acknowledging
receipt of a copy thereof. We were informed by counsel that there is no
practice of serving such papers on the other side in advance and getting
E
the acknowledgment of service endorsed· on the same. It was stated that
such papers would be handed over across the table to the counsel in open
court and some times, the Presiding Officer would enter the same in the
court diary. We were also told that there is no rule in that regard. That is
a very unsatisfactory situation. A rule should·.be made that papers intended
to be filed in Court in matters in which the other side has entered
F
appearance should be served on the opposite party under acknow-
ledgement endorsed thereon.
38. It is seen that the copy of the rejoinder served on counsel for the
landlord in the Court of the A.R.C. does not bear the initial or the G
signature of the tenant or his counsel, nor is there any endorsement that it
is a true copy of the original rejoinder. A rule should be made that any
paper served on the counsel for the opposite side must bear the endorse-
ment that it is a true copy of the original filed in the Court and it should
be signed by the counsel or the party. H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.
A 39. The original rejoinder found among the records of the A.R.C.
bears a rubber stamp on each page with the date being smudged complete-
ly. From that stamp nobody can say that it was filed in Court on 11.10.85.
We accepted that date to be the date of filing because of the entry made
by the A.R.C. in his notes. We have, however, a doubt whether the
B document which is now on file was the same as the one which was filed
before the A.R.C. The reason for entertaining such a doubt is that while
the date stamp in other documents filed in that Court are clear and legible,
the date stamp on this document is alone smudged. In the place of the date
somebody has written in ink a figure which looks like 11. The Presiding
Officer should take care to see that any paper filed in Court bears the date
C stamp clearly on every page and he should put his initials and date on each
page clearly. Such a procedure would ensure to some extent that papers
filed in Court are not tampered with.
40. We have referred to the application for a1ditional evidence
D filed by the tenant before the Rent Tribunal and the fact that one of the
documents said to have been filed along with the application was not
filed at that time and interpolated into the records much later. We also
fmd that the application was not given a separate number. The rejection
of the application was made part of the order in the main appeal. It
E would have been better if the application had been given a separate
number and an order had been passed thereon separately. But that is
not a matter of grave concern. What is to be noted is that in the
application, the documents ought to be filed as additional evidence were
described vaguely in Paragraph 5 as photo copies of the passport and
F the ticket. It is absolutely necessary that every application for permis-
sion to file additional evidence should contain a list of documents giving
full particulars thereof such as date, parties thereto and description.
Apart from that each document should also bear a certificate of endor-
sement made by the counsel or the party that the said document was
the one referred to in the affidavit or application of the party. The
G application must also specify the number of pages of each document
filed therewith. Whenever such applications are filed in pending mat-
ters, the copies thereof and copies of the documents sought to be filed
as additional evidence should be served on the other side after being
duly certified as true copies by the applicant or his counsel. Appropriate
H rules have to be framed in this regard also.
MOHAN SINGH v: LATE AMAR SINGH [SRINIVASAN, J.] 279
41. The above are the matters which have come to our notice in this A
case. There are several other matters relating to practice and procedure
which require proper attention. In so far as the Act is concerned, Section
56 enables the Central Government to make rules. Rule 23 of the rules
framed under the Act provides that the Controller and the Rent f''mtrol
Tribunal are as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is absolutely necessary for the Controller
B
and' the Rent Control Tribunal to see that the provisions of the Statute,
Rules and the Code of Civil Procedure are strictly complied with in all the
proceedings before them.
42. We are informed that even for the civil courts in the Union C
Territory of Delhi, no rules of practice have been framed by the High
Court. It is a sad state of affairs that the High Court of Delhi has not given
its thought in this regard. It is high time that the High Court framed
appropriate rules of practice to be observed by all the courts in the territory
subordinate to it. We direct the Registry to send copies of this judgment
to the concerned department of the Central Government as well as the D
High Court of Delhi so that appropriate rules may be made by them
respectively with regard to the proceedings under Delhi Rent Control Act
and the proceedings in the regular civil courts. We request the High Court
to give its immediate attention to this matter and also cause periodic
inspection of the courts subordinate to it and issue such circulars as may • E
be necessary in order to, plug the loopholes then and there.
43. In the resufr;~ the appeal is dismissed with the above directions.
The tenant shall pay a sum of Rs.20,000 by way of costs to the respondents.
The tenant shall also deliver possession of the premises in question to the
respondents on or before 26.9.1998. F
v.s.s. Appeal dismissed
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