Holding

The conviction and death sentence are upheld as the circumstantial evidence satisfies all legal requirements and the case falls within the "rarest of rare" category.

Summary

Mohan Anna Chavan was convicted of kidnapping, raping and murdering two minor girls aged five and ten. The prosecution relied on a chain of circumstantial evidence, including the victims' last seen with the accused, his extra‑judicial confession, forensic matches of blood on his clothes and nail clippings, and recovery of the bodies at locations he disclosed. The trial court sentenced him to death for murder and custodial terms for the other offences; the High Court affirmed both conviction and sentence. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the circumstantial evidence met the legal tests and whether the death penalty was warranted under the "rarest of rare" doctrine. It held that the evidence formed a complete, unbroken chain pointing unequivocally to the accused’s guilt and that the heinous nature of the crimes placed the case in the rarest of rare category, justifying the death sentence. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The adequacy of circumstantial evidence to sustain conviction
Whether the death penalty is appropriate under the "rarest of rare" doctrine
Whether any mitigating factors merit a lesser sentence

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 366
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 27
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302, s. 363, s. 376

Subjects

circumstantial evidencedeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrinekidnappingrapemurdersentencingforensic evidenceextra‑judicial confession

Judgment

[2008] 8 S.C.R. 1072

A MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN
v.
).~ ,.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
(Criminal Appeal No. 680 of 2007)
MAY 16, 2008
B l .
(DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM AND DR.
MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.) t
PENAL CODE, 1860: .,...
c ss. 363, 376, 302 and 201 - Kidnapping of two minor
girls aged 5 years and 10 years - Rape - Murder - Accused
also earlier twice convicted of offences of kidnapping and rape
of minor girls - Conviction and sentence of death awarded by
trial court - Confirmed by High Court - Held : The case fa//s
D in rarest of rare category - The past instances, the depraved ;._
acts of accused call for only death sentence - Judgment of .
High Court does not warrant any interference - Sentence/Sen-
fencing - Principles explained - Circumstantial evidence.
EVIDENCE:
E
Circumstantial evidence - Held : Conviction can be
based solely on circumstantial evidence, but it should be
tested by touchstone of law relating thereto - In the instant
case, prosecution has been able to establish the accusations
F - Sentence of death awarded by trial court and confirmed by
High Court,· upheld - Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 363, 376, 302
and 201.
The appellant was prosecuted for commission of of-
fences of rape and murder of two minor girls-one aged
G about 5 years and the other a~out 10 years and residing
in his neighborhood. The prosecution case was that at r
abolltJ.O~ PJn.QQ 13.12.1999 the accused along with his
daughter went to the grocery shop of P.W.6. At that time
the two children also w~nt tJiere. They asked the accused
H 1072
1
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1073
MAHARASHTRA

to give them sweets. Ttie accused replied that he did not A
have change and asking them to accompany him, took
both the children with him. The accused returned to the
locality in the morning of 14.12.1999. The residents in-
cluding P.W.5, P.W.11 and P.W.13 caught hold of him and
tied him to a pillar. The police was informed. The accused B
was stated to have made an extra judicial confession that
he had murdered both the children and thrown the body
of one of them in a well and concealed the body of the
other in a bamboo bush. He led the police and the 'panch'
witnesses to the place where he had committed rape on c
the children. At his instance the bodies were recovered.
It was also pointed out that in the year 1989 the accused
was convicted of kidnapping a minor girl and commit-
ting rape on her. Thereafter again he was convicted of
the offence of committing rape on another minor girl. of
0
less than nine years and was sentenced to 10 years rig-
orous imprisonment. The trial court relying upon the pros-
ecution evidence, convicted the accused of the offences
charged and sentenced him to death. The High Court
upheld the conviction and conformed the sentence.
E
In the instant appeal it was contended for the ac-
cused-appellant that since the case rested on circumstan-
tial evidence, a case for conviction was not made out. In
the alternative it was pleaded that death sentence was
not the proper punishment. F
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1.1. It has been consistently laid down by this
Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial
evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when G
all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to
be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the
guilt of any other person. [Para 5] [1083-E]
Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR (1977 SC 1063);
Eradu and Ors. v. State of-Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 316); H
1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446);
State of U.P v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224);
Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok
Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P (AIR 1989 SC 1890). -
relied on
B 1.2. The circumstances from which an inference as
to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be
closely connected with the principal fact sought to be in-
ferred from those circumstances. [Para 5] [1083-G]
c
Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621 C.
Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193,
Pada/a Veera Reddy v. State of A.P and Ors. (AIR 1990 SC
79), State of U.P v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ
1104) - relied on.
0
"Wills' Circumstantial Evidence" by Alfred Wills - referred to.
1.3 There is no doubt that conviction can be based
solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested
E by the touch-stone of law relating to circumstantial evi-
dence. [para 1O] [1085-F]
Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V. State of
Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), Sharad Birdhichand
Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC 1622). - relied
F on.
1.4 In the instant case, interestingly PW 7 and PW 8,
the wife and the daughter of the accused appellant, are
the key witnesses. The prosecution has established that
both the girls were missing since about 6 p.m. on
G 3.12.1999; the accused appellant was last seen in their
company and their dead bodies were recovered in the jr ..
morning of 14.12.1994 pursuant to the disclosure made
by the accused in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evi-
dence Act, 1872. The post mortem of both the bodies was
H conducted on 14.12.1994 between 9.30 P.M. to 11.30 P.M.
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1075
MAHARASHTRA

The evidence of the doctor (PW 9) clearly shows that the A
girls were murdered within 36 hours and the rape was
committed on them within 48 hours before the time of post
mortem. Therefore, the time given by the doctor fits with
the prosecution case of timings relating to last seen. The
other circumstances established were the chemical B
analyst's report of the clothes and nail clippings of the
accused; recovery of the frocks of the victims at the in-
stance of the accused, false explanation given and the
plea of alibi which has been rightly discarded by the courts
below. The prosecution has been able to establish the C
accusations. [para 13 and 16] [1087-A, 1089-A,B,C]
Joseph and Paulo v. State of Kera/a [2000(5) SCC 197]
Damodar v. State of Kamataka [2000 SCC (Crl.) 90] -
relied on
D
• 2.1 Sections 375 and 376 of the Penal Code, 1860
were substantially changed by Criminal Law (Amendment)
Act, 1983, and several new sections were introduced, i.e.
376-A, 376-B, 376-C and 376-D. The fact that sweeping
changes were introduced reflects the legislative intent to E
curb with iron hand, the offence of rape which affects the
dignity of a woman. [para 17] [1089-D,E]
2.2 In operating the sentencing system, law should
adopt the corrective machinery or the deterrence based
on factual matrix. By deft modulation sentencing process F
be stern where it should be, and tempered with mercy
where it warrants to be. The facts and given circumstances
in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which
it was planned and committed, the motive for commission
of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of G
weapons used and all other attendant circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area of consid-
eration. [para 19] [1090-G,H, 1091-A]
Mahesh v. State of M.P (1987) 2 SCR 710) - relied on H
1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A 2.3 It is, therefore, the duty of every court to award
proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence
and the manner in which it was executed or committed etc.
· After giving due consideration to the facts and circum-
stances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sen-
8 tence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and
mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has
been committed are to be delicately balanced in a dispas-
sionate manner. [para 20 and 23] (1091.-E, 1092-E,F]
Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Naiqu (AIR 1991
C SC 1463) and Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil v. State of Gujarat
(1994 (4) sec 353) - relied on.

Dennis Councle MCG Dautha v. State of Callifornia: 402
US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 - referred to.
D -''
2.4 Imposition of sentence without considering its ~
effect on the social order in many cases may be in reality
a futile exercise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where
it relates to offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping,
E misappropriation o'public money, treason and other of-
fences involving moral turpitude or moral delinquency
which have great impact on social order, and public inter-
est, cannot be lost sight of and per se require exemplary
treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sen- 'r
F tences or taking too sympathetic view merely on account
of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be result-
wise counter productive in the long run and against soci-
etal interests which need to be cared for and strength-
ened by string of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing sys-
G tem. [para 25) [1093-D,E,F]
Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of WB. (1994 (2) SCC and ;-
Ravji v. State of Rajasthan, (1996 (2) SCC 175) -relied on.
State of M.P v. Munna Choubey [2005 (2) SCC 712);
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980 (2) SCC 684) and
H
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STAfE OF 1077
MAHARASHTRA (DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

·-1 Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [1983 (3) SCC 470] - fol- A
lowed.
3.1 While deciding the question as to whether the ex-
treme penalty of death sentence is to be awarded, a bal-
ance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
has to be drawn up. If upon taking an otterall global view B
~
of all the circumstances in the light of the propositions
-t laid down by this court and taking into account the an-
• swers to the questions posed by way of the test for the
rarest of rare cas~s, the circumstances of the case are
such that death sentence is warranted, the court would c
proceed to do so. (para 32, 33) [1098-B,C,D]
Union of India & Ors. v. Devendra Nath Rai [ 2006 (2)
sec 243] relied on
3.2 The case at hand falls in the rarest of rare cat- D
>
. egory. The past instances, the depraved acts of the ac-
cused call for only one sentence, that is, death sentence.
Looked at from any angle the judgment of the High Court,
_, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the
trial court, does not warrant any interference. [para 35 E
and 36] [1098-E,F]
CRIMINALAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: CriminalApp~al
No. 680 of 2007
~
From the final Judgment and Order dated 6.9.2002 of the F
High Court of Judicature at Bombay In Confirmation Case No.
3/2001 and Crl. Appeal No. 662/2001
Dr. R.G. Padia, Malabika Sarkar,Ashesh Lal and, Susmita
Lal for the Appellant.
G
Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure for the Respondents.
-""!
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

a Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Death sentence awarded by
learned Sessions Jud2e, Satara having been affirmed in ap-
~ H
1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S.C.R.

A peal and in the reference made under Section 366 of the Code ~~
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') by a Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court this appeal has been filed.
Appellant was convicted for offences punishable under Sec-
tions 363, 376, 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in F-
short the 'IPC').
B
2.Two young girls who had not even seen ten summers in
....
life were the victims of the sexual assault and animal lust of the +-
accused appellant . They were not only raped but were mur-
dered by the accused appellant. This is not the first occasion
c when the appellant has been convicted for rape of minor girls. ~
Earlier in Sessions Case No.145 of 1990, the appellant was
convicted by Learned lllrd Additional Sessions Judge, Thane
by judgment dated 121h June, 1989 for kidnapping a minor girl
and committing rape on her. Strangely in that case the trial court
D had sentenced him to imprisonment for two years in each count. x
Thereafter accused was again convicted in Sessions Case
No.162of1989 for having raped a minor girl of less than nine
years on 28.7.1989. He was convicted by learned lllrd Addi-
tional Sessions Judge, Satara and sentenced to ten years rig- ,
'
E orous imprisonment. He was released after completion of said
sentence and thereafter continued his degraded acts. Two girls;
one was aged about five years and the other about ten years

.. were raped which formed the subject matter of consideration in
this appeal. )'
F 3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as fol- F:.,.. ..

lows:
The family of the complainant Jaysing Dinkar Jadhav
(P.W.10) lived at Gu lamb in the locality of homeless people. He
is the brother of the grandfather of deceased Neelam and Gauri.
G
The complainant has one brother named Vinayak. Ramdas
Vinayak Jadhav (P.W.13) is the son ofVinayak. He and his family
members lived jointly at Gulumb at the time of the incident. De-
ceased Gauri was the daughter of Ramdas Jadhav. At the rel-
evant time, the complainant and other son of Vinayak i.e. I
..
H
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1079
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J)
.....), Chandrakant were living at Khandala. Neelam is the daughter A
of Chandrakant but she was staying at Gulumb for the purpose
of education. She was studying in 1st standard, whereas, Gauri
was studying in 4th standard. They were all residing in Beghar
Vasti i.e. area of homeless people at Gulumb. Accused Mohan
Anna Chavan was also residing alongwith his wife Manda B
Chavan (P.W.7) and daughter Reshma (P.W.8) in the said lo-
-t cality of homeless people at Gulumb. His house was next to the
~
house of Ramdas Jadhav and Tanaji Jadhav.

Tanaji Jadhav (P.W.5} was the cousin brother of both
Neelam and Gauri. He was also residing in Beghar vasti. On c
the night intervening in between 12.12.1999 to 13.12.1999 at
about 2.a.m. Tanaji (P.W.5) had accompanied his wife for an-
swering nature's call. At that time, the accused arrived at Gulumb
from Bombay. He asked Tanaji to go home and told Tanaji that
)( he will wait there. Thereupon, there was a quarrel between the D
two. Then accused left from there. On the next day i.e. on
14.12.1999 at about 1.30 p.m. there was quarrel between the
accused and his wife Manda (P.W. 7). At that time Tahaji had
peeped into the house and thereafter there was a quarrel be-
tween the accused and Tanaji. There was a scuffle between the E
two. At that time, the accused told Tanaji that he would settle the
matter in the evening.

On the same day in the evening at about 6.00 p.m. Reshma
1 (P. W.8) and accused had gone to the grocery shop of Sun ii (P.W.
6) for purchase of grocery articles, Reshma as noted above is F
the daughter of the accused. Similarly, at the same time Neelam
and Gauri were also sent to the grocery shop for purchase of
dry coconut, by their family members. The girls met the accused
and Reshma and Gauri asked him to give sweets (Khau) to
them. The accused said that he did not have change and the G
-_.,. accused asked Gauri and Neelam to accompany him. So say-
ing, he took both the girls with him. He thereafter committed
rape on both the girls and murdered them. He threw the dead
body of Neelam in the well which is situated in the field of the
father of Sakhrarn Bhiku Yadav (PW11 ). He concealed the dead H
1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A body of Gauri in a 'Kalkache Bet' after strangulating her. The ~_.

accused thereafter arrived at village Gulumb on 14.12.1999 in
the morning and at that time, the villagers including the pros-
ecution witness Ramdas Jadhav (P.W. 13), Tanaji Jadhav (P.W.
5) Sakharam Yadav (PW11) and Rajendra Sakhpal (PW12) had
,9 caught hold of the accused and tied him to a pillar of a water- I!
~~I:'.'
\!\'"

tank in the locality of Homeless people, as they suspected that
he would run away, because on interrogation, the accused told +-
them to search in the hilly area of Chandak. The said informa-
tion was given to police on telephone. Some of the villagers
c had gone in search of both the girls in the hilly area but the girls
could not be found and ultimately, the accused made an extra
judicial confession that he had murdered Neelam and thrown
the dead body of Neel am into a well. Meanwhile, the police had
arrived. The accused led the police to the well and the dead-
body of Nee lam was found floating in the water of the well and it :,.
D )'
was taken out. Thereafter, the inquest parichnama (Exhibit-15)
was prepared in presence of panchas by PSI Deshpande
(PW.15). He had also prepared the panchnama of the well (Ex-
hibit-34). The dead-body of Neelam was forwarded to the Medi-
cal Officer, for the purpose of post-mortem examination. The
E accused was taken to the police station as panchnama of his
arrest and seizure of blood stained clothes which were on his
person at the time of arrest was prepared. He was interrogated
in the presence of panch witnesses including panch witness
(PW1 ), Mohammed Rafik Sayyed Mulla. At about 2.00 p.m ac-
F cused stated that he had concealed the dead body of Gauri
near Kalkache-Bet near Chauyndi stream and he was ready to
point out the same and he also stated that he would show the
,...
'
spots where he had molested the two girls. Accordingly this
information was reduced into writing in the form of memoran-
G dum (Exh.31) and then the accused led the police party and
panch witnesses and the accused had showed the places where 'j--
he had committed rape on Nee lam and Gauri. At the spot where
he committed rape on Neelam, the earth was found disturbed
and the earth was found bloodstained, pieces of green bangles
H and half burnt Bidis, were a[s.o. found on the spot, which were
-
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1081
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.)

duly seized by the Police. At the spot where he committed rape A
on Gauri, the earth and some leaves of hybrid plant were found
stained with blood. Thereafter, the accused led them to one
Kalkache-Bet and showed the dead body of Gauri which was
concealed in the "Kalkache-bet" i.e. a place where bamboo
trees and bushes had grown thickly together. Accordingly the B
discovery panchnama (Exh.32) was prepared and inquest
panchnama of the dead body of Gauri was prepared as per
panchnama (Exhibit-16). Ligature marks were seen on the neck
of Gauri which were noted in the inquest panchnama. There-
after, the dead body of Gauri was forwarded to the medical of- C
ficer for the purpose of post mortem examination. After the ar-
rest the accused was sent for medical examination. And his
nail clippings and blood sample was obtained and that was sent
to the Chemical Analyser. On 25.12.1999, the accused was
again interrogated in presence of the panch witnesses includ-
0
ing Shivaji Nalawada (P.W.3) and the accused had furnished
information that he had concealed the frocks of both the girls in
the bushes near Chaundi stream and he was ready to point out
the same. This informatiori was reduced into writing in the form
-( of memorandum (Exh. 37). Pursuant to the said information,
two frocks came to be recovered at the instance of the accused. E
After the investigation was over the charge sheet came to be
filed.
-I 15 witnesses were examined to further the prosecution
version. This was a case based on circumstantial evidence. F
Prosecution relied on the following circumstances to fasten the
guilt on the accused appellant:
"1. Last seen.
2. Motive
G
--t 3. Seizure of blood stained clothes which were on the
person of the accused at the time of arrest.
4. C.A. report which shows that shirt and pant of the
accused were stained with blood Group A which is H
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

'_,
A blood group of both the deceased. I>

5. Blood in the nail clippings of the accused was of 'A'
group which is the blood group of both the deceased.
6. Recovery of dead body of Gauri at the instance of
B the accused.

7. Accused pointing out the places where rape was ·~
committed on Neelam and Gauri where the earth •
was found stained with blood of "A" group and other
incriminating articles were seized .
.c
8. Extra-judicial confession to PW 11.
9. Recovery of frock of both the deceased girls at the
instance of the accused.
10. Accused pointing out the well wherein he had thrown
D )f
Nee lam.
11. False explanation by accused."
Trial court considered all the circumstances to be a com-
plete chain to unerringly pointing at the guilt of the accused ap-
E
pellant. Accordingly, the conviction was recorded. Appellant
was awarded death sentence for the offence punishable under
Section 302 IPC while custodial sentences were imposed for
the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 and 201 IPC.
Appellant questioned correctness of the judgment before the
,...
I

F High Court and as noted above a reference was made by the
trial court in view of the death sentence imposed.
The High Court found that all the circumstances except
the alleged confession to have been established. After analyz-
G ing the evidence the High Court found the evidence to be co-
gent and credible and affirmed the death sentence looking into t--
the ghastly acts committed by the appellant.
In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant
submitted that the case being one which rest on circumstantial
H evidence, a case for conviction is not made out. Alternatively it
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1083
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
is submitted th~t death sentence was not the proper sentence. A
Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand sup-
ported the judgment of the trial court and the High Court and
submitted that this was a case belonging to the rarest of rare
category and death sentence was the appropriate sentence.
B
4. Before analyzing factual aspects it may be stated that
+ for a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must
•
be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances
be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the
Court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence c
can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal
fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means
of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that is, the
evidentiary facts. To put it differently circumstantial evidence is
y not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of vari-
... D
ous other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in
issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances
from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally in-
ferred or presumed.
5. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that E
where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the
inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating
facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the
innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See
Hukam Singh v. State of RajasthanAIR (1977 SC 1063); Eradu F
and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad (AIR 1956 SC 316);
Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (AIR 1983 SC 446); State
of UP v. Sukhbasi and Ors. (AIR 1985 SC 1224); Ba/winder
Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1987 SC 350); Ashok Kumar
Chatterjee v. State of MP (AIR 1989 SC 1890). The circum-
__,_ G
stances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused
is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have
to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact
sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram
v. State of Punjab (AIR 1954 SC 621), it was laid down that
H
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008J 8 s.9.R.

'(
A where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from cir-
cumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be
such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring the
offences home beyond any reasonable doubt.
6. We may also make a reference to a decision of this
B Court in C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of AP (1996) 10
sec 193, wherein it has been observed thus: +
"In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled
law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
c is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must
be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should
be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of
evidence. Further the proved circumstances must be consis-
tent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and to-
tally inconsistent with his innocence .... ". '\'
D
7. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of AP and Ors. (AIR
..
1990 SC 79), it was laid down that when a case rests upon
circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the follow-
ing tests:
E "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly
established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency
F unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a
chain so complete that there is no escape from the
conclusion that within all human probability the crime
was committed by the accused and none else; and
G
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain f•
conviction must be complete and incapable of
explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the
guilt of the accused and such evidence should not
only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but
H
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1085
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

should be inconsistent with his innocence." A
' :;
8. In State of UP v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992 Crl.LJ
1104), it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evalu-
ating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is
reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the
accused must be accepted. 1.t was also pointed out that the cir- B
cumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully es-
tablished and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established
-+
~ must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
9. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circum- c
stantial Evidence" (Chapte~ VI) lays down the following rules
specially to be observed in the case qf circumstantial evidence:
(1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be
clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with
the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the
D
party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal
'!
.. accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstan-
tial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the na-
ture of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of
guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the inno-
cence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any E
other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be
any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled
as of right to be acquitted".
10. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely F
on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-
stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by
the this Court as far back as in 1952.
11. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. V State of
Madhya Pradesh, (AIR 1952 SC 343), wherein it was observed G
thus:
.... "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first
H
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A instance be fully established and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should
be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
B proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such.as to show
that within all human probability the act must have been
c done by the accused."
12. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sha rad
Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (AIR 1984 SC
1622). Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it
has been held that onus was on the prosecution to prove that
D the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution
cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The c~mditions pre-
cedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be
based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established.
They are:
E (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established. The
circumstances concerned must or should and not
ii·
may be established;

F (2) the facts so established should be consistent only
with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is
to say, they should not be explainable on any other
hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
G and tendency;
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except ;..·
the one to be proved; and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so compete as
H not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1087
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

"-i consistent with the innocence of the accused and A
must show that in all human probability the act must
have been done by the accused.
13. In the instant case interestingly PW 7 and PW 8 are
the key witnesses. PWs. 7 &8 are the wife and daughter of the
accused appellant. B

-t 14. In Joseph and Paulo v. State of Kera/a [2000(5) SCC
• 197] it was, inter alia, held as follows:
"The formidable incriminating circumstances against the
appellant, as far as we could see, are that the deceased c
was taken away from the convent by the appellant under
a false pretext and she was last seen alive only in his
company and that it is on the information furnished by the
appellant in the course of investigation that jewels of the
) deceased which were sold to PW 11 by the appellant, D
. were seized."
"The incriminating circumstances enumerated above
unmistakably and inevitably lead to the guilt of the appellant
and nothing has been highlighted or brought on record to
make the facts proved or the circumstances established E
to be in any manner in consonance with the innocence at
any rate of the appellant. During the time of questioning
under Section 313 Cr.PC. the appellant instead of making
at least an attempt to explain or clarity the incriminating
circumstances inculpating him, and connecting him with F
the crime by his adamant attitude of total denial of
everything when those circumstances were brought to his
notice by the Court not only lost the opportunity but stood
self-condemned. Such incriminating links of facts could,
if at all, have been only explained by the appellant, and by G
~~ nobody else, they being personally and exclusively within
his knowledge. Of late, courts have, from the falsity of the
defence plea and false answers given to court, when
questioned, found the missing links to be supplied by such
answers for completing the chain of incriminating H
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A circumstances necessary to connect the person concerned
t-'
with the crime committed.(See: State of Maharashtra v.
Suresh). That missing link to connect the accused
appellant, we find in this case provided by the blunt and
outright denial of every one and all that incriminating
B circumstances pointed out which, in our view, with sufficient
and reasonable certainty on the facts proved, connect the
accused with the death and the cause of the death of
Gracy and for robbing her of her jewellery worn by her - +
MOs 1 to 3, under Section 392. The deceased meekly
•
c went with the accused from the Convent on account of the
misrepresentation made that her mother was seriously ill
and hospitalised aRParently reposing faith and confidence
in him in view of his close relationship - being the
husband of her own sister, but the appellant seems to
have not only betrayed the confidence reposed in him but
D
also took advantage of the loneliness of the hapless :.(
woman. The quantum of punishment imposed is
commensurate with the gravity of the charges held proved
"
and calls for no interference in our hands, despite the fact
that we are not agreeing with the High Court in respect of
E the findings relating to the ch~rge under Section 376.
15. In Oamodar v. State of Karnataka [2000 SCC (Crl)
90] it was, inter alia, observed as follows:
"From the evidence of PWs. 1,6,7 & 8 the prosection has
F satisfactorily established that the appellant was last seen
with the deceased on 30.4.91. The appellant either in his
Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement or by any other evidence
has not established when and where he and,the deceased
parted company after being last seen."
G
16. The other circumstances established were the chemi-
cal analyst's report of the clothes and nail clippings of the ac- t-A
cused, the recovery of the dead bodies pursuant to the disclo-
sure made in terms of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short the 'Evidence Act'), recovery of the frocks at the
H
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1089
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

instance of the accused, false explanation given and the plea of A
".;
alibi which has been rightly discarded by the courts below. The
prosecution has established that both the girls were missing
since about 6 p.m. on 3.12.1999 and the accused appellant
was seen in the company of the girl till morning of 14.12.1994
and soon thereafter dead body of Neelam was found and there- 8
after the dead body of Gauri was found. The post mortem of
Neelam was conducted on 14.12.1994 between 9.30 P.M. to
+ 10.30 P.M. and post mortem of Gouri was conducted on
~

14.12.1994 between 10.30 P.M. to 11.30 P.M. The evidence of
Dr.-PW 9 clearly shows that the girls according to him were c
murdered within 36 hours and the rape has been committed on
them within 48 hours before the time of post mortem. There-
fore, the time given by the doctors fits with the prosecution case
of timings relating to last seen. The prosecution has been able
to establish the accusations.
D
)
....._ 17. The offence of rape occurs in Chapter XVI of IPC. It is
an offence affecting the human body. In that Chapter, there is a
separate heading for 'Sexual offence', which encompasses
Sections 375, 376, 376-A, 376-8, 376-C, and 376-D. 'Rape' is
defined in Section 375. Sections 375 and 376 have been sub- E
stantially changed by Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1983, and
several new sections were introduced by the new Act, i.e. 376-
A, 376-8, 376-C and 376-D. The fact that sweeping changes
were introduced reflects the legislative intent to curb with iron
hand, the offence of rape which affects the dignity of a woman. F
The offence of rape in its simplest term is 'the ravishment of a
woman, without her consent, by force, fear or fraud', or as 'the
carnal knowledge of a woman by force against her will'. 'Rape;
or 'Raptus' is when a man hath carnal knowledge of a woman
by force and against her will (Co. Litt. 123-b); or as expressed
G
more fully,' rape is the carnal knowledge of any woman, above
. "' the age of particular years, against her will; or of a woman child,
under that age, with or against her will' (Hale PC 628). The es-
sential words in an indictment for rape are rapuit and carnaliter
cognovit; but carnaliter cognovit, nor any other circumlocution
H
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A without the word rapuit, are not sufficient in a legal sense to
express rape; 1 Hon.6, 1a, 9 Edw. 4, 26 a (Hale PC 628). In the
crime of rape, 'carnal knowledge' means the penetration to any
the slightest degree of the organ alleged to have been carnally
known by the male organ of generation (Stephen's "Criminal
B Law" 9th Ed. p.262). In 'Encyclopoedia of Crime and Justice'
(Volume 4, page 1356) it is stated "...... even slight penetration
is sufficient and emission is unnecessary". In Halsbury's Stat-
utes of England and Wales (Fourth Edition) Volume 12, it is
+
I

stated that even the slightest degree of penetration is sufficient
c to prove sexual intercourse. It is violation with violence of the
private person of a woman·an-outrage by all means. By the very
nature of the offence it is an obnoxious act of the highest order.
18. The physical scar may heal up, but the mental scar will
always remain. When a woman is ravished, what is inflicted is
D not merely physical injury but the deep sense of some death-
less shame.
19. The law regulates social interests, arbitrates conflict-
ing claims and demands. Security of persons and property of
the people is an essential function of the State. It could be
E achieved through instrumentality of criminal law. Undoubtedly,
there is a cross cultural conflict where living law must find an-
swer to the new challenges and the courts are required to mould
the sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion
of lawlessness would undermine social order and lay it in ruins.
F Protection of society and stamping out criminal proclivity must I

be the object of law which must be achieved by imposing ap- Ii
propriate sentence. Therefore, law as a corner-stone of the edi- '
fice of "order" should meet the challenges confronting the soci-
ety. Friedman in his "Law in Changing Society" stated that, "State
G of criminal law continues to be - as it should be - a decisive
reflection of social consciousness of society". Therefore, in op-
erating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective
machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By deft
modulation sentencing process be stern where it should be, and
H tempered with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1091
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

' ...., given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the A
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for
commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the na-
ture of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are
relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration.
For instance a murder committed due to deep-seated mutual B
and personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death. But an
organised crime or mass murders of innocent people would
+
• call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence. In Mahesh
v. State of M.P (1987) 2 SCR 710), this Court while refusing to
reduce the death sentence observed thus: c
"It will be a mockery of justice to permit the accused to
escape the extreme penalty of law when faced with such
evidence and such cruel acts. To give the lesser
punishment for the accused would be to render the justicing
)
system of the country suspect The common man will lose D
faith in courts. In such cases, he understands and
• appreciates the language of deterrence more than the
reformative jargon."
20. Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate sen-
tence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine E
the public confidence in the efficacy of law and society could
not long endure under such serious threats. It is, therefore, the
duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to
the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was ex-
ecuted or committed etc. This position was illuminatingly stated F
by this Court in Sevaka Perumal etc. v. State of Tamil Naidu
(AIR 1991 SC 1463).
21. The criminal law adheres in general to the principle of
proportionality in prescribing liability according to the culpabil-
G
ity of each kind of criminal conduct. It ordinarily allows some
·~ significant discretion to the Judge in arriving at a sentence in
each case, presumably to permit sentences that reflect more
subtle considerations of culpability that are raised by the spe-
cial facts of each case. Judges in essence affirm that punish-
H
1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A ment ought always to fit the crime; yet in practice sentences are
determined largely by other considerations. Sometimes it is the
correctional needs of the perpetrator that are offered to justify a
sentence. Sometimes the desirability of keeping him out of cir-
culation, and sometimes even the tragic results of his crime.
s Inevitably these considerations cause a departure from just
desert as the basis of punishment and create cases of appar-
ent injustice that are serious and widespread.
+
22. Proportion between crime and punishment is a goal f

respected in principle, and in spite of errant notions, it remains
C a strong influence in the determination of sentences. The prac-
tice of punishing all serious crimes with equal severity is now
unknown in civilized societies, but such a radical departure from
the principle of proportionality has disappeared from the law
only in recent times. Even now for a single grave infraction drastic
D sentences are imposed. Anything less than a penalty of great-
est severity for any serious crime is thought then to be a mea-
sure of toleration that is unwarranted and unwise. But in fact,
quite apart from those considerations that make punishment
unjustifiable when it is out of proportion to the crime, uniformly
E disproportionate punishment has some very undesirable prac-
tical consequences.
23. After giving due consideration to the facts and circum-
stances of each case, for deciding just and appropriate sen-
tence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and miti-
F gating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been
·committed are to be delicately balanced on the basis of really
relevant circumstances in a dispassionate manner by the Court.
Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very
aptly indicated in Dennis Counc/e MCG Dautha v. State of
G Cal/ifornia: 402 US 183: 28 L.D. 2d 711 that no formula of a
foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable
criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in
the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity
· of the crime. In the absence of any foolproof forr:iula which may
H provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1093
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
~
various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity A
of crime, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case,
is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distin-
guished.

24. In Jashubha Bharatsinh Gohil v. State of Gujarat (1994 B
t (4) SCC 353), it has been held by this Court that in the matter of
• death sentence, the Courts are required to answer new chal-
lenges and mould the sentencing system to meet these chal-
lenges. The object should be to protect the society and to deter
the criminal in achieving the avowed object to law by imposing c
appropriate sentence. It is expected that the Courts would op-
erate the sentencing system so as to impose such sentence
which reflects the conscience of the society and the sentencing
process has to be stern where it should be. Even though the
}- principles were indicated in the background of death sentence
. and life sentence, the logic applies to all cases where appropri-
D
ate sentence is the issue.
25. Imposition of sentence without considering its effect
on the social order in many cases may be in reality a futile exer-
cise. The social impact of the crime, e.g. where it relates to E
offences against women, dacoity, kidnapping, misappropria-
tion of public money, treason and other offences involving moral
/;j
turpitude or moral delinquency which have great impact on so-
cial order, and public interest, cannot be lost sight of and per se
require exemplary treatment. Any liberal attitude by imposing F
meager sentences or taking too sympathetic view merely on
account of lapse of time in respect of such offences will be re-
suit-wise counter productive in the long run and against societal
interest which needs to be cared for and strengthened by string
(

..., of deterrence inbuilt in the sentencing system.
G
26. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of WB. (1994 (2)
SCC 220), this Court has observed that shockingly large num-
ber of criminals go unpunished thereby increasingly, encourag-
ing the criminals and in the ultimate making justice suffer by
weakening the system's creditability. The imposition of appro- H
1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 8 S.C.R.

~
A priate punishment is the manner in which the Court responds to
the society's cry for justice against the criminal. Justice demands
that Courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so
that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Court
must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the
B rights of the victim of the crime and the society at large while
considering the imposition of appropriate punishment.
+ f
27. Similar view has also been expressed in Ravji v. State
of Rajasthan, (1996 (2) SCC 175). It has been held in the said
case that it is the nature and gravity of the crime but not the
c criminal, which are germane for consideration of appropriate
punishment in a crimiPal trial. The Court will be failing in its duty
if appropriate punishm~nt is not awarded for a crime which has
been committed not only against the individual victim but also
against the society to which the criminal and victim belong. The
D . punishment to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant
but it should conform to and be consistent with the atrocity and
..:(
. '

brutality with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enor-
mity of the crime warranting public abhorrence and it should
"respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminal". If
E for extremely heinous crime of murder perpetrated in a very bru-
tal manner without any provocation, most deterrent punishment
is not given, the case of deterrent punishment will lose its rel-
evance.
-Y"' '
28. These aspects have been elaborated in State of M.P.
F v. Munna Choubey [2005 (2) SCC 712].
29. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab [1980 (2) SCC
684] a Constitution Bench of this Court at para 132 summed up
the position as follows: (SCC p.729) I
.,.
G "132. To sum up, the question whether or not death penalty j., ~
serves any penological purpose is a difficult, complex and
intractable issue. It has evoked strong, divergent views.
For the purpose of testing the constitutionality of the
impugned provision as to death penalty in Section 302,
H Penal Code on the ground of reasonableness in the light
MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1095
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
·--.,' of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution, it is not necessary A
for us to express any categorical opinion, one way or the
other, as to which of these two antithetical views, held by
the Abolitionists and Retentionists, is correct. It is sufficient
to say that the very fact that persons of reason, learning
and light are rationally and deeply divided in their opinion B
on this issue, is a ground among others, for rejecting the
+ petitioners' argument that retention of death penalty in the
• impugned provision, is totally devoid of reason and
purpose. If, notwithstanding the view of the Abolitionists to
the contrary, a very large segment of people, the world c
over, including sociologists, legislators, jurists, judges and
administrators still firmly believe in the worth and necessity
of capital punishment for the protection of society, if in the
perspective of prevailing crime conditions in India,
contemporary public opinion channelised through the
~ D
. people's representatives in Parliament, has repeatedly in
the last three decades, rejected all attempts, including the
one made recently, to abolish or specifically restrict the
area of death penalty, if death penalty is still a recognised
legal sanction for murder or some types of murder in most
of the civilised countries in the world, if the framers of the E
Indian Constitution were fully aware - as we shall presently
show they were - of the existence of death penalty as
punishment for murder, under the Indian Penal Code, if
. i
the 35th Report and subsequent reports of the Law
Commission suggesting retention of death penalty, and F
recommending revision of the Criminal Procedure Code
and the insertion of the new Sections 235(2) and 354(3)
in that Code providing for pre-sentence hearing and
sentencing procedure on conviction for murder and other
capital offences were before Parliament and presumably G
• --+ considered by it when in 1972-73 it took up revision of the
Code of 1898 and replaced it by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, it is not possible to hold that the provision
of death penalty as an alternative punishment for murder,
in Section 302, Penal Code is unreasonable and not in H
1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 8 S. C.R.

' ,
A the public interest. We would, therefore, conclude that the r
impugned provision in Section 302, violates neither the
letter nor the ethos of Article 19."

30. Similarly in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab [1983 (3)
sec
470} in para 38 the position was summed up as follows:
•
B (SCC p. 489)

"38. In this background the guidelines indicated in Bachan + f
Singh's case (surpa) will have to be culled out and applied
to the facts of each individual case where the question of
c imposing of death sentence arises. The following
propositions emerge from Bachan Singh's case (supra):
(i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted
except in gravest cases of extreme culpability.
I-
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances .:i;
D
of the 'offender' also require to be taken into ..
consideration along with the circumstances of the
'crime'.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is
E an exception. In other words death sentence must
be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to
be an altogether inadequate punishment having
regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime,
and provided, and only provided, the option to impose 'f.
F sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be
conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant
circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
G circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so
t- •
the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded
full weightage and a just balance has to be struck
between the aggravating and the mitigating
circumstances before the option is exercised."
H
- MOHAN ANNA CHAVAN v. STATE OF 1097
MAHARASHTRA [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT. J.]
·~
31. The position was again reiterated in Devender Pal A
Singh v. State of NCT of Delhi {2002 (5)SCC 234] : (SCC p .
• 271, para 58)

"58. From Bachan Singh 's case (supra) and Machhi
Singh's case (supra) the principle culled out is that when
the collective conscience of the community is so shocked,
B

..+
that it will expect the holders of the judicial power centre
to inflict death penalty irrespective of their personal opinion
as regards desirability or otherwise of retaining death
penalty, the same can be awarded. It was observed:
c
The community may entertain such sentiment in the
following circumstances:

-< ( 1) When the murder is committed in an extremely
brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting, or
). D
dastardly manner so as to arouse intense and
" extreme indignation of the community.

(2) When the murder is committed for a motive
which evinces total depravity and meanness;
e.g. murder by hired assassin for money or
E
reward; or cold-blooded murder for gains of a
\ person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a
dominating position or in a position of trust; or
murder is committed in the course for betrayal
~ 1
of the motherland.
F
(3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled
Caste or minority community, etc. is committed
not for personal reasons but in circumstances
which arouse social wrath; or in cases of 'bride
burning' or 'dowry deaths' or when murder is
G
• --t committed in order to remarry for the sake of
extracting dowry once again or to marry another
, woman on account of infatuation.

(4) When the crime is enormous in proportion. For
instance when multiple murders, say of all or H
1098 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 8 S.C.R.

A almost all the members of a family or a large
number of persons of a particular caste,
community, or locality, are committed.

(5) When the victim of murder is an innocent child,
or a helpless woman or old or infirm person or
8 a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a
dominating position, or a public figure generally +
loved and respected by the community.

.... 32. If upon taking an overall global view of all the circum-
c stances in the light of the aforesaid propositions and taking into
account the answers to the questions posed by way of the test
for the rarest of rare cases, the circumstances of the c~se are
such that death sentence is warranted, the court would proceed
to do so.

D 33. What is culled out from the decisions noted above is
•
that while deciding the question as to whether the extreme pen-
alty of death sentence is to be awarded, a balance sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up.

E 34. This position is highlighted in Union of India & Ors. v.
Devendra Nath Rai [ 2006 (2) SCC 243].
35. The case at hand falls in the rarest of rare category.
The past instances highlighted above, the depraved acts of the
accused call for only one sentence that is death sentence.
F 36. Looked at from any angle the judgment of the High
Court, confirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the
trial court, do not warrant any interference.
37. We record our appreciation for the able assistance
G rendeted by learned amicus curiae in the true spirit of friend
and officer of the Court. t--~

38. The appeal fails and is dismissed.
R.P. Appeal dismissed

H