Holding

A marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman is an irregular (fasid) marriage, not void, and the child born of such a marriage is legitimate and entitled to inherit the father's property.

Summary

The plaintiff, Shamsudeen, claimed inheritance rights in two properties originally owned by his grandmother Zainam Beevi, alleging that he was the son of Mohammed Ilias (a Muslim) and Valliamma (a Hindu) born before Ilias's death. The defendants contested his paternity, arguing that the marriage between Ilias and Valliamma was void because of the difference of religion, and that Valliamma, being a Hindu, had no right to Ilias's property. The Supreme Court examined the birth register (admissible under s.35 of the Evidence Act) and established that the plaintiff was indeed the son of Ilias, born two months prior to Ilias's death. It held that a marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman is not void but an irregular (fasid) marriage, and that children born of such a marriage are legitimate and entitled to inherit their father's property. Consequently, the trial and High Court judgments granting the plaintiff his share were affirmed, and the appeal by the defendants was dismissed.

Issues considered

The legitimacy of a child born of a marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman under Muslim personal law
Whether such a marriage is void or merely irregular (fasid) and its effect on inheritance rights
The admissibility and evidentiary value of a birth register extract under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 35

Subjects

Muslim personal lawIrregular marriageFasid marriageLegitimacy of childInheritance rightsEvidence ActBirth registerHindu-Muslim marriageProperty partition

Judgment

[2019] 1 S.C.R. 941 941

MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. A
v.
SHAMSUDEEN (D) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5158 of 2013)
JANUARY 22, 2019 B
[N. V. RAMANA AND
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.]
Muslim Law – Irregular (Fasid) Marriage – Entitlement of
child born out of irregular (fasid) marriage in his father’s properties
– Respondent No.1-plaintiff case was that his father ‘M’ and C
defendant No.1 were sons of one ‘Z’ – Two plaint properties
(Schedule ‘A’ and Schedule ‘B’) belonged to Z – Z gifted Plaint
Schedule ‘A’ property to ‘M’ – ‘M’ married defendant No.8 and no
issue was born out of the wedlock – M’ also married one ‘V’ (a
Hindu woman) and out of the said wedlock plaintiff was born – D
Plaintiff claimed entitlement to 14/16th of the share in Schedule ‘A’
property after the demise of ‘M’ and half the share in Schedule ‘B’
property through inheritance after the demise of ‘Z’ – Suit was filed
– Suit was decreed by the trial Court in favour of plaintiff – First
appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court
– However, the High Court confirmed the judgment and decree E
passed by the trial Court – Appellants-defendants contended that
plaintiff was not the son of ‘M’ as he was born in the year 1949 and
his alleged father ‘M’ had expired in the year 1947 and furthermore,
‘V’ was a Hindu woman by religion she had no right over the property
of ‘M’, consequently plaintiff would not get any share in the property F
of ‘M’ – On appeal, held: Birth register extract of the plaintiff
maintained by the statutory authorities indicated that the plaintiff
was the son of ‘M’ and ‘V’, and was born on 12.02.1949 – It is a
public document maintained by a public servant in discharge of his
official duty, thus, relevant as per s.35 of the Evidence Act – Also,
admittedly, ‘M’ and ‘V’ were living together as husband and wife, G
and ‘M’ had died on 10.09.1124 M.E., which corresponds to
22.04.1949 in Gregorian calender as seen from the Government
Almanac – Thus, plaintiff was born two months prior to the death
of ‘M’ and High Court was correct in concluding, based on the
preponderance of probabilities that ‘V’ was legally wedded wife of
H
941
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A ‘M’ and plaintiff was the child born out of the said wedlock – Insofar
as right of plaintiff over the suit properties is concerned, the
marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fire-worshipper is
neither a valid (sahih) nor void (batil) marriage, but is merely an
irregular (fasid) marriage – Any child born out of such wedlock
(fasid marriage) is entitled to claim a share in his father’s property
B
– Therefore, the trial Court and the High Court were justified in
concluding that the plaintiff was the legitimate son of ‘M’ and ‘V’,
and is entitled to his share in the property as per law – Evidence
Act, 1872 – s.35.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
C
HELD: 1. It is not in dispute that ‘Z’ gifted Plaint Schedule
‘A’ property to her son ‘M’. In view of the gift deed in favour of
‘M’, upon his death, Schedule ‘A’ property would have devolved
upon his legal heirs as an absolute property as provided under
Muslim law. Plaint Schedule ‘B’ property admittedly belonged
D to ‘Z’ and upon her death, it devolved on her legal heirs. Since
‘Z’ had two sons; ‘M’ and defendant No.1, both the sons/their
respective legal heirs would have inherited half a share each after
the death of ‘Z’. [Para 6][946-D-E]
2. It is also not in dispute that Defendant No. 8 is the widow
E (first wife) of ‘M’. She has clearly admitted in her written
statement that ‘M’ married ‘V’, Defendant No. 9, and out of the
said wedlock, the plaintiff was born. The birth register extract of
the plaintiff maintained by the statutory authorities, which indicates
that the plaintiff is the son of ‘M’ and ‘V’. It is a public document.
F An entry in any public or other official book, register or record,
stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public servant
in the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person in
performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law in accordance
with which such book, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant
fact, as per section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
G Additionally, a specific pleading was found in the plaint that ‘M’
and ‘V’ were living together as husband and wife which has not
been denied in the written statement of the defendants. [Para
7][942-E-H]
3. As per Extract from birth register maintained by the
H statutory authorities, the plaintiff was born on 01.07.1124 M.E.
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 943
(D) THROUGH LRS.

(12.02.1949 as per the Gregorian Calendar) and the same has A
not been seriously disputed. Admittedly, ‘M’ died on 10.09.1124
M.E. The said date corresponds to 22.04.1949 in the Gregorian
Calendar, as seen from the Government Almanac, which cannot
be disputed inasmuch as it is a public record maintained by the
Trivandrum Public Library (Government of Kerala). Thus, it can
B
be concluded that the plaintiff was born two months prior to the
death of ‘M’. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court and
the High Court were justified in concluding, based on the
preponderance of probabilities, that ‘V’ was the legally wedded
wife of ‘M’, and the plaintiff was the child born out of the said
wedlock. [Para 7][947-A-C] C
4. In instant case, the High Court was also justified in
concluding that though the plaintiff was born out of a fasid
(irregular) marriage, he cannot be termed as an illegitimate son
of ‘M’. On the contrary, he is the legitimate son of ‘M’, and
consequently is entitled to inherit the shares claimed in the estate D
of his father. The High Court relied upon various texts, including
Mulla’s Principles of Mahommedan Law and Syed Ameer Ali’s
Principles of Mahommedan Law, to conclude that Muslim law does
not treat the marriage of a Muslim with a Hindu woman as void,
and confers legitimacy upon children born out of such wedlock.
The position that a marriage between a Hindu woman and Muslim E
man is merely irregular and the issue from such wedlock is
legitimate has also been affirmed by various High Courts. [Paras
8 and 12][947-D-E; 953-C]
5. Thus, based on the above consistent view, this Court
concludes that the marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or F
fire-worshipper is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage,
but is merely an irregular (fasid) marriage. Any child born out of
such wedlock (fasid marriage) is entitled to claim a share in his
father’s property. It would not be out of place to emphasise at
this juncture that since Hindus are idol worshippers, which G
includes worship of physical images/statues through offering of
flowers, adornment, etc., it is clear that the marriage of a Hindu
female with a Muslim male is not a regular or valid (sahih)
marriage, but merely an irregular (fasid) marriage. [Para 13][953-
D-E]
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944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A 6. In this view of the matter, the trial Court and the High
Court were justified in concluding that the plaintiff is the legitimate
son of ‘M’ and ‘V’, and is entitled to his share in the property as
per law. [Para 14][953-F]
Aisha Bi v. Saraswathi Fathima (2012) 3 LW 937
B (Mad); Ihsan Hassan Khan v. Panna Lal AIR 1928 Pat
19 – affirmed.
Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum (2008) 4 SCC 774 :
[2008] 5 SCR 1 – referred to.
Principles of Mahommedan Law (21st Edition of Mulla);
C Syed Ameer Ali’s Principles of Mahommedan Law;
A.A.A. Fyzee’s Outlines of Muhammadan Law (5 th
edition) – referred to.
Case Law Reference

D [2008] 5 SCR 1 referred to Para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5158
of 2013.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.09.2007 of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in SA No. 693 of 1994(G).
E Guru Krishna Kumar, Sr. Adv., P. V. Dinesh, Ms. Sindhu T. P.,
Mukund P. Unny, Bineesh K., Advs. for the Appellants.
S.C. Patel, Ms. Meera Kaura, Tejas Patel, Rukhsar Khan, Ompal
Shokeen, Hariom, Naveen Kumar Sherawat, Advs. for the Respondents.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. The judgment
dated 05.09.2007 passed in S.A. No. 693 of 1994 by the High Court of
Kerala at Ernakulam is the subject matter of this appeal. By the impugned
judgment, the High Court set aside the judgment of the District Court,
G Thiruvananthapuram dated 12.07.1994 passed in AS No. 264/1989 and
restored the judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 144/1984 by the
Additional Sub Court, Thiruvananthapuram dated 17.07.1989.
2. The facts leading to this appeal are that a suit for partition and
possession of 14/16th share in the Plaint Schedule ‘A’ property and half
the rights over Plaint Schedule ‘B’ property was filed by the Respondent
H
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 945
(D) THROUGH LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

No. 1 herein (original plaintiff). Defendant No. 1 in the suit, Mohammed A
Idris, is the brother of Mohammed Ilias, the father of the plaintiff, and
Defendant Nos. 2 to 7 are the children of Mohammed Idris. Both the
plaintiff’s father and Defendant No. 1 are the sons of Zainam Beevi,
who expired in 1955. Both Plaint properties belonged to her. Plaint
Schedule ‘A’ property was gifted to Mohammed Ilias, based on a gift
B
deed executed by Zainam Beevi.
The case of the plaintiff is that Defendant No. 8 namely Saidat,
was the first wife of Mohammed Ilias, and no issue was born out of the
said wedlock. Thereafter, Mohammed Ilias married Valliamma in 1120
M.E. (as per the Malayalam Calendar, which corresponds to 1945 AD
in the Gregorian system). Valliamma was a Hindu at the time of her C
marriage with Mohammed Ilias. Both Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma
lived together as husband and wife at Thiruvananthapuram. Later,
Valliamma was renamed Souda Beebi. Out of the said wedlock,
Shamsudeen (the plaintiff) was born. Subsequent to the death of
Mohammed Ilias in 1947 AD, Valliamma (Souda Beebi) married D
Aliyarkunju.
The plaintiff claimed that he was the only son of Mohammed Ilias
and on his death, he became entitled to 14/16th of the share in Schedule
‘A’ property. He also claimed half the share in Schedule ‘B’ property
through inheritance after the demise of Zainam Beevi, as the same would E
have devolved upon the plaintiff, being the son of the predeceased son
of Zainam Beevi, and Mohammed Idris, Defendant No. 1, being the
only surviving son of Zainam Beevi. Hence, the suit was filed.
3. It is the case of the defendants that Valliamma was not the
legally wedded wife of Mohammed Ilias and that she was a Hindu by F
religion at the time of marriage. She had not converted to Islam at the
time of her marriage, and thus the plaintiff being the son of Valliamma, is
not entitled to any share in the property of Mohammed Ilias. It is their
further case that Mohammed Ilias had died two years prior to the birth
of the plaintiff.
G
4. As mentioned supra, the trial Court decreed the suit and the
first appellate Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit by setting
aside the judgment and decree of the trial Court. However, the High
Court by the impugned judgment set aside the judgment passed by the
first appellate Court and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by
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946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A the trial Court. Hence, the instant appeal was filed by the original
defendants and the legal representatives of those among them who have
since died.
5. Mr. Guru Krishnakumar, learned Senior Counsel, taking us
through the material on record, submitted that the Trial Court and the
B High Court were not justified in decreeing the suit, inasmuch as the
plaintiff himself had admitted that he was born in the year 1949, whereas
his alleged father Mohammed Ilias expired in the year 1947. Therefore,
the plaintiff could not be treated as the son of Mohammed Ilias. He
further submitted that since Valliamma was a Hindu by religion, she
would not have any right over the property of Mohammed Ilias, and
C consequently the plaintiff would not get any share in the property of
Mohammed Ilias.
6. It is not in dispute that Zainam Beevi gifted Plaint Schedule
‘A’ property to her son Mohammed Ilias. In view of the gift deed in
favour of Mohammed Ilias, upon his death, Schedule ‘A’ property would
D have devolved upon his legal heirs as an absolute property as provided
under Muslim law. Plaint Schedule ‘B’ property admittedly belonged to
Zainam Beevi and upon her death, it devolved on her legal heirs. Since
Zainam Beevi had two sons, both the sons/their respective legal heirs
would have inherited half a share each after the death of Zainam Beevi.
E 7. It is also not in dispute that Defendant No. 8, Saidat is the
widow (first wife) of Mohammed Ilias. She has clearly admitted in her
written statement that Mohammed Ilias married Valliamma, Defendant
No. 9, and out of the said wedlock, the plaintiff was born. Exhibit A3 is
the birth register extract of the plaintiff maintained by the statutory
F authorities, which indicates that the plaintiff is the son of Mohammed
Ilias and Valliamma. It is a public document. An entry in any public or
other official book, register or record, stating a fact in issue or relevant
fact, and made by a public servant in the discharge of his official duty, or
by any other person in performance of a duty specially enjoined by the
law in accordance with which such book, register or record is kept, is
G itself a relevant fact, as per section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
Exhibit A3 being a public document is relevant to resolve the dispute at
hand. Additionally, a specific pleading was found in the plaint that
Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma were living together as husband and
wife in House No. T.C.13 of Poojappura Ward in Thiruvananthapuram,
H which has not been denied in the written statement of the defendants.
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 947
(D) THROUGH LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

As per Exhibit A3 mentioned above, the plaintiff was born on A
01.07.1124 M.E. (12.02.1949 as per the Gregorian Calendar) and the
same has not been seriously disputed. Admittedly, Mohammed Ilias died
on 10.09.1124 M.E. The said date corresponds to 22.04.1949 in the
Gregorian Calendar, as seen from the Government Almanac, which
cannot be disputed inasmuch as it is a public record maintained by the
B
Trivandrum Public Library (Government of Kerala). Thus, it can be
concluded that the plaintiff was born two months prior to the death of
Mohammed Ilias.
Under these circumstances, in our considered opinion, the Trial
Court and the High Court were justified in concluding, based on the
preponderance of probabilities, that Valliamma was the legally wedded C
wife of Mohammed Ilias, and the plaintiff was the child born out of the
said wedlock.
8. The High Court, in our considered opinion, was also justified in
concluding that though the plaintiff was born out of a fasid (irregular)
marriage, he cannot be termed as an illegitimate son of Mohammed D
Ilias. On the contrary, he is the legitimate son of Mohammed Ilias, and
consequently is entitled to inherit the shares claimed in the estate of his
father. The High Court relied upon various texts, including Mulla’s
Principles of Mahommedan Law (for brevity “Mulla”) and Syed Ameer
Ali’s Principles of Mahommedan Law, to conclude that Muslim law E
does not treat the marriage of a Muslim with a Hindu woman as void,
and confers legitimacy upon children born out of such wedlock.
In the 21st edition of Mulla, at page 338, § 250, marriage is defined
as follows:-
“Marriage (nikah) is defined to be a contract which has for its F
object the procreation and the legalizing of children.”
Thus it appears that a marriage according to Muslim law is not a
sacrament but a civil contract. Essentials of a marriage are dealt with in
§ 252 at page 340 of Mulla (21st edition) as follows:
G
“It is essential to the validity of a marriage that there should be a
proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties to the marriage,
and an acceptance of the proposal by or on behalf of the other, in
the presence and hearing of two male or one male and two female
witnesses, who must be sane and adult Mohamedans. The
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948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A proposal and acceptance must both be expressed at one meeting;
a proposal made at one meeting and an acceptance made at another
meeting do not constitute a valid marriage. Neither writing nor
any religious ceremony is essential.”
§ 259(1) at page 345 of the 21st edition deals with difference of
B religion, providing that marriage of a Muslim man with a non-Muslim
woman who is an idolatress or fire worshipper is not void, but merely
irregular. It reads:
“A Mahomedan male may contract a valid marriage not only with
a Mahomedan woman, but also with a Kitabia, that is, a Jewess
C or a Christian, but not with an idolatress or a fire-worshipper. A
marriage however, with an idolatress or a fire-worshipper, is not
void, but merely irregular.”
Before proceeding further, it is crucial to note that under Muslim
law, there are three types of marriage—valid, irregular and void, which
D are dealt with in § 253 at page 342 of Mulla (21st edition):
“A marriage may be valid (sahih), or irregular (fasid) or void
from the beginning (batil).”
The High Court, while dealing with the contention that the correct
translation of the Arabic word “fasid” was “invalid”, and not “irregular”,
E and that therefore a fasid marriage was a void marriage, considered the
changes over time in the interpretation of “fasid”. It would be worthwhile
for us to refer to these changes as well. In the 6th edition of Mulla, at §§
197, 199 and 200, fasid marriage is interpreted as “invalid”. So also in
§§ 197, 199 and 204A of the 8th edition of Mulla, fasid is stated to mean
F “invalid”. For instance, in the 6th edition of Mulla, § 200 at page 162,
dealing with the difference of religion, reads:
“(1) A Mahomedan male may contract a valid marriage not only
with a Mahomedan woman but with a Kitabia, that is, a Jewess
of a Christian, but not with an idolatress or a fire-worshipper. If
he does marry an idolatress or a fire-worshipper the marriage is
G
not void (batil), but merely invalid (fasid).”
(emphasis supplied)
§ 204A at page 164 of the same edition deals with the distinction
between void (batil) and invalid (fasid) marriage. It provides that a
marriage which is not valid may be either void (batil) or invalid (fasid).
H
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 949
(D) THROUGH LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

A void marriage is one which is unlawful in itself, the prohibition against A
such a marriage being perpetual and absolute. An invalid marriage (fasid
marriage) is described as one which is not unlawful in itself, but unlawful
“for something else”, as here the prohibition is temporary or relative, or
when the invalidity arises from an accidental circumstance such as the
absence of a witness. § 204A(3) at page 165 of the 6th edition of Mulla
B
reads:
“…Thus the following marriages are invalid, namely—
(a) a marriage contracted without witnesses, (ss. 196-197);
(b) a marriage by a person having four wives with a fifth wife (s.
198); C

(c) a marriage with a woman who is the wife of another, (s. 198A);
(d) a marriage with a woman undergoing iddat (s.199);
(e) a marriage prohibited by reason of difference of religion
(s. 200); D
(f) a marriage with a woman so related to the wife that if one of
them had been a male, they could not have lawfully intermarried
(s. 204)…”
(emphasis supplied)
E
The reason why the aforesaid marriages are invalid and not void
has also been provided later in the same paragraph. With respect to
marriages prohibited by reason of difference of religion, it is stated thus:
“…in cl. (e) the objection may be removed by the wife becoming
a convert to the Mussulman, Christian or Jewish religion, or the F
husband adopting the Moslem faith…”
In the 10th edition, a change has been made to the meaning of
fasid marriage. In § 196A, valid, irregular and void marriages are dealt
with. It reads:
“A marriage may be valid (sahih) or irregular (fasid), or void G
from the beginning (batil).”
(emphasis supplied)
From the 10th edition onwards, fasid marriage has been described
as an irregular marriage, instead of invalid, but there has been no change
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950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A with regard to the effect of a fasid marriage from the 6th edition onwards.
The effects of an invalid (fasid) marriage have been dealt with in the 6th
edition of Mulla at § 206 at page 166, clauses (1) and (2) of which read:
“(1) An invalid marriage has no legal effect before consummation.
(2) If consummation has taken place, the wife is entitled to dower
B [“proper” (s. 220) or specified (s. 218), whichever is less], and
children conceived and born during the subsistence of the marriage
are legitimate as in the case of a valid marriage. But an invalid
marriage does not, even after consummation, create mutual rights
of inheritance between the parties.”
C In the 8th edition of Mulla, the effects of a fasid marriage have
been dealt with in § 206 at page 173. As in the 6th edition, it is stated that
children conceived and born during the subsistence of a fasid marriage
are legitimate, as in the case of a valid marriage. As noted supra, the
same position has been followed in the subsequent editions also, except
D that fasid has been described as “irregular” from the 10th edition onwards
rather than as “invalid”.
Irrespective of the word used, the legal effect of a fasid marriage
is that in case of consummation, though the wife is entitled to get dower,
she is not entitled to inherit the properties of the husband. But the child
E born in that marriage is legitimate just like in the case of a valid marriage,
and is entitled to inherit the property of the father.
9. Evidently, Muslim law clearly distinguishes between a valid
marriage (sahih), void marriage (batil), and invalid/irregular marriage
(fasid). Thus, it cannot be stated that a batil (void) marriage and a
F fasid (invalid/irregular) marriage are one and the same. The effect of a
batil (void) marriage is that it is void ab initio and does not create any
civil right or obligations between the parties. So also, the offspring of a
void marriage are illegitimate (§ 205A of the 6th and 8th editions and §§
205A of the 10th edition, and 266 of the 18th edition of Mulla). Therefore,
the High Court correctly concluded that the marriage of Defendant No.
G 9 with Mohammed Ilias cannot be held to be a batil marriage but only a
fasid marriage.
10. We find that the same position has been reiterated in the 21st
edition of Mullaas follows. The distinction between void and irregular
marriages has been dealt with in § 264 at page 349:
H
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 951
(D) THROUGH LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

“(1) A marriage which is not valid may be either void or irregular. A
(2) A void marriage is one which is unlawful in itself, the prohibition
against the marriage being perpetual and absolute. Thus, a marriage
with a woman prohibited by reason of consanguinity (§260), affinity
(§261), or fosterage (§262), is void, the prohibition against marriage
with such a woman being perpetual and absolute. B
(3) An irregular marriage is one which is not unlawful in itself, but
unlawful ‘for something else,’ as where the prohibition is temporary
or relative, or when the irregularity arises from an accidental
circumstance, such as the absence of witnesses. Thus the following
marriages are irregular, namely— C
(a) a marriage contracted without witnesses (§ 254);
(b) a marriage with a fifth wife by a person having four wives (§
255);
(c) a marriage with a woman undergoing iddat (§ 257); D
(d) a marriage prohibited by reason of difference of religion
(§ 259);
(e) a marriage with a woman so related to the wife that if one of
them had been a male, they could not have lawfully intermarried
(§ 263). E
The reason why the aforesaid marriages are irregular, and
not void, is that in Clause (a) the irregularity arises from an
accidental circumstance; in Clause (b) the objection may be
removed by the man divorcing one of his four wives; in Clause
(c) the impediment ceases on the expiration of the period of iddat; F
in Clause(d) the objection may be removed by the wife
becoming a convert to the Mussalman, Christian or Jewish
religion, or the husband adopting the Moslem faith; and in
Clause (e) the objection may be removed by the man divorcing
the wife who constitutes the obstacle; thus if a man who has
already married one sister marries another, he may divorce the G
first, and make the second lawful to himself.”
(emphasis supplied)
The effect of an irregular (fasid) marriage has been dealt with in
§ 267 at pages 350-351 of the 21st edition of Mulla as follows: H
952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 1 S.C.R.

A “267. Effect of an irregular (fasid) marriage.—(1) An irregular
marriage may be terminated by either party, either before or after
consummation, by words showing an intention to separate, as where
either party says to the other “I have relinquished you”. An irregular
marriage has no legal effect before consummation.
B (2) If consummation has taken place—
(i) the wife is entitled to dower, proper or specified, whichever is
less (§ 286, 289);
(ii) she is bound to observe the iddat, but the duration of
the iddat both on divorce and death is three course (see § 257(2));
C
(iii) the issue of the marriage is legitimate. But an irregular
marriage, though consummated, does not create mutual rights of
inheritance between husband and wife...”
(emphasis supplied)
D The Supreme Court, in Chand Patel v. Bismillah Begum, (2008)
4 SCC 774, while considering the question of the validity of a marriage
of a Muslim man with the sister of his existing wife, referred to the
above passages from Mulla(from an earlier edition, as reproduced in
the 21st edition) while discussing the difference between void and irregular
marriages and the effects of an irregular marriage.
E
11. In Syed Ameer Ali’s Mohamedan Law also, the same principle
has been enunciated. The learned author, while dealing with the issue of
the legitimacy of the children, observed at page 203 of Vol. II, 5th edition:
“The subject of invalid marriages, unions that are merely invalid
F (fasid) but not void (batil) ab initio under the Sunni Law, will be
dealt with later in detail, but it may be stated here that the issue of
invalid marriage are without question legitimate according to all
the sects.
For example, if a man were to marry a non-scriptural woman, the
G marriage would be only invalid, for she might at any time adopt
Islam or any other revealed faith, and thus remove the cause of
invalidity. The children of such marriage, therefore, would be
legitimate.”
Tahrir Mahmood in his book Muslim Law in India and Abroad,
H (2nd edition) at page 151 also affirms that the child of a couple whose
MOHAMMED SALIM (D) THROUGH LRS. v. SHAMSUDEEN 953
(D) THROUGH LRS. [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

marriage is fasid, i.e., unlawful but not void, under Muslim law will be A
legitimate. Only a child born outside of wedlock or born of a batil marriage
is not legitimate.
A.A.A. Fyzee, at page 76 of his book Outlines of Muhammadan
Law (5th edition) reiterates by citing Mulla that the nikah of a Muslim
man with an idolater or fire-worshipper is only irregular and not void. He B
also refers to Ameer Ali’s proposition that such a marriage would not
affect the legitimacy of the offspring, as the polytheistic woman may at
any time adopt Islam, which would at once remove the bar and validate
the marriage.
12. The position that a marriage between a Hindu woman and C
Muslim man is merely irregular and the issue from such wedlock is
legitimate has also been affirmed by various High Courts. (See Aisha
Bi v. Saraswathi Fathima, (2012) 3 LW 937 (Mad), Ihsan Hassan
Khan v. Panna Lal, AIR 1928 Pat 19).
13. Thus, based on the above consistent view, we conclude that D
the marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fire-worshipper is
neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely an
irregular (fasid) marriage. Any child born out of such wedlock (fasid
marriage) is entitled to claim a share in his father’s property. It would
not be out of place to emphasise at this juncture that since Hindus are
idol worshippers, which includes worship of physical images/statues E
through offering of flowers, adornment, etc., it is clear that the marriage
of a Hindu female with a Muslim male is not a regular or valid (sahih)
marriage, but merely an irregular (fasid) marriage.
14. In this view of the matter, the trial Court and the High Court
were justified in concluding that the plaintiff is the legitimate son of F
Mohammed Ilias and Valliamma, and is entitled to his share in the property
as per law. The High Court was also justified in modifying the decree
passed by the trial Court and awarding the appropriate share in favour
of the plaintiff. No issue has been raised before us relating to the quantum
of share. Accordingly, the appeal fails and stands dismissed. G

Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.

H