Supreme Court of India
MOFIL KHAN & ANR.versusSTATE OF JHARKHAND
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 1016
- Decided
- 9 October 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the case qualifies as "rarest of rare" and upheld the death penalty.
Summary
Mofil Khan and two co‑accused brutally murdered eight members of their own family, including women, children and a physically disabled boy, to obtain property. The trial court sentenced them to death, a decision affirmed by the Jharkhand High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the "rarest of rare" doctrine justified the death penalty, considering the aggravating factors (premeditation, multiple victims, cold‑blooded execution, lack of remorse) and rejecting the appellants' mitigating pleas of age, family responsibilities and lack of prior criminal record. Relying on the jurisprudence of Bachan Singh, Jagmohan Singh and numerous subsequent cases, the Court held that the crime’s depravity and societal impact warranted the death sentence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the death sentences upheld.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the "rarest of rare" doctrine to the murder of eight family members.
- Whether the appellants' mitigating circumstances (age, dependents, no prior record) merit commutation of death to life imprisonment.
- Interpretation of sentencing policy under Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 354(3)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34, s. 449
Subjects
murderdeath penaltyrarest of rare doctrinesentencing policyaggravating circumstancesmitigating circumstancesvictims' rightsproperty disputepremeditated murderIPCCrPC
Judgment
[2014] 10 S.C.R. 812
A MOFIL KHAN & ANR.
v.
STATE OF JHARKHAND
(Civil Appeal No. 1795 of 2009)
OCTOBER 9, 2014
8
[H.L. DATTU, CJI, R.K. AGRAWAL AND
ARUN MISHRA, JJ.]
SENTENCE/SENTENCING:
c
Murder - Sentencing policy - Held: The most significant
aspect of sentencing policy is independent consideration of
each case by the Court and extricating a sentence which is
the most appropriate and proportional to the culpability of the
0 accused - Aggregating circumstance,s and mitigating
circumstances, culled out - The doctrine of "rarest 'of rare"
does not classify murders into categories of heinous or less
heinous - The difference between two is not in the identity of
the principles, but lies in the realm of application thereof to
E individual fact situations - Sentences of severity are imposed
ta reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for
the law, to provide just punishment for the offence, to afford
adequate deterrent to criminal conduct and to protect the
community from further similar conduct - It serves a three-
fold purpose- punitive, deterrent and protective - It is not
F only the victims of crime that require soothing balm, but also
the incidental victims like the family, the co-sufferers and to
a relatively large extent the society too - The judiciary has a
paramount duty to safeguard the rights of the victims as
diligently as those of the perpetrators - Code of Criminal
G Procedure, 1973 - s.354(3).
SENTENCE/SENTENCING:
Murder - Accused person committing murders of 8
H 812
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 813
persons of their family - Death sentence by courts below - A
Held: The time, place and manner of the commission of crime
are indicative of the motive of accused-appellants - They
have ruthlessly and successively butchered their own kith and
kin for obtaining possession of certain pass-book, money and
immovable property without any provocation - Being armed s
with sharp edged weapons, the quick succession with which
the accused-appellants proceeded to slaughter the eight
members of their family classifies their act as pre-planned
and reflects the cold-blooded fashion with which the callous
design was executed - Their lack of remorse is reflected from c
the act of extending threat of life to other members of the
family present in the house should they dare to inform the
police - The mitigating circumstances enumerated, under
which the appellants seek refuge, have failed to convince the
Court - In the considered view of the Court, the "rarest of the
0
rare" case exists when an accused would be a menace, threat
and anti-thetical to harmony in the society - Especially in
cases where an accused does ndt act on provocation, acting
in spur of the moment but meticulously executes a
deliberately planned crime inspite of understanding the E
probable consequence of his act, the death sentence may be
the most appropriate punishment - Keeping in view the
principle of proportionality of sentence or what it termed as
"just-desert" for the vile act of slaughtering eight lives including
four innocent minors and a physically infirm child whereby an
entire family is exterminated, the depravity of appellant's F
offence would attract no lesser sentence than the death
penalty.
Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1987 (2)
=
SCR 710 (1987) 3 sec 80- relied on. G
Sunil Dutt Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), 2013
(9)SCR 1000 = (2014) 4 SCC 375 - held inapplicable.
Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P. 1973 (2)
H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A SCR 541= (1973) 1 SCC 20 and Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, Machhi Singh and Ors. v. State
of Punjab 1983(3)SCR 413 = (1983) 3 SCC 470, Ajitsingh
Harnamsingh Gujral v. State of Maharashtra 2011
(13) SCR 1000 = (2011) 14 SCC 401, State of Uttar Pradesh
B v. Sattan @ Satyendra & Ors. 2009 (3) SCR 643 = (2009) 4
SCC 736; Govindasami v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1998 (2)
SCR 1135= (1998) 4 sec 531, Atbir v. ..Govt. (NCT of Delhi),
2010 (9) SCR 993 = (2010) 9 SCC 1, Ajay Kumar Pal v. State
of JharkhC!!J_d, (2010) 12 SCC 118, Shobhit Chamar v. State
C of Bihar 1998 (2) SCR 117 = (1998}- 3 SCC 455, Sunder
Singh v. State of Uttaranchal 2010 (11) SCR 927 = (2010) 10
SCC 611, C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., 2010 (10) SCR 262
= (2010) 9 SCC 567, Jagdish v. State of M.P. 2009 (14)
SCR 727 = (2009) 9 SCC 495, Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State
D of Bihar 2008 (5) SCR 969 = (2008) 4 SCC 434, Ram
Singh v. Sonia, 2007 (2) SCR 651 = (2007) 3 SCC 1, Holiram
Bordoli v. State of Assam 2005 (3) SCR 406 = (2005) 3 SCC
793, Saibanna v. State of Karnataka 2005 (3) SCR 760 =
(2005) 4 SCC 165, Karan Singh v. State of U.P., (2005) 6
SCC 342, State of Rajasthan v. Kheraj Ram, 2003
E (2) Suppl. SCR 861 = (2003) 8 sec 224, Om
Prakash v. State of Uttarancha/, 2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 623 =
(2003) 1 SCC 648, Praveen Kumar v. State of Karnataka,
(2003) 12 SCC 199, Suresh v. State of U.P.; 2001
(2) SCR 263 = (2001) 3 SCC 673, Ramdeo Chauhan v. State
F of Assam, 2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 28 = (2000) 7 SCC
455, Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of Mahrashtra,
2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104 = (2000) 8 sec 457 State of
I
U.P. v. Dharmendra Singh 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 52 = (1999)
8 SCC 325, Ronny v. State of Mahrashtra 1998 (2) SCR 162 =
G (1998) 3 SCC 625, Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 (6)
Suppl. SCR 783 = (1996) 6 SCC 271, Haresh Mohandas
Rajput v. State of Maharashtra 2011 (14) SCR 921 = (2011)
12 SCC 56, Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v. Republic
of India 2011 (6) SCR 1104 = (2011) 2 SCC 490, Surendra
H
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 815
Kofi v. State of UP. and Ors. 2011 (2) SCR 939 = (2011) 4 A
SCC 80 and Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav v. State of
Maharashtra, 2011 (6) SCR 1104= (2011) 7 SCC 125, Birju
V. State of M.P. 2014 (1) SCR 1047= (2014) 3 sec 421;
Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 4
SCC 292; Sushi/ Sharma v. The State of N. C. T. of Delhi, B
(2014) 4 SCC 317; Anil@ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph v.
State of Maharashtra, 2014 (3) SCR 34 = (2014) 4 SCC 69;
State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul, 2011
(9) SCR 41 = (2011) 7 SCC 437; Brajendrasingh v. State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2012 (3) SCR 599= (2012) 4 SCC 289, c
Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhanna v. State of West Bengal
1994 (1) SCR 37 = (1994) 2 SCC 220, Rattan Singh v. State
of Punjab 1980 (1) SCR 846= (1979) 4 SCC 719, Sevaka
Perumal v. State of T. N. 1991 (2) SCR 711 = (1991) 3 SCC
471 - referred to. D
Case Law Reference:
1973 (2) SCR 541 referred to para 17
(1980) 2 sec 684 referred to para 17
E
1983(3) SCR 413 referred to para 17
2011 (13) SCR 1000 referred to para 21
2009 (3) SCR 643 referred to para 22
1998 (2) SCR 1135 referred to para 23 F
2010 (9) SCR 993 referred to para 24
(2010) 12 sec 118 referred to para 25
1998 (2) SCR 117 referred to para 26 G
2010 (11) SCR 927 referred to para 27
2010 (10) SCR 262 referred to para 28
2009 (14) SCR 727 referred to para 29
H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 10 S.C.R.
A 2008 (5) SCR 969 referred to para 30
2007 (2) SCR 651 referred to para 31
2005 (3) SCR 406 referred to para 32
B 2005 (3) SCR 760 referred to para 33
(2005) 6 sec 342 referred to para 34
2003 (2) Suppl. SCR 861 referred to para 35
2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 623 referred to para 36
c
(2003) 12 sec 199 referred to para 37
2001 (2) SCR 263 referred to para 38
2000 (2) Suppl. SCR 28 referred to para 39
D
2000 (3) Suppl. SCR 104 referred to para· 40
1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 52 referred to para 41
1998 (2) SCR 162 referred to para 42
E 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 783 referred to para 43
2011 (14) SCR 921 referred to para 44
2011 (6) SCR 1104 referred to para 44
F 2011 (2) SCR 939 referred to para 44
2013 (9) SCR 1000 held para 47
inapplicable
2014 (1) SCR 1047 referred to para 48
G (2014) 4 sec 292 referred to para 49
(2014) 4 sec 317 referred to para 50
2014 (3) SCR 34 referred to para 51
H
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 817
2011 (9) SCR 41 referred to para 52 A
2012 (3) SCR 599 referred to para 53
1994 (1) SCR 37 referred to para 57
1980 (1) SCR 846 referred to para 58
B
1987 (2) SCR 710 relied on para 60
1991 (2) SCR 711 referred to para 61
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1795 of 2009. c
From the Judgment & Order dated 02.07.2009 of the High
Court of Jharkhand in Death Reference No. 01 of 2008 with
Criminal Appeal No. (DB) No. 1103 of 2008.
D
Bimal Roy Jad (AC.) for the Appellants.
Ratan Kumar Choudhari, Jayesh Gaurav for the
Respondent.
The Order of the Court was delivered E
ORDER
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
passed by the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Death
Reference No. 01 of 2008 and Criminal Appeal (DB) Nos. 1103 F
of 2008, dated 02.07 J009. By the impugned judgment and
order, the High Court.has confirmed the judgment of conviction,
dated 01.08.2008 passed by the District and Sessions Judge,
Lohardaga in Sessions Trial No. 128 of 2007, whereby and .
whereunder the learned Sessions Judge has convicted the two G
accused-appellants and two others for offence under Sections
302 and 449 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short, "the IPC"). The High Court while confirming the order
of death sentence, dated 05.08.2008 passed by the Trial Court
H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A in respect of the accused-appellants, has thought it fit to modify
the sentence awarded to the other two accused persons,
Saddam Khan and Wakil Khan, to life imprisonment.
2. At the outset, the learned amicus, Shri Bimal Roy Jad,
8 appearing for the two accused-appellants has only assailed the
order of sentence passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by
the High Court and restricted his arguments to the quantum of
punishment awarded. Therefore, the scope of this appeal is
restricted to the determination of appropriate sentence that
C requires to be awarded to the accused-appellants. Further,
since other accused persons in the instant case are not in
appeal before us, the discussions hereinafter would be confined
to the fact relevant for the disposal of present appeal.
3. The prosecution case in brief is, on 06.06.2007 at about
D 8:30 p.m., one Haneef Khan (referred to as "the deceased"
hereafter) was offering Namaz in the mosque at village
Makandu, Jharkhand. The accused-appellants and others, who
are none other than the deceased's brothers and nephews,
approached him and started assaulting him with sharp-edged
E weapons such as sword, tangi, bhujali and spade. The
deceased succumbed to the injuries inflicted by the accused
persons. Leaving the deceased at the spot, the accused-
appellants and others proceeded towards the house of
deceased where, upon hearing the cries of their father, the
F deceased's sons Gufran Khan @ Pala and lmran Khan had
come out on the street. The accused-appellants assaulted the
two unarmed brothers with the aforesaid weapons due to which
the two brothers collapsed and. died in front of their house.
Thereafter, the accused-appellants and others entered the
G house of the deceased and committed murder of Kasuman
Bibi, wife of the deceased and his four sons, namely, Anish
Khan (aged about 5 years), Danish Khan (aged about 8 years),
Yusuf Khan (physically disabled and aged about 18 years) and
Maherban Khan (aged about 1Z years). After committing murder
H pfthe six persons, the accused-appellants threatened other
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 819
members of the household including their mother, Jainub A
Khatoon (PW-2) of meeting the same fate if they inform the
police about the incident and thereafter left the house taking
away certain documents relating to the lands, Pass-book,
jewellery etc.
B
4. On 07.06.2007, at about 6:00 a.m., father of the
deceased, Gaffar Khan (PW-1) upon being informed reached
the village and saw the dead body of the deceased lying at the
mosque, the dead bodies of his grand sons, namely, Gufran
Khan @Pala and lmran Khan were lying in front of the house c
and the dead-bodies of his daughter-in-law, Kasuman Bibi and
her four sons were lying inside the house. There he was
informed by his wife- PW2 of the manner in which the accused-
appella nts alongwith others had committed the offence.
Meanwhile, Chowkidar of Village had informed the Police of 0
the incident telephonically, upon which sanha was entered on
the station diary and the officer in-charge, Shambhu Nath Singh
(PW-13), reached the place of occurrence and recorded the
fardbeyan of the informant, PW-1. Thereafter, P.S. Case No.
80 of 2007was registered and an FIR was drawn. The police E
authorities carried out the investigation and held inquest on the
bodies of the eight deceased persons and prepared inquest
rep()rts, whereafter, the dead-bodies were sent for post mortem
examination. During further investigation, the investigating
officer found blood smeared earth at all the three places of
F
occurrence, and recovered a plastic mat smeared with blood
at the mosque and blood smeared tangi from the house of
another accused person-Kariman Khan @ Kari Khan and
seized them as exhibits.
5. The genesis of the incident has been traced to a G
property dispute between accused-appellants and the
deceased.
6. On completion of the investigation, the charges were
H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A framed against the accused-appellants and others. The
accused-appellants had denied their guilt and thus, the case
was committed to trial.
7. The prosecution has examined 13 witnesses including
8 eye-witness, PW-2. They have also tendered by way of
documentary evidence Exhibit 1 to 9/5 (sic) and also has
marked Material objects 'I' and 'II' while the defence has
examined 4 witnesses and marked Exhibit 'A' to 'E' as
evidence.
c 8. PW-1 is the father of deceased-Haneef Khan and the
accused-appellants. Though not an eye-witness to the incident,
he has testified in respect of the genesis of the dispute
between parties and supported the version of PW-2. PW-2 is
the mother of deceased-Haneef Khan and was present in the
D house in another room during the occurrence of the incident and
hence is an eyewitness. She has deposed in respect of the
sequence of occurrence on the fateful night, the identification
of the accused-appellants and genesis of the dispute between
parties. PW-3 and PW-6 are independent witnesses who were
E offering Namaz at the mosque during the incident and PW-5
is the Imam of the mosque who also witnessed the incident.
Their testimony supports the prosecution case in respect of the
accused-appellants indiscriminately assaulting the deceased-
Haneef Khan with sword and bhujali. PW-4 is a resident of the
F same village and has testified that the accused-appellants were
present in the village on the fateful night and did not take part
in the marriage proceedings held in another village where other
villagers including PW-1 were present. PW-7, neighbor of
deceased-Haneef Khan, has corroborated the prosecution
G version in respect of the accused-appellants assaulting the
deceased's two sons in front of his house with sword and
bhujali. PW-8, the medical practitioner who conducted post
mortem of the dead bodies has testified to the cause of death
being shock and hemorrhage of vital organs like brain due to
H injuries sustained by the deceased persons.
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 821
9. In their defense, the accused-appellants have denied the A
charges against them.
10. The Trial Court after marshalling of facts and thorough
scrutiny of evidence on record has concluded that the accused-
appellants, armed with sword and bhujali, alongwith other 8
persons had entered into the mosque and assassinated the
deceased, killed his two sons in front of his house and then
entered the house where they assaulted his wife and four
minors including a physically challenged child leading to their
death. The Court has further rejected the defense pleaded by C
the accused-appellants and established their presence in the
village on the fateful night in view of PW-4's testimony. Further,
the Court has found the testimony of the sole eye-witness, PW-
2, credible and trustworthy. Therefore, in light of the motive of
the accused-appellants being clear from the record, the
0
apparent pre-meditation of successive murders and their
choice of the day of execution of the said merciless plan when
residents of the village had left for another village to attend a
wedding, the Court has concluded the guilt of the accused-
appellants in killing the eight persons and convicted them for E
offence under Sections 302 and 449 read with 34 of IPC. While
sentencing them, the Trial Court has recorded the aggravating
and mitigating circumstances for awarding death sentence.
11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment and order, the
accused-appellants along with two others had approached the F
High Court in Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 1103 of 2008.
12. The High Court after carefully analyzing the evidence
on record has come to the conclusion that the Trial Court has
not committed any error in convicting and sentencing the G -
appellants and accordingly has confirmed the judgment and
order of the Trial Court insofar as the appellants are concerned.
However, the High Court has modified the sentence of other
two accused persons from death sentence to imprisonment for
I~. H
i
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 10 S.C.R.
A 13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence,
the accused-appellants are before us in this appeal.
14. The learned amicus for the appellants would confine
his arguments only to the question of sentence. He would submit
8 that neither do the appellants have any criminal antecedents nor
are they hardened criminals. He would contend that the
appellants are middle-aged and have a family and old aged
parents-PW-1 and PW-2 and sentencing them to death would
devastate the said dependents. He would further submit that
C there is a possibility of reformation of the appellants and they
must not be deprived of their life, but be provided with an
opportunity to reform themselves especially when they have a
considerable life-span ahead.
15. Learned counsel for the State ably justifies the judgment
D and order passed by the High Court.
16. We have given our anxious consideration to the
evidence on record and the submissions put forth by both the
learned counsel. We have carefully perused the judgments and
E orders of the Courts below.
17. The awarding of death penalty has been a matter of
serious academic and judicial debate to discern an objective
and rational basis for the exercise of the power and to evolve
F sound jurisprudential principles governing the exercise thereof.
In this regard the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in
Jagmohan Singh v. The State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 20 and
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, a three
Judge Bench decision in Machhi Singh and Ors. v. State of
G Punjab (1983) 3 sec 470, are the leading cases wherein
certain principles in the matter of sentencing has been evolved
by this Court. The broad principles tailored by this Court in its
judgments provide guidelines to ensure that the discretion
vested in the Court is not unbridled.
H 18. This Court in the aforesaid decisions has evolved the
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 823
doctrine of "rarest of the rare" case and put it to test via the A
medium of charting out the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances in a case and then balancing the two in the facts
and circumstances of the case. As a norm, the most significant
aspect of sentencing__policy is independent consideration of
each case by the Court and extricating a sentence which is the B
most appropriate and proportional to the culpability of the
accused. It may not be apposite for the Court to decide the
quantum of sentence with reference to one of the classes under
any one of the head while completely ignoring classes under
other head. That is to say, what is required is not just the C
balancing of these circumstances by placing them in separate
compartments, but their cumulative effect which the Court is
required to keep in its mind so as to better administer the
criminal justice system and provide an effective and meaningful
reasoning by the Court as contemplated under Section 354(3) D
Code while sentencing. The following broad heads have been
culled out by the successive judgments of this Court:
"Aggravating Circumstances:
1. The offences relating to the commission of heinous E
crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping etc.
by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital
felony or offences committed by the person having a
substantial history of serious assaults and criminal
convictions. F
2. The offence was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of another serious offence.
3. The offence was committed with the intention to create
a fear psychosis in the public at large and was committed G
in a public place by a weapon or device which clearly
could be hazardous to the life of more than one person.
4. The offence of murder was committed for ransom or like
offences to receive money or monetary benefits. H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A 5. Hired killings.
6. The offence was committed outrageously for want only
while involving inhumane treatment and torture to the victim.
7. The offence was committed by a person while in lawful
B custody.
8. The murder or the offence was committed, to prevent a
person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or custody
in a place of lawful confinement of himself or another. For
c instance, murder is of a person who had acted in lawful
discharge of his duty under Section 43 Code of Criminal
Procedure.
9. When the crime is enormous in proportion like making
an attempt of murder of the entire family or members of a
D
particular community.
10. When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person relies
upon the trust of relationship and social norms, like a child,
helpless woman, a daughter or a niece staying with a
E father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such a trusted
person.
11. When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
F 12. When there is a cold blooded murder without
provocation.
13. The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or
shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the
G conscience of the society.
Mitigating Circumstances:
1. The manner and circumstances in and under which the
offence was committed, for example, extreme mental or
H emotional disturbance or extreme provocation in
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 825
contradistinction to all these situations in normal course. A
2. The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but
not a determinative factor by itself.
3. The chances of the accused of not indulging in
commission of the crime again and the probability of the B
accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
4. The condition of the accused shows that he was
mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity to
appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct. c
5. The circumstances which, in normal course of life, would
render such a behavior possible and could have the effect
of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given situation
like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to such a
D
peak of human behavior that, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the accused believed that he
was morally justified in committing the offence.
6. Where the Court upon proper appreciation of evidence
is of the view that the crime was not committed in a pre- E
ordained manner and that the death resulted in the course
of commission of another crime and that there was a
possibility of it being construed as consequences to the
commission of the primary crime.
F
7. Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the testimony
of a sole eye-witness though prosecution has brought
home the guilt of the accused. While determining the
questions relateable to sentencing policy, the Court has to
follow certain principles and those principles are the G
loadstar besides the above considerations in imposition
or otherwise of the death sentence.
Principles:
1. The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A the 'rarest of rare' case for imposition of a death sentence.
2. In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other
punishment, i.e., life imprisonment would be completely
inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
B 3. Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
exception.
4. The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life
cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature
c and circumstances of the crime and all relevant
circumstances.
5. The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner
(extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime
was committed and the circumstances leading to
D commission of such heinous crime."
19. We remind ourselves that the doctrine of "rarest of rare"
does not classify murders into categories of heinous or less
heinous. The difference between two is not in the identity of the
E principles, but lies in the realm of application thereof to
individual fact situations. Sentences of severity are imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the crime, to promote respect for the
law, to provide just punishment for the offence, to afford
adequate deterrent to criminal conduct and to protect the
F community from further similar conduct. It serves a three-fold
purpose- punitive, deterrent and protective.
20. Before proceeding to discuss the fact situation in the
instant case, it would be expedient to briefly visit the judicial
G decisions of this Court on sentencing policy in cases wherein
the entire family has been exterminated and where the accused
persons plead for lesser sentence on grounds of age, lack of
criminal antecedents and existence of dependents such as
children or old aged parents or seeks commutation indicating
H probability of reformation and rehabilitation.
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 827
21. In Ajitsingh Harnamsingh Gujral v. State of A
Maharashtra, (2011) 14 sec 401. the accused was convicted
under Section 302 of IPC for murder of his wife, one son and
two daughters by burning. This Court awarded him
death sentence classifying the case as rarest of rare. It
observed that burning living persons to death is horrible act B
causing excruciating pain to the victim. The person in the
position of trust instead of doing his duty of protecting his family
has killed them in a cruel and barbaric manner, thus eliminating
possibility of being reformed or rehabilitated.
c
22. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sattan @ Satyendra &
Ors. (2009) 4 sec 736, the accused had committed the
murder of six members of family including helpless women and
children in brutal, diabolic and beastly manner. This Court held
that the crime is enormous in proportion and shocks 0
conscience of Court. The Court observed that the depraved
acts of accused call for only one sentence, that is the
death sentence.
23. In Govindasami v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1998) 4 SCC
531, the accused committed five murders for which he was E
acquitted by the Trial Court but convicted and sentenced to
death by the High Court. This Court in appeal confirmed the
sentence and held, that, the brutal manner of wiping out the
entire family of his uncle (except one son studying in
Coimbatore escaping) by appellant to grab his properties F
shocks judicial conscience and no lesser sentence is
appropriate.
24. Atbir v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 9 SCC 1, is a
case where the accused had committed murder of step G
relatives to grab entire family property. This Court held that
though the accused was 25 years old at the relevant point of
time, considering his hunger and lust for property, killing his own
(step) family members by trapping them within closed doors
when they were helpless and unarmed and had no occasion H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R. -
A to provoke or resist has brutally and mercilessly caused 37 knife
blows on vital parts of all three victims until each one had died;
such act of barbarism calls for no sentence lesser than the
death sentence.
8 25. Similarly, in Ajay Kumar Pal v. State of Jharkhand,
(2010) 12 sec 118, the domestic servant had laced the food
with pesticide and assaulted the inmates with sharp-edged
weapons and thereafter had set the house on fire. This Court
held that murder of three persons without sudden provocation
C wiping out almost entire family involved preparation and pre-
planned execution and thus calls for imposition of death
penalty.
26. In Shobhit Chamar v. State of Bihar, (1998) 3 SCC
455, two accused were before this Court for committing dacoity
D and murder of all six male members of a family including two
minor children. While for one accused evidence of wieldfng any
specific weapon could not be produced by the prosecution, use
of firearm and presence of motive was proved by the
prosecution for the other accused. This Court considering
E former accused was not related to latter had commuted the
death sentence of former and confirmed the death penalty of
the latter accused.
27. In Sunder Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (2010) 10
F SCC 611, in the incident five persons lost their lives while the
sole surviving lady survived with 70% burn injuries. Therein, the
accused had arrived at the spot well prepared carrying jerry
cans containing petrol, sword, pistol with two bullets indicating
pre-meditation. The murder was committed in a cruel,
G grotesque and diabolical manner by closing the door of the
house evidencing that the accused actually intended to burn all
the persons inside the room. In absence of any mitigating
circumstance weighing in favor of the accused, the death
sentence was upheld.
H
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 829
28. In C. Muniappan v. State of T.N., (2010) 9 SCC 567, A
three helpless, innocent, unarmed, girl students had died and
20 received burn injuries by burning of the bus bY three
members of an unlawful assembly engaged in road blocking
in a public demonstration. This Court held that it was one of
the rarest of rare cases, indicating prior planning, lack of B
provocation and certainly one where the accused would be a
menace and threat to the harmonious and peaceful co-
existence of the society and hence the death sentence was the
most appropriate punishment.
c
29. In Jagdish v. State of M.P.,(2009) 9 SCC 495, the
accused had murdered his wife and five children (aged 1 to
16 years) in his own house. The murders were particularly
horrifying as the assailant was in a dominant position and a
position of trust as the head of the family. This Court held that 0
the balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
was heavily weighed against the assailant making it a rarest
of rare case and hence, the award of death sentence was
confirmed.
30. In Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2008) 4 E
sec 434, the accused, who was a paying guest for a
continuous period of four years in lieu of a paltry sum of Rs.500/
- for food and meals, had brutally killed three innocent and
defenseless children aged 8, 15 and 16, attempted to murder
the father (informant) and mother who survived the attack with F
multiple injuries. In lack of provocation or motive for committing
this ghastly act at a time when the children were sleeping and
presence of several incised wounds caused to the deceased,
this Court held that the murders were brutal, diabolic, inhuman
in nature and considering the enormity of the crime held that G
the mindset of the accused could not be said to be amenable
to any reformation and sentenced him to death.
31. Ram Singh v. Sonia, (2007) 3 SCC 1 involved facts
where a married couple murdered the wife's father, mother, H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 10 S.C.R.
A sister, step brother and his whole family including three young
ones of 45 days, 2 Y:z years and 4 years with the motive of
resisting her father from giving property to her step brother and
his family. This Court held that since the murders were
committed in a cruel, pre-planned and diabolic manner while
B the victims were sleeping, without any provocation from the
victim's side, it could be concluded the accused persons did
not possess any basic humanity and lacked the psyche or
mindset amenable to any reformation and therefore, the case
fell within the category or rarest of rare cases for imposition of
C death penalty.
32. In Holiram Bordoli v. State of Assam, (2005) 3 SCC
793, the accused persons, armed with lathis and other
weapons, had come to the house of the victim and started
0 pelting stones on the bamboo wall of the said house.
Thereafter, they closed the house from the outside and set the
house on fire. When the son, daughter and the wife of the victim
somehow managed to come out of the house, the accused
persons caught hold of them and threw them into the fire again.
E Thereafter, the elder brother who was staying in another house
at some distance from the house of the victim was caught and
dragged to the courtyard of the accused where the accused cut
him into pieces. It was held that even in absence of any strong
motive and lack of provocation, the offence was committed in
F the most barbaric manner to deter others from challenging the
supremacy of the accused in the village and therefore,
imposition of death penalty was found fit.
33. In Saibanna v. State ofKamataka, (2005) 4 SCC 165,
the accused had pre-planned the murder of his second wife and
G daughter age~round one year when the victims were sleeping
by usin9 a hunting knife Oambia) which is not ordinarily available
in a house at the time when he was out on parole. The Court
found no justified reasons for any extenuating circumstances
in favour of the accused, thus placing the case under the 'rarest
H
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 831
of rare case' category and justifying imposition of death A
sentence.
34. In Karan Singh v. State ofU.P., (2005) 6 SCC 342,
the two appellants chased the three deceased persons involved ·
with them in a property dispute and butchered them with axes B
and other weapons in a barbaric manner. Thereafter, they had
entered their house and killed two children with the sole intention
to exterminate the entire family. The Court held that it was a
'rarest of the rare' case and sentenced the appellants to death.
35. State of Rajasthan v. Kheraj Ram, (2003) 8 SCC224 .· C
is the unfortunate case where the accused deliberately planned
and executed his two innocent children, wife and brother-in-law
when they were steeping at night. The Court noticed that there
was no remorse for such a gruesome act which was indicated
by the calmness with which he was smoking "chilam" after .the D
commission of the act. The incident being pre-planned, after
analyzing the entire chain of events and circumstances, the .
inevitable conclusion was reached that the accused acted in a
most cruel and inhuman manner and the murder was committed
in an extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical, revolting and E
dastardly manner. ·
36. In Om Prakash v. State of Uttaranchal, (2003) 1 SCC
648, the accused was a domestic servant who killed three
members and attempted to kilt the fourth member of F
the family of his employer in order to take revenge for the
decision· to dispense with his service and to commit robbery.
The death sentence was upheld.
37. In Praveen Kumarv. State of Kamataka, (2003) 12 G
sec 199, the accused was accommodated in the houseby one
of the victims, his aunt, despite her large family, and she gave
him an opportunity to make an honest living as a tailor. The
accused committed the pre-planned, cold-blooded murders of
relatives and well wishers including one young child while they H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A were asleep. After the commission of the crime the accused
absconded from judicial custody for nearly four years, indicating
that possibility of any remorse or rehabilitation is none. This
Court has held that the extreme penalty of death was justified.
B 38. In Suresh v. State ofU.P., (2001) 3 SCC 673, the brutal
murder of one of the accused's brother and his family members
including minor children at night when they were fast asleep with
axe and chopper by cutting their skulls and necks for a piece
of land was considered to be a grotesque & diabolical act,
C where any other punishment than the death penalty was
unjustified.
39. In Ramdeo Chauhan v.State of Assam, (2000) 7 SCC
455, the accused committed a pre-planned cold-blooded brutal
murder of four inmates of a house including two helpless
D women and a child aged 2 % years during their sleep with a
motive to commit theft. The accused also attacked with a spade
another inmate of the house, an old woman, and a neighbour
when they entered the house. The Court held that the young age
(22 years) of the accused at the time of committing the crime
E was not a mitigating circumstance, and death penalty was a
just and proper punishment.
40. In Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of
Mahrashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457, there was a pre-planned,
F calculated, cold-blooded murder of five women, including one
pregnant woman and two children of about 2 years of.age, all
inmates of a house, in order to wipe out all evidence of robbery
and theft committed by two accused in the house at a time
when male members of the house were out. It was held that the
G young age (20-22 years) of the accused persons cannot serve
as a mitigating circumstance.
41. In State ofU.P. v. Dharmendra Singh, (1999) 8 SCC
325, 5 persons were murdered, an old man of 75 years, a
H woman aged 32 years, two boys aged 12 years and a girl aged
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 833
15 years, at night when they were asleep by inflicting multiple A
injuries to wreak vengeance. This Court held that the ghastly
and barbaric murder can be termed as rarest of the rare case
and death penalty was just for such a diabolic act. .
42. In Ronny v. State of Mahrashtra, (1998) 3 SCC 625, B
the accused was the nephew of the deceased, and because
of the relationship he gained access inside the house for
himself and his friends. The victims were unarmed and the
crime was committed for gain i.e. to rob the valuables of the
deceased family. The accused then killed all three members c
and then committed rape on the lady who was the wife of his
maternal uncle and as old as his mother. Considering the facts
of the case this Court held that it cannot be said that the
offences were committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance as everything was done in a 0
preplanned way, and hence death penalty was upheld.
43. Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1996) 6 SCC 271
was a case where the dispute between the appellant and the
deceased only related to erecting a barbed fence on a portion
of the residential complex. The appellant in pursuance of the E
same had murdered his bother, his two minor sons and an aged
aunt by cutting their neck with a kassi while they were all
sleeping and also attempted to murder his brother's wife and
daughter but they survived with serious injuries.
The death sentence was held to be justified. F
44. In Haresh Mohandas Rajput v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 12 SCC 56, Rabindra Kumar Pal alias Dara Singh v.
Republic of India, (2011) 2 SCC 490, Surendra Kofi v. State
of U.P. and Ors., (2011) 4 sec 80 and Sudam@ Rahul G
Kaniram Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 7 SCC 125,
this Court has opined that the death sentence must be awarded
where the victims are innocent children and helpless women,
especially when the crime is committed in a most cruel and
H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A inhuman manner which is extremely brutal, grotesque, diabolical
and revolting.
45. The crime test, criminal test and the "rarest of the rare"
test are certain tests evolved by this Court. The tests basically
8 examine whether the society abhors such crimes and whether
such crimes shock the conscience of the society and attract
intense and extreme indignation of the community. The cases
exhibiting pre-meditation and meticulous execution of the plan
to murder by leveling a calculated attack on the victim to
C annihilate him, have been held to be fit cases for imposing
death penalty. Where innocent minor children, unarmed
persons, helpless women and old and infirm persons have
been killed in a brutal manner by persons in dominating
position, and where after ghastly murder displaying depraved
mentality, the accused have shown no remorse, death penalty
0
has been imposed. Where it is established that the accused
is a hardened criminal and has committed murder in a diabolic
manner and where it is felt that reformation and rehabilitation
of such a person is impossible and if let free, he would be a
E menace to the society, this Court has riot hesitated to confirm
death sentence. Many a time, in cases of brutal murder,
exhibiting depravity and callousness, this Court has
acknowledged the need to send a deterrent message to those
who may embark on such crimes in future. In some cases
F involving brutal murders, society's cry for justice has been taken
note of by this Court, amongst other relevant factors. While
deciding whether death penalty should be awarded or not, this
Court has in each case realizing the irreversible nature of the
sentence, pondered over the issue many times over. This Court
G has always kept in mind the caution sounded by the Constitution
Bench in Bachan Singh case (supra) that judges should never
be blood thirsty but wherever necessary in the interest of society
identify the rarest of rare case and exercise the tougher option
of death penalty.
H 46. Having noticed the decisions of this Court on the said
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 835
aspect, we would consider other decisions of this Court on A
which reliance has been placed by the learned amicus.
47. The case of Sunil Dutt Shanna v. State (Govt. of NCT
of Delhi), (2014) 4 SCC 375 has been relied upon by the
learned amicus to bring home the point that the lack of criminal B
antecedents and existence of dependents of the accused would
be considered as mitigating circumstances warranting award
of a lesser .sentence. In the said case, the accused-husband
was convicted under Section 304-B of the IPC for dowry death
of the wife within two years of the marriage and was awarded C
the sentence of life imprisonment. His sentence was modified
to ten years of rigorous imprisonment by this Court considering
that his age at the time of commission of the offence-21 years
and that he had a young son. In our considered view, the
aforesaid mitigating circumstances considered by this Court 0
while modifying the sentence of the accused-husband therein
would not be relevant in the instant case. Firstly, the said case
did not involve testing the culpability of the accused on the
balance sheet of mitigating and aggravating circumstances to
determine whether the offence committed was "rarest of rare".
E
48. In the case of Birju v. State of M.P., (2014) 3 sec
421, this Court has dealt with the question of chances of the
accused not indulging in commission of the crime again and
the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
This case relates to the killing of a child aged one year who F
was in the arms of the grand-father when the accused shot him
in the head with a country made pistol for which the accused
was awarded death sentence by the Trial Court which was
affirmed by the High Court and modified to rigorous
imprisonment for 20 years by this Court on grounds that though G
the accused person had criminal antecedents, the depravity of
the crime was not such so as to fall under the category of the
"rarest of rare" cases. Learned amicus has relied on paragraph
20 of the judgment to buttress the argument that sentencing
H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A policy requires the Court to balance the probability of the
accused committing crime again and being a menace to the
society if let free.
49. The learned amicus seeks to draw strength from the
8 decision of this Court in Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of
Maharashtra, (2014) 4 SCC 292. In the said decision, this
Court has held that since the core of criminal case lies in facts
and the facts differ in each case, there cannot be tailored a
formula whereby the cases could be compartmentalized as
C rarest of rare or otherwise. Considering the facts of the said
case, this Court observed that since the probability of award
of lif~ imprisonment was not "unquestionably foreclosed", death
penalty could not be awarded and therefore, commuted the
sentence.
D 50. In Sushi/ Sharma v. The State of N.C. T. of Delhi,
(2014) 4 sec 317, the evidence on record had established
the position that though both the accused-appellant and
deceased therein were married and living together, their
relations were strained as the appellant suspected her fidelity
E and the murder was the result of this possessiveness. This
Court considered that the appellant had no criminal
antecedents and was not a confirmed criminal. This Court
observed that no evidence was led by the State to indicate that
he is likely to revert to such crimes in future and the appellant
F being the only son of his parents who are old and infirm, the
mitigating circumstances weighed in his favor and the death
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
51. Anil @ Anthony Arikswamy Joseph v. State of
G Maharashtra, (2014) 4 sec 69 was a case where the accused
was in a dominating position and the victim was an only
innocent boy. This Court applied the crime test, criminal test
and also weighed the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
in light of "rarest of the rare" doctrine and concluded that the
H murder was committed in an extremely brutal manner which
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 837
pricks not only judicial conscience but also conscience of A
society. This Court considered that the accused has no previous
criminal history and is 42 years of age alongwith the fact that
the boy had voluntarily come to the accused and was not
kidnapped. Further, since the entire case rests on
circumstantial evidence and generally in the absence of ocular B
evidence death sentence is seldom awarded, this Court opined
that incarceration of further period of 30 years without remission
in addition to sentence already under-gone will be an adequate
sentence.
52. State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsu/,
c
(2011) 7 sec 437 arose out of brutal and diabolical killing of
three innocent family members due to their resistance to the
accused person's demands for partition of the land and other
property and allotment of shares. This Court observed that the
D
circumstances and manner of committing crime should pricks
judicial conscience of Court to extent that only and inevitable
conclusion should be awarding of death penalty. This Court
considered that though the manner of committing crime was
deplorable but attendant circumstances and fact that (i) the
E
accused administered sweets containing sedatives/poisonous
substance even to his own wife, shows that his fcustration, and
probably greed, for property had attained volcanic dimensions;
(ii)the intensity of bitterness between members of the family
had exacerbated thoughts of revenge and retaliation and (iii)
F
constant nagging by his wife as mitigating circumstance in
commission of crime and consequently, held that awarding
death sentence amounting to taking away life of an individual
would not be appropriate as the case does not fall in category
of 'rarest of rare cases'.
G
53. In Brajendrasingh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012)
4 sec 289, a man suspecting his wife of having illicit relations
with his neighbor, had killed his three young children who were
asleep, sprinkled kerosene oil on his wife and put her on fire.
This Court considered that the incident occurred in spur of the H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 10 S.C.R.
A moment, was not premeditated and the accused attempted
suicide after committing the crime and concluded that
circumstances examined cumulatively would suggest the
existence of a mental imbalance in the accused at the moment
of committing the crime and therefore, commuted the death
B sentence to imprisonment for life.
54. Having considered the case laws relied on by the
learned Amicus, we would now revert back to the factual
situation of this case. In the instant case, the time, place and
C manner of the commission of crime are indicative of the motive
of the accused-appellants. The accused-appellants have
ruthlessly and successively butchered their own kith and kin for
obtaining possession of certain pass-book, money and
immovable property without any provocation. They chose a day
when most of the residents of the village including PW-1 had
0
went out to attend a wedding at an adjacent village and ensured
that their despicable act did not suffer any resistance from them.
At first, they entered the Mosque where the deceased was
offering Namaz and indiscriminately attacked him with the sword
E and bhujali. Thereafter, they proceeded towards his house and
slained the deceased's two sons- Gurfan Khan and lmran
Khan, who had come out of the house hearing their father's cries
for help. Committed to their pre-meditated object, the accused-
appellants forced themselves into the deceased's house and
F killed Kasuman Bibi and her four minor children including a
physically disabled child. Being armed with sharp edged
weapons such as sword, tangi, bhujali and spade, the quick
succession with which the accused-appellants proceeded to
slaughter the eight members of their family classifies their act
G as pre-planned and reflects the cold-blooded fashion with which
the callous design was executed.
55. The accused-appellants in their unquenched thirst for
land and money extirpated eight innocent lives. The soured
relations between the brothers did not restrict them from
H eliminating the family of Haneef Khan, thereby killing his two
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 839
young sons, his wife and his four minor sons aged one 5, 8, A
12 and 18 approximately, respectively, one of who was
physically disabled. Their lack of remorse is reflected from the
act of extending threat of life to other members of the family
present in the house should they dare to inform the police.
B
56. It is heart wrenching to fathom the plight of an old
mother who witnessed her own sons kill their brother and his
family. PW-2, the sole eye-witness, despite being the mother
of both the accused-appellants has supported the prosecution
case and testified against them. Her testimony has been C
unassailed, corroborated by her statement under Section 164
of the Code and other witness to the incident. No oblique
motive has surfaced from the record which would impregnate
her statement with suspicion against her own sons. Usually a
brother, a sister or a parent who has seen the commission of
crime, may resile in the Court from a statement recorded during D
the course of investigation. It happens instinctively, out of natural
love and affection, not out of persuasion by the accused person.
The witness has an obvious stake in the innocence of the
accused and therefore tries to save him from the guilt. Here,
PW-2 has not only come forward by testifying for the E
prosecution but has also stood unshaken by the family ties in
her tryst for justice to the slain half of her family. It would be the
paramount duty of the Court to provide justice to the incidental
victims of the crime- the family members of the deceased
persons. Therefore, appropriate and proportional sentence F
requires to be imposed. On one hand, such sentencing would
demonstrate respect to those most personally affected by the
grief and horror of murder, on the other it would also be in
accordance with the goals of the victims' rights and the
principles of restorative justice. G
57. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee@ Dhanna v. State of West
Bengal, (1994) 2 SCC 220, this Court has observed that the
measure of punishment in a given case depends upon the
atrocity of the crime, the conduct of the criminal and the H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A defenseless and unprotected state of the victim. Further that
imposition of the appropriate punishment is the manner in which
the Courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the
criminal and justice demands that Court should impose such
punishment which reflects public abhorrence of the crime. This
B Court highlighted the Court's duty to view the rights of the
victims of crime and the society while considering imposition
of appropriate punishment.
58. In Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1979) 4 SCC 719
C this Court lamenting the unfortunate state of victims' right
protection in India observed that "it is a weakness of our
jurisprudence that victims of crime and the dependents of the
victims do not attract the attention of law. In fact, the victim
reparation is still the vanishing point of our law. This is the
deficiency in the system, which must be rectified by the
0 legislature."
59. In the context of these turbulent social times, we cannot
remain oblivious to the substantial suffering of the victims. It
stands as a fact that criminal justice reform and civil rights
E movement in India has historically only paid considerable
attention to the rights of the accused and neglected to address
to the same extent the impact of crime on the victims. It is not
only the victims of crime only that require soothing balm, but
also the incidental victims like the family, the co-sufferers and
F to a relatively large extent the society too. The judiciary has a
paramount duty to safeguard the rights of the victims as
diligently as those of the perpetrators.
60. In Mahesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1987) 3 SCC
G 80, this Court has deprecated the lenient approach in imposition
of the appropriate punishment and observed that it would be a
mockery of justice to permit the accused to escape the extreme
penalty Qf law when faced with clear evidence and diabolic acts.
This Court held that to award the lesser punishment would be
H to render the justice system of this country suspect due to which
MOFIL KHAN v. STATE OF JHARKHAND 841
the common man would lose faith in courts. This Court A
approved the harshest punishment in such cases as here
adopting the approach that the accused understands and the
society appreciates the language of deterrence more than the
reformative jargon.
B
61. In Sevaka Perumal v. State of T.N., (1991) 3 SCC
471, this Court stated that undue sympathy to impose
inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system
and undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. The
society could not long endure under such serious threats and c
therefore, it is the duty of every court to award proper sentence
having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in
which it was executed or committed, etc.
62. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstances under
which the appellants seek refuge have failed to convince us. D
The age of the appellants is not a relevant circumstance in the
present case. They were middle aged at the time of
commission of the offence and their faculties were ripe enough
to comprehend the implications of their actions and therefore,
do not warrant pardon of this Court. Secondly, the E
circumstance that the appellants have a family and old aged
parents etc. does not convinces us, especially in light of the fact
that the parents themselves have testified against the
appellant's act of uprooting their brother's family and their utter
disregard for blood relations. Thirdly, the mere fact that some F
of the accused persons of young age have been awarded a
lesser sentence than death sentence can not be made a ground
for commuting the sentence of death to imprisonment for life.
The manner in which the crime was committed on the helpless
members of a family including children of tender age and child G
with locomotive disability and design of the accused-appellants
to eliminate the whole family justifies the grant
of death sentence. Lastly, the manner of the commission of
crime, the diabolic murder of the young and innocent children
of deceased-Haneef Khan for property and choice of the day H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 10 S.C.R.
A of commission of crime by the appellants belittles the argument
with respect to possibility of reformation of the appellants and
their possible rehabilitation.
63. In our considered view, the "rarest of the rare" case
8 exists when an accused would be a menace, threat and anti-
thetical to harmony in the society. Especially in cases where
an accused does not act on provocation, acting in spur of the
moment but meticulously executes a deliberately planned crime
inspite of understanding the probable consequence of his act,
C the death sentence may be the most appropriate punishment.
We are mindful that criminal law requires strict adherence to
the rule of proportionality in providing punishment according to
the culpability of each kind of criminal conduct keeping in mind
the effect of not awarding just punishment on the society.
0 Keeping in view the said principle of proportionality of sentence
or what it termed as "just-desert" for the vile act of slaughtering
eight lives including four innocent minors and a physically infirm
child whereby an entire family is exterminated, we cannot resist
from concluding that the depravity of the appellant's offence
E would attract no lesser sentence than the death penalty.
64. In the result, we are in agreement with the reasons
recorded by the Trial Court and approved by the High Court
while awarding and confirming the death sentence of the
accused-appellants. In our considered view, the judgment(s)
F and order(s) passed by the Courts below does not suffer from
any error whatsoever.
65. The appeal stands dismissed, accordingly.
G 66. The Registry is directed to pay Rs.10,000/- (Rupees
Ten Thousand Only) to the learned Amicus Curiae.
Ordered accordingly.
Rajendra Prasad Appeal dismissed.
H
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