Holding

The petition is dismissed because the petitioners failed to prove title to the land and therefore did not establish a violation of their fundamental right to property, and the delay, though inordinate, does not alone bar the petition.

Summary

The Mizo Chief Council filed a writ petition under Article 32 on behalf of tribal chieftains alleging that the State had acquired their traditional lands without paying due compensation, violating their fundamental right to property. The petition was filed in 2014, more than six decades after the 1955 notification that transferred the chiefs' "Ram" to the State under the Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act, 1954. The Court examined whether the petition was barred by delay and laches and whether the chiefs could establish a proprietary title over the lands. It held that, although the delay was inordinate, the petitioners failed to provide a cogent explanation and, more importantly, could not prove absolute ownership of the land, nor demonstrate that the compensation was illusory. Consequently, no violation of the fundamental right to property was established. The writ petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the writ petition is barred by delay and laches under Article 32.
Whether the Mizo Chiefs' fundamental right to property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 was violated.

Legislation cited

Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880
Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act, 1954s. Section 2(p), s. Section 3(1), s. Section 4, s. Section 5, s. Section 6
Citizenship Act, 1955
Constitution (Forty‑fourth Amendment) Act, 1978
Constitution of India
Government of India Act, 1935
Limitation Act, 1963
Lushai Hills District (Change of Name) Act, 1954
Scheduled District Act, 1874

Headnote

Issue for Consideration The present writ petition has been filed by the Mizo Chief Council, through its President, on behalf of the tribal chieftains. The primary grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents seized/acquired the lands of these chieftains The following questions fall for consideration: (i) Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches; (ii) Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs were violated. Headnotes† Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act, 1954 –

Subjects

delaylachesfundamental rightscompensationMizo Chief CouncilLushai HillsArticle 32right to propertyAssam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Acttransformative constitutionalismhistorical wrongspublic interest

Judgment

[2026] 4 S.C.R. 58 : 2026 INSC 236

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram,
Thr. President Shri L. Chinzah
v.
Union of India & Ors.
(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 22 of 2014)
13 March 2026
[J.B. Pardiwala* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The present writ petition has been filed by the Mizo Chief Council,
through its President, on behalf of the tribal chieftains. The primary
grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents seized/acquired
the lands of these chieftains without paying due compensation.
The following questions fall for consideration: (i) Whether the writ
petition is hit by delay and laches; (ii) Whether any fundamental
rights of the Mizo Chiefs were violated.

Headnotes†
Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights) Act,
1954 – Constitution of India – Doctrine of delay and laches
in Art.32 petition – The instant writ petition filed by the Mizo
Chief Council on behalf of the tribal chieftains of the erstwhile
Lushai Hills district (present-day State of Mizoram) and their
legal heirs – By virtue of 1954 Act, the State was enabled to
acquire certain rights and interests of the Chiefs in and over
the land located in the Lushai Hills district – On 23.03.1955,
a notification was issued in exercise of the powers conferred
by s.3(1) of the Act, 1954, declaring that the right and interest
of the chiefs in the Ram (territory of chiefs) specified in the
Schedule thereto would stand transferred to and vested in the
State free from all encumbrances (impugned notification) – The
primary grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents
seized/acquired the lands of these chieftains without paying
due compensation – Further, petitioner contends that this
deprivation violated the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs,
specifically the right to property, which was guaranteed at

* Author
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 59

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

the time of the acquisition – Respondents submits that the
petition is not maintainable owing to delay and laches in filing
the same and Mizo Chiefs cannot be classified as the absolute
owners of the land – Correctness:
Held: Undeniably, there has been an inordinate delay of nearly six
decades, given that the impugned notification was issued in the
year 1955 and the present petition was instituted only in the year
2014 – What is important is to gauge if the petitioner has a cogent
explanation for the delay – In the decades immediately following
Independence, the administrative and constitutional status of the
area was in a state of continuous evolution – Another mitigating
circumstance is the Mizo Chiefs’ continuous agitation of their claims
before various forums – The chiefs persisted with administrative
representations for a prolonged duration, a crucial factor warrants
specific attention – Further fortifying this expectation is the fact that
the Chief Minister of Mizoram, on at least two distinct occasions,
addressed formal communications to the Prime Minister of India,
espousing the chiefs’ claims for compensation – Weighing the
totality of these circumstances, this Court is conscious of the fact
that the delay herein is undeniably inordinate, and the explanation
offered by the petitioner is, strictly speaking, not unequivocally
convincing – In the present case, the central dispute concerns the
alleged violation of the Mizo Chiefs’ right to property, as guaranteed
under Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution, respectively – In an
effort to discharge the burden of establishing title to the land, the
petitioners have primarily relied on accounts and writings of scholars
and officials of the British government – Upon a meticulous perusal
of the said material, it is, at the very outset, highly ambiguous
whether these texts unequivocally recognise the Mizo Chiefs as
the absolute owners of the land – The petitioners have advanced
no compelling justification as to why such writings and accounts
should be elevated to the status of conclusive evidentiary proof –
The material adduced by the respondent, at least on a prima facie
examination, indicates that during the British administration of
the Lushai Hills district, the title over the land never vested in the
Chiefs – Consequently, this Court is constrained to hold that the
petitioners have woefully failed to discharge their burden of proving
title over the subject lands – Both sides have failed to present a
continuous, documented chain of events that would clearly map
out the status of the land at different periods – Therefore, having
considered the matter from all vantage points, the inescapable
60 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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conclusion is that the petitioner has not been able to establish
any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs in the
present matter. [Paras 55, 57-61, 65, 68, 69, 74]

Constitution of India – Art.32 – Doctrine of Delay and Laches
in Art.32 Petitions:
Held: It is settled law that in the context of petitions under Article
32, the doctrine of laches operates as a flexible rule of practice
rather than a rigid rule of law to be mechanically applied – Its
application is anchored in sound judicial discretion, moulded by
the specific facts and circumstances of each case – In application
of the said doctrine the inquiry shall be guided by three primary
considerations: first, whether there has been an inordinate delay
in approaching the Court; secondly, whether the petitioner has
provided a cogent and satisfactory explanation for such delay; and
thirdly, whether entertaining the belated claim would unsettle settled
matters and prejudice third party rights by reopening matters long
concluded – Consideration should be given to the totality of the
circumstances affecting both parties, rather than the mere fact of
delay – When evaluating the totality of circumstances for applying
the doctrine of delay and laches to an Art.32 petition, the pivotal
considerations are two-fold: (i) whether entertaining the claim would
unsettle concluded matters and prejudice third-party rights, and
(ii) whether the petitioner has offered a cogent explanation for the
delay – The adequacy of the explanation for the delay constitutes
the paramount consideration when determining whether an Art.32
petition ought to be dismissed on the ground of laches – Stated
differently, the operative test is not one of ‘unreasonable delay’
but of ‘unexplained delay’. [Paras 39-41, 44, 45]

Constitution of India – Arts. 19(1)(f), 31 – Constitution (Forty-
Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978:
Held: Right to property was earlier enshrined in Arts.19(1)(f) and
31 of the Constitution – It may be noted that both these provisions
were repealed by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment)
Act, 1978 – However, the 44th Amendment is prospective in its
operation, and all laws passed and executive action taken prior
to 20th June 1979 will continue to be judged by and be subject to
the provisions of Part III, including Arts.19(1)(f) and 31 – Art.19(1)
(f) guaranteed to the Indian citizens a right to acquire, hold, and
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 61

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

dispose of property – Art.19(5), however, permitted the State to
impose by law reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests
of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any
Scheduled Tribe – Art.31(1) laid down that no person could be
deprived of his property without the authority of law – Art.31(2),
on the other hand, underwent significant change and was the
focal point of multiple constitutional amendments. [Paras 63, 64]

Burden of Proof – Fundamental Right violation – Burden of
proof in cases where fundamental rights violations:
Held: It is established that who bears the burden of proof in
cases where fundamental rights violations are alleged depends
on the fundamental right alleged to have been violated – The
same burden of proof rule will not apply to all fundamental rights
violation challenges – However, in cases such as the present
one, the initial burden is on the petitioner to satisfy the Court and
make out a case for an invasion of their fundamental right(s) – To
discharge this initial burden and successfully establish a violation of
their fundamental right to property, the petitioner must necessarily
succeed on two distinct fronts – First and foremost, it must prove a
clear title of the Mizo Chiefs over the subject lands – To establish
such a title, the petitioner must conclusively demonstrate that,
under the chieftainship system, as it operated during the British
regime, the Mizo Chiefs held complete ownership of the land, rather
than merely functioning as local administrative heads – Secondly,
and only upon proving the ownership as aforesaid, the petitioner
must satisfy the other parameters under Art.31 – This includes,
amongst other things, proving that the respondents deprived the
chiefs of their property without lawful authority, or that the property
was acquired without providing due compensation – In the present
case, petitioners have woefully failed to discharge their burden of
proving title over the subject lands – The petitioner has not been
able to establish any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo
Chiefs in the present matter – Hence, not entitled to any relief.
[Paras 66, 67, 69, 74]

Case Law Cited
Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr. [1969] 2
SCR 824 : (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors. v. Union
of India & Ors. [1970] 2 SCR 697 : (1970) 1 SCC 84; R.S Deodhar
62 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

& Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [1974] 2 SCR 216 : (1974)
1 SCC 31; Aflatoon & Ors v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors. [1975]
1 SCR 802 : (1975) 4 SCC 285 – followed.
Joginder Nath & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. [1976] 2 SCR
553 : (1975) 3 SCC 459; G.P. Doval & Ors. v. Chief Secretary,
Government of U.P. & Ors. [1985] 1 SCR 70 : (1984) 4 SCC 329;
Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
[2014] 14 SCR 744 : (2015) 3 SCC 1 – relied on.
M/s Dehri Rotas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board
Bhojpur & Ors. [1992] 2 SCR 155 : (1992) 2 SCC 598; Rashid
Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana [1950] 1 SCR 566 : 1950 SCC
OnLine SC 16; Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors. [1993]
2 SCR 581 : (1993) 2 SCC 746; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union
of India [1984] 2 SCR 67 : (1984) 3 SCC 161; R.S. Makashi v.
I.M. Menon [1982] 2 SCR 69 : (1982) 1 SCC 379; S.S. Moghe
v. Union of India [1981] 3 SCR 875 : (1981) 3 SCC 271; Sukh
Dutt Ratra & Anr v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. [2022] 2
SCR 1041 : (2022) 7 SCC 508; Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v.
Union of India [2018] 7 SCR 379 : (2018) 10 SCC 1; Indian
Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State of Kerala [2018] 9
SCR 561 : (2019) 11 SCC 1; Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal
Pradesh & Ors. [2020] 1 SCR 749 : (2020) 2 SCC 569; Urban
Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi & Ors. [2024] 12 SCR 993 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725; Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
Ors. [1962] 1 SCR 574 : 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21; Prem Chand
Garg & Anr v. The Excise Commissioner, U.P. & Ors. [1963]
Supp. 1 SCR 885 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 37; State of Orissa v.
Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 396; Karnataka
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan [2006] 3 SCR 783 : (2006) 4
SCC 322; P.C. Sethi v. Union of India [1975] 3 SCR 201 : (1975)
4 SCC 67; Purshottam Lal v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 651;
Deena & Ors. v. Union of India [1984] 1 SCR 1 : (1983) 4 SCC
645; A. Hamsaveni & Ors v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. [1994]
Supp. 2 SCR 404 : (1994) 6 SCC 51; Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd.
v. State of Bihar [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 831 : 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 379 – referred to.
Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd (1874) 5 PC
221 – referred to.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 63

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act,
1978; Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights)
Act, 1954; Lushai Hills District (Change of Name) Act, 1954;
Government of India Act, 1935; Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation,
1880; Scheduled District Act, 1874; Citizenship Act, 1955; Limitation
Act, 1963.

List of Keywords
Delay; Laches; Fundamental Rights; Compensation; Mizo chief
Council; Lushai Hills; Doctrine of delay and laches in Article 32
petitions; Unexplained delay; Unreasonable delay; Transformative
constitutionalism; Rectification of historical wrongs and systemic
inequities; Mizo Chiefs’ fundamental right to property; Right
to property under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31; Burden of proof
in fundamental rights violations; Absolute ownership of land;
Traditional chieftainship system; Boundary papers conferment of
rights; Illusory statutory compensation; Privy purses; Erstwhile
rulers of Princely States.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 22 of 2014
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioner(s):
D.N. Goburdhun, Sr. Adv., Lalremsanga Nghka, Kedar Nath
Tripathy, Aditya Narayan Tripathy, Manoj Kumar Upadhyay,
Siddhartha Jha, Chandan Ramamurthi, Rohan K.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
R Venkatarmani, Attorney General for India, Tushar Mehta, Solicitor
General, Biswajit Deb, Sr. Adv, Advocate General, Rajat Nair,
Ms. Suhashini Sen, Chinmayee Chandra, Akshay Amritanshu,
Sachin Sharma, Kartikay Aggarwal, Chitvan Singhal,
Ms. Ameyavikrama Thanvi, Raman Yadav, Abhishek Kumar Pandey,
Arvind Kumar Sharma, Anando Mukherjee, Shwetank Singh,
Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Rajat Nair, Ms. Suhasini Sen, Chinmayee
Chandra, Akshay Amritanshu, Sachin Sharma.
64 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.B. Pardiwala, J.

For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the
following parts:

INDEX*

A. FACTUAL MATRIX ............................................................ 2
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER AND
THE INTERVENOR ............................................................ 7
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS ... 10
D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED ......................................... 11
E. ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 12
(I) Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches? 12
(a) Doctrine of Delay and Laches in Article 32
Petitions ............................................................. 12
(b) Principles Governing the Application of Delay
and Laches to Article 32 Petitions ..................... 33
(c) Application to the facts of this matter ................ 40
(II) Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs
were violated? ............................................................ 44

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the Mizo Chief Council,
through its President, on behalf of the tribal chieftains of the erstwhile
Lushai Hills district (present-day State of Mizoram) and their legal
heirs. The primary grievance of the petitioner is that the respondents
seized/acquired the lands of these chieftains without paying due
compensation. The petitioner contends that this deprivation violated
the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs, specifically the right to
property, which was guaranteed at the time of the acquisition.
* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 65

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

A. FACTUAL MATRIX
2. To understand the dispute before us, it is indispensable to gauge how
the society was structured and organised in the Lushai Hills district,
both before and after the area was annexed and brought under the
control of the British administration. It is pertinent to note that the
limited objective here is to outline the broad administrative structure
and the players involved, so as to provide the necessary context for
evaluating the legal questions raised in the present petition.
3. Historically, Mizo society was centred around the institution of the
chiefs. The petitioner asserts that these chiefs were the absolute
owners of the lands upon which their respective villages were situated.
This territory, referred to as the chieftain’s “Ram”, was administered
by the chief, who exercised executive and judicial authority over it.
It is further claimed that the chief allotted farmland from this Ram
to the villagers and, in return, was entitled to receive “Fathang”,
a customary tribute comprising a portion of the annual agricultural
produce, primarily paddy.
4. Thereafter, the British made inroads and annexed the Lushai Hills
district in the 1890’s. The administration of the district was vested
in the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Superintendent of the
Lushai Hills district, his assistants, and the chief and headmen of
the villages. Thus, following the British annexation, the colonial
administration retained the Chieftainship system for administrative
convenience. Chiefs were appointed to ensure good governance,
and in return, they enjoyed the privilege of chieftainship. All chiefs
were responsible for controlling their villages in every way. Thus,
the day-to-day administration of the villages was left largely in the
hands of the chief. The chief was entitled to collect Fathang and
other taxes and, in turn, obliged to submit a portion of his collections
to the British officers.
5. It was, however, not the case that the Chiefs operated in complete
freedom. The chiefs entered into an understanding called “Ramrilekha”
with officials of the British government, whereby the boundaries or
territorial extent of a chief’s authority and influence were roughly
demarcated, and the chiefs were made to pledge loyalty to the
British government (hereinafter referred to as “boundary paper”).
These boundary papers also stated that the area specified therein
would be the Chiefs’ Ram as long as they live, subject to them
66 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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remaining loyal to the government, and that after their death, the
superintendent shall appoint their successor, who in all probability
would be their children.
6. After the British entered the picture, while the chiefs retained
administrative flexibility, their authority dwindled and was fettered by
the British officials’ supervision. The Superintendent held a swathe
of powers, such as the authority to: (i) regulate the succession to
villages of deceased chiefs, to appoint guardians to minor chiefs, and
to appoint chiefs or headmen (subject to the chief commissioner’s
decision and due regard being had to the Lushai custom and
hereditary rights of existing families of chiefs) (ii) authorise the
partition of existing villages to form new villages and (iii) punish and
dispose of chiefs for misconduct, subject to the Chief Commissioner’s
confirmation. Further, the formation of new villages without the
Superintendent’s prior sanction was forbidden.
7. The administration of the Lushai Hills district continued on much
the same lines until independence. Although supervised, the British
government recognised that the chiefs contributed to the effective
administration of the Lushai Hills district.
8. When the Lushai Hills district was formed by amalgamating tracts
known as North and South Lushai Hills in 1898, the district was
governed by the Assam Frontier Tracts Regulation, 1880, and
notifications were issued under the provisions of the aforesaid
Regulation and the Scheduled District Act, 1874. Moreover, in 1936,
the Lushai Hills district was designated as an excluded area under
the Government of India Act, 1935. However, it is essential to note
that there appears to be no single, comprehensive legislation that
covered all aspects of governance in the region during this period
of British Rule. Instead, the Lushai Hills district seems to have been
administered through a patchwork of notifications, rules, and standing
orders issued from time to time.
9. Post-independence, the Lushai Hills district was administered as part
of the state of Assam. Under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, the
Lushai Hills district came to be recognised as an autonomous district
and was governed by district and regional councils, in accordance
with the provisions in the Sixth Schedule. Thereafter, the Lushai Hills
district was renamed the Mizo District vide the Lushai Hills District
(Change of Name) Act, 1954.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 67

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

10. In 1954, the Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights)
Act, 1954 (hereinafter “the Act, 1954”) was passed by the then State
of Assam. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act, 1954,
read as follows:
“The chief in the Lushai Hills has been exercising certain
administrative and judicial functions in respect of village
administrative and in recognition of their services inherent
to enjoy certain rights and privilege. With the growth of
political consciousness, and the establishment of the
District Council in the Lushai Hills, there has been an
instant demand for the abolition of the system of chief. This
can be done only under law providing for the acquisition
of the rights of the chiefs in respect of “ Ram” (Chief’s
land) and “ Fathang “ (Paddy tax) which are in the nature
of rights to the property, after payment of compensation.
Hence this Bill.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

11. The legislature enacted the Act, 1954, with the primary objective of
enabling the State to acquire certain rights and interests of the Chiefs
in and over the land located in the Lushai Hills district. To effectuate
this purpose, the Act, 1954, empowered the State Government to issue
a notification declaring that the rights and interests of a Chief in his
Ram, as specified in the said notification, shall stand transferred to and
absolutely vest in the State. Consequent to such transfer and vesting,
the Act, 1954 laid down a comprehensive statutory scheme detailing
the method for computation and disbursement of compensation,
whilst also prescribing a specific adjudicatory procedure to resolve
any disputes arising in relation to such compensation. Furthermore,
the Act, 1954 mandates that upon such acquisition, all Ram shall be
administered by the District Council or Regional Council, as the case
may be, in accordance with the laws in force at that time. The relevant
provisions of the 1954 Act are, for convenience, extracted below:

“Section 2 – Definitions
[...]
2(p) – “Ram” means a tract or tracts of land held by a
chief under a Ramrilekha or boundary paper issued by
the competent authority
68 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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[...]
Section 3 – Notification declaring the vesting of “Ram”
in the State
(1) The State Government may, from time to time, by
notification declare that the rights and interests of
a chief in his Ram specified in the notification shall
stand transferred to and vest in the State free from
all encumbrances.
[...]

Section 4 – Consequence of such notification
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time
being in force or in any agreement or contract expressed
or implied, on the publication of the notification referred
to in section 3, all rights and interests of the Chief in the
Ram shall, save as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act, cease and shall vest absolutely in the State free from
all encumbrances in accordance with the provisions of this
Act with effect from the agricultural year next following the
date of publication of such notification.

Section 5 – Compensation how to be paid
No compensation to any chief whose rights and interests
in his Ram vest in the State under the provisions of this
Act shall be payable except as provided for in this Act.

Section 6 – Settlement of Rams
(1) The District Council or the Regional Council, as the
case may be shall take over charge of any Ram, the rights
and interests of the chief in which vest in the State.
(2) All the Rams shall be administered by the District
Council or the Regional Council, as the case may be, in
accordance with the law for the time being in force in the
Lushai Hills District.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 69

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

12. On March 23, 1955, a notification was issued in exercise of the
powers conferred by Section 3(1) of the Act, 1954, declaring that the
right and interest of the chiefs in the Ram specified in the Schedule
thereto would stand transferred to and vested in the State free from all
encumbrances (hereinafter referred to as “impugned notification”).
13. Thereafter, the title/heading of Section 3 of the Act, 1954, was
amended by the Assam Mizo District (Acquisition of Chief’s Rights)
(Amendment) Act, 1955, from “Notification declaring the vesting of
“Ram” in the State” to “Notification declaring the vesting in the State
of a Chief’s rights and interest in his Ram”.
14. A total of INR 14,78,980/- was paid to the chiefs as compensation
under the Act, 1954. The petitioner claims that the compensation
paid was limited to the Fathang and does not take into account the
value of the lands that belonged to the chiefs and were subsequently
vested in the State. Thus, no compensation was paid for the lands.
15. After the passing of the Act, 1954, the Mizo chiefs have, over the
decades, agitated their claim for compensation in respect of the
land that came to be vested with the government before multiple
forums. The record shows the plethora of correspondence between
representatives of the chiefs and the State and Central Governments
on this issue. In fact, the issue was agitated by the petitioner before
the Guwahati High Court at least on two occasions. On both occasions,
the High Court disposed of the matter without delving into its merits,
hoping it would be amicably resolved between the parties. However,
no settlement was reached between the parties.
16. In such circumstances referred to above, the petitioner is before this
Court with this present writ petition.
17. Further, an intervention application was filed by the Lushai Chief
Association, which was allowed vide this Court’s order dated
August 13, 2025.

B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER AND THE
INTERVENOR
18. Broadly stated, the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner
and the intervenor are as follows:
a. Historically, the Mizo Chiefs were the absolute owners of
the entire tract of land that presently constitutes the State
70 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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of Mizoram. The traditional Mizo chieftainship system was
uniquely distinct from other indigenous landholding systems,
which were typically characterised by communal or collective
ownership. The Chiefs functioned as the absolute masters
and monarchs of their respective domains, holding hereditary,
complete, and exclusive proprietary rights over the territory.
While the advent of British occupation curtailed certain powers
held by the chiefs, the chiefs of the Lushai Hills district retained
complete ownership of the territories. That the lands belonged
to the chiefs is borne out by the traditional practices of the Mizo
people and by the accounts and writings of British government
scholars and officials.
b. Post-independence, the chiefs were unlawfully deprived of the
said lands without payment of any due compensation. The Act,
1954 was highly circumscribed in its scope. It merely addressed
the extinguishment of certain administrative rights and privileges
of the Chiefs and did not address the ownership rights that the
Chiefs held in the Ram. Consequently, the State’s actual taking
over of the chiefs’ territorial lands was an executive action entirely
devoid of statutory authority. Since the deprivation of their land
was completely without the authority of law, it violated the right
to property, which was, at the relevant time, recognised as a
fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution. Such an
arbitrary action of the State also violates Articles 14 and 21 of
the Constitution.
c. Even if this Court were to construe the Act, 1954, as a law
which provided for the acquisition of the said lands, the
statutory compensation provided and disbursed thereunder was
completely ‘illusory’ and a mere pittance in exchange for the vast
tracts of land that the State effectively expropriated and acquired.
Such payment of ‘illusory’ compensation is also violative of the
fundamental right to property. Therefore, from whichever angle
the issue is looked at, the inescapable conclusion remains that
the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs, especially that of the
right to property, were unconstitutionally breached.
d. The State’s actions also suffer from the vice of manifest
arbitrariness. The Mizo Chiefs stood on an equal footing with
the rulers of the erstwhile Princely States. While the Princely
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 71

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

rulers across the country were systematically integrated into
the Union with the solemn guarantee of privy purses, the Mizo
Chiefs were arbitrarily singled out and denied such privileges.
Consequently, such actions on behalf of the State constitute
a breach of the guarantee bestowed under Article 14 of the
Constitution.
e. The respondents have taken contradictory stances, prolonging
the issue for many decades under the pretext of resolving it
amicably. They cannot contend that the issue is now time-
barred. The plethora of correspondence presented shows that
the petitioner/Mizo Chiefs have consistently pursued the issue
since its inception.
f. Under the Sixth Schedule, the District Council had the exclusive
power to make laws regarding the allotment, occupation, or use
of land. Thus, the State of Assam (the parent state in 1954)
lacked the legislative power to enact the Act, 1954, effectively
overriding the District Council’s powers.
19. On the basis of the above, the learned counsel prayed that there
being merit in their petition, the same may be allowed and: (i) the
impugned notification be set aside; and (ii) the chiefs be granted
such compensation, as this Court deems fit, by the respondents
in lieu of their actions which had violated their fundamental rights.

C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
20. Broadly stated, the submissions made on behalf of respondent no. 1
(Union of India) and respondent no.2 (State of Mizoram) are as follows:
a. The present writ petition is impractical as the petitioner is virtually
seeking compensation for the entire state of Mizoram. Further,
Article 32 cannot be invoked to reignite settled matters that
reached administrative finality decades ago. The petitioner’s
claims are hopelessly time-barred.
b. Mizo Chiefs cannot be classified as the absolute owners of
the land. Whatever customary authority the Chiefs may have
historically wielded, any semblance of absolute proprietary
title was extinguished following the advent of the British
administration in the Lushai Hills district. The entire district
72 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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was brought under the supervision of the British officials, and
the Chiefs were reduced to mere intermediaries, exercising
administrative control over specific tracts of land strictly on the
basis of boundary papers issued by the British regime. Further,
the area continued to be governed by the rules and regulations
established by the British administration till the abolition of the
chieftainship after the passing of the Act, 1954, and the issuance
of the impugned notification.
c. The petitioner has failed to adduce any cogent documentary or
historical evidence to substantiate its lofty and sweeping claims
of absolute, hereditary ownership. Therefore, the foundational
premise of the petitioner’s case, that the Mizo Chiefs were
unconstitutionally deprived of their private property, is factually
unsubstantiated.
d. The Act, 1954, was enacted solely to disband the traditional
chieftainship system and to extinguish the administrative rights
and privileges that the Chiefs exercised over their respective
Rams. Accordingly, the statutory compensation provided
for and duly disbursed under the Act, 1954, was intended
solely to recompense the Chiefs for the loss of these specific
administrative rights. The petitioner’s contention that the
compensation is ‘illusory’ is entirely misconceived and falls
flat, as it erroneously compares the compensation amount to
the value of land that the Chiefs never legally owned in the
first place.
21. On the basis of the above, the learned counsel for the respondents
prayed that there being no merit in the present writ petition, the
same may be dismissed.

D. ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED
22. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having gone
through the materials on record, the following questions fall for our
consideration:
a. Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches?
b. Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs were
violated?
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 73

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

E. ANALYSIS

(I) Whether the writ petition is hit by delay and laches?
23. Before adverting to the merits of the rival contentions regarding the
alleged infringement of the Mizo Chiefs’ fundamental right to property,
it is incumbent upon us to address the threshold issue of delay and
laches. The respondents have contended that the present petition is
barred by a significant lapse of time and that its consideration would
unsettle matters that are long settled.

(a) Doctrine of Delay and Laches in Article 32 Petitions
24. To adjudicate this contention, it is apposite for us to examine how
this Court has addressed the applicability of the doctrine of delay
and laches to petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
The best starting point for any discussion on the doctrine of laches is
the often-quoted passage from Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd, reported in (1874) 5 PC 221, which states as
follows:
“Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse
of time and delay are most material. But in every case,
if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be
just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not
amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity
of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such
cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval, which might affect either party
and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the
one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
74 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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25. In the Indian legal landscape, this Court’s Constitution Bench
decision in Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi &
Anr, reported in (1969) 1 SCC 110, serves as the primary entry
point for any discussion regarding the applicability of the doctrine of
laches to petitions filed under Article 32. The seminal issue before
the Bench was whether the remedy under Article 32, which itself is
a fundamental right, could be fettered by any period of limitation,
i.e., whether any time limit could be imposed on petitions under
Article 32. While the Court dismissed the petition by a 3:2 majority
on merits, the legal principles enunciated regarding the application of
the doctrine of laches are of primary importance. The majority held
that delay and laches are factors that can be considered in Article
32 petitions, and that this Court is not precluded from declining relief
where a petitioner approaches the Court after an inordinate delay.
The relevant observations crystallising this view are extracted below:

M. Hidayatullah, C.J (as he then was)
“7. It follows, therefore, that this Court puts itself in restraint
in the matter of petitions under Article 32 and this practice
has now become inveterate. The question is whether this
Court will inquire into belated and stale claims or take
note of evidence of neglect of one’s own rights for a long
time? I am of opinion that not only it would but also that
it should. The party claiming Fundamental Rights must
move the Court before other rights come into existence.
The action of courts cannot harm innocent parties if their
rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of the person
moving the Court. This principle is well recognised and has
been applied by Courts in England and America.
8. The English and American practice has been outlined in
Halsbury›s Laws of England and Corpus Juris Secundum.
It has been mentioned by my brethren in their opinions and
I need not traverse the same ground again except to say
this that Courts of Common Law in England were bound by
the Law of Limitation but not the Courts of Chancery. Even
so the Chancery Courts insisted on expedition. It is trite
learning to refer to the maxim “delay defeats equity” or the
Latin of it that the Courts help those who are vigilant and
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 75

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

do not slumber over their rights. The Courts of Chancery,
therefore, frequently applied to suits in equity the analogy
of the Law of Limitation applicable to actions at law and
equally frequently put a special limitation of their own if
they thought that the suit was unduly delayed. This was
independently of the analogy of law relating to limitation.
The same practice has been followed in the United States.
9. In India we have the Limitation Act which prescribes
different periods of limitation for suits, petitions or
applications. There are also residuary articles which
prescribe limitation in those cases where no express period
is provided. If it were a matter of a suit or application, either
an appropriate article or the residuary article would have
applied. But a petition under Article 32 is not a suit and it is
also not a petition or an application to which the Limitation
Act applies. To put curbs in the way of enforcement of
Fundamental Rights through legislative action might well
be questioned under Article 13(3). The reason is also quite
clear. If a short period of limitation were prescribed the
Fundamental Right might well be frustrated. Prescribing
too long a period might enable stale claims to be made to
the detriment of other rights which might emerge.
10. If then there is no period prescribed what is the
standard for this Court to follow? I should say that utmost
expedition is the sine qua non for such claims. The party
aggrieved must move the Court at the earliest possible
time and explain satisfactorily all semblance of delay. I
am not indicating any period which may be regarded as
the ultimate limit of action for that would be taking upon
myself legislative functions. In England a period of 6
months has been provided statutorily, but that could be
because there is no guaranteed remedy and the matter is
one entirely of discretion. In India I will only say that each
case will have to be considered on its own facts. Where
there is appearance of avoidable delay and this delay
affects the merits of the claim, this Court will consider it
and in a proper case hold the party disentitled to invoke
the extraordinary jurisdiction.
76 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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11. Therefore, the question is one of discretion for this
Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit
and there is no upper limit. A case may be brought within
Limitation Act by reason of some article but this Court
need not necessarily give the total time to the litigant to
move this Court under Article 32. Similarly in a suitable
case this Court may entertain such a petition even after
a lapse of time. It will all depend on what the breach of
the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are when
and how the delay arose.

S.M. Sikri, J.
14. Article 32(2) of the Constitution confers a judicial power
on the Court. Like all judicial powers, unless there is an
express provision to the contrary, it must be exercised in
accordance with fundamental principles of administration
of justice. [...] I understand that one of the fundamental
principles of administration of justice is that, apart from
express provisions to the contrary, stale claims should
not be given effect to. But what is a stale claim? It is not
denied that the Indian Limitation Act does not directly apply
to a petition under Article 32. [....]
xxx
18. [...]The history of these writs both in England and
the U.S.A. convinces me that the underlying idea of
the Constitution was to provide an expeditious and
authoritative remedy against the inroads of the State. If
a claim is barred under the Limitation Act, unless there
are exceptional circumstances, prima facie it is a stale
claim and should not be entertained by this Court. But
even if it is not barred under the Indian Limitation Act,
it may not be entertained by this Court if on the facts of
the case there is unreasonable delay. [...]It is difficult to
lay down a precise period beyond which delay should be
explained. I favour one year because this Court should
not be approached lightly, and competent legal advice
should be taken and pros and cons carefully weighed
before coming to this Court. It is common knowledge that
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 77

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

appeals and representations to the higher authorities take
time; time spent in pursuing these remedies may not be
excluded under the Limitation Act, but it may ordinarily be
taken as a good explanation for the delay.
19. It is said that if this was the practice the guarantee of
Article 32 would be destroyed. But the article nowhere says
that a petition, howsoever late, should be entertained and
a writ or order or direction granted, howsoever remote the
date of infringement of the fundamental right. In practice
this Court has not been entertaining stale claims by persons
who have slept over their rights. There is no need to depart
from this practice and tie our hands completely with the
shackles imposed by the Indian Limitation Act[....]

R.S Bachawat, J.
39. The next and the more fundamental question is whether
in the circumstances the Court should give relief in a writ
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. No period of
limitation is prescribed for such a petition. The right to
move this Court for enforcement of fundamental rights is
guaranteed by Article 32. The writ under Article 32 issues
as a matter of course if a breach of a fundamental right
is established. Technical rules applicable to suits like the
provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
are not applicable to a proceeding under Article 32. But
this does not mean that in giving relief under Article 32
the Court must ignore and trample under foot all laws of
procedure, evidence, limitation, res judicata and the like.
Under Article 145(1)(c) rules may be framed for regulating
the practice and procedure in proceedings under Article
32. In the absence of such rules the Court may adopt any
reasonable rule of procedure. Thus a petitioner has no
right to move this Court under Article 32 for enforcement of
this fundamental right on a petition containing misleading
and inaccurate statements and if he files such a petition
the Court will dismiss it, see Indian Sugars & Refineries
Ltd. v. Union of India, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 158. On
grounds of public policy it would be intolerable if the Court
78 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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were to entertain such a petition. Likewise the Court held
in Daryao v. State of U.P. that the general principles of
res judicata applied to a writ petition under Article 32.
Similarly, this Court has summarily dismissed innumerable
writ petitions on that ground that it was presented after
unreasonable delay.
40. The normal remedy for recovery of money paid to the
State under coercion or mistake of law is by suit. Articles
32 and 226 of the Constitution provide concurrent remedy
in respect of the same claim. The extraordinary remedies
under the Constitution are not intended to enable the
claimant to recover monies, the recovery of which by
suit is barred by limitation. Where the remedy in a writ
application under Article 32 or Article 226 corresponds
to a remedy in an ordinary suit and the latter remedy is
subject to the bar of a statute of limitation, the Court in its
writ jurisdiction acts by analogy to the statute, adopts the
statute as its own rule of procedure and in the absence
of special circumstances imposes the same limitation on
the summary remedy in the writ jurisdiction. On similar
grounds the Court of Chancery acted on the analogy
of the statutes of limitation in disposing of stale claims
though the proceeding in a Chancery was not subject
to any express statutory bar, see Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Vol. 14, page 647, Article 1190, Knox v. Gye.
[LR 5 LH 656, 674] Likewise, the High Court acts on the
analogy of the statute of limitation in a proceeding under
Article 226 though the statute does not expressly apply
to the proceeding. The Court will almost always refuse to
give relief under Article 226 if the delay is more than the
statutory period of limitation, see State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai at pp. 273-274.
41. Similarly this Court acts on the analogy of the statute
of limitation in respect of a claim under Article 32 of the
Constitution though such claim is not the subject of any
express statutory bar of limitation. If the right to a property
is extinguished by prescription under Section 27 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, the petitioner has no subsisting right
which can be enforced under Article 32 (see Sobbraj
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 79

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

Odharmal v. State of Rajasthan ). In other cases where the
remedy only and not the right is extinguished by limitation,
it is on grounds of the public policy that the Court refuses
to entertain stale claims under Article 32. The statutes of
limitation are founded on sound principles of public policy.
As observed in Whitley Stoke’s Anglo-Indian Codes, Vol.
11, p. 940; “The law is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure the quiet of the community, to suppress
fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence, and to prevent
oppression”. In Ruckmaboye v. Lulloobhoy Mottichund
[the Privy Council observed that the object of the statutes
of limitation was to give effect to the maxim, “interest
reipublicoe ut sit finis litium” (co litt 303) the interest of the
State requires that there should be a limit to litigation. The
rule of res judicata is founded upon the same rule of public
policy, see Daryao v. State of U.P. at p. 584. The other
ground of public policy upon which the statutes of limitation
are founded is expressed in the maxim “vigilantibus non
dormientibus jura subveniunt” (2 Co Inst. 690) the laws
aid the vigilant and not those who slumber. On grounds
of public policy the Court applies the principles of res
judicata to writ petitions under Article 32. On like grounds
the Court acts on the analogy of the statutes of limitation
in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 32. [...]

G.K. Mitter, J.
65. The Limitation Acts do not in terms apply to claims
against the State in respect of violation of fundamental
rights. A person complaining of infraction of any such rights
has one of three courses open to him. He can either make
an application under Article 226 of the Constitution to a
High Court or he can make an application to this Court
under Article 32 of the Constitution, or he can file a suit
asking for appropriate reliefs. The decisions of various High
Courts in India have firmly laid down that in the matter
of the issue of a writ under Article 226 the Courts have a
descretion and may in suitable cases refuse to give relief
to the person approaching it even though on the merits the
applicant has a substantial complaint as regards violation
of fundamental rights. Although the Limitation Act does not
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apply, the Courts have refused to give relief in cases of
long or unreasonable delay. As noted above in Bhailal Bhai
case, it was observed that the “maximum period fixed by
the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit
in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken
to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking
remedy under Article 226 can be measured”. On the
question of delay, we see no reason to hold that a different
test ought to be applied when a party comes to this Court
under Article 32 from one applicable to applications under
Article 226. There is a public policy behind all statutes of
limitation and according to Halsbury’s Laws of England
(3rd Edn., Vol. 24), Article 330 at p. 181:
“The courts have expressed at least three
different reasons supporting the existence
of statutes of limitation, namely, (1) that long
dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice
in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disprove a stale claim and (3)
that persons with good causes of action should
persue them with reasonable diligence.
66. In my view, a claim based on the infraction of
fundamental rights ought not to be entertained if made
beyond the period fixed by the Limitation Act for the
enforcement of the right by way of suit. While not holding
that the Limitation Act applies in terms, I am of the view
that ordinarily the period fixed by the Limitation Act should
be taken to be a true measure of the time within which a
person can be allowed to raise a plea successfully under
Article 32 of the Constitution. [...]”
(Emphasis Supplied)

26. A close examination of the aforesaid excerpts reveals a clear judicial
consensus: four out of the five learned Judges of the Bench agreed
that the remedy under Article 32, though a fundamental right, is not
immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure.
Consequently, petitions even under Article 32, seeking to agitate
stale claims, ought not to be entertained. This restraint is largely
rooted in the following factors: (i) the law assists those who are
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 81

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights; (ii) actions of the
courts cannot harm innocent third parties whose rights emerge by
reason of delay i.e., entertaining long-dormant claims would disturb
the settled position and unjustly prejudice third parties by placing
an unreasonable burden on them to defend against claims after a
prolonged period had passed (due to loss of evidence and change
in context); and (iii) it is essential to put a time limit on proceedings
to provide certainty and prevent confusion from cases being in
perpetual flux.
27. Further, a perusal of the above extracts reveals that the judicial opinion
diverged on the precise yardstick to be applied when determining
whether there has been a delay in instituting a petition under Article
32. Some members of the Bench favoured drawing a strict analogy
with the periods prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963, whereas
others advocated for a flexible approach. However, all four opinions
recognised that Article 32 was not directly fettered by the Limitation
Act, 1963, nor was any explicit period prescribed for instituting a
petition under Article 32. In this context, the view propounded by
Hidayatullah, C.J., emerged as the most pragmatic guide, holding
that no fixed time limit could be laid down and that the question
of delay is one of discretion to be exercised on a case-by-case
basis. According to him, the decision would depend on: (i)whether
the petitioner has offered a valid and plausible explanation for the
delay, i.e. when and how the delay arose so as to gauge whether
or not the delay was avoidable; (ii) whether the delay had affected
the merits of the case and (iii) what the breach of fundamental right
and the remedy claimed are.
28. In Tilokchand (supra), K.S. Hegde, J., in his opinion, differed
from the other four members on the Bench and held that a petition
under Article 32 cannot be refused on the ground of laches. His
dissent was primarily premised on an apprehension that treating the
remedy under Article 32 as discretionary would dilute its status as a
guaranteed fundamental right, potentially reducing it to the level of
an ordinary civil right. The relevant excerpts of his dissenting opinion
are reproduced below:
“77. Our Constitution makers in their wisdom thought that
no fetters should be placed on the right of an aggrieved
party to seek relief from this Court under Article 32. A
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comparison of the language of Article 226 with that of Article
32 will show that while under Article 226 a discretionary
power is conferred on the High Courts the mandate of
the Constitution is absolute so far as the exercise of this
Court’s power under Article 32 is concerned. Should this
Court, an institution primarily created for the purpose of
safeguarding the fundamental rights guaranteed under
Part III of the Constitution, narrow down those rights?
The implications of this decision are bound to be far
reaching. It is likely to pull down from the high pedestal
now occupied by the fundamental rights to the level of
other civil rights. I am apprehensive that this decision
may mark an important turning point in downgrading the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
I am firmly of the view that a relief asked for under Article 32
cannot be refused on the ground of laches. The provisions
of the Limitation Act have no relevance either directly or
indirectly to proceedings under Article 32. Considerations
which are relevant in proceedings under Article 226 are
wholly out of place in a proceeding like the one before us.
The decision of this Court referred to in the judgment of
Bachawat and Mitter, JJ., where this Court has taken into
consideration the laches on the part of the petitioners are
not apposite for our present purpose. None of those cases
deal with proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution.
The rule enunciated by this Court in State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai , is only applicable to proceedings under Article 226.
At p. 271 of the report, Das Gupta, J., who spoke for the
Court specifically referred to this aspect when he says:
“That it has been made clear more than once
that power to relief under Article 226 is a
discretionary power.”
78. Therefore those decisions are of no assistance to us in
deciding the present case. Once it is held that the power
of this Court under Article 32 is a discretionary power —
that in my opinion is the result of the decision of Bachawat
and Mitter, JJ.—then it follows that this Court can refuse
relief under Article 32 on any one of the grounds on which
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 83

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

relief under Article 226 can be refused. Such a conclusion
militates not only against the plain words of Article 32
but also the lofty principle underlying that provision. The
resulting position is that the right guaranteed under that
article would cease to be a fundamental right.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

29. In Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors., reported
in (1970) 1 SCC 84, when dealing with claims relating to seniority
in appointments under a writ petition, a Constitution Bench of this
Court, upholding the principle laid down in Tilokchand (supra),
reiterated that no relief would be given to petitioners who, without
reasonable explanation, approach this Court under Article 32 of the
Constitution after inordinate delay. The relevant observations made
by this Court are as follows:
“31. But insofar as the attack is based on the 1952 Seniority
Rules, it must fail on another ground. The ground being
that this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution has
been brought about fifteen years after the 1952 Rules
were promulgated and effect given to them in the Seniority
List prepared on August 1, 1953. Learned counsel for
the petitioners says that this Court has no discretion and
cannot dismiss the petition under Article 32 on the ground
that it has been brought after inordinate delay. We are
unable to accept this contention. This Court by majority
in Tilokchand Moti Chand v. H.B. Munshi held that delay
can be fatal in certain circumstances. [...]
32. The learned counsel for the petitioners strongly urges
that the decision of this Court in Tilokchand Motichand
case needs review. But after carefully considering the
matter, we are of the view that no relief should be given
to petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation,
approach this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution
after inordinate delay. The highest Court in this land has
been given original jurisdiction to entertain petitions under
Article 32 of the Constitution. It could not have been the
intention that this Court would go into stale demands
after a lapse of years. It is said that Article 32 is itself a
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guaranteed right. So it is, but it does not follow from this
that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that
this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in
petitions filed after inordinate delay.
33. We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground,
but we must administer justice in accordance with law and
principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would
be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which
have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to
sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion
effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the
lapse of a number of years. It was on this ground that
this Court in Jaisinghani case observed that the order in
that case would not affect Class II officers who have been
appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In
that case, the Court was only considering the challenge
to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this
case, we are asked to consider the validity of appointments
and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950.
If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out
Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently
Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in
this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant
Commissioners of Income Tax and who were appointed
and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950,
should be left alone.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

30. In R.S Deodhar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported
in (1974) 1 SCC 317, the respondents raised a preliminary objection
contending that the petition under Article 32 ought to be dismissed at
the threshold on the ground of gross delay and laches. A Constitution
Bench of this Court, however, repelled this contention and reasoned
that: (i) the petitioners had offered a valid explanation for the delay;
(ii) what was challenged in the petition was not a thing of the past
and was still being followed, and thus its constitutionality should be
adjudged; and (iii) the adjudication of the claim would not cause
unjust prejudice or deprivation to the respondents. The relevant
observations in this regard are extracted below:
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 85

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

“10. The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of
the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of
gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional
cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back
as November 1, 1956 by the Government Resolution of
that date, and the procedure for making promotion to
the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional
select-list, which was a necessary consequence of the
creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/ Tehsildars,
had been in operation for a long number of years, at any
rate from April 7, 1961, and the Rules of July 30, 1959
were also given effect to since the date of their enactment
and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until July
14, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve
years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause
of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents,
was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think
this contention should prevail with us. In the first place,
it must be remembered that the rule which says that the
Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not
a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and
proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule
that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily
refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend
on its own facts. [...]Here the petitioners were informed
by the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, by his letter
dated October 18, 1960 and also by the then Secretary
of the Revenue Department in January 1961 that the
rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector in the
reorganised State of Bombay had not yet been unified,
and that the petitioners continued to be governed by the
rules of Ex-Hyderabad State and the Rules of July 30,
1959 had no application to them. The petitioners were,
therefore, justified in proceeding on the assumption that
there were no unified rules of recruitment to the posts
of Deputy Collector and the promotions that were being
made by the State Government were only provisional to be
regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made.
86 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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It was only when the petition in Kapoor case was decided
by the Bombay High Court that the petitioners came to
know that it was the case of the State Government in that
petition — and that case was accepted by the Bombay
High Court — that the Rules of July 30, 1959 were the
unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector
applicable throughout the reorganised State of Bombay.
The petitioners thereafter did not lose any time in filing
the present petition. Moreover, what is challenged in
the petition is the validity of the procedure for making
promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector — whether it
is violative of the equal opportunity clause — and since
this procedure is not a thing of the past, but is still being
followed by the State Government, it is but desirable that
its constitutionality should be adjudged when the question
has come before the Court at the instance of parties
properly aggrieved by it .It may also be noted that the
principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief
to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the
rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay
in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed
unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.[...]
Here, as admitted by the State Government in para 55 of
the affidavit in reply, all promotions that have been made
by the State Government are provisional and the position
has not been crystallised to the prejudice of the petitioners.
No rights have, therefore, accrued in favour of others by
reason of the delay in filing the petition. The promotions
being provisional, they have not conferred any rights on
those promoted and they are by their very nature liable
to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally
determined, so requires. We were also told by the learned
counsel for the petitioners, and that was not controverted
by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State
Government, that even if the petition were allowed and
the reliefs claimed by the petitioners granted to them, that
would not result in the reversion of any Deputy Collector
or officiating Deputy Collector to the post of Mamlatdar/
Tehsildar; the only effect would be merely to disturb their
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 87

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

inter se seniority as officiating Deputy Collectors or as
Deputy Collectors. Moreover, it may be noticed that the
claim for enforcement of the fundamental right of equal
opportunity under Article 16 is itself a fundamental right
guaranteed under Article 32 and this Court which has
been assigned the role of a sentinel on the qui vive for
protection of the fundamental rights cannot easily allow
itself to be persuaded to refuse relief solely on the jejune
ground of laches, delay or the like. “
(Emphasis Supplied)

31. This Court, in Joginder Nath & Ors v. Union of India & Ors,
reported in (1975) 3 SCC 459, relying upon the decisions in
Tilokchand (supra), Rabindranath Bose (supra), and R.S Deodhar
(supra) respectively, held that the preliminary objection raised on
the grounds of delay and laches would not succeed in the facts and
circumstances of the case as: first, there was no delay in filing the
petition; and secondly, dealing with the petition would not unsettle
long standing settled matters. The relevant observation made by
this Court is as follows:
“9. In our opinion on the facts and in the circumstances
of this case the preliminary objection raised on behalf of
the respondents cannot succeed. The first list fixing the
seniority of the Judicial Officers initially recruited to the Delhi
Judicial Service was issued on August 2, 1971. This was
subject to revision on good cause being shown. Petitioners
also, as we shall show hereinafter in this judgment on one
ground or the other, wanted their position to be revised in
the seniority list. They, however, did not succeed. A revised
seniority list was issued on June 2, 1973. The filing of
the writ petition was not designedly delayed thereafter.
Since the petitioners position in the seniority list vis-a-vis
Respondents 3 to 6 had not been disturbed in the new
list dated June 2, 1973 it was sufficient for the petitioners
to challenge the list dated August 2, 1971. We shall point
out in this judgment that except the promotion to the
posts of Additional District Judges, the seniority in relation
to which also is under challenge in this writ application,
nothing special had happened creating any right in favour
88 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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of the respondents or no such position had been created
the disturbance of which would unsettle the long standing
settled matters. The writ application, therefore, cannot be
thrown out on the ground of delay in regard to any of the
reliefs asked for by the petitioners.”
32. In Aflatoon & Ors v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., reported in (1975)
4 SCC 285, a Constitution Bench of this Court declined to entertain
an Article 32 petition challenging land acquisition proceedings on
the ground of inordinate delay and laches. This Court, on the facts
of the case, held that the litigants acted in a non-vigilant manner
by ‘sitting on the fence’ for a long period of time while the State
completed the acquisition process and thereafter filed the petition
at a highly advanced stage. Allowing such a non-vigilant petitioner
to pursue the claims after inordinate delay, this Court held, would
tantamount to putting a ‘premium on dilatory tactics’. The relevant
observations made by this Court are as follows:
“9. Assuming for the moment that the public purpose
was not sufficiently specified in the notification, did the
appellants make a grievance of it at the appropriate time?
If the appellants had really been prejudiced by the non-
specification of the public purpose for which the plots in
which they were interested were needed, they should
have taken steps to have the notification quashed on that
ground within a reasonable time. They did not move in
the matter even after the declaration under Section 6 was
published in 1966. They approached the High Court with
their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under
Section 9 were issued to them. In the concluding portion
of the judgment in Munshi Singh v. Union of India, it was
observed: [SCC p. 344, para 10]
“In matters of this nature we would have taken
due notice of laches on the part of the appellants
while granting the above relief but we are
satisfied that so far as the present appellants are
concerned they have not been guilty of laches,
delay or acquiescence at any stage.”
We do not think that the appellants were vigilant.
xxx
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 89

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions
should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct
in not challenging the validity of the notification even after
the publication of the declaration under Section 6 in 1966.
Of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants.
There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners
should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for
challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959
on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose
were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is
a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition
of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the
Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on
the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the
declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack
the notification on grounds which were available to them
at the time when the notification was published would be
putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are
liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay
on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand
v. H.B. Munshi and Rabindranath Base v. Union of India).”
(Emphasis Supplied)

33. In G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. &
Ors, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 329, this Court, while dealing with
the contention that the petitioners had moved the Court after a long
unexplained delay, made the following pertinent observation:
“16. A grievance was made that the petitioners have
moved this Court after a long unexplained delay and the
Court should not grant any relief to them. It was pointed
out that the provisional seniority list was drawn up on
March 22, 1971 and the petitions have been filed in the
year 1983. The respondents therefore submitted that
the Court should throw out the petitions on the ground
of delay, laches and acquiescence. It was said that
promotions granted on the basis of impugned seniority
list were not questioned by the petitioners and they have
acquiesced into it. We are not disposed to accede to this
request because Respondents 1 to 3 have not finalised
90 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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the seniority list for a period of more than 12 years and
are operating the same for further promotion to the utter
disadvantage of the petitioners. Petitioners went on making
representations after representations which did not yield
any response, reply or relief. Coupled with this is the
fact that the petitioners belong to the lower echelons of
service and it is not difficult to visualise that they may find
it extremely difficult to rush to the court. Therefore, the
contention must be rejected.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

34. The observation made by this Court in G.P. Doval (supra) adds an
important dimension to the considerations that ought to be taken into
account when deciding whether a petition under Article 32 is barred
by delay or laches. This Court, in Rabindranath Bose (supra), R.S.
Deodhar (supra), Joginder Nath (supra), and Aflatoon (supra)
respectively, while deciding whether the petition was barred by delay
or laches, scrutinised the issue from the vantage point of conduct
and knowledge of the petitioners and whether there would be any
disturbance to settled matters. However, in G.P. Doval (supra), it
was explicitly recognised that extenuating circumstances inherent to
the petitioner’s status, such as economic status, can also be one of
the factors considered to validly explain a delay in approaching the
Court. In essence, this Court acknowledged that the rigours of delay
and laches cannot be mechanically applied where the petitioners, by
virtue of their status, face genuine impediments in accessing justice.
35. In Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors,
reported in (2015) 3 SCC 1, this Court dealt with a batch of writ
petitions under Article 32 challenging Section 6A of the Citizenship
Act, 1955. The respondents raised a preliminary objection, contending
that since Section 6A was enacted in 1985, a challenge mounted in
2012 was barred by delay and laches. While examining this contention,
this Court comprehensively reviewed the jurisprudence on delay and
laches in Article 32 petitions, analysing landmark decisions including
Tilokchand (supra), Rabindranath Bose (supra), and R.S Deodhar
(supra). Echoing our observations above, it was noted that while the
broad ratio in Tilokchand (supra) is that an Article 32 petition can
be dismissed for delay, no clear majority view emerged on the exact
parameters or standard for such dismissal.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 91

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

36. Crucially, this Court noted that the petitions were filed on behalf
of a whole class of people, raised contentions regarding a severe
violation of fundamental rights, particularly Articles 21 and 29 of the
Constitution, respectively, and also dealt with an issue that was still
very much playing out on the ground. Consequently, it was held that
such a kind of petition could not be dismissed at the threshold on the
ground of delay/laches, as doing so would mean that the Court would
be guilty of ‘shrinking its constitutional duty’. This Court went further,
noting that significant developments have occurred in the landscape
of Indian constitutional jurisprudence since this Court’s decision in
Tilokchand (supra). Consequently, according to the bench, the
time had come for this Court to say that, at least when it comes to
violations of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty, delay
or laches, by itself, without more, would not be sufficient to shut the
doors of the court on any petitioner. Regarding the constitutionality
of Section 6-A, the court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench
for adjudication. The relevant observations made by this Court are
as follows:
“21. Article 32 of the Constitution which has been described
as the “heart and soul” of the Constitution guarantees
the right to move the Supreme Court for the enforcement
of all or any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III of the Constitution. This Article is, therefore, itself a
fundamental right and it is in this backdrop that we need
to address the preliminary submission.
xxx
27. In Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd. v. Union of
India [(2004) 11 SCC 526 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 99] , the
employer newspaper wished to challenge paragraph 80
of the Employees’ Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, which
came into force in 1956. The challenge was made in a writ
petition under Article 32, 45 years later in 2001. This was
turned down by a Bench of two Judges with a caveat, that
if it was the case of the petitioners that with the passage
of time, a certain provision had become unconstitutional,
then obviously the very passage of time would not amount
to delay for which a writ petition would not be entertained.
92 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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28. Similarly in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [(2009)
1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] , a Bench of two
Judges held that there is no upper and no lower limit
when it comes to an Article 32 petition. It all depends on
the breach of the particular fundamental right, the remedy
claimed, and how the delay arose. On facts, the petition
was turned down as there was an unexplained delay of
ten years.
29. In Bangalore City Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. State
of Karnataka, a two Judge Bench of this Court understood
the ratio of Tilokchand Motichand as follows:
“[...]
48. The ratio of the aforesaid decision is that
even though there is no period of limitation for
filing petitions under Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution, the petitioner should approach the
Court without loss of time and if there is delay,
then cogent explanation should be offered for
the same. However, no hard-and-fast rule can
be laid down or a straitjacket formula can be
adopted for deciding whether or not this Court
or the High Court should entertain a belated
petition filed under Article 32 or Article 226 of
the Constitution and each case must be decided
on its own facts.”
30. It will be seen that, in the present case, the petitioners
in the various writ petitions represent an entire People—the
tribal and non-tribal population of the State of Assam. In
their petition, they have raised a plea that the sovereignty
and integrity of India is itself at stake as a massive influx of
illegal migrants from a neighbouring country has affected
this core Constitutional value. That, in fact, it has been held
in Sonowal case that such an influx is “external aggression”
within the meaning of Article 355 of the Constitution of India,
and that the Central Government has done precious little
to stem this tide thereby resulting in a violation of Article
355. As a result of this huge influx, periodic clashes have
been taking place between the citizens of India and these
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 93

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

migrants resulting into loss of life and property, sounding
in a violation of Articles 21 and 29 of the Constitution of
the Assamese people as a whole. Not only is there an
assault on the life of the citizenry of the State of Assam
but there is an assault on their way of life as well. The
culture of an entire People is being eroded in such a way
that they will ultimately be swamped by persons who have
no right to continue to live in this country. The petitioners
have also argued that this Hon’ble Court in Sonowal case
[has specifically held in para 79 thereof that : (SCC p. 723)
“79. … Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally
crossed the border and have trespassed into
Assam or are living in other parts of the country
have no legal right of any kind to remain in India
and they are liable to be deported.”
They have also raised a fervent plea that Article 14 also
continues to be violated as Section 6-A(3) to (5) are not
time bound but are ongoing.
31. Given the contentions raised specifically with regard to
pleas under Articles 21 and 29, of a whole class of People,
namely, the tribal and non-tribal citizens of Assam and
given the fact that agitations on this score are ongoing,
we do not feel that petitions of this kind can be dismissed
at the threshold on the ground of delay/laches. Indeed,
if we were to do so, we would be guilty of shirking our
Constitutional duty to protect the lives of our own citizens
and their culture. In fact, the time has come to have a
relook at the doctrine of laches altogether when it comes
to violations of Articles 21 and 29.
32.Tilokchand Motichand is a judgment involving property
rights of individuals. Ramchandra Deodhar case , also
of a Constitution Bench of five judges has held that the
fundamental right under Article 16 cannot be wished away
solely on the ‘jejune’ ground of delay. Since Tilokchand
Motichand case was decided, there have been important
strides made in the law. Property Rights have been
removed from part III of the Constitution altogether
by the Constitution 44th Amendment Act. The same
94 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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amendment made it clear that even during an emergency,
the fundamental right under Article 21 can never be
suspended, and amended Article 359(1) to give effect
to this. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , decided
nine years after Tilokchand Motichand , Article 21 has
been given its new dimension, and pursuant to the new
dimension a huge number of rights have come under the
umbrella of Article 21 [for an enumeration of these rights,
see Kapila Hingorani (1) v. State of Bihar, para 57]. Further,
in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn, it has now been
conclusively held that all fundamental rights cannot be
waived (at para 29). Given these important developments
in the law, the time has come for this Court to say that
at least when it comes to violations of the fundamental
right to life and personal liberty, delay or laches by itself
without more would not be sufficient to shut the doors of
the court on any petitioner. “
(Emphasis Supplied)

37. In Citizenship Act, 1955, Section 6-A, reported in (2024) 16
SCC 105, a Constitution Bench of this Court, of which one of us
(J.B. Pardiwala, J.) was a member, addressed the constitutionality
of Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, on reference from the
decision in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha (supra). Surya Kant, J
(as he then was), in his leading opinion, dealt with the issue of
whether the writ petitions were maintainable in view of the inordinate
delay of 27 years. He noted that while the doctrine of laches and
the Limitation Act, 1963 served similar underlying purposes, the
difference lay in the fact that the doctrine of laches was not rigid in
its application, as its application was evaluated on a case-by-case
basis. Consequently, since the principle was not an inviolable legal
rule, it allows the court to conduct individualised analyses and, in
some circumstances, entertain the claims even when they may be
delayed, and third-party interests or rights may have been created.
38. According to Surya Kant, J., the claims affecting the public at large
or claims challenging the vires of a statute vis-à-vis the Constitution
are two such circumstances in which the doctrine of delay and
laches would not be strictly applied. On the facts of the case, Surya
Kant J held that both the aforesaid mitigating factors are met and
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 95

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

that the petitioners’ claims could not be dismissed at the threshold
on the ground of laches. J.B. Pardiwala, J., in his separate opinion,
concurred with the views expressed by Surya Kant, J., on the issue
of delay and laches. The relevant observations made by Surya
Kant, J., are as follows:
“66. Hence, it is settled law that the doctrine of laches is
not an inviolable legal rule but a rule of practice that must
be supplemented with sound exercise of judicial discretion.
While courts must ordinarily apply this doctrine in light of
the policy reasons discussed before, the doctrine allows
the Court to conduct an individualised analysis of each
case and entertain claims in the competing interests of
justice, even when the claim may be delayed and third-
party rights may have been created.
67. We may, however, hasten to clarify that the doctrine of
delay and laches is not to be ipso facto excluded where
a breach of fundamental rights is alleged. The five-Judge
Benches of this Court in Narayani Debi Khaitan v. State of
Bihar , Daryao v. State of U.P. and Tilokchand Motichand ,
and a three-Judge Bench in Amrit Lal Berry v. CCE , have
reiterated that even in such like cases the court must see
the effect of laches. However, that being said, there may
be instances where considerations of justice demand
that the court adjudicate on the merits of a case rather
than summarily dismissing it based solely on procedural
grounds such as delay.
68. One such factual circumstance is when the claim affects
the public at large. In Kashinath G. Jalmi v. Speaker , this
Court analysed several precedents (including Tilokchand
Motichand ) and differentiated them by holding that the
doctrine of laches cannot be used to expel a claim that
is made on behalf of the public. Judicial discretion, while
applying this doctrine, must always be governed by the
objective of promoting the larger public interest; and if a
claim affects the public at large, the Court should go into
the merits of the case. Where it is found that denial of
consideration on merits is likely to affect society in general
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and can have a cascading effect on millions of citizens, the
Court will carve out an exception and proceed to decide
the lis on merits.
69. Another vital circumstance where the doctrine of delay
and laches would not be applicable strictly is in matters
where the vires of a statute are challenged vis-à-vis the
Constitution. This Court has, in the due course of time,
accepted the idea of transformative constitutionalism, which
conceptualises the Constitution not as a still document
cast in stone at the day of its formation but as a living
and dynamic body of law, capable of constant updation
and evolution as per changing societal mores. Should
this Court deny a constitutional challenge solely based
on delay, it would effectively establish an arbitrary cut-off
beyond which laws could no longer be re-examined in light
of changing circumstances. Such a rigid approach cannot
be countenanced as changing societal circumstances
sometimes necessitate a reconsideration of the status
quo — even when the challenge is brought after a
considerable lapse of time.
70. To instantiate, a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India , held Section 377 of
the Penal Code, 1860 to be ultra vires of the Constitution,
regardless of the fact that the provision was a part of the
statute for over a century. The Court took note of the
norms of contemporary society and declared them to be
unconstitutional. If the doctrine of laches were to be applied
strictly, time would run in favour of a constitutionally invalid
statute, which cannot be allowed in the larger interests of
justice and the transformative nature of the Constitution.
71. Adverting to the facts of the case, it seems that the
two mitigating circumstances mentioned above are directly
attracted.
72. First, the petitioners have raised various substantial
questions that affect the public at large, including the erosion
of the culture of indigenous communities, discrimination
against the State of Assam, and the larger perceived threat
to the security of the country from immigration. Therefore,
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 97

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

instead of being an in personam dispute between two
individuals, the questions raised by the petitioners directly
or indirectly affect a large citizenry.
xxx
74. Second, since the controversy pertains to the
constitutionality of a statutory provision, the doctrine of
laches ought not to be applied strictly to bar the claim at the
very threshold. As discussed in para 69, such constitutional
adjudication cannot be made subject to any straitjacket rule
of limitation. Challenges regarding the constitutionality of
a statute require the Court to take a liberal approach and
permit a certain amount of flexibility. A contrary approach
would set a wrong precedent and act as a bar against
challenging anachronistic laws that might no longer align
with the ideals of constitutionalism. This would constitute
an unsound legal principle since oppressive laws should
not persist solely because they have been tolerated by
society for a certain period.
xxx
78. To conclude, while there has undoubtedly been a
considerable delay in filing the instant writ petitions, the
doctrine of laches cannot be applied strictly to disbar the
claims at the threshold. This is so because the present
proceedings raise substantial questions that affect the
public at large and the constitutional validity of a statutory
provision. If we were to decide otherwise, we would be,
in essence, creating an artificial deadline for important
constitutional issues. This would give rise to an unfair
principle of law in the realm of constitutional adjudication.”
(Emphasis Supplied)

(b) Principles Governing the Application of Delay and Laches
to Article 32 Petitions
39. A cumulative reading of the aforementioned decisions makes it evident
that, in the context of petitions under Article 32, the doctrine of laches
operates as a flexible rule of practice rather than a rigid rule of law
98 [2026] 4 S.C.R.

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to be mechanically applied. Its application is anchored in sound
judicial discretion, moulded by the specific facts and circumstances
of each case. This discretionary approach empowers the Court to
perform a crucial balancing exercise by weighing the equity in not
allowing stale claims against its paramount constitutional duty to
enforce fundamental rights.
40. Furthermore, a conspectus of the above decisions demonstrates
that whenever this Court has been called upon to apply the doctrine
of laches, its inquiry has consistently been guided by three primary
considerations: first, whether there has been an inordinate delay in
approaching the Court; secondly, whether the petitioner has provided
a cogent and satisfactory explanation for such delay; and thirdly,
whether entertaining the belated claim would unsettle settled matters
and prejudice third party rights by reopening matters long concluded.
41. It is important to clarify and emphasise that, when applying the
doctrine of delay and laches, consideration should be given to the
totality of the circumstances affecting both parties, rather than the
mere fact of delay. As has been rightly held, the test is not as to
the physical running of time.1 To apply the doctrine strictly based on
the quantum of delay would fundamentally alter its core character,
transforming it from a flexible, discretionary standard into a rigid rule.
Such an approach would effectively convert the equitable doctrine
into a rule of statutory limitation, a position contrary to the spirit of
this Court’s decisions on this issue.
42. When evaluating the totality of circumstances for applying the doctrine
of delay and laches to an Article 32 petition, the pivotal considerations,
as delineated above, are twofold: (i) whether entertaining the claim
would unsettle concluded matters and prejudice third-party rights,
and (ii) whether the petitioner has offered a cogent explanation for
the delay. At this juncture, it is crucial to appreciate the interplay
between these two factors. Frequently, when a party approaches
this Court after a considerable hiatus, adjudicating the claim and
granting the relief sought will inevitably unsettle, to some extent,
existing arrangements and potentially impact third-party rights.

1 See ¶ 13, M/s Dehri Rotas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board Bhojpur & Ors. (1992)
2 SCC 598.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 99

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

43. If a rigidly conservative approach were adopted, the mere prospect
of such disruption or unsettling of third-party rights would invariably
lead to the dismissal of the petition at the threshold. Further, where
the delay has been satisfactorily explained, demonstrating an absence
of blameworthy conduct or negligence on the part of the petitioner,
barring them from pursuing their fundamental rights at the threshold
stage on the basis that it will affect third parties would be manifestly
unjust, especially in the context of proceedings under Article 32.
44. It is a well-settled proposition that the jurisdiction of this Court
under Article 32 is expansive and is not confined to the issuance
of traditional prerogative writs, but explicitly encompasses the
power to issue any directions, orders, or writs appropriate for the
enforcement of fundamental rights.2 This Court has repeatedly
affirmed its constitutional mandate to develop new tools and devise
innovative remedies to facilitate the enforcement of fundamental
rights.3 Consequently, the mere possibility of the potential disruption
that such relief might cause cannot serve as the sole bedrock for
dismissing a petition at the threshold on the ground of laches. Where
a petitioner furnishes a cogent explanation for the delay, the court is
bound to examine the matter. If the court subsequently determines
that the specific relief claimed is unfeasible or would unduly prejudice
third-party rights, it would exercise its plenary powers to mould
the relief in such a manner that disruption is minimised whilst still
ensuring that the fundamental rights of the petitioner are enforced.
45. Flowing from the aforesaid discussion, it is evident that the adequacy of
the explanation for the delay constitutes the paramount consideration
when determining whether an Article 32 petition ought to be dismissed
on the ground of laches. Stated differently, the operative test is not
one of ‘unreasonable delay’ but of ‘unexplained delay’. This principle
is fortified by the fact that, even in instances where this Court has
declined relief to prevent the disruption of crystallised third-party
rights, such as in Aflatoon (supra) and others4, the foundational
premise for dismissal was a petitioner’s failure to furnish a cogent
and satisfactory explanation for the delay.

2 See ¶ 14, Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, 1950 SCC OnLine SC 16.
3 See ¶ 20, Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa & Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 746 & ¶ 13, Bandhua Mukti Morcha
v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161.
4 See ¶ 30, R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon (1982) 1 SCC 379 & ¶ 23-25, S.S. Moghe v. Union of India
(1981) 3 SCC 271.
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46. This emphasis on the unexplained delay assumes a heightened
significance in writ proceedings where the State is the respondent.
Situations frequently arise, like in G.P. Doval (supra), where the delay
in invoking Article 32 is at least in part attributable to the State’s own
conduct, such as prolonged administrative indecision or inertia. In
such scenarios, the State cannot be permitted to benefit from its own
lethargy by weaponising the doctrine of laches against a petitioner,
particularly when it itself has delayed taking a conclusive decision
until matters had already attained artificial finality.5
47. The evolution of this Court’s application and reliance on the doctrine
of laches suggests that the apprehensions articulated by Hegde, J.,
in his dissenting opinion in Tilokchand (supra) are, to a large extent,
allayed. The Court has consistently held that the doctrine of laches
should not be applied rigidly and that delay and laches cannot be
valid defences in cases where circumstances exist which shock the
judicial conscience of the Court or where the demand for justice
is so compelling that a constitutional court ought to exercise its
jurisdiction with a view to promoting justice. 6 Where the circumstances
demanded, this Court has proceeded on the notion that there is no
“limitation” to doing justice and that the need for finality must be
balanced with the need to rectify injustice.7 Further, as observed in
the decision in G.P. Doval (supra), this Court is not tethered to a
purely technical approach to delay. It recognises that a petitioner’s
inability to approach the court on time may be caused by genuine
systemic and practical hardships, rather than mere negligence.
48. The exposition by this Court in Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha
(supra) and Section 6A - In Re (supra) further adds a new dimension
to the issue of delay and laches in Article 32 petitions. By invoking
the aspect of ‘public interest’, the Court has ensured that important
public issues are not held to be beyond the purview of this court’s
jurisdiction solely on the basis of the fact that there was a delay in
bringing the same before the court. Further, by invoking the idea
of transformative constitutionalism, the Court has upheld the view
that the Constitution is a social document, whose principles and

5 See ¶ 17, Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr. v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (2022) 7 SCC 508.
6 See ¶ 12.12 & 12.13, Vidya Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (2020) 2 SCC 569
7 See ¶ 18, Sukh Dutt Ratra & Anr v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. (2022) 7 SCC 508 & ¶ 51,
Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3725.
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Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

ideals ought to be appreciated and applied dynamically, in line with
the changing tides of society. Consequently, delay and laches may
not be relevant factors where it is shown that an issue needs to be
constitutionally reevaluated owing to the change in circumstances
that has ensued.
49. Another crucial facet of transformative constitutionalism, as heralded
by this Court in Navtej Singh Johar & Ors v. Union of India, reported
in (2018) 10 SCC 1, and Indian Young Lawyers Association &
Ors v. State of Kerala & Ors, reported in (2019) 11 SCC 1, is the
Constitution’s profound potential to address and correct historical
wrongs. Historical injustices are often deeply entrenched in societal
structures and arrangements, rendering them self-perpetuating across
generations. Correcting such historical injustices forms the fulcrum
of the Constitution, specifically Part III, which deals with fundamental
rights. The emancipatory power of the Constitution lies precisely in its
capacity to break these cycles. It requires constitutional provisions to
be interpreted and applied in a manner that actively seeks to rectify
these entrenched systemic inequities.
50. In this context, a rigid or mechanical application of the doctrine of
delay and laches could inadvertently serve to perpetuate historical
wrongs, effectively denying access to justice and shielding systemic
inequities behind procedural barriers. However, as our preceding
analysis demonstrates, this Court’s jurisprudence is sufficiently robust
to prevent such an outcome. The flexible, context-specific approach to
laches ensures that the historical realities and practical impediments
faced by litigants are duly accounted for. Consequently, any attempt
to invoke delay as a procedural shield to insulate historical injustices
from judicial scrutiny would likely fail.
51. When this Court is confronted with claims that are inextricably linked
to notions of historical wrong or systemic injustice, the judicial scales
must largely tilt in favour of granting access to the court. The ultimate
adjudication on the merits may or may not find the substantive law to
be in favour of a petitioner. However, the very act of allowing these
claims to be heard and deliberated upon is an essential aspect of
constitutional recognition. It ensures that the procedural threshold
of laches does not become an insurmountable wall.
52. Such ideals of constitutionalism are further enabled by Article 32,
which imposes a duty and a privilege on this Court to enforce
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fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution. At this juncture, it
is apposite to refer to the following observation made by this Court
in Daryao & Ors v. State of U.P. & Ors., reported in 1961 SCC
OnLine SC 21:
“8. There can be no doubt that the fundamental right
guaranteed by Article 32(1) is a very important safeguard
for the protection of the fundamental rights of the citizens,
and as a result of the said guarantee this Court has been
entrusted with the solemn task of upholding the fundamental
rights of the citizens of this country. The fundamental rights
are intended not only to protect individual’s rights but they
are based on high public policy. Liberty of the individual
and the protection of his fundamental rights are the very
essence of the democratic way of life adopted by the
Constitution, and it is the privilege and the duty of this Court
to uphold those rights. This Court would naturally refuse
to circumscribe them or to curtail them except as provided
by the Constitution itself. It is because of this aspect of
the matter that in Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras in
the very first year after the Constitution came into force,
this Court rejected a preliminary objection raised against
the competence of a petition filed under Article 32 on the
ground that as a matter of orderly procedure the petitioner
should first have resorted to the High Court under Article
226, and observed that “this Court is thus constituted the
protector and guarantor of the fundamental rights, and it
cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it,
refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against
infringements of such rights”. [...]”
(Emphasis Supplied)

53. On similar lines, this Court in Prem Chand Garg & Anr v. The
Excise Commissioner, U.P & Ors, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 37, observed as follows:
“2. [...]The fundamental right to move this Court can,
therefore, be appropriately described as the corner-stone
of the democratic edifice raised by the Constitution. That
is why it is natural that this Court should, in the words
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 103

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

of Patanjali Sastri J., regard itself “as the protector and
guarantor of fundamental rights,” and should declare that
“it cannot, consistently with the responsibility laid upon it,
refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against
infringements of such rights.” In discharging the duties
assigned to it, this Court has to play the role “of a sentinel
on the qui vive” and it must always regard it as its solemn
duty to protect the said fundamental rights’ zealously and
vigilantly. [...]”
(Emphasis Supplied)

54. The overarching discourse on the doctrine of delay and laches
becomes crystal clear when situated within the broader context of
this Court’s constitutional duty and privilege under Article 32, as
clearly enunciated in Daryao (supra) and Prem Chand (supra).
This Court has consciously evolved the equitable doctrine of laches
to ensure that it in no manner circumscribes or dilutes the solemn
constitutional responsibility vested in it. A strict, mechanical application
of delay would invariably lead to the dismissal of petitions at the very
threshold, precluding any substantive adjudication of the fundamental
rights claims advanced. Such an approach would be fundamentally
antithetical to this Court’s role as the protector and guarantor of
fundamental rights and would effectively shrink the profound duty
and privilege entrusted to this Court.

(c) Application to the facts of this matter
55. Adverting to the factual matrix of the present case, a prima facie
assessment might suggest that the present writ petition is barred
by the doctrine of laches. Undeniably, there has been an inordinate
delay of nearly six decades, given that the impugned notification was
issued in the year 1955 and the present petition was instituted only
in the year 2014. Furthermore, adjudicating the claims raised herein
would inevitably necessitate reopening historical legal settlements that
have long attained finality. However, as delineated in the preceding
analysis, the mere quantum of delay or the prospect of disruption
cannot be considered as sufficient reasons in themselves to bar a
petition under Article 32. What is important is to gauge if the petitioner
has a cogent explanation for the delay.
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56. It stands to reason that an inordinate delay spanning six decades
is rarely attributable to a solitary cause. The present factual matrix
is no exception. To explain its prolonged absence from this Court,
the petitioner has placed reliance on a confluence of mitigating
circumstances.
57. One mitigating factor is the region’s unique and tumultuous historical
trajectory. In the decades immediately following Independence, the
administrative and constitutional status of the area was in a state
of continuous evolution. Originally administered as the Lushai Hills
district within the State of Assam, the region was subsequently
reorganised into the Union Territory of Mizoram under the North-
Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971, before finally attaining
full statehood in 1987. This period was simultaneously marked by
significant political upheaval spanning nearly two decades in the
form of an insurgency. Viewed cumulatively, these background
conditions would have presented formidable practical hurdles.
In such a climate of acute political unrest and chaos, claims for
compensation and historical land rights are inevitably relegated
to the periphery, making it exceptionally difficult for Mizo Chiefs to
secure meaningful engagement with their grievances, especially
within political circles.
58. Another mitigating circumstance is the Mizo Chiefs’ continuous
agitation of their claims before various forums. The material on record
evidences a pursuit of their grievances, thereby dispelling the notion
that the chiefs were indolent or slumbering over their rights. We are,
however, mindful that the mere filing of successive representations
to the authorities, particularly after previous representations have
been rejected or a reasonable period has elapsed, does not furnish
a valid explanation to surmount the bar of laches.8
59. In the present factual matrix, while it might be contended that the
chiefs persisted with administrative representations for a prolonged
duration, a crucial factor warrants specific attention. On multiple
occasions, respondent no. 2 (the State of Mizoram) conducted itself
in a manner that engendered a legitimate expectation amongst the

8 See ¶ 5-7, State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray & Ors. (1977) 3 SCC 396 & ¶ 6-10 & Karnataka
Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006) 4 SCC 322.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 105

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

chiefs that an amicable resolution was imminent, thereby obviating the
immediate need for adversarial litigation. Evidence of such conduct
is reflected in the official assurances tendered by the State before
the Gauhati High Court, at a time when the chiefs were actively
agitating for their rights. To substantiate, it would do well to look at
the circumstances in which the writ appeals being pursued by the
chiefs in the Gauhati High Court came to be disposed of:
a. In Writ Appeal No. 69 of 1998, the Counsel for the State of
Mizoram submitted that the government is considering the claim
for compensation and that a suitable order would be passed
shortly, in consultation with the Union of India. In lieu of this
statement, the counsel for the chiefs did not press the issue
further. Consequently, the High Court disposed of the matter with
the observation and direction that the government of Mizoram
would consider the claim of the village chief, in consultation
with the Union of India, expeditiously and preferably within
three months. If the chiefs were not satisfied with the order,
they were entitled to seek redressal of their grievances before
an appropriate forum
b. Thereafter, in Writ Appeal No. 598 of 2005, once again, the
Counsel for the State of Mizoram stated that the claim as
espoused by the chiefs would be adjudicated afresh by the
State in accordance with law. Consequently, the High Court
closed the writ appeal with the direction to the government
of Mizoram to consider the claim of the chiefs afresh. In the
event the chiefs felt aggrieved by the decision taken by the
government of Mizoram, it was left open for them to pursue
such remedy as may be available under law.
60. Further fortifying this expectation is the fact that the Chief Minister
of Mizoram, on at least two distinct occasions, addressed formal
communications to the Prime Minister of India, espousing the chiefs’
claims for compensation. It is necessary to clarify that this Court does
not construe such intergovernmental correspondence as constituting
promissory estoppel against the State, being acutely aware that
political communications often carry dimensions beyond the purview
of judicial consideration. Nevertheless, these communications are
pertinent to the extent that they signalled a sympathetic stance
towards the chiefs’ grievances. Such conduct could reasonably have
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led the chiefs to hope that a resolution was forthcoming, thereby
dissuading them from initiating litigation.9
61. Weighing the totality of these circumstances, this Court is conscious
of the fact that the delay herein is undeniably inordinate, and
the explanation offered by the petitioner is, strictly speaking, not
unequivocally convincing. Nevertheless, we are not inclined to
dismiss this petition at the threshold solely on the ground of delay. It
is evident from the record that the State of Mizoram (respondent no.2)
has held out hope for an amicable settlement and never outrightly
rejected the grievances of the chiefs. It is this unique combination,
the continuous representations made by the chiefs coupled with the
State’s supportive stance, that understandably pushed the chiefs to
seek an administrative resolution rather than immediately pursuing
legal remedies. Equally significant is that, on two prior occasions
when the chiefs approached the High Court, the matter was not
adjudicated on the merits. Instead, owing to the ongoing dialogue
between the parties, the High Court left the avenue open for the
chiefs to pursue appropriate legal remedies in the future. To shut
the doors on them at this third instance, without ever examining the
substance of their claims, would be highly unjust.

(II) Whether any fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs were
violated?

62. It is well settled that, for relief to be granted in a writ petition under
Article 32, a case must be made out establishing the existence of a
fundamental right and its breach, actual or threatened.
63. Right to property was earlier enshrined in Articles 19(1)(f) and 31
of the Constitution. It may be noted that both these provisions were
repealed by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
However, the 44th Amendment is prospective in its operation, and all
laws passed and executive action taken prior to 20th June 1979 will
continue to be judged by and be subject to the provisions of Part
III, including Articles 19(1)(f) and 31.
64. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed to the Indian citizens a right to acquire,
hold, and dispose of property. Article 19(5), however, permitted the

9 See ¶ 21, P.C. Sethi v. Union of India (1975) 4 SCC 67 & ¶ 16, Purshottam Lal v. Union of India
(1973) 1 SCC 651.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 107

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

State to impose by law reasonable restrictions on this right in the
interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests
of any Scheduled Tribe. Article 31(1) laid down that no person could
be deprived of his property without the authority of law. Article 31(2),
on the other hand, underwent significant change and was the focal
point of multiple constitutional amendments. Article 31(2) as it stood
when it was originally enacted and Article 31(2) as it stood before
its abrogation in 1978, are reproduced below:
“Article 31(2) at the time of enactment of the Indian
Constitution
No property, movable or immovable, including any
interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial
or industrial undertaking, shall be taken possession
of or acquired for public purposes under any law
authorising the taking of such possession or such
acquisition, unless the law provides for compensation
for the property taken possession of or acquired
and either fixes the amount of the compensation, or
specifies the principles on which, and the manner
in which, the compensation is to be determined and
given.

Article 31(2) as it stood before its abrogation in 1978
No property shall be compulsorily acquired or
requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by
authority of a law which provides for acquisition or
requisitioning of the property for an amount which may
be fixed by such law or which may be determined in
accordance with such principles and given in such
manner as may be specified in such law, and no
such law shall be called in question in any court on
the ground that the amount so fixed or determined
is not adequate or that the whole or any part of such
amount is to be given otherwise than in cash.”
65. In the present case, the central dispute concerns the alleged violation
of the Mizo Chiefs’ right to property, as guaranteed under Articles
19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution, respectively. The petitioner claims
this right was breached either because the Mizo Chiefs were deprived
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of their lands without lawful authority, or because the compensation
paid to them was wholly ‘illusory’. Given that the impugned actions of
the respondents occurred at a time when the right to property was a
fundamental right under Part III, and considering that the Constitution
(Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, operates only prospectively,
the right to property was firmly in existence at the relevant time.
Consequently, the existence of a fundamental right, as is required
for invoking and claiming relief under Article 32, stands satisfied.
66. It is established that who bears the burden of proof in cases where
fundamental rights violations are alleged depends on the fundamental
right alleged to have been violated. The same burden of proof rule will
not apply to all fundamental rights violation challenges.10 However, in
cases such as the present one, the initial burden is on the petitioner
to satisfy the Court and make out a case for an invasion of their
fundamental right(s).11
67. To discharge this initial burden and successfully establish a violation
of their fundamental right to property, the petitioner must necessarily
succeed on two distinct fronts. First and foremost, it must prove a
clear title of the Mizo Chiefs over the subject lands, which, in the
context of its sweeping claim, effectively encompasses the entire
territorial expanse of the present-day State of Mizoram.12 To establish
such a title, the petitioner must conclusively demonstrate that, under
the chieftainship system, as it operated during the British regime,
the Mizo Chiefs held complete ownership of the land, rather than
merely functioning as local administrative heads. Secondly, and only
upon proving the ownership as aforesaid, the petitioner must satisfy
the other parameters under Article 31. This includes, amongst other
things, proving that the respondents deprived the chiefs of their
property without lawful authority, or that the property was acquired
without providing due compensation.
68. In an effort to discharge the burden of establishing title to the land,
the petitioners have primarily relied on accounts and writings of
scholars and officials of the British government. Upon a meticulous

10 See ¶ 15-29, Deena & Ors. v. Union of India (1983) 4 SCC 645.
11 See ¶ 5, A. Hamsaveni & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. (1994) 6 SCC 51.
12 See ¶ 4, Bokaro and Ramgur Ltd. v. State of Bihar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 379.
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Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

perusal of the said material, it is, at the very outset, highly ambiguous
whether these texts unequivocally recognise the Mizo Chiefs as the
absolute owners of the land. Furthermore, even assuming that such
an interpretation could be culled from these writings, the petitioners
have advanced no compelling justification as to why such writings and
accounts should be elevated to the status of conclusive evidentiary
proof. It is legally untenable for this Court to rest a decision of such
magnitude on the fragile foundation of such flimsy submissions and
woefully inadequate proof.
69. The material adduced by the respondent, at least on a prima facie
examination, indicates that during the British administration of the
Lushai Hills district, the title over the land never vested in the Chiefs.
Furthermore, the record before us is bereft of any comprehensive
compilation or analysis of the boundary papers issued to the Chiefs,
nor is it established that these documents were uniform in their
conferment of rights and duties. However, an examination of the
boundary paper available on record entirely belies the petitioner’s
claim, as nothing therein even remotely suggests the conferment
or recognition of absolute ownership of land. Consequently, we
are constrained to hold that the petitioners have woefully failed to
discharge their burden of proving title over the subject lands.
70. We are cognisant that, unlike in modern times, establishing land
title from the pre-independence era, especially within a traditional
chieftainship system, rarely involves a neat or conclusive paper trail.
However, given the sheer magnitude of the petitioner’s claims, it is
only reasonable to expect a much deeper historical investigation on
its part. To substantiate such an extravagant demand, the petitioner
ought to have relied on alternative sources of evidence, such as
government documents, official notifications, and administrative
orders, to build a coherent understanding of their alleged title. Both
sides have failed to present a continuous, documented chain of
events that would clearly map out the status of the land at different
periods.
71. Furthermore, the constitutional jurisprudence governing the right
to property, particularly under the erstwhile Article 31, is deeply
intricate and has been the subject of extensive judicial exposition.
Consequently, apart from establishing ownership, there are other
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aspects to the right to property that the petitioner had to prove
thoroughly. For instance, while the petitioner baldly asserts that
the statutory compensation disbursed to the Mizo Chiefs was
‘illusory’, they have entirely failed to traverse the plethora of legal
precedents rendered by this Court that delineate the parameters for
determining when compensation becomes legally illusory. Moreover,
the pleadings are silent on how this specific claim interacts with the
broader constitutional framework of property rights under Part III, or
on how it reconciles with other legislation in force in the then State
of Assam. In essence, the petitioner has approached a profoundly
complex legal issue in a simplistic and superficial manner.
72. The petitioner has further advanced a plea of discrimination,
contending that the Mizo Chiefs stood on an equal historical footing
with the rulers of the erstwhile Princely States. They argue that the
State’s failure to grant them comparable compensation or privy
purses is manifestly arbitrary and violative of their fundamental rights.
However, this assertion, much like its above claims, is entirely devoid
of any legal basis and thereby merits outright rejection. The privy
purses and other privileges granted to the erstwhile rulers of the
Princely States were the direct outcome of specific, pre-constitutional
political and contractual arrangements negotiated between those
rulers and the Government. Consequently, it would be legally flawed
to equate and elevate these entitlements to the status of a right,
which all erstwhile rulers were constitutionally bestowed upon. Such
political arrangements cannot be claimed as a matter of a legally
enforceable right, much less a fundamental right.
73. The petitioner has also contended that the State of Assam (the
parent State in 1954) lacked legislative jurisdiction to enact the Act,
1954. However, as the petitioner has not discharged its burden of
establishing any violation of the fundamental rights of the chiefs, we
do not deem it necessary to address the vires of the Act, 1954 or
the legality of the impugned notification in this present writ petition.
74. Therefore, having considered the matter from all vantage points, the
inescapable conclusion is that the petitioner has not been able to
establish any violation of the fundamental rights of the Mizo Chiefs
in the present matter. Consequently, the petitioner is not entitled to
any of the reliefs sought herein.
[2026] 4 S.C.R. 111

Mizo Chief Council Mizoram, Thr, President Shri L. Chinzah v.
Union of India & Ors.

75. For all the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is accordingly
dismissed.
76. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand dismissed.

Result of the case: Writ Petition Dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan