Supreme Court of India
MISS MOHINI JAINversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1992 INSC 186
- Decided
- 30 July 1992
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- KULDIP SINGH
Holding
The Court held that the fee of Rs.60,000 for Indian students from outside Karnataka is a capitation fee, not a tuition fee, and the notification fixing such fee is ultra vires the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 and violative of Article 14, thus it is struck down.
Summary
Miss Mohini Jain, an Indian student from outside Karnataka, was denied admission to a private medical college after she could not pay a Rs.60,000 annual fee, which she alleged to be a capitation fee. She filed a writ petition under Article 32 challenging the Karnataka Government's 1989 notification fixing differential tuition fees for private medical colleges. The Court examined whether a constitutional right to education exists, whether the fee constitutes an arbitrary capitation fee violating Article 14, and whether the notification was ultra vires the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984. Relying on the Constitution, Directive Principles, and precedents, the Court held that the Rs.60,000 charge is a capitation fee, not a tuition fee, and is prohibited by the Act and the equality clause. Consequently, the notification's provisions allowing such fees were struck down, but no relief was granted to the petitioner regarding admission.
Issues considered
- Whether the Constitution guarantees a right to education and if the capitation fee infringes that right
- Whether charging a capitation fee for admission to educational institutions is arbitrary, unfair and violative of Article 14
- Whether the 1989 Karnataka Government notification permits the collection of capitation fee within the meaning of the Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984
- Whether the notification is violative of the provisions of the Act that prohibit capitation fees
Legislation cited
- Karnataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984s. 2(b), s. 2(e), s. 3, s. 5
Subjects
right to educationcapitation feeArticle 14equalityKarnataka Educational Institutions Actprivate medical collegestuition feeconstitutional law
Judgment
A MISS MOHINI JAIN
v.
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.
JULY 30, 1992
B [KULDIP SINGH AND R.M. SAHAI, JJ.)
Constitution of India, 1950-Articles 41, 45-Right to education- ::>---
Whether a constitutional right-Capitation fee-Whether unconstitutional.
C Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Preamble--Object of.
Kamataka Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee)
Act, 1984-Sections 3, 5(1)-Notification under-M.B.B.S: Course-Admis-
sion-Tuition fee-Different rates for the three categories of students-Legality
D of-Excess Tuition fee other than Rs.2,000 per annum-Whether Capitation
fee-Whether permissible in /aw-Held, Notification ultra vires.
The respondent ~o.1 - State Government issued a notification dated
June 5, 1989 under section 5(1) of the Kamataka Educational Institutions
E (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 fixing the tuition fee, other fees
and deposits to be charged from the students by the Private Medical
Colleges in the State. The tuition fee per year for the candidates admitted
against "Government seats" was Rs.2,000, whereas for the Kamataka
students (o~er than those admitted against "Government seats") the . ....-
tution fee was not exceeding Rs.25,000 and for the students belonging to
F the category of "Indian students from outside Kamataka" were to pay the
tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum.
The petitioner, who came under the category of "Indian students
from outside Kamataka", was informed by the respondent No.3 - Private
Medical College, that she could be admitted to the MBBS Course in the
G session commencing February/March 1991, provided she would deposit
Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish a bank guarantee
in respect of the fees for the remaining years of the MBBS Course. When
the father of the petitioner informed the respondent No.3 that he could not ·
pay the exorbitant annual tution fee of Rs.60,000, the petitioner was denied
H admission.
658
MOillNI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 659
The petitioner has, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, · 'A
challenged the notification dated S.6.1989 issued by the respondent No.1,
'. permitting the Private Medical Colleges to charge exorbitant tuition fees 1
from the students other than those admitted to the "Government seats".
Respondent No.3 contended that the students from whom higher
tuition fee was charged belong to a different class; that those who were B
admitted to the "Government seats" were meritorious and the remaining
non-meritorious; that classification of candidates into those who pos-
sessed merit and those who did not possess merit was a valid classification
and as such the college-management was 'Nithin its right to charge more
fee from those who did not possess merit; that the object sought to be t
achieved by the said classification was to collect money to meet the expen-
ses incurred by the college in providing medical education to the students.
The intervener-Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association ar-
gued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka did not
receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government; D
that the Private Medical Colleges would incur about Rs.S lakhs per student
as expenditure for S year MBBS course; that 40% of the seats in the
colleges were set apart as "Government seats" to be filled by the Govern-
ment; that the students selected and admitted against Government seats
would pay only Rs.2,000 per annum as such the rest of the burden was on E
those who were admitted against management quota; that the tuition fee
was not excessive and as such there was no question of making any profit
-- by the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka.
Respondent No.3 and the intervener submitted that in order to run
the medical colleges the managements were justified in charging the
capitation fee; that apart from the Act, there was not provision under the
F
Constitution or under any other law which would forbid the charging of
capitation fee.
On the questions: (1) Was there a 'right to education' guaranteed to
the people of India under the Constitution? If so, did the concept of 0
'capitation fee' infracts the same?; (2) Whether the charging of capitation
fee in consideration of admissions to educational institutions was ar-
bitrary, unfair, unjust and as such violated Article 14 of the Constitution?;
(3) Whether the impugned notification permitted the Private Medical
Colleges to charge capitation fee in the pise of regulating fees under the H
'
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.
A Act? and (4) Whether the notification was violative of the provisions of the
the Act?, allowing the writ petition to the extent of striking down the
capitation fee, this Court
·HELD: 1.01. The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the duty of the State
to respect and protect the same. It is primarily the education which brings-
B forth the dignity of a man. The framers of the Constitutions were aware that
more than seventy per cent of the people, whom they were giving the Con-
stitution of India, were ill!trate. They were also hopeful that within a period
of ten years illiteracy would be wiped out from the country. It was with that
hope that Articles 41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of the Constitution.
C An individual cannot be assured of human dignity unless his personality is
developed and the only way to do that is to educate him. [667F]
1.02. Article 41 in Chapter IV of the Constitution recognises an
individual's right "to education". It says that "the State shall, within the
-
limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective provision
D for the securing the right .••••to education••.." Although a citizen cannot
enforce the directive principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitu-
tion but these were not intended to be mere pious declarations. [667H]
1.03. Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the
Constitution a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter Ill shaH
E
remain beyond the reach of large majority which is illiterate. [668E]
1.04. lbe "right to education", therefore, is concomitant to the fun-
damental rights enshrined under Part Ill of the Constitution. The State is
under a constitutional mandate to provide educational institutions at all
F levels for the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must
function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire
education cannot be confined to the richer section of the society. [670A]
1.05. Every citizen bas a 'right to education' under the Constitution.
G The State is under an obligatJ~n to establish educational institutions to
enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its
obligation through state-owned or state-recognised educational institu·
tions. When the State Government grants recognition to the private educa-
tional institutions it creates an agency to fulfil its obligation under the
Constitution. The students are given admission to the educational institu-
H lions • whether state-owned or state-recognised in recognition of their
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA 661
'right to education' under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee in A
consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent denial
of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution. [672C-E]
1.06. Capitation fee is nothing but a price for selling education. The
concept of "teaching shops" is contrary to the constitutional scheme and
is wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. [670C] B
1.07. "Right to life" is the compendious expi:ession for all those rights
-~ which the Courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the in-.
dividual is free to pursue. The right to education flows directly from right, C
to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual,
cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The,
State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide,
educational facilities at all levels to its citizens. [669 F-G]
D
1.08. Capitation fee makes the availability of education beyond the ·
reach of the poor. The State action in permitting capitation fee to be '
charged by S~te-recognised educational institutions is wholly arbitrary '
and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. [672G]
1.09 The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias. It enable E
~I
the rich to take admission whereas the poor has to withdraw due to
financial inability. A poor student with better merit cannot get admission
because he has no money whereas the rich can purchase the admission.
Such a treatment is patendy unreasonably, unfair and unjust. There is,
therefore, no escape from the conclusion that charging of capitation ~ee in F
consideration of admissions to educational institutions is wholly arbitrary
and as such infracts Article 14 of the Constitution. (673 F-G]
Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
[1981] 2 SCR 516; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors.,
[1984) 2 SCR 67; E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (1974] 2 G
SCR 348; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Ramana
Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport Authority of India and Ors.,
:--{ (1979) 3SCR1014;Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc.,
[1981) 2 SCR 79 and Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc.,
(1984) 3 SCR 942, referred to. fl
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat and another, (1955] SCR
UIS, distinguished.
Dr. Ambedkar - C.A.D. Vol. VIII P.476; IMA Resolutions of India
Medical Conference held at Cuttak on December 28-30, 1980; Presidential
Address of Dr. K.S. Chugh, Chainnan, Department of Medicine and Head
B Department of Nephrology Postgraduate Institute of Medical _Education and
Research, Chandigarh delivered on 17.1.1992 at the 47th Annual Conference
of the Association of Physicians in India, held at Patna, referred to.
2. The Kamataka Educational_ Institutions (Prohibition of Capita-
C tion Fee) Act, 1984 has been brought into existence by the Karnataka State
Legislature with the object of effectively curbing the evil practice of collec·
iog capitation fee for admitting students into the educational institutions
in the State of r~rnataka. The preamble to the Act which makes the object
clear. [679F]
-
D 3.01. The -State Government in fulfilling its obligation under the
Constitution to provide medical education to the citizens has fixed
Rs.2,000 per annum as tuition fee for the students selected on merit for
admission to the medical colleges and also against "Government seats" in ·
private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by a student admitted
E to the private medical college is only Rs.2,000 per annum. The seats other
than the "Government seats" which are to be filled from outside Kamataka
the management has been given free hand where the criteria of merit· is ·
not applicable and those who can afford to pay Rs.60,000 per annum are
---
considered at the discretion of the management. [680 F-H]
F 3.02. If the State Government fixes Rs.2,000 per annum as the tuition
fee in government colleges and for "Government seats" in private medical
colleges then it is the State-responsibility to see that any private college
which has been set up with Government permission and is being run with
Government recognition is prohibited from charging more than Rs.2,000
G from any student who may be resident of any part of India. When the State
Government pennits a private medical college to be set-up and recognises its
curriculum and degrees, then the said college is performing a function which
under the Constitution has been assigned to the State Government. [681A]
3.03. Capitation fee in any form cannot be sustained in the eyes or
H law. The only m__ethod of admission to the medical colleges in consonance
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.) ~3
with fair play and equity is by ways of merit and merit alone. Charging of A
capitation fee by the private educational institutions as a consideration for
admission is wholly illegal and cannot be permitted. (674 B-C]
3.04. Rs.60,000 per annum permitted to be charged from Indian
students from outside Kamataka in Para 1(d) of the notification is not
tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee and as such cannot be sustained and, B
is liable to be struck down. [681C]
3.05. What is provided is paras l(d) and l(c) of the impugned,
notification dated June S, 1989 is capitation fee and not a tuition fee. It ·.
has to be held that the notification is beyond the scope of the Act rather ' C
goes contrary to Section 3 of the Act and as such has to be set aside. It is
-- not permissible in law for any educational institution to charge capitation '
fee as a consideration for admission to the said institution. [681E]
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.456of1991 .
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
.D
Vijay Pandia and R. Satish for the Petitioner.
Santosh Hegde, R. Jagannatha Gouley, M.K. Dua, K.H. Nobin Singh,
Manoj Sarup, C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Mohan, Ms. Anita Lalit and M. ,E
Veerappa for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KULDIP SINGH, J. The Karnataka State Legislature, with the object
of eliminating the practice of collecting capitation fee for admitting stu- f
dents into educational institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act). The Act
.. _,....____
which replaces the Karnataka Ordinance No.14 of 1983 came into force
with effect from July 11, 1983. Purporting to regulate the tuition fee to be
charged by the Private Medical Colleges in the State, the Karnataka
Government issued a notification dated June 5, 1989 under Section 5(1) of G
the Act thereby fixing the tuition fee, other fees and deposits to be charged
from the students by the Private Medical Colleges in the State. U~der the
notification the candidates admitted against "Government seats" are to pay
Rs.2,000 per year as tuition fee. The Karnataka students (other than those
admitted against "Government seats") are to be charged tuition fee not tt'
)-
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A exceeding Rs.25,000 per annum. The third category is of "Indian students
from outside Karnataka", from whom tuition fee not exceeding Rs.60,000
per annum is permitted to be charged.
Miss Mohini Jain a resident of Meerut was informed by the Manage-
ment of Sri Siddharatha Medical College, Agalokote, Tumkur in the State
B of Karnataka that she could be admitted to the MBBS course in the session
commencing February/March 1991. According to the management she was
asked to deposit Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first year and furnish
a bank guarantee in respect of the fee for the remaining years of the MBBS
course. The petitioner's father informed the management that it was
C beyond his means to pay the exorbitant annual fee of Rs.60,000 and as a
consequence she was denied admission to the medical college. Mohini Jain
has alleged that the management demanded a further capitation fee of
rupees four and a half lakhs but the management bas vehemently denied
the same.
-
)I.--
D
In this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India Miss
Mohini Jain has challenged the notification of the Karnataka Government
permitting the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka to charge
exorbitant tuition fees from the students other than those admitted to the
"Government seats".
E
Mr. San(osh Hedge learned counsel appearing for the medical col- ~·
(
lege respondent No.3 has contended that the students from whom higher
F
tuition fee is charged belong to a different class. According to him those
who are admitted to the "Government seats" are meritorious and the
remaining non-meritorious. He states that classification of candidates into
those who possess merit and those who do not possess merit is a valid
-
classification and as such the college-management is within its right to
charge more fee from those who do not possess merit. He further states
that the object sought to be achieved by the said classification is to collect
money to meet the expenses incurred by the college in providing medical
G education to the students. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appear-
ing for the intervener Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association has
argued that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka do not
receive any financial aid from either the Central or the State Government.
According to him the Private Medical Colleges incur about Rs.5 lakhs per
H student as expenditure for a 5 year MBBS course .. 40% of the seats in these
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 665
colleges are set part as "Government seats" to be filled by the Government. A
The students selected and admitted against Government seats pay only
Rs.2,000 per annum as such the rest of the burden falls on those who are
admitted against management quota. He, therefore, contended that the
tuition fee is not excessive and as such there is no question of making any
profit by the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka. Mr. B
Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan have vehemently contended that in order to ,
run the medical colleges the managements are justified in charging the
capitation fee. According to them, apart from the act, there is no provision '
-~~ under the Constitution or under any other law which forbids the charging
of capitation fee. Finally they have relied upon the judgment of this Court
in D.P. Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat, and another, (1955] SCR 1215. C 1
After hearing learned counsel for the parties and also perusing the '
written arguments submitted by them the following points arise for our
consideration in this writ petition:
(1) Is there a 'right to education' guaranteed to the people of India 'D
under the Constitution? If so, does the concept of 'capitation fee' infracts '
the same?
(2) Whether the charging of capitation fee in consideration of admis-
sions to educational institutions is arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such E
violates the equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution?
(3) Whether the impugned notification permits the Private Medical !
Colleges to charge capitation fee in the guise of regulating fees under the ,
Act?
(4) Whether the notification is violative of the provisions of the Act
which in specific terms prohibit the charging of capitation fee by any
educational institution in the State of Karnataka?
In order to appreciate the first point posed by us it is necessary to
refer to various provisions of the Constitution of India. The preamble G
promises to secure to all citizens of India "justice, social, economic and
political" "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship". It fur-
ther provides "equality of status and of opportunity" and assures dignity of
the individual. Articles 21, 38, 39(a) and (f), 41 and 45 of the Constitution
are reproduced hereunder: H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.
A "21. Protection of life and personal liherty.-No person shall
be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to
procedure established by law."
"38. State to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare
of the people.-(1) The State shall strive to promote the Wel-
B fare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as
it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and
political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life.
(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to minimise the ine-
c qualities in income, and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in
status, facilities and opportunities, not only amongst individuals
but also amongst groups of people residing in different areas
or engaged in different vocations." -
"39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by the State. -
D The State shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing-
(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to
an adquate means to livelihood;
E (f) that children are given opportunities and facilities to
develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and
dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against
exploitation and against moral and material abandonment."
F "41. Right to work, to education and to public assistance in
certain cases. - The State shall, within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective provision for secur-
ing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in
cases of unemployment, old a:ge, sickness and disablement, and
in other cases of undeserved want."
G
"45. Provision for free and compulsory education for
children. - The State shall endeavour to provide, within a
period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitu-
tion, for free and compulsory education for all children until
H they complete the age of fourteen years."
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.) 667
It is no doubt correct that "right to education" as such has not been A
guaranteed as fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution but
reading the above quoted provisions comulatively it becomes clear that the
framers of the Constitution made it obligatory for the State to provide
education for its citizens.
B
The preamble promises to secure justice "social, economic and politi-
cal" for the citizens. A peculiar feature of the Indian Constitution is that it
combines social and economic rights along with political and justiciable
legal rights. The preamble embodies the goal which the State has to achieve
in order to establish social justice and to make the masses free in the
positive sense. The securing of social justice has been specifically enjoined C
- an object of the State under Article 38 of the Constitution. Can the
objective which has been so prominently pronounced in the preamble and
Article 38 of the Constitution be achieved without providing education to
the large majority of citizens who are illiterate. The objectives flowing from
the preamble cannot be achieved and shall remain on paper unless the D
people in this country are educated. The three pronged justice promised
by the preamble is only an illusion to the teaming-million who are illiterate.
It is only the education which equips a citizen to participate in achieving
the objectives enshrined in the preamble. The preamble further assures the
dignity of the individual. The Constitution seeks to achieve this object by
guaranteeing fundamental rights to each individual which he can enforce E
~ I
through court of law if necessary. The directive principles in Part IV of the I
Constitution are also with the same objective. The dignity of man is
inviolable. It is the duty of the State to respect and protect the same. It is
primarily the education which brings-forth the dignity of a man. The
framers of the Constitution were aware that more than seventy per cent of F
· the people, to whom they were giving the Constitution of India, were
illiterate. They were also hopeful that within a period of ten years illiteracy
would be wiped out from the country. It was with that hope that Articles
41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of the Constitution. An individual
cannot be assured of human dignity unless his personality is developed and
the only way to do that is to educate him. This is why the Universal G
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 empksises "Education shall be
directed to the full development of the human personality.... " Article 41 in
Chapter IV of the Constitution recognises an individual's right "to educa-
tion". It says that "the State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity
and development, make effective provision for securing the right. ..... to H
I .
I
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A educationw. Although a citizen cannot enforce the directive principles
contained iri. Chapter IV of"the Constitution but these were not intended
to be mere pious declarations. We may quote the words of Dr. Ambedkar
in that respect:
"In enacting this Part of the Constitution, the Assembly is giving
B certain directions to the future legislature and the future ex-
ecutive to show in what manner they are to exercise the legis-
lature and the executive power they will have. Surely it is not
the intention to introduce in this Part these principles as mere
pious declarations. It is the intention of the Assembly that in
c future both the legislature and the executive should not merely
pay lipservice to these principles but that they should be made
the basis of all legislative and executive action that they may be
taking hereafter in the matter of the governance of the country"
(C.A.D. Vol.VII p.476.)
-
D The directive principles which are fundamental in the governance of
the country cannot be isolated from the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Part III. These principles have to be read into the fundamental
rights. Both are supplementary to each other. The State is under a con-
stitutional mandate to ~reate conditions in which the fundamental rights
E guaranteed to the individuals under Part III could be enjoyed by all.
Without making "right to education" under Article 41 of the Constitution
a reality the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond the
--
reach of large majority which is illiterate.
This Court has interpreted Article 21 of the Constitution of India to
F include the right to live with human dignity and all that goes along with it.
In Francis Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi,
(1981) 2 SCR 516, this Court elaborating the right guaranteed under Article
21 of the Constitution of the India held as under:
"But the question which arises is whether the right to life is
G limited only to protection of limb or faculty or does it go further
and embrace something more. We think that the right to life
includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life such as >---
adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter and facilities for read-
H ing, writing and expression oneself in diverse forms, freely
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 669
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human A
beings. Of course, the magnitude and content of the com-
ponents of this right would depend upon the extent of the
economic development of the country, but it must, in any view
of the matter, include the right to the basic necessities of life
and also the right to l..my on such functions and activi~ies as B·
constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self."
In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 2 SCR
67, this Court held as under:-
"This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article 21 C
derives its life breath from the Directive Principles of State
Policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and
.. --'.
Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include
protection of the health and strength of workers men and
women, and of the tender age of children against abuse, op- D
portunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational
facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity
relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist
in order to enable a person to live with human dignity and no
State - neither the Central Government nor any State Govern- E
ment - has the right to take any action which will deprive a
person of the enjoyment of these basic essential."
- "Right to life" is the cor.ipendious expression for all those rights
which the Courts must enforce because they are basic to the dignified F
enjoyment of life. It extends to the full range of conduct which the in-
dividual is free to pursue. The right to education tlows directly from right
to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity of an individual
cannot be assured unless it is accompanied by the right to education. The
State Government is under an obligation to make endeavour to provide
educational facilities at all levels to its citizens. G
,
The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution
of India including the right to freedom of speech and expression and other
- rights under Article 19 cannot be appreciated and fully enjoyed unless a
citizen is educated and is conscious of his individualistic dignity. H1
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A The "right to education", therefore, is concomitant to the fundamen-
tal rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The State is under
a constitutional-mandate to provide educational institutions at all levels for
the benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must function to the
best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity to acquire education cannot be
confined to the richer section of the society. Increasing demand for medical
B education has led to the opening of large number of medical colleges by
private persons, grvups and trusts with the permission and recognition of
State Governments. The Karnataka State has permitted the opening of
several new medical colleges under various private bodies and organisa-
tions. These institutions are charging capitation fee as a consideration for
c admission. Capitation fee is nothing but a price for selling education. The
concept of "teaching shops" is contrary to the constitutional scheme and is
wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. As back as December
1980 the Indian Medical Association in its 56th All India Medical Con-
-
ference held at Cuttack on December 28-30, 1980 passed the following
D resolutions:
"The 56th All India Medical Conference views with great
concern the attitude of State Governments particularly the
State Government of Karnataka in permitting the opening of
new Medical Colleges under various bodies and organisations
E in utter disregard to the re<".ommendations of Medical Council
of India and urges upon the authorities and the Government
of Karnataka not to permit the opening of any new medical
college, by private bodies.
It further condemns the policy of admission on the basis of
F capitation fees. This commercialisation of medical education
endangers the lowering of standards of medical education and
encourages bad practice."
Dr. K.S. Chugh, Chairman, Department of Medicine and Head
G Department of Nephrology Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education
and Research Chandigarh, recipient of Dr. B.C. Rai National Award as
'eminent medical man for 1991', in his Presidential Address delivered on
January 17, 1992 at the 47th Annual Conference of the Association of )--
Physicians in India held at Patna observed as under:
H "In the recent p~t, there has been a mushroom growth of ..
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 671
~
medical colleges in our country. At the time of independence A
we had 25 medical colleges which turned out less than 2000
graduates every year. At the present time, there are 172 (150
already functioning and 22 are being established) medical col-
leges with an annual turn over of over 20,000 graduates. The
Mudaliar Commission had recommended a doctor-population
ratio of 1 : 3500. We have already achieved a ratio of 1 : 2500.
B
If we take into account. the practitioners of other systems of
~-I medicine who enjoy pay scales and privileges comparable to
those of allopathic doctors, India will soon have a doctor-
population ratio of 1 : 500. Such over production of technical
- man-power from our medical colleges is bound to lead to
unemployment and frustration. Indeed the unabated exodus of
our professional collegues to other countries is a direct conse-
quence of these lop-sided policies .
c
. ~- According to some estimates., India has exported human
D
capital worth over 51 billion d~llars to USA alone during I
1966-88. Currently about 8000 skilled young men and women
are leaving the country every year. It is high time a blanket ban
is imposed on any further expansion of medical colleges in our
country and a well thought out plan to reduce the intake into
_,_\' existing institutions is prepared. This will help to improve the E
standard of medical education and health care in our country.
It is common knowledge that many of the newly started
medical colleges charge huge capitation fees. Besides, most of
these are poorly equipped and provide scanty facilities for F
~-
training of students. At best such institutions can be termed as
"Teaching Shops". Experience has shown that these colleges
admit students who have been unable to gain admission in
recognised medical colleges. The result is a back door entry
into medical training obtained solely by the ability to pay one's
way through. Even the advice of the Medical Council of India G
is sidelined in many such cases. The Government must resist
'~ all pressures to allow· this practice to continue. Admission to
medical colleges bought by paying. capitation fees must be
stopped forthwith and all such existing institutions required to
.... strictly adhere to the Medical Council of India rules. H
) ...
012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.
A In the words of my predecessor Dr. V. Parameshvara, "The
need of the hour is better doctors than more doctors, better
health education than more education, better health care than
more health care delivery."
The Indian Medical Association, the Association of Physicians of
B
India and various other bodies and organisations representing the medical
profession in this country have unanimously condemned the practice of
charging capitation fee as a consideration for admission to the medical
college.
c We hold that every citizen has a 'right to education' under the
Constitution. The State is under an obligation to established educational
institutions to enable the citizens to enjoy the said right. The State may
dis6harge its obligation through state-owned or state-recognised education-
al institutions. When the State Government grants recognition to the
D private educational institut!ons it creates an agency to fulfil its obligation
under the Constitution. The students are given admission to the education-
al institutions - whether state-owned or state- recongnised - in recognition
of their 'right to education' under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee
in consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a patent denial
of a citizen's right to education under the Constitution.
E
Indian civilisation recognises education as one of the pious obliga-
tions of the human society. To establish and administer educational institu-
tions -is considered a religious and charitable object. Education in India has
never been a commodity for sale. Looking at the economic-front, even forty
F five years after achieving independence, thirty per cent of the population
is living below poverty-line and the bulk of the remaining population is
struggling for existence under povert}r-conditions. The preamble promises
and the directive principles are a mandate to the state to eradicate poverty
so that the poor of this country can enjoy the right to life guaranteed under
the Constitution. The state action or inaction which defeats the constitu-
G tional-mandate is per se arbitrary and cannot be sustained. Capitation fee
makes the availability of education beyond the reach of the poor. The state
action in permitting capitati5>n fee to be charged by state-recognised educa-
tional institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution of India. -During the last two decades the horizon of
H equality clause has been widened as a result of this Court's judgments.
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 673
Earlier the violation of Article 14 was judged on the twin tests of classifica- A
tion and nexus. This Court in E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and
Anr.,[1974] 2 SCR 348 gave new dimension to Article 14 in the following
words:
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimen-
sions and it cannot be "cribbed, cabined and confined" within B
traditional and doctrinaire limits. From a positivistic point of
view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law
in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an
absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it C
--- that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitu-
tional law and is therefore violative of Article 14."
This Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621,
Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. 71ie lnt!!mational Airport Authority of India and
Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 1014 and Ajay Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and D
Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79 following E.P. Royappa authoritatbely held that
equality is directly opposed to arbitrariness. In Ajay Basis this Court
observed as under :
"Unfortunately, in the early stages of the evolution of our
constitutional law, Article 14 came to be identified with the E
doctrine of classification ... In Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
-
this Court laid bare a new dimension of Article 14 and pointed
out that that Article has highly activist magnitude and it em-
bodies a guarantee against arbitrariness ....."
F
The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class bias. It enable the
rich to take admission whereas the poor has to withdraw due to financial
inability. A poor student with better merit cannot get admission because
he bas no money whereas the rich can purchase the admission. Such a
treatment is patently unreasonable, unfair and unjust. There is, therefore, G
no escape from the conclusion that charging of capitation fee in considera-
tion of admissions to educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such
infracts Article 14 of the Constitution.
We do not agree with Mr. Hegde that the management has a right
to admit non-meritorious candidates by charging capitation fee as a con- H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992] 3 S.C.R.
A sideration. This practice strikes at the very root of the constitutional
scheme and our educational system. Restricting admission to non-
meritorious candidates belonging to the richer section of society and
denying the same to poor meritorious is wholly arbitrary against the con-
stitutional scheme and as such cannot be legally permitted. Capitation fee
B in atty form cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The only method of
admission to the medical colleges in consonance with the fair play and
,equity is by ways of merit and merit alone. y-
We, therefore, hold and declare that charging of capitation fee by
c
the private educational institutions as a consideration for admission is
wholly illegal and cannot be permitted.
Mr. Santosh Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan learned counsel for
--
respondent 3 and the intervener have relied upon D.P. Joshi v. The State
of Madhya Bharat and Anr., (supra) for the proposition that classification
D of candidates for admission to medical colleges on the basis of residence
is permissible. In D.P. Joshi's case a resident of Delhi was admitted as a
student of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College Indore which was
run by the State of Madhya Bharat. His complaint was that the rules in
force in the said institution discriminated in the matter of fees between
E students who were residents of Madhya Bharat and those who were not,
and that the latter had to pay in addition to the tuition fee and charges
payable by all the students a sum of Rs.1500 per annum as capitation fee
and that the charging of such a fee from the students coming out of Madhya
Bharat was in contravention of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of
F India. In D.P. Joshi's case the only point for decision before this Court was
whether the classification on the ground of residence was justified. This
court while dealing with the question obst!rved as under:
"The impugned rule divides, as already stated, self-nominees
into two groups, those who are bona fide residents of Madhya
G Bharat and those who are not, and while it imposes a capitation
fee on the latter, it exempts the former from the payment
thereof. If thus proceeds on a classification based on residence
within the State, and the only point for decision is whether the .
ground of classification has a fair and substantial relation to
H the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely arbitrary and
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 675
fanciful. A
The object of the classification underlying the impugned
rule was clearly to help to some extent students who are
residents of Madhya Bharat in the prosecution of their studies,
and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and
laudable objective for a State to encourage education within its B
borders. Education is a State subject, and one of the directive
principles declared in Part IV of the Constitution is that the
State should make effective provisions for education within the
limits of its economy. (Vide article 41). The State has to
- contribute for the upl<eep and the running of its educational
instituti?ns. Vf._e are in .this petition concerned with a Medical
College, and it is well-known that it· requires considerable
finance to maintain such an institution. If the State has to spend
C,
money on it, is it unreasonable that it should so order the
educational system that the advantage of it would to some D
extent at least enure for the benefit of the State? A concession
given to the residents of the State in the matter of fees is
obviously calculated to serve that end, as presumably some of
them might, after passing out of the College, settle down as
doctors and serve the needs of the locality. The classification
is thus based on a ground which has a reasonable relation to E'
the subject-matter of the legislation, and is in consequence not
open to attack. It has been held in the State of Punjab v. Ajaib
Singh and Anr., that a classification might validly be made on
a geographical basis. Such a classification would be eminently
just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the F
concern primarily of the State. The contention, therefore, that
the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravention of article
14 must be rejected."
D.P. Joshi's case is an authority for the proposition that classification
on the ground of residence is a justifiable classification under Articles 14 G
and 15(1) of the Constitution of India. The question that capitation fee as
a consideration for admission is not permissible under the. scheme of the
constitution, was neither raised nor adverted to by this Court. The imposi-
tion of capitation fee was also not questioned on the ~ound of arbitrari-
ness. The only question raised before the Court was that the Madhya H '
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A Bharat students could not be exempted from the payment of the capitation
fee. It is settled by thiS Court that classification on the ground of residence
is a valid classification. Subsequently this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain etc. v.
Union of India and Ors. etc., [1984) 3 SCR 942 reiterated the legal position
on this point. We are, therefore, of the view that D.P. Joshi's case does not
give us ary guidance on the points before us.
B
To appreciate the third point it is necessary to notice the relevant
provisions of the Act and the notification. Sections 2(b), (e), 3, 4, and 5 of
the Act are as under:
"2(b). "Capitation fee" means any amount, by whatever name
c called, paid or collected directly or indirectly in excess of the
fee prescribed under section 5, but does not include the deposit
specified under the proviso to section 3.
--
(e) "Government Seats" means such number of seats in such
D educational institution or class or classes of such insti.tutions in
the state as the Government may, from time to time, specify
for being filled up by it in such manner as may be specified by
it by general or special order on the basis of merit and reser-
vation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Clas-
ses and such other categories, as may be specified, by the
E Government from time to time, without the requirement of
payment of capitation fee or cash deposit.
3. Collection of capitation fee prohibited. - Notwithstanding
an}'thing contained in any law for the time being in force, no
capitation fee shall be collected by or on behalf cf any educa-
F
tional institution or by any person who is incharge of or is
responsible for the management of <>uch institution:
Provided ...........
4. Regulation of Admission to educational institutions etc.
G
Subject to such rules, or general or special orders, as may be
made by the Government in this behalf and any other law for
the time being in force.
(1) (a) the minimum qualification for admission to any
H course of study in an educational institution ,shall be such as
IMOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 677
may be specified by - A
(i) the University, in the case of any course study in an educa- !
tional institution maintained by or affiliated to such University:
Provided that the Government may, in the interest of excellence 1
of educati,;m, fix any higher minimum qualification for any B
course of study.
(ii) the Government in the case of other courses of study in
i'. any other educational institution;
(b) the maximum number of students that could be admitted c
to a course of study in an educational institution shall be such 1
as may be fixed by the Government from time to time;
(2)in order to regulate the capitation fee charged or collected 1
during the period specified under the proviso to section 3, the
~
Government may, from time to time, by general or special D
order, specify in respect of each private education~_ institution
or class or classes of such institutions.
(a) the number of seats set apart as Government seats:
{b) the number of seats that may be filled up by the manage- E
"
~
ment of such institution.
(i) from among Karnataka students on the basis of merit, on
payment of such cash deposits refundable after such number
of years, with or without interest as may be specified therein,
F
but without the payment of capitation fee; or
~- (ii) at the discretion:
Provided that such number of seats as may be specified by the
Government but not less than fifty per cent of the total number
G
of seats referred to in clauses (a) and (b) shall be filled from
among Karnataka students.
• Explanation. - For the purpose of this section Karnataka
students means persons who have studied in such educational
institutions in the State of Karnataka run or recognised by the H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A Government and for such number of years as the Government
may specify;
(3) an educational institution required to fill seats in accord-
ance with item (i) of sub-clause (b) of clause (2) shall forin a
· committee to select candidates for such seats. A nominee each
B of the Government and the University to which such educa-
tional institution is affiliated shall be included as members in
such committee.
5. Regulation of fees, etc. - (1) It shall be .-:ompetent for the
Government, by notification, to regulate the tuition fee or any
c other fee or deposit or other amount that may be received or
collected by any
1
educational
.
institution or class of such institu-
tions in respect of any or all class or classes of students.
(2) No educational institution shall collect any fees or amount
D or accept deposits in excess of the amounts notified under
sub-section (1) or permitted under the proviso to section 3.
· (3) Every educational institution shall issue an official receipt
for the fee or capitation fee or deposits or other amount
collected by it.
E
(4) All monies received by any educational institution by way
of fee or capitation fee or deposits or other amount shall be
deposited in the account of the institution, in any Scheduled
Bank and shall be applied and expended for the improvement
of the institution and the development of the educational
F facilities and for such other related purpose and to such extent
and in such manner as may be specified by order by the
Government.
(5) In order to carry out the purposes of sub-section (4), the
Government may require any educational institution to submit
G
their programmes or plans of improvement and dev~lopment
of the institution for the approval of the GovernmenL
The relevant part of the notification dated June 5, 1989 issued by the
Karnataka Government under Section 5 of the Act is reproduced
H hereunder:
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 679'
"In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of, A
Section 5 of the Karnataka educational Institutions (Prohibition
of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984, the Government of Kaniataka '
hereby fix the Tuition Fee and other fees and deposits that may
be collected by the Private Medical Colleges in the State with ·
effect from the academic year 1989-90 and until further orders • B
as follows:
(a) Candidates admitted to seats in Government Medical Col-
leges shall be charged a tuition fee of Rs.2,000 each per ·
annum (Rupees two thousand only);
,C
(b) Candidates admitted against Government seats in Private
Medical Colleges shall be charged a tuition fee of Rs.2,000 '
.... each per annum (Rupees two thousand only). For this '
purpose "Government seats" shall mean Government seats
as defmed by section 2 (e) of the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984; .D
(c) Karnataka Students (other than students admitted against '
Government seats as at (b) above) admitted by Private
Medical Colleges shall be charged tuition fee not exceeding ,
Rs.25,000 each per annum (Rupees Twenty-five thousand
only); 'E
( d) Indian Students from outside Karnataka admitted by
Private Medical Colleges shall be charged tuition fee not ,
exceeding Rs.60,000 each per annum (Rupees Sixty
thousand only);" ,F
The Act has been brought into existence by the Karnataka State ,
--- Legislature with the object of effectively curbing the evil practice of col-
lecting capitation fee for admitting students into the educational institu-
tions in the State of Karnataka. The preamble to the Act which makes the
object clear is reproduced hereunder: G
"An Act to prohibit the collection of capitation fee for admis-
sion to educational institutions in the State of Karnataka and
matters relating thereto;
Whereas the practice of collecting capitation fee for admit- N
.J-
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.
A ting students into educational institutions is widespread in the
State;
And whereas this undesirable practice beside contributing
to large scale commercialisation of education has not been
conducive to the maintenance of educational standards;
B
And whereas it is considered necessary to effectively curb
this evil practice in public interest. by providing for prohibition
of collection of capitation fee and matters relating thereto;
Be it enacted 'by the Karnataka State Legislature in the
c Thirty-fourth Year of the Republic of India as follows:"
Section 3 of the Act prohibits the collection of capitation fee by any
educational institution or by any person who is in charge of or is respon-
sible for the management of such institutions. Contravention of the
D provisions of the Act has been made punishable under Section 7 of the Act
with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but
shall not exceed seven years and with fine which may extend· to five
thousand rupees. Section 5 of the Act authorises the Government to
regulate the tuition fees by way of a notification. The Karnataka Govern-
ment have issued a notification under Section 5(1) of the Act wherein the
E fee charged from Indian students from outside Karnataka has been fixed
not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum. Whether Rs.60,000 per annum can be
considered a tuition fee or it is a capitation fee is the question for our
determination.
The notification fixes Rs.2000 per annum as the tuition fee for
F candidates admitted to the seats in Government medical colleges and for
the candidates admitted against "Government seats" in private . medical
colleges. All these seats are filled purely on the merit of the candidates. It
is thus obvious that the State Government in fulfilling its obligation under
the Constitution to provide medical education to the citizens has ·fixed
G Rs.2000 per annum as tuition fee for the students selected on merit for
admission to the medical colleges and also against "Government seats" in
private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by a student admitted
to the private medical college is only Rs. 2000 per annum. The seats other
than the "Government seats" which are to be filled from outside Karnataka
the management has been given free hand where the criteria of merit is
H not applicable and those who can afford to pay Rs. 60,000 per annum are r
MOHINI JAIN v. STATE OF KARNATAKA [KULDIP SINGH, J.] 681
considered at the discretion of the management. Whatever name one may , A
--"' · give to this type of extraction of money in the name of medical education
it is nothing but the capitation fee. If the State Government fixes Rs.2000
per annum as the tuition fee in government colleges and for "Government
seats" in private medical colleges than it is the state-responsibility to see
that any private college which has been set up with Government permission
and is being run with Government recognition is prohibited from charging B
more than Rs.2000 from any student· who may be resident of any part of '
India. When the State Government permits a private medical college to be
set-up and recognises its curriculum and degrees than the said college is
performing a function which under the constitution has been assigned to
the State Government. We are therefore of the view that Rs.60,000 per C
annum permitted to be charged from Indian students from outside Kar-
- nataka in Para 1(d) of the notification is not tuition fee but in fact a
capitation fee and as such cannot be sustained and is liable to be struck
down. Whatever we have said about para 1(d) is also applicable to Para
l(c) of the notification.
D
Since we have held that what is provided in para l(d) and l(c) of
the impugned notification datP.d June 5, 1989 is capitaion fee and not a
tuition fee it has to be held that the notification is beyond the scope of the
Act rather goes contrary to section 3 of the Act and as such has to be set
aside. We therefore hold and declare that it is not permissible in law for E
any educational institution to charge capitation fee as a consideration for
admission to the said institution.
For the reasons given above we allow this ·.vrit petition and quashed
para l(d) and l(c) of the Karnataka State Government notification dated F
June 5, 1989. As a consequence paragraph 5. of the said notification
automatically becomes redundant. We make it clear that nothing contained
in this judgment shall be applicable to the case of foreign students and
students who are non-resident Indians. We further hold that this judgment
shall be operative prospectively. All those students who have already been G
admitted to the private medical colleges in the State of Karnataka in terms
of the Karnataka State Notification dated June 5, 1989 shall not be entitled
to the advantage of this.judgment and they shall continue their studies on
the same terms and conditions on which they were admitted to the con-
solidated MBBS course. H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.
A Although we have struck down the capitation fee and allowed the
writ petition to that extent, we are not inclined to grant any relief regarding
admission to the petitioner. She was not admitted to the college on merit ~--
and secondly the course commenced in March-April, 1991 and we see no
justification to direct respondent 3 the medical college to admit the
B petitioner. The writ petition is allowed in the above terms with no order as
to costs.
V.P.R. Petition allowed.
-
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