Holding

Once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC on a prima facie basis, the High Court cannot quash the FIR or the charges by invoking Section 482 or by relying on documents outside Sections 239 and 240, except in rare exceptional cases.

Summary

The appellant filed an FIR alleging offences under Sections 406 and 498-A IPC against her husband, his parents and other relatives. The police investigated, filed a charge sheet and the magistrate took cognizance, framed charges under Sections 239 and 240 of the CrPC and fixed a date for recording evidence. Before trial could commence, the accused (except the husband) approached the Punjab & Haryana High Court under its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and the proceedings. The High Court, however, examined affidavits and documents beyond those contemplated in Sections 239 and 240 and quashed the FIR and the charges. The Supreme Court held that once charges are framed on a prima facie basis under Section 240, the High Court cannot use its revisional jurisdiction or Section 482 to quash the FIR or charges, except in rare exceptional circumstances, and it cannot rely on affidavit evidence or documents not referred to in Sections 239/240. The appeals were allowed, the High Court order set aside and the matter remanded for disposal in accordance with law.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court can quash an FIR and charges after a charge sheet has been filed and charges framed, by invoking its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.
Whether the High Court may rely on documents other than those considered under Sections 239 and 240 CrPC in a revisional proceeding.
Whether affidavit evidence can be used by the High Court to determine the commission of an offence at the charge‑framing stage.
Whether the High Court erred in treating the matter as an inquiry into the existence of an offence and the continuance of investigation after cognizance had been taken.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173, s. 239, s. 240, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 406, s. 498

Subjects

Criminal Procedure CodeSection 482Section 239Section 240FIR quashRevisional jurisdictionCharge framingAffidavit evidencePrima facie caseHigh Court powerIndian Penal Code 406Indian Penal Code 498A

Judgment

A MJNAKSHI BALA

SUDHIR KUMAR AND ORS.

MAY 10, 1994

B [S.C. AGRAWAL AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Sections 239, 240 and 48J-Lodging
of FIR-Charges framed on a finding that prima facie case made
out-Revisional Jurisdiction-High Cowt il!fe1fering and quashing FIR relying
c on documents other than those refmed to in Ss.239 and 240-Also dealing
with rival contentions and going into 1ne1its of the case-Held : An1ounts to
usu1ping power of Ilia/ Court and hence not justified.

Appellant lodged a first Information Report alleging commission of
offences under sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, by her
D husband, parents in-law and four other members of her husband's family.
Police registered the case and after investigation charge sheeted all of
them. All the accused except the appellant's husband approached the High
Court for quashing the FIR. In the meantime the trial Court framed
charges and f1Xed a date for recording of Prosecution evidence. However,
E before the evidence could be recorded, the High Court quashed the entire
-proceedings. Hence these appeals.

Allowing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1. The entire approach o~ the High Court in dealing with the
F matter is patently wrong and opposed to settled principles of law. The
petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. was filed in the High Court at a stage
when the police has already submitted charge sheet on completion of
investigation and when the petition came up for hearing a competent Court
had not only taken cognisance thereupon but framed charges also. Inspite
G thereof, the High Court, surprisingly enough, proceeded to deal with the
matter as if it was called upon to decide whether the F.I.R. disclosed any
offence and, for that matter, whether investigation should be permitted to
continue. (1010-F, G]

State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., AIR
H (1982) SC 949, distinguished.
1008
MINAKSHJ v. S. KUM,\IZ I ~1.K. MUKHERJEE. J.] 1009

2. If charges are framed in ;.1ccorclance with Section 240 Cr. P.C. on A
a finding that a p1inia facic case has ht'en made out • as has been done in
the instant case - the person arraigned n1ay, if he feels aggrieved, invoked
the revisional Jurisdiction of the Hig:h Court or the Sessions Court to
contend that the charge sheet submitted under Section 173 Cr. P.C. and
documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had B
committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional Court if
so satisfied can quash the charges frames against him. Once charges are
framed under Section 240 Cr.P.C. the High Court in its revisional juris-
-...- diction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those
referred to in Sections 239 and 240 Cr. P.C.; nor would it be justified in
invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the C
same except in those r~re cases where forensic exigencies and formidable
compulsions justify such a course. Even in such exceptional cases the High
Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and
can be legally translated into relevant evidence.

3. In the instant case, instead of adverting to and confining its D
attention to the documents referred to in Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. the
High Court has dealt with the rival contentions or the parties raised
through their respective affidavits at length and on a threadbare discus-
sion thereof passed the order quashing the FIR. The Course so adopted
cannot be supported because finding regarding commission of an offence E
cannot be recorded on the basis of affidavit evidence, and at the stage of
framing of charge the Court cannot usurp the £unctions of a trial court to
delve into and decide upon the respective merits of the case.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 333-
™~~ F
From the Judgment and Order dated 3.6.92 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in Crl. Misc. No. 8184-M & 14917 of 1991.

Ranjit Kumar for the Appellant.
G
U.R. Lalit, Muni Lal Verma, Seeraj Bagga and Ms. Surestha Bagga
for the Respondents.

The following .J udgmcnt of the Court was delivered by
---.- M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. Special leave granted. Heard the learned H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 3 S.C.R.

A counsel appearing for the parties.
?- ,.
On September 24, 1990 the appellant lodged a first information
report (FIR) with the Ci\11 Lines Police Station, Ludhiana alleging com-
mission of offences under Sections 406 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code
by her Husband, parents-in-law and four other members of her husband's
B family. On that information a case was registered and on completion of
investigation Police submitted charge sheet against all of them on Decem-
ber 31, 1990. Aggrieved thereby all the accused persons, except the
appellant's husband, filed a petition in the Punjab and Haryana High Court ~

on July 14, 1991 seeking exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482
c Cr.P.C. for quashing the F.I.R. and the proceeding arising therefrom. By
the time the petition came up for hearing before the High Court, the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana had taken cognizance upon
the charge sheet and, after hearing the parties, framed charges under
Sections 406 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code against all the accused
persons. As they had pleaded no guilty the Magistrate has also fixed a date
D for recording of prosecution evidence. Before,. however, evidence could be
gone into the High Court took up the pefition for final hearing, along with
another petition which the accused respondents had subsequently filed
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside the charges, and quashed the
entire proceeding including the charges framed against the accused by a
E common order. Hence these two appeals.

Having carefully gone ihrough the impugned order we are con-

•
strained to say that the entire approach of the High Court in dealing with
the matter is patently wrong and opposed to settled principles of law. As
F earlier noticed, the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was filed in the High
Court at a stage when the police had already submitted charge sheet on
completion of investigation and when the petition came up for hearing a
competent Court had not only taken cognisance thereupon but framed
charges also. Inspite thereof,· the High Court, surprisingly enough,
proceeded to deal with the matter as if it was called upon to decide
G whether the F.l.R. disclosed any offence and, for that matter, whether
investigation should be permitted to continue. This will be evident from the
•
following observations made by the High Court.

"The principles relating to the quashing of the F.I.R. at its initial
fl stage were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in
MINAKSHI v. S. KUMAR (M.K. MUKHERJEE. J. J 1011

State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors. AIR A
(1982) SC 949. Their Lordships observed therein that once an
offence is disclosed, an investigation into the offence must neces-
sarily follow in the interest of justice. If, however, no offence is
disclosed, an investigation cannot be permitted, as any investiga-
tion, in the absence of any offence being disclosed, will result in
unnecessary harassment to a party, whose liberty and property may
B
be put to jeopardy for nothing."
, The High Court then quoted in extenso from the judgment ·in
Swapan Kumar Guha's case and laid particular emphasis on the following
passage: c
"If, on the other other harid, the Court on con~ideration of the
relevant materials is satisfied that no offence is disclosed, it will
be the duty of the Court to interfere \vith any investigation and to
stop the same to prevent any kind of uncalled for and unnecessary
D
> harassment to an individual."

To conclude, the materials brought on record clearly showed that the
proceeding impugned before it wa~ an abuse of the process of the Court.

In the case of Swapan Ku1nar Guha this Court was moved at a stage E
when investigation was being carried on and the question for its considera-
tion was as to whether the first information report lodged therein disclosed
an offence under Section 4 read with Section 3 of the Prize Chits and
Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act, 1978 entitling the police to
undertake the investigation. This Court examined that question with refer-
ence to the facts of the case and held that the allegations did not attract F
the provisions of the above Act. The High Court, therefore, was not at all
justified in placing reliance upon the case of Swapan Kun1ar Guha.

Having regard to the fact that the offences, for which charge-sheet
was submitted in the instant case and cognisance taken, were triable as a
warrant case the magistrate was to proceed in accordance with Sections G
239 and 240 of the Code at the time of framing of the charges. Under the
above sections, the Magistrate is first required to consider to police report
and the documents sent with it under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and examine the
accused, if he thinks necessary, and give an opportunity to' the prosecution
and the accused of being heard. Jf o~ such consideration, examination and ll
1012 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 3 S.C.R.

A hearing the Magistrate finds the charge groundless he has to discharge the .. l
accused in terms of section 239 Cr.P.C.; conversely, if he finds that there
is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable
by him he had lo frame a charge in terms of Section 240 Cr.P.C.

If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 Cr.P.C. on a
B finding that a pn·nia facie case has been made out - as has been done in
the instant case - the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke
the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to
contend that the charge sheet submitted under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and
documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had
committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional Court if
c so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him."To put il differently,
once charges are framed under Section 240 Cr.P.C. the High Court in its
revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents
other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 Cr.P.C.; nor would it
be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
D to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and
formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in
such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents
which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant
evidence.

E Apart from the infirmity in the approach of the High Court in dealing
with the matter which we have already noticed, we further find that instead
of adveiting to and confining its attention to the documents referred to in
Section' 239 and 240 Cr.P.C. the High Court has dealt with the rival
contentions of the parties raised through their respective affidavits at
length and on a threadbare discussion thereof passed the impugned order,
F
The Course so adopted cannot be supported; firstly, because finding
regarding commission of an offence cannot be recorded on the basis of
affidavit evidence and secondly, because at the stage of framing of charge
the Court cannot usurp the functions of a trial Court to delve into and
decide upon the respective merits of the case.
G
On the conclusions as above we allow these appeals, set aside the
impugned order and remand the matter to the High Court to dispose of
the petitions of the accused respondent in accordance with law and in the
light of the observation made hereinbefore.

G.N. Appeals allowed.