Holding

An appeal under Section 19 is limited to orders punishing contempt; directions on the merits in a contempt proceeding are not appealable under Section 19 but are appealable as a Letters Patent intra‑court appeal, and the Single Judge’s directions for reinstatement, arrears and revocation of suspension were beyond jurisdiction and were set aside.

Summary

The employee Chunilal Nanda was suspended by Midnapore Peoples' Co‑op. Bank Ltd. and challenged the suspension through multiple writ petitions. The High Court, in contempt proceedings, ordered his reinstatement, payment of arrears and the revocation of his suspension, and also directed the removal of the appointed Enquiry Officer. The Bank appealed, arguing that the Single Judge had exceeded jurisdiction by deciding merits of the dispute in a contempt proceeding and that the order was not appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 19 permits appeal only against orders imposing punishment for contempt, and that the Single Judge's directions on merits were not punishments and therefore not appealable under Section 19. However, such interlocutory orders affecting vital rights are appealable as intra‑court appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court's contempt order and allowed the Bank's appeal, deleting the reinstatement and arrears directions, and dismissed the related Special Leave Petitions as infructuous.

Issues considered

Whether an order rendered in contempt proceedings that decides the merits of a dispute is appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and if not, what remedy is available to the aggrieved party.
Whether an intra‑court appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against an interlocutory order of a Single Judge that finally determines rights and obligations.
Whether a contempt proceeding can validly direct reinstatement of a suspended employee, payment of salary arrears, revocation of suspension, and replacement of the Enquiry Officer.

Legislation cited

Subjects

contempt of courtSection 19Letters Patent appealintra‑court appealreinstatementsuspension revocationdisciplinary enquirycooperative bankjurisdictioncontempt proceedings

Judgment

A MIDNAPORE PEOPLES' CO-OP. BANK LTD. AND ORS.
v.
CHUNILAL NANDA AND ORS.

MAY 25, 2006

B [B.P. SINGH AND R.V. RAVEENDRAN. JJ.]

Service Law:

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 19/Limitation Act, 1963;
c Section 5:

Employee-Suspension-Enquiry Proceedings-Challenge to-Single
Judge of High Court ordered denovo enquiry-Delay in completion of
enquiry-Filing of contempt petition by the employee-Single Judge of the
High Court directing the employer-Bank to reinstate the suspended employee
D and to pay arrears of salary-Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
the Letters Patent Appeal and also application for condonation of delay-
On appeal, Held: Appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt Act lies only
against the order of High Court imposing punishment for contempt--:fn a
contempt proceeding, it is not appropriate to decide any issue on merits-
E Single Judge of the High Court erred in issuing directions for reinstating
the employee and payment of arrears in a contempt proceeding-The order
ofSingle Judge was appealable in Terms ofClause 15 ofthe Letters Patent-
Moreover, there was no disobedience/breach/negligence on the part of the
employer to provoke the Court to issue such directions-Hence set aside-
F Constitution of India, !950-Article 136.

Practice and Procedure:

Filing of appeal-Aggrieved persons-Since the Chairman and the
Secretary were representatives of the Bank and directions were issued to
G them, they were the persons aggrieved and, therefore, could file an appeal
against such directions.

Letters Patent; Clause 15: In what circumstances. Letters Patent
Appeal is maintainable against Interlocutory Order--Held: Though orrf,e,r of
H the Single Judge is interlocutory as it finally decided a collateral is{;ue,
986
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA 987

Letters Patent Appeal could be filed against such order-Code of Civil A
Procedure, 1908 Section 2(9) Order 43 Rule I.

The questions which arose for consideration in these appei:ls for
determination by this Court were:

(i) whether the order passed by High Court in a contempt
proceedings by rendering a decision on the merits of a dispute between
the parties, either by an interlocutory order or final judgment, is
appealable under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, If not,
what is the remedy of the person aggrieved;
c
(ii) whether an inter-court appeal lies against the Interlocutory
orders passed by a Single Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent;

(iii) whether the Court, in a co,ntempt proceeding initiated by a
delinquent employee against the Enquiry Officer as also the Chairman
and Secretary in-charge of the employer-Bank, complaining of
D
disobedience of an order directing completion of the enquiry in a time
bound schedule could direct (a) that the employer shall reinstate the
employee forthwith; (b) that the employee shall not be prevented from
discharging his duties in any manner; (c) that the employee shall be paid
all arrears of salary; (d) that the Enquiry Officer shall cease to be the E
Enquiry Officer and the employer shall appoint a fresh Enquiry Officer,
and (e) that the suspension shall be deemed to have been revoked.

Allowing Civil Appeal No. 1727 of 2002 and dismissing SLP (C)
Nos. 13045-46 of 2003 as infructuous, the Court F

HELD: I.I. An appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts
Act is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court
passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. (1000-B)

1.2. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, G
nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping
the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the
contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the Act. In special
circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the
Constitution. (1000-C) H
988 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 1.3. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide •
whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what
should be the punishment. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate
to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute
between the parties. [1000-D[

B 1.4. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on
the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise
of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable
under section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where
such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with
C the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under
section 19 of the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably
connected directions. [1000-E-FI

1.5. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or
makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the
D parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without
remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if
the order was of a Single Judge and there is a provision for an intra-
court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136
of the Constitution of India (in other cases). The issue regarding
appealability of order of the High Court in the Contempt proceeding
E is answered accordingly. [1000-G-HI

Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice <Jatikrushna Misra, AIR (1974) SC
2255; Purushotum Dass Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon, AIR (1978) SC 1014,
Union of India v. Mario Cabral e Su, AIR (1982) SC 691, D.N. Taneja v.
Bhajan Lal, [1988) 3 SCC 26, State of ,'.faharashtra v. Muhboob S.
F
Allibhoy, [19961 4 SCC 411 and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, [19961
6 sec 291, relied on.

2.1. The term 'judgment' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters
Patent will take into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section
G 2(9) CPC and orders enumerated in Order 43 Rule I of CPC, but also
other orders which, though may not finally and conclusively determine
the rights of parties with regard to all or any matters in controve.-sy,
may have finality in regard to some collateral matter, which will affect
the vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties. Interlocutory
orders which finally decide a question/issue in controversy in the main
H
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA 989
.. case, orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly A
affects the said decision in the main case, and orders wich finally decide
a collateral issue or question which is not the subject matter of the main
case, are therefore, 'judgments' for the purpose of filing appeals under
the Letters Patent. On the other hand, routine orders and orders which
do not finally determine the question/issue are not 'judgments' for the
purpose of filing appeals provided under the Letters Patent. B
(1004-A-B-C]

Shah Babula/ Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kanta & Anr., AIR (1981) SC
1786; Central Mine Planning and Design Institution Ltd v. Union of India,
[20011 2 SCC 588; Mithaila/ Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Deveram Kini, C
[20031 10 SCC 691 and Subal Paul v. Malina Paul, [2003) 10 SCC 361,
relied on.

2.2. The Division Bench of the High Court committed a serious and
obvious error in holding that the appeal was not maintainable under
clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Though the order of the Single Judge D
by which several directions to the Bank with reference to first Respondent

-
were issued, is not a final 'judgment', it is an 'interlocutory judgment'
which finally decides several rights and obligations of the employee
vis-a-vis the employer and therefore, appealable under clause 15 of the
Letters Patent. (1004-G-H)
E
2.3. Proceedings having been impleaded eo nomine as respondents
1and4 respectively. The 'Bank' as such was not a party to the contempt
proceedings. The single Judge proceeded on the basis that the Chairman
and the Secretary-in-Charge represented the 'Bank' by referring to
them as 'Respondent Bank' and directing them to reinstate the
F
complainant and to pay all salary arrears to him. If the Chairman and
Secretary-in-Charge were considered as representing the Bank for
issuing such directions, certainly they could file an appeal against such
directions. The directions were issued to them and they were the persons
aggrieved. (1004-C-FJ
G
3.1. As Enquiry officer was not a party to the writ petition, and
as he did not conduct the enquiry, there was no question of his
disobeying any order. After perusing the records, the court came to.the
conclusion that a prima facie case was made out for issuing show cause
notice only against the present Enquiry Officer. This mean that no case
H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A was made out for issue of show cause notice to the Chairman and
Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank. In fact, it was not the case of the first
respondent that after the appointment of the Enquiry Officer, there was
any disobedience by the Bank. In the circumstances, the court ought to
have proceeded to consider whether there was any wilful disobedience
of the order of the High Court, on the part of the Enquiry Officer, and
B if so, punish him for contempt. As he was nowhere circumstances, the
court ought to have proceeded to consider whether there was any wilful
disobedience of the order of the High Court, on the part of the Enquiry
Officer, and if so, punish him for contempt. As he was nowhere in the
picture when the order was passed in the writ petition, and as he was
C appointed as an independent Enquiry Officer only by subsequent order
and as there was a complaint about the non-cooperation by the first
respondent, (delinquent employee), it is doubtful whether there was any
case for even issuing a show cause notice to him. (1005-D-E-F-G]

3.2. The Single Judge could not have made an order in the
D contempt proceedings, that the Enquiry Officer, by his conduct,
disqiralified himself to be the Enquiry Officer and that he shall cease

-
to be the Enquiry Officer and that another Enquiry Officer shall be
appointed. [1005-H, 1006-A)

3.3. There was also no justification for the further direction by the
E Single Judge in the contempt proceedings, that too by an interlocutory
order, that the complainant should immediately and forthwith be
reinstated into the service of the Bank, aud shall be deemed to be in the
service of the Bank all through, that the employee shall not be prevented
in any manner from discharging his duties and that he shall be paid all
F arrears of salary, and that the suspension order shall be deemed to have
been revoked and amounted to adjudication of rights and liabilities not
in issue in the contempt proceedings. At all events, on the facts and
circumstances, there was no disobedience, breach or neglect on the part
of the Bank and its President and Secretary, to provoke the court to
issue such directions, even assuming that such directions could be issued
G in the course of the contempt proceedings. Hence such directions of
Single Judge and the direction relating to revocation of suspension are
set aside. (1006-B-C-D)

4. Since the Enquiry Officer has completed the enquiry and
H submitted his report, and no action has b,.en taken thereon in view of
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] 991

the pendency of this civil appeal and the interim order dated 25.2.2002 A
passed earlier, the Bank is at liberty to take further action in pursuance
of the Inquiry Report in accordance with law. (1006-F-G]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1727 of
2002.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.2001 of the High Court of
Calcutta in F.M.A.T. No. 4975/1998.

WITH

SLP (C) Nos. 13045-46/2003. c
Kailash Vasdev, Sr. Adv., Parijat Sinha, Snehasish Mukherjee, S.C.
Ghosh and Satish Vig, Advs., with him for the Appellants.

Alok Kumar, Vikas Mahajan and R.C. Kohli, Advs., for the Respondents.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RA VEEN ORAN, J. : This civil appeal by special leave is against the
judgment dated 26.2.2001 in M.A.T. No.4075 of 1998 passed by the High
Court of Calcutta. E
2. The first respondent was working as Secretary of the Midnapore
Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd. [Appellant No. I herein, for short the 'Bank'].
Appellants 2 and 3 are respectively the Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge
of the first appellant bank. The first respondent was kept under suspension
pending initiation of disciplinary proceedings, in pursuance of a resolution F
of the Board of Directors of the Bank dated 16.4.1994. The respondent filed
a writ petition [C.O. No. 8789(W) of 1995] challenging the suspension, inter
alia on the ground that charge-sheet had not been issued. On 27.6.1995, the
said writ petition was disposed of recording the submission that the bank was
issuing a charge-sheet. The Bank was directed to deliver a copy of the G
charge-sheet and pay the arrears of subsistence allowance within one week.
The first respondent was directed to file his written statement within I 0 days.
The Enquiry Officer was directed to conclude the enquiry within a period
of three months from the date of communication of the order subject to first
respondent rendering full cooperation for the conduct of the disciplinary
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A proceedings.

3. A charge-sheet dated I. 7.1995 was issued to the first respondent
containing nine charges. The first Respondent filed his written statement on
17. 7.1995. The Enquiry Officer completed the enquiry and submitted his
report dated 14.9.1995 finding the first respondent guilty of all charges. A
B copy of the said report was furnished to the first respondent under cover of
bank's letter dated 25.9.1995 giving him an opportunity to submit his
representation.

4. At that stage, the first respondent filed another writ petition [CO No.
c 20008 (W) of 1995] before the High Court for quashing the enquiry
proceedings alleging bias against the Enquiry Officer (Asit Mahapatra). A
learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court allowed the said writ petition
by order dated 9.4.1997 in the following manner :

(i) The enquiry proceedings and the consequential action taken
D by the Bank were set aside.

(ii) The Chainnan of the Bank was directed to appoint someone
who is not a member of the Bank's Board of Directors as
Enquiry Officer by requesting the Registrar, Cooperative
E Societies to nominate a suitable officer preferably of the rank
of Asst. Registrar of Cooperative Societies, to be the Enquiry
Officer. A time bound schedule was indicated for appointment
of the Enquiry Officer.

(iii) The Enquiry Officer to be so appointed was required to
F
conduct enquiry de novo by observing all the principles of
natural justice and the applicable rules and regulations and
submit his report within four months from the date of first
sitting subject to first respondent fully cooperating in the
...
enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority was directed to take
G suitable action on the basis of such Report.

(iv) The Bank was directed to pay proper subsistence allowance
to the first respondent during the period of suspension.

H 5. On the Bank· s request, the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] 993

·- Societies, Midnapore-I appointed Sri H. K. Maiti, Cooperative Development A
Officer, as Enquiry Officer on 9.5. I 997. Subsequently, the Assistant Registrar
by communication dated 3.10.1997 revoked the appointment of Sri H.K.
Maiti as Enquiry Officer being of the view that the tenor of the order of the
High Court did not permit the appointment of Sri H.K. Maiti who was only
a Development Officer, as the Enquiry Officer. Thereafter, the Bank wrote
to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies on 24.10.1997 to nominate
B
an officer of the rank of an Assistant Registrar for being appointed as
Enquiry Officer. In view of the delay, the Bank also approached the High
Court for suitable extension of time. On 19.12.1997, the court extended the
time for appointment of Enquiry Officer by two weeks. By order dated
5.1.1998, the Registrar nominated Sri S. K. Das, Assistant Registrar of Co- c
operative Societies, Midnapore-1, for being appointed as the Enquiry Officer.
He was accordingly appointed as the Enquiry Officer. He started a fresh
enquiry.

6. As the enquiry was not completed within four months from the date D
of first sitting, the first respondent moved a contempt application [CPAN
2233of1997]. The Chairman of the Bank, the Enquiry Officer (S. K. Das),
the previous Enquiry Officer (Sri H. K. Maiti) and the Secretary-in-Charge
of the Bank were impleaded eo nomine as respondents I to 4 in the said
contempt petition. The learned Single Judge summoned the enquiry records E
from the Enquiry Officer. On perusing the records, he was of the view that
the Enquiry Officer had not proceeded with due diligence. Therefore, the
learned Single Judge made an order dated 20.1I.I998, the operative portion
of which is extracted below :

"!. Let a Rule be issued against the respondent no.2 Sri S. K. Das, F
Assistant Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Midnapore I, (charging
him?) with committing contempt of this Court (and?) for directing
him to show cause as to why he should not be punished for
committing contempt. The Respondent no. 2 shall remain present
personally on all the dates of hearing in this Court. He shall file his G
affidavit in opposition within two weeks from today.

2. Since the respondent no. 2 has by his conduct, disqualified
himself to be the Enquiry Officer, I direct that he shall cease to be
the Enquiry Officer. It shall be open to the respondents, however, H
A
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

in the light of the aforesaid two orders of the Court, to appoint any
. '

other person as the Enquiry Officer and to proceed with the matter
om e again in the light of the aforesaid directions.

3. f"hc petitioner shall immediatdy and forthwith be reinstated in
the service of the respondent Bank and shall deemed to be in their
B service all through. He shall not be prevented in any manner from
discharging his duties and shall be paid all arrears of salary within
four weeks from today

Let the contempt application appear two weeks hence. The suspension
c order shall be immediately deemed to have been revoked."

7. Feeling aggriev.:d, respondents I and 4 in the contempt petition
(Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank) filed M.A.T. No.4075 of
1998. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the said appeal as not
maintainable by th..: impugned judgment dated 26.2.200 I. on the following
D
two grounds :

(i) The order of the learned Single Judge did not punish any
contemnor. Therefore, the appeal could not be entertained
under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 which
E provided for appeals only against orders punishing a contemnor.

(ii) The appeal did not satisfy the requirements of clause 15 of the
Letters Patent, and. therefore, could not be entertained as a
Letters Patent Appeal.
F
While so dismissing the appeal, the Division Bench directed the appellants
therein to forthwith implement the order of the learned Single Judge. The
said judgment is challenged in this civil appeal by special leave. This Court,
while granting leaw on 25 .2.2002, stayed the operation of the order dated
26.2.2001 in M.A.T. No.4075 of 1998, as also the further proceedings in the
G contempt petition (CPA No.2233'1997) with a i;ondition that the Enquiry
Officer appointed in pursuance of the order dated 9 .4. I 997 shall complete
the enquiry within six months.

8. In view of the observations of the Division Bench that the appeal
H by the Chainnan and St:cretary-in-Charge eo nomine was not maintainable,
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN,J.] 995
•·
and to avoid any technical objections, the Bank and its Board of Directors A
tiled M.A.T. No.I 102 of 2001 on 4.4.2001 challenging the order dated
20.11.1998 along with an application for condonation of delay. A Division
Bench of the High Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay
by merely stating that the delay of 728 days had not been properly explained,
and consequently dismissed the appeal. The said order dismissing the
application under section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 and consequently,
B
dismissing the appeal, is challenged in SLP(C) Nos.13045-46 of 2003.

9. On the aforesaid facts and the contentions urged, the following
questions arise for consideration :

(i) Where the High Court, in a contempt proceedings, renders a
c
decision on the merits of a dispute between the parties, either
by an interlocutory order or final judgment, whether it is
appealable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971 ? If not, what is the remedy of the person aggrieved ?
D
(ii) Where such a decision on merits, is rendered by an interlocutory
order of a learned Single Judge, whether an intra-court appeal
is available under clause 15 of the Letters Patent ?

(iii) In a contempt proceeding initiated by a delinquent employee
(against the Enquiry Officer as also the Chairman and Secretary E
in-charge of the employer-Bank), complaining of disobedience
of an order directing completion of the enquiry in a time bound
schedule, whether the court can direct (a) that the employer
shall reinstate the employee forthwith; (b) that the employee
shall not be prevented from discharging his duties in any F
manner; (c) that the employee shall be paid all arrears of
salary; (d) that the Enquiry Officer shall cease to be the
Enquiry Officer and the employer shall appoint a fresh
Enquiry Officer; and (e) that the suspension shall be deemed
to have been revoked ?
G
Re : Point No. (i) :

10. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ['CC Act' for short]
provides for appeals. Relevant portion of sub-section (I) thereof is extracted
below:
H
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
•
A (I) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision
of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for
contempt-

(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to
a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court:
B
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the
Supreme Court:

The scope of Section 19 has been considered by this Court in Baradakanta
Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, AIR (1974) SC 2255, Purushotam
c Dass Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon, AIR (1978) SC 1014, Union of India v.
Mario Cabral e Sa AIR (1982) SC 691, D.N Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, [1988]
3 SCC 26, State of Maharashtra v. Mahboob S. Allibhoy, [ 1996] 4 SCC 411
and J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar, [1996] 6 SCC 291. These cases dea!t
with orders refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or initiating contempt
proceedings or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor or dropping the
D proceedings for contempt. Jn all these cases, it was held that an appeal was
not maintainable under section 19 of CC Act as the said Section only
provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt.

l 0.1. In Baradakanta Mishra, a three Judge Bench of this Court held
that an order declining to initiate a proceeding for contempt amounts to
E
refusal to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and
therefore, such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The question as to whether an
appeal would be maintainable under section 19 where the court initiates a
proceeding for contempt but after due consideration and hearing finds the
F alleged contemnor not guilty of contempt, or having found him guilty
declines to punish him, was left open.
•
I 0.2. In Purushotam Dass Goel (supra), certain aspects of Section 19
were left open. This relevant portion is extracted below :

G The (contempt) proceeding is initiated under Section 17 by issuance
of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders
passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be
the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court
as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the
High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides
H
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] 997

•· some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the A
right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a proceeding for
contempt by the issuance of the notice on the primafacie view that
the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide
any question ... It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an
exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this
Court under Section 19. A final order, surely, will be appealable.
B

If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before
the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground
of its being barred under Section 20 of the Act but the High Court
holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal c
would lie to this Court under Section 19 from such an order
although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court.
We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such
. an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an
~ample to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage
in the proceeding may be appealable under Section 19."
D

I0.3. While Baradakanda Mishra and Purushotam Das left open the
question whether an appeal under section 19 would be maintainable in
certain areas, in D. N. Taneja (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
categorically held that appeals under section 19 would lie only against the E
orders punishing the contemnor for contempt and not any other order passed
in contempt proceedings. We extract below the relevant portions from the
said decision :

"The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (I) of
F
Section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed
in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt.... When
the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged
contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or
power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court
is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, G
it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction
or power as conferred on it by Article 21 5 of the Constitution.

It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged
contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the court hears the parties H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, •
examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting
or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the
contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for
contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should
act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment
B
for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High
Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction
or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution.

The aggrieved party under section 19( I) can only be the contemnor
c \\<ho has been punished for contempt of court."

[Emphasis supplied]

l 0.4. In Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), this Court reiterated the above
O position thus :

"On a plain reading Section· 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as
of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, ifthe High
Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any
E person for contempt of court, then only an appeal shall be
maintainable under sub-section (I) of Section 19 of the Act. As sub-
section ( 1) of Section l 9 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right
from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been
provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the
F High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings.
The words 'any order' has to be read with the expression 'decision'
used in said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise
of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 'Any order' is not
independent of the expression 'decision'. They have been put in an
G alternative form saying 'order' or 'decision'. In either case, it must
be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression 'any
order' is read independently of the "decision" then an appeal shall
lie under sub-section (I) of Section I9 even against any interlocutory
order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which
shall lead to a ridiculous result."
H
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, .I.] 999

• I· I 0.5. J. S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (supra) is nearest to this case, on facts. A
A contempt petition was filed alleging that the seniority list drawn pursuant
to the order of the High Court was not in conformity with the said order.
The High Court found it to be so, but held that the disobedience was not
willful and, therefore, did not punish for contempt. But the High Court gav~
a direction to redraw the seniority list. The State Government challenged the
said direction in an intra court appeal. The Division Bench held that the
B
appeal was not maintainable under section 19 of the CC Act, but was
maintainable as an intra-court appeal as the direction issued by the single
Judge would be a "judgment" within the meaning of that expression in
section 18 of Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Accordingly, the Division
Bench set aside the direction of the learned Single Judge to re-do the list. c
The said order was challenged before this Court. This Court confirmed the
decision of the Division Bench and held as follows :

"Therefore, an appeal would lie under section 19 when an order in
exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the
contemnor has been passed. In this case, the finding was that
D
the respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So there
is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the orders
of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal under section 19 would
not lie.
E
The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the
contempt proceedings to find out, whether it is in confonnity with-
the directions issued by the earlier Ben.ches. It is seen that once there
is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions
issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of act on to F
seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of
the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may
not be in confonnity with the directions. But that would be a
fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the
opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be
the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial G
review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned
single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other
words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider
the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be
permissible ... " H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals ·• ,
against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus :

I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an
order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction
to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for
B contempt.

II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt,
nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping
the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the
c contemnor, is appealable under Section 19 of the CC Act. In special
circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the
Constitution.

III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide
whether any contempt of court has been committed, and if so, what
D should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a
proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue
relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties.

IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on
E the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise
of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable
under section 19 of CC Act. The only exception is where such direction
or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order
punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of
F the Act, can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected
directions.

V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or
makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the
parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without
G remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-court appeal (if
the order was of a learned Single Judge and there is a provision for an
intra-court appeal), or by seeking special leave :o appeal under Article
136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases).

H The first point is answered accordingly.
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] 1001

Re : Point No. (ii) : A
12. We will next consider as to whether an intra-court appeal under
clause 15 of the Letters Patent was available against the interlocutory order
dated 20.11.1998 containing the directions on merits of the dispute. Clause
15 of the Letters Patent provides for an appeal from a 'judgment' ofa single
Judge in exercise of original jurisdiction, to a Division Bench. In Shah
B
Babula/ Khimjiv. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr., AIR (1981) SC 1786, the scope
of clause 15 of the Letters Patent was considered. This Court held :

"The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil
Procedure seems to be rather narrow and the limitations engrafted c
by sub-section (2) of section 2 cannot be physically imported into
the definition of the word 'judgment' as used in Cl. 15 of the Letters
Patent because the Letters Patent has advisedly not used the term
'order' or 'decree' anywhere. The intention, therefore, of the givers
of the Letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' should receive D
a much wider and more liberal interpretation than the word
'judgment' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time,
it cannot be said that any order passed by a trial Judge would
.. amount to a judgment; otherwise there will be no end to the number
of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent It E
seems to us that the word 'judgment' has undoubtedly a concept
of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense. In other words,
a judgment can be of three kinds - (1) A final Judgment ...... (2)
A preliminary Judgment ....... (3) Intermediary or interlocutory
judgment - Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the
quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a) to (w) of Order F
43, Rule 1 and have already been held by us to be judgments within
the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There

-· may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order
43, Rule l but which also possess the characteristics and trappings -
of finality in that, the orders may adversely affect a valuable right G
of the party or decide an important aspect of the trial in an ancillary
proceedings. Before such an order can be a judgment the adverse
effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather
than indirect or remote ... in other words every interlocutory order
cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders would be H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and
valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to
the party concerned."

" ....... any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial
Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience
B or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated
as a judgment, otherwise the appellate court (Division Bench) will
be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial
Judge ........ the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must
contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order
c decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or
in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings."

14. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent of Patna High Court (corresponding
to clause 15 of Letters Patent of Calcutta High Court) was considered by this
D Court in Central Mine Planning and Design Institute Ltd v. Union of India,
[200 I] 2 SCC 588. In that case, the award of an Industrial Tribunal directing
reinstatement and payment of partial backwages was challenged in a writ
petition before the High Court of Patna. The workman claimed interim relief
under section 17-B of the Industrial Dispt•tes Act, 1947. The learned Single
....
Judge directed the employer to pay full wages to the workman during the
E
pendency of the writ petition. That was challenged in a Letters Patent Appeal.
The Division Bench held that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable
as the order directing payment under section 17-B of the I.D. Act was
not a 'judgment'. Reversing the said decision, this Court held that an
interlocutory order passed in a writ proceeding directing payment under
F section I 7B of Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 was a final determination
affecting the vital and valuable rights and obligations of parties and,
therefore, would fall under the category of 'intermediary or interlocutory
judgment' against which a Letters Patent Appeal would lie. The following
observations are relevant :
·-
G
"It is now well settled that the definition of "judgment" in section
2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application to Letters
Patent ........................... , it follows that to determine the question
whether an interlocutory order passed by one Judge of a High Court
falls within the meaning of 'judgment' for purposes of Letters
H
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RAVEENDRAN, J.] I 003

Patent the test is : Whether the order is a final determination A
affecting vital and valuable rights and obligations of the parties
concerned, This has to be ascertained on the facts of each case."

15. The above principle was reiterated in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh
v. Annabai Devram Kini, [2003] 10 SCC 691 andSubal Paulv. Malina Paul,
B
[2003] 10 SCC 361. In the latter case, this Court held :

"While determining the question as regards clause 15 of the Letters .
Patent, the court is required to see as to whether the order sought
to be appealed against is a judgment within the meaning thereof or
not. Once it is held that irrespective of the nature of the order, c
meaning thereby whether interlocutory or final, a judgment has
been rendered, clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be attracted .
...Clause 15 of the Letters Patent confers a right of appeal on a
litigant against any judgment passed under any Act unless the same
is expressly excluded. Clause 15 may be subject to an Act but when D
it is not so subject to the special provision the power and jurisdiction
of the High Court under clause 15 to entertain any appeal from a
judgment would be effective."
...
16. Interim orders/interlocutory orders passed during the pendency of E
a case, fall under one or the other of the following categories :

(i) Orders which finally decide a question or issue in controversy in
the main case.

(ii) Orders which finally decide an issue which materially and directly F
affects the final decision in the main case.
'•
(iii) Orders which fi~ally decide a collateral issue or question which
is not the subject matter of the main case.
G
(iv) Routine orders which are passed to facilitate the progress of the
case till its culmination in the final judgment.

(v) Orders which may cause some inconvenience or some prejudice
to a party, but which do not finally determine the rights and H

..
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A obligations of the parties.

The tenn 'judgment' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent will take
into its fold not only the judgments as defined in section 2(9) CPC and orders
enumerated in Order 43 Rule I of CPC, but also other orders which, though
may not finally and conclusively detennine the rights of parties with regard
B
to all or any matters in controversy, may have finality in regard to some
collateral matter, which will affect the vital and valuable rights and obligations
of the parties. Interlocutory orders which fall under categories (i) to (iii)
above, are, therefore, 'judgments' for the purpose of filing appeals under the
Letters Patent. On the other hand, orders falling under categories. (iv) and
c (v) are not 'judgments' for purpose of filing appeals provided under the
Letters Patent.

17. The next question is whether the appeal was not maintainable
because, it was filed by the Chainnan and the Secretary-in-Charge of the
D Bank eo nomine, and not by the "Bank" itself. The order dated 20.11.1998
against which the appeal was filed, was passed by the learned single Judge
in the course of contempt proceedings. The Chainnan and the Secretary-in-
Charge were parties to such proceedings having been impleaded eo nomine
as respondents I and 4 respectively. The 'Bank' as such was not a party to
the contempt proceedings. The lear!Jed single Judge proceeded on the basis
E
that the Chainnan and the Secretary-in-Charge represented the 'Bank' by
referring to them as 'Respondent Bank' and directing them to reinstate the
complainant (first respondent herein) and to pay all salary arrears to him.
If the Chainnan and Secretary-in-Charge were considered as representing the
Bank for issuing such directions, certainly they could file an appeal against
F such directions. The directions were issued to them and they were the persons
aggrieved.

18. The Division Bench, therefore, committed a serious and obvious
error in holding that the appeal [MAT 4075/1998) was not maintainable
G under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Though the order of the learned Single
Judge dated 20.11.1998, by which several directions to the Bank with
reference to first Respondent were issued, is not a final 'judgment', it is an
'interlocutory judgment' which finally decides several rights and obligations
of the employee vis-a-vis the employer and therefore, appealable under
H clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

..
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RAVEENDRAN, J.] l 005

Re : Point No. (iii) : A
19. As noticed above, by order dated 9.4.1997 in C.O. No.200008(W)/
1995, the first inquiry proceedings were set aside and the Chairman of the
Bank was directed to appoint an outsider, preferably an officer from the Co-
operative Department, as the Enquiry Officer, with a further direction that
such Enquiry Officer should conduct the enquiry de novo, and submit the
B
report within four months (from the date of first sitting), and a direction to
the first respondent to fully co-operate in the enquiry. The time stipulated
for appointment of the Enquiry Officer was extended by two weeks on
19.12.1997. The new Enquiry Officer was appointed by the Registrar of Co-
operative Societies, on 5.1.1998. The inquiry was not completed within four c
months and that led to the initiation of the contempt proceedings by the
employee (first respondent). The Chairman of the Bank, the Enquiry Officer;
the previous Enquiry Officer (H. K. Maiti, whose appointment was revoked
on 3.10.1997) and the Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank were shown as
contemnors/respondents I to 4. As H.K. Maiti was not a party to the writ D
petition, and as he did not conduct the enquiry, there was no question of his
disobeying any order. After perusing the records, the court by order dated
20.11.1998 came to the conclusion that aprimafacie case was made out for
""
issuing a show cause notice only against Sri S.K. Das (Enquiry Officer). This
meant that no case was made out for issue of show cause notice to the
E
Chairman and Secretary-in-Charge of the Bank. In fact, it was not the case
of the first respondent that after the appointment of S.K. Das as Enquiry
Officer, there was any disobedience by the Bank.

20. In the circumstances, the court ought to have proceeded to consider
whether there was any wilful disobedience of the order dated 9.4.1997, on F
I the part of S K Das and if so, punish him for contempt. As S.K. Das was
·nowhere in the picture when the order dated 9.4.1997 was passed in the writ
petition, and as he was appointed as an independent Enquiry Officer only
by an order dated 5.1.1988 and as there was a complaint about the non-
cooperation by the first respondent, (delinquent employee), it is doubtful G
whether there was any case for even issuing a show cause notice to him. Be
that as it may. We are not concerned with the issue of show cause notice
to S.K. Das in this appeal. What is relevant to be noticed is that the learned
Single Judge could not have made an order in the contempt proceedings, that
Sri S.K. Das had, by his conduct, disqualified himself to be the Enquiry H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Officer and that he shall cease to be the Enquiry Officer and that another
Enquiry Officer shall be appointed.

21. There was also no justification for the further direction by the
learned Single Judge in the contempt proceedings, that too by an interlocutory
order, that the complainant should immediately and forthwith be reinstated
B into the service of the Bank, and shall be deemed to be in the service of the
Bank all through, that the employee shall not be prevented in any manner
from discharging his duties and that he shall be paid all arrears of salary
within four weeks, and that the suspension order shall be deemed to have
been revoked. These were totally outside the scope of the proceedings for
c contempt and amounted to adjudication of rights and liabilities not in issue
in the contempt proceedings. At all events, on the facts and circumstances,
there was no disobedience, breach or neglect on the part of the Bank and
its President and Secretary, to provoke the court to issue such directions, even
assuming that such directions could be issued in the course of the contempt
proceedings. Hence, directions (2) and (3) and the direction relating to
D
revocation of suspension are liable to be set aside.

Re : SLP (c) Nos. 13045-4612003

22. These SLPs. arise out of the order dated 3.9.2001 in MAT No. 1102/
E 200 I filed by the Bank against the order dated 20.11.1998 in CPAN No.
2237/1997. As we have held that the appeal filed by the Chairman and
Secretary on behalf of the Bank [MAT No. 4075/1998] against the said order
was maintainable, these SLPs. have become infructuous.

Conclusion :
F
23. During the pendency of this appeal, the Enquiry Officer has
completed the enquiry and submitted his report dated 18.7.2002. No action
has been taken thereon in view of the pendency of this civil appeal and the
interim order dated 25.2.2002 which permitted only the completion of the
G enquiry. In view of this decision, there will now be no impediment for the
Bank to take further action based on such Inquiry Report.

24. In view of the above, we dispose of these matters as follows :

(i) CA No. 1727/2002 is allowed. The order dated 26.2.2001 or the
H Calcutta High Court in MATNo.4075/1998 is set aside. Directions
MIDNAPORE PEOPLE' CO-OP. BANK LTD. v. C. NANDA [RA VEENDRAN, J.] J007

(2) and (3) as also the direction that "the suspension shall be A
immediately deemed to have been revoked" contained in the order
dated 20.11.1998 of the learned Single Judge passed in CPAN
No.2233/1997 (arising from C.O. No. 20008(W) of 1995) are
deleted.

(ii) SLP (C) Nos. 13045-46/2003 are dismissed as infructuous.
B

(iii) The appellant-Bank is at liberty to take further action in pursuance
of the Inquiry Report dated 18. 7.2002, in accordance with law.

(iv) Parties to bear their respective costs. c
S.K.S. C.A. No. 1727/02 allowed and
SLP(c) Nos. 13045-46/2003
dismissed as infructuous.