MEHMOODA GULSHANversusJAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO

                             (2017] l S.C.R. 692



A                        MEHMOODA GULSHAN
                                      v.
                      JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO
                    (Civil Appeal Nos. 1398-1399of2011)
B                           rEBRUARY17,2017
         [KURIAN JOSEPH AND A.M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
          Rent Control and Eviction:
            Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop Rent Control Act. 1966 -
c   s. 11 (J)(h) - Eviction - Requirement of landlord for own
    .occupation - It could mean occupation by member of a family - On
     facts, eviction petition by landlord seeking tenanted premises for
    his son - Trial court allowed the petition holding the need for
    premises as genuine, however High Court held the requirement of
     own occupation not est~blished for non-examination of the son,
D
     for whose benefit, eviction was sought - Held: Requirement of
     landlord for own occupation could mean occupation by member of
     a family - Mere non-examination of family member who intends to
     do business cannot be taken as a ground/or repelling the reasonable
     requirement of the landlord - Son, being unemployed and
E    undereducated, landlord able to establish that business was the
     available option and tenanted premises was the only space
     available - Thus, genuine need for the premises established -
     Landlord having established reasonable requirement of tenanted
     premises for own occupation, order passed by the trial court restored,
     and that of the High Court set aside.
F
          Allowing the appeals, the Court
           HELD: 1.1 It has clearly come in evidence of the appellant
     that her one son is unemployed and in view of unemployment, he
     was frustrated. The appellant's husba1;d had contracted second
a    marriage and he had deserted the appellant. The appellant herself
     was unemployed with no source of income. The appellant, hence,
     prayed that the property be returned to her so that her son can
     look after the family. In cross-examination, she denied the
    .suggestion that the son was doing business with his father. It had
     also been stated further that "except the premises and the
H
                                     692
 MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                             693


residential house, the plaintiff has uo other property". The trial      A
court· meticulously analyzed and appreciated the reasonable
requirement of the premises for the business to be managed by
the son of the appellant especially in her peculiar family
circumstances. The. trial court appreciated the evidence in the
right perspective and held tba·t it is not mere desire but genuine
                                                                        B
need. The finding of the trial court was challenged mainly on the
ground that the son, for whose benefit the eviction is sought, Was
not examined. The main ground on which the appellant was non-
suited in the first appeal and the intra-court appeal is that the
appella~t failed to establish her reasonable requirement for own
occupation. [Paras 12, 13] [700-E-ll; 701-A]                             c
       1.2 Mere non-examination of the family member who
intends to do the business cannot be taken as a ground for
repelling the reasonable requirement of the landlord. The question
whether there is a reasonable requirement by the landlord of the
premises, would depend on .whether the landlord has been able           D
to establish a ·genuine element of need for the premises. What is
a genuine need would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Merely because the landlord has not examined the
member of the family who intends to do business in the premises,
he caunot be non-suited in case he has otherwise established a
genuine need. The need is a matter of appreciation of evidence,          E
and once there is· no perversity in the appreciation of evidence
on the need, the said finding of fact cannot be reopened. The
eviction is not sought on the last limb of section ll(l)(h) of the
Act namely, "for the occupation of any person for whose benefit
the house or shop is held". The premises sought to be evicted is         F
not held for the benefit of the son alone; but the whole family. It
is for the own occupation of the landlord. It has been established
in the facts of this case that the landlord was not happy and content
with the paltry rent received from the premises. The landlord
intended to· engage her son in the business at the premises. It is
for the landlord to decide as to the best use the premises should        G
be put to. There is nothing wrong on the part of a landlord in
making plans for .a· better living by doing business engaging her
son. Having regard to the background of the son who is
unempIQyed and u·nde·reducated, the appellant was able to
establish that business was the available option and the tenanted       H
694           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] 1 S.C.R.



A     premises was the only space available. Thus, the genuine need
      for the premises has been established. Unfortunately, the High
      Court has missed these crucial aspects. [Paras 14, 21] [701-B-
      C; 705-E-H; 706-A]
        . 1.4 The appellant having established a reasonable
B     requirement of the tenanted premises for own occupation, is
      entitled to succeed. The judgment of the Single Judge in the first
      appeal and confirmed in the intra-court appeal by the Division
      Bench, is set aside. The judgment and decree of the trial court is
      restored. The respondent is granted a period of three months to
      surrender vacant possession. [Para 22) [706-B-C]
c
            Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by
            Lrs. and others (1979) 1 SCC 273 : 1979 (2) SCR 1;
            Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC
            397 : 2002 (3) SCR 1078; Ajit Singh and another v. Jit
            Ram and another (2008) 9 SCC 699 : 2008 (13) SCR
D           555; C. Karunkaran(dead) by Lrs. v. T. Meenakshi 2005
            (13) SCC 99; Gu/raj Singh Grewal v. Dr. Harbans
            Singh and ano.ther (1993) 2 SCC 68 : 1993 (1) SCR
            149 - referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
E
      1979 (2) SCR 1                 referred to             Para 15
      2!102 (3) SCR 1078             referred to             Para 17
      2008 (13) SCR 555              referred to             Para 18
      2005 (l~) SCC 99               referred to             Para 19
F     1993 (1.) SCR 149              referred to             Para 20
            CIVILAPPI;'.LLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1398-
      1399 of2011.
            From the Judgment and Order dated 23 .10.2009 of the High Court
      of Jam mu and Kashmir at Srinagar in LPA No. 175 of2009 & CMPNo.
G     275 of2009.
           V. Giri, Sr. Adv., Deepak Prakash, Ms. Saumiya Sinha, Vishal
      Somany, Raneev Dahiya, (For Jogy Scaria), Advs. for the Appellant.
           Ms. Diksha Rai, Ms. Kanika Saran, Sagar Yaish, Advs. for the
      Respondent.                                          ·
H
  MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                                    695



      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 A
       KURIAN, J, I. Whether the requirement of the landlord forown
occupation could also mean occupation by a member of the family, in
this case, the son, is the short question arising for consideration.
       2. Appellant filed Civil Suit No. 42 of2000 seeking eviction of the
respondent from the premises let out to him on 15.11.1997 for a period          B
of eleven months. The said tenancy was verbally extended for a further
period of eleven months though it was the contention of the respondent
that the said extension was for eleven years. Since, the premises was
not vacated after the extended period of eleven months, the suit was
filed for eviction.                                                              c
      3. Besides the ground on expiry of the period, it was the case of
the appellant that the premises was required for her own use. To quote
from paragraph-5 of the plaint:
      "5,        xxx       xxx       xxx        xxx       xxx
                                                                                 D
            i. That the plaintiff has been deserted by her husband namely
            : Ch. Mohd Khatai who has arranged 2"' marriage in the state
            of Bangalore, leaving behind the plaintiff and two sons namely
            Shujat Huyder aged 27 years unemployed and Waseem Hyder
            aged 15 years, presently reading in 9'h class.
                                                                                 E
            ii. That the plaintiff has no source ofincome after the desertion
            by her husband and elder sons being of 27 years o!d is still
            unemployed because of the fact, that the son of the plaintiff
            namely Shujat Hyder is simply a matriculate.
            iii. That the plaintiff being a house lady and intends to use the
                                                                                 F
            rental premises by observing his elder son to start his own
            business as such the plaintiff requires the rental premises for
            her son who can support the family in the long run.
            iv. That the plaintiff has no other source of income except to
            use the rental premises by observing her elder son for starting
            his own business in the rental premises..                            G

            v. That the son of the plaintiff cannot claim any Govt. service
            because of the fact he is simply a matriculate and he is at the
            verge of crossing the age limit.
            vi. That the plaintiff cannot absorb her son in any private         H
696            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [20 I 7] I S.C.R.


A              institution, he only alternative is to start his business in the rental
               premises.
               vii. That the plaintiff requires the rental property for her personal
               use, enabling her elder son to establish the business therein.
               viii. That the plaintiff has a liability of her sons, as such requires
B              the rented prope11y for establishing own business therein."
            4. The following issues were framed by the trial court:
            "I . Whether the defendant was bound to hand over the possession
                of the suit premises to the plaintiff after the period of tenancy
c                was over on 13. 11.1999? OPP.
            2. Whether the plaintiff requires the suit premises for her
               unemployed son? ... OPP
            3. Whether the plaintiff has rented the premises for period of 11
               years, as such is stopped from claiming the eviction before the
D              stipulated period? ... OPD
            4. What is the comparative advantage and disadvantage of the
               parties? ... OPP/OPD
            5. Whether the requirement of the plaintiff will be satisfi'ld by
               partially affecting the defendant from suit premises? ... OPD
E
            6. To what relief the plaintiff is entitled to?"
             5. Since we are concerned mainly with the requirement on the
      ground of own occupation, we confine references only to the consideration
      of issues 2 and 4.
 F          "Issue No.2: With regard to issue no.2 whether the plaintiff require
            the premises for her unemployed son.
            There is ample evidence on the file lead by the plaintiff as well as
            admitted in cross examination by the defendant that the husband
            of plaintiff has married with a Hindu girl at Cochin and he is
G           residing with his second wife there. The plaintiff has two sons
            both of them are idle. The elder one.being of the aged of about 30
            years is not doing any work and that way is idle. It is also on the
            record that he is not qualified so that he may aspire for any
            government job nor has it been proved by the defendant that he i~
            associated with the business of his father at Kochin. Every parent
 H
MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                                697
               [KURIAN, J.]

  has a cherished desire to get his or her ward settled in some job          A
  so that he can have a sustenance in his life. The plaintiff dc~s not
  possess any commercial building other than the suit premises
  where her son could start any business for his sustenance. Though
  it is settled law on the subject that there is a difference between
  desire and requirement. Requirement means when objectively seen
                                                                             B
  there must be the necessity with the party to require the premises
  for his own use. It is not a sheer desire only whether the landlord
  may show his intent to occupy the premises. So there is a difference
  between the two situations and while differentiating the two
  situations the evidences on the file is sufficient to prove that the
  son of the plaintiff is in his 30s and is still idle. In these hard times, c
  the family requirements cannot be met by mere rent ofRs.5000/-
  which defendant is paying. So in the given c.ircumstances, it has ·
  been proved by the plaintiff thatplaintiff requires the suit premises
  for her unemployed son. The defendant has though tried to
  controvert this position but have not been able to convince the
                                                                             D
  court that the son of the plaintiff is in any manner associated with
  the business of his fathernt·Cochin. So this issue is also decided
  in favour·ofthe plaintiff.
  Issue No.4: With regard tci is~ue no.4 of comparative advantage
  arid disadvantage of the parties, the law on the subject is very
  clear that we have to take into account while comparing the               E
  advantages and disadvantages ofthe respective parties the interests
  of the person for whose benefit the house and shop is held whether
  he being landlord or the tenant. The explanation to clause (h) of
  the J&K Houses and Shop Rent Control Act contains specific
  provisions regarding the weighing and measuring the relative              F
  hardship which may be caused to the tenant or landlord in case of
  granting or refusing a decree for .eviction. The principle of law
  enacted with the expansion is to the effect that the law will lean in
  favour ·of the person to whom the greater inconvenience and
  hardship is caused and would grant-the relief to the landlord only
  whe~ his hardships are likely to exceed the hardships which may           G
  be caused to the tenant. Thus, the question of comparative
  advantage and disadvantage has an important bearing on \he
  question of granting or refusing the relief. The question of balance
  of convenience or .principle of comparative advantage and
  disadvantage will come up only when the court is satisfied that           H
             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2017] l S.C.R.


A         the premises are reasonably required by the landlord or any person
          for whose behalf the house or shop is held. But before this i~ to be
          decided, the court has to find and determine two things i.e. I)
          reasonable requirements of the landlord or the person for whose
          benefit the house or shop is held; II) ce>mparative advantage and
          disadvantage of the landlord or any person and the tenant and
B
          these two ingredients must coexist. So what is to be seen while
          comparing these two aspects, we have to consider the reasonable
          requirement of the landlord or ejectment of his tenant. The question
          of requirement always differs from case to case depending on
          the facts of its own. While comparing advantages and
c         disadvantages of the parties, we have to apply our mind objectively
          firstly to this aspect whether requirement of the landlord is real
          and is only not a desire, but there is some compulsion that he
          requires the premises for his own use.and it is also to be seen
          whether by eviction the defendant may not be put to such a
          disadvantage in which he cannot be compensated. So, the need
D
          of the landlord must be pressing one and real. Applying this test to
          the facts of the instant case and taking stock of the evidence
          recorded by the defendant as well as by the plaintiff, it !s not
          disputed. It is also in the evidence that the landlords is not having
          any source of income other than the rent received through Rent
E         controller and naturally speaking the amount of Rs.5000/- per
          month is so paltry amount in these hard times when every item of
          the day to day needs is so costly that hardly she cannot sustain
          her family. Thus in the given situation it is the landlord whose
          need is more pressing and real an is put to disadvantage in
          comparison to the disadvantage which would be caused to the
F
          defendant by eviction. because the machinery installed c:m be
          removed with much case and he can get on rent any other
          alternative premises in the vicinity and that will not put to jeopardy
          the interests of the defendant. Therefore, the comparative
          advantage and disadvantage is also in favour of the landlord.
G         Hence, this issue is also decided in favour of the plai!lfiff,"
           6. Issue No. 5, on partial eviction, was also answered in favour of
    the plaintiff. Thus, by judgment dated 12.12.2007, the suit was decreed.
         7. Aggrieved, the respondent filed Civil FfrstAppeal No. 228 of
    2007 before the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir at Srinagar. The
H
 MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                               699
                [KURIAN, J.]

learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 04.08.2009, allowed the appeal.   A
According to the learned Single Judge:
      "From the pleadings it would appear that the premises is
      required for the son of the respondent. The responden~'s
      case before the trial court was that her son was unemployed
     .and that the suit premise was required for him. The trial            B
      Court, as noticed above, found that the respondent has two
      sons both of them are alive. The elder one of the age of 30
      years, is not doing any work and that way is idle. The trial
      Court has further found that the son of the respondent is
      not qualified so that he may aspire for any government job.
      On going through the evidence it would, however, appear              c
      that the findings are based on either the statement of the
      plaintiff or her witnesses. The best witness in these
      circumstances, to depose on the personal requirement was
      the son of the respondent himself but he has not been
      examined as witness before the trial Court. No explanation           D
      has been given for his non examination."
      8. It was also held that:
      "There is nothing in the statement of the respondent which
      could even indirectly suggest the nature of the business that
      her son intends to carry on this property, his resources to          E
      carry on the business and his aptitude and physical strength
      and other facts requisite for such a purpose. Thus the
      evidence is so vague that no reliance can be placed on it.
      Reasonable requirement is a question of law but whether
      the landlord has, in a suit for eviction under Section 11 (h)        F
      of the J&K Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, proved it
      or not is essentially a question of fact. Onus to prove is on
      the plaintiff. While judging the requirement of a landlord
      (or the person for whose use the shop is required), the court
      has to take into account a variety of factors such as the
                                                                           G
      social status of the concerned person, the standard of his
      living, his habits, his comforts, the state of his health, the
      number of his family members, the nature of business he
      intends to start and the suitability of the property for such
      business, the resources he has got to run the business and
                                                                          H
700              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2017] l S.C.R.


A            the like. If the very person who needs the shop for his use
             is reluctant to appear before the Court, the Court would not
             extend any help to him and would not grant any relief in his
             favour."
              9. Aggrieved, the appellant filed intra-court appeal as Letters
B     Patent Appeal No. 175 of2009 leading to the impugned judgment dated
      23. l 0.2009. The Division Bench concurred with the learned Single Judge
      and held .that the appellant has failed to prove that the premises was
      required for own occupation, and hence, the appeal.
            I 0. Heard Mr. V. Giri, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the·
c     appellant and Ms. Diksha Rai, learned Counsel appearing for the
      respondent.
             11. Section 11 (I )(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shop
      Rent Control Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is the
      relevant provision:
D            "Section ll(l)(h)" ... wherethehouseorshopisreasonably
             required by the landlord either for the purposes of building ·
             orre-building, orfor his own occupation or forthe occupation
             of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held;"
              12. The main ground on which the appellant was non-suited in the
E     first appeal and the intra-court appeal is that the appellant has failed to
      establish her reasonable requirement for .own occupation. Having not
      examined the son who intends to do the business, according to the High
      Court, the requirement of own occupation was not established.
               13. We fail to understand the approach made by the High Court.
F       It has clearly come in evidence of the appellant that her one son is
        unemployed and in view of unemployment, he was frustrated. The
        appellant's husband had contracted second marriage and he had de~erted
       the appellant. The appellant herself was unemployed with no source of
        income. The appellant, hence, prayed that the property be retumed to
      . her so that her son can look after the family. In cross-examination, she
G     'denied the suggestion that the son was doing business with his father. It
        had also been Stated further that "except the premises and the residential
        house, the plaintiff has no other property". The trial court has meti.culously
        analyzed and appreciated the reasonable requirement of the premises
        for the business to be managed by the son of the appellant especially in
H
       MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                                  701
                      [KURIAN, J.]

     her peculiar family circumstances. In our view, trial court has appreciated    A
     the evidence in the right perspective and held that it is not mere desire
     but genuine need. The finding of the trial court was challenged mainly
     on the ground that the son, for whose benefit the eviction is sought, has
     not been examined.
            14. Mere non-examination of the family member who intends to           B
     do the business cannot be taken as a ground for repelling the reasonable
     requirement of the landlord. Under the Act, the landlord needs to establish
     only a reasonable requirement. No doubt, it is not a simple desire. It
     must be a genuine need. Whether the requirement is based on a desire
     or need, will depend on the facts of each case.
                                                                                    c
           15. In Bega Begum and others v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead)
     by Lrs. and others', this Court has taken the view that the requirement
     only connotes an element of genuine need. To quote from paragraph-13:
            "13. Moreover, Section l l(h) of the Act use.s the worJs
            "reasonable requirement" which undoubtedly postulate that               D
            there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere
            desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need
            should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even
            the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court
            has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of
            the term "need" or "requirement" should not be artificially             E
            extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained
            as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for tile
            landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would
            defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility
            of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified          F
            grounds. This appears to us to be the general sch.eme of all
            the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the count')'.
            This Court has considered the import of the word
'i          "requirement" and pointed out that it merely connotes that
            there should be an element of need."
                                                                                    G
            16. Bega Begum (supra) has also considered the scope and ambit
     of the expression "reasonable requirement" at paragraph-17:
            "17. This brings us to the next limb of the argument of the
            learned Counsel for the respondents regarding the
      1 (1979) 1sec213
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702      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               (2017] I S.C.R.


A     interpretation of Section 11 (I )(h) of the Act. Section 11 (I )(h)
      of the Act runs thus:
         "I l(l)(h ... where the house or shop is reasonably
         required by the landlord either for purposes of building
         or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the
B        occupation of any person for whose benefit the house
         or shop is held;
            Explanation.-The Court in determining the
       reasonableness of requirement for purposes of building or
       rebuilding shall have regard to the comparative public
c      benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing
      'ac'commodation, and in determining reasonableness of
       requirement'for occupation shall have regard to the
       comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or
       the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held
       and of the tenant."
D
      It was submitted by \kAndley, leanied Counsel for the
      responden'ts that the words used in Section I l(l)(h) are
      "that the house should be required by the landlord for his
      own 'occupation or for the occupation of any person for
      whose benefit the house or shop is held". It was argued
E     that the words "own occupation" clearly postulate that the
      landlord must require it for his personal residence and not
      for starting any business in the house. We are, however,
      unable to agree with this argument. The provision is meant
      for the benefit of the landlord and, therefore, it must be so
F     construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word
      "occupation" does not exclude the possibility of the landlord
      starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also
      would amount to personal occupation by the landlord. In
      our opinion, the section contemplates the actual possession
      of the landlord, whether for his own residence or for his
G     business. It is manifest that even ifthe landlord is running a
      hotel in the house~ he is undoubtedly in possession or
      occupation of the house' in the legal sense of the term.
      Furthermore, the section is wide enough to include the
      necessity of not only the landlord but also of the persons
H     who are living with him as members of the same family."
  MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                                       703
                 [KURIAN, J.]

       17. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal', after extensively              A
referring to all the decisions of this Court and some other High Courts, it
was held that in interpreting "own use", the court should adopt a practical
and meaningfui· approach guided by realities oflife. The guidelines are
being summarized at paragraph-33:
          "33. Our conclusions are crystallised as under:                           B
          (i) The words "for his own.use" as occurring in Section 13(3)(aXii)
          of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, I 949 must receive
          a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow
          con'struction.
          (ii) The expression - landlord requires for "his .own use", is not        c
    ·.t
          confined in its meaning to actuar physical user by the landlord
          personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but
          also of the normal "emanations" of the landlord is included therein.
          All the cases and circumstances in which actual :>hysical
          occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation            D
          or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively
          enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as
          interr~iationship and interdependence- economi~· ci~ otherwise,
          between the landlo,rd and such person in the background of social,
          socio~reiigious and loc~l customs and obligations of the society or
          region to which they belong.                                              E
          (iii) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded
          and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own
          requirement; and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the
          circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a
          person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord            F
          as "his own" occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn,
          depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationshi;> and/or
          dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as
          "his own" and the person who would actually use the premises;
          (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward;      G
          and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being
          satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as
          distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold
          the landlord's claim.

 '(2002) 5 sec 397                                                                  H
704            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2017] I S.C.R.


A           (iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall ac!opt a
            practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.
            (v) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit
            premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the
            requirement oflandlord "for his own use" within the meaning of
B           Section 13(3)(a)(ii)."
             18. J9ginder Pal (supra) was followed in many subsequent
      decisions and one close to the dispute in the instant case is Aiit Singh
      and another v. Jit Ram and another'. It has been held at paragraph-
      19:
c           "19. From the aforesaid decision of this Court (in Joginder Pal
            case), it is therefore clear that this Court has laid Jown
            authoritatively that a non-residential premises, if required by a
            son for user by him would cover the requirement of the words
            used in the section i.e. "for his own use" in reference to a landlord.
D              "
             19. In C. Karunkaran (dead) by Lrs. v. T. Meenakshi', one
      issue which arose for consideration was whether non-examination of
      the person for whose need the building was required was fatal. It was
      held that "mere non-examination ofthe person for whose need the building
E     was required by itself was no ground to non-suitt.he landlady". To quote:
            " ... Mere non-examination of the person for whose need the
            building was required by itself was no ground to non-suit the
            landlady. In a number of decisions, [this fact is acknowledged by
            the first appellate court also], it has been held that it is not necessary
F           to examine the person for whose need the premises are required.
            It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case .... ".
            20. In Gulraj Singh Grewal v. Dr. Harbans Singh and another',
      this Court had an occasion to see whether a landlord can be non-suited
      on the ground of non-examination of the son for whose benefit the
      premises is sought to be vacated. This Court held that in case the need
G
      has otherwise been established in evidence, the non-examination is not
      material. At the best, it is only a matter of appreciation of evidence. To
      the extent relevant, paragraph-8 reads as follows:
      '(2008J 9 sec 699
      'Civil Appeal No. 2773 of2002 decided on 06.10.2005
H     '<1993) 2 sec 68
  MEHMOODA GULSHAN v. JAVAID HUSSAIN MUNGLOO                                       705
                 [KURIAN, J.]

       "8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the personal           A
       need found proved is only of respondent 2, son of respondent 1,
       who did not enter the witness-box and, as stated in an ~ftidavit
       filed in this Court, even he is carrying on his profession at a place
       about 25 kms. away from Ludhiana, in our opinion, this finding of
       fact is unassailable. The High Court has clearly observed that no
                                                                                   B
       meaningful argument could be advanced on behalfofthe appellant
       to challenge this finding of the appellate authority. Respondent 1
       who is the father of respondent 2, has supported and proved the
       need of respondent 2, who also is a landlord. The fact that for
       want of suitable accommodation in the city of Ludhiana,
       respondent 2 is at present carrying on his profession at some                c
       distance from Ludhiana is not sufficient to negative the landlord's
       need. In these circumstances, the non-examination ofrespondent
       2 also, when respondent 1 has examined himself and proved the
       need of the landlord, is immaterial and, at best, a matter relating
       only to appreciation of evidence, on which ground this finding of
                                                                                    D
       fact cannot be reopened ....."
          21. Thus, the question is whether there is a reasonable requirement
  by the landlord of the premises. This would depend on whether the
  landlord has been able to establish a genuine element of need for the
  premises. What is a genuine need would depend on the facts and
  circumstances of each case. Merely because the landlord" has not                  E
  examined the member of the family who intends to do business in the
  premises, he camlot be non-suited in case he has otherwise established
. a genuine need. The need is a matter of appreciation of evidence, and
  once there is no perversity in the appreciation of evidence on the need,
  the said finding of fact cannot be reopened. It may be crucially relevant         F
  to note that the eviction is not sought on the last limb of Section 11 (I )(h)
  of the Act namely, "for the occupation of any person for whose benefit
  the house or sl10p is held". The premises sought to be evicted is not held
  for the benefit of the son alone; but the whole family. It is for the own
  occupation of the landlord. It has been established in the facts of this
  case that the landlord was not happy and content with the paltry rent             G
  received from the premises. The landlord intended to engage her son in
  the business at the premises. It is for the landlord to decide as to the best
  use the premises should be put to. There is nothing wrong on the part of
   a landlord in making plans for a better living by doing business engaging
  her son. Having regard to the background of the son who is unemployed             H
706                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     (2017] I S.C.R.


A     and undereducated, the appellant was able to establish that business
      was the available option and the tenanted premises was the only space
      available. Thus, the genuine need for the premises has been established.
      Unfortunately, the High Court has missed these crucial aspects.
            22. The appellant having established a reasonable requirement of
B     the tenanted premises for own occupation, is entitled to succeed.
      Therefore, the appeals are allowed. The judgment of the learned Single
      Judge in the first appeal and confirmed in the intra-court appeal by the
      Division Bench, which is impugned in these appeals, is set aside. The
      judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The respondent is
      granted a period of three months to 'surrender vacant possession.
c
              23. There shall be no order as to costs.

      Nidhi Jain                                                Appeals allowed.




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