MEGHMALA & ORS.versusG. NARASIMHA REDDY & ORS.

                     [2010) 10 S.C.R. 47


                     MEGHMALA & ORS.                              A
                               v.
              G. NARASIMHA REDDY & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal Nos.6656-57 of 2010)
                  AUGUST 16, 2010
            ,,      "          (/'
     [P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

     Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982:

       Suit land purchased by appellant/applicant by way of a c
 registered sale deed - Challenge not made by anyone as to
 the validity of the sale deed - In earlier proceedings,
 respondents claiming right ·over suit land - However, not
 producing any document to show their right, interest or title in
 the suit land - Order attaining finality to the effect that there D
 was no misrepresentation or fraud or suppression of material
 fact on the part of the app,ellant in respect of his claim over
 suit land - Fresh proceedings by respondents raising issue
'of fraud - Held: Wou°Jd be tantamount to malicious
 prosecution as the issue had earlier been adjudicated upon
 - Finding of facts. was recorded in earlier proceedings that the E
 appellant was in actual possession of land and was illegally
 dispossessed by the respondents - Land grabbing.

     s.10 - Allegation of land grabbing - Burden to prove
 innocence - Held: Is on the accused - It is not like any other F
 criminal case where accused is presumed to be innocent
 unless the· guilt is proved - Criminal law - Burden of proof .

      Review: Review application - Maintainability of - Held:
 In case a review application is filed before filing the special G
 /eave· petition and the review application remains pending till
 the dismissal of the special leave petition; then the review
 application deserves to be considered - However, if a review
 application is filed subsequent to dismissal of the special
                               47                                 H
    48      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   leave petition, the process of filing review application would
    amount to abuse of process of the court and such an
    application is not maintainable - Administration of justice -
    Abuse of process of law.

         Judgment/order: Obtained by playing fraud on court -
B
    Validity of - Held: An act of fraud on court is always viewed
    seriously - Order obtained by making misrepresentation or
    playing fraud upon the competent authority not valid in the
    eyes of law - Fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles
    and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or
C   saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including
    res judicata -:- Equity - Fraud on couff.

       The suit land was purchased by the appellant/
  applicant by way of registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980.
D The appellant filed a complaint under the Andhra Pradesh
  Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 against the
  respondents stating that they grabbed his land and
  raised construction. thereon. The plea raised by the
  respondents was that in respect of the suit land, there
E was an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976, in favour of a
  Society which had allotted the land in their favour,
  therefore, the vendors of the appellant had no right to·
  transfer the land in favour of the appellant. The Special
  Court by order dated 4.11.1997 held that the appellant
F was  the owner of the suit land and that the respondents
  were land grabbers. The respondents filed a writ petition
  before the High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter
  the respondents filed special leave petition before this
  Court 'which was dismissed as withdrawn giving liberty
G to the. respondents to file review petition before the High
  Court. The respondents filed a review petition before the
  High Court which was dismissed. Thereafter, in
  pursuance of the order in execution proceedings passed .
  on 7.11.2002, the appellant was put into possession of

H
   MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &               49
                    ORS.
the suit land on 16.12.2002. The respondents filed writ A
petitions challenging the order dated 7 .11.2002 which
were dismissed by the High Court by order dated
17.12.2002. The review petitions filed thereagainst before
the High Court, were also dismissed.
                                                            B
     In 2005, the respondents filed a review applic·ation
before the Special Court seeking review of the order
dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed the
applications before the Special Court for fresh
declaration that they were the owners. The Special Court
dismissed the said applications. The High Court allowed C
the writ petitions filed by the respondents and directed
the Special Court to decide the applications afresh on
merits, as in the opinion of the High Court, the
applications required certain inquiry on factual matters
and the claim of the respondents could not have been D
rejected merely on the determination and attaining finality
of orders in earlier proceedings. The instant appeals were
filed challenging the order of the High Court.

     Allowing the appeals, the Court                          E
      HELD: 1.1. In case a litigant files a review application
  before filing the special leave petition before this Court
  and it remains pending till the special leave petition
  stands dismissed, the review application deserves to be
  considered. However, if a review application is filed F
  subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition, the·
· process of filing review application amounts to abuse of
  process of the court. Filing of such a review application
  by the respondents at a belated stage amounts to abuse
  of process of the court and such an application is not G
  maintainable. Thus, the High Court ought not to have
  entertained the writ petition against the order of dismissal
  of the review application by the Special Court and the
  order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set
  aside. [Para 17-18] [66-D-G]                                 H
    50       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   1
     r   Mis .• Kabari Pvt Ltd. v. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR .1996
    SC 742;. State of Maharashtra·& Anr. v. Prabhakar Bhikaji
    Ingle AIR 1996 SC 3069; Raj Kumar Sharma v. Un«:Jn of India
    (1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust
    v. Swami Prakasananda & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; .K. Ajit
B   Babu & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473;
    Gopabandhu Biswal v. Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR
    1998 SC 1872; Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K.
    Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486; Kunhayammed
    & Ors. .v. State of Kera/a & Anr. AIR 2000 SC 2587; National
c   Housing Coop. Society Ltd. v. State of ·Rajasthan & Ors:
    (2005) 12 SCC 149; K. Rajamou/i v. A. V.K.N. Swamy AIR
    2001SC2316; Mis. Green View Tea & Industries v. Collector,
    Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738; Kumaran Silk
    Trade (P) Ltd. .v. Devendra AIR 2007 SC 1185, relied on.

D      2.1. The applications filed by the respondents before
  the Special Court for fresh declaration that they were the
  ·owners, were based on the ground's that the earlier
   udgment and order were obtained by the appellant/
  .ipplicant suppressing the material facts and the suit land
E was not identified properly. However, the respondents
  had never been able to show as to under what
  circumstances they were interested· in the suit land
  because before the Special Court in the first round, they
  failed to show any document that land had ever been
F transferred by the tenure-holders/owners in favour of the
  Society or the Society had made any allotment in their
  favour or they were members of the said Society or they
  obtained any sanction from statutory authority to raise
  the construction. [Paras 19, 30] [66-G-H; 70-8-C]
G
        2.2. It is settled proposition of law that where an
    applicant gets an order/office by making at
    misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent
    authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of

H
   MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &              51
                    ORS.
  law. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design A
  to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The
. expression "fraud" involves two. elements, deceit and
  injury to the person deceived. It is a way of cheating
  inten~ed to get an advantage. An act of fraud on court is
  always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a
  a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a
  property would render the transaction void ab initio.
  Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a
  given case deception may not amount to· fraud, fraud is
  an anathema to all equitable principles and any affair c
  tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the
  application of any equitable doctrine including res
 judicata. Even in judicial proceedings, once a fraud is
  proved, all advantages gained by playing fraud can be
  taken away. In such an eventuality, the questions of non- D
  executing of the statutory remedies or statutory bars like
  doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression. of
  any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the
  court. Every court has an inherent power to recall its own
  order obtained by fraud, as the order so obtained is non
  est. [Paras 20, 25, 26, 27, 2B] [67-B; 68-D-E; G-H; 69-A-F] E
     S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853; Lazarus Estate Ltd.
v. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349; Andhra Pradesh State
Financial Corporation v. Mis. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. F
AIR ,1994 SC 2151; State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Prabhu ·
(1994) 2 SCC 481; Smt. Shrisht Dhawan v. Mis. Shaw
Brothers AIR 1992 SC 1555; United India Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165; District
Collector & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare G
Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. v. M.
Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655; Union oflndia & Ors.
v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman,
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. v. Girdharilal Yadav
(2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash H
    52      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   Babula/sing Parmar (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals
    Industries Ltd. v. Coal Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC
    2798; Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. v..State of Bihar & Anr.
    (2009) 8 SCC 751; Dr. Vim/a v. Delhi Administration AIR
    1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.
B   (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.
    Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma v Steel
    Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; Regional
    Manager, Central Bank of India v Madhulika Guruprasad
    Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170; Gowrishankar & Anr. v.
C   Joshi Amba Shanker Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202;
    Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319;
    Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti
    Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education
    AIR 2003 SC 4628; Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of Tamil
D   Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836; Kinch v. Walcott (1929) AC
    482 28 - relied on.

         2. 3. There was a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980
    in favour of the appellant/applicant. Nobody had ever filed
    any application before the competent court to declare
E said sale deed as null and void. The issue of mis-
    representation/fraud, suppression of material fact and
    identification of land was in issue in earlier review
    petitions before the Special Court and in the writ petitions
    before the High Court. In this regard, the Special Court
F in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding
    the identity of land on the basis of revenue record and
    came to the conclusion that there was no mis-
    representation or fraud on the part of the appellant/
    applicant.. The Society claimed to have an agreement to
G . sell in its favour which did not confer any title in favour
    of the Society. A finding of fact had been recorded in
    earlier proceedings that the appellant/applicant was in
    actual physical possession of the land and he was
    illegally/forcibly dispossessed by the respondents. [Paras
H 31, 33] [72-8-C; 70-E-G]
                                            '·.
    MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &              S3
                     ORS.

       3, A person in illegal occupation of the land has to A
 be evicted following the procedure prescribed under the
 law. Even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. The
 State authorities cannot become the law unto
 themselves. Even they cannot dispossess a person by
 an executive order. Government can resume possession B
 only in a manner known to or recognised by law and not
 otherwise. Tri~ forcible eviction of the appellant/applicant
                ·\
 by the respondents was unwarranted and unlawful. The
 proceedings were initiated under the Andhra Pradesh
 Land Grabbing (Prol)ibition) Act, 1982. It is a special Act c
 to prevent illegaj activities of land grabbing. The
 Legislature, in its\ wisdom, constituted a Special Court
 presided over by a person who is or is eligible to be the
                    I   .               .   ~



 Judge of the High Court, and consisting.of Members who
 ~-or are ·eligible to become a District Judge and District
                                                               0
·-collector. Therefore; persons having enough experience
 and who have .acquired a higher status have been given
 responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes under the
 A~t. That Special. Court has been conferred with the
 powers of civil: or criminal courts. As per the provisions
 of Section 10 of the Act, the burden of proof is on the
                                                               E
 accused to prove that he is not guilty. Thus, it is not like
 any other cri,minal case where accused is presumed to
,be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The presumption
 of innocence is a huinan right, however, it is subject to
 the statutory exceptions, and the said principle .forms the F
lbasis of criminal jurisprudence. For this purpose, the
 nature of offence, its, seriousness and gravity thereof has
 to be taken into consideration. Statutes like Negotiable
  Instruments Act, 1881; Prevention of Corruption· Act,
 1988; and Terrorist and Disr~ptive\ Activities (Prevention) · G
 Act, 1987, provide for presum~tion of guilt if the
 circul!l~tances provided in those statutes are found to be
 fulfifled-and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the
  accused. Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating
                                                               H
    54       SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A course from ordinary criminal law shifting the burd~n on
  the accused to prove that he was not guilty. The High
  Court while deciding these cases has not ,considered the
  issue of the locus.standi of the respondents to maintain
  the application for eviction of the appellant/applicant.
B Chagrined and frustrated ..litigants should notbe permitted
  to give vent to their frustratio.ns by cheaply invoking the
  jurisdiction of the court. The co~rt proceedings cou.ghtnot
  to be permitted to degenerate into a we~pon of
  harassment and persecution. [Paras 34, 36, 37) [72-D-H;
c 73-B-H; 74-A-B]

       Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. ¥· Naresh Narayan Roy
  AIR 1924 PC 124; La/Ju Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish
  Singh & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620; Ram Ratan v. State of U.P.
  AIR 1977 SC 619; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v.
D Union of India & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 872; Krishna Ram Mahala
  v. Mrs. Shobha Vankat Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097; Nagar
  Palika, Jind v. Jagat Singh AIR 1995 SC 1377; Bishan Das
  v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570; State of U.P. & Ors. v.
  Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Sing/7 & Ors. AIR 1989 SC
E 997; State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Vishnunarayan &
  Associates (P) dd. & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 134, relied on.
                          Case Law Reference:
     AIR 1996 SC~742             relied on          Para 9
F
     AIR 1996 SC '3069           relied on          Para 10
         i
     (19$5) 2 Scale 23           relied on          Para 11
     AIR 1997 SC 3277            relied on          Para 11
G                     '
     (1997) 6 sec 473            relied on          Para.11
     AIR 1998 SC 1872            relied on          Para 11
                  J
     AIR 1999 SC 1486            relied on          Para 12

H
MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &    55
                 ORS.
AIR 2000 SC 2587        relied on   Para 13     A
(2005) 12 sec 149       relied on   Para 14
AIR 2001 SC 2316        relied on   Para 15
AIR.2004 SC 1738        relied on   Para 15
                                                B
AIR 2007 SC 1185        relied on   Para 16..
AIR 1994 SC 853         relied on   Para 20 ·
1956 All. E.R. 349      relied on   Para 20
AIR 1994 SC 2151
                                                c
                        relied on   Para 21
(1994) 2 sec 481        relied on   Para 21
AIR 1992 SC 1555        relied on   Para 22
AIR 2000 SC 1165        relied on   Para 23 .   D

(1990) 3 sec 655        relied on   Para 24
(1995) Suppl. 4 sec 100 relied on   Para 24
  ,
(2004) 6 sec 325        relied on   Para 24     E
(2001) 1 sec 80         relied on   Para 24
AIR 2007 SC 2798        relied on   Para 24
(2009) 8 sec 751        relied on   Para 24
                                                F
AIR 1963 SC 1572        relied on   Para 25
(1996) 5 sec 550        relied on   Para 25
AIR 2005·SC 3110        relied on   Para 25
                                                G
(2008) 12 sec 481       relied on   Para 25
c2008) 13 sec 110       relied on   Para 25
AIR 1996 SC 2202        relied on   Para 26
(2003) 8 sec 319        relied on   Para 26     H
    56      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A    AIR 2002 SC 33               relied on             Para 26
     AIR 2003 SC 4628             relied on             Para 26
     AIR 2004 SC 2836             relied on             Para 26
     (1929) AC 482                relied on             Para 27
B
     AIR 1924 PC 124              relied on             Para, 34
     AIR 1968 SC 620              relied on             Para 34
                                                               ';
     AIR 1977 SC 619              relied on             Para 34
c                                                       Para 34
     AIR 1296 SC 872              relied on
     AIR 1989 SC 2097             relied on             Para 34
     AIR 1995 SC 1377             relied on             Para 35
D    AIR 1961 SC 1570             relied on             Para 36
     AIR 1989 SC 997              relied on             Para 36
     c2002) 4 sec 134             relied on             Para 36

E        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
    6656-6657 of 2010.
          From the Judgment & Order dated 26.04.2007 of the High
    Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ.·
    Petition Nos. : 19963 and 19962 of 2006.
F
          P. Vishwanatha Shetty, G. Seshagiri Rao, Sridhar Potaraju
    for the Appellants.

         M .. v. Durga Prasad, G. Ramakrishna. Prasad, B.
G   Suyodhan, Amar Pal, Bharat J. Joshi, T. Anamika, D. Rama
    Krishna Reddy, SaFljai Kumar Pathak for the Respondents.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
H
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                        57
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

        2. Judicial pronouncements unlike sand dunes are known          A
 for their stability/finality. However, in this case, in spite of the
. completion of several rounds of litigation upto the High Court,
 and one round of litigation before this Court, the respondents
  claim a right to abuse the process of the Court with the
  perception that whatever may be the orders of the High Court          B
  or this Court, inter-se parties the dispute shall be protracted and
 will never come to an end.

     3. These appeals have been preferred against the
Judgment and Order dated 26.04.2007 of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh, at Hyderabad, passed in Writ Petition Nos. C
19962-19963 of 2006, by which the High Court has allowed the
said petitions against the Judgment and order of the Special
Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition)
Act, 1982 (hereinafter called, "Act 1982"), dismissing the review
application No. 397/2005 in LGC No. 76/1996 and in LGCSR D
357/2005.

    4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to the present
cases are as under :-
                                                                      E
      (A) V ..Ram Chandra Reddy and his brother (vendors) had
 a huge chunk of land and a part of it could have been the subject
 matter of the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation)
 Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act 1976). The said vendors
 entered into an agreement to sell dated 23.01.1976 for selling
 a part of the land (hereinafter called 'suit land') to a cooperative F
 society namely, Gruha Lakshmi Cooperative Housing Society
 Ltd. (hereinafter called, "the Society"). The vendors, V. Ram
 Chandra Reddy and his brother executed a sale d~ed in favour .
 of A. Sambashiva Rao (hereinafter called the appellant/
 applicant) which was registered on 21.05.1980 vide document G
 No. 4758/80 and the appellants were put in possession of the
 suit land.

     (B) The appellant/applicant- vendee filed LGC No. 76/1996
 against the respondents under the provisions of the Act, 1982          H
    58       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   alleging that he had been working in Andhra Pradesh State
    Road Transport Corporation and was mostly out of station, and
    the respondents had forcibly grabbed his land and raised
    construction thereon. Thus, he sought the relief of their·
    dispossession and action against them under the provisions
B   of the Act, 1982.

         (C) After complying with the requirements of the statutory
    provisions i.e. taking the sanction etc., the respondents were
    issued a show cause notice. The respondents filed their reply
    submitting that in respect of the suit land, there was an
C   agreement to sell, dated 23.01.1976, in favour of the society
    and once such an agreement to sell had been executed, vendors
    had no right to transfer the land in favour of the appellanU
    applicant. The society had allotted the suit land in their favour,
    therefore, the application was liable to be rejected.
D
          (D) The Special Court after appreciating the evidence,
    vide Judgment and order dated 4.11.1997 came to the
    conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner of the suit
    land and that the respondents had no right, title or claim over
E   the suit land. They had forcibly occupied the land and they were
    land grabbers, thus, they were liable to be evicted and orders
    for that purpose were passed.

        (E) Being aggrieved by the order of the Special Court
    dated 4.11.1997, the respondents preferred writ petition No.
F   33572/1997 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which
    was dismissed vide Judgment and Order dated 3.07.2001.

         (F) Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the
    respondents preferred Special Leave Petition (c) No. 18218/
G   2001 before this Court, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide
    order dated 2.11.2001 giving liberty to the respondents to file
    review petition before the High Court.

         (G) The respondents filed review petition No. 31506/2002
H
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                    59
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
before the High Court. However, the said review petition was      A
dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 16.12.2002.

     (H) In the intervening period, when the review petition was
pending before the High Court, the appellant/applicant fifed
execution proceedings by moving IA No. 518/2002. The
                                                                   8
Respondents also moved an application to summon the record
of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Secundrabad, pertaining to
the survey of the suit land along with an application for the stay
of Execution proceedings. The Special Court vide order dated
7.11.2002 allowed the Execution Application filed by the
appellant/applicant but dismissed the application filed by C
respondents directing the Revenue Divisional Officer to
implement the order dated 4 .11.1997.

    (I) The respondents being aggrieved by the common order
dated 7.11.2002, filed writ petition nos. 22953 and 23105 of D
2002, which were, dismissed by the High Court vide order
dated 17.12.2002.

     (J) In pursuance of the order in Execution Proceedings
dated 7.11.2002, the appellants were put into possession of       E
the suit land on 16.12.2002.

     (K) The respondents being aggrieved by the order of the
High Court dated 17.12.2002, preferred review petitions before
the High Court, which were dismissed by the Court vide order
dated 17.11.2003.                                                 F

      (L) The respondents filed Review Application no. 397/2005
in lGC No. 76 after an inordinate delay; seeking review of the
order dated 4.11.1997. The respondents subsequently filed an
application in LGCSR No. 357/2005 before the Special Court G
for fresh declaration that they were the owners and that the
appellants, who had succeeded throughout the litigation, were
the land grabbers. The, respondents in the said application
impleaded persons other than the appellant/applicant also, i.e.
the vendors of the appellant/applicant and govt. officials etc., H
        60       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.

    A   who are the other appellants in these cases. The Special Court
        dismissed the said applications vide orders dated 6.7.2006 and
        11.7.2006.
\             (M) The respondents, being aggrieved by both the orders,
    B   fi[ed Writ Petition Nos. 1S962 and 19963 of 2006, which have.
        been allowed by the High Court vide impugned Judgment and
        order dated 26.04.2007, directing the Special Court to decide
        both the applications afresh on merit, as in the opinion of the
        High Court, the applications required certain inquiry on factual
        matters and the claim of the respondents could not have been
    C   rejected merely on the determination and attaining finality of
        orders in earlier proceedings. Hence, these appeals.

               5. Sh. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, learned senior counsel
        appearing for the appellants, has submitted that even if there
    D   was an agreement to sell by the vendor of the appellants in
        favour of the society, such an agreement did not confer any title
        in the suit land in their favour. The respondents had not been
        the members of the said Society, nor had any allotment ever
        been made by the Society in their favour. The earlier
    E   proceedings came to an end after having several rounds of
        litigation upto the High Court and one round upto this Court. The
        orders passed therein attained finality and in pursuance of the
        same, the appellant/applicant came into possession of the suit
        land. Issues of fraud and identification of land had been in issue
        in some of the earlier proceedings. Once the respondents had
    F
        approached this Court, the question of entertaining the review
        petition after an inordinate delay of 7-8 years does not arise.
        The respondents have no locus standi to ask the Special Court
        to determine under what circumstances the appellant/applicant
    G   had obtained the suit land. An application to call for certain
        records in respect of the suit land from 1972 to 2002, the survey
        reports etc. cannot be made by them. The High Court has
        gravely erred in interfering with the orders of the Special Court
        rejecting both the applications. Thus, the appeals deserve to
        be allowed.
    H
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                        61
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     6. Per contra, Sh. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel             A
appearing for the respondents submitted that the transfer of
land in favour of the appellant/applicant vide registered sale
deed dated 21.05.1980 was itself a fraudulent transaction and
material in this regard was suppressed from the Special Court
while obtaining the orders in their favour. Fraud vitiates             B
everything. The respondents have raised the issue of the
identification of the suit land. Thus, the applications filed by the
respondents were maintainable and the High Court has rightly
reversed the orders passed by the Special Court. The appeals
lack merit and no interference is warranted by this Court.             c
     7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

     Admittedly, there is a registered sale deed in favour of the
appellant/applicant dated 21.05.1980 and there may be an D
agreement to sell in favour of the society dated 23.01.1976. It
is settled legal proposition that an agreement to sell does not
create any right, or title in favour of the intending buyer. The
Society did not file suit for specific performance against the
vendors prior to the execution of sale deed in favour of the E
appellant/applicant on 21.05.1980. The Special Court, after
appreciating the entire evidence on record, came to the
conclusion that the appellant/applicant was the owner and was
in actual physical possession of the land and that the
respondents had grabbed the said land. The Special Court has F
observed as under:-

     "In the cross-examination, RW1 (respondent No.1 herein)
     had to admit that they have not filed any document to show
     that the said plot was allotted in their favour by the society
     and that they have not filed any document to show that they G
     are the members of the said society. He also admitted that
     without any municipal sanction or permission, they raised
     the construction in the scheduled land."

     The Special Court further held that the respondents were          H
    62        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010) 10 S~C.R.


A   land grabbers within the meaning of the Act, 1982 and thus,
    they were directed to restore the premises to the appellant/
    applicant. These findings of fact had been affirmed upto the
    High Court.                                             -

           8. The record of the case reveals that respondents have
8
     filed review petitions before the Special Court as well as before
     the High Court. However, all the applications had been
  . dismissed by the Courts concerned. The respondents again
     filed an application seeking review of the order dated
     4.11.1997. Section 17-A of the Act, 1982 provides that in order
C to prevent the miscarriage of justice, a review application can
     be entertained on the grounds that the order has been passed
     under a mistake of fact, ignorance of any material fact or an
     error apparent on the face of law. Limitation for filing the review
     application before the Special Court has been prescribed
D under Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing
     (Prohibition) Rules, 1988, as 30 days from the date of the order
     of which the· review is sought. The respondents had earlier
     challenged the said order dated 4.11.1997 before the High
   . Court, as well as before this Court. Review petitions had been
E filed before the Special Court, as well as before the High Court.
    Thus, question does arise as to whether it is permissible for a
     litigant to file a review application after approaching the superior
     forum/court.

F   Review - After approaching the Higher Forum:-

         9. In Mis. Kabari Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Shivnath Shroff & Ors. AIR
    1996 SC 742, this Court had taken a view that the court cannot
    entertain an application for review if before making the review
    application, the superior court had been moved for getting the
G   self-same relief, for the reason that for the self-same relief two
    parallel proceedings before the two forums cannot be taken.

         10. In State of Maharashtra & Anr_ Vs. Prabhakar Bhikaji
    Ingle AIR 1996 SC 3069, this Court held that when a special
H   leave petition from the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                         63
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
a non-speaking order, the main order was confirmed by the               A
Court. Thereafter, the power of review cannot be exercised by
the Tribunal as it would be "deleterious to the judicial discipline".

     11 '. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Raj
Kumar Sharma Vs. Union of India (1995) 2 Scale 23; Sree B
Narayana Dharmasanghom Trust Vs. Swami Prakasananda
& Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3277; K. Ajit Babu & Ors. Vs. Union of
India & Ors. (1997) 6 SCC 473; and Gopabandhu Biswa/ Vs.
Krishna Chandra Mohanty & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1872.

       12. In Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm & Anr. Vs. K. C
 Santhakumaran & Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1486, a three Judge
 Bench of this Court considered the issue afresh and held that
filing of the review petition after dismissal of the special leave
 petition by it against the self-same order amounted to an abuse
of process of the court and the entertainment of such a review D
application was in affront to its order and it was subversive of
judicial discipline.

     13. In Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs. State of Kera/a & Anr.
AIR 2000 SC 2587, a three Judge Bench of this Court                     E
reconsidered the issue and all above referred judgments and
came to the conclusion that dismissal of special leave petition
in limine by a non-speaking order may not be a bar for
entertaining a review petition by the court below for the reason
that this Court may not be inclined to exercise its discretion
under Article 136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will      F
be governed by Article 141 where the matter has been "decided
on merit by a speaking judgment. In that case doctrine of
merger would come into place and lay down the following
principles:-
                                                                        G
     (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an
     order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority
     before superior forum and such superior forum modifies,
     reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the
     decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision H
    64       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010) 10 S.C.R.


A        by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists,
         remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the
         eye of law.

         (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the
         Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is
B
         upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an
         appeal. The second stage commences if and when the
         leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition
         is converted into an appeal.

c        (iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or
         unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of
         jurisdiction exercised· by the superior forum and the content
         or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid
         shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The
D        superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing,
         modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it.
         Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court
         may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order
         appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction
E        and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction
         disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The
         doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former
         and not to the latter.

         (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a
F        no11-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it
         does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing
         special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place
         of the order under challenge. A!J that it means is that the
         Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to
G        allow the appeal being filed.

         (v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order,.
         i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the
         order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law
H        contained in the order is a declaration of law by the
   MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                      65
         ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the           A
     Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law,
     whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded
     fY  the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto
     and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings
     subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the
       \
                                                                      B
     Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But,
     this does not amount to saying that the order of the court,
     tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order
     of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition
     or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order         c
     binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings
     between the parties.

     14. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter
 has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party
 may approach the High Court by filing a review petition.             D

     Similar view has been reiterated in National Housing
 Coop. Society Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan & .Ors. (2005) 12
 sec 149.
                                                                      E
        15. In K. Rajamouli Vs. A. V.K.N. Swamy AIR 2001 SC
   2316, this Court considered the ratio of the judgment in
   Kunhayammed (supra); and Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm
   (supra) and held that if a review application has been filed
   before the High Court prior to filing the special leave petition
   before this Court and review petition is decided/rejected,
                                                                      F
   special leave petition against that order of review would be
   maintainable. In case the review application has been filed
   subsequent to dismissal of the special leave petition it would
   amount to abuse of process of the court and shall be governed
   by the ratio of the judgment in 'Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm    G
-: (sup,ra). The said judgment has been approved and followed
 Jb. y this Court in Mis. Green View Tea & Industries Vs.
 \Collector, Golaghat, Assam & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 1738.

      '1s. In Kumaran Silk Trade (P) Ltd. Vs. Devendra AIR            H
    66       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A 2007 SC 1185, this Court held as under:-

         "As a matter of fact at the earlier stage this Court did not
         consider the question whether one of the appeals against
         the order dismissing the Review Petition on merits was
B        maintainable. At best the order of remand and the decision
         in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kera/a & Anr. (2000)
         6 SCC 359 would enable the petitioner to get over the ratio
         of the three Judge Bench decision in Abbai Maligai
         Partnership Firm & Anr. v. K. Santhakumaran & Ors.
         (1998) 7 sec 386 that the seeking of a review after the
c        petition for special leave to appeal was dismissed without
         reserying any liberty in the petitioner was an abuse of
         process."
            .'
       17. Thus, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the
D effect that in case a litigant files a review petition before filing
  the Special Leave Petition before this Court and it remains
  pending till the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed, the
  review petition deserves to be considered .. In case it is filed
  subsequent to dismissal of the Special Leave Petition, the
E process of filing review application amounts to abuse of
  process of the court.

         18. ln view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
    that filing of such a review application by the respondents at a
    belated stage amounts to abuse of process of the Court and
F   such an application is not maintainable. Thus, the High Court
    ought not to have entertained the writ petition against the order
    of dismissal of the review application by the Special Court and
    the order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set
    aside.
G
       19. So far as the other application filed by the respondents
  before the Special Court is concerned, it is based on the
  grounds that earlier judgment and order had been obtained by
  the appellant/applicant suppressing material facts and the suit
H land had not been identified properly, and therefore, the
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                     67
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
judgment of the Special Court duly affirmed by the High Court       A
stood vitiated.

Fraud/Misrepresentation: -

     20. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant
gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing         B
fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be
sustained in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts
ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu
(dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR
1994 SC 853). In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besa/ay 1956 All.          C
E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no
judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to
stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels
everything."
                                                                    D
     21. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs.
Mis. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. Al R 1994 SC 2151 ; and
State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481,
this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its
equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration   E
of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by
promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the
law from the crafty evasions and sub-letties invented to evade
law."

    22. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. Mis. Shaw Brothers. AIR          F
1992 SC 1555, it has been held as under:-

           "Fraud and co7/usion vitiate even the most solemn
     proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It
     is a concept descriptive of human conduct."                    G

       23. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh
 & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and
justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant)
and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over
 all these centuries.                                               H ·
    68       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A        24. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is
    that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and
    benefit to the persons who played fraud or made -
    misrepresentation ana in such circumstances the Court should
    not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman,
s   Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society,
    Vizianagaram & Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3
    SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran (1995)
    Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidya/aya
    Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharila/ Yadav (2004) 6 SCC 32'.S;.
c   State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babula/sing Parmar
    (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. C(jjf
     Tar Refining Company AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed
    Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2009) 8 SCC 75-1 ).

       25. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an
D egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings
  of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with
  a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The___
  expression "fraud'' involves two elements, deceit and injury to
  the person deceived. It is a cheating intended t9 get an
E advantage. (Vide Dr. Vim/a Vs. Delhi Administration AIR 1963
  SC 1572; Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.
  (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T.
  Suryachandra Rao AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma Vs.
  Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors. (2008) 12 SCC 481; and
F Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika ·
  Guruprasad Dahir & Ors. (2008) 13 SCC 170).

         26. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A
  collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the
G others in relation to a property would render the transaction void
  ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a
  given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is
  anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with
  fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any
  equitable doctrine including resjudicata. Fraud is proved when
H                 --    .
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                        69
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
it is shown that a false representation has been made (i)              A
knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly,
careless whether it be true or false. Suppression of a material
document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (Vide S.P.
Changalvaraya Naidu (supra); Gowrishankar & Anr. Vs. Joshi
Amba Shankar Family Trust & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2202; Ram                 B
Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi & Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 319;
Roshan Deen Vs. Preeti Lal AIR 2002 SC 33; Ram Preeti
 Yadav Vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate
 Education A_IR 2003 SC 4628; and Ashok Leyland Ltd. Vs.
 State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. AIR 2004 SC 2836).                         c
     27. In kinch Vs. Walcott (1929) AC 482, it has been held
that " .... mere constructive fraud is not, at all events after long
delay, sufficient but such a judgment will not be set aside upon
mere proof that the judgment was obtained y perjury."
                                                                       D
     Thus, detection/discovery of constructive fraud at a much
belated stage may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment
procured by perjury .

. , ,. 28. From the above, it is evident that even in judicial         E
 proceedings, once a fraud is proved, all advantages gained by
 playing fraud can be taken away. In such an eventuality the
 questions of non-executing of the statutory remedies or statutory
 bars like doctrine of res judicata are not attracted. Suppression
 of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court.
                                                                       F
 Every court has an inherent power to recall its own order
 obtained by fraud as the order so obtained is non est.

     29. The inst~mt case required to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid 'Settled legal propositions.
                                                                       G
     The case.. bf the respondents has been that transfer by the
vendor in favour of the appellant was not genuine. Material
information had been suppressed from the Special Court. More
so, there was no proper identification of the suit land in the
                                                                       H
    70       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2€>1 O] 10 S.C.R.


A   earlier litigation. The reports submitted in this regard were not
    correct.

      30. Respondents have never been able to show as under
  what circumstances they are interested in the suit land because
8 before the Special Court in the first round they failed to show
  any document that land had ever been transferred by the tenure
  holders/owners in favour of the Society or the Society had
  made any allotment in their favour or they were member of the
  said Society or they obtained any sanction from statutory
C authority to raise the construction.

       Shri M.V. Durga Prasad, Ld. Counsel appearing for the
  said respondents was repeatedly asked by us to show any
  document on record linking the said respondents with the suit
  land. Though, he argued for a long time, raised large number
D of issues but could not point out a single document which may
  reflect that respondents could have any claim on the suit land.
  Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the application
  at their behest was not maintainable.

         31. The issue of mis-representation/fraud, suppression of
E   material fact and identification of land had been in issue in
    earlier review petitions before the Special Court and in the Writ
    Peiitions before the High Court. In this regard, the Special
    Court in execution proceedings was fully satisfied regarding the
    identity of land on the basis of revenue record and came to the
F   conclusion that there was no mis-representation or fraud on the
    part of the appellant/applicant. The order of the Special Court
    dated 11th July, 2006 made it clear that all these issues had
    been agitated in earlier proceedings. The Special Court has
    held as under:
G
         "The applicants herein as contended in this L.G.C. have
         filed IA No.869/2002 for stay of proceedings and IA No.
         861/2002 for summoning the record in File No.B/9815/97
         from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer on the
H        ground of alleged fraud played by the Manda/ Revenue
 MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                       71
       ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    Officer and the Mandal Surveyor. Those petitions were            A
    heard at length and were dismissed holding that the
    alleged fraud as contended by the applicants herein was
    not made out and the property which is the subject matter
    of L.G.C. No.76/96 should be delivered to the respondents
    herein by evicting the applicants. As mentioned already,         B
    in execution of the said· order, applicants herein were
    evicted and possession was delivered to the respondents.

          Admittedly, the common order passed in IA Nos.
    518/2002, 861/2002 and 869/2002, by this Court was
    questioned by the applicants herein by filing Writ Petitions     ~
    before the Hon'ble High Court of A.P. and the same was
    also dismissed holding that the applicants herein are
    trying to protract the litigation and to delay the delivery of
    possession of· the property in question to the
    respondents."(emphasis added)                                    D

     32. In another case decided by the Special Court vide
order dated 6th July, 2006 the Court had taken note of the
pleadings in respect of identification of land and mis-
representation/fraud/collusion in the earlier proceedings and the    E
observations made by the Writ Court in its order dated 17th
December, 2002 that the said respondents were interested in
protracting the litigation and obstructing the implementation of
the order of the Special Court dated 4.11.1997. The said order
had been passed in Application No. 51 of 2002 where one of           F
the main grounds had been that the appellant/applicant had
played fraud in obtaining the said order as is taken note of in
paragraph 13 of the said order by the Special Court. The
Special Court also took note of earlier direction to the Revenue
Divisional Officer to identify the land and p'ossession of the       G
same was delivered to the decree holder. The said order was
under challenge before the High Court in Writ Petition Nos.
22953/2002 and 23105/2002 wherein pleading of the alleged
fraud and mis-identification of suit land were taken. The Special
Court came to the conclusion that there was no suppression           H
            72       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


        A   of any fact by the revenue authorities or the court was misled
            at the time of obtaining such orders.

               33. There is a registered sale deed dated 21.5.1980 in
          favour of the appellant/applicant. Nobody has ever filed any
          application before the competent court to declare said sale
        B
          deed as null and void. Respondents have no right or interest
          in the suit property. The Society claimed to have an agreement
          to sell in its favour which did not confer any title in favour of the
          Society. A finding of fact had been recorded in earlier
          proceedings that the appellant/applicant was in actual physical
        c possession of the land and he was illegally/forcibly
          dispossessed by the respondents.

            Forcible dispossession:-

        D        34. Even a trespasser cannot be evicted forcibly. Thus, a
            person in illegal occupation of the land has to be evicted
            following the procedure prescribed under the law. ( Vide
            Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. Vs. Naresh Narayan Roy AIR
            1924 PC 124; Lal/u Yeshwant Singh Vs. Rao Jagdish Singh
            & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 620; Ram Ratan Vs. State of U.P. AIR
        E
            1977 SC 619; Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Union
            of India & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 872; and Krishna Ram Mahale
            Vs. Mrs. Shobha Vankat Rao AIR 1989 SC 2097) .

                  35. In Nagar Palika, Jind Vs. Jagat Singh AIR 1995 SC
        F   1377, this Court observed that Section 6 of the Specific Relief
            Act 1963 is based on the principle that even a trespasser is
            entitled to protect his possession except against the true owner
            and purports to protect a person in possession from being
            dispossessed except in due process of law.
        G
                 36. Even the State authorities cannot dispossess a person
            by an executive order. The authorities cannot become the law
            unto themselves. It would be in violation of the rule of law.
,,l.,
            Government can resume possession only in a manner known
            to or recognised by law and not otherwise. (Vide Bishan Das
        H
  MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                       73
        ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
Vs. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1570; Express Newspapers               A
Pvt. Ltd. (supra); State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Maharaja
Dharmander Prasad Singh & Ors. AIR 1989 SC 997; and
State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Vishnunarayan & Associates
(P) Ltd. & Anr. (2002) 4 sec 134).
                                                                       B
      37. The forcible eviction of the appellanUapplicant by the
respondents was unwarranted and unlawful. Proceedings had
been initiated under the Act, 1982. It is a special Act to prevent
illegal activities of land grabbing. The Legislature, in its wisdom,
constituted a Special Court presided over by a person who is           C
or el';:iible to be the Judge of the High Court, and consisting of
the Members who are or eligible to become District Judge and
District Collector. Therefore, persons having enough experience
and who have acquired a higher status have been given
 responsibility to adjudicate upon the disputes under the Act
 1982. That Special Court has been conferred with the powers           D
 of Civil or Criminal Courts.

     As per the provisions of Section 10 of the Act 1982, the
burden of proof is on the accused to prove that he is not guilty.
Thus, it is not like any other criminal case where accused is          E
presumed to be innocent unless the guilt is proved. The
presumption of innocence is a human right, however, subject
to the statutory exceptions, the said principle forms the basis
of Criminal Jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of
offence, its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken irito     F
consideration. Statutes like Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881;
 Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and Terrorist and Disruptive
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for presumption of
guilt if the circumstances provided in those Statutes are found
to be fulfilled and shift the burden of proof of innocence on the      G
accused. Thus, the Legislature has adopted a deviating course
from ordinary criminal law shifting the burden on the accused
to prove that he was not guilty. The High Court while deciding
these cases has not considered the issue of the locus standi
 of the respondents to maintain the application for eviction of
                                                                       H
    74       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A the appellant/applicant. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should
  not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply
  invoking the jurisdiction of the court. The court proceedings
  ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of
  harassment and persecution.
B
       38. In view of the above factual position, we reach the
  following conclusions:       i

      (i) There has been a registered sale deed in favour of the
  appellant/applicant by the vendors which was registered on
C 21.5.1980 and he was put in possession.

        (ii) Prior to the execution of the said sale deed there has
    been an agreement to sell dated 23.1.1976 in favour of the
    Society.
D
        (iii) In respect of the said agreement to sell the litigation
    remained pending before the Civil Court but there is nothi~g
    on record to show as to what had been its outcome.              ·

      (iv) An agreement to sell did not confer any right on the
E Society, though the appellant acquired the title over the suit land
  by execution and registration. of the sale deed dated
  21.5.1980.

        (v) The respondents had not been the members of the
F   Society nor Society made any allotment in .their favour.

         (vi) Before the Special Court, the respondents could not
    show as under what circumstances they co~ld stake their claim
    on the suit land and no document worth the name could be
    shown which may link them to the suit land.
G
        (vii) Respondents grabbed the suitland forcibly and raised
    a construction without any authorisation.

       (viii) In spite of our repeated queries, learned counsel for
H the respondents could not point out a single document on
 MEGHMALA & ORS. v. G. NARASIMHA REDDY &                        75
       ORS. [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.)
record to show that they could have any right, interest or title in   A
the suit land.

    (ix) The litigation completed several rounds before the High
Court and this is the second round of litigation before this Court.

    (x) AH the courts proceedings reveal that after proper            8
adjudication the declaration had been made that suit land
belonged to the appellant/applicant and respondents were
merely land grabbers.

  . (xi) In earlier review petitions filed by the respondents         C
before the Special Court and further taking the matter to the
High Court in Writ Petitions and Review Applications before
the High Court the issue of mis-representation/fraud/collusion
and mis-identification of the suit land had been raised but they
could not succeed.                                                    D

    (xii) In execution proceedings, the appellant/applicant
succeeded and came in possession of the suit land in 2002.

     (xiii) Respondents filed frivolous application raising the
issue of fraud and mis-identification of the suit land which had      E
earlier been adjudicated upon. The review application was filed
at much belated stage.

     (xiv) The review application was certainly not maintainable
as the respondents had approached the higher forum and it             F
merely amounted to abuse of process of the court.

       (xv) The respondents had been interested only to protract
the litigation by one way or the other.

     (xvi) Fresh proceedings taken by the respondents before          G
the Special Court in fact, is tantamount to malicious prosecution.

    39. The High Court failed to take all aforesaid factors into
consideration before passing impugned judgment and order.
                                                                      H
    76      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A       40. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion
  that judgment and order of the High Court impugned herein, is
  not sustainable in the eyes of law. The appeals are allowed.
  The judgment of the High Court dated 26.4.2007 is set aside
  and the judgments and orders dated 6.7.2006 and 11.7.2006
B passed by the Special Court are restored. No costs.

    D.G.                                        Appeals allowed.