MEENAL BHARGAVAversusNAVEEN SHARMA
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 467
- Decided
- 9 May 2018
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- A K SIKRI
Holding
A court may not punish a party for contempt for non‑compliance with a settlement order unless it first determines that the party actually breached the consent terms; the High Court’s contempt order was therefore set aside.
Summary
Meenal Bhargava and Naveen Sharma, a married couple, lived in the US/Canada and had a child, Pranav. The husband obtained a Canadian court order granting him custody and directing the child’s return, which the wife ignored and brought the child to India, prompting the husband to file a habeas corpus petition in the Rajasthan High Court. The parties later mediated and entered a settlement requiring the wife to return to the US with the child and the husband to provide a flat, after which the habeas corpus petition was disposed. The husband subsequently filed a contempt petition alleging the wife breached the settlement; the High Court found her guilty of contempt under s.12(1) and s.12(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and sentenced her to six months civil imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court erred by punishing the wife without first determining whether she actually violated the consent terms and by ignoring the need to decide the child‑custody issue. The contempt order was set aside, the habeas corpus petition revived for merits, and the husband was permitted to re‑file a contempt petition after proper consideration of the parties’ obligations.
Issues considered
- The High Court's power to punish for contempt under s.12(1) r/w s.12(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 without first ascertaining breach of the settlement consent terms.
- Whether a decree of conjugal rights or a settlement requiring resumption of matrimonial relations can be enforced by contempt.
- The appropriate forum and procedure for determining child custody arising from a foreign court order in a habeas corpus petition.
- The enforceability of the settlement terms and the procedural requirements before invoking contempt.
Legislation cited
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 12(1), s. 12(3)
Subjects
Judgment
[2018] 4 S.C.R. 521 521
MEENAL BHARGAVA A
v.
NAVEEN SHARMA
(Civil Appeal No. 1606 of 2018 etc.)
B
MAY 09, 2018
[A. K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.]
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971:
C
s.12(1) r/w s. 12(3) – Appellant (wife) left company of her
husband (respondent) with her son – Canadian Court granted
custody of the child to the husband – Wife without complying with
the order of Canadian Court, came to India – Husband filed Habeas
Corpus petition in the High Court in India – The parties reached
settlement on certain terms – Husband thereafter filed contempt D
petition seeking execution of consent terms and punishment of wife
for contempt of Court – High Court found the wife guilty of contempt
of court awarding punishment of six months civil imprisonment –
On appeal, held: High Court was not right in punishing the wife
for contempt without considering the allegations as to whether she E
fulfilled her obligations under the consent terms – Settlement as
regards resumption of matrimonial relations was reached in the
proceedings which essentially related to custody of the child –
Therefore, focus of the High Court should have been on the custody
of the child and should have restored the Habeas Corpus petition
and decided the same on merit – Order passed in contempt petition F
is set aside – Habeas Corpus petition is revived which shall be
decided by High Court on merits.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1. When the notice of the contempt petition was G
served upon the appellant, she filed reply thereto stating that
she had taken requisite steps under the settlement and it is the
respondent who failed to get orders dated April 16, 2015 passed
by Canadian Court nullified thereby disabling her to go to America
inasmuch as she could be arrested immediately on landing in
H
521
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A USA/Canada in view of the aforesaid order. She also alleged that
list of flats was not sent to her. Moreover, conduct of the
respondent, post-settlement, was not good. She had also filed
additional reply dated December 11, 2017 contending that (i)
pursuant to High Court orders, she had gone to Delhi hotel to
meet respondent and his mother but she was publicly humiliated
B
there, (ii) she had found that the respondent had been fired by
his employer for taking bribes and he had not been truthful to
the Government also and (iii) respondent had not paid a single
penny as maintenance. This was followed by application dated
December 19, 2017 by the appellant seeking recall of order dated
C December 17, 2015. [Para 15][530-A-C]
2. The High Court has not adverted to the important aspect
that needed attention in such a case, namely, whether it was the
appellant who was responsible for not adhering to the terms of
the consent order and thereby violated the directions issued by
D the High Court in its orders dated May 09, 2017. The approach
of the High Court was to insist the appellant to adhere to the
settlement terms even at that stage and on her refusing to do so,
it arrived at a finding that she had committed the contempt of the
court’s order as the aforesaid conduct was found to be abhorrent.
It is,thus, the stubborn attitude shown by the appellant during
E
the hearing of the contempt petition which has weighed by the
High Court. That, was not the correct approach for punishing the
appellant for contempt of court. The contempt petition was filed
by the respondent alleging that the appellant had not fulfilled her
obligations under the consent terms and the directions given by
F the High court in this behalf. It was, thus, necessary for the High
Court to discuss and consider, in the first instance, as to whether
these allegations of the respondent were correct. [Para 18][531-
D-H]
3. The consent terms on which the parties settled the matter
G contained an important part of agreement, namely, both the
parties decided to live together again. This happened in the
proceedings which essentially related to the custody of child. No
doubt, when the parties agreed to resume the matrimonial
relations and decided to live again as husband and wife, the
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 523
problem of custody got automatically solved thereby as it brought A
about an ideal situation where the child could have the company
of his both the parents. However, this did not materialise. Even
when a decree of conjugal rights is filed by a competent court of
law in favour of one of the spouses, such a decree cannot be
executed and the other spouse who is directed to resume the
B
conjugal relations, cannot be forced to do so. It is a different
matter that for not obeying such a decree, other consequence
follow including right to the decree holder to seek divorce. When
that is the position even in respect of a decree passed by
competent court of law forcing the appellant to join the company
of the respondent and on her failing to do so punishing her in C
committing contempt of the court’s order, that too by awarding
maximum civil imprisonment in law cannot be countenanced. In
a matter like this, the focus of the High Court should have been
on the custody of the child, which was a subject matter of the
Habeas Corpus petition. However, as far as that aspect is
D
concerned, the High Court simply stated that it would be open to
the respondent to execute the order of the Canadian Court dated
April 16, 2015. Here again the High Court has fallen into error.
In fact, in a matter like this, the High Court should have restored
the Habeas Corpus Petition and decided the same on merits.
However, when application for this purpose was filed by the E
respondent, instead of doing so the High Court passed the orders
dated October 05, 2017 giving liberty to the respondent to file
the contempt petition. Therefore, the order of the High court
whereby the appellant was punished for contempt, is set aside.
[Paras 19, 20][532-A-F, G]
F
4. It would be open to the respondent to press the contempt
petition before the High Court and if he so chooses the High
Court shall decide the contempt petition by first finding out as to
whether the appellant is correct in her submissions that it is the
respondent who did not take necessary steps to ensure that the
appellant joins the company of the respondents along with the G
child in USA. The appeal of the respondent is also partly allowed
by setting aside the direction of the High Court permitting the
respondent to file the execution petition. Instead with the consent
of both the parties, order dated October 05, 2017 passed in
H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A Miscellaneous Application filed by respondent in Habeas Corpus
petition is set aside and his Habeas Corpus petition is revived
which shall be dealt with by the High Court on merits in order to
decide as to whether custody of the child is to be handed over to
the respondent. [Para 20][532-G-H; 533-A-B]
B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1606
of 2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.01.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in D. B. Civil
Contempt Petition No. 1846 of 2017
C WITH
Civil Appeal No. 3629 of 2018.
Mrs. Anjana Prakash, Sr. Adv., Amit Pawan, Anuj Prakash,
Abhishek Amritanshu, Anand Nandan, Rajat Kapoor, Hassan Zubair
D Waris, Akshat Srivastav, Rohit Rajershi, Advs. for the Appellants.
Prabhjit Jauhar, Ms. Upasna Gupta, S. S. Jauhar, Advs. for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. K. SIKRI, J. 1. These are the cross-appeals, filed by both
E the parties challenging different parts of the orders dated January 9,
2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan in D.B. Civil
Contempt Petition No. 1846 of 2017. The parties are husband and wife.
After their marriage in the year 2007, the wife joined her husband in the
United States of America (USA). Their child, named Pranav, was born
F out of this wedlock in August, 2009 at Baltimore, USA. In 2010, they
migrated to Canada. For certain reasons, the matrimonial relations
became strained and the wife viz. Meenal Bhargava (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘appellant’), left the company of her husband Naveen Sharma
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘respondent’) and on July 26, 2013, went
away from her husband, taking Pranav with her. Initially, for some time,
G she stayed in Buffalo, New York and thereafter came to India in August,
2013.
2. The respondent filed a case for custody of Pranav in a Canadian
Court. Vide order dated October 29, 2014, the Court granted temporary
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 525
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
custody of Pranav to the respondent. By that time, appellant had brought A
Pranav to India i.e. on August 4, 2013. After order dated October 29,
2014 granting temporary custody of Pranav was passed in favour of the
respondent, the mother of the appellant filed a motion in a Court at Canada
stating that the said Court at Canada had no jurisdiction in the matter.
This contention was, however, rejected by the Court and, thereafter on
B
April 2, 2015, another order was passed directing the appellant to return
Pranav to its jurisdiction and appear before the Court on April 16, 2015.
The appellant did not comply with this order, which led to issuance of
red corner notice by the FBI/Interpol against the appellant.
3. Since the appellant had travelled out of territorial jurisdiction of
the Canadian Court and had come to India with Pranav, finding no other C
alternative, the respondent herein filed a Habeas Corpus Petition in the
High Court of Judicature at Rajasthan. In the said petition, notice was
issued to the appellant herein. Having regard to the nature of dispute,
the High Court deemed it proper to explore the possibility of settlement
in the first instance. Thus, by order dated December 17, 2015, the parties D
were referred to mediation. This effort bore fruits as the respondent
and appellant settled the matter.
4. The appellant agreed to come back to USA and join the company
of the respondent along with Pranav. Consent terms were recorded and
on the basis thereof, the High Court disposed of the Habeas Corpus E
Petition vide order dated December 17, 2015 incorporating those terms
of settlement in its order and directing the parties to abide by the same.
These consent terms are as under:
“(1) Both the parties will withdraw their respective cases within
4 months from today. F
(2) Mr. Naveen Sharma will find out 3-4 flats for choice of Smt.
Meenal and Smt. Meenal will then go to U.S.A. to select one of
them. This process should complete within 18 months.
(3) In the meantime Mr. Naveen Sharma will come to India to
meet Mrs. Meenal and Pranav at least for 3 time. Similarly G
Mrs. Meenal will go to U.S.A. along with her son under the security
with condition that Mr. Naveen will arrange all their expenses
including travelling expenses and will undertake that if both of
them desire to return India then Mr. Naveen will arrange their
safe return to India.
H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A (4) The flat which is going to purchase by Mr. Naveen Sharma
should be in joint name of both party. None of the party will
entitle to sale this flat or it’s any part independently. Mr. Naveen
Sharma will arrange collateral security against loan and in no case
the flat should be taken from ownership and possession of Mrs.
Meenal Sharma. In case any mis-happening the flat will remain
B
in ownership of Mrs. Meenal Sharma.
(5) Mr. Naveen, Mrs. Meenal and Pranav will live jointly at U.S.A.
after purchase of flat. None of the family member of both parties
will disturb and interfere in their lives.”
C
5. For certain reasons, the laudable settlement, hoping to achieve
win-win situation, did not turn into reality. As per the respondent, it is
the appellant who committed breach of the said settlement and also
violated the directions contained in the order of the High Court to comply
with these terms. As she failed to adhere to the settlement and did not
D comply with the directions of the High Court in this behalf, the respondent
herein filed Civil Contempt Petition in the High Court seeking execution
of the consent terms and punishment to the appellant under the Contempt
of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). The appellant
also, thereafter, filed application in the High Court seeking recall of the
consent order dated December 17, 2015. The High Court has, by
E impugned judgment dated January 9, 2018, found the appellant to be in
contempt and award maximum punishment of six months civil
imprisonment under Section 12(1) read with Section 12(3) of the Act
with direction to the appellant to surrender within four weeks. The High
Court has also dismissed the application preferred by the appellant for
F recall of order dated December 17, 2015. However, it has not accepted
the request of the respondent to give him the custody of Pranav pursuant
to the Canadian Court’s order dated April 16, 2015 and, instead, permitted
the respondent to seek execution of the said order.
6. The appellant has challenged the aforesaid order against the
G findings of the High Court holding her to be in contempt of its order and
awarding the said punishment. The respondent feels aggrieved by that
part of the order whereby the High Court has refused to grant him the
custody of Pranav and showed him the route of execution. This, in
nutshell, is the scope of two appeals before this Court.
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 527
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
7. As noted above, Pranav was born in Baltimore, USA on August A
22, 2009. He is having US citizenship. Both the parties, after their
marriage, have resided in America or Canada. They have also became
Permanent Residents of Canada as well as America. From the date of
his birth in August, 2009, Pranav remained with their parents, initially in
America and thereafter in Canada till July 26, 2013, when the appellant
B
went away with him to Buffalo, New York and thereafter came to India
on August 4, 2013. Pranav stayed with his father, along with her mother,
for four years and since then he is living with her mother to the exclusion
of the respondent. He was 4 years of age when he was brought to India
by the appellant and is in India now for more than 4½ years. Another
pertinent fact which is to be noted is that the respondent has got orders C
from the Canadian Court giving custody of Pranav to him and has directed
the appellant herein to return the child back to Canada.
8. In the aforesaid background, the respondent had filed petition
for Habeas Corpus. However, the said petition was not heard on merits
inasmuch as parties were relegated to mediation where they settled the D
matter leading to disposal of the Habeas Corpus petition vide order dated
December 17, 2015 on the consent terms which were made part of the
order with specific directions to both the parties to adhere to those
conditions. We have already noted the consent terms as per which the
parties had to withdraw their respective cases against each other within
4 months from the date of the order of the High Court. The respondent E
was obligated to find out 3-4 flats for choice of the appellant. After
having chosen these flats, he was to show the same to the appellant.
The appellant, at that stage, was supposed to go to USA to select one of
the said flats. On this selection, she was to join the respondent with
Pranav, thereby achieving again the matrimonial alliance and Pranav F
having benefit of the company of both his parents. This entire process
was to be completed within 18 months. During the aforesaid period of
18 months which was given to the respondent to find out flats in USA,
the respondent was permitted to come to India, at least three times, to
meet the appellant and Pranav. Likewise, the appellant and Pranav
were also supposed to go to USA under security and for such visits, it G
was the responsibility of the respondent to arrange all their expenses
including travelling expenses. During such visits, they were entitled to
remain in USA as per their choice and as and when they desired to
return to India, the respondent had to arrange their safe return to India.
H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A 9. Three main obligations, as per the consent terms, were foisted
upon the respondent, viz.:
(i) To find 3-4 flats in USA to enable the appellant to select one of
them. The chosen flat was to become abode of the family.
(ii) To withdraw the cases filed against the appellant. This included
B complaint filed with Police and also take steps to ensure that warrants/
red-corner notice issued by the FBI/Interpol also stands withdrawn. This
was necessary for smooth entry of the appellant in USA.
(iii) After the selection of the flat by the appellant, the respondent
was obligated to purchase the said flat in joint names.
C
10. Likewise, the appellant was bound to carry out the following
tasks as per the aforesaid statements:
(i) To withdraw all the cases filed by her against the respondent.
(ii) After earmarking of 3-4 flats by the respondent, to go to USA
D to select one of them.
(iii) On selecting the flat and purchase thereof by the respondent
in joint names of the appellant and respondent, she was to go to USA
along with Pranav and stay there with the respondent.
11. For certain reasons, the parties fell apart and the settlement
E
terms could not be fructified leading to the unfortunate situation. As per
the respondent, he had played his part by complying with the said terms
inasmuch as he withdrew the illinois police complaint, warrants/red-corner
notice issued by FBI/Interpol on February 12, 2016. He also visited
India three times i.e. in August, 2016, December, 2016 and August, 2017.
F During these visits, the respondent had shown to the appellant various
flats selected online by him with request to the appellant to make her
choice. However, on his third visit in August, 2017, the appellant did not
allow Pranav to meet the respondent as a result of which police complaint
was filed with the SHO, Ajmer on August 26, 2017. The respondent also
sent air tickets to the appellant on August 31, 2017 for travel on September
G 3, 2017 to enable her and Pranav to visit USA. The respondent further
claims that he had also planned a trip to Disney World, Florida for Pranav
along with the appellant. According to the respondent, in spite of all the
efforts made by the respondent, it is the appellant who backed out and
resiled from the settlement as she failed to perform her role.
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 529
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
12. The appellant, on the other hand, blames the respondent which A
led to the aforesaid failure. Her accusation is that after the Habeas
Corpus Petition was disposed of vide order dated December 17, 2015,
she filed following three petitions on April 12, 2016 seeking to withdraw
the following cases filed by her:
(i) Custody Petition filed by her before the Family Court, Ajmer. B
(ii) Maintenance case filed by her before the Family Court, Ajmer.
(iii) Divorce case filed by her before the Family Court, Ajmer.
13. It is further claimed by the appellant that even the criminal
proceedings launched by her under Section 498-A IPC etc. were quashed
by the High Court on a petition filed by the respondent under Section C
482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) which happened
because of her no objection as per the settlement. Pointing the finger at
the respondent, her imputation is that he did not withdraw the custody
case filed by him in the Canadian Court and/or sought vacation/rescinding
of order dated April 16, 2015 by which custody of Pranav was ordered
D
in favour of the respondent. She also alleges that the respondent failed
to send a list of flats to her within the stipulated 18 months time which
was mentioned in the consent terms. Thus, according to the appellant, it
is the respondent who has not fulfilled his obligations under the settlement.
In fact, she even filed miscellaneous application in the petition that was
filed by the respondent under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and was allowed by E
the High Court on April 12, 2017, seeking recall of the said order on the
ground that it was the respondent who had committed breach of the
settlement. High Court, however, rejected the said application vide order
dated May 9, 2017 on the ground that the said order had been passed
after issuance of notice to the appellant.
F
14. With this kind of impasse, the respondent filed a miscellaneous
application in the Habeas Corpus Petition seeking revival thereof on the
ground that the appellant had breached the consent terms. This application
was, however, not accepted by the High Court on the ground that if
there was any breach or disobedience on the part of the appellant herein,
there was an alternative remedy available to the respondent to file G
contempt petition. This application was, thus, dismissed as withdrawn
by order dated October 5, 2017 with liberty to the respondent to file the
contempt petition. Thereafter, the respondent filed the contempt petition
on November 7, 2017 which has culminated in the impugned judgment
dated January 9, 2018. H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A 15. We may mention at this stage that when the notice of the
contempt petition was served upon the appellant, she filed reply thereto
stating that she had taken requisite steps under the settlement and it is
the respondent who failed to get orders dated April 16, 2015 passed by
Canadian Court nullified thereby disabling her to go to America inasmuch
as she could be arrested immediately on landing in USA/Canada in view
B
of the aforesaid order. She also alleged that list of flats was not sent to
her. Moreover, conduct of the respondent, post-settlement, was not good.
She had also filed additional reply dated December 11, 2017 contending
(i) pursuant to High Court orders, she had gone to Delhi hotel to meet
respondent and his mother but she was publicly humiliated there, (ii) she
C had found that the respondent had been fired by his employer IBM for
taking bribes and he had not been truthful to the Government also and
(iii) respondent had not paid a single penny as maintenance. This was
followed by application dated December 19, 2017 by the appellant seeking
recall of order dated December 17, 2015.
D 16. The aforesaid stand of the appellant has been taken note of
with a specific purpose, namely, it is the contention of Mrs. Anjana
Prakash, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, that the
High Court has, in the impugned judgment, not even discussed and dealt
with the submissions of the appellant that she had not committed any
breach of the order or consent terms and on the contrary, it is the
E respondent who failed to fulfil his obligations thereunder. She submitted
that from the reading of the impugned order, it can be discerned that the
High Court Bench kept on insisting the appellant to join the company of
the respondent along with Pranav and on her refusal to do so, the High
Court has taken the view that appellant has shown strong defiance to
F the orders of the Court. In the process, the High Court has not even
cared to examine who was at fault insofar as adherence to the consent
order is concerned. She also submitted that the High Court took into
consideration another extraneous factor. It has noted in the impugned
judgment that statement was given in the Court by the father of the
appellant that the application for recall of order dated May 9, 2017 passed
G in petition filed by the respondent under Section 482 Cr.P.C., was moved
by the counsel for the appellant without her instructions. That, however,
was found to be false assertion inasmuch as the High Court called for
the record of that case and found that each page of the application was
signed by the appellant and on realising this, it was conceded that lawyer
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 531
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
was instructed to make such an application. It was contended by the A
learned senior counsel that even if this was correct, it has no bearing
insofar as the contempt case is concerned.
17. Mr. Jauhar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on
the other hand, put entire blame upon the appellant who, according to
him, took summersault with intention to commit breach of settlement B
terms as there was change of heart and she decided not to join the
company of the husband. He took pains to demonstrate that respondent
had took all the necessary steps in terms of the settlement. He still
wanted the appellant to resume matrimonial alliance for the sake of
saving the family ties and also to enable Pranav be in the company of
both the parents. C
18. We have duly considered the submissions of counsel for both
the parties. As noted in detail above, both the parties are blaming each
other for the failure of settlement terms. In this backdrop, we have
gone through the impugned order passed by the High Court. In the
entire judgment, the High Court has not adverted to the important aspect D
that needed attention in such a case, namely, whether it was the appellant
who was responsible for not adhering to the terms of the consent order
and thereby violated the directions issued by the High Court in in its
orders dated May 09, 2017. After all, the respondent had filed the
contempt petition attributing breach of the directions on the part of the E
appellant. In reply, the appellant had taken up the stand that she was not
responsible for the happenings and squarely blamed the respondent
therefor. The High Court has not discussed these aspects. On the
contrary, the approach of the High Court was to insist the appellant to
adhere to the settlement terms even at that stage and on her refusing to
do so it arrived at a finding that she had committed the contempt of the F
court’s order as the aforesaid conduct was found to be abhorrent. It is,
thus, the stubborn attitude shown by the appellant during the hearing of
the contempt petition which has weighed by the High Court. That,
according to us, was not the correct approach for punishing the appellant
for contempt of court. The contempt petition was filed by the respondent G
alleging that the appellant had not fulfilled her obligations under the
consent terms and the directions given by the High court in this behalf.
It was, thus, necessary for the High Court to discuss and consider, in the
first instance, as to whether these allegations of the respondent were
correct.
H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A 19. There is another way of looking into the matter. The consent
terms on which the parties settled the matter contained an important
part of agreement, namely, both the parties decided to live together again.
This happened in the proceedings which essentially related to the custody
of child. No doubt, when the parties agreed to resume the matrimonial
relations and decided to live again as husband and wife, the problem of
B
custody of Pranav got automatically solved thereby as it brought about
an ideal situation where Pranav could have the company of his both the
parents. Unfortunately, this did not materialise. In a case like this whether
the High Court could force the appellant to join the company of the
respondent and live with him, if he had decided for certain reasons not to
C do so? Even when a decree of conjugal rights is filed by a competent
court of law in favour of one of the spouses, such a decree cannot be
executed and the other spouse who is directed to resume the conjugal
relations, cannot be forced to do so. It is a different matter that for not
obeying such a decree, other consequence follow including right to the
decree holder to seek divorce. When that is the position even in respect
D
of a decree passed by competent court of law forcing the appellant to
join the company of the respondent and on her failing to do so punishing
her in committing contempt of the court’s order, that too by awarding
maximum civil imprisonment in law cannot be countenanced. In a matter
like this, the focus of the High Court should have been on the custody of
E the child, which was a subject matter of the Habeas Corpus petition.
However, as far as that aspect is concerned, the High Court simply
stated that it would be open to the respondent to execute the order of the
Canadian Court dated April 16, 2015. Here again the High Court has
fallen into error. In fact, in a matter like this, the High Court should have
restored the Habeas Corpus Petition and decided the same on merits.
F
However, when application for this purpose was filed by the respondent,
instead of doing so the High Court passed the orders dated October 05,
2017 giving liberty to the respondent to file the contempt petition.
20. Having regard to our aforesaid discussion, we allow the appeal
filed by the appellant and set aside the order of the High court whereby
G the appellant is punished for contempt. It would be open to the respondent
to press the contempt petition before the High Court and if he so choses
the High Court shall decide the contempt petition in the light of the
aforesaid observations made by this Court, namely, to first find out as to
whether the appellant is correct in her submissions that it is the respondent
H
MEENAL BHARGAVA v. NAVEEN SHARMA 533
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
who did not take necessary steps to ensure that the appellant joins the A
company of the respondents along with Pranav in USA. We also allow
the appeal of the respondent partly by setting aside the direction of the
High Court permitting the respondent to file the execution petition. Instead
with the consent of both the parties, order dated October 05, 2017 passed
in Miscellaneous Application filed by respondent in Habeas Corpus
B
petition is set aside and her Habeas Corpus petition is revived which
shall be dealt with by the High Court on merits in order to decide as to
whether custody of Pranav is to be handed over to the respondent. Before
us, both the parties have advanced arguments on this aspect whereas
the appellant submitted that the welfare of Pranav lies in continuing his
custody with his mother. The respondent had made a fervent plea to C
claim the custody on the basis of the order of the Canadian Court.
However, we are deliberately not dealing with this aspect as this aspect
is the subject matter of Habeas Corpus Petition pending in the High
Court and it is the High Court which has to deal with and decide this
question, in the first instance.
D
21. Both the aforesaid appeals are allowed on the aforesaid terms,
without any orders as to costs.
22. Before we part with, we are constrained to make few
comments about the conduct of the parties who are not fully
acknowledging the truth and reality of the situation. It is either the E
appellant or the respondent or may be, to some extent, both of them,
who are to be blamed for the egoist approach. No doubt, on an earlier
occasion, some differences arose between them which led to strained
relations and the appellant even came back to India. Legal battles of all
kinds started with both the parties filing multiple proceedings against
each other. In these dark clouds enveloping the relationship between F
the parties, a silver lining emerged in the form of mediation. As both the
parties acted with wisdom and maturity, mediation exercise was
successful. Both the parties not only buried their acrimony against each
other but decided to have a new beginning. The magic of mediation
worked at that moment. The consent terms which were recorded in the G
settlement arrived at during mediation proceedings brought about the
resolution which could truly be levelled as ‘win-win’ situation. The accord
was aimed at reuniting the two spouses with the aim of bringing happiness
in the matrimonial relationship. More importantly, paramount interest of
H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 4 S.C.R.
A Pranav as a child was acknowledged by the parties as any child,
particularly at this age, needs the company of both the parents for him/
her to bloom and for ideal bringing up. In fact, as is clear from the
events noted above, both the parties even took initial steps to make this
settlement a success. However, before it could be seen as ‘happy ending’
and parties could reach that end of the road where they could find their
B
final destination as envisaged in the settlement, they encountered a road
block. Whether it happened due to the fault of the appellant or that of
respondent, we are not commenting about the same. Unfortunate part
is that instead of acknowledging the truth, parties are grumbling
continuously and complaining against each other. This accusation,
C castigation, chargeability and dilation, depicting deviation from rectitude
is a mindless exercise and, in the process, true welfare of Pranav is
sought to be sacrificed. We are compelled to express these sentiments
because of the reason that things have still not gone beyond repair. Had
the parties shown positive and cooperative attitude (which, we are sure,
they had demonstrated during mediation talks) they could still achieve
D
an amiable resolution, inasmuch as it is even now possible to work out
the terms of the compromise that was entered into between them. In
fact, the respondent had expressed his willingness to go an extra-mile to
save the settlement and the matrimonial home. However, the appellant
stood firm in her attitude as she kept on saying that she could no longer
E repose confidence and trust in the respondent. She has a grudge that
respondent lured her into the settlement with selfish motive to take away
the custody of Pranav with no love towards her and his moves lack bona
fides. The respondent, on the other hand, maintained the position that
appellant was resorting to falsehood because of her selfish motives which
were kept higher in priority, even at the cost of family life. However, we
F
may re-emphasise that all is not lost and situation can still be brought
under control if there is a dispassionate and objective thinking by both
the parties, keeping aside their ego. Life has problems. Parties have to
understand those problems and to reflect on the reasons why these
problems have arisen leading to such kind of disputes. Both the parties
G have also to reflect on the future and to make up their mind on that basis
as to whether it would be in their interest, as well as in the interest of
Pranav to bury the hatched and have a new beginning. We say no
more.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeals allowed.
H
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