Holding

The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in granting interim permission to admit students contrary to the Supreme Court’s order, thereby setting aside the High Court’s order, upholding the debarment, and directing compensation to the affected students.

Summary

The Supreme Court entertained Civil Appeal No. 19662 of 2017 filed by the Medical Council of India against the G.C.R.G. Memorial Trust, which had been debarred from admitting medical students for the 2017‑18 and 2018‑19 academic years. The High Court, despite a Supreme Court order dated 28‑08‑2017 prohibiting any interim order, allowed the Trust to admit students for 2017‑18 without hearing the Central Government or the MCI. The Supreme Court held that the High Court acted without jurisdiction, set aside its order, upheld the debarment, and ordered the Trust to compensate each admitted student Rs.10,00,000 plus a refund of fees, and imposed costs of Rs.25 lakhs. The Court also rejected the Trust’s request for permission for the 2018‑19 session. The judgment emphasized judicial propriety and discipline, condemning the High Court’s haste and disregard for procedural fairness.

Issues considered

The High Court’s authority to pass an interim order permitting admission of students contrary to the Supreme Court’s earlier direction.
Whether the debarment of the institution for the academic years 2017‑18 and 2018‑19 is legally valid.
Whether the institution is liable to compensate students admitted in violation of the debarment.
The propriety of the High Court’s procedure in denying the Central Government and MCI an opportunity to be heard.

Subjects

judicial proprietyjudicial disciplinemedical council of Indiadebarmentstudent compensationinterim orderSupreme CourtHigh Courtmedical educationacademic session

Judgment

(2017] ll S.C.R. 92

A MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA
v.
Q.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 19662 of 2017)
B NOVEMBER 23, 2017
(DIPAI<i MISRA, C.JI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.)
Judicial Propriety/Judicial Discipline:
Medical institution debarred from admitting students for
c academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19 by order dared 31.05.2017
- Writ petition by respondent-instillllion - High Court directed Central
Government to reconsider the issue of letter of permission granted
to the institutir,m - Cemral Government by its order dated 19.08.2017
confirmed its order dated 31.05.2017 - Writ petition 11/Art. 32 by
D the inslitutiof/ - Petition withdrawn with permission to approach
High Court 11/Art. 226 - Supreme Court by its order dated
28.08.2017. 1~hi/e permitting to withdraw the petition, made it clear
that the High Court, while entertaining the writ petition shall not
pass any interim order pertaining to the academic year 2UI 7-18 -
Writ petition .filed u!Art. 226 - High Court quashing the orders dated
E
19.08.:!017 and 31.05.201 7, granted permission to the respundent-
institution to admit students for academic session 2017-18 - On
appeal, held: Despite the order of Supreme Court dated 28.08.2017,
the High Court permitted the institution to admit students for academic
year 2017-18 that too without giving any opportunity to Central
F Government and Medical Council of India lo rep(v - The impugned
judgment shows unnecessary and uncalled for hun:v. unjustified
haste and unreasonable sense of pron1ptitude ~ Judicial propriel)'
requires judicial discipline - A Judge is expected tu abandon his
personal notion or i111pression gathered from su~jective experience
- The process of ac(judicalion lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of
G
materials sans emotions - The High Omrt had no reason to abandon
the concept of judicial propriety and transgress the nil es - If the
instit11tion has admitted students, they are debarred from continuing
in the course - However, the institution is directed to compensate
such students by paying Rs. 10,00,00VI- to each student apart from
H
92
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 93
& ORS.

rejimding their fees - The prayer in respect of academic session A
2018-19, is also rejected - Ed11cation!Ed11cational Institutions.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The contmt of the order of Supreme Court dated
28.08.2017 is graphically clear. The High Court was not allowed
to pass any interim order pertaining to the Academic Session B
2017-2018, but the Division Bench of the High Court, for some
unfathomable and inscrutable reason, allowed the prayer. Before
the High Court, time was sought on behalf of the Central
Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits. The same
was denied and the contesting parties were deprived of the c
opportunity to contest. The judgment was delivered without
waiting for the reply from the Central Government or MCI. The
judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary and uncalled for
hurry, unjustified haste and an unreasonable sense of promptitude
possibly being oblivious of the fact that the stand of the Medical
Council of India and the Central Government could not be given D
indecent burial when they were parties on record. Such a
procedure cannot be countenanced in law. [Para 8][99-H; 100-A-
D]
2. The judicial propriety requires judicial discipline. In the
absence of a reply tiled by the Medical Council of India and the E
Central Government, it could not have been possible to answer
the factual matrix of the case. What is not possible, is not possible.
In respect of the cases where renewal was granted. In any case,
granting renewal for 2017-2018 and confirmation of letter of
permission for 2016-2017 was totally unwarranted. [Para 91(100-
E-F] F

3. The adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to
a state as if they dragged themselves to the realm of "willing
suspension of disbelieP'. Possibly, they assumed that they could
do what they intended to do. A Judge cannot think in terms of
"what pleases the Prince has the force of law". The law docs not G
allow so, for law has to be observed by requisite respect for law.
[Para 9][100-G-H]
Shiv Moha11 Singh ~: The State (Delhi Administration)
(1977) 2 SCC 238 : [1977] 3 SCR 172; Om Prakash
Chautala v. Kanwar Bhan (2014) 5 SCC 417 : [201<1] H
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I l S.C.R.

A l SCR 939: Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem
Heavy Engineering Works (P) ltd. and Am: ( 1997) 6
SCC 450 : [1997) l Su pp!. SCR 184 - relied on.
Quillen v. Board of Education 115 NYS 2d 122, 126
(1952) - referred to.
B "fl,!J: Justice Frankfurter : 'A Heritage for all Who Love
the Law·· by Clark, Tom C.. 51A.B.A.J.330, 332 (1965):
Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert f-1. Jackson,
55 Columbia Law Review (April, 1955) p. 436 -
referred to.
c 4. A Judge is expected to abandon his 11ersonal notion or
impression gathered from subjective experience. The process
of adjudication lays emphasis on the wise scrutiny of materials
sans emotions. A studied analysis of facts and evidence is a
categorical imperative. Deviation from them is likely to increase
D the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality to take
justice to her coffin. )Para 15Jl102-F]
5. The Division of High Court Bench had no reason to
abandon the concept of judicial propriety and transgress the rules
and further proceed on a path where it was not required to. Such
E
things create ,institutional problems and the Judges shall be
guided by it. (rara 18][103-C-DI

·. 6. As this Court had stayed the operation of the order at
the interim stl)ge and further directed that if the Institution had
admitted students they were debarred from continuing in the
course. The same stands confirmed. The students who were
F
given admission by the institution that had taken recourse to
unholy and uncalled for practice should not be allowed to suffer
and arc to be compensated. Therefore, the respondent-institution
is directed to pay Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students who had
taken admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally, as
G the conduct of the l" respondent, is absolutely blameworthy, costs
of Rs.25 lacs is imposed to be deposited before this Court. [Para
17][102-G; 103-A-C]
7. As far as the prayer of the institution as regards the
Academic Session 2018-2019 is concerned, it docs not deserve
H consideration and, accordingly, stands rejected. An unscrupulous
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 95
& ORS.

litigant who conceived tbe idea of paving the path of his own A
desire, moving according to his design, proceeding as per his
whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning any sense
of prudence cannot be leniently dealt with. It is the duty of the
Court to take stringent action, for he bas polluted the purity
attached to the justice dispensation system and sullied the majesty
B
of law. [Para 1811103-D-E]
Case Law Reference
[1977] 3 SCR 172 relied on Para 12
[2014] I SCR 939 relied on Para 13
c
[1997] I Su11pl. SCR 184 relied on Para 14
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 19662
of2017.
From the J udgmcnt and Order dated 01.09.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad, at Lucknow in Misc. Bench No. 20275 of D
2017.
Vikas Singh. Sr. Adv., Gaurav Sharma, Dhawal Mohan, Prutcck
Bhatia, Abhishek, Ms. Mansi Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.
Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Advs., Amit Kumar,
E
Ms. Harshika Verma, D. N. Goburcihan, G. Govcradhan, Ms. Liz Mathew.
M. F. Philip. Sarad Kr. Singhania. Gurmect Singh Makkcr, Puncet Jain,
Mrs. Pratibha Jain. Somesh Chandra Jha. Ad vs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DIPAK MISRA, CJ! I. Leave granted. F
2. The present appeal frescoes the scenario where one is tempted
to quote a few lines from what has been stated in Quillen v. Bo11rd of
Ed11clltio11 1• It reads thus:-
"Thc distinction between the gourmet and the gourmand is as
neat and decisive in the prosaic realm of negotiation as in the G
festive sphere of gastronomic enjoyment- attempting to satisfy
an unrestrained or exaggerated appetite in either field may prove
discomforting if not disastrous."

'115NYS2dl22.126 (1952)
H
96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I l S.C.R.

A The purpose of referring to the same is to highlight the unrestrained
and exaggerated appetite. When the factual matrix would be unrolled,
the greed mall its colours shall come to the forefront.
3. The present appeal by special leave calls in questwn the legal
acceptability of the order dated 0 l" September 2017 passed by a Divis10n
B Bench of the High Court ofAllahabad, Lucknow Bench m Misc. Bench
No.13530 of2017 whereby the High Court has quashed the order dated
l ':I"' August 2017 as well as order dated 31" May 2017 passed by the
Central Govunment and eventually granted permission to the l"
respondent to admit students for the Academic Session 2017-201 8.
c 4. When the matter was listed on 06"' September 2017, this Court
had passed the following order:
"Issue notice fixing a returnable date within four weeks.
As Mr. Maninder Singh, learned Additional Solicitor Genernl
for respondent No.3-Union oflndia and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, kamed
D senior counsel has entered appearance on behalf of respondent
N o.1 and 2, no fmiher notice need be issued.
As far as respondent No.5 and 6 arc concerned, let notice be
issued.
Dasti in addition is permitted.
E
As an interim order, it is directed that there shall be stay of
the operation of order dated l" September, 20 l 7 further corrected
on 4'" $cptcmbcr 2017.
If the Institution has admitted students they are debarred from
F continuing in the course. We have passed this order as we while
disposing of the writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the
Constitution had passed the following order:-
'Le;imed counsel for the petitioners seeks leave of this Court
to withdraw the writ petition to approach the High Court under
G A1ticle 226 of the Constitution of India.
The writ petition is permitted to be withdrawn. However, it is
made clear that the High Comt, while entertaining the writ
petition, shall not pass any interim order pertaining to the
academic year 2017-2013.'
H
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 97
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!]

We really fail to fathom the manner in which lhe High Court A
has misconstrued our order and passed the final order for 2017-
2018. We arc issuing notice only to test the propriety of the order
and also ifthe Institution is eligible to get the renewal of letter of
permission for 2018-20 19."
The aforesaid order eloquently reflects the shock expressed by B
this Court. As is ret1ectible from the aforesaid, notice was issued only to
test the propriety of the order and also if the institution is eligible to get
the renewal for 20 l 8-2019.
5. We shall initially address the first issue. To adjudge the issue of
propriety of the order passed by the High Court, we arc compelled to c
travel in a time machine. The respondent-institution had filed a writ
petition, i.e., Writ Petition (Civil) No.13530 of2017 before the High Court
and was dealt with by the Division Bench of the High Court on 08 11'
August 2017. On that day, the following order came to be passed:
"In reference to order dated 4.8.2017, the Central Government, D
as per the instructions received by Mr. Asit Kumar Chaturvedi,
learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent no. l, has
agreed to entertain the petitioners' matter along with other similar
matters and consider it to revaluatc the recommendations/views
of the MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight
Committee as available on record for grant of approval to the E
petitioner-institution to admit the students in MBBS Course, after
affording an opportunity ofhcaring to th~ petitioner-institution to
the extent necessary. To facilitate the Central Government, the
whole paragraph 25 of the judgment in which directive has been
issued by the Supreme Court is reproduced below: F
'25. In the above persuasive premise, the Central Government
is hereby ordered to consider afresh the materials on record
pertaining to the issue of confirmation or otherwise of the letter
of permission granted to the petitioner colleges/institutions. We
make it clear that in undertaking this exercise, the Central G
Government would revaluate the recommendations/views of
the MCI, Hearing Committee, DGHS and the Oversight
Committee, as available on records. It would also afford an
opportunity ofhearing to the petitioner colleges /institutions to
the extent necessary. The process ofhearing and final reasoned
H
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] I l S.C.R.

A decision thereon, as ordered, would be completed peremptorily
within a period of I0 days from today. The parties would
unfailing co-operate in compliance of this direction tu meet the
time frame fixed.'
Therefore, we also direct the Central Government lo consider
B the petitioners' matter accordingly within seven days as framed
by Hon'blc the Supreme Court.
The m~llter is listed before Hon 'ble the Supreme Comt on
24.8.2017.
We, therefore, also direct the regislly to list this matter on
c 28.8.2017."
6. In pursuance of the aforesaid order. taking note of the
deficiencies, the Central Government passed the following order on
19.8.2017:
"17. Now, in compliance with the above direction of Court, the
D
Ministry granted hearing to the college on 16.08.2017. The
Hearing Committee after considering the records and oral &
written submission of the college submitted its report to the
Ministry. The findings of the Hearing Committee are as under-
The Committee notes that there was no deficiency of faculty
E
and residents as per MCI assessment report. The findings of the
assessor indicate some deficiency of clinical material and the
observance of hospital protocols.
During the course of hearing, the college produced certain
documents contesting the findings of the assessors. The
F
Committee perused the case sheet of single normal delivery on
the day of inspection as shown by the college. The delivery of
Ms. Sameerun was performed without blood transfusion and the
mother was discharged without treatment of anacmcia when she
was severely anaemic at the time of admission with a haemoglobin
G level of 6.5 gm%. This is gross negligence. Further, the college
could not produce any Government issued birth certificates in
support of their claim of average number of deliveries.
The inept handling of patients in the hospital is further confirmed
during the perusal of cases pertaining to casualty and ICUs. The
H
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. G.C.R.G. MEMORIAL TRUST 99
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJ!]

college could not satisfy regarding the patients in casualty wards. A
None of the 3 patients in !CCU seemed to have cardiac history.
The pulse rate of one of the patient who was a PSVT (tachycardia)
case was noted as 72/min at the time of admission. NO
investigation was done. Other two patients with diagnosis of
Kyphoscoliosis (spinal deformity) and vestibular neuritis (car B
problem) were also admitted in the cardiac ICU. This confirms
the finding of assessors and the college had no explanation. It is
understood that as per MSR, the requirement is for requisite
number of beds in ICUs, however, the college seem to be
employing doubtful measures to show patients.
It was also noted that the college was neither aware nor following c
the provisions qfbiomcdical waste (BMW) rules.
The explanation offered by the college in obtaining 14 cadavers
from 'Dcra Saccha Sauda' Sirsa, Haiyana without requisite
permission and death certificates is a serious issue to be looked
into by the concerned authorities. D

In view of the above, despite the fact that no deficiency of
faculty and residents is noted, the functioning of the hospital as
per norms is in serious doubt and the Committee agrees with the
decision of the Ministry vidc letter dated 31.05.2017 to debar the
college for two years and also permit MCI to encash bank E
guarantee.
18. Accepting the recommendations of the Hearing Committee,
the Ministry reiterates its earlier decision dated 31.05.2017 to debar
the college from admitting students for a period of two years i.e.
2017-18 and 2018-19 and also to authorize NCI to encash the F
Bank Guarantee of Rs.2 Crore."
7. As the facts would further uncurtain, the institution filed a petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution before this Court and chose to
withdraw the same to approach the High Cou11 under Article 226 of the
Constitution. The said order has already been quoted while reproducing G
the order dated 06.09 .20 l 7.
8. The content of the order dated 28.08.2017 is graphically clear.
The High Court was not allowed to pass any interim order pertaining to
the Academic Session 2017-2018 but the Division Bench of the High
H
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] l 1 S.C.R.

A Court, for some unfathomable and inscrmable reason. referred to certain
judgments of this Court and allowed the prayer. It is beyond our
comprehension as ro how the High Court could have even remotely
thought of passing an order granting the Letter of Permission for the
Academic Session 2016-2017 and renewal for 2017-2018. It is worthy
to mention here that before the High Court, time was sought on behalf
B
of the Central Government and the MCI to file counter affidavits. The
same was denied and the contesting parties were deprived of the
opportunity to contest. Be it noted, the writ petition that was filed before
this Court was withdrawn on 28'h August, 2017 and a fresh writ was
filed before the High Court on 29'" August 2017 and the judgment was
c delivered without waiting for the reply from the Central Gowrnment or
MCI on OP' September 2017. ll is clear as the cloudless sky that the
judgment of the High Court shows unnecessary and uncalled for hurry,
unjustified haste and an unreasonable sense of promptitude possibly being
oblivious of the fact that the stand of the Medical Council oflndia and
the Central Government could not be given indecent burial when they
D
were parties on record. Such a procedure cannot be countenanced in
law.
9. The wntroversy cannot be allowed to end with our aforesaid
finding. The judicial propriety requires judicial discipline. In the absence
of a reply filed by the Medical Council of India and the Central
E Government. it could not have been possible to answer the factual matrix
of the case. What is not possible, is not possible. We may hasten to add
that in respect of the cases where renewal was granted, Mr. Vikas
Singh would submit that the deficiency was within the permissible limit
but in the present case, it was not so and in any case, granting renewal
F for 20 I 7-20 l 8 and confirmation of letter of permission for 2016-2017
was totally unwarranted. In most of the cases. this Court has directed
forre-inspection by the MCI which would then take a final decision for
the academic year 20 l 8-20 I 9. It is a most w1fortunate situation that the
Division Bench has paved such a path. One cannot but say that the
adjudication by the Division Bench tantamounts to a state as if they
G dragged themselves to the realm of "willing suspension of disbelief'.
Possibly. they assumed that they could do what they intended to do. A
Judge cannot think in terms of"what pleases the Prince has the force of
law". Frankly speaking, the law does not allow so, for law has to be
observed by requisite respect for law.
H
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 101
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJJ)

IO. In this context. we may note the eloquent statement of Benjamin A
Cardozo who said:
"The judge is not a knight errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his
own ideal of beauty and goodness."
11. In this regard, the profound statement ofFclix Frankfurter' is
apposite to reproduce: B

"For the highest exercise of judicial duty is to subordinate one's
personal pulls and one's private views to the law of which we are
all guardians -those impersonal convictions that make a society a
civilized community, and not the victims of personal rule."
c
The learned Judge has further stated':
"What becomes decisive to a Justice's functioning on the Court in
the large area within which his individuality moves is his general
attitude toward law, the habits of the mind that he has formed or
is capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment. his
D
temperament or training for putting his passion behind his judgment
instead of in front of it. The attitudes and qualities which I am
groping to charncterize are ingredients of what compendiously
might be called dominating humility."
12. In Shiv Mohan Singh v. The State (Delhi Admi11istratio11) 4 ,
E
the Coui1 has observed:
" ... a Judge even when he is free, is still not wholly free; he is not
to innovate at pleasure; he is not a knight-errant roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness; he is to draw
inspiration from consecrated principles' ... "
F
13. In this context, we may refer with profit the authority in Om
Pr11kaslr Cl11111t11la v. K1111w11r B/11111' wherein it has been stated:
"19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not to be
guided by any kind ofnotion. The decision-making process expects
a Judge or an adjudicator to apply restraint, ostracise perceptual G
1
Clark, Ton1 C., •·Mr. Justice Frankfurter:' A Heritage for all Who Love the La,v", 51
A.BAJ. 330. 332 (1965)
'Foreword, lo Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law Review (April,
1955)p.436.
'(1977)2 SCC238
'(2014)5SCC417
H
i02 SUPREME COURT REPORTS i2017] l i S.C.R.

A subjectivity. make one ·s emotions subservient to one's reasoning
and think dispassionately. He is expected to be guided by the
established norms ofjudicial process and decorum."
And again:
"20. A Judge should abandon his passion. He must constantly
B remind himself that he has a singular master "duty to truth" and
such truth is to be arrived at within the legal parameters. No
heroism, no rhetorics."
14. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Hea11y
Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and anotlier'', the three-Judge Bench
c observed:
"32. When a position in law is well settled as a result of judicial
pronouncement of this Co wt, it would amow1t to judicial impropriety
to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts
to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order
D which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Suchjudieial
adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the
tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled
principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has
the cffoct of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of
E the panics. It is time that this tendency stops."
15. The aforcstatcd thoughts arc not only meaningfully pregnant
but also expressively penetrating. They clearly expound the role of a
Judge, especially the effort ofundcrstanding and attitude of judging. A
Judge is expected to abandon his personal notion or impression gathered
from subjective experience. The process of adjudication lays emphasis
F
on the wise scrutiny of materials sans emotions. A studied analysis of
facts and evidence is a categorical imperative. Deviation from them is
likely to increase the individual gravitational pull which has the potentiality
to take justice to her coflin.
16. As is perceptible, we had stayed the operation of the order at
G
the interim stage and further directed that if the Institution had admitted
students they were debarred from continuing in the course. The same
stands confirmed.

"( 19971 6 sec 450
H
MEDICAL COUNCIL OF INDIA v. GC.R.G MEMORIAL TRUST 103
& ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

17. Further, the question that remains to be adjudicated is whether A
the students who were given admission by the institution that had taken
recourse to unholy and uncalled for practice should be allowed to suffer.
We think not. Students are to be compensated. They had paid the fees.
Hopes were kindled in their hearts and aspirations in their mind. Their
young minds_ were polluted by the institution and, therefore, we direct B
the respondent-institution to pay Rs.10,00,000/- to each of the students
who had taken admission apart from refunding their fees. Additionally,
as the conduct of the I" respondent, namely, GC.R.G. Memorial Trust,
is absolutely blameworthy, we impose costs ofRs.25 lacs to be deposited
before this Court within eight weeks hence.
18. Before parting, it is necessary to add and repeat that the c
Division Bench had no reason to abandon the concept ofjudicial propriety
and transgress the rules and further proceed on a path where it was not
required to. Such things create institutional problems and we are sure
that the learnce! Judges shall be guided by it. As far as the prayer of the
institution as regards the Academic Session 2018-2019 is concerned, it D
does nqt deserve consideration and, accordingly, stands rejected. We
.say so as an unscrupulous litigant who conceived the idea of paving the
path of his own desire, moving according to his design, proceeding as
per hi~ whim and marching ahead with brazenness abandoning any sense
of prudence cannot be leniqntly dealt with. It is the duty of the Court to
take stringent action, for he has polluted the purity attached to the justice E
dispensation system and sullied the majesty oflaw.
19. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the appeal stands allowed.
Costs. as already assessed.

Kalpana K. Tripa1hy Appeal allowed.