MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.versusSMT. RAJ KUMARI BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

                  [2010) 10 S.C.R. 1113


         MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.                        A
                           v.
  SMT. RAJ KUMARI BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. &
                         ORS.
           (Civil Appeal No. 10249 of 2003)
                                                              B
                  SEPTEMBER 8, 2010
     [MARKANDEY KATJU AND T.S. THAKUR, JJ.]

      Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 21 rr. 66(2), 72 and
 85 - Violation of - Decree - Attachment of property of C
judgment-debtor and issuance of sale proclamation -
Proceedings for auction sale - Sale of property in favour of
decree-holder on basis of compromise/adjustment between
the parties - Confirmation of sale and issuance of sale
certificate by executing court -Challenge to, on the ground D
of violation of the provisions of Or. 21 rr. 66(2), 72 and 85 -
 On appeal, held: Said issues were decided in three round of
proceedings - In the first round, issue as regards confirmation
of sale in favour of decree holder, grant of sale certificate to
her as a/so compromise recorded in execution proceedings E
 was declared to be valid - Said issue attained finality and
cannot be re-agitated - Decree under execution was held to
 be a mortgage decree - In second round, executing court
held that the decree continued to subsist till judgment-debtor
 delivered possession of premises in terms of compromise F
 and the court accordingly issued warrants for delivery of
possession to decree holder- Said order a/so attained finality
- In the third round, application by decree holder was held to
be within time and maintainable in law - It cannot be said that
since the first appeal filed by judgment-debtor in the third G
round was dismissed in limini, by a non-speaking order,
 appellate court ought to have remitted the matter to Single
Judge of High Court - Since the litigation was three decades
old, appellate court decided to resolve the matter on merits
                           1113                               H
    1114    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A rather than remitting it back - Thus, interference under Article
  136 not called for - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 136
  - Auction - Decree - Appeal - Judgment/order - Non-
  speaking order.

       Judgment/order - Recording of reasons in appealable
8
  orders:. Requirement of- Held: Recording of reasons in such
  cases is very important - Appellate court or authority ought
  to have advantage of examining reasons that prevailed with
  the court or the authority making the order - Absence of
C reasons in appealable order deprives appellate court or
  authority of that advantage and casts an onerous
  responsibility upon it to examine and determine the question
  on its own - Appellate court or authority may in a given case
  decline to undertake any such exercise and remit the matter
  back to lower court or authority for a fresh and reasoned order
D - Remands are usually avoided if appellate court is of the view
  that it will prolong the litigation - Appeal - Delayllaches.

      The respondent-plaintiff filed a recovery suit against
  the appellant-defendant and the same was decreed. In the
E execution of the decree, the defendant's property was
  attached and sold in public auction in favour of the
  decree-holder. The judgment-debtor filed objection to the
  legality of the auction, but during its pendency, the parties
  entered into a compromise that the decree holder would
F deposit a sum of Rs.35,000/- for payment to the judgment
  debtor, whereupon the latter would handover to the
  decree holder the vacant possession of the property. The
  judgment-debtor filed an application for setting aside the
  compromise as also an application for setting aside the
G sale for non-compliance of Or. 21 rr. 72 and 85 of CPC.
  The executing court confirmed the sale in favour of the
  decree-holder on basis of the compromise between the
  parties. The said order attained finality. Thereafter, the
  judgment-debtor filed fresh objections before the

H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARI 1115
        BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

executing court that the said property was exempt from         A
attachment and sale because it was a residential
premises, thus, the decree was a simple money decree.
The executing court held that the confirmation of sale and
issue of the sale certificate in favour of the decree-holder
was legal and valid and that the decree-holder was             B
entitled to possession of the property sold in her favour.
It issued warrants for delivery of possession of the
property in favour of the decree-holder. The judgment-
debtor for the third time raised the objections to the
delivery of possession on the ground that there was no         c
decree for possession. The executing court held that the
said issues had already been decided against the
judgment-debtor by the earlier orders which had attained
finality; and that the application under Or. 21 r. 97 CPC
having been filed by the decree-holder within the              D
stipulated period of 30 days from the date of resistance
to the delivery of possession was maintainable\ The
judgment-debtor challenged the order. The Single Judge
of the High Court dismissed the the execution first
appeal. The Letters Patent Appeal was also dismissed.
                                                               E
Therefore, th·e appellant filed the instant appeal.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: 1.1 The view taken by the executing court and
by the High Court in regard to the issues relating to the      F
procedure adopted and the order passed by the
executing court up to the stage of confirmation of the sale
in favour of the decree-holder, attained finality with the
dismissal of the Special Leave Petition filed against the
said orders whereby the confirmation of sale in favour of      G
the decree-holder as also the grant of sale certificate to
her was declared to be valid. Any attempt to re-agitate the
very same questions that stand concluded by the said
judgment and orders is, therefore, futile if not a clear
abuse of the process of law. In particular, the decree
                                                               H
    1116   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2010] 10 S.C.R.

A under execution was held to be a mortgage decree. The
  executing court held that where the decree-holder was
  himself the purchaser, the requirement of making a
  deposit of 25% of the bid money was not attracted. The
  challenge to the compromise entered into between the
B parties on the ground that the same was fraudulent was
  repelled by the executing court and the compromise was
  held to be valid in law. [Para 8] [1125-G-H; 1126-A-E]

      Manila/ Mohan/a/ Shah and Ors. v. Sardar Syed Ahmed
C Sayed Mahmad and Anr. AIR 1954 SC 349 - referred to.

       1.2 In appeal against the order passed by the
  executing court whereby it confirmed the sale in favour
  of the decree-holder in accordance with the compromise
  between the parties, the Single Judge of the High Court
D upheld the view taken by the executing court and
  declared that a compromise could be recorded even in
  execution proceedings and that the bald allegations
  suggesting a fraud were wholly untenable. The dismissal
  of the Letters Patent Appeal and the Special Leave
E Petition against the said orders by this Court placed all
  these aspects beyond the pale of any further challenge
  or controversy. All contentions relating to the validity of
  the confirmation of sale in favour of the decree holder and
  the issue of a sale certificate in her favour which stood
F finally determined against the appellants in terms of the
  judgments and orders of the executing court and the
  High Court in the first round, stand concluded and cannot
  be re-agitated. [Para 8] [126-E-G]

      1.3 In the second round, the executing court once
G again examined the matter and rejected the fresh set of
  objections raised by the judgment-debtor. The executing
  court held that the questions raised by the judgment-
  debtor stood answered by the earlier orders passed by
  the executing court and upheld by the High Court in
H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMAR! 1117
        BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

appeal; and that the decree continued to subsist till the      A
judgment-debtor delivered possession of the premises in
terms of the compromise. The court accordingly issued
warrants for delivery of possession to the decree-holder.
The view taken by the executing court in the said order
also attained finality as no appeal or other proceedings       B
were filed against the same. Any effort to re-kindle the
controversy surrounding aspects which stand finally
decided must necessarily fail. [Para 9) [1126-H;1127-A-D]

      1.4 The third round of proceedings started with the      C
objections raised by the judgment-debtor leading to the
passing of an order by the executing court. The
executing court decided the issues in favour of the
decree holder and held that the application filed by the
decree-holder was within time and maintainable in law.
The said order when assailed before the High Court in          D
FAQ was upheld and the appeal was dismissed in limine
by the Single Judge of the High Court. The Letters Patent
Appeal assailing the said dismissal also met the same
fate. The Division Bench noted that the questions sought
to be raised in the third round of the proceedings had         E
been dealt with and answered against the judgment-
debtor in terms of the earlier orders passed by the
executing court and the appellate court in appeal. There
is nothing wrong with that view to warrant interference.
The High Court took pains to recall the history of the         F
litigation, the issues that were raised from time to time
and the judgments that determined those issues. It was
justified in taking the view that the judgment-debtor had
successfully prevented delivery of possession of the
property to the decree-holder for such a long time even        G
after the sale of the property in her favour which was
found by all the courts including this Court to be perfectly
valid in law. The argument that even after the sale was
declared to be legally valid, the decree-holder could not
demand delivery of possession, as the decree stood fully       H
   1118    SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A adjusted and satisfied, was also rightly rejected by the
  executing court against which the judgment-debtor
  sought no redress. [Para 10 & 11] [1127-E; 1128-8-F]

      2.1 There is a requirement that courts and indeed all
  such authorities, who exercise the power to determine
8
  the rights and obligations of individuals, must give
  reasons in support of their orders. In a system governed
  by the rule of law, there is nothing like absolute or
  unbridled power exercisable at the whims and fancies of
  the repository of such power. There is nothing like a
C power without any limits or constraints. That is so even
  when a court or other authority may be vested with wide
  discretionary power, for even discretion has to be
  exercised only along well recognized and sound juristic
  principles with a view to promote fairness, inducing
D transparency and aiding equity. [Paras 13 and 14] [1129-
  C; 1130-8-D)
       Hindustan Times Limited v. Union of India and Ors. 1998
  (2) SCC 242; Arun s/o Mahadeorao Damka v. Addi. Inspector
E General of Police and Anr. 1986 (3) SCC 696; Union of India
  and Ors. v. Jai Prakash Singh and Anr. 2007 (10) SCC 712;
  Secretary and Curator, Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah
  Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity and Ors. 2010 (3) SCC 732; Ram
  Phal v. State of Haryana and Ors. 2009 (3) SCC 258;Director,
F Horticulture Punjab and Ors. v. Jagjivan Parshad 2008 (5) ,
  sec 539 - referred to.
       2.2 The first and the most effective check against
  arbitrary exercise of power is that the orders can be made
  only after due and proper application of mind. Application
G of mind brings reasonableness not only to the exercise
  of power but to the ultimate conclusion also. Application
  of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure of the
  mind which is best demonstrated by recording reasons
  in support of the order or conclusion. [Para 15) [1130-E]
H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARI 1119
        BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

     2.3 Recording of reasons in cases where the order            A
is subject to further appeal is very important from yet
another angle. An appellate court or the authority ought
to have the advantage of examining the reasons that
prevailed with the court or the authority making the order.
Conversely, absence of reasons in an appealable order             B
deprives the appellate court or the authority of that
advantage and casts an onerous responsibility upon it
to examine and determine the question on its own. An
appellate court or authority may in a given case decline
to undertake any such exercise and remit the matter back          c
to the lower court or authority for a fresh and reasoned
order. However, it is not an inflexible rule, for an appellate
court may notwithstanding the absence of reasons in
support of the order under appeal before it examines the
matter on merits and finally decide the same at the               D
appellate stage. Whether or not the appellate court
should remit the matter is discretionary with the appellate
court and would largely depend upon the nature of the
dispute, the nature and the extent of evidence that may
have to be appreciated, the complexity of the issues that
arise for determination and whether remand is going to            E
result in avoidable prolongation of the litigation between
the parties. Remands are usually avoided if the appellate
court is of the view that it will prolong the litigation. [Para
16) [1130-F-H; 1131-A-C]
                                                                  F
     2.4 The appellate court appears to have decided
against remanding the matter to the Single Judge of the
High Court on the ground of absence of reasons in the
order passed by the latter because any such remand
would have only prolonged the agony of the parties. It is         G
clear that the appellate court was conscious of the fact
that the litigation had been prolonged for many years.
Therefore, it decided to resolve the matter on merits rather
than remitting the same back for a fresh disposal by the
                                                                  H
    1120   SUPREME COURT REPORTS           [201 OJ 10 S.C.R.

A Single Judge of the High Court. In as much as the
  appellate court adopted that approach it did not commit
  any mistake to warrant interference under Article 136 of
  the Constitution. The litigation between the parties
  having continued for three decades, the discretion vested
B in the appellate court and was rightly exercised by it.
  [Para 17] [1131-D-F]

      Desh Bandhu Gupta v. N.L. Anand 1994 (1) SCC 131;
  Mahakal Automobiles and Anr.- v. Kishan Swaroop Sharma
  2008 (13) SCC 113; Ambati Narasaya v. M. Subba Rao 1989
C (Suppl.) 2 SCC 693; S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath
  1994 (1) SCC 1; AR. Antulay v. R.S. Naik and Anr. 1988 (2)
  sec 602 - referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:
D      1994 (1) sec 131          Referred to.      Para 6
       2000 (13) sec 113         Referred to.      Para 7
       1989 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 693 Referred to.        Para 7
E      1994 (1) sec 1            Referred to.      Para 7
       1988 (2) sec 602          Referred to.      Para 7
       AIR 1954 SC 349           Referred to.      Para 8
       1998 (2) sec 242          Referred to.      Para 13
F
       1986 (3) sec 696          Referred to.      Para 13
       2001 (10) sec 112         Referred to.      Para 13
       2010 (3) sec 132          Referred to.      Para 13
G
       2009 (3) sec 258          Referred to.      Para 13
       2000 (5) sec 539          Referred to.      Para 13


H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1121
        BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS.

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                   A
10249 of 2003.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 05.10.2001 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in L.P .A. No. 167 of
1989.                                                                 B
     R.K. Kappor, Ramraghvendra (for Anis Ahmed Khan) for
the Appellants.

    Arvind Verma, Arvind Minocha, Veena Minocha, Randhir
Singh for the Respondents.                                            C

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. This appeal by special leave arises
out of an order passed by a Division Bench of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana whereby Letters Patent Appeal No.167            D
of 1989 filed by the appellants has been dismissed with costs.
The facts giving rise to the present appeal have been set out
at length in the order impugned in this appeal hence call for no
repetition except to the extent the same is absolutely necessary.
What is striking about the case is that a decree passed in            E
favour of the respondent as far back as on 25th October, 1976
remains to be executed even aft'.'lr the lapse of 34 years during
which period the decree holder as also the judgment debtor
have both passed away leaving behind the legacy of litigation
to the next generation. The chequered history of a bitter fight       F
which has brought the parties to this Court for the second time
amply demonstrates that the real troubles of a plaintiff start only
after he obtains a decree, thanks to the long winding legal
procedure and the ingenuity of the lawyers who often exploit the
same to the benefit of one party at the cost of the other.            G

     2. A suit filed by Late Raj Kumari the plaintiff for recovery
of a sum of Rs.60,000/- was decreed in her favour with costs
by the Trial Court on 25th October, 1976 against Hans Raj,
defendant now deceased. In execution of the said decree SCF
                                                                      H
    1122     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A No.9, Sector 27-D, Chandigarh was attached and finally sold
  in a public auction on 17th April, 1978, for a sum of Rs.82,000/
  - in favour of the decree holder who was permitted by the
  Executing Court to participate in the auction. The judgment
  debtor filed his objections challenging the legality of the auction,
B but while the same were pending consideration, the parties put
  in a written compromise on 16th June, 1979 which, inter alia,
  provided that the decree holder would deposit a sum of
  Rs.35,000/- for payment to the judgment debtor, whereupon the
  latter shall handover to the decree holder the vacant possession
c of the property aforementioned that stood attached. The
  Executing Court recorded the statement of the parties in support
  of the compromise and adjourned the matter for passing final
  orders. But before any such order could be made the judgment
  debtor filed an application with a prayer for setting aside the
  compromise on the ground that the same was void ab-initio and
0
  had been brought about by fraud. Another application filed by
  him prayed for setting aside of the 1sale. for non-compliance with
  the provisions of Order XXI Rules 72 and 84 of the C.P.C. The
  decree holder also moved an application for passing final
E orders in terms of the compromise stating that he had deposited
  the bank drafts for a total sum of Rs.35,000/- as the judgment
  debtor had refused to accept the said amount.

        3. The Executing Court finally made an order on 30th
  August 1979 whereby it confirmed the sale in favour of the
F decree holder in accordance with the compromise between the
  parties. Aggrieved, the judgment debtor filed FAO No.502 of
  1979 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. The appeal
  failed and the contention urged before the High Court that the
  compromise entered into between the parties was vitiated by
G fraud was repelled. The High Court further held that the sale in
  favour of the decree holder was not in violation of the provisions
  of Order XXI, Rules 84 and 85 of CPC. A Letters Patent
  Appeal filed against the order passed by the learned Single
  Judge also failed and was dismissed on 18th November, 1981.
H A Special Leave Petition against the said two orders was
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1123 .:·
 BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

dismissed by this Court in limine on 5th January, 1982 thereby       A
bringing finality to the question of legality of the sale of the
property in favour of the decree holder on the basis of the
compromise/adjustment arrived at between the parties.

     4. The judgment debtor then filed fresh objections before
                                                                     8
the Executing Court, inter alia, contending that the property
bearing SCF No.9, Sector 27-D, Chandigarh, was exempt from
attachment and sale, the same being a residential premises
and the decree in question being a simple money decree. The
decree holder also moved an application for restoration of the
execution proceedings which had been adjourned sine die and          C
the execution file consigned to record, on account of stay issued
by the High Court in the earlier proceedings. The Executing
Court formulated the points that arose for determination and
answered the same against the judgment debtor in terms of its
order dated 25th September, 1984. It held that the confirmation      D
of sale and issue of the sale certificate in favour of the decree
holder was legal and valid and that the decree holder was
entitled to possession of the property sold in her favour.
Resultantly, the Executing Court issued warrants for delivery of
possession of the property in question in favour of the decree       E
holder.

      5. The delivery of posses::;1on was for the third time
resisted by the judgment debtor on the ground that there was
no decree for possession. The Executing Court dealt with these       F
objections in its order dated 5th October, 1987 and noted that
the issues raised by the judgment debtor had already been
decided against him by the earlier orders of the Executing Court
dated 30th August, 1979 and 25th September, 1984 which
orders had attained finality. It also held that application dated    G
22nd January, 1985 under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC having been
filed by the decree holder within the stipulated period of 30 days
from the date of resistance to the delivery of possession was
maintainable. The above order was assailed by the judgment
debtor in Execution First Appeal which was dismissed by a
                                                                     H
    1124     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   learned Single Judge of the High Court on 26th September,
    1988. A Letters Patent Appeal preferred against the said order
    also failed and was dismissed on 5th October, 2001. The
    present appeal assails the correctness of the said order as
    noticed earlier.
B
          6. Appearing for the appellant Mr. R.K. Kapoor strenuously
    argued that the Executing Court had committed a serious
    irregularity in the matter of directing attachment of property of
    the judgment debtor and issuing a sale proclamation. He
    contended that since the proclamation of sale was itself
C   fraudulent and in complete violation of the provisions of Rule
    66(2) Order XXI all the subsequent proceedings of auction sale,
    its confirmation and issuance of certificate etc. were a nullity
    in the light of the judgment of this Court in Desh Bandhu Gupta
    v. N.L. Anand 1994 (1) SCC 131. He further contended that
D   the Executing Court had permitted the decree holder to
    participate in the auction of the property in question in violation
    of Order XXI Rule 72-A. He urged that if the decree in favour
    of the decree holder was a mortgage decree, it was essential
    for the Court to fix a reserve price which it had not fixed. The
E   order permitting the decree holder to participate in the auction
    proceedings was, therefore, illegal and without jurisdiction
    argued Mr. Kapoor. It was further submitted that the decree
    holder was bound to deposit 25% of the amount offered by him
    in terms of Order XXI Rule 84(1) CPC which was not deposited
F   and that the transfer of the execution petition pending in the
    Court of Sub Judge to the Court of Sub Judge, First Class
    where the execution proceedings arising out of the earlier
    decree were pending without notice to the judgment debtor was
    illegal. He also referred to the various interim orders passed
G   by the Executing Court to show that the Court had acted
    arbitrarily and thereby illegally deprived the judgment debtor of
    his property.

        7. Relying upon the decision of this Court in Mahakal
    Automobiles and Anr. v. Kishan Swaroop Sharma 2008 (13)
H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1125
 BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

sec 113 it was urged by Mr. Kapoor that notice upon the              A
judgment debtor whose property was being sold was necessary
and any sale in the absence of such notice was a nullity.
Reliance was also placed on the decisions of this Court in
Ambati Narasaya v. M. Subba Rao 1989 (Suppl.) 2 SCC 693,
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath 1994 (1) SCC 1,                B
A.R. Antu/ay v. R.S. Naik and Anr. 1988 (2) SCC 602, in
support of the submission that the procedure adopted by the
 Executing Court was neither just nor fair and not even in
accordance with the provisions of the CPC. Mr. Kapoor also
made a grievance against the dismissal of the first appeal           c
preferred by the judgment debtor in limine, by a non-speaking
order. He submitted that although the Division Bench had while
disposing of the Letters Patent Appeal by the impugned
judgment gone into the merits of the contentions urged by the
appellant yet the same did not cure the defect in the order          D
passed by the Single Judge whereby the first appeal filed by
the appellant had been dismissed without recording any
reasons.

      8.The litigation between the parties has a chequered
history and has passed through different stages. The first stage     E
led to an order of attachment of the property in question, issue
of a sale proclamation, confirmation of the sale in favour of the
decree holder by the Executing Court and the grant of sale
certificate to her. Except two, each one of the contentions urged
by Mr. Kapoor before us relate to the procedure adopted and          F
the order passed by the Executing Court up to the stage of
confirmation of the sale in favour of the decree holder. All these
contentions were urged by the appellants before the Executing
Court who rejected the same and before the High Court who
dismissed the appeals filed before it. The view taken by the         G
Executing Court and by the High Court in regard to the issues
raised by the appellants has attained finality with the dismissal
of the Special Leave Petition filed against the said orders
whereby the confirmation of sale in favour of the decree holder
as also the grant of sale certificate to her was declared to be      H
    1126     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A valid. Any attempt to re-agitate the very same questions that
  stand concluded by the said judgment and orders is therefore
  futile if not a clear abuse of the process of la.w. In particular the
  question whether the decree under executiop was a mortgage
  decree or a simple money decree, was answered in favour of
B the decree holder and the decree held to be a mortgage
  decree. Similarly the question whether non deposit of 25% of
  the bid amount by the decree holder, who was permitted to
  participate in the auction by the Executing Court rendered the
  sale in her favour was answered against the appellants herein.
C Relying upon the decision of this Court in Manila/ Mohan/al
  Shah & Ors. v. Sardar Syed Ahmed Sayed Mahmad and Anr.
  AIR 1954 SC 349, the Executing Court held that where the
  decree holder was himself the purchaser the requirement of
  making a deposit of 25% of the bid money was not attracted.
  So also the challenge to the compromise entered into between
0
  the parties on the ground that the same was fraudulent was
  repelled by the Executing Court and the compromise held to
  be valid in law. In appeal against the order dated 30.8.1979
  passed by the Executing Court, the learned Single Judge of the
  High Court affirmed the view taken by the Executing Court and
E declared that a compromise could be recorded even in
  execution proceedings and that the bald allegations suggesting
  a fraud were wholly untenable. The dismissal of the Letters
  Patent Appeal and the special leave petition against the said
  orders by this Court has placed all these aspects beyond the
F pale of any further challenge or controversy. It follows that all
  contentions relating to the validity of the confirmation of sale in
  favour of the decree holder and the issue of a sale certificate
  in her favour which stand finally determined against the
  appellants in terms of the judgments and orders of the Executing
G Court and the High Court in the first round, stand concluded &
  cannot be re-agitated. Reliance upon the decisions of this Court
  cited by Mr. Kapoor, is therefore of no assistance to him.

      9. In the second round which started with a fresh set of
H objections raised by the judgment debtor, the Executing Court
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1127
 BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

once again examined the matter and rejected the objections           A
by an order dated 25th September, 1984. The Executing Court
held that the questions raised by the judgment debtor stood
answered by the earlier orders passed by the Executing Court
and upheld by the High Court in appeal. The contention that the
compromise between the parties extinguished the decree and           B
was a complete adjustment within the meaning of Order XXI
Rule 2 was also repelled. The Court held that the decree
continued to subsist till the judgment debtor delivered
possession of the premises in terms of the compromise. The
court accordingly issued warrants for delivery of possession to      C
the decree holder. It is common ground that the view taken by
the Executing Court in the said order has also attained finality
as no appeal or other proceedings were filed against the same.
In the above background, any effort to rekindle the controversy
surrounding aspects which stand finally decided must                 D
necessarily fail.

       10. The third round of proceedings it is noteworthy started
11Vith the objections raised by the judgment debtor leading to the
passing of an order dated 5th October, 1987 by the Executing
Court. The Court formulated as many as 14 issues which the           E
judgment debtor sought to agitate in opposition to the execution
of the decree and held that all of them except Issue Nos. 7 and
9, stood decided by the Executing Court against the judgment
debtor in terms of its orders dated 30th August, 1979 and 25th
September, 1984. The Executing Court said:-                          F

     "In the light of the circumstances stated above, I am of the
     opinion that the contentions forming the subject matter of
     issue Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12 & 13 have already
     been gone into and decided against the JD on merits.            G
     Orders dated 30.8.1979 and 25.9.84 of Sarvshri B.C.
     Rajput and Jagroop Singh learned Sub-Judge, 1st Class,
     respectively in this behalf have become final and binding
     on the JD. It is thus no more open to me to go into these
     questions and decide them afresh. I therefore, do not feel
                                                                     H
    1128     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A        it necessary to dilate upon the case law cited quo these
         issues."

          11. As far as issues no.7 and 9 are concerned, the
    Executing Court decided the same also in favour of the decree
    holder and held that the application filed by the decree holder
B   was within time and maintainable in law. The said order when
    assailed before the High Court in FAQ No.502 of 1979 was
    upheld and the appeal dismissed in /imine by the learned
    Single Judge ,of the High Court. L'1tters Patent Appeal No.167
    of 1989 assai1ing the said dismissal also met the same fate.
C   The Division Bench noted that the questions sought to be raised
    in the third round of the proceedings had been dealt with and
    answered against the judgment debtor in terms of the earlier
    orders passed by the Executing Court and the Appellate Court
    in appeal. There is, in our opinion, nothing wrong with that view
D   to warrant interference. The High Court has taken pains to recall
    the history of the litigation, the issues that were raised from time
    to time and the judgments that determined those issues. It was
    justified in taking the view that the judgment debtor had
    successfully prevented delivery of possession of the property
E   to the decree holder for such a long time even after the sale of
    the property in her favour which was found by all the courts
    including this Court to be perfectly v.alid in law. The argument
    that even after the sale was declared to be legally valid, the
    decree holder could not demand delivery of possession, as the
F   decree stood fully adjusted and satisfied was also rightly
    rejected by the Executing Court, in its order dated 25.9.1984
    against which the judgment debtor had sought no redress.

        12. That brings us to the question whether the Division
  Bench of the High Court committed a mistake in ignoring the
G fact that the Single Judge who dismissed the first appeal filed
  by the judgment debtor had recorded no reasons in support of
  the order passed by him. It was, according to Mr. Kapoor,
  necessary for the Single Judge to give reasons in support of
  the order made by him howsoever brief the same may have
H
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1129
 BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]

been. The absence of any reason in the order passed by the          A
Single Judge was, argued the learned counsel, sufficient for the
Division Bench to set aside the same and remit the matter
back for a fresh disposal in accordance with law. In as much
as the Division Bench ignored that legal deficiency in the order
and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits, it committed a        B
mistake that ought to be corrected by this Court, was the only
submission made by Mr. Kapoor that merits consideration.

      13. The juristic basis underlying the requirement that
Courts and indeed all such authorities, as exercise the power       C
to determine the rights and obligations of individuals must give
reasons in support of their orders has been examined in a long
line of decisions rendered by this Court. In Hindustan Times
Limited v. Union of India & Ors. 1998 (2) SCC 242 the need
to give reasons has been held to arise out of the need to
minimize chances of arbitrariness and induce clarity. In Arun       D
s!o Mahadeorao Damka v. Addi. Inspector General of Police
& Anr. 1986 (3) SCC 696 the recording of reasons in support
of the order passed by the High Court has been held to inspire
public confidence in administration of justice, and help the Apex
Court to dispose of appeals filed against such orders. In Union     E
of India & Ors. ~ Jai Prakash-..Singh & Anr. 2007 (10) SCC
712, reasons were held to be live links between the mind of
the decision maker and the controversy in,question as also the
decision or conclusion arrived at. In Secii:ftar:y and Curator,
Victoria Memorial Hall v. Howrah Ganatantrik Nagrik Samity          F
& Ors. 201 O (3) sec 732, reasons were held to be the
heartbeat of every conclusion, apart from being an essential
feature of the principles of natural justice, that ensure
transparency and fairness, in the decision making process. In
Ram Phal v. State of Haryana & Ors. 2009 (3) SCC 258,               G
giving of satisfactory reasons was held to be a requirement
arising out of an ordinary man's sense of justice and a healthy
discipline for all those who exercise power over others. In
Director, Horticulture Punjab· & Ors. v. Jagjivan Parsh ad 2008
(5) sec 539, the recording of reasons was held to be                H
    1130    SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 10 S.C.R.


A   indicative of application of mind specially when the order is
    amenable to further avenues of challenge.

       14. It is in the light of the above pronouncements
  unnecessary to say anything beyond what has been so
8 eloquently said in support of the need to give reasons for orders
  made by Courts and statutory or other authorities exercising
  quasi judicial functions. All that we may mention is that in a
  system governed by the rule of law, there is nothing like
  absolute or unbridled power exercisable at the whims and
C fancies of the repository of such power. There is nothing like a
  power without any limits or constraints. That is so even when a
  Court or other authority may be vested with wide discretionary
  power, for even discretion has to be exercised only along well
  recognized and sound juristic principles with a view to
  promoting fairness, inducing transparency and aiding equity.
D
       15. What then are the safeguards against an arbftrary
  exercise of power? The first and the most effective check
  against any such exercise is the well recognized legal principle
  that orders can be made only after due and proper application
E of mind. Application of mind brings reasonableness not only to
  the exercise of power but to the ultimate conclusion also.
  Application of mind in turn is best demonstrated by disclosure
  of the mind. And disclosure is best demonstrated by recording
  reasons in support of the order or conclusion.
F       16. Recording of reasons in cases where the order is
  subject to further appeal is very important from yet another
  angle. An appellate Court or the authority ought to have the
  advantage of examining the reasons that prevailed with the
  Court or the authority making the order. Conversely, absence
G of reasons in an appealable order deprives the appellate Court
  or the authority of that advantage and casts an onerous
  responsibility upon it to examine and determine the question
  on its own. An appellate Court or authority may in a given case
  decline to undertake any such exercise and remit the matter
H back to the lower Court or authority for a fresh and reasoned
MAYA DEVI (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. v. RAJ KUMARl1131
 BATRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. [T.S. THAKUR, J.]
order. That, however, is not an inflexible rule, for an appellate     A
Court may notwithstanding the absence of reasons in support
of the order under appeal before it examine the matter on
merits and finally decide the same at the appellate stage.
Whether or not the appellate Court should remit the matter is
discretionary with the appellate Court and would largely depend       8
upon the nature of the dispute, the nature and the extent of
evidence that may have to be appreciated, the complexity of
the issues that arise for determination and whether remand is
going to result in avoidable prolongation of the litigation between
the parties. Remands are usually avoided if the appellate Court       C
is of the view that it will prolong the litigation.

      17. In the present case the appellate Court appears to have
decided against remanding the matter to the Single Judge on
the ground of absence of reasons in the order passed by the
latter because any such remand would have only prolonged the          D
agony of the parties. From a reading of the impugned order of
the appellate Court it is clear that the appellate Court was
conscious of the fact that the litigation had been prolonged for
many years. It, therefore, decided to resolve the matter on
merits rather than remitting the same back for a fresh disposal       E
by the learned Single Judge. In as much as the appellate Court
adopted that approach it did not, in our opinion, commit any
mistake to warrant our interference under Article 136 of the
Constitution. The litigation between the parties having continued
for three decades, the discretion vested in the appellate Court       F
and was rightly exercised by it. The submissions made by Mr.
Kapoor that the appellate Court ought to have remitted the
matter back to the Single Judge must, therefore, fail and is
hereby rejected.

     18. In the result this appeal fails and dismissed but in the     G
circumstances without any order as to costs.

N.J                                          Appeal dismissed.