MAY GEORGEversusSPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.

                        [2010) 7 S.C.R. 204


A                          MAY GEORGE
                                 v.
                   SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 2255 of 2006)

                           MAY 25, 2010
B
      [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]

         Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

c      ss. 4, 6, 11 and 18 - Acquisition for planned
  development of industrial town - Award made - Possession
  taken - Thereafter, one of the /and-owners filing writ petition
  challenging the award on the ground that notice u/s. 9(3) not
  served - Single Judge of High Court dismissing the petition
  - Division Bench of High Court dismissing writ appeal, but
0
  giving liberty to the claimant to move application u!s. 18 - On
  appeal, held: Once award made and possession taken, land
  vested in the State and cannot be diversted even if some
  irregularity found in the acquisition proceedings - On facts, it
  cannot be presumed that claimant had no knowledge of
E acquisition - Challenge to the award is belated.

          s. 9 - Notice under - Whether mandatory - Held: The
     provision not mandatory - In view of the scheme of the Act,
     failure of notice u/s. 9(3) would not adversely affect the
F.   subsequent proceedings including the Award and title of the
     Government in the acquired land.
       Interpretation of Statute - Contextual interpretation -
  Held: In order to decide whether a provision is directory or
  mandatory, the Court, in addition to the language of the
G provision, should examine the context in which it is used and
  the purpose it seeks to achieve, and the legislative intent -
  In order to declare a provision mandatory the test is whether
  non-compliance thereof could render the entire proceedings
  invalid or not .
H                               204
  MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                  205

     Appellant filed a writ petition challenging the award        A
made u/s. 11 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. She claimed
that she was never aware of the acquisition proceedings
and she was not served with notice u/s. 9(3) of the Act;
and that she came to know about the acquisition of her
land when she was served with a notice that she was in            B
illegal possession of the land. Single Judge of the High
Court dismissed the petition. In writ appeal, Division
Bench of High Court confirmed the judgment of Single
Judge. However, Division Bench gave liberty to the
appellant to move an application for making reference u/          c
s. 18 of the Act.
    In appeal to this Court, appellant contended inter-alia
that provisions of s. 9 being mandatory in nature, non-
compliance thereof would vitiate the Award and all other
consequential proceedings.                                        D
     Respondent contended that notice u/s. 9(3) was
served on the appellant by affixing the same on the land
of the appellant as she was not available; and that
provisions of s. 9(3) are not mandatory; that reference u/
                                                                  E
s. 18 was time barred and High Court was not competent
to enhance the period of limitation.
    Dismissing the appeal, the Court
    HELD: 1.1. Huge area of land had been acquired for
                                                                  F
planned development of industrial town, the land of the
appellant cannot be exempted on any ground
whatsoever. More so, appellant's land was of negligible
area in comparison of the total land acquired and
therefore, at the behest of only one person, the
acquisition proceedings cannot be disturbed. [Para 10]            G
[213-A-B]
     1.2. It is not the case of the appellant that Notification
u/s. 4 and Declaration u/s. 6 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894
were not published or given publicity as mandatorily              H
   206     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2010] 7 S.C R


A required under the law. Once, Award was made and
  possession had been taken, land stood vested in the
  State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested
  even if some irregularity is found in the Award. [Para 10]
  [212-G-H; 213-A-B]
B
       1.3. Acquisition proceedings/Award have been
  challenged at a belated stage after a decade of taking
  possession of the land in dispute. In the facts and
  circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to
  presume that appellant had no knowledge of the
C acquisition proceedings. The writ court rejected the plea
  taken by the appellant, after being fully satisfied that the
  notice u/s. 9(3) was affixed on the part of the land in
  dispute as the appellant was not available; appellant was
  not the resident of the area. Though appellant was aware
D of the proceedings, conveniently chose to remain silent
  and made use of the notice, asking her removal from the
  unauthorised occupation as the basis of challenging the
  Award and land acquisition proceedings after inordinate
  delay of 10 years and vesting of land in the State itself.
E The same findings have been affirmed by the appellate
  court. In case the High Court has considered the matter
  in detail and recorded the findings on factual question,
  this Court may not examine that question at all. [Paras 11,
  29 and 30] [213-C-D; 220-8-D, E-F]
F
       Swaran Lata etc. vs. State of Haryana and Ors. JT 2010
  (3) SC 602, relied on.
      2.1. While determining whether a provision is
  mandatory or directory, in addition to the language used
G therein, the court has to examine the context in which the
  provision is used and the purpose it seeks to achieve. It
  may also be necessary to find out the intent of the
  legislature for enacting it and the serious and general
  inconveniences or injustice to persons relating thereto
H from its application. The provision is mandatory if it is
  MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                207


passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of A
something and prescribes the formalities for doing certain
things. In order to declare a provision mandatory, the test
to be applied is as to whether non-compliance of the
provision could render entire proceedings invalid or not.
Whether the provision is mandatory or directory, s
depends upon the intent of Legislature and not upon the
language for which the intent is clothed. The issue is to
be examined having regard to the context, subject matter
and object of the statutory provisions in question. The
court may find out as what would be the consequence c
which would flow from construing it in one way or the
other and as to whether the statute provides for a
contingency of the non-compliance of the provisions and
as to whether the non-compliance is visited by small
penalty or serious consequence would flow therefrom
                                                            0
and as to whether a particular interpretation would defeat
or frustrate the legislation and if the provision is
mandatory, the act done in breach thereof will be invalid.
 [Paras 14 and 24] [214-H; 215-A~B; 218-E-H; 219-A]
    State of UP. and Ors. vs. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR 1961         E
SC "751, followed.

     Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. The State of Bombay and Ors.
AIR 1952 SC 181; Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. Rampur vs.
Municipal Board Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895; State of Mysore         F
vs. V.K. Kangan AIR 1975 SC 2190; Sharif-Ud-Din Vs. Abdul
Gani Lone AIR 1980 SC 303; Ba/want Singh and Ors. vs.
Anand Kumar Sharma and Ors. (2003) 3 SCC 433;
Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd. and
Ors. AIR 2003 SC 511; Chandrika Prasad Yadav vs. State
of Bihar and Ors. AIR 2004 SC 2036; Mis. Rubber House vs.       G
Mis. Excellsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 1160;
State of Haryana and Anr. vs. Raghubir Dayal (1995) 1 SCC
133, relied on.

                                                                H
    208      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A       B. S. Khurana and Ors. vs. Municipal Corporation of
    Delhi and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 679; Gullip11/i Sowria Raj vs.
    Bandaru Pavani @ Gul/ipili Pavani (2009) 1 SCC 714,
    referred to.

          2.2. Section 9 of the Act provides for an opportunity
8 to the "person- interested" to file a claim petition with
  documentary evidence for determining the market value
  of the land and in case a person does not file a claim u/
  s. 9 even after receiving the notice, he still has a right to
  make an application for making a reference u/s. 18 of the
C Act. Therefore, scheme of the Act is such that it does not
  cause any prejudicial consequence in case the notice u/
  s. 9(3) is not served upon the person interested. [Para 13]
  [214-F-G]
o      2.3. Failure of issuance of notice u/s. 9(3) would not
  adversely affect the subsequent proceedings including
  the Award and title of the Government in the acquired
  land. So far as the person interested is concerned, he is
  entitled only to receive the compensation and therefore,
E there may be a large number of disputes regarding the
  apportionment of the compensation. In such an
  eventuality, he may approach the Collector to make a
  reference to the Court u/s. 30 of the Act. [Para 25] [219-
  8-C]

F         Or. G. H. Grant vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237, relied
    on.
       2.4. lnspite of the fact that Section 9 notice had nc'
  been served upon the person- interested, he could still
G claim the compensation and ask for making the reference
  u/s. 18. There is nothing in the Act to show that non-
  compliance thereof wil: be fatal or visit any penalty. [Para
  27] [219-E-F]
      State of Tamil Nadu vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal and Ors.
H (1996) 7 SCC 269; Nasik Municipal Corporation v.
   MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.               209

Harbansla/ Laikwant Rajpa/ and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 199; Tika     A
Ram and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689,
relied on.
     3. In case the High Court has granted the relief to the
appellant to make the application for making a reference
                                                               B
u/s. 18 of the Act and further directions have been issued
to the Collector to make the reference and further to the
Tribunal to decide the same within the stipulated period,
instead of approaching this Court in appeal, the appellant
ought to have pursued that remedy. [Para 31] [220-G]
                                                               c
                    Case Law Reference:
    JT 2010 (3) SC '502      Relied on.           Para 11

    AIR 1952 SC 181          Relied on.           Para 15
                                                               D
    AIR 1961 SC 751          Followed.            Para 16
    AIR 1965 SC 895          Relied on.           Para 17
    AIR 1975 SC 2190         Relied on.           Para 17
                                                               E
    AIR 1980 SC 303          Relied on.           Para 18
    (2003) 3 sec 433         Relied on.           Para 19
    AIR 2003 SC 511          Relied on.           Para 19
    AIR 2004 SC 2036         Relied on.           Para 19      F

    AIR 1989 SC 1160         Relied on.           Para 20
    (2000) 1 sec 679         Referred to.         Para 21
    (1995) 1 sec 133         Relied on.           Para 22      G

    (2009) 1 sec 714         Referred to.         Para 23
    AIR 1966 SC 237          Relied on.           Para 26
     (1996) 1 sec 269        Relied on.           Para 28      H
    210      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2010] 7 S.C.R.


A         (1997) 4 sec 199        Relied on.            Para 28

          (2009) 10 sec 689       Relied on.            Para 30

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    2255 of 2006.
B
        From the JL1dgment & Order dated 13.09.2004 of the High
    Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. 1692 of 1997.

         Shekhar Naphade, T.V.S. Raghvendra, Nikhil Nayyar for
    the Appellant.
c
         R. Venkataramani, Soma Sundaram, R. Nedumaran,
    Pattabhiraman, K.K. Mani, Ankit Swarup for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D      DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed
  against the judgment and order dated 13.9.2004 passed by the
  High Court of Madras dismissing the Writ Appeal No.1692 of
  1997 by which the Court has affirmed the judgment and order
  of the Learned Single Judge dated 4.12.1997 in Writ Petition
E No.14319 of 1986 wherein the appellant had challenged the
  Award made under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act,
  1894 (hereinafter called the Act) on the ground that he had not
  been served with the notice under section 9(3) of the Act.

       2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that
F Notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on 7 .1.1976
  covering the area to the extent of 30.80 acres being part of
  different survey numbers and belonging to large number of
  persons in Seevaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chingleput
  District of Tamil Nadu for planned development of Electrical/
G Electronics Industrial Estate including appellant's land
  measuring 33 cents therein in Survey No. 36/1A/1. Considering
  grave urgency, filing of objections under Section SA of the Act
  were dispensed with and provisions of Section 17 of the Act
  were resorted to. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was
H made on 1.10.1976 and Award under Section 11 was made
   MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                     211
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
.on 16.11.1979 in respect of entire land covered by the said         A
 Notification and Declaration.  '

      3. Appellant claimed that she had purchased the said land
on 27.9.1961 and mutation had taken place, thus her name
stood recorded in the revenue reco!d. Appellant's grievanc~
has been that she had never been aware of the acquisition
proceedings and she was not served with notice under section
9(3) of the Act. She was never dispossessed from the ~
of the land. She was granted temporary licence forestablishing
Small Scale Industries on 24:11.1984 and a permanent
certificate for the said purpose on 31.1.1986.                  C

     4. She got the information first time that a part of her land
had been acquired only on receiving the notice dated
8.12.1986 issued by Respondent-Department to the effect that
she was in illegal possession and occupation of the said part        D
of the land and she was directed to demolish the structure put
up by her.

      5. Appellant, after collecting the required documents,
approached the High Court by filing the Writ Petition No.14319/      E
86 challenging the Award dated 16.11.1979 and other
subsequent proceedings. The Ld. Single Judge dismissed the
petition vide judgment and order dated 4.12.1997.

     6. Being aggrieved, appellant preferred the Writ Appeal
                                                                     F
No.1692 of 1997 which has also been dismissed vide
impugned Judgment. However, the Court has given liberty to
the appellant to move an application for making reference under
section 18 of the Act within a period of two weeks from the date
of receipt of the order and further directed the Land Acquisition
Collector to make a reference, if such an application is filed       G
within a period of four weeks thereafter, and the Court further
directed the. Tribunal to decide the reference within a period of
three months from the date of its receipt. Hence, this appeal.

                                                                     H
    212      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2010) 7 S.C.R.


A         7. Shri Shekhar Naphade, Ld. Senior Counsel appearing
  for the appellant has raised large number of issues and made
  an attempt to challenge the entire acquisition proceedings
  though the limited prayer of quashing the Award was made
  before the High Court. Shri Naphade has submitted that the
8 provisions of Section 9 are mandatory in nature and non-
  compliance thereof would vitiate the Award and all other
  consequential proceedings. Appellant had never been aware
  of issuance of Section 4 Notification or Section 6 Declaration
  or Award made thereafter. No notice had ever been served
C upon her in respect of acquisition proceedings. Therefore, the
  appeal deserves to be allowed.

          8. Per contra, Shri R. Venkataramani, Ld. Senior Counsel
  for the respondents has submitted that the Notification under
  Section 4 and Declaration under Section 6 of the Act had been
D given due publicity as per the requirement of law. Section 9(3)
  notice had been affixed on the land as the appellant was not
  available. Even otherwise, the provisions of Section 9(3) are
  not mandatory and therefore, would not vitiQte the Award or any
  other subsequent proceedings. More so, the High Court had
E given liberty to the appellant to make a reference under Section
  18 thus, appellant cannot raise the grievance at all. Reference
  under Section 18 of the Act would be time barred and the High
  Court had no competence to enhance the period of limitation.
  The appeal is devoid of any merit and hence, liable to be
F dismissed.

         9. We have considered the rival submissions made by
    learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the
    record.
G
         10. Land measuring 30.80 acres stood notified and
    acquired. The land consisted of large survey numbers and
    belonged to a large number of persons. It is not the case of
    the appellant that Notification under Section 4 and Declaration
    under Section 6 were not published or given publicity as
H
    MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                     213
            [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
 mandatorily required under the law. Once, Award was made              A
 and possession had been taken, land stood vested in the State
 free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested even. if some
 irregularity is found in the Award. As huge area of land had been
 acquired for planned development of industrial town, the land
 of the appellant cannot be exempted on any ground whatsoever.         B
 More so, appellant's land was of negligible area in comparison
 of the total land acquired and therefore, at the behest of only
 one person, the acquisition proceedings cannot be disturbed.

       11. Admittedly, acquisition proceedings/Award have been         C
- challenged at a belated stage after a decade of taking
  possession of the land in dispute. In the facts and
  circumstances of this case, it is difficult to presume that
  appellant had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings.
  While dealing with a similar case, this Court in Swaran Lata
                                                                       0
  etc. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. JT 201"0 (3) SC 602 has held
  as under:

      "12. . ........ the only ground taken in the writ petition has
      been that substance of the notification under Section 4
      and declaratiorz under Section 6 of Act 1894 had been            E
      published in the newspapers having no wide circulation.
      Even if, the submission made by the petitioners is
      accepted, it cannot be presumed that they could not be
      awarf!! of acquisition proceedings for the reason that very
      huge. chunk of land belonging to large number of tenure          F
      holders had been notified for acquisition. Therefore, it
      should have been a talk of the town. Thus, it cannot be
      presumed that petitioners could not have knowledge of
      the acquisition proceedings."
                                                                       G
      In Swaran Lata (supra), this Court has held that acquisition
  proceedings cannot be challenged at a belated stage.

      12. The only question remains for our consideration is as
  to whether the provisions of Section 9(3) are mandatory in           H
    214       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 7 S.C~R.


A nature and non-compliance thereof, would vitiate the Award and
  subsequent proceedings under the Act. Section 4 Notification
  manifests the tentative opinion of the Authority to acquire the
  land. However, Section 6 Declaration is a conclusive proof
  thereof. The Land Acquisition Collector acts as Representative
B of the State, while holding proceedings under the Act, he
  conducts the proceedings on behalf of the State. Therefore, he
  determines the pre-existing right which is recognised by the
  Collector and guided by the findings arrived in determining the
  objections etc. and he quantifies the amount of compensation
c to be placed as an offer on behalf of the appropriate
  government to the person interested. It is for the tenure holder/
  person interested to accept it or not. In case, it is not acceptable
  to him, person interested has a right to ask the Collector to
  make a reference to the Tribunal.
D
          13. Section 9(3) of the Act reads as under :-

          "The Collector shall also serve notice to the same effect
          on the occupier (if any) of such land and on all such
          persons known or believed to be interested therein, or to
E         be entitled to act for persons so interested, as reside or
          have agents authorized to receive service on their behalf,
          within the revenue district in which the land is situate"

       Seiction 9 of the Act provides for an opportunity to the
F "person- interested" to file a claim petition with documentary
  evidence for determining the market value of the land and in
  case a person does not file a claim under Section 9 even after
  receiving the notice, he still has a right to make an application
  for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore,
G scheme of the Act is such that it does not cause any prejudicial
  consequence in case the notice under Section 9(3) is not
  served upon the person interested.

        14. While determining whether a provision is mandatory
H or directory, in addition to the language used therein, the Court
     MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                     215
             [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
  has to examine the context in which the provision is used and         A
  the purpose it seeks to achieve. It may also be necessary to
  find out the intent of the legislature for enacting it and the
  serious and general inconveniences or injustice to persons
  relating thereto from its application. The provision is mandatory
, if it is passE?d for the purpose of enabling the doing of something   B
  and prescribes the formalities for doing certain things.

        15. In Dattatraya Moreshwar Vs. The State of Bombay & ·
  Ors., AIR 1952 SC 1$1, this Court observed that law which
  creates public duties is directory but if it confers private rights · C
  it is mandatory. Relevant passage from this judgment is quoted
  below:-

       "It is well settled that generally speaking the provisions of
       the statute creating public duties are directory and those
       conferring private rights are imperative. When the provisjon     D
       of a statute relate to the performance of a public dutyand
       the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in
       neglect of this duty would work serious general
       inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control
       over those entrusted with the duty and at the same time          E
       would not promote the main object of legislature, it has
       been the practice of the Courts to hold such provisions to
       be directory only the neglect of them not affecting the
       validity of the acts done."
                                                                        F
        16. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of U.P. &
   Ors. Vs. Babu Ram Upadhya AIR 1961 SC 751, decided the
   issue cbserving :-

       "For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature, the     G
       Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design
       of the statute, and the consequences which would follow
       from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of
       other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with
       the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance,
                                                                        H
     216      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 7 S.C.R.


A          namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the
           non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non·
           compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some
           penalty, the serious. or trivial consequences that flow
           therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the
s          legislation will be defeated or furthered."

       1"1. In Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd., Rampur Vs.
  Municipal Board, Rampur AIR 1965 SC 895; and State of
  Mysore Vs. V.K. Kangan, AIR 1975 SC 2190, this Court held
C that as to whether a provision is mandatory or directory, would,
  in the ultimate analysis, depend upon the intent of the law-
  maker and that has to be gathered not only from the
  phraseology of the provision but also by considering its nature,
  its design and the consequence which would follow from
  construing it in one way or the other.
D
           18. In Sharif-Ud-Oin Vs; Abdul Gani Lone AIR 1980 SC
     303, this Court held that the difference between a mandatory
  and directory rule is that the former requires strict observance
  while in the case of latter, substantial compliance of the rule may
E be enough and where the statute provides that failure to make
  observance of a particular rule would lead to a specific
  consequence, the provision has to be construed as mandatory.

       19. Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in
F Ba/want Singh & Ors. Vs. Anand Kumar Sharma & Ors. (2003)
  3 SCC 433; Bhavnagar University Vs. Palit9oa Sugar Mill Pvt.
  Ltd. & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 511; and Chandrika Prasad Yadav
  Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 2036.

          20. In Mis. Rubber House Vs. Mis. Excel/sior Needle
.G
     Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 1160, this Court considered
     the provisions of the Haryana (Control of Rent & Eviction) Rules,
     1976, which provided for mentioning the amount of arrears of
     rent in the application and held the provision to be directory
     though the word "shall" has been used in the statutory provision
 H
  MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                       217
          [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
for the reason that non-compliance of the rule, i.e. non-              A
mentioning of the quantum of arrears of rent did involve no
invalidating consequence and also did not visit any penalty.

     21. In 8.S. Khurana & Ors. Vs. Municipal Corporation of
Delhi & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 679, this Court considered the               B
provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957,
particularly those dealing with transfer of immovable property
owned by the Municipal Corporation. After considering the
scheme of the Act for the purpose of transferring the property
belonging to the Corporation, the Court held that the                  C
Commissioner could alienate the property only on obtaining the
prior sanction of the Corporation and this condition was held
to be mandatory for the reason that the effect of non-observance
of the statutory prescription would vitiate
                                        \ .
                                            the transfer though no
specific power had been conferred l::l~on the C_orporation to          D.
transfer the property.

    22. In State of Haryana & Anr. Vs. Raghubir Dayal (1995)
1 SCC 133, this Court has observed as under:-

     "The use of the word 'shall' is ordinarily mandatory but it       E
     is sometimes not so interpreted if the scope of the
     enactment, on consequences to flow from such
     construction would not so demand. Normally, the word
     'shall' prima facie ought to be considered mandatory but
     it is the function of the Court to ascertain the real intention   F
     of the legislature by a careful examination of the whole
     scope of the statute, the purpose it seeks to serve and the
     consequences that would flow from the construction to be
     placed thereon. The word 'shall', therefore, ought to be
     construed not according to the language with which it is          G
     clothed but in the context in which it is used and the
     purpose it seeks to serve. The meaning has to be
     described to the word 'shall; as mandatory or as directory
     accordingly. Equally, it is settled law that when a statute is
      passed for the purpose of enabling the doing of something        H
    218       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  (2010] 7 S.C.R.


A         and prescribes the formalities which are to be attended
          for the purpose, those prescribed formalities which are
          essential to the validity of such thing, would be mandatory.
          However, if by holding them to be mandatory, serious
          general inconvenience is caused to innocent persons or
s         general public, without very much furthering the object of
          the Act, the same would be construed as directory."

       23. In Gullipilli Sowria Raj Vs. Bandaru Pavani@ Gul/ipili
    Pavani (2009) 1 SCC 714, this Court while dealing with a
C similar issue held as under :

          "... The expression "may" used in the opening words of
          Section 5 is not directory.as has been sought to be argued,
          but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit
          a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7
D         of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that
          a Hindu Marriage, as understood under Section 5, could
          be solemnised according to the ceremonies indicated
          therein"

E      24. The law on this issue can be summarised to the effect
  that in order to declare a provision mandatory, the test to be
  applied is as to whether non-compliance of the provision could
  render entire proceedings invaiid or not. Whether the provision
  is mandatory or directory, depends upon the intent of
F Legislature and not upon the language for which the intent is
  clothed. The issue is to be examined having regard to the
  context, subject matter and object of the statutory provisions in
  question. The Court may find out as what would be the
  consequence which would flow from construing it in one way
G or the other and as to whether the Statute provides for a
  contingency of the non-compliance of the provisions and as to
  whether the non-compliance is visited by small penalty or
  serious consequence would flow therefrom and as to whether
  a particular interpretation would defeat or frustrate the
H legislation and if the provision is mandatory, the act done in
   MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                    219
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
breach thereof will be invalid.                                      A

     25. The instant case is required to be examined in the light
of the aforesaid settled legal provision.

     In fact, failure of issuance of notice under section 9(3)
                                                                     B
would not adversely affect the subsequent proceedings
including the Award and title of the government in the acquired
land. So far as the person interested is concerned, he is entitled
only to receive the compensation and therefore, there may be
a large number of disputes regarding the apportionment of the        C
compensation. In such an eventuality, he may approach the
Collector to make a reference to the Court under section 30 of
the Act.

     26. In Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 237,
this Court has held that if a "person interested" is aggrieved       D
by the fact that some other person has. withdrawn the
compensation of his land, he may resort to the procedure
prescribed under the Act or agitate the dispute in suit for
making the recovery of the Award amount from such person.
                                                                     E
     27. In fact, the land vest in the State free from all
encumbrances when possession is taken under section 16 of
the Act. Once land is vested in the State, it cannot be divested
even if there has been some irregularity in the acquisition
proceedings. In spite of the fact that Section 9 Notice had not      F
been served upon the person- interested, he could still claim
the compensation and ask for making the reference under
section 18 of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to show that
non-compliance thereof will be fatal or visit any penalty.

     28. The view taken by us hereinabove stands fortified by        G
large number of judgments of this Court wherein it has been
held that if there is an irregularity in service of notice under
sections 9 and 10, it could be a curable irregularity and on
account thereof, Award under Section 11 would not become
                                                                     H
    220     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 7 S.C.R


A   invalid (see : State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Mahalakshmi Ammal
    & Ors. (1996) 7 SCC 269; and Nasik Municipal Corporation
    v. Harbansla/ Laikwant Rajpa/ and Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 199).

        29. Be that as it may, the Writ Court rejected the
8 contentions raised by the appellant after being fully satisfied that
  the notice under section 9(3) was affixed on the part of the land
  in dispute as the appellant was not available; appellant was not
  the resident of the area; and if instead of Smt. in the notice/
  documents, she had been shown as "Thiru", it would be
C immaterial so far as the merit of the case was concerned. The
  Court was fully satisfied that notice had been affixed on the
  land, satisfying the requirement of law and the Award had been
  made within limitation. Though appellant was aware of the
  proceedings conveniently, chose to remain silent and made use
  of the notice, asking her removal from the unauthorised
O occupation as the basis of challenging the Award and land
  acquisition proceedings after inordinate delay of 10 years and
  vesting of land in the State itself.

      The same findings have been affirmed by the Appellate
E Court.

         30. In case the High Court has considered the matter in
    detail and recorded the findings on factual question, this Court
    may not examine that question at all. [vide Tika Ram & Ors.
F   Vs. State of UP. & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 689].

       31. We also fail to understand that in case the High Court
  has granted the relief to the appellant to make the application
  for making a reference under Section 18 of the Act and further
  directions have been issued to the Collector to make the
G reference.and further to the Tribunal to decide the same within
  the stipulated period, instead of approaching this Court in
  appeal, the appellant ought to have pursued that remedy.

      Submissions have been made on behalf of the
H respondents that as the Court lacks competence to extend the
   MAY GEORGE v. SPECIAL TAHSILDAR & ORS.                   221
           [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

period of limitation, direction issued by the High Court giving     A
liberty to the appellant herein to make an application for making
reference under Section 18 is without jurisdiction. Such a
submission cannot be examined for the simple reason that the
respondents-authorities have chosen not to challenge the
impugned Judgment. Thus, we are not in a position to examine        B
the correctness of that submission or making any observation
regarding the law of limitation for the purpose of making
reference. This question is left open.

      32. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal    C
fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

K.K.T.                                      Appeal dismissed.