MATHAI @ JOBYversusGEORGE & ANR.

                    [2010) 3 S.C.R. 533


                     MATHAI @JOBY                              A
                             v.
                     GEORGE & ANR.
       (Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7105 of 2010)
                     MARCH 19, 2010
                                                               B
      [MARKANDEY KATJU AND R.M. LODHA, JJ.]

     CONSTITUTION OF IND/A, 1950:

      Article 136 and 145(3) - Discretion of Supreme Court to c
 entertain petitions under Article 136 - Matter referred to
 Constitution Bench - Petition filed against the order of High
 Court dismissing writ petition challenging the order of trial
court rejecting the application of the defendant in a suit,
seeking to send the will for another expert opinion as he was 0
not satisfied with the first expert report - HELD: Prima facie
such special leave petitions should not be entertained by
Supreme Court - Article 136, like Article , 226, is a
discretionary remedy and the Supreme Court is not bound to
interfere even if there is an error of law or fact in the order E
impugned before it - Article 136 was never meant to be an
ordinary forum of appeal at all like s.96 or even s.100 CPC -
Under the constitutional scheme, ordinarily the last court in
the country in ordinary cases was meant to be the High Court
- The Supreme Court as the apex Court in the country was
meant to deal with important issues like constitutional F
questions, questions of law of general importance or where
grave injustice had been done - However, the Court has been
converted practically into an ordinary appellate court which
was never the intention of Article 136 - The time has now
come when an authoritative decision by a Constitution Bench G
should lay down some broad guidelines as to when the
discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution should be
exercised, i.e. in what kind of cases a petition under Article

                            533                                H
                                                                    ,,
    534      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A 136 should be entertained - Since the matter involves
  interpretation of Article 136, it should be decided by a
  Constitution Bench in view of Article 145(3) of the Constitution
                                                           1

  - Let the papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble the Chief
  Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench, to
B decide which kinds of cases should be entertained under
  Article 136, and/or for /aying·down some broad guidelines in
  this connection. [Para 4, 5, 14, 23 and 27)

          N. Suriyaka/a vs. A. Mohandoss & Ors. 2007 (2)
C SCR 419; Bengal Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd.
  Vs Their Employees 1959 AIR 633= 1959 (2) Suppl.
   SCR 136; Kunhayammed & Ors. Vs State of Kera/a &
  Anr. 2000 AIR 2587= 2000 (1) suppl. SCR 538; State of
  Bombay vs Rusy Mistry 1960 AIR 391; Municipal Board
  Pratabgarh vs Mmahendra Singh Chawla 1982 (3) SCC
D 331; Handra Singh vs State of Rajasthan & Anr.
   2003 AIR 2889= 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 674; Ram Saran Das
  & Bros. Vs CIT Calcutta 1962 AIR 1326=1962 (1) Suppl.
   SCR 276; Pritam Singh vs. State 1950 SCR 453; Tirupati
  Bafaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.
E 2004 AIR 2351= 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 494; Jamshed
  Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees Port of Mumbai &
  Anr. 2004AIR 1815= 2004 (1) SCR 483; Narpat Singh etc.
  etc.    Vs Jaipur Development Authority & Anr.
   2002 AIR 2036= 2002 (3) SCR 365; Ashok Nagar Welfare
F Association & Anr. Vs R.K. Sharma & Ors. 2002 AIR
  335=2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 662; Bihar Legal Support
  Society New Ode/hi vs. Chief Justice of India 1987 AIR ·
  38= 1987(1) SCR 295, relied on.

G       R.K. Jain Memorial Lecture delivered by K.K. Venugopa/
    on 30.1.2010; and Article by Justice K.K. Mathew published
    in 1982(3) sec (Jour) 1, referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:
          2007 (2) SCR 419       relied on             para 6
H
        MATHAI @ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                     535


     1959 (2) Suppl. SCR 136 relied on               para 8       A
     2000 (1) suppl. SCR 538       relied on         para 8
     1960 AIR 391                  relied on         para 8
     1982 < 3) sec 331             relied on         para 8
                                                                  B
     2003 (1) Suppl. SCR 674       relied on         para 8
     1962 (1) Suppl. SCR 276 relied on               para 9
     1950 SCR 453                  relied on         para 9
                                                                  c
     2004 (1) Suppl. SCR494        relied on         para 10
     2004 (1) SCR 483              relied on         para 11
     2002 (3) SCR 365              relied on         para 12
     2001 (5) Suppl. SCR 662 relied·on               para 13      D

     1987(1) SCR 295               relied on        . para 17


     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: SLP (Civil) No. 7105           E
of 2010.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 9.11.2009 .of the High
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WP (C) No. 31726 of 2009.

    C.N. Sree Kumar for the Petitioner.                           F
    The following Order of the Court was delivered

                            ORDER

     1. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.                 G

    2. This special leave petition has been filed against the
judgment and order dated 09.11.2009 of the High Court of
Kerala Ernakulam in W.P.(C) No. 31726/2009. By the
impugned order the writ petition filed by the petitioner herein
has been disposed off                                             H
        536      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 3 S.C.R.


    A       3. The petitioner herein is one of the defendants in a suit
      in which he has disputed the genuineness of a Will dated
      13.01.2006. The Will in question was sent for expert opinion
      to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Thiruvananthapurm. The
      Forensic Science Laboratory submitted its report to the Trial
    B Court. Not satisfied with the report the Petitioner herein wanted
      another opinion from another expert. The said prayer of the
      petitioner was rejec.ted by the Trial Court and the writ petition
      filed against the order of the Trial Court has been dismissed
      by the impugned order. Against the High Court's order the SLP
    c has been filed. -
            4. We are prima facie of the opinion that such special
      leave petitions should not be entertained by this Court. Now-a-
      days all kinds of special leave petitions are being filed in this
      Court against every kind of order. For instance, if in a suit the
    D trial court allows an amendment application, the matter is often
      contested right up to this Court. Similarly, if the delay in filing
      an application or appeal is condoned by the Trial Court or the
      appellate court, the matter is fought upto this Court.
      Consequently, the arrears in this Court are mounting and
    E mounting and this Court has been converted practically into an
      ordinary appellate Court which, in.our opinion, was never the
      intention of Article 136 of the Constitution. In our opinion, now
      the time has come when it should be decided by a Constitution
      Bench of this Court as to in what kind of cases special leave
    F petitions should be entertained under Article 136 of the
      Constitution.

            5. Article 136, no doubt, states that the Supreme Court
      may in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any
    G judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
      cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the
      territory of India. However, it is not mentioned in Article 136 of
      the Constitution as to in what kind of cases the said discretion
      should be exercised. Hence, some broad guidelines need to
      be laid down now by a Constitution bench of this Court
    H




I
         MATHAI @ JOBY v.1 GEORGE & ANR.                       537


otherwise this Court will be flooded (and in fact is being flooded)   A
with all kind of special leave ,petitions even frivolous ones and
the arrears in this Court will keep mounting and a time will come
when the functioning of this Court will become impossible. It may
be mentioned that Article 136, like Article 226, is a discretionary
remedy, and this Court is not bound to interfere even if there Js     B
an error of law or fact in the impugned order.

   6. This Court in the case of N. Suriyakala vs. A.
Mohandoss and Others (2007) 9 sec 196 observed as under:

     "In this connection we may clarify the scope of Article 136.     C
     Article 136 of the Constitution is not a regular forum of
     appeal at all. It is a residual provision which enables the
     Supreme Court to interfere with the judgment or order of
     any court or tribunal in India in its discretion."
                                                                      D
     7. Article 136(1) of the Constitution states:

     "Article 136(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter,
     the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
     leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
     sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made          E
     by any court or tribunal in the territory of India."

     8. The use of the words "in its discretion" in Article 136
!early indicates that Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal
upon any party but merely vests a discretion in the Supreme           F
Court to interfere in exceptional cases vide Mis. Bengal
Chemical & Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. vs. Their Employees
AIR 1959 SC 633(635), Kunhayammed & Ors. vs. State of
Kera/a & Anr. 2000(6) SCC 359 and State of Bombay vs.
Rusy Mistry AIR 1960 SC 391(395). In Municipal Board,                 G
Pratabgarh &Anr. vs. Mahendra Singh Chawla &Ors. 1982(3)
SCC 331 and in Chandra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan AIR
2003 SC 2889 (vide para 43 & 45), this Court observed that
under Article 136 it was not bound to set aside an order even
if it was not in conformity with law, since the power under Article   H
    538      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2010] 3 S.C.R.


A   136 was discretionary.

        9. Though the discretionary power vested in the Supreme
  Court under Article 136 is apparently not subject to any
  limitation, the Court has itself imposed certain limitations upon
  its own powers vide Ram Saran Das and Bros. vs.
8
  Commercial Tax Officer, Calcutta & Ors. Al R 1962 SC
  1326(1328) and Kunhayammed vs. State of Kera/a 2000(6)
  SCC 359 (para 13). The Supreme Court has laid down that this
  power has to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases
C only. Thus, in Pritam Singh vs. The State AIR 1950 SC 169,
  this Court obseNed (vide para 9) as under :-

          "On a careful examination of Art.136 along with the
          preceding article, it seems clear that the wide discretionary
          powar with which this Court is invested under is to be
D         exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only, and as
          far as possible a more or less uniform standard should
          be adopted in granting special leave in the wide range
          of matters which can come up before it under this article."

E       10. In Tirupati Balaji Developers Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of
    Bihar AIR 2004 SC 2351, this Court obseNed about Article 136
    as under:-

          "It is an extraordinary jurisdiction vested by the Constitution
          in the Supreme Court with implicit trust and faith, and
F         extraordinary care arid caution has to be obseNed in the
          exercise of this jurisdiction. Article 136 does not confer a
          right of appeal on a party but vests a vast discretion in the
          Supreme Court meant to be exercised on the
          considerations of justice, call of duty and eradicating
G         injust(ce."

        11. In Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees,
    Port of Mumbai Al R 2004 SC 1815 (para 33), this Court
    obseNed as under :-

H         "The discretionary power of the Supreme Court is plenary
        MATHAI @ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                       539


    in the sense that there are no words in Article 136 itself       A
    qualifying that power. The very conferment of the
    discretionary power defies any attempt at exhaustive
    definition of such power. The power is permitted to be
    invoked not in a routine fashion but. in very exceptional
    circumstances as when a question of law of general public        B
    importance arises or a decision sought to be impugned
    before the Supreme Court shocks the ~onscience. This
    overriding and exceptional power has l:.3en vested in the
    Supreme Court to be exercised sparingly and only in
    furtherance of the cause of justice in the Supreme Court         c
    in exceptional cases only when special circumstances are
    shown to exist."

    In the same decision this Court also observed as under:-

     "It is well settled that Article 136 of the Constitution does   D
     not confer a right to appeal on any party; it confers a
     discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in
   · suitable cases. Article 136 cannot be read as conferring
     a right on anyone to prefer an appeal to this Court; it only
     confers a right on a party to file an application seeking       E
     leave to appeal and a discretion on the Court to grant or
     not to grant such leave in its wisdom. When no law confers
     a statutory right to appeal on a party, Article 136 cannot
     be called in aid to spell out such a right. The Supreme
     Court would not under Article 136 constitute itself into a      F
     tribunal or court just settling disputes and reduce itself k>
     a mere court of error. The power under Article 136 is an
     extraordinary power to be exercised in rare and
     exceptional cases and on well-known principles."

    12. In Narpat Singh vs. Jaipur Development Authority             G
(2002) 4 sec 666, this Court observed as under :-

    "The exercise of jurisdiction conferred by 'Art.136 of the
    Constitution on the Supreme Court is discretionary. It does
    not confer a right to appeal on a party to litigation; it only   H
    540       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A         confers a discretionary power of widest amplitude on the
          Sµpreme Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands
          of }u~~e. On one hand, it is an exceptional power to be
          exercised sparingly, with caution and care and to remedy
          extraordinary situations or situations occasioning gross
B         failure of justice; on the other hand, it is an overriding
          power whe_reunder the Court may generously step in to
          impart justice and remedy injustice."

       13. In Ashok Nagar Welfare Association vs. R.K. Sharma
  AIR 2002 SC 335, this Court observed that even in cases
C where special leave is granted, the discretionary power vested
  in the Court continues to remain with the Court even at the
  stage when the appeal comes up for hearing.

         14. Now-a-days it has become a practice of filing SLPs
D   against all kinds of orders of the High Court or other authorities
    without realizing the scope of Article 136. Hence we feel it
    incumbent on us to reiterate that Article 136 was never meant
    to be an ordinary forum of appeal at all like Section 96 or even
    Section 100 CPC. Under the constitutional scheme, ordinarily
E   the last court in the country in ordinary cases was meant to
    be the High Court. The Supreme Court as the Apex Court in
    the country was meant to deal with important issues like
    constitutional questions, questions of law of general importance
    or where grave injustice had been done. If the Supreme Court
F   entertains all and sundry kinds of cases it will soon be flooded
    with a huge amount of backlog and will not be able to deal with
    important questions relating to the Constitution or the law or
    where grave injustice has been done, for which it was really
    meant under the Constitutional Scheme. After all, the Supreme
G   Court has limited time at its disposal and it cannot be expected
    to hear every kind _of dispute.

       15. Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Senior Advocate and a very
  respected lawyer of this Court in his R.K. Jain Memorial
  Lecture delivered on 30.01.2010 has pointed out that an
H alarming state of affairs has developed in this Court because
        MATHAI@ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                    541


this Court has gradually converted itself into a mere Court of A
Appeal which has sought to correct every error which it finds
in the judgments of the High Courts of the country as well as
the vast number of tribunals. Mr. Venugopal has further
observed that this Court has strayed from its original character
as a Constitutional Court and the Apex Court of the country. B
He further observed that if the Apex Court seeks to deal with
all kinds of cas.es, it necessarily has to accumulate vast arrears
over a period oftime wnjch it will be impossible to clear in any
foreseeable future. According to him, this is a self-inflicted
injury, which is the cause of the malaise which has gradually G
eroded the confidence of the litigants in the Apex Court of the
country, mainly because of its failure to hear and dispose of
cases within a reasonable period of time. He has further
observed that it is a great tragedy to find that cases which have
been listed for hearing years back are yet to be heard. He has· 0
further observed as under :

    "We have, however, to sympathize with the judges. They
    are struggling with an unbearable burden. The judges
    spend late nights trying to read briefs for a Monday or a
     Friday. When each of the 13 Divisions or Benches have E
    to dispose off about 60 cases in a day, the functioning of.
    the Supreme Court of India is a far cry from what should
    be desiderata for disposal of cases in a calm and
    detached atmosphere. The Judges rarely have the leisure
    to ponder over the arguments addressed to the court and F
    finally to deliver a path-breaking, outstanding and classic
    judgment. All this is impossible of attainment to a Court
    oppressed by the burden of a huge backlog of cases. The
    constant pressure by counsel and the clients for an early
    date of hearing and a need to adjourn final hearings which G
    are listed, perforce, on a miscellaneous day i.e. Monday
    or a Friday, where the Court finds that it has no time to
    deal with those cases, not only puts a strain on the Court,
    but also a huge financial burden on the litigant. I wonder
    what a lawyer practising in 1950 would feel if he were today H
    542       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A         to enter the Supreme Court premises on a Monday or a
          Friday. He would be appalled at the huge crowd of lawyers
          and clients thronging the corridors, where one finds it
          extremely difficult to push one's way through the crowd to
          reach the Court hall. When he enters the Court hall he finds
B         an equally heavy crowd of lawyers blocking his way. I do
          not think that any of the senior counsel practicing in the
          Supreme Court, during the first 3-4 decades of the
          existence of the Court, would be able to relate to the
          manner in which we as counsel argue cases today. In
c         matters involving very heavy stakes, 4-5 Senior Advocates
          should be briefed on either side, all of whom would be
          standing up at the same time and addressing the court,
          sometimes at the highest pitch possible.

          All these are aberrations in the functioning of an Apex
D         Court of any country."

       16. Mr. Venugopal has pointed out that in the year 1997
  there were only 19,000 pending cases in this Court but now,
  there are over 55,000 pending cases and in a few years time
E the pendency will cross one lakh cases. In 2009 almost 70,000
  cases were filed in this Court of which an overwhelming number
  were Special Leave Petitions under Article 136. At present all
  these cases have to be heard orally, whereas the U.S. Supreme
  Court hears only about 100 to 120 cases every year and the
F Canadian Supreme Court hears only 60 cases per year.

         17. In Bihar Legal Support Society vs. Chief of Justice of
    India and Anr. (1986) 4 SCC 767 (vide para 3) a Constitution
    Bench of this Court observed as under·:-

G         "It may, however, be pointed out that this Court was never
          intended to be a regular cow't of appeal against orders
          made by the High Court or the sessions court or the
          magistrates. It was created for the purpose of laying down
          the law for the entire country ............... It is not every case
H         where the apex court finds that some injustice has been
         MATHAI @ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                        543


    done that it would grant special leave and interfere. That         A
    would be converting the apex court into a regular c:;ourt of
    appeal and moreover, by so doing, the apex courtwould
    soon be reduced to a position where it will find itsel!_l{pable
    to remedy any injustice at all, on account of theji:e!nlendous
    backlog of cases which is bound to accumufote. We must             B
    realize that in the vast majority of qase&the" High Courts
  ~ must become final even if they are· wrong".

    18. In this connection Paul Freund has set out the opinion
of Mr. Justice Brandeis', the celebrated.Judge of the U.S.             C
Supreme Court in the following words: '

     "... he was a firm believer in limiting t~e jurisdiction of the
     Supreme Court on every front as he-would not be seduced
     by the Quixotic temptation to right every fancied wrong
     which was paraded before him ....... Husbanding his time          D
     and energies as if the next day were to be his last, he
     steeled himself, like a scientist in the sJ;irvice of man,
     against. the enervating distraction of the countless
     tragedies he was not meant to relieve. His concern for
     jurisdictional and procedural limits reflected, on the            E
     technical level, an essentially stoic philosophy. For like
     Epictetus, he recognized 'the impropriety of being
     emotionally affected by what is not under one'cs control'.

    The only way found practicable or acceptable in this country       F
    (U.S.A.) for keeping the volume of cases within the
    capacity of a court of last resort is to allow the intermediate
    courts of appeal finally to settle all cases that are of
    consequence only to parties. This reserves to the court of
    last resort only questions,,9n1 which lower courts are in
    conflict or those of generafTri'fportance to the law."             G

     19. Justice K.K. Mathew, an eminent Judge of this Court,
in an article published in (1982) 3   sec (Jour) 1, has referred
to the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the renowned Judge
of the U.S. Supreme Court as follows :           ·                     H
    544       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010) 3 S.C.R.


A         "The function of the Supreme Court, according to Justice
          Frankfurter, was to expound and stabilize principles of law,
          to pass upon constitutional and other important questions
          of law for the public benefit and to preserve uniformity of
          decision among the intermediate courts of appeal. The time
B         and attention and the energy of the court should be devoted
          to matters of large public concern and they should not be
          consumed by matters of less concern, without special
          general interest, merely because the litigant wants to have
          the court of last resort pass upon his right. The function of
c         the Supreme Court was conceived to be, not to remedying
          of a particular litigant's wrong, but the consideration of
          cases whose decision involved principles, the application
          of which were of wide public or governmental interest and
          which ought to be authoritatively declared by tile final court.
          Without adequate study, reflection and discussion on the
D
          part of judges, there could not be that fruitful interchange
          of minds which was indispensable to thoughtful, unhurried
          decision and its formulation in learned and impressive
          opinions and therefore Justice Frankfurter considered it
          imperative that the docket of the court be kept down so
E         that its volume did not preclude wise adjudication. He was
          of the view that any case which did not rise to the
          significance of inescapability in meeting the
          responsibilities vested in the Supreme Court had to be
          rigorously excluded from consideration".
F
        20. According to Justice Mathew, the Supreme Court, to
  remain effective, must continue to decide only those cases
  which present questions whose resolution will have immediate
  importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved.
G It is Justice Mathew's opinion that -

          "To say that no litigant should be turned out of the Supreme
          Court so long as he has a grievance may be good
          populistic propaganda but the consequence of accepting
          such a demand would surely defeat the great purpose for
H
            MATHAI @ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                    545


     which the Court was established under our constitutional         A
     system. It is high time we recognize the need for the
     Supreme Court to entertain under Article 136 only those
     cases which measure up to the significance of the
     national or public importance. The effort, then, must
     therefore be to voluntarily cut the coat of jurisdiction         a
     according to the cloth of importance of the question and
     not to expand the same with a view to satisfy every litigant
     who has the means to pursue his cause."

     21. Mr. Venugopal has suggested the following categories         C
of cases which alone should be entertained under Article 136
of the Constitution.

      (i)     All matters involving substantial questions of law
              relating to the interpretation of the Constitution of
              India;                                                  D

      (ii)    All matters of national or public importance;

      (iii)   Validity of laws, Central and State;

      (iv)    After Kesavananda Bharati, (1973) 4 SCC 217, the        E
              judicial review of Constitutional Amendments; and

      (v)     To settle differences of opinion of important issues
              of law between High Courts.

      22. We are of the opinion that two additional categories        F
of cases can be added to the above list, namely (i) where the
Court is satisfied that there has been a grave miscarriage of
justice and (ii) where a fundamental right of a persor. has prima
facie been violated. However, it is for the Constitution Bench
to which we are referring this matter to decide what are the          G
kinds of cases in which discretion under Article 136 should be
exercised.

    23. In our opinion, the time has now come when an
authoritative decision by a Constitution Bench should lay down        H
    546     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 3 S.C.R.


A   some broad guidelines as to when the discretion under Article
    136 of the Constitution should be exercised, i.e., in what kind
    of cases a petition under Article 136 should be entertained. If
    special leave petitions are entertained against all and sundry
    kinds of orders passed by any court or tribunal, then this Court
B   after some time will collapse under its own burden .

      . 24. It may be mentioned that in Pritam Singh vs. The State
  AIR 1950 S.C. 169 a Constitution Bench of this Court observed
  (vide para 9) that "a more or less uniform standard should be
C adopted in granting Special Leave". Unfortunately, despite this
  observation no such uniform standard has been laid down by
  this Court, with the result that grant of Special Leave has
  become, as Mr. Setalvad pointed out in his book · My Life', a
  gamble. This is not a desirable state of affairs as there should
  be some uniformity in the approach of the different benches of
D this Court. Though Article 136 no doubt confers a discretion on
  the Court, judicial discretion, as Lord Mansfield stated in classic
  terms in the case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528 "means
  sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule,
  not humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful"
E
        25. The Apex Court lays down the law for the whole country
  and it should have more time to deliberate upon the cases it
  hears before rendering judgment as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
  observed. However, sadly the position today is that it is under
F such pressure because of the immense volume of cases in the
  Court that Judges do not get sufficient time to deliberate over
  the cases, which they deserve, and this is bound to affect the
  quality of our judgments.

       26. Let notice issue to the respondents. Issue notice also
G to the Supreme Court Bar Association, Bar Council of India and
  the Supreme Court-Advocates-on-Record Association.

         27. Since the matter involves interpretation of Article 136
    of the Constitution, we feel that it should be decided by a
H   Constitution· Bench in view of Article 145(3) of the Constitution.
         MATHAI @ JOBY v. GEORGE & ANR.                     547


Let the papers of this case be laid before Hon'ble the Chief       A
Justice of India for constitution of an appropriate Bench, to
decide which kinds of cases should be entertained under
Article 136, and/or for laying down some broad guidelines in
this connection.
                                                                   B
     28. The Constitution Bench may also consider appointing
some senior Advocates of this Court as Amicus Curiae to
assist in the matter so that it can be settled after considering
the views of all the concerned parties.

R.P.                    Matter referred to Constitution Bench.