Holding

The testimony of the sole eye‑witness was wholly reliable and, together with corroborative material, was sufficient to sustain the conviction; the High Court was correct in reversing the acquittal.

Summary

The appellants, Marwadi Kishor Parmanand and Marwadi Mangal Dhulji, were charged with murder of Punaram and Sohanlal under IPC sections 302 and 34. The trial court acquitted them, finding the sole eye‑witness, Ranchhodbhai (PW‑1), unreliable. The Gujarat High Court reversed the acquittal, holding PW‑1’s testimony reliable and corroborated by forensic and other witness evidence, and convicted the appellants to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a conviction can rest on a single eye‑witness and whether the High Court was justified in overturning the trial court’s finding. It concluded that PW‑1’s evidence was wholly reliable, consistent with material facts and supported by other evidence, and therefore sufficient for conviction. The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court’s judgment.

Issues considered

Can a conviction for murder be sustained solely on the testimony of a single eye‑witness without additional corroboration?
Whether the High Court was entitled to reverse an acquittal on appeal under Sections 378 and 386 of the CrPC?
Do the inconsistencies and omissions in PW‑1’s statements render his testimony unreliable?
Does the presence of the accused in the hospital and forensic evidence corroborate the eye‑witness’s account?

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378, s. 386
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murdereye‑witness testimonysingle witnessconvictionacquittalappellate reviewIPC 302CrPC 378corroboration

Judgment

MARWADI KISHOR PARMANAND
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT

MARCH 15, 1994

[DR. A.S. ANAND AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.] B

Indian Penal Code, 186(}-Section 302/34--Conviction under-Ap-
preciation of evidence of a solitary but reliable eye witness-Conforming to
. and consistent on all niate1ial points-His presence at place of occurrence
established-Conviction based on his testilnony even without coJTobora- C
tion-Sustainable.

Criminal Procedure Code, !973-Sections 378 and 386-Appeal
against acquittal-Scope of

Evidence-Witness deposing about a fact evidence has to be ap- D
preciated in a realistic nianner having due regard to all the sunnunding facts
and circumstances prevailing at or about the time of occurrence.

The two appellants were convicted u/s 302/34 or the Indian Penal
Code and sentenced to life imprisonment by the High Court converting the
acquittal of the appellants recorded by the Trial Court into conviction.
E
This appeal by special leave had been directed by the appellants against
the judgment or the High Court.

The prosecution case \Vas that the complainant, PWI was a Govern-
ment Contractor and the two deceased persons, namely P and S who were F
known to him were also engaged in the contract business; that the deceased
were interested in securing the contract from Saurashtra Chemicals for
removal of dust but no final deal was struck in their favour; that the
complainant accompanied with the two deceased persons met PWS, an
Officer of Saurashtra Chemicals in his office where they discussed with
him the terms and conditions but the contract was still not finalised; that G
when the complainant along with the two deceased were proceeding on foot
to take meals, the two appellants came on a scooter, got down with open
knives in their hands and rushed towards P and S; that one or the
appellants held P and another held S and asked them as to why they were
coming in their way as they were not happy with the deceased who were H
1
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 3 S.C.R.

A trying to obtain the said contract; that the complainant being frightened
on seeing the appellant~ with open knives, stood at a distance at the corner
of the broader lane watching them with fear and anxiety; that one of the
appellants gave one knife blow lo P and another appellant gave one knife
blow to S; that the complainant looking to the incident of assault by knife,
became nervous and ran away fro1n there, came to a nearby lane and when
B he heard that the appellants started the scooter and went away, he
returned lo the lane where the incident had occurred; that the complainant
noticed that though there were blood stains in the lane, P and S were not
there and, therefore, he proceeded ahead and found P lying unconscious
at the corner of the by lane; that he rushed to a nearby tea shop and made
C a telephone call for ambulance and also informed the police station of the
incident; that thereafter the complainant proceeded further and found that
S was lying dead on another road; that the ambulance arrived after about
an hour and injured S and P were taken to hospital by the complainant
where the two were declared dead and the complainant gave first informa-
D tion report which was registered. The prosecution further stated that the
tWo appellants also reached the police station in injured condition and they
were also taken in the same hospital by a constable and after the report
of the complainant was recorded and sent to the police station for registra-
tion, the same police ollicer also recorded the FIR alleged to have been
given by the appellant No. 2 which was also registered.
E
At the Trial the two appellants adjured their guilt and pleaded false
implication. They denied having met the deceased persons on the day of
occurrence or the alleged entries in the police station dairy regarding their
appearance in the police station or that they were taken to the Hospital.
Both the appellants denied the disclosure statement, the seizure of knives
F
at their instance, seizure of scooter as well as appellants clothes stained
with blood. They took the plea that they had a quarrel intre se in which
they had sustained the injuries.

The trial court on scrutiny of the evidence of the sole eye witness, the
G complainant, PWl disbelieved his testimony on account of veracious infir-
mities and recorded the order of acquittal of both the appellants. The Trial
Jndgc recorded the findings that the evidence of PWS did not establish the
presence of PWl along with two deceased persons who came to him to
negotiate the contract as he deposed about the presence of a third person ·,.
H whom he did not know at that time but learnt subsequently that he was.
M.K.PARMANAND v.STATEOFGUJARAT 3

the complainant, but subsequently in his statement before police he did A
not state that he knew the name ol' complainant; that PWl did not know
the accused since before and he learnt about their names in the hospital
but could not identify in the Court; that PWl had a very short span of time
to observe the appellants and, therefore, it was not possible for him to fix
up definitively that the appellants were the assailants; that PWl said to
have seen the accused appellants in the hospital did not state the said fact
B
in his fard-beyan recorded in the hospital which was treated as FIR; that
the alleged sole eye witness received no injuries and the appellants also
did not attack him which fact supported the possibility that he might not
have detained himself at the place of occurrence to see the incident; that
the witness did not shout for help nor did he tell anyone before giving FIR C
at the hospital that he had seen the incident himself; that the statement of
complainant that he saw the accused appellant in the hospital was also
improbable in view of the evidence of PWlO who examined the accused No.2
in the hospital at 235 p.m. and the appellant No. 1 at 4.00 p.m. while both
of them had not come to the hospital together; that the evidence of D
constable PW19 could not be accepted that he had taken both the appel-
lants from police station in the Government Vehicle without any police yadi
(memo) to the hospital and lastly that in view of the evidence of Head
Constable PW18 that he did not receive any telephonic call from com-
plainant about the inci<!ent and that in the absence of entry in the police
station diary to support the version of complainant, his statement was E
falsified.

In appeal, the High Court on reappraisal and close scrutiny of the
evidence of the said eye witness recorded the conclusion that testimony of
the sole eye witness did not suffer from any infirmity and held that slight
F
variations in his statement, on immaterial asp~cts did not make his
testimony incredible. Placing complete reliance on the evidence of PWl,
and other material on record, the High Court reversed the acquittal and
convicted both the appellants u/s 302/34 of the Penal Code and sentenced
each one of them to undergo life in1prisonment. Hence this appeal.
G
The appellants submitted that the High Court while interfering with
finding of facts recorded by the Trial Court did not follow the principles
to be followed in an appeal from the order of acquittal; that the sole eye
witness PWl \Vas neither accompanying the deceased at the time of occur-
rence nor was he present at the time of occurrence but a got up witness H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A and, therefore, the conviction of the appellants could not be founded on -J_

the testimony of PWl.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The evidence of a witness deposing about a fact has to be
B appreciated in a realistic manner having due regard to all the surrounding
facts and circumstances prevailing at or about the time of occurrence of
an incident. Some contradictions and onlissions even in the evidence of a
witness who was actually present and had seen the occurrence are bound
to occur even in the natural course. It is a sound rule to be observed that
C where the facts stated by an eye-witness substantially conform to and are
consistent on material points from the facts stated earlier to the police
either in FIR or case diary statements and are also consistent in all
material details as well as on vital points there would be no justification
or any valid reason for the Court to view his evidence with suspicion or
D cast any doubt on such evidence. In the present case as the solitary witness
PWl was a wholly reliable witness and his evidence in itself, without any
further corroboration was enough to sustain the conviction of the two
appellants for the cirme they were charged with, but the evidence of the
sole eyeawitness found corroboration on material aspects from the ?
evidence of PW6, PWS, PW10, PWU, PW12 and the Head Constable PW18.
E Thus the corroboration was also not lacking in the present case and there
was hardly any g~ound or any possibility of taking the view which was
unfortunately taken by the Trial Judge. The Trial Court clearly fell in
serious error in rejecting the truthful version made by the sole eyeawitness
PWl whose evidence did not suffer from any infirmities, much less the
p unwarranted criticism made by the Trial Court. The High Court was
therefore, in exercise of its powers under Sections 378 and 386 Criminal
Procedure Code, fully justified to reverse the erron.eous findings recorded
by the Trial Court. (22-C-H; 23-A]

2.1. Different person~ react differently in different situations and
G circumstances. No hard and fast rule of universal application with regard
to the reaction of a person in a given circumstance can be laid down. Most
often ~'hen a person happens to see or come across a gruesome and cruel
act being perpetrated within his sight then there is a possibility that he
may lose his equilibrium and balance of mind and therefore he may remain
H a silent spectator till he is able to reconcile himself and then react in his
M.K.PARMANAND v. STATE OF GUJARAT 5

own way. (17-E-F] A
2.2. In the present case on perusal of the evidence of the sole
eye-witness, it was revealed that he did depose that when be saw the
appellants got down from the scooter with open knives he was frightened
and therefore, kept himself away witnessing the incident by standing at the
extreme and remained thinking as what to do. He rushed to a nearby shop B
to phone for the ambulance and inform the police. The presence of PWl
at the place of occurrence and his being in the company of the deceased
was established by several circumstances as pointed out by the High Court.
The witness had sufficient opportunity and time to see and identify the
appellants and, therefore, he could not have made any mistake as to the c
identity of the assailaints. The witness was a matured person and a
Government Contractor. He was expected to possess a fair knowledge and
understanding and not expected to fanlter in recognizing persons whom
he had seen in broad-day light. Presence of the two appellants in the
hospital was conclusively established by reliable evidence of PWlO as well
as by the admission of this fact by the appellants themselves. Presence of D
PWl in the hospital at the relevant time could not be doubted at all. The
prosecution had examined one PW6, who bad a tea shop and a telephone.
He deposed that on the day of occurrence one person made two phones,
one to the police station and the other to the fire brigade saying that two
persons were injured with knife and, therefore, to send ambulance imme- E
diately. The witness did not know as to what was the name of the person
who made the phone calls but after the telephonic message the ambulance
car did arrive at the place of occurrence and the victims were taken to the
hospital in the same ambulance and the complainant also accompanied
the injured to the hospital. [pp 18-A-H; 19-A-H; 20-A; 21-C-E; 22-A-B]
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
700 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4/5.9.80 of the Gujarat High
Court in Cr!. A. No. 1072 of 1978.
G
B.K. Mehta, Ms. Reema Bhandari and K.V. Sreekumar for the
Appellant.
T
R.N. Sachthey, Anip Sachthey and S.K. Sabharwal for the Respon-
dent. H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by +
FAIZAN UDDIN, J. This appeal by special leave has been directed
by the two appellants Marwadi Kishor Parmanand and Marwadi Mangal
Dhulji against the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat whereby the High
Court has converted the acquittal of the appellants herein recorded by the
B
Additional Sessions Judge, Junagarh into a conviction under Section 302/34
of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced them to life imprisonment.

The complainant Ranchhodbhai Bhagwanand. That the relevant
time, was a Government Contractor and the two deceased persons, namely
c Punaram and Sobania! who were known to him were also engaged in the
contract business. The deceased Punaram and Sohanlal were interested in
securing the contract from Saurashtra Chemicals for removal of dust (Grit)
and in that connection they had approached the complainant Ranchhod-
bhai to ascertain whether he too was interested in the same. It is said that
D a sum of Rs. 25,000/- was deposited by the deceased persons through a
Bank draft with Saurashtra Chemicals but no final deal was struck in their
favour till 11.8.77. The complainant accompanied with the two deceased
persons came to Porbandar from Junagarh on 11.8.77 at about 11.00 AM
and met O.P. Makkar, PW8 an officer of Saurashtra Chemicals in his office.
There they discussed with him the terms and conditions but the contract
B was still not finalised. It is said that a car belonging to the old contractor
whose contract work with Saurashtra Chemicals was going on, was parked
outside the gate of the company, but there was not one in the car. The
complainant Ranchhodbhai along with the two deceased Punaram and
Sohanlal left Saurashtra Chemicals at about 12.30 PM and proceeded on
F a Rickshaw to Sudama Chowk, and from there they proceeded on foot
towards Ghayal Lodge to take meals there. While so proceeding towards
Ghayal Lodge they passed from the Liberty Talkies road to a narrow Lane
and from there to a broader lane at the end of which there was a road.
According to the complainant when they came out of the broader lane, the
two appellants came on a scootec from opposite direction which they
G slopped and parked near them. It is alleged that both the appellants got
down from the scooter with open knives in their hands and rushed towards
Punaram and Sohanlal. One of the appellants held Punaram and another
held Soh:mlal and asked them as to why they were coming in their way. T
The deceased Punaram and Sohanlal offered to withdraw from the contract
H if the .appellants were interested in the same. It is said that the contract in
I

-~

M.KPARMANAND v.STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 7
r
which the deceased were interested was given to Mukesh & Co. and one A
Ram Gopal had an interest in the same and since the appellants were not
only related to Ram Gopal, but they were themselves partners in Mukesh
& Co. and, therefore, they were not happy with the deceased who were
trying to obtain the said contract.

The complainant being frightened with the attitude of the appellants B
with open knives, he stood at a distance at the corner of the broader lane
watching them with fear and anxiety. lt is said that though the deceased
were prepared to withdraw themselves from the said deal yet one of the
appellants gave one knife blow to Punaram and another appellant gave one
knife blow to Sohanlal. The complainant, Ranchhodbhai, looking to the c
incident of assault by knife, became narvous and ran away from there and
came to a nearby lane. Soon after he heard that the appellants started the
scooter and went away. The complainant, Ranchhodbhai again returned to
the lane where the incident had occurred. He noticed that though there
were blood stains in the lane but Punaram and Sohanlal were not there D
and, therefore, he proceeded ahead and found Punaram lying unconscious
at the corner of the byelane. He rushed to a nearby tea shop and made a
telephonic call for ambulance and also informed the police station of the
incident. Thereafter he proceeded further and found that Sohanlal was
lying dead on the Liberty Talkies road. According to the complainant the
E
ambulance arrived after about an hour and injured Sobania! and Punararn
were taken to hospital by the complainant. The Medical Officer who
attended the two declared them dead. It is said that in the meanwhile the
Police Inspector, Dwivedi, PW20 also arrived in the hospital where the
complainant Ranchhodbhai (PWl) gave First Information Report at 3.30
PM Marked 'A' which was registered in the Police Station at about 3.45 F
PM.

ll is also the prosecution case that the two appellants also reached
the police station in injured condition and they were also taken in the same
hospital by a constable in a van at or about the time when the report of G
the complainant Ranchhobhai was being recorded in the hospital. After
the report of Ranchhodbhai was recorded and sent to the police station
for registration, the same Police Officer also recorded the FIR alleged to
have been given by the appellant No.2, Mangal Dhulji which was also
registered at the police station at about 4.00 PM. H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A After the preparation of the Inquest Reports or' the two dead bodies,
post-mortem was conducted. Dr. H.V. Avasia, PWU performed an autopsy
over the dead body of Punaram on the day of occurrence itself between
5.00 to 6.00 PM who as per his post-mortem report found an incised wound
on the left Supraclavi~ular region one inch above from the mid of left
clavicle on the apex of the left lung traverse in position. The injury was
B anti-mortem in nature and sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death. Dr. H.N. Joshi, PW12 performed an autopsy over the dead
body of Sohanlal on the day of occurrence itself between 5.30 to 7.00 PM
and as per his report he found 1 oblique stab wound cavity deep on left
laternal side of vertebral column between 8th and 9th, inter-costal space
C left side Plurs of left long was cut and left lung had collapsed. The injury
was ante-mortem in nature. The cause of death was due to shock and
haemorrhage and injury to vital organ like lung.
I

During the course of investigation wall scrappings and blood stained
D earth from the lane as well as from the Liberty Talkies road was lifted. The
scooter on which the appellants are said to have arrived at the place of
occurrence was also seized from appellant No. 1, Kishor. The clothes of
the appellant, Mangal Dhulji collectively marked 'F' and his wrist watch
marked 'G' were also seized. On the disclosure statement, said to have
been made by the appellant Mangal Dhulji, a blood stained knife article
E 'H' was also seized at his instance. The blood stained clothes collectively
marked 'I' of the appellant, Kishor and his blood stained watch marked 'J'
were also seized. On a disclosure statement said to have been made by the
appellant, Kishor a knife article 'K' was also seized at his instance. All these
articles were sent to the Chemical Examiner, Ahmedabad. The Chemical
p Examiner found blood on the earth lifted from the place of occurrence and
well scrappings as well as on the two knives seized from the appellants and
also on the Golden dial wrist watch. The Serologist found human blood on
the wall scrappings, earth, wrist watch and knives and also on some of the
clothes of the appellants.

G A Site Plan Ext. 32 was also prepared by the Maintenance Surveyor,
I.M. Joshi, PW3 in which the lane where the incident is said to have
occurred and the two places where the dead bodies of Sohanlal and
Punaram were found lying are shown as well as the places where blood was
found. In the cite plan Ext. 32, blood has been shown to be present at the
H entrance of the lane as well as near Kalyan Press at Liberty Road as well
M.K PARMANAND v. STATEOFGU.IARAT[FAIZAN UDDIN,J.] 9

as near garage belonging to Govind Mcehami (PW 2). A
At the trial the two appellants adjured their guilt and pleaded false
implication. The appellants denied that they were partne" in Mukesh &
Co. or that the two deceased persons were negotiating for the said contract.
They also denied having met the deceased persons on the day of occur-
rence in the lane where the incident is said to have occurred. They also B
denied the alleged entries in the police station diary regarding their ap-
pearance in the police station or that they were taken from the Police
Station to the Hospital by the Constable Prabhashanker Tulsi, PW19.
Though appellant No.1, Kishor admitted to have gone to the hospital at
4.00 PM but he ·stated that he was discharged same day after dressing. c
Appellant No.2, Mangal Dhulji also admitted to' have been examined by
the Medical Officer in the hospital same day at 2.35 PM in respect of an
injury which according to him was sustained by him on account of his
scuffle with appellant No.1. Both the appellants denied the disclosure
statement and the seizure of knives at their instance. The appellant No.1
also denied the seizure of scooter from him as well as the seizure of mat D
and right side grip which are said to be stained with blood. Both the
appellants took the plea that they had a quarrel inter se in which they had
sustained the injuries.

The learned Additional Sessions Judge on scrutiny of the evidence E
of the sole eye-witness Ranchhodbhai, PWl disbelieved his testimony on
account of various infirmities pointed out by him in his judgment and,
therefore, recorded the order of acquittal of both the appellants. However,
the High Court on reappraisal and close scrutiny of the evidence of the
said eye-witness recorded the conclusion that testimony of the above
named sole eye-witness does not suffer from any infirmities as pointed out F
by the trial and took the view that slight variations in his statement, on
immaterial aspects do not make his testimony incredible. Placing complete
reliance on the evidence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1, and other material on
record, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted both the
appellants under Section 302/34 of the Penal Code and sentenced each one G
of them to undergo life imprisonment against which this appeal has been
directed.

Learned counsel for the appellants first submitted that though the
..-· . High Court while interferring with the finding of facts recorded by the Trial
Court sounded a note of caution that they are fully conscious of the fact H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A that in an appeal from the order of acquittal the powers of the High Court
to reassess the evidence and reach its own conclusions arc as extensive as
in an appeal againsl the order of conviction, yet as a rule of prudence it
should always give proper weight and consideration to the views of the
Trial Court as to the credibility of the witness; the presumption of in-
nocence in favour of the accused; the right of the accused to the benefit
B of any doubt and the slowness to the appellate Court in disturbing a finding
of fact arrived at by the Trial Judge who had the advantage of seeing the
witness, but the High Court in fact practically did not follow the said
principles which are well settled by a series of decisions of this Court. The
learned counsel for the appellants denounced the reasoning and the view
c taken by the High Court on the evidence of the sole witness and streneously
urged that the sole eye-witnes:; Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 was neither accom-
panying the deceased at the time of occurrence nor was he present at the
time of occurrence and he is not an eye-witness to the occurrence but a
got up witness which is evident from various infirmities as pointed out by
D the Trial Court and, therefore, the com"ction of the appellants cannot be
founded on the testimony of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 who is said to be the
only eye-witness.

The law relating to the value of the sole eye-witness was settled by
this Court as far back as 1957 in the case of V 1hevar v. 1he State of
E Madras, AIR (1957) SC 614, in which this Court in paragraph 11 of the
Report observed as under :

"The Indian Legislature has not inisted on lar"ng down any such
exceptions to the general rule recognised in S.134 quoted above.
F The section enshrines the well recognised maxim that 'Evidence
has to be weighed had not counted.' Our Legislature has given
statutory recognition to the fact that administration of justice may
be hampered if a particular number of witnesses were to be insisted
upon. It is not seldom that a crime has been committed in the
presence of only one witness, leaving aside those cases which are
G not of uncommon occurrence where determination of guilt
depends entirely on circumstantial evidence. If the Legislature
were to insist upon plurality of witnesses, cases where the testimony
of a single ffitness only could be available in proof of the crime,
would go unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the presiding
H judge comes into play. The matter thus must depend upon the
I
~

M.K. PARMAN AND ,._STATE OF GUJARAT [FAJZAN UDDIN . .I.[ 11

circumstances of c;.i,ch case and the qualily of the evidence of the A
single \Vitness \vhose testimony has to be either accepted or
rejected. If such a testimony is foun<l by the Court to he entirely
reliable, there is no legal impediment to the conviction of the
accused person on such proof. Even as the guilt of an accused
person may be provc<l by the testimony of a single witness, the
innocence of an accused person may be established on the tes-
B
timony of a single witness, even though a considerable number of
witnesses may be forthcoming to testify the truth of the case for
the prosecution. Hence, in our opinion, it is a sound and well
established rule of law that the court is concerned with the quality
and not with the quantity of the evidence necessary for pro\1ng or C
11
disproving a fact.

In the said report this Court further pointed out that generally
speaki11g oral testimony may be classified into three categories, namely (1)
Wholly reliable (2) Wholly unreliable, and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor D
wholly unreliable. So far as the first category of proof is concerned, the
Courts have no difficulty in coming to its conclusion either way i.e. to say
it may convict or may acquit on the testimony of the single witness, if his
testimony is found to be above approach or suspicion of interestedness,
incompetence or subordination. In the case of second catagory of the
witness, the Court has equally no difficulty in coming to the conclusion. E
But in the third category of cases, the Court has to be circumspect and has
to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony,
direct or circumstantial. Most often there are situations where only a single
person is available to give ev1dence in respect of a disputed fact. Naturally
in such a situation the Court has to weigh carefully such a testimony and F
if it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and free from all taints which
tend to render oral testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its duty to act
upon such testimony. It is no doubt true that in the present case the
prosecution case rests on the testimony of the sole eye-witness, namely,
Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 and, therefore, we shall examine his testimony with
greater care and caution and in accordance with the principles enunciated G
for appreciation of the evidence of single witness with a \1ew to see whether
the High Court while reversing the order of acquittal has acted within the
judicial constraints and the principles stated above.

Before examining the testimony of the sole eye-witness Ranchhod- H
\
).

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994J 3 S.CR.

A bhai, PW 1, and other evidence and relevant n1aterial on record, we shall
prefer to look to the infirmities noticed by the Trial Court and other
grounds on the basis of which his testimony has been rejected by the Trial
Court while recording the order acquittal.

At the very out set we may mention that an argument \Vas advanced
B before the Trial Court on behalf of the accused/appellants that the place
of occurrence was not the same as deposed by the prosecution witnesses,
particularly by the alleged sole eye-witness Ranchhodbhai, PW 1, but this
argument was repelled and rejected by the Trial Court itself by holding
that there was no substance in the same in view of the fact that blood stains
C were found on Liberty Talkies Road as well as in the Lane. We also fmd
ourselves in full agreement to this part of the finding as confirmed by the
High Court also.

However, the learned Trial Judge recorded the findings that the
D evidence of Makkar, PW 8, the Assistant Engineer of Saurashtra Chemicals
did not establish the presence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 along with the two
deceased persons who came to him to negotiate the contract as Shri
Makker deposed about the presence of a third person whom he did not
know it that time but learnt subsequently that he was the complainant
belonging to Junagarh but in his statement before police recorded after 2-3
E days he did not state that he knew the name of Ranchhodbhai and that he
was of Junagarh; the identity of the assailants could not be fixed as
Ranchhodbhai, PW l did not know the accused appellants since before
and he learnt about their names in the hospital between 3.30 to 4.00 PM•
but could not identify in the Court as to who was Kishor and who was
F Mangal; the compiainant Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 had a very short span of
time to observe the appellants and, therefore, it was not possible for him
to fix up definitely that the appellants were the assailants. The witness
Ranchhodbhai is said to have seen the accused appellants in the hospital
but he did not state the said fact in his Fard-beyan recorded in the hospital
which was treated as FIR. The alleged sole eye-witness Ranchhodbhai
G received no injuries and the accused appellants also did not attack him
which fact supports the possibility that he may not have detained himself
at the place of occurrence to see the incident; regarding the conduct of the
sole eye-witness Ranchhodbhai the Trial Court observed that he did not
shout for help nor did he tell to anyone before giving FIR at the hospital
H that he had seen the incident himself. The learned Trial Judge, therefore,
M.KPARMANAND v.STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 13

treated this story as unnatural. The Trial Court proceed to observe that the A
statement of complainant Ranchhodbhai that he saw the accused appel-
lants in the hospital is also improbable in view of the evidence of Dr.
Nathani, PW 10 'vho examind the accused No. 2, Mangat at 2.35 PM in the
hospital and the appellant No. 1, Kishor at 4.00 PM while both of them
had not come to the hospital together; the evidence of Constable Prab-
hashankar Tulsi, PW19 cannot be accepted that he had taken both the
B
accused appellants from police station in the Government vehicle without
any police yadi (Memo) to the hospital; and, lastly, the Trial Court ob-
served that in view of the evidence of Head Constable, Moolehand
Hiranand, PW 18 that he did not receive any telephonic call from
Ranchhodbhai about the incident and in the absence of entry in the police C
station diary to support the version of Ranchhodbhai that he had phoned
the police station and Fire Brigade about the occurrance, his statement is
falsified. On these findings the learned Trial Judge took the view that
Ranchhodbha~ PW 1 cannot be accepted as an eye-witnes.' and, as such,
no conviction can be founded on his evidence and, therefore, recorded the D
order of acquittal of the appellants from the offences they were charged
with. As against this the High Court took a contrary view by reversing all
the aforesaid findings and conclusion recorded by the Trial Court and took
a definite view that the evidence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 is fully consistent,
free from all infirmities and embellishment and treating him as a truthful
witness placed him in the category of wholly reliable witness and, therefore, E
reversed the order of acquittal and recorded the finding of guilt against
the appellants.

The question for our consideration is whether the High Court on
reappraisal of the testimony of the sole eye-witness and other material on
F
record has acted within the constraints and the principles laid down by this
Court with regard to the reassessment of the evidence and was justified in
interferring with the order of acquittal.

Learned counsel for parties were heard quite at length. Having
regard to the settled principles of law and the dictum with regard to the G

.
\ powers of the High Court to deal with an appeal from an order of acquittal,
we have critically examined the evidence of the alleged eye-witness
I Ranchhodbha~ PW 1, and other witnesses together with all the relevant
material on record and have also carefully perused the judgments of the
Trial Court and the High Court. We are of the firm opinion that the H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) 3 S.C.R.

A learned Trial Judge rejected the evidence on misplaced considerations as
well as on flirnpsy grounds and took entirely an unreasonable view resulting
into patent miscarriage of justice which has been demonstrated by the High
Court in its well reasoned judgment and which would be evident from the
discussion in the paras hereafter. We shall examine the material evidence
minutely and closely to point out that the view taken by the High Court on
B reappraisal of the evidence is the only reasonable and possible view.

But before we launch our scrutiny of the evidence of occurrence on
record we may look to the medical evidence, as to the nature of injiries
and cause of death of the two victims, though the homicidal deaths of
C Punaram and Sohanlal are not in dispute. Dr. Avasia, PW 11, at the
relevant time was Medical Officer in Bhavsinhji hospital at Porbandar who
conducted an autopsy over the dead body of Punaram on 11.8.77. The dead
body was received by the Doctor at 4.45 PM with a police yadi. The
post-mortem commenced at 5.00 PM and completed at 6.00 PM and as per
D post mortem report and the evidence of Dr. Avasis, PW 11, there was an
incised wound on the left superclavicular region which had also cut the left
lung. The injury was ante-mortem in nature and the cause of death was on
account of haemorrhage due to profused bleeding. The injury in the
opinion of the doctor was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause the death of the victim. The dead body of Sohanlal was also received
E in the same hospital at 5.25 PM by Dr. Joshi, PW 12 who performed an
autopsy at 5.30 PM and completed the same at 7.00 PM. As per post-mor-
tem report and statement of Dr. Joshi there was one stab wound 211 x V2 11
cavity deep on the left laternal side of vertibral column between 8th and
9th inter-costal space and had cut the plura of the left lung which had
F collapsed. 111is injury was ante-mortem in nature and in the opinion of the
doctor it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and
the same could have been caused by a weapon like knife.

The medical evidence discussed above established beyond doubt that
the two victims had died the homicidal death on the date of occurrence
G itself.

Now we shall advert to the material evidence on record.
Ranchhodbhai, PW 1, the solitary witness of the incident is resident of
Porbandar. At the relevant time he was a Government Contractor and the ,...
H deceased Punaram was also working as a contractor who belonged to
I
~

M.K. PARMANAND v. STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZAN UDDIN,J.] 15

Rajasthan but was living at Malia for the last 10 to 15 years and was known A
to Ranchhodbhai since a number of years and had also worked with the
deceased Punaram in the years 1973-74. The deceased Sohanlal was known
to this witness Ranchhodbhai since about three months prior to the occur-
rence. Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 deposed that about three months prior to the
occurrence both the deceased Punaram and Sobania! had approached him
B
... '
saying that they wanted to take the contract of lime dust of Saurashtra
Syndicate, Porbandar. Both the deceased asked him to accompany them
and see by himself. Ranchhodbhai then went along with them to Porbandat
and came back but without obtaining the contract. About three-four days
prior to the occurrence the two deceased persons again approached
Ranchhodbhai in his shop at Junagarh and told him that they had finalised
c
the work of lime dust with Saurashtra Syµdicate. The deceased Punaram,
therefore, went to Dhari for collecting the dues of his bill and Sobania!
stayed at Junagarh for a day and then went to his place Malia. A day before
the occurrence deceased Punararn again approached Ranchhodbhai and
told him that he had taken out a Demand Draft (Ext. 49) for a sum of Rs. D
25000 for payment to the Saurashtra Chemicals.

., Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 further deposed that on 11.8.77, the day of
occurrence, he along with the deceased Punaram and Sohanlal left
Junagarh for Porbandar by bus at 6.00 AM and met Shri Makkar, PW 8
who was a Civil Engineer in Saurashtra Chemicals and discussed with him
E
.' the terms of contract but the contract could not be finalised. Ranchhodbhai
i and the two deceased persons left Saurashtra Chemicals at about 12.30 in
the noon and saw a motorcar parked outside the factory gate belonging to
the then contractor of Saurashtra Chemicals. Ranchhodbhai goes on the
state that at the factory gate they hired a Rickshaw for taking them up to F
•• Sudama Chowk. From Sudarna Chowk they proceeded on foot to Ghayal
lodge through Liberty Talkies road, taking their lunch there. They enquired
from a person the location of Ghayal lodge. He guided th~m to the road
leading to the said lodge. All the three persons passed through a narrow
lane, arrived at a big road and at that point, as stated by Ranchhodbhai,
G
PW 1, two persons arrived on a scooter and rushed towards them with
open knives. One of them caught hold Punaram while the other caught hold
Sohanlal. Ranchhodbhai identified the appellants in the Court room to be
~ those two persons who arrived on the scooter with open knives as accord-
;>r
ing to him he had seen these two appellants again in the Government
H
I
}

16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A dispensary also soon after the occurrence between 3.30 to 4.00 PM.

Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 further deposed that after the appellants
caught hold the deceased Punaram and Sohanlal with open knives, the
appellant questioned them as to why they were obstructing in their contract
with Saurashtra Chemicals. When this dialogue was going on between the
B deceased and the appellants he got frightened and, therefore, ran away to
some distance and stood at the corner of the lane watchiug them from ....
there. Then the man who had caught Punaram gave a knife blow to him
and the other man who had caught Sohanlal gave a knife blow to him also
while the two victims were shouting as to why they are being assaulted.
C Rachhodbhai further deposed •;hat he then came on the main road and at
that time he heard that the accused/appellants started the scooter and then
saw the assailants going away on the motor cycle. After the appellants went
away he came back to the place wherefrom he had seen the occurrence.
He found blood in the narrow lane but Punararn and Sobania! were not
D there. He went to the narrow lane "nd from there reached to the Liberty
Talkies road. He saw Punaram lying unconscious in a lane connecting the
Liberty Talkies road. He was bleeding from his shoulder. He then rushed
to a nearby tea-shop wherefrom he phoned for the ambulance and also
informed the police about the occurrence. Thereafter he saw a crowd of '
some persons at the nearby tea shop. He also went there and found that
E Sobania! was lying dead on the Liberty road.

After about an hour the ambulance arrived and Sohanlal and
Punaram both were removed to the hospital. Ranchhodbhai deposed that
he accompanied them in the ambulance to the hospital where they were
F examined and declared dead by the doctor. In the meanwhile the Police
Inspector, Dwivedi, PW 20 arrived in the hospital and started writing his
report. Ranchhodbhai deposed that while he was dictating the complaint
to the Police Inspector the two appellants also came to the same hospital
for treatment of their injuries. Ranchhodbhai stated that he had told the
Police Inspector Dwivedi that these two accused were the assailants of
G Punaram and Sohanlal. In cross-examination Ranchhodbhai stated that
after the appellants had caught hold the victims he remained standing there
for 2 to 3 minutes and thereafter he ran away and came on the road which
has a dead end which is just near the Liberty road. He further stated that
he had informed the police that two murders had taken place and that they
H should come immediately but no reply was received from the police to the
I

)

M.K.PARMANAND 1·. STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZANUDDIN.1.J

effect whether they had taken any notice to the same or not. He further A
deposed that from the dispensary staff he had heard the names of the
appellants as Kishore and Mangal when the injuries of the appellants were
being dressed and that he had seen the accused persons in the dispensary
after the police had come and he was dictating his complaint to the police
approximately al about 3.45 PM.
B
i In the aforesaid statement of the solitary eye-witness, namely,
Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 we do not find any infirmity or anything unusual
features from which it may be inferred that the witness is a got up witness
and not a truthful person.
c
However, the learned Trial Judge found various faults in his evidence
which we have already pointed out earlier but on a close scrutiny of his
evidence we find that the grounds considered by the Trial Court in reject-
ing his evidence are totally unfounded and unsupportable from the
evidence and material on record and the learned Trial Judge too~ a D
perverse view of his evidence. One of the reasons given by the Trial Court
for rejecting the evidence of Ranchhodbhoi is that at the time of occur-
rence his conduct was not riatural inasmuch as that after he saw that his
two companions were being given knife blows he neither shouted for help
nor after the occurrence told about the incident to anyone before making
the report to the police in the hospital. Jn our opinion the learned Trial E
Judge comn1ittcd a se1ious e1ror in rejecting his evidence on this account
totally ignoring the fact that different persons react differently in different
situations and circ1anstunces. No hard and fast rnle of universal application
with regard to tlze reaction of a person in a given circunistance can be laid
down. Most often when a person happen to see or conze across a gntesonze F
and c1uel act being pe1petrated within his sight then there is a possibility that
he niay lose his equilibriuni al1d balance of n1ind and therefore /1 v 111ay
re1nains as a silent spectator till he is 4_hle In rPconc;fe hintse.'f and then react
in his 01vn way. There 1nay be a pe1:~·on 1vho nu1y react by shouting for help
while others n1ay even choose to quietly slip aivay front the place of occur-
rence giving an ilnpression as zf they have seen nothing with a view to avoid G
their involven1ent, in any way, with the occu1Tence. Yet, there niay be .Persons
who 1nay be so daring hazardous and chivalrous enough to conic fo1ward
unhesiiitantly and jump in the fray at the poi/ of their own life with a zeal to
scare away the assailants and save the victini froni further assailants. Thus,
it is common knowledge that different persons react differently and no H
I

~

18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994)JS.C.R.

A hard and fast rule as to their behaviour can precisely be laid down in a
defined \Vay. in the present case on perusal of the evidence of the sole
eye-witness Ranchhodbhai we find that he did depose that when he saw
the appellants got down from the scooter with open knives he was
frightened and, therefore, kept himself away witnessing the incident by
standing at the extreme end of the lane and for some time he was confused
B and remained thinking as what to do. Not only this but he rushed to a
nearby shop to phone for the ambulance and inform the police. In this
regard the approach of the learned Trial Judge in appreciating the
evidence of the sole eye-witness, Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 is wholly erroneous
and unrealistic. The High Court was, therefore, fully justified in rejecting
c this ground.

The other reason slated by the learned Trial Judge in rejecting the
evidence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 is that the evidence of Shri Makkar, PW
8 Assistant Engineer of Saurashtra Chemicals did not establish the
D presence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 along with the two deceased persons who
had come to him on the day of occurrence to negotiate the contract and
since there is no other evidence to show the presence of PW 1 at the place
of occurrence he cannot be accepted as a witness to the incident. In our
opinion the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge is faulty and perverse
totally contrary to the facts on record. We have examined the evidence of
E Shri Makkar, PW 8 who has deposed that the contract was given to Mukesh
& Co. for the year preceding to the year of occurrence and other work was
done by the deceased Sohanlal in the name of Santosh & Co. He also
deposed that negotiations with the deceased Sohanlal and Punaram were
also going on. He stated that the two deceased persons had come to his
office on the day of occurrence at about 10.30 AM along with a third
F person from Junagarh. Surprisingly enough the learned Trial Judge treated
this evidence as formal in character and rejected the evidence of Shri
Makkar, PW 8 on the ground that in his police statement he did not
disclose the name of the witness Ranchhodbhai to be the third person
accompanying the deceased persons. The reasoning is extremely erroneous
G and unsustainable because the witness Makkar is said to have stated in his
police statement that the deceased were accompanied with a third person
in his office and did not disclose that the third person was Ranchhodbhai.
But the mere fact that Shri Makkar did not name of the third person, who
was a total stranger for him, accompanying the two deceased persons, will
not render his testimony as untruthful or unreliable. The presence of
H Ranchhodbhai at the place of occurrence and his being in the company of
J
M.K. PARMAN AND v. STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZAN UDDIN.J.J 19

the deceased is established by several circumstances as pointed out by the A
High Court and we do not deem it necessary to repeat tht:rn here over
again since we agree with the High Courts reasoning and finding.

Yet another reason for rejectirig the evidence of sole eye-\vitness
·Ranchhodbha~ PW 1 is that the two appellants were stranger to him and
the witness having seen them within the short span of time only during the B
course of occurrence it was not possible for him to say definitely that the
appellants were assailants. This finding is again devoid of any substance for
the reason that according to the evidence of Ranchhodbhai, PW 1, he
watched the appellants for 2-3 minutes discussing with the two deceased
as to why they were obstructing in their contract and thus had sufficient
opportunity to see the appellants. Secondly, soon after the occurrence he
c
again saw the appellants in the same hospital, where the two deceased were
taken between 3.30 to 4.00 PM where the appellants had also come for the
dressing of their injuries. The presence of the two appellants in the same
hospital is established beyond all doubts by the evidence of Dr. Nathan~
PW 10. In these circumstances we find that the witness Ranchhodbhai had D
sufficient opportunity and time to see and identify the appellants and,
therefore, he could not have made any mistake as to the identity of the
assailants. The \Vitness, Ranchhodbhai is a matured person and a Govern-
ment Contraclor. He is expected to possess a fair knowledge and under-
standing and not expected to faulter in recognizing persons whom he had
seen in broad-day light. The fact that the witness Ranchhodbhai had seen E
the accused appellants in the hospital but did not state that fact in his
Fard-beyan which was recorded in the hospital is not of much consequence
as the presence of the two appellants in the hospital is conclusively estab-
lished by reliable evidence of Dr. Nathani PW 10 as well as by the
admission of this fact by the appellants tbemsclves.
F
Another ground taken by the learned Trial .Judge in rejecting the
evidence of Ranchhodbhai is the fact that it was quite improbable for the
witness Ranchhodbhai to have seen the appellants together in the hospital
as according to the evidence of Dr. Nathani, PW 10, the accused appellant
No. 2, Mangat was examined at 2.3S PM while the accused appellant No. G
1, Kishor was examined by him al 4.00 PM and that both of them had not
come to the hospital together. If we may say so, this reasoning is absolutely
faulty as the learned Trial Judge has erred in not properly appreciating the
_x evidence in this behalf. It may be stated that the presence of Ranchhodbhai
in the hospital at the relevant time cannot be doubted at all. Similatly the H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ994J 3 S.C.R.

A presence of the two appellants in the hospital also at or about the same
time cannot be doubted. Constable Prabhashankar, PW 19 has clearly
deposed that on 11.8.77 when he was on duty two persons came to the
police station and identify the appellants, in Court room, stated that they
were the persons who came to the police station. He further stated that
B these two persons had injuries said to be sustained in a scuffle between
them. One person had injury on the thumb and the blood was oozing out
and another person had an ordinary injury. On the direction of the Station
House Officer he took both the appellants to the hospital for treatment but
without any Yadi (Memo) being given by the Police Inspector. Dr. Nathani,
PW 10 deposed that appellant No. 2, Mangat was brought to the hospital
C by Police Constable Prabhashankar, PW 19. The accused appellant No. 2
Mangal was examined by him at 2.35 PM and found an incised wound over
the right palm laternal aspect. The injury was fresh and bleeding caused
by a sharp cutting instrument like a knife. Dr. Nathani stated that the
accused No. 2 Mangat was admitted as an indoor patient and he was
D discharged on 12.8.77 at 1.00 PM. This shows that appellant Mangat was
in the hospital right from 2.35 PM till LOO PM on 12.8.77. Dr. Nathani, PW
10 examined appellant No. 1 Kishor also same day at about 4.00 PM who
had one incised muscle deep wound on the rest of left thumb. A perusal
of the Fard-beyan (FIR) given by Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 in the hospital will
E go to show that it was recorded between 3.30 to 3.45 PM on 11.8.77. The
evidence of Constable Prabhashankar, PW 19 as discussed above goes to
show that he took both the accused/appellants to the hospital for treatment
of their injuries. It appears that since the accused Mangat had a bit serious
injury he was examined first and admitted as an indoor patient, the turn of
1:· cxan1ining accused No. 1, Kishor may have come later at about 4.00 PM.
But the mere fact that he was examined at 4.00 PM will not lead to an
inference that he reached the hospital only at 4.00 PM and not alongwith
the accused No. 1 Kishor as deposed by Prabhashankar, PW 19. This apart
the question \vhether hoth the appellants catne together to the hospit<JI is
no1 very inuch n1aterial but there is positive evidence that they were in the
G hospital during the period the complaint of Ranchhodbhai was being
recorded and. therefore, the reasoning of 1he learned Trial Judge that
Ranchhodhhai would nut have seen the appellants in the hospital together
is absolutely incorrect and on that account the evidence of Ranchhodbhai
cannot be rejected as doubtful within any stretch of imagination.
H
M.K.PARMANAND v. STAIBOFGUJARAT[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 21

There is yet another ground which made the learned Sessions Judge A
to disbelieve the testimony of Ranchhodbhai and it is. this that he did not
find in the evidence of the Head Constable Moolchand Hiranand, PW 18
who was on duty in the police station at the relevant time, that he received
any telephonic message from Ranchhodbhai about the incident and there
was no entry to this effect in the police station diary to support the version
of Ranchhodbhai that he had phoned to the police station and fire brigade.
B
This finding of the learned Trial Judge, like all other findings is also based
on wholly wrong approach to the case and total mis-appreciation of the
evidence on record which would be demonstrated by us in the para
hereinafter.
c
The prosecution had examined one Jayantilal, PW 6 who had a tea
shop on the Liberty road and has a telephone bearing No. 408. he deposed
that on the day of occurrence at about 1.30 or 2.00 PM when he was present
in his shop, one person came and said he wanted to phone. He allowed
him to telephone and that person made two phones, one to the police D
station and the other to the fire brigade saying that two persons were
injured with knife and, therefore, send ambulance immediately. He further
deposed that the person who came to phone and made two phone calls
belonged to Junagarh. A criticism was advanced that Constable Prab-
hashankar, PW 19 who was on duty in Porbandar City Police Station did
not depose that any such telephonic message was conveyed to the police E
station and the station diary of Porbandar dated 11.8.77 Ext. 64 only shows
a telephone message having been conveyed at 2.10 PM by Gopalbhai
Ranchhodbhai from telephone No. 622 of Gujarat Cycle Stores near Liber-
ty Talkies that two persons were lying in a pool of blood and were
unconscious. This evidence was sought to be capitalised by the learned F
counsel for the appellants by contending that Ranchhodbhai did not phone
at all either to the police station or for the ambulance as he himself does
not n1ake any mention for having phoned frpn1 phone No. 622. We are
afr1.1id, thi,o;. argument h1.1s no substance. In fact the Constable Prab-
hashankar was not questioned at all either in exan1ination-in-chief or in
cross-examination about Ranchhodbhai having phoned from phone No. G
4iJ8 or 622. However, the Head Constable Moolchand, PW 18 who made
the entry Ext. 64 in the police station diary deposed that he had received
the phone from phone No 622 of Gujarat Cycle Store, Liberty Road,
Porbandar. The question \vhether the telephonic n1cssage was conve;ied
from phone No. 408 or 622 is not so much material as the message itself H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] 3 S.C.R.

A and in view of the evidence of J ayantilal Pandey, PW 6 and Head Constable
Moolchand, PW 18 it can hardly be said that no telephonic message was
conveyed by Ranchhodbhai, PW 1. It is true that the witness Jayantilal did
not know as to what was the name of the person who made the phone calls
but in the context of what' has been discussed above that person could be
no other than Ranchhodbhai PW 1, himself. This inference is fortified from
B the fact that after the telephonic message the ambulance car did arrive at
the place of occu;rcnce an'd the victims were taken to the hospital in the
same ambulance and the complainant Ranchhodbhai also accompanied the
injured to the hospital. Not only this but police also arrived in the hospital
as in the mean time a message from the hospital was also sent to the police
c station about the two injured persons.

The evidence of a witness deposing about a fact has to be ap-
preciated in a realistic manner having due regard to all the surrounding
facts and circumstances prevailing at or about the time of occurrence of
D an incident. Some contradictions and omissions even in the evidence of a
witness who was actually present and had seen the occurrence are bound
to occur even in the natural course. It is a sound rule to be observed that
where the facts stated by an eye-witness substantially conform to and are
consistent on material points from the facts stated earlier to the police
either in FIR or case diary statements and are also consistent in all material
E details as well as on vital points there would be no justification or any valid
reason for the Court to view his evidence with suspicion or cast any doubt
on such e\idence. Jn the present case as discussed above we find that the
solitary witness Ranchhodbhai, PW 1 is a wholly reliable witness and his
evidence in itself, without any further corroboration is enough to sustain
F the conviction of the two appellants for the crime they are charged with,
but we find that the evidence of the sole eye-witness Ranchhodbhai finds
corroboration on material aspects from the evidence of .Jayantilal PW 6,
Makker PW 8, Dr. Nathani PW 10, Dr. Avasia PW 11, Dr. Joshi PW 12
and the Head Constable Moolchand PW 18. Thus the corroboration is also
not lacking in the present case and rhere was hardly any ground or any
G possibility of taking the view which is unfortunately taken by the learned
Trial Judge. Jn our considered opinion the Trial Court clearly fell in serious
error in rejecting the truthful version made by the sole eye-witness PW l
.\vhose evidence does not suffer from any infirmities, muchless the un\var-
ranted criticism made by the Trial Court. The High Court was therefore,
H in exercise of its po\vers under Sections 378 and 386~ Criminal Procedure
I I

M.KPARMANAND v.STATEOFGUJARAT[FAIZANUDDIN,J.] 23

Code, fully justified to reverse the erroneous findings recorded by the Trial A
Court. We find ourselves wholly in agreement with the view taken by the
High Court and the conclusions recorded by it. Consequently the appeal
deserves to be dismissed.

In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. The conviction
of the two appellants as recorded by the High Court with sentences B
thereunder is maintained.

RA

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•