Holding

The allegations do not establish the essential elements of cheating, forgery, or a breach of Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, and the supplementary investigation fails to meet the standards of Section 173(8) CrPC, warranting the quashing of the FIR and related proceedings.

Summary

The appellants, a married couple, obtained a passport for their minor child allegedly without the husband’s genuine consent, leading the husband to file a complaint alleging forgery of his signature and cheating. The trial magistrate ordered further investigation, resulting in a supplementary charge‑sheet that added offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 IPC and Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, despite no new evidence being produced. The Supreme Court examined the essential ingredients of cheating and forgery and found that the alleged conduct lacked deceit, dishonest intention, and any loss or damage to the husband, rendering the offences unsubstantiated. It also held that the supplementary investigation did not satisfy the requirements of Section 173(8) CrPC and that no prima‑facie case existed under the Passports Act. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court and trial magistrate’s orders, quashed the FIR and all related proceedings, and awarded costs to the appellant‑wife.

Issues considered

Whether the appellants' conduct prima facie constitutes cheating under Section 420 IPC
Whether a prima facie case exists for forgery under Sections 468 and 471 IPC
Whether there is a violation of Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967
Whether the supplementary charge‑sheet complies with the requirements of Section 173(8) CrPC

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(8), s. 239
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 201, s. 34, s. 420, s. 468, s. 471
Passports Act, 1967s. 12(b)

Subjects

CheatingForgeryPassport ActSection 12(b)Section 173(8) CrPCProcedural irregularitiesAbuse of process of lawFurther investigationSupplementary charge‑sheetDishonest intentionDeceit

Judgment

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 623 : 2024 INSC 49

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr.
v.
State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 335 of 2024)
22 January 2024
[Surya Kant* and Dipankar Datta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
The crux of respondent No. 2’s allegations is that the appellants
purportedly forged his signature on the passport application
submitted to obtain the minor child’s passport. Whether the actions
of the appellants prima facie constitute the offence of cheating u/s.
420 IPC; Whether there has been a prima facie case made out for
forgery u/ss. 468 and 471 IPC; Whether there has been a violation
of s.12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967; Whether in the absence of
any new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn
by the investigating officer in the supplementary report, a Judicial
Magistrate was compelled to take cognizance, as such a report
lacked investigative rigour and failed to satisfy the requisites of
s.173(8) Cr.P.C.

Headnotes
Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating and Forgery – Appellants’ prayer
to discharge them u/ss. 420, 468, 471, 120-B, 201 r/w. s.34 of
IPC was dismissed by the High Court – Propriety:
Held: In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the
appellant-wife seems to have breached the notion of mutual marital
trust and unauthorizedly projected respondent no. 2’s consent in
obtaining the passport for their minor child – It, however, remains
a question as to how such an act can be labelled as ‘deceitful’ –
The motivations prompting either of the appellants to procure a
passport for the minor child were not rooted in deceit – Furthermore,
the grant of passport to the minor child did not confer any benefit
upon the appellan-wife, nor did it result in any loss or damage
to respondent no. 2 – In the same vein, appellant no. 2, being
the father of the appellant-wife and assisting in securing the
passport for the child, derived no direct or indirect benefit from
this action – This grant can be best characterised as the minor

* Author
624 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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child’s acquisition of property – Since the gain by the minor child
is not at the cost of any loss, damage or injury to respondent
no. 2, both the fundamental elements of ‘deceit’ and ‘damage
or injury’, requisite for constituting the offence of cheating are
conspicuously absent in this factual scenario – As far as forgery
is concerned, the offences of ‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ intersect
and converge, as the act of forgery is committed with the intent
to deceive or cheat an individual – The determination of whether
the appellants prepared a false document, by forging respondent
no. 2’s signature, however, cannot be even prima facie ascertained
at this juncture – Considering the primary ingredient of dishonest
intention itself could not be established against the appellants,
the offence of forgery too, has no legs to stand – The elementary
ingredients of ‘cheating’ and ‘forgery’ are conspicuously missing
– Thus, the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the
appellants is nothing but an abuse of the process of law – The
impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial Court are set
aside. [Paras 16, 18, 20, 23, 34, 39]
Passport Act, 1967 – s. 12(b) – Whether there was a violation
of s.12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967:
Held: Section 12(b) categorically states that, whoever knowingly
furnishes any false information or suppresses any material
information, with a view to obtaining a passport or travel document
under this Act or without lawful authority, alters or attempts to
alter or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or travel
document – As discernible from the language of the provision,
what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished
false information or suppressed material information with the
intent of obtaining a passport or travel document – In the instant
case, it is crucial to consider that the State FSL report explicitly
stated that the alleged forgery of respondent No. 2’s signatures
on the passport application was inconclusive – Moreover, the
cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance
of the Prescribed Authority – No complaint to that effect has been
disclosed against the Appellants – The Court cannot proceed on
the basis of conjectures and surmises.[Paras 35, 36]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 173 (8) – Respondent
no. 2 invoked s.173(8) Cr.P.C. and sought further investigation
of the offences u/ss. 468 and 471 IPC in the concerned FIR –
Trial Magistrate allowed respondent no. 2’s prayer for further
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 625

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

investigation – Pursuant thereto, the investigating agency
filed a supplementary charge-sheet against the appellants –
Propriety:
Held: It is a matter of record that in the course of ‘further
investigation’, no new material was unearthed by the investigating
agency – Instead, the supplementary charge-sheet relies upon the
Truth Lab report dated 15.07.2013, obtained by respondent no. 2,
which was already available when the original chargesheet was
filed – The term ‘further investigation’ stipulated in s.173(8) Cr.P.C.
obligates the officer-in-charge of the concerned police station to
‘obtain further evidence, oral or documentary’, and only then forward
a supplementary report regarding such evidence, in the prescribed
form – The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers
that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather
than re-evaluating or reassessing the material already collected
and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the
initial police report, known as the chargesheet u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C.
– In the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the
conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary
report, a Judicial Magistrate is not compelled to take cognizance,
as such a report lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the
requisites of s.173(8) Cr.P.C. – The investigating agency acted
mechanically, in purported compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s
order. [Paras 26 and 27]
Penal Code, 1860 – Cheating – Components of:
Held: It is paramount that in order to attract the provisions of s.420
IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove that the accused has
cheated someone but also that by doing so, he has dishonestly
induced the person who is cheated to deliver property – There are,
thus, three components of this offence, i.e., (i) the deception of
any person, (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to
deliver any property to any person, and (iii) mens rea or dishonest
intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement –
There is no gainsaid that for the offence of cheating, fraudulent
and dishonest intention must exist from the inception when the
promise or representation was made. [Para 11]
Penal Code, 1860 – Forgery – Components of:
Held: There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled
in order to establish the offence of ‘forgery’, namely: (i) that the
626 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with
the intention that the forged document would be used for the
purpose of cheating – Simply put, the offence of forgery requires
the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention
of causing damage or injury. [Para 22]

Case Law Cited
Krishna Chawla v. State of UP [2021] 2 SCR 550:
(2021) 5 SCC 435; Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of
Investigation [2011] 8 SCR 1: (2011) 5 SCC 708; Vinay
Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and others [2012] 13 SCR 1005:
(2013) 5 SCC 762; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
and another [1978] 2 SCR 621: (1978) 1 SCC 248; K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India [2018] 8 SCR 1: (2019)
1 SCC 1 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edition,
Vol.1, pg.903 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Passport Act, 1967.

List of Keywords
Cheating; Components of cheating; Fraudulent intentions;
Dishonest intentions; Deceit; Damage; Injury; Forgery; Components
of forgery; Procedural irregularities; Abuse of the process of law;
Further investigation; Supplementary charge-sheet; Fresh oral or
documentary evidence.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.335
of 2024.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.02.2021 of the High Court
of Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLRP No.692 of 2018.
Appearances for Parties
Ranbir Singh Yadav, Mohammed Sharookh, Prateek Yadav, Ms.
Anzu K. Varkey, Ms. Mahesh Sharma, Ms. Chembugari Abheeshna,
Advs. for the Appellants.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 627

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

Narendra Hodda, Sr. Adv., Sanchit Garga, R. D. Singh, Ms. Mithu
Jain, Kunal Rana, Pranshu Kaushal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Surya Kant, J.
Leave granted.
2. The Appellants assail the judgment dated 18.02.2021, passed by
the High Court of Karnataka, at Bengaluru (hereinafter, ‘High
Court’), whereby their Criminal Revision Petition challenging the
order dated 15.03.2018 of the VI Additional Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Bengaluru (hereinafter, ‘Trial Magistrate’) has been
dismissed. Consequently, the Appellants’ prayer to discharge them
in connection with FIR No. 141/2010 under Sections 420, 468, 471
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter,
‘IPC’) registered at P.S. Adugodi, Bengaluru has been concurrently
turned down.
A. FACTS
3. The brief facts that are relevant to the present proceedings are set
out as follows:
3.1. The Appellant No. 1 – wife, and Respondent No. 2 – husband, got
married in Bengaluru on 02.08.2007. At the time of their marriage,
Respondent No. 2 was engaged in a software business, located
in New Castle Upon Tyne, the United Kingdom. During this
period, Respondent No. 2 statedly assured the Appellant – wife
that post marriage they would reside together in London. It is
the Appellants’ case that Respondent No. 2 initially refused
to take the Appellant – wife with him, but after considerable
persuasion, she managed to accompany Respondent No. 2
to London. However, soon after, Respondent No. 2 allegedly
abandoned her and forcefully confined her to the residence of
her sister-in-law. At the same time, Respondent No. 2 returned
to India.
3.2. Appellant No. 2, who is the father of the Appellant – wife, had to
intervene in the aforesaid circumstances and facilitate the latter’s
return to India. Subsequently, on 02.06.2008, the Appellant
628 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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– wife gave birth to a male child. The Appellants allege that
Respondent No. 2 and his family members did not provide any
financial assistance to the Appellant – wife and the minor child. In
January, 2009, the Appellant – wife sought to obtain a passport
for the minor child based allegedly upon Respondent No. 2’s
instructions. Respondent No. 2 also assured them that he had
arranged their stay in the United Kingdom. Shortly thereafter,
the minor child’s passport was issued, and Respondent No.
2 obtained a sponsorship letter from his brother-in-law, Dr.
M.K. Shariff, which was duly forwarded to the United Kingdom
High Commission. The sponsorship letter stated that Dr. M.K.
Shariff would accommodate the Appellant – wife and the minor
child during their visit to the United Kingdom and specifically
mentioned the minor child’s passport number.
3.3. However, as per the allegations of the Appellants, the duration
of marriage with Respondent No. 2 was fraught with physical
and mental torture solely on account of Respondent No. 2’s
relentless financial demands. More pertinently, Respondent
No. 2, during his visit to India towards the end of 2009,
subjected the Appellant – wife to coercion and torture. These
acts of intimidation prompted the Appellant – wife to file a
complaint against Respondent No. 2 and his family members
on 07.04.2010 before the Basavangudi Women Police Station,
Bengaluru. The complaint was registered as Crime No. 68 /
2010, under Sections 346, 498A and 506, read with Section
34 IPC. Additionally, the complaint alleges that Respondent
No. 2, on the pretext of arranging for their travel to the United
Kingdom, took away the minor child’s passport and jewellery
items belonging to the Appellant – wife.
3.4. Having learnt of the complaint filed by his wife, Respondent
No. 2 also lodged a complaint of his own on 13.05.2010 before
the Adugodi Police Station, alleging that the Appellants had
forged his signatures on the minor child’s passport application
and submitted the same to the Regional Passport Office,
Bengaluru, at the time when Respondent No. 2 was in the
United Kingdom. This complaint was registered as FIR No.
141/2010 under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section
34 IPC (hereinafter, ‘Concerned FIR’).
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 629

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

3.5. Following the investigation conducted in the Concerned FIR,
the investigating agency proceeded to file a chargesheet,
implicating the Appellants and one Mr. Aksar Ahmed Sheriff,
who is a travel agent, for procuring the minor child’s passport
using forged documents. Notably, the charges for offences
under Sections 468 and 471 IPC were dropped. Consequently,
a case numbered CC No. 23545 / 2011 commenced before the
Trial Magistrate only for the offences punishable under Section
420 read with Section 34 IPC.
3.6. The Appellants sought quashing of the aforementioned
chargesheet vide Criminal Petition No. 3600 / 2012, invoking
the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’), but their petition
was dismissed vide order dated 22.04.2014. However, liberty
was granted to the Appellants to approach the Trial Magistrate
and seek their discharge from the case CC No. 23545/2011.
3.7. The Appellants consequently moved an application under Section
239 CrPC, seeking discharge in CC No. 23545 / 2011. In the
meantime, Respondent No. 2 also invoked Section 173(8) CrPC
and sought further investigation of the offences under Sections
468 and 471 IPC in the Concerned FIR. The Trial Magistrate
on 24.06.2015, vide separate orders, allowed Respondent No.
2’s prayer for further investigation and directed him, being the
de facto complainant, to furnish necessary evidence before the
investigating officer, if so required. On the other hand, the Trial
Magistrate dismissed the Appellants’ discharge application on
the ground that the question as to whether an offence under
Section 420 IPC was made out or not would be decided during
the course of trial.
3.8. Pursuant to the abovementioned order of the Trial Magistrate, the
investigating agency filed a supplementary chargesheet against
the Appellants on 25.07.2017, adding offences under Sections
468, 471, 420, 120-B and 201 read with Section 34 IPC and
Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967. At this juncture, it is
imperative to highlight that the concerned Passport Officer was
also implicated as Accused No. 4, for allegedly providing false
information regarding the availability of the original passport of
the minor child and being complicit with the Appellants in its
630 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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destruction. The supplementary chargesheet also referred to
a report provided by the State Forensic Laboratory, Madiwala,
Bengaluru, dated 27.02.2016 (hereinafter, ‘State FSL’), which
categorically states as follows:
“Opinion on questioned photocopied signatures marked
as Q1 to Q4 is not expressed since, the questioned
photocopied signatures are showing bad line quality of
strokes.”
3.9. In addition to the State FSL Report, the supplementary
chargesheet also mentioned a report dated 15.07.2013
purportedly obtained by Respondent No. 2 from a private agency,
known as, ‘Truth Lab’. This report opined that the signatures
on the passport application did not signify a close resemblance
with the specimens of Respondent No. 2’s signatures.
3.10. Subsequent to these developments, when the case CC No.
23545 / 2011 was taken up for hearing before charge, it was
urged on behalf of the Appellants that there were no grounds
to frame charges. However, the Trial Magistrate repelled this
contention by order dated 15.03.2018 and declined to discharge
them.
3.11. The Appellants preferred to challenge the Trial Magistrate’s
order vide Criminal Revision Petition No. 692 / 2018, but as
noticed at the outset, the High Court dismissed the same via
the impugned order dated 18.02.2021, primarily on the ground
that there were specific allegations against the Appellants which
required a full-fledged trial.
3.12. The aggrieved Appellants are now before this Court.
B. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Mr. Ranbir Singh Yadav, Learned Counsel appearing for the
Appellants, argued that Respondent No. 2’s complaint pertaining to
the forgery of the passport application was merely a counterblast
to the Appellant – wife’s complaint alleging cruelty against him.
He contended that Respondent No. 2 had expressly consented to
obtaining the minor child’s passport and after the issuance of passport,
had even sent the sponsorship letter authored by his brother-in-law,
Dr. M.K. Shariff, for the relocation of the Appellant – wife and the
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 631

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

minor child to London. It was argued that this sponsorship letter is
vital since it had been obtained at the instance of Respondent No.
2 and it specifically mentioned the passport number of the minor
child, thereby implying consent of Respondent No. 2.
5. Mr. Yadav further contended that the opinion rendered by the State
FSL was inconclusive as to the alleged forgery, and no additional
material whatsoever had been recovered by the investigating agency
between filing the original chargesheet and the supplementary
chargesheet. Mr. Yadav also highlighted the reliance placed by both
the High Court and the Trial Magistrate on the opinion of a handwriting
expert obtained by Respondent No. 2 through a private agency –
known as the Truth Lab. He vehemently urged that the State FSL
Report should have been given utmost weightage in comparison to
a paid opinion so as to uphold the fairness and impartiality of the
investigation. Mr. Yadav contended that no prima facie case had been
made out against the Appellants. Citing the decision of this Court
in Krishna Chawla v. State of UP,1 he emphasised upon the duty
of the Trial Magistrate to nip frivolous prosecution in the bud before
it reaches the trial stage by discharging the accused in fit cases.
6. Contrarily, Mr. Narender Hooda, Learned Senior Counsel representing
Respondent No. 2, strongly refuted the allegations levelled by the
Appellants. He strenuously urged that Respondent No. 2 was not
present in India during the period from 13.07.2008 to 17.11.2009,
when the alleged passport application with his forged signatures was
submitted, to procure the minor child’s passport. He further argued
that the Trial Magistrate has unequivocally observed that the Passport
Officer (Accused No. 4), who deliberately withheld the original passport
application, was an accomplice in the offence of the destruction of
evidence. Additionally, Mr. Hooda objected to discarding the Truth
Lab report at the stage of deciding the discharge application on the
premise that the report of the State FSL was ambiguous and that
the veracity of the private lab report could be ascertained only at
the time of trial.
7. In addition to the full insight of the controversy, as highlighted by the
learned counsel for the parties, we have also meticulously perused
the chargesheets and other documents brought on record by them.

1 (2021) 5 SCC 435, para 23.
632 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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C. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION
8. The foremost question that falls for consideration before us is whether
a prima facie case, to subject the Appellants to the agony of trial,
has been made out. In furtherance of this question, the following
issues emerge for our further consideration:
(i) Whether the actions of the Appellants prima facie constitute
the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC?
(ii) Whether there has been a prima facie case made out for forgery
under Sections 468 and 471 IPC?
(iii) Whether there has been a violation of Section 12(b) of the
Passports Act, 1967?
D. ANALYSIS
9. In the present case, charges have been brought against the Appellants
for offences punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471, 120-B, 201,
read with Section 34 IPC, and Section 12(b) of the Passports Act,
1967. In this context, it is paramount to delve into the ingredients of
‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ required to be prima facie established against
the Appellants, at the very threshold. We are conscious of the fact
that such an evaluation would have to proceed on the premise
that the material gathered by the investigating agency is not to be
discarded or disbelieved at this stage.
The offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC:
10. Section 420 IPC provides that whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly
induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or
to make, alter or destroy, the whole or any part of valuable security,
or anything, which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be liable to be punished for
a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to
fine. Further, Section 415 IPC distinctly defines the term ‘cheating’.
The provision elucidates that an act marked by fraudulent or dishonest
intentions will be categorised as ‘cheating’ if it is intended to induce
the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to
consent that any person shall retain any property, causing damage
or harm to that person.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 633

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

11. It is thus paramount that in order to attract the provisions of Section
420 IPC, the prosecution has to not only prove that the accused
has cheated someone but also that by doing so, he has dishonestly
induced the person who is cheated to deliver property. There are,
thus, three components of this offence, i.e., (i) the deception of
any person, (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to
deliver any property to any person, and (iii) mens rea or dishonest
intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement.
There is no gainsaid that for the offence of cheating, fraudulent and
dishonest intention must exist from the inception when the promise
or representation was made.
12. It is well known that every deceitful act is not unlawful, just as not
every unlawful act is deceitful. Some acts may be termed both as
unlawful as well as deceitful, and such acts alone will fall within
the purview of Section 420 IPC. It must also be understood that a
statement of fact is deemed ‘deceitful’ when it is false, and is knowingly
or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by
another person, resulting in damage or loss.2 ‘Cheating’ therefore,
generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces
a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security,
prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which they
would not have done but for the inducement.
13. The term ‘property’ employed in Section 420 IPC has a well-defined
connotation. Every species of valuable right or interest that is
subject to ownership and has an exchangeable value – is ordinarily
understood as ‘property’. It also describes one’s exclusive right to
possess, use and dispose of a thing. The IPC itself defines the term
‘moveable property’ as, “intended to include corporeal property
of every description, except land and things attached to the
earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to
the earth.” Whereas immoveable property is generally understood
to mean land, benefits arising out of land and things attached or
permanently fastened to the earth.
14. Having fully addressed the contours of the offence of ‘cheating’, let
us now advert to the facts of the instant case to appreciate whether
the allegations made by Respondent No. 2, are sufficient to prima

2 P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 6th Edition, Vol. 1, pg. 903.
634 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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facie establish that: (i) the Appellants have deceived Respondent
No. 2; (ii) Respondent No. 2 was induced with dishonest intentions;
(iii) such inducement was for the delivery of any property or valuable
security; and (iv) as a result of such an act, Respondent No. 2 has
suffered some damage or injury.
15. Each of these ingredients need to be analysed to ascertain
whether Respondent No. 2 has made allegations in his complaint
to substantiate points (i) to (iv) above. Additionally, it would also aid
in determining whether the original or supplementary chargesheet
addresses any of these ingredients.
16. The crux of Respondent No. 2’s allegations is that the Appellants
purportedly forged his signature on the passport application submitted
to obtain the minor child’s passport. Assuming the allegation to be
accurate, it would undoubtedly constitute an unlawful act. However,
as set out earlier, it is crucial to underscore that not every unlawful
act automatically qualifies as ‘deceitful’. In the peculiar facts and
circumstances of this case, the Appellant – wife seems to have
breached the notion of mutual marital trust and unauthorizedly
projected Respondent No. 2’s consent in obtaining the passport for
their minor child. It, however, remains a question as to how such an
act can be labelled as ‘deceitful’. The motivations prompting either
of the Appellants to procure a passport for the minor child were not
rooted in deceit. Furthermore, the grant of passport to the minor
child did not confer any benefit upon the Appellant-wife, nor did
it result in any loss or damage to Respondent No. 2. In the same
vein, Appellant No. 2, being the father of the Appellant – wife and
assisting in securing the passport for the chid, derived no direct or
indirect benefit from this action.
17. In this context, the critical inquiry arises: how does the act of forging
signatures on the passport application, aimed at obtaining the minor
child’s passport, amount to inducing Respondent No. 2 to relinquish
any property or valuable security? Examining the situation, it becomes
apparent that the aforementioned act does not entail inducement
leading to the parting of any property by Respondent No. 2. The nature
of the property which can be claimed to have been relinquished or the
tangible loss, damage, or injury, if any, suffered by Respondent No.
2 are not visible at all. The unequivocal response to these queries
is clearly in the negative.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 635

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

18. Respondent No. 2, the biological father and natural guardian of the
minor child, is positioned as such in relation to the grant of a passport
to his son. This grant can be best characterised as the minor child’s
acquisition of property. Since the gain by the minor child is not at the
cost of any loss, damage or injury to Respondent No. 2, both the
fundamental elements of ‘deceit’ and ‘damage or injury’, requisite
for constituting the offence of cheating are conspicuously absent in
this factual scenario.
19. Conversely, can the Appellant – wife, being the natural mother of
the child and a natural guardian, be accused of acting `dishonestly’
when applying for the passport of her minor child? A passport, is an
authorised instrument which enables a person to travel outside the
country of his origin. In this case, the passport was admittedly issued
in favour of the minor child. Whether it was stolen by Respondent
No. 2 or misplaced, is wholly immaterial to the present discussion.
The grant of passport to the minor child is nothing but a right
conferred upon him by statute. The passport is meant to facilitate
him to accompany his mother to London and stay with his father.
However, there is not even a whisper of allegation or suggestion that
the passport was obtained to the detriment of the child’s wellbeing.
The underlying intent of obtaining the passport was, ironically,
essential for the Appellant – wife and minor child to live together
with Respondent No. 2, on whose instructions the passport was
statedly obtained. Conversely, it is the actions of Respondent No.
2 that have seemingly deprived the minor child of his right to seek
the care and company of his father, as the passport was allegedly
taken away by Respondent No. 2 in a clandestine manner.
20. The background of this case and the chronology of events squarely
indicate that it is the touchstone of a marital dispute. The insinuations
made by Respondent No. 2, even if they possess an iota of truth, have
miserably failed to prima facie establish the elements of ‘cheating’
and thus, the accusation made against the Appellants under Section
420 IPC must fall flat.
The offence of forgery under Sections 468 and 471 IPC:
21. The offence of ‘forgery’ under Section 468 IPC postulates that whoever
commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic document
forged, shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished
636 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Whereas Section 471
IPC states that whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine
any documents which he knows or has reason to believe it to be a
forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if he
had forged such document.
22. There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order
to establish the offence of ‘forgery’, namely: (i) that the accused has
fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that
the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating.
Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false
document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury.3
23. The offences of ‘forgery’ and ‘cheating’ intersect and converge, as
the act of forgery is committed with the intent to deceive or cheat
an individual. Having extensively addressed the aspect of dishonest
intent in the context of ‘cheating’ under Section 420 IPC, it stands
established that no dishonest intent can be made out against
the Appellants. Our focus therefore will now be confined, for the
sake of brevity, to the first element, i.e., the preparation of a false
document. The determination of whether the Appellants prepared a
false document, by forging Respondent No. 2’s signature, however,
cannot be even prima facie ascertained at this juncture. Considering
the primary ingredient of dishonest intention itself could not be
established against the Appellants, the offence of forgery too, has no
legs to stand. It is also significant to highlight that the proceedings
as against the concerned Passport Officer, who was implicated as
Accused No. 4, already stand quashed. In such like situation and
coupled with the nature of allegations, we are unable to appreciate
as to why the Appellants be subjected to the ordeal of trial.
24. That apart, there are glaring procedural irregularities that have been
overlooked by the Trial Magistrate, which warrants examination.
It is extremely important to delve into these improprieties since
the supplementary chargesheet filed by the investigating authority
included the offence of ‘forgery’ under Sections 468 and 471 IPC.

3 Sushil Suri v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2011) 5 SCC 708, para 26.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 637

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

Questions overlooked by the lower courts:
25. As previously noted, the Appellants stand accused of forging the
signatures of Respondent No. 2 on the passport application of
the minor child. The investigating agency initially found insufficient
evidence to support charges under Sections 468 and 471 IPC.
Accordingly, no chargesheet was filed under these provisions.
However, in compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s order dated
24.06.2015, a supplementary chargesheet was submitted under
Sections 468, 471 and 201 IPC and Section 12(b) of the Passports
Act, 1967.
26. It is a matter of record that in the course of ‘further investigation’, no
new material was unearthed by the investigating agency. Instead,
the supplementary chargesheet relies upon the Truth Lab report
dated 15.07.2013, obtained by Respondent No. 2, which was already
available when the original chargesheet was filed. The term ‘further
investigation’ stipulated in Section 173(8) CrPC obligates the officer-
in-charge of the concerned police station to ‘obtain further evidence,
oral or documentary’, and only then forward a supplementary report
regarding such evidence, in the prescribed form.
27. The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that
fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than
re-evaluating or reassessing the material already collected and
considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial
police report, known as the chargesheet under Section 173(2)
CrPC.4 In the absence of any new evidence found to substantiate the
conclusions drawn by the investigating officer in the supplementary
report, a Judicial Magistrate is not compelled to take cognizance,
as such a report lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the
requisites of Section 173(8) CrPC. What becomes apparent from the
facts on record of this case is that the investigating agency acted
mechanically, in purported compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s
order dated 24.06.2015.
28. Regrettably, the Trial Magistrate, while directing further investigation,
overlooked the significant aspect that the offences imputed upon
the Appellants fall within the ambit of Chapter XVII, ‘Of Offences

4 Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali and others, (2013) 5 SCC 762, para 22.
638 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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Against Property’, and Chapter XVIII, ‘Of Offences Relating to
Documents and to Property Marks’ of the IPC. All the offences
delineated or illustrated under these two chapters predominantly
pertain to commercial or property disputes arising from dishonest,
deceitful and fraudulent transactions, wherein an individual is induced
to part with their property or valuable security, leading to subsequent
injury or damage. These offences typically diverge from the customary
realm of matrimonial disputes, which constitute the underlying cause
in this instance.
29. The Trial Magistrate, prior to entertaining the application filed by
Respondent No. 2, should have applied his mind and posed certain
queries in order to find out as to: (i) Why does Respondent No. 2
want to deprive his minor child of a passport?; (ii) Is it the case that
he did not want his minor child to join his company in London?; (iii)
How has Respondent No. 2 secured the maintenance, education and
future prospects of the minor child?; (iv) Does the minor child have
a civil right to hold a passport even if one of his parents does not
accord consent?; (v) Can the minor child be granted a passport with
the consent of one parent under whose care and custody he is?; (vi)
What is the tangible loss, injury or damage suffered by Respondent
No. 2 due to procurement of a passport by his minor son? Had the
Trial Magistrate taken the pains to confront Respondent No. 2 with
these questions, we have no reason to doubt that the vexatious
persecution faced by the Appellants, could not at least be attributed
to a judicial order.
30. We also fail to understand the reliability of the material based on
which the investigating agency or the Trial Magistrate could form a
prima facie opinion concerning the allegation of forgery of signatures
of Respondent No. 2. As observed earlier, the State FSL report
does not substantiate these allegations. In our opinion, a paid report
obtained from a private laboratory seems to be a frail, unreliable,
unsafe, untrustworthy and imprudent form of evidence, unless
supported by some other corroborative proof. It is painful to mention
that Respondent No. 2 has not produced any other substantive
proof, nor has the investigating agency obtained any such material in
compliance with the Trial Magistrate’s order for further investigation.
The basis on which the Trial Magistrate formed a prima facie opinion,
in the absence of such supporting evidence is, therefore, beyond
our comprehension.
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 639

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

31. The Trial Magistrate and the High Court unfortunately failed to
appreciate that the genesis of the present controversy lies in a
marital dispute. Respondent No. 2 is alleged to have abandoned
the Appellant – wife and the minor child, even during the period
when the Appellant – wife was temporarily residing with him in
London. The timeline in this case is noteworthy: immediately after
the Appellant – wife filed Crime No. 68 / 2010 against Respondent
No. 2 on 08.04.2010, invoking Sections 346, 498A, 506, and 34 IPC,
the counter-complaint by Respondent No. 2 followed on 13.05.2010.
Further, the passport for the minor child was issued sometime in 2009.
The question that naturally arises is whether it is a mere coincidence
that Respondent No. 2 chose to make his complaint only after an
FIR had been lodged against him.
32. On the one hand, there is no indication whatsoever that Appellant
No. 1 ever endeavoured to deceive or induce Respondent No. 2
into parting with his movable or immovable property or valuable
security, either for her benefit or that of the minor child. While on
the other hand, the law imposes an obligation upon Respondent No.
2 to provide adequate maintenance to his wife and the minor child.
The complaint lodged by Respondent No. 2 on 13.05.2010, while
unleashing accusations of forgery and fabrication, is conveniently
silent on what measures he has undertaken for his minor child’s
welfare.
33. In light of these circumstances, the Trial Magistrate should have
approached the complaint with due care and circumspection,
recognising that the allegations do not pertain to offences against
property or documents related to property marks. Instead of wielding
judicial authority against the Appellants, the Trial Magistrate should
have exercised prudence, making at least a cursory effort to discern
the actual ‘victim’ or ‘victimiser’. The failure to do so is both fallible
and atrocious.
34. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the elementary
ingredients of ‘cheating’ and ‘forgery’ are conspicuously missing. Thus,
the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the Appellants
is nothing but an abuse of the process of law.
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In the context of Section 12(b) of the Passports Act, 1967:
35. In addition to the abovementioned provisions of the IPC, the Appellants
have also been accused of committing an offence under Section 12(b)
of the Passports Act, 1967. Section 12(b) categorically states that,
whoever knowingly furnishes any false information or suppresses
any material information, with a view to obtaining a passport or
travel document under this Act or without lawful authority, alters or
attempts to alter or causes to alter the entries made in a passport or
travel document, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to two years or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees or with both.
36. As discernible from the language of the provision, what must be
established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information
or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a
passport or travel document. In the present case, it is crucial to
consider that the State FSL report explicitly stated that the alleged
forgery of Respondent No. 2’s signatures on the passport application
was inconclusive. Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can
be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority. No complaint
to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants. This Court,
therefore, will exercise caution before invoking such severe offences
and penalties solely on the basis of conjectures and surmises.
The conduct exhibited by Respondent No. 2:
37. Having scrutinised the elements of cheating and forgery, it is also
imperative to consider the conduct of Respondent No. 2 since the
inception. Firstly, following the solemnisation of the marriage between
the concerned parties, the Appellant – wife purportedly endured both
physical and mental torture and was further not extended any support
by Respondent No. 2 and his family members even after the birth
of the minor child. Secondly, the original passport of the minor child
was presumed to have been issued with the consent and support
of Respondent No. 2. He allegedly even sponsored the travel of his
wife and minor son through his brother-in-law for visa purposes, who
in his sponsorship letter explicitly cited the passport number of the
minor child. Thirdly, Respondent No. 2 chose to lodge the Concerned
FIR as a counterblast to the complaint filed by the Appellant – wife
in Crime No. 68/2010 in spite of being fully aware of the issuance of
the minor child’s passport. Thus, the Appellants were unnecessarily
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 641

Mariam Fasihuddin & Anr. v. State by Adugodi Police Station & Anr.

implicated and dragged into criminal proceedings, thereby causing
undue hardship to them. These instances shed light on Respondent
No. 2’s conduct preceding the initiation of the present proceedings
and provide insight into his motivations for instigating the same.
38. It is undeniable that despite the evident discord between the
Appellants and Respondent No. 2, resulting in numerous complaints
and legal proceedings, the issue at hand has adversely impacted
the rights and interests of the minor child. The right to travel abroad
is a fundamental right of an individual, albeit not absolute, and
subject to established legal procedures.5 The conduct exhibited by
Respondent No. 2 infringes upon the best interests of the minor
child, which necessitates the child’s travel abroad for the realisation
of opportunities and intrinsic value, aligning with the child’s dignity,
as enshrined by the Constitution.6
E. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS
39. Consequently, the appeal is allowed; the impugned judgment of
the High Court dated 18.02.2021, and that of the Trial Magistrate
dated 15.03.2018, are hereby set aside. As a sequel thereto, the
FIR No. 141 / 2010 registered at Police Station Adugodi, Bengaluru
under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with Section 34 IPC, lodged by
Respondent No. 2 against the Appellants and all the proceedings
arising therefrom are hereby quashed.
40. Respondent No. 2 is liable to pay the cost of Rs. 1,00,000/- to
Appellant No. 1. Ordered accordingly, Respondent No. 2 shall pay the
costs within six weeks, failing which the Trial Magistrate is directed
to initiate coercive measures for recovery thereof.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

5 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and another (1978) 1 SCC 248, paras 76, 80-85.
6 K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1, paras 376-379.