Holding

The Vice‑Chancellor lacked authority to dismiss the respondent and the Executive Council’s ratification could not validate the ultra vires act.

Summary

The Deputy Registrar of Marathwada University was dismissed by the Vice‑Chancellor after a departmental enquiry, despite earlier clean‑chit reports. The University argued that the Vice‑Chancellor had authority to discipline and that the Executive Council’s later ratification cured any defect. The Supreme Court examined the powers conferred by the Marathwada University Act, 1974, holding that the Vice‑Chancellor’s express power to regulate officers does not include the power to remove them, which is vested in the Executive Council under section 24(1)(xxix). Delegation of that power to the Vice‑Chancellor required the Chancellor’s approval, which was absent, rendering the delegation invalid. Consequently, the Vice‑Chancellor’s dismissal order was ultra vires and could not be validated by subsequent ratification. The Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the High Court’s quashing of the dismissal.

Issues considered

The scope of the Vice‑Chancellor’s statutory powers under the Marathwada University Act, 1974, especially whether they include disciplinary removal of officers.
Whether the Executive Council’s resolution ratifying the Vice‑Chancellor’s action can cure an ultra vires exercise of power.
Whether delegation of disciplinary power to the Vice‑Chancellor was valid without the Chancellor’s approval as required by section 24(1)(xli) and section 84 of the Act.

Legislation cited

Marathwada University Act, 1974s. 10, s. 11, s. 19, s. 23, s. 24, s. 27, s. 8, s. 84

Subjects

University administrationDelegation of statutory powersUltra viresRatificationDisciplinary actionVice‑ChancellorExecutive CouncilStatutory interpretation

Judgment

A MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY
v.
SESHRAO BALWANT RAO CHAVAN

APRIL 13, 1989

B [K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.)

Marathwada University Act, 1974: Sections 8, 10, 11, 19, 23, 24, --,
27 and 84-Vice Chancellor of every university-Conscious keeper and

C
constitutional ruler-Responsible for over all administration of
academic affairs-To act firmly to put down indiscipline and malprac-
lice-Executive Council has power of removal 'to 'regulate the work and
-
conduct of the officers'-Whether implies power to take disciplinary
action. ~

Administrative Law: Delegation of power-When statute pres-
cribes a particular body to exercise power-That body alone and none
D else can exercise it-Unless it is delegated-Ratification-Cannot cure
an ultra vires action.

The respondent was a Deputy Registrar of the appellant-
University. As the Controller of Examinations had proceeded on leave -4
the respondent was discharging the duties of Controller of Examina-
E lions. A complaint alleging that the respondent had delayed the pay-
ment of the bills of an outstation party who had printed the question
papers for the annual examination was received by the University. The •
Executive Council of the University appointed an Enquiry Officer to
hold an enquiry to find out whether the bills were deliberately kept
pending with any ulterior motive. The Enquiry Officer gave a clean chit ,:.
F to the respondent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Control-
ler of Examinations.

The Executive Council of the University did not take any decision
on the report of the Enquiry Officer, but entrusted the question to the
Vice-Challcellor who was 'present at the meeting. The Vice-Chancellor
G directed a departmental enquiry against the respondent and appointed
an advocate as the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry Officer by his report
held the respondent guilty of all the charges levelled against him. The
Vice Chancellor after giving a show cause notice and considering the
reply of the respondent, dismissed him from service.

H The respondent moved the High Court under Article 226 chat-
454
MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN 455
y
lenging his dismissal. When the writ-petition was taken up for hearing
A
the High Court directed the entire matter to be placed before the Execu-
tive Council for an appropriate decision. The Executive Council con-
sidered the matter at its meeting and passed a resolution. ratifying the ,,
action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, and confirming the dismissal of
the respondent. At the final disposal of the writ petition, the High Court
~ examined the matter on merits and held that the action taken by the B
Vice-Chancellor being without any authority or power, these defects
'ff could not be cured by ratification by the Executive Council in its subse-
quentresolution. The High Court accordingly quashed the departmen-
tat proceedings taken aj!ainst the respondent, and also the order of
termination of his services .

·t-
•
In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behalf of the c '
University : (i)That on a true construction of the several provisions or
the marathwada University Act, 1974, the termination of services of the
respondent cannot be assailed for want of power or jurisdiction on the
part or the Vice-Chancellor, and (2) that if the order was defective or
without authority, the ratification by the Executive Council had D
rendered it immune from any challenge.

Dismissing the Appeal, the Court,
+ ..
HELD: I. The Vice-Chancellor in every univerliity is the con-
scions keeper of the University and the constitutional ruler. He is the E

- principal executive and academic officer of the University. He is
entrusted with the responsibility of overall administration of academic
as well as non-academic affairs. [464A-B]

JI, 2. As the principal executive officer the Vice-Chancellor also car-
ries .with him an implied power, the magisterial power. This power is F
essential for him to maintain .domest!c discipline in the academic and
.non-academic affairs. In a wide variety of situations in the refotionship
/" of tutor and pupil, he has to act firmly and promptly to put down
indiscipline and malpractice. It may not be illegitimate if he could call
to aid his implied powers and also emergency powers to deal with all
·such situations. [464D-EJ G _,,-
~
A!;r,
3. The Marathwada University Act, .1974 confers both express
and implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express powers
include among others, the duty to ensure that the provisions of the Act,
Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned. '
_;~

[Section 11(3)} He has a right to regulate the. work and conduct of H

~'
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 2 S.C.R.

A Officers and teaching and other employees of the University [Sec.
ll(b)(a)l. He has also emergency powers to deal with any untoward
situation [Section 11(4)] a very significant power. If he believes that a
situation calls for impiediate action, he can take such action as he thinks
necessary, though in the normal course he is not competent to do so.
However he must report to the concerned "authority or body, who
B WOl!ld, iil the ordinary course, have dealt with the matter. [464B-C]
4. The power 'to regulate the work and conduct of the officers' ·-..
cannot include the power to take disciplinary action for their removal. '

C
[464F]
5. When a statute prescribes a particular body to exercise a
power, it must be exercised only by that body. [464G]
-
,,
,,
Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. I, 4th Edn. page 32, referred
to.

6. The Marathwada University Act confers power to appoint
D officers on the Executive Council and it generally includes the power
to rfmove. This power is located under Section 24(1) (XXIX) of the
Act, [464F,G]

7. The resolution of the Executive Council at a meeting, at which
tlte Vice Chancellor was also present, gave full power to the Vice-
E Cha1we1l11r •to take a decision on this question'. By the power delegated
1m<1er the resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject
the report with httimation to the Executive Council. He could not have
taken any other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any
Pther actiol!. [465F-G]

F 8. The resolution was also not in harmony with the statutory
requirement. Approval of the Chancellor to the delegation of power by
the Executive Council to the Vice-Chancellor was mandatory under
section 24(l)(xli) read with sectioll' 84 of the Marathwada University -....
Act. The resolution not being in conformity with the statutory require-
ment could not confer power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action
G agai.:1st Ute respondent. [465H; 466A-CJ ~

9. Ratification is generally an act of principal with regard to a
contract or an act done by his agent. The principles of ratification in the
context of the law of agency apparently do not have any application
with regard to exercise of power conferred under statutory provisions.
H The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the power conferred and
-, .
• ..
-

MARATIIWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN (SHETfY, J.( 457

any action without power has no legal validity. It is ab initio ·void and -·-~·

A
cannot be ratified. [468A-B]

Friedman's Law of Agency (5th.Edn.) Chapter 5 at page 73,
Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at page 39, Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta
v. Union of India, [1974] I SCR 304 and Bernard v. National Dock
~ Labour Board, [1953] I All Eng. Law Reports 1113.

... In the instant case, there was no prior. delegation of power to the
Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the respondent.
There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the
-action taken by the Vice-Chancellor, nor the ratification hy the Execu-
tive Council could be sustained. [469F]
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3927
of 1986.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.6.1986 of the Bombay
High Court in Writ Petition No. 10 of 1980. D

S.K. Dholakia, A.M. Khanwilkar and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the
Appellant.

V.M. Tarkunde, Karanjawa!a, Mrs. Karanjawala and H.S.
Anand for the Responaent. E

The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by:

K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by leave is from a
~ decision of th_e Bombay High Court which allowed the respondent's
petition for a writ of certiorari. In so doing the court quashed depart- F
mental proceedings initiated against the respondent and the resultant
order terminating his services.

The facts are substantially undisputed and may briefly be stated
as follows:
G
Respondent-Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan was at the relevant
time the Deputy Registrar of the Marathwada University, One Mr.
Yelikar was working then as Controller of Examinations. In or about
April 1976, Mr. Yelikar proceeded on leave and the present respon-
dent was directed to discharge the duties of the Controller of Examina-
tions. Accordingly, he joined his new assignment and continued to hold H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

that post when the controversy which culminated in his dismissal took
A
place.

It is said that one Mr. Swaminathan from Madras was entrusted
with the printing works needed to conduct annual examinations of the
University for the years 1974 and 1975. Mr. Swaminathan submitted
\
B his bills amounting about Rs.6,00,000 for the work performed by him. y
The bills were not cleared immediately, and Mr. Swaminathan comp-
lained to the University authorities. He also submitted a petition to the )
Prime Minister of India which was forwarded to the University for
immediate action. This led to an enquiry to find out whether the bills
were deliberately kept pending with any ulterior motive. The Execu-
tive Council of the University appointed a four-member committee
C including the Vice-Chancellor to enquire into the matter. The commit-
tee after investigation submitted a report in November 1977 making
some prima facie observations against the respondent. Thereupon, the
Executive Council desired to have the matter throughly examined by
another committee. It appointed Mr. N.B. Chavan for the purpose.
D Mr. Chavan made a detailed enquiry but found nothing against the
respondent. On December 23, 1978, he submitted a report stating inter
alia that there was no delay in clearing the said bills and if there was
any delay, it was justified in the circumstances. He has stated that the
University utilised the time for internal audit in which it was found that
the claim of Mr. Swaminathan was excessive to the extent of Rs.48,000
E and odd. The report of Mr. Chavan thus gave a clean chit to the
respondent as to his conduct in discharging the duties as Controller of
Examinations.

If the Executive Council had accepted the report and closed the
matter that would have been better. But unfortunately, it was not done
F and another chapter was opened. On March 22, 1979, the report of
Mr. Chavan was placed before the Executive Council which without
taking any decision entrusted the question to the Vice-Chancellor. The
Vice-Chancellor was present in that meeting--and agreed to take a
decision in about a month. But what he did was entirely different.
Purporting to act under the powers given to him by the Executive
(; Council, he directed departmental enquiry against the respondent. He
appointed Mr. Motale, Advocate as an Inquiry Officer who framed
three charges: First chafge impeached the respondent of intentionally
delaying the clearance of the bills of Mr. Swaminathan and thus
tarnishing the image of the University. Second charge alleged that the
respondent did not place before the Executive Council, the letters
H addressed by the Chancellor of the University on July 23, 1976 and
, · ' J<

MARATIIWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN· [SHETIY, J.] 459
·~·
,August 19, 1976. Third charge accused the respondent for not produc-
! ing all the available papers for scrutiny by the one-man committee
A,
Iheaded by Mr. Chavan. ':::
! '

On October 25, 1979, Mr. Motale submitted his· enquiry report
to. the Vice-Chancellor holding the responde11t guilty of the charges.
..---1( After a usual procedure of giving show cause notice and considering
the reply thereto, the Vice-Chancellor decided to dismiss the respon-
_,,. dent. On January 2, 1980, he accordingly made an order.

The matter did not rest there. The respondent moved the High
Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging his dismissal.
'When the writ petition first came up for hearing in November 1985,
, the High Court took a very curious stand. It observed that the entire c
)> matter be placed before the Executive Council for taking an
appropriate decision. As_ per this observation, the matter came up
· before the Executive Council in the meeting held on December 26/27,
1985. The Executive Council passed a resolution inter alia, ratifyipg
the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor and confirming the dismissal of D
' the respondent. This has added a new dimension to the case.

At the final disposal of the writ petition, the High Court, how-
ever, examined the merits of the matter. The High Court held that the
action taken by the Vice-Chancellor was without authority of law. As
to the ratification made by the Executive Council, the High Court E

- held: "That the acts done by the Vice-Chancellor remain the acts
without any authority or powers and that defects cannot be cured by
the subsequent resolution." With these conclusions, the High Court
quashed the departmental proceedings taken against the respondent
and also the order of termination of his services.
F
Being aggrieved by the judgment, the Marathwada University by
obtaining special leave has appealed to this Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant put his contention in two
ways: First, he said that on the true construction of the relevant provi-
sions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974, the termination of G
services of the respondent cannot be assailed for want of power or
jurisdiction on the part of the Vice-Chancellor. Counsel next said that
if the order was def_ective or without authority, the ratification by the
Executive Council has rendered it immune from any challenge.

In order to appreciate these submissions, we must outline the . H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 2 S.C.R.

A statutory provisions of the Marathwada University Act, 1974 (called
shortly "the Act"). Section 8 specifies the officers of the University.
The Vice-Chancellor is one of the officers. Section 10 provides for
appointment of the Vice-Chancellor. He shall be appointed by the
Chancellor and shall ordinarily hold office for a term.of three years.
Section 11 reads, so far as material, as follows:
a
"11(1): The Vice-Chancellor shall be the principal
executive and academic officer of the University, and shall 'r
in the absence of the Chancellor, preside at the meetings of
the Senate and at any Convocation of the University .... "

"11(3): It shall be the duty of the Vice-Chancellor to
c ensure that the provisions of this Act, the Statutes, Ordi-
nances and Regulations are faithfully observed. The
Chancellor shall, for this purpose, have the power to issue
directions to the Vice-Chancellor who shall give effect to
any such directions."
D
11(4): If there are reasonable grounds for the Vicc-
Chancellor to believe that there is an emergency which
requires immediate action to be taken, he shall take such
action as he thinks necessary and shall, at the earliest op-
portunity, report in writing the grounds for his belief that
E there was an emergency, and the action taken by him, to
such authority or body as would in the ordinary course,
have '·"alt with the matter ..... " -
11(6)(a): It shall be lawful for the Vice-Chancellor,
as the principal executive and academic officer, to regulate
F the work and conduct of the officers, and of the teaching,
academic and other employees of the University, in accord-
ance with the provisions of this Act, the Statutes, Ordi-
nances and Regulations."

"11(7): The Vice-Chancellor shall exercise such
G other powers and perform such other duties as are pres-
cribed by the Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations."

Section 19 enumerates the authorities of the University. The
Executive Council is one of the authorities specified thereunder.

H Section 23 to the extent necessary is in the following terms:
ii
, ..
_ ,.'

MARAIBWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN [SHETIY, J.] 461

"23(1): lhe Executive Council shall be the principal
.
A "'
executive authority of the University, and shall consist of
the following members, namely,: (i) the Vice-Chancellor-
ex-officio Chairman."

Section 24 deals with the powers and duties of the Executive
Council. These powers and duties are wide and varied and it is suffi- B
cient if we read sub-sections (1), (xxix) and (xii) of sec. 24. They are as

" follows:

"24(1): Subject to such conditions as are prescribed
by or under this Act, the Executive Council shall exercise
the following powers and perform the following duties,
namely ........ " c
+ "24(l)(xxix): appoint officers and other employees
of the University, prescribe their qualifications, fix their
emoluments, define the terms and conditions of their
service and discipline and where necessary, their duties." D
"24(1)(xli): delegate, subject to the approval of the
Chancellor, any of'its powers (except the power to make
·t Ordinances), to the Vice-Chancellor, the Registrar or the
Finance Officer, or such other officers or authority of the
University or a committee appointed by it, thinks fit." E

Two other provisions are material, namely, secs. 37 and.84. Sec-
tion 37, omitting the unnecessary, is in these terms:

~ Sec. 37 Subject to the conditions prescribed by or under
this Act, the Senate may make the Statutes to provide for F
all or any of the following matters namely:

~'"' (xvi): The term of office, duties and conditions of service
of officers, teachers and other employees of the University,
· the provisions of pension, insurance _and provident fund
and the manner of termination of their service and other G
disciplinary action and their qualifications, except those of
teachers."

Section 34 is as follows:

"Delegation of_powers: Subject to the provisions of H '

"1b
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A this Act and Statutes any officer or authority of the Uni·
versity may, by order, delegate his or its powers, exceptthe
power to make Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations, to
any other officer or authority under his or its control, and
subject to the conditions that the ultimate responsibility for
the exercise of the powers so delegated shall continue to
B vest in the officer or authority delegating them." '

With these provisions, we tum to consider the first question
urged for the appellant. The question is whether the Vice-Chancellor
was competent to direct disciplinary action against the respondent. In
J\
'
this context, we may make a few general observations about the posi-
c tion and powers of the Vice-Chancellor. The University Education
Commission in its report (Vol. I December 1948 to August 1949) has
summarised the powers and duties as follows (at 421): +
"Duties of Vice-Chancellor-A Vice-Chancellor is
the chief academic and executive officer of his university.
D He presides over the Court (Senate) in the absence of the
Chancellor, Syndicate (Executive Council), Academic
Council, and numerous committees including the selection
committees for appointment of staff. It is his duty to know
the senior members of the staff intimately and to be known
to all members of the staff and students. He must command
E their confidence both by adequate academic reputation and
by strength of personality. He must know his university
well enough to be able to foster its points of strength and to
foresee possible points of weakness before they become
acute: He must be the 'keeper of the university's con-
scic:nce', both setting the highest standard by example and
F dealing promptly and firmly with indiscipline and mal·
pratice of ariy kind. All this he must do and it can be done
as constitutional ruler; he has not, and should not have
autocratic power. Besides, this he must be the chief liaison
between his university and the public, he must keep the
university alive to the duties it owes to the public which it
G serves: and he must win support for the university and
understanding of its needs not merely from potential
benefactors but from the general public and its elected re-
presentatives. Last, he must have the strength of character
to resist unflinchingly the many forms of pressure to relax
standards of all sorts, which are being applied to univer-
H sities today."
MARATIIWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN (SHETI'Y, J.] 463

This has been approved by the Education Commission, 1964-66.
A
In the report of the Education Commission, 1971 (pages 610-11 para
13.32) it was stated:

"The person who is expected, above all, to embody
the spirit of academic freedom and the principles of good
management in ~ university is the Vice-Chancellor. He B
stands for the commitment of the university to scholarship
and pursuit of truth and can ensure that the executive wing
of the university is used to assist the academic community
in all its activities. His selection should, therefore, be
governed by this overall consideration."

Dr. A.H. Homadi in his wise, little study about the role of the Vice-
c
+ Chancellor in the university administration in developing countries has
this to state (at 49):

The President or the Vice-Chancel/or:
D
"The President must be willing to accept a definition of
educational leadership that brings about change to the
academic life of the institution. He must be fired by a deep
concern for education. He should instil a spirit and keeness
about growth and development in such a way that the pro-
fessiriate feels that their goals are interlinked with those of E
the University, that their success depends upon the success
of the University. The professors should be given detailed
information about the' jobs that they have to perform and
their good performance should be given due recognition by
administration leadership. Even such small encouragement ,
will boost their morale to greater heights. The President F
should have faith in nis own abilities as welf as on the
abilities of other professors and administrators and should
provide guidelines about the kind of efforts ·he would like
his professors and administrators to make, setting an exam-
ple by his own actions and exercises. The negative force of
fear, when used and no one denies that an element of hard G ·1

headedness is some. times required as a persuasive indu.:e-
ment to professors and administrators of university should
be employed judiciously. Under no circumstances should
the apathy and belligerence of the professors and adminis-
trators be aroused. These call for strong but sympathetic
leadership in the President." H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A The Vice-Chancellor in every university is thus the conscious
keeper of the University and constitutional ruler. He is the principal
executive and academic officer of the University. He is entrusted with
the responsibility of overall administration of academic as well as non-
academic affairs. For these P\lrposes, the Act confers boih express and
B implied powers on the Vice-Chancellor. The express powers include
among others, the duty to ensure that the provisions of the Act,
Statutes, Ordinances and Regulations are observed by all concerned.
(Section 11(3)). The Vice-Chancellor has a right to regulate the work
and conduct of officers and teaching and other employees of the Uni-
versity (Section 11(6)(a)). He has also emergency powers to deal with
any untoward situation (Section 11(4)). The power conferred under
c sec. 11(4) is indeed significant. If the Vice-Chancellor believes that a
situation calls for immediate action, he can take such action as he
thinks necessary though in the normal course he is not competent to
take that action. He must, however, report to the concerned authority
or body who would, in the ordinary course, have dealt with the matter.
D That is not all. His pivotal position as the principal executive officer
also carries with him the implied power. It is the magisterial power
which is, in our view, plainly to be inferred. This power is essential for
him to maintain domestic discipline in the academic and non-academic
affairs. In a wide variety of situations in the relationship of tutor and
pupil, he has. to act firmly and promptly to put down indiscipline and
malpractice. It may not be illegitimate if he could call to aid his implied
E
powers and also emergency powers to deal with all such situations.

Counsel for the appellant argued that the express power of the
Vice-Chancellor to regulate the work and conduct of officers of the
University implies as well, the power to take disciplinary action against
officers. We are unable to agree with this contention. Firstly, the
F
power to regulate the work and conduct of officers cannot include the
power to take disciplinary action for their removal. Secondly, the Act
confers power to appoint officers on the Executive Council and it
generally includes the power to remove. This power is located under
sec. 24(1)(xxix) of the Act. It is, therefore, futile to contend that the
Vice-Chancellor can exercise that power which is conferred on the
G Executive Council. It is a settled principle that when the Act pres-
cribes a particular body to exercise a power, it must be exercised only
by that body. It cannot be exercised by others unless it is delegated.
The law must also provide for such delegation. Halsbury's Laws of
England (Vol. I 4th Ed. para 32) summarises these principles as
follows:
H
MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN [SHE1TY, J.L 465

"32. Sub-delegation of powers. ln accordance. with A
the maxim delegatius non potest delegare, a statutory
power .must be exercised. only by the body or officer in
whom it. has been confided, unless sub-delegation of the
power is authorised by express words or necessary implica-
tion. There. is a strong presumption against construing a·
grant of legislative, judicial or disciplinary power as B
impliedly authorising sub-delegation; and the same may be
said of any power to the exercise of which the designated
body should address its own mind."

The counsel for the appellant next submitted that the Executive
Council in the instant case had delegated its disciplinarly power to the
Vice-Chancellor and the Act provides for such delegation. In support
c
+ of the contention he relied upon the following resolution of the Execu-
tive Council:

"Full power be given to the Vice-Chancellor to take a
decision on this question and the Vice-Chancellor informed D
the Executive Council that he will take decision in about a
month. On this decision, Shri Gangadhar Pathrikar gave
his opinion that the Executive Council should take a deci-
sion on the note dated 16.1.1979 submitted by him and
other two members and since it was not accepted, he does
not agree with the above decision." E

This resolution, in om opinion, is basically faulty at least for two
reasons. It may be recalled that the Executive Council without consi-
d_ering the report of Mr. Chavan, wanted the Vice-Chancellor to take a
decision thereon. It may also be noted that the Vice-Chancellor was
present at the meeting of the Execuiive Council when the resolution F
was passed. He was given "full power to take a decision" which in the
context, was obviously on the report of Mr. Chavan, and not on any
other matter or question. He said that he would take a decision in
about a month. In our opinion, by the power delegated under the
resolution, the Vice-Chancellor could either accept or reject the report
with intimation to the Executive Council. He could not have taken any G
other action and indeed, he was not authorised to take any other
action.

The other infirmity in the said resolution goes deeper than what
it appears. The resolution was not in harmony with the statutory re-
quirement. Section 84 of the Act provides for delegation of powers and H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A
it states that any officer or authority of the University may by order,
dele)!ate his or its power (excepi power to make Ordinance and
Regulations) to any other officer or authority subject to provisions of
the Act ;ind Statutes. Section 24(1)(xli) provides for delegation of
power by the Executive Council. It staies that the Executive Council
may delegate arty of its power (except power to make Ordinances) to the
B Vice-Chancellor or to any other officer subject to the approval of the
Chancellor. (underlying is ours). The approval of the Chancellor is
mandatory. Without such approval the power cannot be delegated to
the Vice-Chancellor. The record does not reveal that the approval of
the Chancellor was ever obtained. Therefore, the resolution which was
not in conformity with the statutory requirement could not confer
C power on the Vice-Chancellor to take action against the respondent.

This takes us to the second contention urged for the appellants. +
The contention relates to the legal effect of ratification done by the
Executive Council in its meeting held on December 26/27, 1985. The
decision taken by the Executive Council is in the form of a resolution
D and it reads as follows:

"Considering the issues, the Executive Council resol-
ved as follows:

1. The Executive Council at its meeting held on
E March 22, 1979, had by a resolution given full authority to
the Vice-Chancellor for taking further proceedings and
decision in both the cases of the defaulting officers.

2. In exercise of above authority, the Vice-Chancel-
lor appointed an Inquiry Officer and as suggested by the
F Inquiry Officer issued Show Cause notices, obtained
replies from the Officers and lastly issued orders for
terminating their services;

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

G It was further resolved that-

(i) There has been no inadequacy in the proceedings
against both the officers;

(ii) The punishment ordered against both the officers is
H commensurate with the defaults and allegations proved
MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN (SHETIY, J.] 467

against both the officers; and
A
(iii) The Executive Council, therefore, wholly, endorses
the actions taken by the then Vice-Chancellor against both
the officers."

By this resolution, we are told that the Executive Council has B
ratified the action taken by the Vice-Chancellor. Ratification is gener-
ally an act.of principal with regard to a contract or an act done by his
agent. In Friedman's Law of Agency (Fifth Edition) chapter 5 at p. 73,
thecprinciple of ratification has been explained:

"What the 'agent' does on behalf of the 'principal' is
done at a time when the relation of principal and agent c
does not exist: (hence the use in this sentence, but not in
subsequent ones, of inverted commas). The agent, in fact,
has no authority to do what he does at the time he does it.
Subsequently, however, the principal, on whose behalf,
though without whose authority, the agent has acted, D
accepts the agent's act, and adopts it. just as if there had
been a prior authorisation by the principal to do exactly
what the agent has done. The interesting point, which has
given rise to considerable difficulty and dispute, is that
ratification by the principal does not merely give validity to
the agent's unauthorised act as from the date of the ratifica- E
tion: it is antedated so as to take effect from the time of the
agent's act. Hence the agent is treated as having been
authorised from the outset to act as he did. Ratification is
'equivalent to an antecedent authority'."

In Bowstead on Agency (14th Ed.) at p. 39) it is stated: F

"Every act whether lawful or unlawful, which is
capable of being done by means of an agent (except an act
which is in its inception void) is capable of ratification by
tlie person in whose name or on whose behalf it is done
..... The words "lawful or unlawful", however, are G
included primarily to indicate that the doctrine can apply to
torts. From them it would follow that a principal by ratifi-
cation may retrospectively turn what was previously an act
wrongful against the principle, e.g. an unauthorised sale,
or against a third party, e.g. a wrongful distress, into a
legitimate one; or become liable for the tort of another by H
ratifying."
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 2 S.C.R.

A These principles of ratification, apparently do not have any
application with regard to exercise of powers conferred under statu-
tory provisions. The statutory authority cannot travel beyond the
power conferred and any action without power has no legal validity. It
is ab initio void and cannot be ratified.

B The counsel for the appellant, however, invited our attention to
the case of Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. The Union of India, [1974] 1
SCR 304. It was a case of termination of services of the Secretary of a
Company. The Board of Directors decided to terminate the services of ,.
the Secretary. The Chairman of the Board of Directors in fact '·
terminated his services. Subsequently, in the meeting of the Board of
Directors the action taken by the Chairman was confirmed. In the suit
c instituted by the Secretary challenging the termination of his services,
the Court upheld on the principle that the action of the Chairman even +
though it was invalid initially, could be validated by ratification in a
regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. Mathew, J.
-while considering this aspect of the matter, observed lat pp. 307
D and 308]

"Even if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter
terminating the services of the appellant by the Chairman
was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the Board of
Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his
E services, it would not follow that the action of the
Chairman conld not be ratified in a regularly convened
meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even
assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to
terminate the services of the appellant, he was acting on
behalf of the Company in doing so, because, he purported
F to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it
was open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of
Directors to ratify that action which, though unauthorised,
was done on behalf of the Company. Ratification would
always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it
must be held that the services of the appellant were validly
G terminated on December 17, 1953. The appellant was not
entitled to the declaration prayed for by him and. the trial
court as well as the High Court was right in dismissing the
claim."

These principles of ratification governing transactions of a com-
H pany where the general body is the repository of all powers not be
MARATHWADA UNIVERSITY v. S.B.R. CHAVAN [SHElTY, J.] 469

Y · extended to the present case. We were also referred to the decision of A
the Court of Appeal in Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board,
[1953) 1 All Eng. Law Reports 1113 and in particular the observation
of Denning L.J., (at 1118 and 1119):

"While an administrative functiori can often be
B
delegated, a judicial function rarely can be. No judicial
tribunal can delegate its functions unless it is enabled to do
so expressly or by necessary implication. In Local Govern-
ment Board v. Arlidge (2) the power to delegate was given

- by necessary implication, but there is nothing in this
scheme authorising the board to delegate this function and
it cannot be implied. It was suggested that it would be c
impracticable for the board to sit as a board to decide all
+ these cases, but I see nothing impracticable in that. They
have only to fix their quorum at two members and arrange
for two members, one from each side, employers and
workers, to be responsible for one week at a time.
D
"Next, it was suggested that, even if the board could
not delegate their functions, at any rate they could ratify
the actions of the port manager, but, if the board have no
power to delegate their functions to the port manager,' they
can have no power to ratify what he has already done. The
effect of ratification is to make it equal to a prior com- E
mand, but as a prior command, in the shape of delegation,

- would be useless, so also is _a ratification."

These observations again are of little assistance to· us since we
have already held that there was no prior delegation of power to the
Vice-Chancellor to take disciplinary action against the· respondent. F
There was no subsequent delegation either. Therefore, neither the
action taken by the Vice'Chancellor, nor the ratification by the Execu-
tive Council could be sustained.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
G
~ N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.