MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.versusNINGAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

                    [2011] 12 S.C.R. 435


           MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS.                         A
                           .   V.
              NINGAPPA (0) BY LRS. & ORS.
              (Civil Appeal No. 3495 of 2001)
                   SEPTEMBER 08, 2011
                                                                  B

           [G.S. SINGHVI AND H.L. DATIU, JJ.]

      Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s. 14 - Rights of female
Hindu under - Held: Any property of a female Hindu is her . C
absolute property - She has full ownership over any property
that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana - She may
dispose of the same as per her wish, and the same shall not
be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property - There
is no presumption that of jqint family property, and there must
be some strong evidence in .favour of the same - On facts, D
propositor after maffiage lived in the paternal house of his wife
('PJ - 'P' was gifted a propsrty by her father by a gift deed at
the time of marriage, and continued_to be in possession and
purchased more properties from the income of the land gifted
to her - Propositor except having some income from tenanted E
land had no personal income nor agricultural income which
he could utilize for purchase of any property- Suit for partition
by son of 'P' alleging that the entire property was a joint family
property - Trial court rightly held that lands other than the
tenanted portion as occupied by propositor, were the absolute F
self acquired properties of 'P' which she had purchased/
acquired from the income and funds from the lands gifted by
'P', whereas the order of the High Court that the properties to
the suit were joint family properties and the parties to the suit
were entitled for 1!3rd share in those properties, set aside.      G

    'S' and 'P' got married in 1924 and at the time of the
marriage, the father of 'P' gitted her land A7 under a Gift
Deed. 'S' after his marriage, continued to reside in his in-

                               435                                H
    436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2011] 12 S.C.R.


 A laws house and during his life time, he had no other
   source of income except from. the tenanted lands. 'P'
   purchased certain lands A(4)-A(6) under a Sale Deed from
   the income of the land gifted to her by her father.
   Thereafter, with the income from the said two lands, 'P'
,8 purchased another land A(S)-(12). 'S' died in the year
   1951 leaving behind four sons and one daughter-'M'
   (appellant-defendant), 'N' (respondent-plaintiff), 'B'
   (deceased); and 'SN' and 'C' (pre-deceased).

C      In her life time 'P' relinquished her share in land A(4)-
  A(6) in favour of the appellant. Thereafter, subsequent to
  an oral partition, she gave one part of the property A(8)·
  A(12) to the respondent and other to legal heirs of 'B'. In
  1984, 'P' executed a will of 'Stridhana' land to her
  daughter, 'SN'. Thereafter 'P' died. The respondents filed
D a suit for partition seeking separate possession of 1/3rd
  share each alleging that the entire property is the joint
  family property and not the personal property of 'P'. The
  trial court held that except tenanted portion the said
  properties were self acquired properties of 'P'. The High
E Court held that the properties described in the suit are
  joint family properties and the parties to the suit are
  entitled for 1/3rd share in those properties. Therefore, the
  appellant filed the instant appeal.

F         Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act,
  1956 clearly mandates that any property of a female
  Hindu is her absolute property and she, therefore, has full
  ownership. The Explanation to sub-section (1) further
G clarifies that a Hindu woman has full ownership over any
  property that she has acquired on her own or as
  stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the
  same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be
  treated as .a part of the joint Hindu family property. There
H is no presumpti9n that of joint family property, and there
 MARABASAPPA (0) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 437
            (D) BY LRS. & ORS.

must be some strong evidence in favour of the same.             A
[Paras 21 and 22] [451-E-G]

     Appasaheb Chamdgade v. Devendra Chamdgade and
Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 521 - referred to.

     2.1 The High Court did not accept the findings and         B
conclusion reached by the trial court. The High Court
wrongly shifted the burden of proving that the said lands
were a part of the self acquired property of 'P' and not a
part of the joint family property of the appellants-
defendents, when there was no affirmative proof of              C
anything contrary. The High Court erred in shifting the
burden of proof on the appellants, especially when there
was nothing on record either by way of oral or
documentary evidence produced by the respondents-
plaintiffs before the trial court. [Para 13] [446-F-H]          D

     2.2 Suit Land A(7) was 'stridhana' property of 'P'. This
property was gifted to her by her father under a registered
Gift Deed iii 1924. She was the owner of the said land.
She continued to be in possession of the said land till she     E
bequeathed the same in favour of defendant No.5 under
a Will dated 30.06.1984. On the death of 'P' and on ttie
basis of the said Will, the legatee-defendant No.5 claims
she became owner of the said land which was noted in
the Revenue Records. The Will and the Revenue entries
made were questioned by the plaintiffs and successfully         F
proved that the said Will was not executed by 'P'.
Therefore, defendant No.5 cannot claim title over A(7)
under the Will and this property cannot be brought into
the hotchpotch of the joint family property and would not
be available for partition. Stridhana belonging to a            G
woman is a property of which she is the absolute owner
and which she may dispose of at her pleasure, if not in
all cases during coverture, in all cases .during
widowhood. Since the plaintiffs proved that 'P' had not
                                                                H
    438     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A alienated the property by executing a Will in favour of
  defendant No. 5 during her lifetime, the property is the
  absolute property of 'P' and would not be available for
  partition among the members of joint family since it does
  not partake the character of joint family property. [Para
B 18] [448-E-H; 449-A-B]

         2.3 As regards the Suit· Schedule properties Item
    No.A(4) to A(6), it is the case of -the plaintiffs that the said
    properties were purchased by 'S', father of the plaintiffs
    and the defendants under a Sale Deed dated 05.10.1944,
C   but, in the name of his wife 'P' from and out of the income
    of the tenancy lands A(1) to A(3) for the purpose of the
    joint family for which he was also the Karta of the family.
    However, it is the case of the contesting defendants that
    the said property is the self acquired property of 'P' from
D   and out of her income derived from the property gifted
    to her by her father in the year 1924; that 'S' was the
    tenant of the property A(1) to A(3) only from the year 1947
    and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that from out of the
    income of the property A(1) to A(3), lands in item A(4) to
E   A(7) were purchased. It has come in evidence of the
    contesting defendants that propositor 'S' was the tenant
    of the lands A(1) to A(3) only from the year 1947. The
    same was not disputed by the plaintiffs by leading any
    other cogent evidence to prove that 'S' was the tenant of
F   the lands A(1) to A(3) even prior to 1944, the date of the
    Sale Deed. In the absence of any evidence, much less
    cogent and reliable evidence, it is difficult to accept the
    version of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule A(4) to A(6)
    should be put into common hotch potch and partitioned
3   by meters and bounds. [Para 19] [449-C-G]
      2.4 As regards the lands at Item A(8) to A(12), it is the
  case of the plaintiffs that on the death of propositor 'S',
  joint family continued and during its continuance,
H agricultural lands which is now sub-divided as items A(8)
 MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 439
            (D) BY LRS. & ORS.
to A(12) came to be purchased out of the joint family          A
funds, but, in the name of 'P', since she was eldest
member of the joint family at the relevant point of time.
The oral evidence was led in support of the assertion
made in the plaint. The plaintiffs did not produce any
other evidence in support of the claim so made. The            B
defence pleaded by the defendants, apart from others, is
that 'P' had her independent source of income from A(7)
lands. She, with the aid of the said income, acquired not
only A(4) to A(6) but also A(8) to A(12) lands and the
tenancy lands was hel~ by joint family. It is also             c
contended by them that propositor 'S', after marrying 'P',
lived in the paternal house of his wife 'P', which fact is
not denied by the plaintiffs, and 'S' had no personal
income nor agricultural income which he could utilize for
purchase of any property, much less A(8) to A(12)              0
properties. The trial court, after considering the entire
evidence on record came to the conclusion that lands
A(S) to A(12) is the absolute self acquired properties of
'P'. The findings and the conclusion so arrived is based
on the proper appreciation of the evidence on record and       E
the respondents did not bring anything contrary to make
a different view. Therefore, lands A(S) to A(12) of the suit
Schedule is not the joint family property but the absolute
property of 'P', which she purchased/acquired from the
income and funds from the lands A(7) and A(4) to A(8).
[Para 23] [452-C-H; 453-A-B]                                   F

     3. The reasoning given by the High Court cannot be
accepted. Thus, the reasoning and conclusion reached
by the tria1 court is concurred with. Thus, the judgment
and order passed by the High Court is set aside and that       G
of tile trial court is restored. [Paras 24 and 25] [453-C-D]
                    Case Law Reference:
    (2001) 1 sec 521         Referred to          Para 22
                                                               H
    440       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    3495 of 2001.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 30.03.1999 of the
    High Court of Karnataka in RFA no. 385 of 1993.
B         Rajesh Mahale and Giri K., for the Appellants.

        Gireesh Kumar (for Khwairakpam Nobin .Singh), M.A.
    Chinnasamy and Ankur S. Kulkarni for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
       H.L. DATTU, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the
  Judgment and Order of the High Court of Karnataka at
  Bangalore, dated 30th March 1999 in R.F.A. No. 385 of 1993,
  RF.A. No. 258 (sic.) of 1994 and RF.A. No. 775of1995 (sic.),
D wherein the High Court has modified the Decree of the Trial
  Court and has held that the properties described in 'A' Schedule
  to the suit are joint family properties and the parties to the suit
  are entitled for 1/3rd share in those properties. The other
  obseNations and directions of the Court is not relevant for the
E purpose of this appeal.         ·

        2. The question that is contested by the parties and has
  fallen for our consideration is whether the properties in dispute
  are the personal acquisitions of Parwatevva, or, as held by the
F High Court, a part of the joint family property.

          3. The factual matrix in brief is as follows:-

       Siddappa and Parwatevva got married in 1924 and at the
  time of the marriage, the father of Parwatewa gifted her land
G in Survey No. R.S. No. 271/1 measuring 8 Acres 16 Guntas
  under registered Gift Deed dated 30th April 1924 ["A7"].
  Siddappa, after his marriage, continued to reside in his in-laws
  house. During his life time, Siddappa had no other source of
  income except from the tenanted lands which was only a small
H extent and was totally dry lands. Parwatewa purchased lands
 MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 441
      (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
in R.S. No. 91 measuring 19 Acres 13 Guntas under a                   A
registered Sale Deed from the income of the land that was
gifted to her by her father on 5th October, 1944 [A(4) - A(6)].
Thereafter, on 2nd June, 1951, with the income from the above
two lands, Parwatevva purchased another land being R.S. No.
143 measuring 28 Acres 23 Guntas [A(8)-A(12)]. Siddappa               B
died in the year 1951. The couple had four sons and one
daughter - Marabasappa (appellant-defendant), Ningappa
(respondent-plaintiff), Bhimappa (deceased - legal heirs are
on record), Sangawwa and Channappa (pre-deceased without
any heirs).
                                                                     c
      4. In her life time Parwatevva relinquished her share in R.S.
No. 91 in favour of the present appellant (Marabasappa). ·
Thereafter, subsequent to an oral partition, she gave one part
of the other property bearing R.S. No. 143/1 and R.S. No. 143/
2 to the respondent (Ningappa) and the heirs of Bhimappa D
respectively. In June 1984, Parwatevva executed a will of
'stridhana' land to her daughter, Sangawwa. Parwatevva died
on 08.07.1984. The present dispute is between her children
and their heirs.
                                                                       E
      5. The respondents-plaintiffs filed a suit bearing O.S. No.
40/1990 before the Court of the Civil Judge, Gadag [hereinafter
referred to as "the Trial Court'l, inter a/ia alleging that the entire
property mentioned above is the joint family property and the
same was not the personal property of Parwatevva, and hence, F
a prayer for partition and separate possession of 1/3rd share
was made in respect of Schedule 'A' to 'C' properties.
Schedule 'A' properties consist of agricultural lands, Schedule
'B' properties consist of houses and open places and Schedule
'C' properties consist of movables of all the properties held by
the defendants-appellants except the plaintiffs' properties. The G
Trial Court negatived this contention of the respondents-
plaintiffs on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence and
found, inter a/ia, that the said properties were self acquired

                                                                      H
    442      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A properties of Parwatevva, accordingly, has partly decreed the
  suit in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents.

        6. Being aggrieved, the parties to the suit preferred Regular
  First Appeals. The High Court, by the impugned Judgment and
  Order, set aside the Judgment of the Trial Court and took the
8 view that apart from the stridhana land, the rest of the property
  was a part of the joint family property purchased from the
  income and funds of the joint family property and, therefore, the
  decree, as sought by the plaintiffs, requires to be granted.
  Against this finding and the conclusion reached by the High
C Court, the appellants-defendants are before us.

      . 7. Shri. Rajesh Mahale, learned counsel, appears for the
    appellants and Shri. Gireesh Kumar, learned counsel, appears
    for the respondents.
D
       8. The original appellants and respondents have all died
  during the pendency of the Suit and the Regular First Appeal
  and their legal representatives have been brought on record
  with the permission of the Court. Since, it is a family dispute
  between the brothers and their heirs, it was suggested to the
E parties through their learned counsel that the course of
  mediation be adopted to settle the dispute. This Court [G.S.
  Singhvi and A.K. Ganguly, JJ.] passed the following order on
  the 9th of December, 2010:

F         "During the midst of arguments, learned counsel for the
          parties agreed that their clients may be given an
          opportunity to make an attempt to amicably settle their
          dispute by negotiations.

          In view of the statement made by the learned counsel, we
G         direct both the parties to appear before the Mediation
          Centre, Karnataka High Court, Principal Bench at
          Bangalore, on 17.01.2011.

          The lncharge, Mediation Centre, Karnataka High Court,
 MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 443
      (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
      Principal Bench, Bangalore, shall send a report to this            A
      Court within next four weeks.

      List the case in the first week of March 2011."

     9. The learned counsel for the parties has reported to us
that there is no settlement reached between the parties.                 B

       10. Shri. Mahale, learned counsel, submitted that the Trial
· Court, after appreciating the evidence on record, had reached
  the conclusion that the properties in question are the self
  acquired properties of Parwatewa. It is submitted that the High        c
  Court, while considering the evidence on record and the
  conclusion reached by the Trial Court, has erroneously come
  to the conclusion that the property in dispute is a joint family
  property and therefore, the findings of the High Court are
  perverse and further, the High Court has committed serious             o
  error in law in holding that the disputed property is a joint family
  property. Shri. Gireesh Kumar, learned counsel for the
  respondents, has supported the findings of the High Court.

      11. The sum and substance of the allegations in the suit
are that out of the tenanted land, 2 Acres, 10 Guntas, late              E
Siddappa acquired all the other properties including the land            "
in R.S No. 271/1 and R.S. No. 91 and R.S. No. 143. Therefore,
all the properties are joint family properties, though they stand
in the name of Parwatewa. The Trial Court has relied upon the
registered Gift Deed [Ex. 0~60] and has come to the conclusion           F
that the property marked A7 was the stridhana property of
Parwatevva, and by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1955 read with the Explanation, was the
absolute property of Parwatevva and could not be blended in
the joint family property. The Trial Court, while considering the        G
nature of the lands A(4) to A(6), has taken into consideration
the certified copy of the sale deed in respect of that land
[Ex.D.8], and has come to the conclusion that there is no
evidence adduced by the respondents-plaintiffs to deny the fact
that the lands A(4) to A(6) were 11ot purchased from the                 H
    444               '
            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A independent income of the Parwatevva, and hence, $gatived
  the contention of the respondents-plaintiffs that the lands were
  joint family property, and has also held that these lands were
  purchased by Parwatevva from the income derived from the
  stridhana lands, i.e., A7. With regard to the lands A(8) to A(12),
B the Trial Court, relying on the certified copy of the sale deeds
  of the said lands [Ex.D. 45], has again found that there was no
  proof that the said property was acquired out of the income of
  the joint family property as asserted by the respondents-
  plaintiffs, and concluded that the same was purchased from the
c income derived from the aforementioned two properties by
  Parwatewa.

          12. The High Court has found fault with the finding of the
    Trial Court and has held:

D        "21. Coming to the properties said to have been
         purchased in the name of Parvatewwa under the
         registered sale deed dated 5-10-1944, twenty years after
         the Gift deed, the learned Judge find that R.S. No. 91
         which lands in A(4) to A(6) was purchased under Ex.D. 8.
E        Now the reasoning given by the learned Judge that if
         Siddappa is the protected tenant of the said land, there is
         no reason for him to purchase the said land under Ex.D.
         8 cannot be appreciated. In any event, whenever a mother
         is there and the properties are purchased in the name of
F      · the mother, the presumption is that it is for the benefit of
         the family. It is nobody's case that the lands purchased is
         for the intention and for the benefit of the mother alone and
         she also did not differentiate between her sons and
         daughters. This is a natural and human aspect which has
         not been considered by the trail court. The finding that
G
         Siddappa do no continued (sic.) as tenant or protected
         tenant of all the lands as mentioned in Ex.P. 20 except 1
         acre 20 guntas of land in R.S. 274/3 and A(3) land in R.S.
         No.:9/3A is not sustainable. Why should valuable tenancy
         rights given up and then the purchase made in the name
H
MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 445
     (0) BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.] .
  of the mother is not understandable nor it is not explained;     A
  probably in confirmation of tenancy rights and make it clear
  that the properties does not go out of the family. The sale
  is taken in the name of the mother. Therefore, in my
  opinion, the purchase made by the mother is only from and
  out of the income from the family and there is no evidence       B
  to show that she had any independent or individual income
  from the gifted property to purchase these properties.
  Therefore, irresistible inference shall be drawn that the
  property purchased in the name of the mother is for the
  benefit of all the members of the family. Now no doubt the       C
  plaintiff came fory,tard with the case that suit lands A(4) to
  A(6) and A(8) to A(12) were purchased from and out of
  the family income and the income from the A(1) to A(3)
  lands. But once it is seen that the 1st defendant was
  managing the affairs of the family as 'karta', the burden
  shifts on him to prove that the properties purchased was
                                                                   0
  not for the benefit of the family, but they were exclusively
  belong to the mother. In those days income from 3 acres
  30 guntas cannot be considered as thin nucleus as has
  been wrongly held by the trial court. Having held that
  applying the dictum in I.LR. 1990 Kar Pg-1182, the initial       E
  burden lies upon the plaintiff. But once such burden is
  discharged and shifts on the defendant, the trial court
  should have considered that whether the defendant has
  proved that the purchase was made from any other source
  of income excepting the income from A(1) to A(3). In the         F
  absence of any positive evidence spoken to by D.W. 2 or
  the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant that the
  mother was trying to save the property either for herself or
  not for the benefit of the everybody, the irresistible
  conclusion is that the mother is always mother and the           G
  properties purchased in her name shall be the properties
  of the family. There is a clear evidence adduced by the
  plaintiff that the suit lands in A(1) to A(3) were the basis
  the income of which was utilized for acquisition of the lands
  in A(4) to A(6) and A(8) to A(12) lands. But the trial court     H
    446     SUJ:REME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A        has relied upon the gift in question and left it not been
         considered on erroneous approach. The mere fact that the
         mother has the son and ip-so-facto that the mother is
         cultivating the land when there admittedly sons who is
         professional agriculturist and whether it is mother alone or
B        father himself cultivating the lands; everybody contri-butes
         (sic.) their right and labour to cultivate the land. It is
         nobody's case that Parwatevva kept her income separately
         or that income was not accrued (sic.) by the father
         Siddappa. When it is found by the court below that the
         plaintiff was only 16 years of age in 1944, and defendant
c        no. 1 was about 22 or 23 years of age, the burden should
         have been shifted to 1st defendant to explain as to what
         really happened and what is the necessity for purchase of
         the property in the name of the mother. This has not been
         done. Having been found that during the lifetime of
D        Siddappa, Parwatewa could not have being (sic.) the karta
       . of the family. That defendant-1 a!one would have become
         'karta' of the family, the court below ought to have placed
         the burden on the defendant and the defendant has not
         proved or discharged that burden at all. The learned judge
E        would embarked upon the surmises and imagination
         regarding the income and came to wrong conclusion that
         the family did not have nucleus to acquire the properties
         mentioned in 'B' and 'C' Schedule."

F       13: As is clear from the above conclusion, the High Court
  has not accepted the findings and conclusion reached by the
  Trial Court. The High Court has, in our opinion, wrongly shifted
  the burden of proving that the said lands were a part of the self
  acquired property of Parwatevva and not a part of the joint
G family property of the appellants-defendants, when there was
  no affirmative proof of anything contrary. In our view, the High
  Court has erred in shifting the burden of proof on the appellants-
  defendants, especially when there was nothing on record either
  by way of oral or documentary evidence produced by the
H respondents-plaintiffs before the trial court.
  MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 447
       (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
       14. The genealogical relation between the parties is not         A
 in dispute. Propositor Siddappa died in the year 1951 and he
 was survived by his wife Parwatewa, plaintiffs and defendants.
 He was the tenant of the suit lands A(1) to A(3). It is claimed
 that Siddappa had purchased lands in R.S. No.91 under a
 Registered Sale Deed dated 05.10.1944 out of the joint family          B
 income and funds but in the name of his wife Parwatevva. The
 lands in R.S. No. 91 is further divided as A(4) to A(6). It is also
 claimed that lands in R.S. No.143 was purchased out of joint
·family funds in the name of Parwatevva. These lands are sub-
 divided as Serial Numbers A(8) to A(12). Lands in R.S.                 c
 No.271/1, which was gifted to Parwatevva by her father, was
 claimed that it got blended and treated with the other joint family
 property. Marbasappa, defendant No.1, being the eldest in the
 family had applied to the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy
 rights of tenanted lands A(1) to A(3) and the same has been            0
 granted in his name and conferment of occupancy rights would
 enure to the benefit of the joint family. Plaintiffs assert that the
  Suit Schedule properties are joint f~mily properties and,
 therefore, the same requires to be partitioned according to their
  shares by a decree of partition and separate possession. The          E
  claim of the plaintiffs is denied by the contesting defendants.
  Parties have led in copious oral and documentary evidence.
      15. At present, we are mainly concerned with 'A' Schedule
 properties. The parties to the appeal have no grievance so far
 as decree passed in respect of 'B' and 'C' Schedule properties         F
 are concerned.                                           ·

        16. In so far as lands shown as A(1) to A(3) are.concerned,
 it is claimed by the plaintiffs that the propositor Siddappa was
 a tenant of the lands and continued as such till his death in the      G
 year 1951. Thereafter, the HUF continued to be the tenants of
 the lands and the defendant No.1, being the head of the family,
 had applied for grant of occupancy rights in respect of those
 tenanted lands and the Land Tribunal had granted occupancy
 rights in his favour. On the death of Siddappa, the tenancy lands      H
    448     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A A(1) to A(3) were mutated in the name of his sons. It is claimed
  that the occupancy rights so granted would enure to the benefit
  of the whole joint family. Therefore, it is a joint family property
  and requires to be partitioned among the members of the joint
  family. The defendants have denied that the lands A(1) to A(3)
B are the joint family tenancy lands.

       17. After perusing the records and the order passed by
  the Land Tribunal, Gadag, it appears to us that defendant No.
  1 had applied to the Land Tribunal for grant of occupancy rights
C in respect of land in Survey No. R.S . No. 9/3A and R. S. No.
  274/3 measuring an extent of 2 Acres and 10 Guntas and 1
  Acre and 20 Guntas respectively. Land Tribunal had granted
  occupancy rights in favour of the applicant-defendant No. 1 in
  respect of the said two lands. Shri Mahale, learned counsel for
  the appellants, does not contend contrary to the findings and
D conclusion reached by the Trial Court. He admits that though
  occupancy rights are granted by the Land Tribunal in the
  individual name of the appellant-defendant No.1, the said
  occupancy rights enure to the benefit of all the member:s of the
  Joint family.
E
       18. Suit Land A(7) bearing R.S. No.271/1 was 'stridhana'
  property of Parwatevva. This property was gifted to her by her
  father under a registered Gift Deed dated 30th April, 1924. She
  was the owner of the said land. She continued to be in
F possession of the said land till she bequeathed the same in
  favour of defendant No.5 under a will dated 30.06.1984. On the
  death of Parwatevva and on the basis of the said Will, the
  legatee-defendant No.5 claims she has become owner of the
  said land. The same has been noted in the Revenue Records.
G The Will and the Revenue entries made are questioned by the
  plaintiffs and has successfully proved that the said Will was not
  executed by Parwatewa. Therefore, defendant No.5 cannot
  claim title over A(?) under a Will Ex. D-51. Accordingly, this
  property cannot be brought into the hotchpotch of the joint family
  property and would not be available for partition. Stridhana
H
 MARABASAPPA (0) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 449
      (D} BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
belonging to a woman is a property of which she is the absolute      A
owner and which she may dispose of at her pleasure, if not in
all cases during coverture, in all cases during widowhood. Since
the plaintiffs have proved that Parwatewa had not alienated the
property by executing a Will in favour of defendant No. 5 during
her lifetime, the property is the absolute property of Parvatevva    B
and would not be available for partition among the members
of joint family since it does not partake the character of joint
family property.

      19. Now coming to Suit Schedule properties Item No.A(4)        C
to A(6), it is the case of the plaintiffs that the said properties
were purchased by Siddappa, father of the plaintiffs and the
defendants under a Sale Deed dated 05.10.1944, but, in the
name of his wife Parwatewa from and out of the income of the
tenancy lands A(1) to A(3) for the purpose of the joint family
for which he was also the Karta of the family. However, it is the    D
case of the contesting defendants that the said property is the
self acquired property of Parwatevva from and out of her
income derived from the property_ gifted to her by her father in
the year 1924. The defence that is also put up by the defendants
is that Siddappa was the tenant of the property A(1) to A(3)         E
only from the year 1947 and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim
that from out of the income of the property A( 1) to A(3), lands
in item A(4) to A(7) were purchased. It has come in evidence
of the contesting defendants that propositor Siddappa was the
tenant of the lands A(1) to A(3) only from the year 1947. The        F
same is not disputed by the plaintiffs by leading any other
cogent evidence to prove that Siddappa was the tenant of the
lands A(1) to A(3) even prior to 1944, the date of the Sale
Deed. In the absence of any evidence, much less cogent and
reliable evidence, it is difficult to accept the version of the      G
plaintiffs that the suit schedule A(4) to A(6) should be put into
common hotch potch and partitioned by meters and bounds.

    20. We may also notice the observations made by the Trial
Court, which we also agree, in the course of its judgement.
                                                                     H
     450      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A          "61. Now let us firstly take up A(4) to A(6) lands. Ex.D.8 is
           the certified copy of the sale deed in respect of said land.
           dated 05-10-1944. It is necessary to emphasize that
           according to the plaintiffs, Shiddappa was protected tenant
           of the lands mentioned therein as per Ex.P.20, which
B          pertains to 1947. They have obviously, not produced any
           records, such as R.O.Rs. or mutation entries to show that
           Shiddappa was the tenant of those 11 lands, mentioned
           in Ex.P.20 even prior to 1947. ft is essential because, we
           are assessing the productivity of nucleus as on the date
c          of Ex.D.8. Ex.D.8 is admittedly of 1944. Since no
           document is produced by plaintiffs to show that Shiddappa
           was the tenant even prior to 1947 of the lands referred to
           in Ex.P.20, it cannot be said that he had no 'independent
           source of income at the relevant time of 1944 (Ex.D.8).
           Evidence on record justified that at the relevant time of
D
           Ex.D.8, Parvatewwa was already owner and possessor of
           A(7) land, extent of which is 8 acres 16 guntas. Excepting
           this land, the family of the parents of plaintiff No.1,
           defendant No.1 and Bheemappa, is not shown to have had
           any other source of income. Hence, it follows that the land
E          in Ex.D.8 could not have been acauired at all by
           Shiddappa, out of his income, since he is not shown to
           have had any income at all. ft is too much to say that the
           income of the lands at A(1) to A(3) was the source of
           income for acquisition of the lands A(4) to A(6) (Ex.D.8).
C'
'          This argument pre-supposes that Shiddappa was a tenant
           of A(1) to A(3) lands even prior to 1944 (Ex.D.8).
           Absolutely there is no evidence. Hence, it cannot be said
           that Shiddappa had purchased A(4) to A(6) lands, which
            is land in Ex.D.8, out of the income of the joint family.
G           Indeed, he was living in the house of his parents-in-law with
            Parvatewwa and Ex.D.60 of 1924 shows that he had no
           financial strength. Hence, I am of the definite opinion that
           the land in Ex.D.8 must have had been acquired by
            Parvatewwa out of the income she had derived from A(7)
H           land. It cannot be said and it is not acceptable that
 MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 451
      (D) BY LRS. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]

    Shiddappa had purchased the land mentioned in Ex.D.8            A
    in the name of his wife Parvatewwa. I make it clear that it
    was purchased by her only out of her income derived from
    A(7) land.

    Plaint shows that plaintiff No.1 and defendant No.1 were        B
    of 62 and 70 years respectively on the date of suit. It shows
    that in 1944, the year of Ex.D.8, plaintiff No.1 was about
    16 years of age, and defendant No.1 was about 22 or 23
    years of age. I am emphasizing these facts to show that
    neither of them had independent source of income. It must       C
    mean that Parvatewwa was the absolute owner of the suit
    lands A(4) to A(6) mentioned in Ex.D.8. Hence, it cannot
    be said as joint family property. Joint family did not have
    at all, any nucleus to acquire the land in Ex.D.8. Hence,
    said finding is recorded."
                                                                    D
Therefore, the findings contrary to the above view by the High
Court are erroneous and cannot be sustained.

     21. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 19'56 clearly
mandates that any property of a female _Hindu is her absolute       E
property and she, therefore, has full ownership. The Explanation
to sub-section (1) further clarifies that a Hindu woman has full
ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own
or as stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the
same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be treated
                                                                    F
as a part of the joint Hindu family property.

     22. This Court has time and again held that there is no
presumption that of joint family property, and there must be
some strong evidence in favour of the same. In the case of
Appasaheb Chamdgade v. Devendra Chamdgade and Ors.,                 G
(2007) 1 SCC 521, after examining the decisions of this Court,
it was held:

    "17. Therefore, on survey aforesaid decisions, what
    emerges is that there is no presumption of a joint Hindu        H
    452       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 12 S.C.R.


A         family but on the evidence if it is established that the
          property was joint Hindu family and the other properties
          were acquired out of that nucleus, if the initial burden is
          discharged by tlie person who claims joint Hindu family,
          then the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition
B         to establish affirmatively that property was acquired without
          the aid of the joint family property by cogent and necessary
          evidence."

          23. Insofar as lands at Item A(8) to A(12) are concerned,
    it is the case of the plaintiffs that on the death of propositor
C   Siddappa, joint family continued and during its continuance,
    agricultural lands in R.S. No.143, which is now sub"divided as
    items A(8) to A( 12) came to be purchased out of the joint family
    funds, but, in the name of Parwatevva, since she was eldest
    member of the joint family at the relevant point of time. The oral
D   evidence was led in support of the assertion made in the plaint.
    The plaintiffs have not produced any other evidence in support
    of the claim so made. The defence pleaded by the defendants,
    apart from others, is that Parwatevva had her _independent
    source of income from A(7) lands. She, with the aid of the said
E   income, acquired not anly A(4) to A(6) but also A(8) to A(12)
    lands and the tenancy lands was held by joint family. It is also
    contended by them that propositor Siddappa, after marrying
    Parwatewa, lived in the paternal house of his wife Parwatewa,
    which fact is not denied by the plaintiffs, and Siddappa had no
F   personal income nor agricultural income which he could utilize
    for purchase of any property, much less A(8) to A(12)
    properties. The Trial Court, after considering the entire evidence
    on record has come to the conclusion that lands A(8) to A(12)
    is the absolute self acquired properties of Parwatewa . The
G   findings and the conclusion so arrived is based on the proper
    appreciation of the evidence on record and the respondents
    have not brought to our notice anything contrary to make a
    different view. Therefore, while agreeing with the findings and
    the conclusion reached by the Trial Court, we reject the
H   contention canvassed by learned counsel for the respondents.
 MARABASAPPA (D) BY LRS. & ORS. v. NINGAPPA 453
      (0) BY LRS .. & ORS. [H.L. DATTU, J.]
Therefore, lands in R.S. No. 143, which is now sub-divide~as          A
A(8) to A(12) of the suit Schedule is not the joint family property
but the absolute property of Parwatevva, which she has
purchased/acquired from the income and funds from the lands
A(7) and A(4) to' A(8). Accordingly, 'A' Schedule properties          ,
requires to be partitioned among the family members in                B
accordance with law.

      24. In the light of above discussion, we are unable to
accept with the reasoning given by the High Court. We are in
agreement with the reasoning and conclusion reached by the
Trial Court.                                                          c
     25. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment
and Order passed by the High Court in RFA No. 385 of 1993
dated 30.03.1999 is set aside and Judgment and decree
passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No. 40 of 1990 dated                 D
15.07.1993 is restored. Parties are directed to bear their own
costs.

N.J.                                            Appeal allowed.