Holding

Suits for permanent injunction restraining a licensor from forcibly recovering possession are covered by the phrase ‘relating to recovery of possession’ in Section 41(1) and therefore fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, Bombay.

Summary

The appellants, licensees of certain premises in Greater Bombay, filed suits for permanent injunction in the City Civil Court to prevent the licensor‑defendants from forcibly evicting them. The defendants challenged the City Civil Court’s jurisdiction, arguing that under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 such suits fall exclusively within the Small Causes Court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of the phrase “relating to recovery of possession” and held that it is broad enough to encompass injunction suits aimed at protecting possession from illegal forcible recovery. Consequently, the suits satisfy both conditions of Section 41(1) – they are between a licensor and licensee and relate to recovery of possession of immovable property in Greater Bombay. The Court therefore affirmed the High Court’s view that the City Civil Court lacks jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether a suit for permanent injunction filed by a licensee against a licensor, seeking to prevent forcible recovery of possession, is cognizable by the Small Causes Court under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882.
Whether the City Civil Court, Bombay, has jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rent Act, 1947s. 28(1)
Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882s. 41(1)
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. 6

Subjects

jurisdictionsmall causes courtpermanent injunctionlicensee‑licensorrecovery of possessionSection 41(1)City Civil CourtBombay

Judgment

\\

A MANSUKHLAL DHANRAJ JAIN AND ORS. ETC.
v. r
EKNATH VITHAL OGALE ETC.

FEBRUARY 8, 1995

B [S. MOHAN. AND S.B. MAJMUDAR, JJ.]

Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 188~Section 41(1)-Court of
small causes-Jurisdiction of-Phrase 'relating to recovery of posses- ~
sion-Scop~Licensee seeking permanent injunction against licensor

c · restraining him from recovering possession by forcible means-Exclusive juris-
diction of Small Causes Courts.

The appellants filed suit for permanent injunction on the ground
that they were in possession of the suit shop. The respondent being tenant
of the suit premises put the appellants into possession thereof under an
D irrevocable licence • tenancy agreement and that due to some difference of
opinion between the parties, the defendant started threatening the appel·
lants that he would physically throw them out of the suit premises. The
appellants moved an application for temporary injunction pending the
suit. The relief was claimed on the basis that appellants were licensees and
E the defendants-respondents were the licensors.
The respondents raised an objection regarding the jurisdiction of
• the City Civil court to entertain such a suit. Examining this contention as
a preliminary issue, the City Civil Court held that the Court had jurisdic·
tion to entertain such a suit for injunction. On revision, the Division Bench
F of the High Court held that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to -+-'
entertain the suit. Hence this appeal.

The appellants contended that these were suits for injunction
simplicitor for protecting their possession from the illegal threatened acts
of respondents and that the present suits did not satisfy conditions nos. 1
G & 3 for attracting section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts
Act, 1882.
>-
The question raised for consideration was whether the suit filed by
the plaintiff claiming the right to possess the suit premises as a licensee,
H against defendant. alleged licensor was cognizable by the Court of Small
996
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 997

Causes as per Section 41(1) of the Act or whether the City Civil Court had A
jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1. The phrase 'relating to recovery of possession' as found
in Section 41 (1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act is comprehen- B
sive in nature and takes in its sweep all types of suits and proceedings
which are concerned with the recovery of possession of suit property from
the licensee and, therefore, suits for permanent injunction restraining the
defendant from effecting forcible recovery of such possession from the
licensee-plaintiff would squarP.ly be covered by the wide sweep of the said C
phrase. Because of the non obstante clause contained in Section 41(1), even
if a suit may otherwise lie before any other court, if such a suit falls within
the sweep of Section 41(1), it can be entertained only by the Court of Small
Causes. [1004-H, 1005-A, 1001-G]

2. When a Plaintiff licensee seeks permanent injunction against the D
defendant-licensor restraining the defendant from recovering the posses-
sion of the suit property by forcible means from the plaintiff, such a suit
does have a bearing on or a concern with the recovery of possession of
such property. [1003-E]

3. In the instant case the Plaintiff claimed relief on the basis that E
they were licensees on monetary consideration and the defendants were the
licensors. These suits could lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of Small
Cause Cou~s and the City Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to
entertain such suits. [1002-F, 1005-B]

Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. and Anr., [1985] 1 F
SCR 432; Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., [1988] 2
SCC 299; Babula/ Bhuramal andAnr. v. Nandram Shivram and Ors., [1959)
SCR 367 and Nataraj Studios v. Navrang Studios, [1981] 2 SCR 466, relied
on.
G
Ambalal v. Narmada, (1963) 4 Guj L R 90; Ramkishore v. Vijay
Bahadursingh AIR (1964) Born. 85 and Dattatreya Krishna v. Jairam Ganesh,
AIR (1965) Born. 177, affirmed.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4913 of
. 1989 Etc. II
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 22.3.88 of the Bombay High
Court in C.R.A. No. 12 of 1985. ·

Vasdev Prakash (In-Person) for the Appellant.

T.C. Sharma and Ms. Neelam Sharma for the Appellant in C.A. No.
B 4913/89. '

Gorab Banerjee, R. Karanjawala, Ms. Ruby Ahuja and Ms. M.
Karanjawala for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
MAJMUDAR, J. In both the civil appeals the first one arising pur-
suant to the certificate of fitness granted under Article 133 of the Constitu-
tion by the High Court of Bombay and the other one arising out of special
leave to appeal granted by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
D of India against another decision of the same High Court, a short question
arises for our consideration. It is as under :

"Whether the suit filed by the plaintiff claiming the right to possess
the suit premises as a licensee, against defendant alleged licensor,
who is said to be threatening to disturb the possession of the
E plaintiff licensee, without following due procedure of law, is cog-
nizable by the court of small causes Bombay as per Section 41(1)
of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act (hereinafter referred
to as "the Small Causes Courts Act") , 1882 or whether it is
cognizable by the City Civil Court, Bombay, constituted under the
F Bombay City Civil Act."

The High Court by the impugned judgment in these appeals has
taken the view that such a suit is not maintainable before the City Civil
Court and should be filed in the Small Causes Court, Bombay, under
G Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act. The learned Counsel for the
appellants contended before us that the said view is not correct. Learned
counsel for the respondents on the other hand has· sup"J>orted the same
vi,ew.

Before we consider the aforesaid question, a few relevant facts
H leading to both these appeal deserve to be noted at the outset.
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 999

FACTS IN CA. NO. 4913 OF 1989 A
The appellant-plaintiffs filed suit No. 1290 of 1984 in the Bombay
City Civil Court against the respondent-defendant for permanent injunc-
tion on the ground that the appellants are in possession of the suit shop.
That the respondent-defendant is tenant of the !.Uit premises being Shop
No. 4, Meghji Vallabhdas Trust Building, Bhavanishankar Road, Dadar, B
Bombay. That the defendant took the same premises in December, 1974
on rent and put the appellants into possession thereof under an irrevocable
licence/tenancy agreement. It was agreed that Plaintiff No. 1 had to pay
licence fee to the defendant or to the landlord. The plaintiff further avered
that due to some difference of opinion between the parties, the defendant C
started threatening the appellants that he would physically throw them out
of the suit premises and hence the suit for permanent injunction restraining
the respondent-licensor from disturbing the possession of the plaintiff-
licensees of the suit premises.

We are not concerned with the defence of the respondent on merits D
for resolving the present controversy about the jurisdiction of the City Civil
Court to entertain such a suit. Jurisdiction of the Court has to be decided
at this stage on the averments in the plaint on demurrer, taking them to be
true.

The appellants moved an application for temporary injunction pend- E
ing the suit. While opposing the said application, the respondent contended
that the City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and it was
only the Small Causes Court, Bombay, which could entertain such a suit.
This contention was examined by the City Civil Court as a preliminary
issue. After hearing both the sides, learned Judge of the City Civil Court
came to the conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain such a F
suit for injunction and thereafter directed that the injunction application
should be heard on merits.

The said order of City Civil Court was challenged by the respondent
by filing Civil Revision Application No. 212 of 1985 in the High Court. The G
learned Chief Justice (Madhava Reddy, CJ) who heard the revision in the
first instance thought it fit to refer the matter to a Division Bench, looking
to the importance of the question involved. The revision application there-
after was placed before a Division Bench consisting of P.B. Swant, J. (as
he then was) and G.H. Gutta!, J. Sawant, J. took the view that the City Civil
Court had jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, but Gutta!, J. took a contrary H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A view and held that such a suit could lie only under Section 41 (1) of the
Small Courts Act before the Small Causes Court, Bombay. In view of the
difference of opinion between the two learned Judges constituting the T
Division Bench, the matter was referred to a third learned Judge Pendse,
J. Pendse, J. after hearing the parties came to the conclusion that the City
B Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain tp.e suit. He agreed with the
view take~ by Guttal, J. Thereafter the matter was placed before the
Division Bench for final orders and in the light of the decision reached by
Guttal, J. and Pendse, J., the revision application was allowed and it was
held that the City Civil Court had no j~risdiction to entertain the suit. On
an application by the appellants for certificate under Article 133(1), the ·~
C Division Bench granted the certificate as prayed for and that is how this
civil appeal has been filed in this Court and has reached hearing before us.

FACTS IN CA. NO. 4753 OF 1989:

D The appellant-plaintiff filed Suit No. 7508 of 1984 in the City Civil
Court at Bombay against the respondents for permanent injunction
restraining the respondent-defendants, their servants and agents from dis-
possessing the appellant-plaintiff from the suit premises being 505-A, Neel
Kanth, 98, Marine Drive, Bombay, save and except by due process of law.
A further injunction was also sought, restraining the respondents from in
E any manner obstructing or interfering with the possession of the plaintiff
in respect of the aforesaid suit premises save and except by due process of
law. The case of the plaintiff was that it was a firm which started its
business as shroffs & financiers in the suit premises. That premises which
originally belonging to S. Mathuradas were purchased by Respondents
p Nos. 1 & 2 who a!'e also dealing as the Shroffs and financiers. On behalf
of Respondents Nos. 1 & 2, Respom:lent No. 3 used to accept monthly -+-
compensation which used to be paid by cheque. That the plaintiff had been
paying monthly compensation to Respondent No. 3 who had been accept·
ing the same till 1982. The case of the plaintiff was that the premises were
given to the plaintiff-firm by way of licence by Defendant No. 3 and as the
G plaintiff apprehended that the defendants were likely to oust the plaintiff
from the suit premises without following due process of law, he filed the
aforesaid suit for the above stated reliefs.

In the said suit, by notice of motion the appellant-plaintiff prayed for
H interim reli~f against the respondents. That notice of motion was dismissed
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 1001

by the Trial Court on merits after hearing the contesting parties. The A
appellant-plaintiff thereafter filed an appeal from. Order No. 598 of 1986
before the Bombay High Court. In that appeal, the learned Single Judge
S.M. Daud, J., took the view that City Civil Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit. For reaching that conclusion the learned Judge placed
reliance on the decision of the High Court in Civil Revision Application
No. 212 of 1985 which is the subject-matter of companion appeal before
B
us. As noted earlier, the appellant obtained leave to appeal under Article
136 of the Constitution and has filed this appeal.

As both the appeals raised common question for consideration,
learned counsel for the comesting parties were heard in common on this C
question and accordingly we are disposing of these appeals by this judg-
ment.

In order to resolve the controversy posed for our consideration, it
will be appropriate to note the relevant statutory provision having a direct D
bearing on this question. Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act
reads as under :

"41(1). Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act
or in any other law for the time being in force but subject to the
provisions of Sub-section (2), the Court of Small Causes shall have E
jurisdiction to entertain and try all suits and proceedings between
a licensor and licensee, or a landlord and tenant, relating to the
recovery of possession of any immovable property situated in
Greater Bombay, or relating to the recovery of the license fee or
charges of rent thereof, irrespective of the value of the subject F
matter of such suits or proceedings."

A mere look at the aforesaid provision makes it clear that because of the
non-obstante clause contained in the section, even if a suit may otherwise
lie before any other court, if such a suit falls within the sweep of Section G
41(1) it can be entertained only by the Court of Small Causes. In the
present proceedings we are not concerned with the provisions of sub-
section (2) of Section 41(1) and hence we do not refer to them. For
applicability of Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act, the following
conditions must be satisfied before taking view that jurisdiction of regular
competent civil court like City Civil Court is ousted. H
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A (i) it must be a suit or proceeding between 'the licensee and licensor;
or
T
(ii) between a landlord and a tenant;

(iii) such suit or proceeding must relate to the recovery of possession
l;3 of any property situated in Greater Bombay; or

(iv) relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or rent
thereof.

In the present case; we are not concerned with the 2nd and 4th
C conditions, as the only contention of the appellants is that the present suits
do not satisfy conditions nos. 1 and 3 for attracting Section 41(1). The
respondents claim to the contrary. It is obvious that if the present suits
satisfy conditions nos. 1 and 3 they would clearly attract the applicabilit}r
of Section 41(1) of the Act and such suits would be outside the purview of
D regular civil court like the City Civil Court. Therefore, the enquiry which
becomes relevant at this stage is to find out from the averments in the
plaints whether these are suits between a licensor and a licensee and
whether they relate to the recovery of possession of immovable property
situated in Greate.r Bombay.

E So far as the first condition is concerned, a comprehensive reading
of the relevant averments in the plaints in both these cases leaves no room
for doubt that the plaintiffs claim relief on the basis that they are licensees
on monetary consideration and the defendants are the licensor. The first
condition is clearly satisfied. Then remains the question whether the third
F condition, namely that the suits must relate to the recovery of possession
of immovable property situated in Greater Bombay is satisfied or not. It is
not in dispute that the suit properties are immovable properties situated in
Greater Bombay but the controversy is around the question whether these
suits relate to recovery of possession of such immovable properties. The
appellants contended that these are suits for injunction simpliciter for
G protecting their possession from the illegal threatened acts of respondents-
defendants. Relying on a series of decision of this Court and the Bombay
High Court, Guttal, J., Pendse, J. and Daud, J. had taken the view that
such injunction suits can be said to be relating to the possession of the
immovable property. Sawant, J. has taken a contrary view. We shall deal
H with these relevant decisions at a later stage of this judgment. However, on
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 1003

the clear language of the section in our view it cannot be said that these A
suits are not relating to the possession of the immovable property. It is
pertinent to note· that Section 41(1) does not employ words "suits and
proceedings for recovery of possession of immovable property''. There is a
good deal of difference between the words "relating to the recovery of
possession" on the one hand and the terminology "for recovery of posses-
sion of any immovable property". The words "relating to" are of wide import
B
and can take in their sweep any suit in which the grievance is made that
the defendant is threatening to illegally recover possession from the plain-

.... tiff-licensee. Suits for protecting such possession of immovable property
against the alleged illegal attempts on the part of the defendant to forcibly
recover such possession from the plaintiff, can clearly get covered by the c
wides weep of the words "relating to recovery of possession" as employed
by Section 41(1). In this connection, we may refer to Blacks' Law Diction-
ary Super Deluxe 5th Edition. At page 1158 of the said Dictionary, the term
"relate" is defined as under :

"to stand in some relation, to have bearing or concern, to D
pertain, refer, to bring into association with or connection with."

It cannot be seriously disputed that when a plaintiff- licensee seeks per-
manent injunction against the defendant- licensor restraining the defendant
from recovering the possession of the suit property by forcible means from E
the plaintiff, such a suit does have a bearing on or a concern with the
recovery of possession of such property~ In the case of Renusagar Power
Company Ltd. v. General Electric Company & Anr., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 432, a
Division Bench of this Court had to consider the connotation of the term
"relating to", Tulzapukar, J. at Page 471 of the report has culled out
propositions emerging from the consideration of the relevant authorities. F
At page 471 proposition No. 2 has been mentioned as under :

"Expressions such as "arising out of' or "in respect of' or "in
connection with" or "in relation to" or "in consequence of' or
"concerning" or "relating to" the contract are· of the widest G
amplitude and content and include even questions as to the exist-
ence, validity and effect (scope) of the arbitration agreement."

In Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union India & Ors., [1988) 2 S.C.C. 299,
another Division Bench of this Court consisting of Sabyaschi Mukherji (as
he then was) and G.L. Oza, JJ., had an occasion to consider this very H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A question m connection with the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the
Swadeshi Cotton Mil~s Co. Ltd. (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertaking)
Act, 1986. Sabyaschi Mukherji, J. speaking for the Court, has made the T
following pertinent observations in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the report :

"The words "arising out of' have been used in the sense that it
B comprises purchase of shares and lands from income arising out
of the Kanpur undertaking. We are of the opinion that the words
"pertaining to" and "in relation to" have the same wide meaning
and have been used interchangeably for among other reasons,
which may include avoidance of repetition of the same phrase in
c the same clause or sentence, a method followed in good drafting.
The word "pertain" is synonymous with the word "relate" , see
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 17, Page 693.

The expression "in relation to" (so also "pertaining to"), is a very
broad expression which presupposes another subject matter. These
D
are words of comprehensiveness which might have both a direct
significance as well as an indirect significance depending on the
context, see State Wakf Board v. Abdul Azeez, following and ap-
proving Nitai Charan Bagchi v. Suresh Chandra Paul, Shyam Lal
v. M. Shyamlal and 76 Corpus Juris Secundum 621. Assuming that
E the investments in shares and in lands do not form part of the
undertakings but are different subject matters, even then these
would be brought within the purview of the vesting by reason of
the above expressions. In this connection reference may be made
to 76 Corpus Juris Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is
stated that the terms "relate" is also defined as meaning to bring
F
into association or connection with. It has been clearly mentioned
that "relating to" has been held to be equivalent to or synonymous
with as to "concerning with" and "pertaining to". The expression
"pertaining to" is an expression of expansion and not of contrac-
tion."
G
It is, therefore, obvious that the phrase 'relating to recovery of possession'
as found in Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Court Act is comprehensive
in nature and takes in its sweep all types of suits and proceedings which
are concerned with the recovery of possession of suit property from the
H. licensee and, therefore, suits for permanent injunction restraining the
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE (MATMUDAR, J.) 1005

defendant from effecting forcible recovery of such possessiqn from the A
licensee plaintiff would squarely be covered by the wide sweep of the said
phrase. Consequently in the light of the averments in the plaints under
consideration and the prayers sought for therein, on the clear language of
Section 41(1), the conclusion is inevitable that these suits could lie within
the exclusive jurisdiction of Small Causes Court, Bombay and the City Civil
Court would have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits.
B

We may now refer to the relevant decisions of this Court and other
Courts to which our attention was invited by learned counsel for both the
- .. sides. As some of the decisions referred to a pari materia provision as found
in Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates C
Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Bombay Rent Act "), it
will be necessary to refer to the said provision. Section 28(1) of the Bombay
Rent Act reads as under :

"28. Jurisdiction of courts. Notwithstanding anything contained in
any law and notwithstanding that by reason for the amount of the D
claim or for any other reason, the suit or proceeding would not,
but for this provision, be within its jurisdiction, -

(a) in Greater Bombay, the Court of Small Causes, Bombay, in
any area for which, a Court of Small Causes is established under E
the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, such Court and

(b) elsewhere, the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having
jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or, if there
is no such Civil Judge, the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior
Division) having ordinary jurisdiction, F

shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try suit or proceeding
between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent
or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of
this Part apply."
' G
When Section 41(1) of the Small Causes Courts Act is read injuxta position
with the aforesaid Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, it becomes clear
that pari materia words are used about nature of suits, in both these
provision for conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Small Causes Court,
namely, they alone can entertain such suits or proceedings relating to H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A recovery of possession of premises. It is of course true that Section 41 of
the Small Causes Courts Act deals with such suits between the licensee and
licensor while Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act deals with suits between
landlord and tenant. But the nature of such suits as contemplated by both
these sections is the same, namely, it should be the suit relating to the
B recovery of possession of premises. Interpreting the phrase 'relating to
recovery of possession' as found in Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, a
Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in the case of Babula/
Bhuramal and Anr. v. Nandram Shivram and Ors., (1959] S.C.R. 367, held
that a suit for declaration that one of the plaintiffs was the tenant of the
defendant landlord and the other plaintiffs were his sub-tenants and they
C were entitled to be protected from evidence squarely falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, under Section
28 of the Bombay Rent Act and jurisdiction of the City Civil Court for
entertaining such a suit is excluded. Imam, J. Speaking for the three-Judge
Bench in that case observed at page 374 of the report as under :
D "The present suit filed in the City Civil Report raised in substance
a claim to the effect that the plaintiffs were the tenants of the
premises within the meaning of the Act. Such a claim was one
which arose out of the Act or any of its provisions. The suit related
to possession of the premises and the right of the landlord to evict
E any of the plaintiffs was denied on the ground that the first plaintiff
was a tenant within the meaning of the Act and the premises had
been lawfully sublet by him to the second and third plaintiffs. The
City Civil Court was thus called upon to decide whether the first
plaintiff was a tenant of the premises within ·the meaning of the
Act and whether he had lawfully sublet the same to the second
F
and third plaintiffs. The City Civil Court, therefore, had to deter-
mine whether the plaintiffs had established their claim to be in
. possession of the premises in accordance with the provisions of
the Act."

G The .situation in the present case is almost parellel. The plaintiffs-
licencees claim their right as licensees to protect possession of the suit
premises from licensors by invoking the help of the Court. Such suits
obviously woUld have to be styled as suits relating to recovery of possession,
on a party of reasoning which appealed to the three-Judge Bench of this
H Court in Babulal's case (supra).
M.D. JAIN v. E.V. OGALE [MAJMUDAR, J.] 1007

The same phraseology employed by section 28 of the Bombay Rent A
Act, namely, 'suits relating to recovery of possession' also came up for
consideration before a latter-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Natraj Studios v. Navrang Studios, [1981) 2 S.C.R. 466. In that case the
facts were that there was a leave and licence agreement the parties. By
virtue of section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act, a licensee in occupation on
1.2.1973 became a deemed tenant. The appellant-licensee filed a declara-
B
tory suit praying for a declaration that the plaintiff-appellant was a monthly
tenant of the two studios and all other structures and open land covered
by the agreement. It was submitted by counsel for the appellant that the
.... essence of the dispute between the parties was the right to possession of
the two studios. This Court, speaking through Chinnappa Reddy, J., held c
at page 477 as follows :

"We may now proceed to consider the submission that the Court
of Small Causes alone has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the
dispute between the parties. S.28(1) of the Bombay Rent Act,
positively confers jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes to D
entertain and try any suit or proceeding between landlord and
tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises
or between a licensor and a licensee relating to the recovery of
license fee or charge and to decide any application made under
the Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the E
Act of any of its proceedings, and negatively it excludes the
jurisdiction of any other Court from entertaining any such suit,
proceeding or application or dealing with such claim or question:

After analysing the previous decisions of this Court in Babulal Bhuramal,
Raizada Topandas etc., this Court held at page 483B as follows : F
"The relationship between the parties being . that of licensor-
landlord and licensee-tenant and the dispute between them relat-
ing to the possession of the licensed-demised premises, there is no
help from the conclusion that the Court of Small Causes alone has G
the jurisc!iction and the Arbitrator has none to adjudicate upon
the dispute between the parties."

It was submitted by learned counsd for the respondents that in these
two cases plaintiffs had prayed for declaration of their status. While in the
present cases on such declaration is sought. In our view this will make no H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A difference. Even in the present cases before getting interim injunction or
perpetual injunction, plaintiff will have to show that he is a licensee on
monetary consideration as claimed by him and the defendant is licensor
and that he has threatened to illegally disturb his possession of the suit
premises. It is the substance of the relief which matters and not its form.

B In view of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it must be held that
the impugned judgments under appeal were rightly decided by tlie High
Court and call for no interference in thr.se appeals.

Before parting with these cases, we may mention that the Gujarat
C High Court in the case of Ambalal v. Nannada, (1963) 4 Gujarat Law
Reporter p.90 has taken the view that a suit where plaintiff claims that he
is entitled to possession and seeks a permanent injunction restraining the
respondent-landlord for recovering possession, would fall under Section 28
of the Bombay Rent Act. The very same view was taken by a Division
D Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ramkishore v.
Vijaybahadursingh, A.LR. (1964) Born. 85. A full Bench of the Bombay
High Court in the case of Dattatreya Krishna v. Jairam Ganesh, A.LR.
(1965) Born. 177) which a held that suits for injunction against defendant-
landlords restraining them from forcibly evicting the plaintiff-tenants from
possession of the suit premises would lie within the exclusive jurisdiction
E of the Small Causes Court, Bombay as such suits will be suits relating to
recovery of possession of premises. In our view the aforesaid decisions lay
down correct law on the point. Swant, J. in the impugned judgment under
appeal in Civil Appeal No. 4913 of 1989 was inclined to take a contrary
view on the ground that the plaintiff had not prayed for a declaration about
F his licence and all that he was claiming was to protect his possession against
threats of unlawful eviction and the Court had not to decide the status of
the plaintiff. With respect, on the clear recitals and prayers in the plaint
such a view is not sustainable. It is easy to visualise that before getting
injunction whether temporary or permanent the plaintiff has to establish a
legal right for the said relief, as seen earlier. Once the plaintiff contends
G that he is a licensee of the suit premises and the defendant is a licensor
and on that basis he wants the assistance of the Court to protect his
possession, it would be a suit between a licensee and licensor relating to
the recovery of possession.

H Analogy drawn by Sawant, J. from cases under Section 6 of the
M.D. JAIN v. E.. V~ OGALE (MAJMUDAR, J.] 1009

Specific Relief Act, 1963 on the clear averments in the plaints in present A
cases is also not apposite. It is trite to say that Section 6 of the Specific
Relief Act given a summary remedy to the plaintiff to seek restoration of
possession from the defendant within six months of illegal recovery of
possession by the defendant, without referring to the title of the plaintiff
and defendant. It is purely a possessory suit wherein status of the party is
irrelevant. In such type of suits the plaintiff is not required to prove his
B
title or a superior right to possession as compared to the defendant and
has only to show that he was in possession of the suit immovable property
and he was illegally dispossessed within a period of six months prior to the
date of the suit. Once the pl~ntiff proves this case\ he becomes entitled to
succeed and can get status quo ante and restoration of possession of the c
suit premises through the assistance of the Court. In given cases, even
injunction suits purely based on previous peaceful possession and sub-
sequent threatened dispossession may stand on an entirely different footing
and might not attract the sweep of Section 41(1) of the Small Causes
Courts or for that matter Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act. But the D
present suits are not of that type. They are suits clearly based on the
allegation that the plaintiffs are licensees on monetary considerations and
they apprehend to be dispossessed, not in accordance with law, at the
hands of defendant-licensors. Such suits as we have discussed earlier,
clearly attract the applicability of Section 41 of the Small Causes Courts
Act as both the conditions for its applicability, namely, that they are suits E
between licensees and licensors and they relate to recovery of possession
of immovable properties situated in Greater Bombay are complied with.
Consequently the conclusion is inevitable that the aforesaid suits as filed
by the appellants were not cognizable by the City Civil Court, Bombay and
they could be entertained only by the Small Causes Court, Bombay, and
F
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the latter court.

As a result of this discussion, both these appeals fail. The City Civil
Court is directed to return the plaints in both these cases to the respective
appellants for being presented to proper Court 0f Small Causes, Bombay,
if so advised. Appeals are accordingly dismissed subject to the aforesaid G
direction to the City Civil Court, Bombay. No order as to costs in both
these appeals.

R.A. Appeals dismissed.