MANOJversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR.

                 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 144 : 2026 INSC 152

                                Manoj
                                 v.
                     State of Maharashtra & Anr.
                    (Criminal Appeal No. 1630 of 2015)
                             13 February 2026
            [B.V. Nagarathna and R. Mahadevan,* JJ.]


                          Issue for Consideration
       In the absence of any subsisting statutory control or saving
       provision operative on the date of the alleged incident, whether
       the prosecution of the appellants under the Essential Commodities
       Act, 1955 is legally tenable.

                                 Headnotes†
       Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – s.3 r/w. s.7 – Cement Control
       (Amendment) Order 1989 – Cement Control Order, 1967 –
       Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973 – The
       prosecution case is that the Public Works Department of the
       State Government had awarded the work of construction of
       a Khar passage in cement concrete – As per the terms of the
       contract, the PWD was required to supply 850 bags of cement
       from Government quota to the contractor (A3) – According
       to the prosecution, the second indent of 400 bags of cement
       released from the PWD godown did not reach the work site –
       Raids were conducted and Trucks were intercepted – During
       the raid, the appellants were allegedly found in possession of
       365 bags of cement of Government quota – The remaining 25
       bags of cement were allegedly recovered on 28.04.1994 from
       a shop and it was alleged that 10 cement bags were received
       by A5 for delivering the cement bags to the appellants – Upon
       appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial Court convicted
       Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 for the offences u/s.3 r/w. s.7 of
       the E.C. Act and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous
       imprisonment for one year – Conviction and sentence was
       affirmed by the High Court – Correctness:
       Held: By notification dated 24.11.1962, cement was declared
       an “essential commodity” u/s.2(a) of the E.C. Act, thereby


* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                              145

                    Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


     subjecting it to statutory control in public interest – In exercise of
     powers conferred u/s. 3 of the E.C. Act, the Central Government
     promulgated the Cement Control Order, 1967, which laid down
     an exhaustive framework for regulation of production, supply,
     distribution and pricing of cement – In terms of s.5 of the E.C.
     Act, the Central Government delegated its powers in respect
     of cement being a commodity other than foodstuffs to the State
     Governments – Pursuant thereto, the State of Maharashtra
     issued the Maharashtra Cement (Licensing and Control) Order,
     1973 – Subsequently, by S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989, the
     Central Government substantially withdrew price and distribution
     control over cement and deleted several operative clauses of
     the Cement Control Order, 1967 – Further, by notification dated
     07.08.1990, the delegation of powers to the State Government to
     regulate retail distribution of cement through licenses or permit
     was expressly rescinded – In the present case, the alleged
     offence is stated to have occurred on 24.03.1994 – On that date,
     neither the Cement Control Order, 1967 nor the Maharashtra
     State licensing regime under the 1973 Order operated so as to
     attract penal consequences u/s.7 of the E.C. Act – Significantly,
     the prosecution has failed to place on record any subsisting control
     order, notification, or statutory restriction in force on the relevant
     date – Therefore, the prosecution launched against the appellants
     under the E.C. Act was wholly misconceived – Both the trial Court
     and the High Court failed to examine the legal effect of decontrol
     and proceeded solely on an appreciation of evidence, ignoring the
     absence of a statutory foundation for the offence – The judgment of
     conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below are set aside.
     [Paras 15.1, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 16, 17, 28]

     Penal Code, 1860 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 –
     s.222 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 – s.245 –
     Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – s.3 r/w. s.7 – Lapse in
     investigation – Failure of investigating agency to invoke
     appropriate provisions of Penal Code, 1860:
     Held: Both the trial Court and the High Court held that the appellants
     failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation or documentary
     justification for possession of cement bags – These findings are
     essentially factual and are supported by the evidence on record– In
     the absence of any subsisting statutory order u/s.3 of the E.C. Act
     on the date of the alleged occurrence, a conviction u/s.7 thereof
     is legally impermissible – This was a case where the investigating
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       agency ought to have invoked appropriate provisions of the Indian
       Penal Code, having regard to the nature of the allegations and
       the evidence collected – In a given case, where the facts proved
       disclose commission of a minor offence, the trial Court is empowered
       u/s.222 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 245 of the Bharatiya
       Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) to record a conviction for such
       minor offence even in the absence of a specific charge, provided
       the essential ingredients thereof are established beyond reasonable
       doubt and no prejudice is caused to the accused – The prosecution,
       however, did not culminate in any such exercise, nor can the High
       Court, in an appeal against conviction under a distinct statutory
       offence, substitute the conviction by invoking provisions of the
       Indian Penal Code for the first time – The lapse, therefore, lies
       squarely at the door of the investigating agency. [Paras 25, 26, 27]

                                Case Law Cited
       Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India [2000] 1 SCR
       518 : (2000) 2 SCC 536 – relied on.
       Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh [2004]
       Supp. 4 SCR 390 : (2004) 7 SCC 490; Salekh Chand and
       Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1960 SC 283; Malkiat
       Singh and Another v. State of Punjab [1969] 2 SCR 663 : (1969)
       1 SCC 157 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Essential Commodities Act, 1955; Cement Control (Amendment)
       Order 1989; Cement Control Order, 1967; Maharashtra Cement
       (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Code of
       Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
       2023.

                               List of Keywords
       Section 3 of Essential Commodities Act, 1955; Section 7 of Essential
       Commodities Act, 1955; Control order; Nullum Crimen Sine Lege;
       Distinct statutory offence; Minor offence; Commission of a minor
       offence; Documentary justification; Lawful authority; Regulatory
       control; Cement; Storage of cement; Unauthorised purchase;
       Possession of cement; Statutory framework; Subsisting statutory
       control; Statutory foundation of offence; Statutory restriction;
       Notification; Distribution of cement; Licences; Permit.
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                          147

                             Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


                                         Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       1630 of 2015
       From the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2014 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRA No. 166 of 2000
       With
       Criminal Appeal No. 1631 of 2015

                                     Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Sudhanshu Chaudhary, Dr. Aditya Sondhi, Sr. Advs., Samarjit G
       Pattnaik, Rahul Totala, Gaurav Vutts, Nikhil Runwal, Ms. Kashish
       Seth, Anubhav Kumar, Rijuk Sarkar, Faisal Sherwani.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Shrirang B.
       Varma, Bharat Bagla, Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Adarsh Dubey,
       Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar.

                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                                Judgment

       R. Mahadevan, J.

1.     The appellants herein, Manoj (A1) and Prakash (A2), who are related
       to each other as nephew and uncle, were tried and convicted for
       the offences punishable under Section 3 read with Section 7 of the
       Essential Commodities Act, 19551 and were sentenced to undergo
       rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 100/-,
       in default thereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one
       month, by judgment dated 03.04.2000 passed by the Special Judge,
       Aurangabad2 in Special Case No. 22 of 1994. Aggrieved thereby,
       the appellants preferred Criminal Appeal No. 166 of 2000 before
       the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad3.


1    For short, “E.C. Act”
2    Hereinafter referred to as “the trial Court”
3    Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”
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       The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment
       of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. Hence, the
       present criminal appeals.
2.     The prosecution case is that the Public Works Department4 of the
       State Government had awarded the work of construction of a Khar
       passage in cement concrete along the Kannad – Bahirgaon Road,
       Aurangabad to Bharat Majdoor Credit Cooperative Society. After
       obtaining the work order, the Chairman of the said Society, Madhukar
       (A3) is alleged to have sublet the work to Prakash Vyenkatrao (A4).
       At the relevant time, Sadashiv (A5) and one more accused (A6) were
       working as peons in the PWD godown at Aurangabad.
3.     As per the terms of the contract, the PWD was required to supply
       850 bags of cement from Government quota to the contractor (A3)
       for execution of the work. Accordingly, the Deputy Engineer of PWD,
       Ramesh Jaiswal (P.W.8) issued the first indent for supply of 400 bags
       of cement in the first week of March 1994. However, according to
       the prosecution, the second indent of 400 bags of cement released
       from the PWD godown did not reach the work site.
4.     It is further alleged that on 24.03.1994, P.S.I. Kadam (P.W.2) of Kranti
       Chowk Police Station, Aurangabad received secret information that
       two trucks carrying Government quota cement were stationed near
       Hari Masjid at Mondha, Aurangabad and that the cement bags were
       being unloaded at Mistri Traders with the intention of black-marketing
       them. Acting on the said information, P.S.I. Kadam conducted a raid
       and intercepted two trucks bearing registration Nos. MHF-6625 and
       MHB-5061 which were found parked on the road between two shops,
       namely, Mistri Traders and Maharashtra Agro Industries, allegedly
       belonging to the appellants.
5.     During the raid, the appellants were allegedly found in possession of
       365 bags of cement of Government quota. The remaining 25 bags
       of cement were allegedly recovered on 28.04.1994 from the shop
       of Maharashtra Agro Industries. During investigation, it was further
       alleged that Sadashiv (A5) had delivered the cement bags to the
       appellants and had received 10 bags of cement as commission.
6.     P.S.I. Kadam lodged a complaint with Kranti Chowk Police Station
       for the offences punishable under Section 3 read with Section 7 of


4    For short, “PWD”
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                         149

                         Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


      the E.C. Act against the appellants and four other accused persons.
      Upon completion of investigation, a chargesheet was filed and the
      case was taken on file as Special Case No. 22 of 1994.
7.    During trial, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and relied upon
      oral and documentary evidence as well as material objects. Upon
      appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial Court convicted
      Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 5 for the offences under Section 3 read
      with Section 7 of the E.C. Act and sentenced each of them to undergo
      rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of Rs.100/-,
      in default thereof to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one
      month. Accused Nos. 4 and 6 were acquitted of the charges.
8.    The conviction and sentence so recorded by the trial Court were
      affirmed by the High Court in the appeal filed by the appellants.
      Consequently, the appellants have approached this Court by way
      of the present criminal appeals.
9.    The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants submitted
      that the appellants were prosecuted for offences under Sections 3
      and 7 of the E.C. Act for the alleged violation of the Maharashtra
      Cement (Licensing and Control) Order, 1973. It was urged that Section
      3(c) and (d) of the E.C. Act empowers the Central Government to
      regulate the production, supply, price and distribution of essential
      commodities by issuing appropriate orders, while Section 7 provides
      for penalties only in cases of contravention of such orders. The
      Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 5 of the
      E.C. Act, delegated certain powers to the State Government in
      respect of commodities other than foodstuffs and fertilisers vide S.O.
      1844 dated 18.06.1966 and S.O. 2314 dated 30.07.1966, pursuant
      to which, the State of Maharashtra framed the Maharashtra Cement
      (Licensing and Control) Order, 19735. The said Order provided for
      licensing under Clauses 3, 4, 5, and 7, restriction on storage under
      Clause 8, and prohibition of selling or buying cement at a higher
      price under Clause 21.
      9.1. The learned senior counsel contended that Clause 21 of the
           1973 Order cannot operate independently and has to be read
           with Clause 10 of the Cement Control Order, 1967, which
           alone provided for fixation of wholesale and retail prices. In the


5    For short, “1973 Order”
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            present case, the prosecution has not produced any material
            to demonstrate what the controlled price of cement was on
            the relevant date. There is also no evidence of any purchase,
            sale or intention to sell, nor even proof of the exact quantity of
            cement in terms of weight alleged to have been stored.
       9.2. It was further submitted that the delegation of powers
            made in 1966 stood rescinded and was replaced by fresh
            delegations vide S.O.681 dated 10.11.1974 and S.O.682 dated
            30.11.1974. It was pointed out that the Cement Control Order,
            1967 underwent amendment by S.O.105 dated 28.02.1982,
            and thereafter, by S.O. 168 dated 01.03.1989, the Central
            Government substantially deregulated price and distribution
            control of cement with effect from 01.03.1987 by omitting the
            preamble (paras 1 and 1A), Clauses (d) and (e) of paragraph
            2, paragraphs 3, 3A, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 and the Schedule
            to the Cement Control Order, 1967. Consequently, Clause 21
            of the 1973 Order, which depended entirely upon Clause 10
            of the Cement Control Order, 1967 for price fixation, became
            unenforceable. It was further submitted that by S.O. 624 dated
            07.08.1990, the Central Government withdrew the powers of
            the State Government relating to regulation of retail cement
            distribution through licensing.
       9.3. The learned senior counsel further contended that there is no
            evidence to establish that the cement allegedly found in the
            godown and shop was levy cement or part of any government
            quota. Without admitting the prosecution case, it was argued
            that the levy on cement was introduced only in 1982 under
            Sections 18G and 25 of the Industries (Development and
            Regulation) Act, 1951, and therefore issue of levy or non-levy
            cement would not attract the provisions of the E.C. Act unless
            a valid and operative order under Section 3 was shown to have
            been violated. Reliance was placed on Sections 78 and 81 of
            the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, regarding the presumption of
            genuineness of Gazette notifications, and on the decision of
            this Court in Prakash Babu Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya
            Pradesh6 to contend that a conviction under Section 7 of the E.C.


6   (2004) 7 SCC 490
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                       Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


            Act necessarily requires proof of the existence and contravention
            of an operative order under Section 3. It was submitted that no
            such order was either in force or proved in the present case.
            Reliance was also placed on Salekh Chand and another v.
            State of Uttar Pradesh7. wherein this Court held that in the
            absence of proof of the controlled price prevailing on the date
            of sale, a conviction under the E.C. Act cannot be sustained.
     9.4. It was submitted that the ratio of the aforesaid judgments
          squarely applies to the present case as neither was the 1973
          Order shown to be operative on the relevant date nor was any
          controlled price of cement proved by the prosecution.
     9.5. It was further contended that both the trial Court and the High
          Court failed to appreciate the admissions of P.S.I. Kadam (P.W.2)
          and Balaji (P.W.17) that no order under the E.C. Act relating to
          cement was filed along with the chargesheet. Reliance was also
          placed on the admission of the Store Keeper Ashruba Natha
          Ubale (P.W. 9) who stated that cement was freely available in
          the open market at the relevant time. With regard to Accused
          No. 2 – Prakash Jain, it was submitted that he was neither
          the owner nor in possession of the cement, and there is no
          evidence of his involvement except a vague allegation of having
          assisted Accused No. 1. His statement under Section 313 of
          the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) and the sales tax
          registration certificate relating to his tea shop clearly establish
          that he had no connection with the alleged offence, and that
          his conviction merely on account of relationship with Accused
          No. 1 is wholly unsustainable.
     9.6. On the aforesaid grounds, the learned senior counsel prayed
          for setting aside the judgments dated 03.04.2000 passed
          by the trial Court and 09.10.2014 passed by the High Court
          and for acquittal of the appellants. In the alternative, it was
          submitted that Section 7 of the E.C. Act penalises only attempt
          or abetment and not mere preparation as held in Malkiat Singh
          and another v. State of Punjab8 and that in the absence of
          proof of purchase or sale, mere possession of cement bags in a


7   AIR 1960 SC 283
8   (1969) 1 SCC 157
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            godown would not attract penal consequences. Even otherwise,
            considering the advanced age of the appellants, absence of
            criminal antecedents and the long lapse of time, it was prayed
            that the appellants be extended the benefit of the Probation of
            Offenders Act, 1958.
10. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the State of
    Maharashtra submitted that the High Court has rightly concluded
    that the possession of cement by the appellants stood duly proved
    on the basis of the evidence on record. It was contended that the
    cement supplied by the Government to Accused No. 3 for execution
    of Government work was diverted and sold to the appellants, and
    that once possession of cement in such quantity was established,
    the burden shifted upon the appellants to satisfactorily explain the
    legality of such possession.
       10.1. It was further submitted that the appellants admittedly did not
             possess any valid licence for storage or sale of cement, and
             therefore the contravention of the statutory provisions stood
             established, attracting the rigours of Sections 3 and 7 of the
             E.C. Act. The learned counsel argued that the High Court,
             upon proper appreciation of the evidence, rightly held that
             it was incumbent upon the appellants to demonstrate either
             their authority to possess the cement or their right to store it.
       10.2. The learned counsel contended that having regard to the
             nature of the offence and the admitted fact that the appellants
             had no connection whatsoever with the Government contract
             under which cement was supplied at concessional rates, no
             plausible explanation could be offered by them. It was submitted
             that the High Court correctly concluded that the prosecution
             evidence establishes that the cement was Government cement
             meant exclusively for public works, and that its diversion and
             unauthorised possession by the appellants was proved beyond
             reasonable doubt.
       10.3. It was therefore submitted that the High Court was fully justified
             in confirming the judgment of conviction and sentence passed
             by the trial Court, which does not call for any interference by
             this Court.
11. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the materials
    available on record.
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                    Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


12. Admittedly, there was a contract for construction of a Mori in cement
    concrete on the Kannad - Bahirgaon Road, which was allotted to
    Accused No.3, who was the Chairman of Bharat Mazdoor Cooperative
    Society. According to the prosecution, the said Society further
    entrusted execution of the work to Accused No 4. Accused Nos.
    5 and 6 were working as Peons in the Public Works Department
    godown at Aurangabad.
13. The specific allegation against the appellants (Accused Nos. 1 and
    2) is that they purchased cement at a concessional or controlled
    rate from Accused Nos. 3 and 4 which was meant exclusively for
    execution of Government work, with the intent to sell the same at a
    higher price and that such cement was unauthorisedly stored in their
    godown. On this basis, it is alleged that the appellants committed
    offences punishable under Section 3 read with Section 7 of the E.C.
    Act. The criminal proceedings initiated against them culminated in
    their conviction and sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment with
    a fine of Rs. 100/-, which was affirmed by the High Court. Therefore,
    the appellants are before this Court.
14. The principal contention urged by the learned senior counsel for the
    appellants is that in view of the Cement Control (Amendment) Order
    1989, all restrictions on sale, purchase, possession and storage of
    cement stood lifted with effect from 01.03.1989. Consequently, dealing
    in cement did not constitute any offence on the date of the alleged
    incident, i.e., 24.03.1994. It was further contended that once statutory
    control over cement was withdrawn, there was no surviving order
    under Section 3 of the E.C. Act whose contravention could attract
    penal consequences under Section 7, rendering the prosecution
    fundamentally unsustainable.
15. To appreciate the aforesaid submission, it is necessary to briefly
    notice the statutory framework governing control and regulation of
    cement at the relevant point of time.
     15.1. Cement is a commodity of vital importance to economy and
           infrastructure development. Under the Industries (Development
           and Regulation) Act, 1951, cement is a “Scheduled Industry”
           within the meaning of Section 3(1). By notification dated
           24.11.1962, cement was declared an “essential commodity”
           under Section 2(a) of the E.C. Act, thereby subjecting it to
           statutory control in public interest.
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       15.2. In exercise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the E.C.
             Act, the Central Government promulgated the Cement Control
             Order, 1967, which laid down an exhaustive framework for
             regulation of production, supply, distribution and pricing of
             cement. The object of the said Order was to ensure equitable
             distribution of cement at fair prices and to prevent hoarding,
             diversion and black-marketing, particularly during periods of
             scarcity.
       15.3. In terms of Section 5 of the E.C. Act, the Central Government
             delegated its powers in respect of cement being a commodity
             other than foodstuffs to the State Governments. Pursuant
             thereto, the State of Maharashtra issued the 1973 Order
             providing for licensing, regulation of storage and sale of cement,
             and penal consequences under Section 7 of the E.C. Act for
             contravention thereof.
       15.4. Subsequently, by S.O. 168(E) dated 01.03.1989, the Central
             Government substantially withdrew price and distribution
             control over cement and deleted several operative clauses
             of the Cement Control Order, 1967. The relevant notification
             expressly brought the said decontrol into effect from 01.03.1989.
             For better appreciation, the same is reproduced below:
                  “MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND COMPANY
                                 AFFAIRS
                     (Department of Industrial Development)
                                      ORDER
                          New Dehi, the 1st March, 1989
                  S.O. 168€. – whereas the Central Government has
                  decided for the removal of price and distribution
                  control of cement with effect from the first day of
                  March, 1989:
                  Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
                  sections 18G and 25 of the Industries (Development
                  and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), the Central
                  Government hereby makes the following amendment
                  in the Cement Control Order, 1967, namely:-
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                    Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


                1.(1) This Order may be called the Cement Control
                (Amendment) Order, 1989;
                (2) It shall come into force on the First day of March,
                1989.
                2. Paragraph 1 to the Preamble, Paragraph -1A,
                clauses (d) and (e) of paragraph 2, paragraph 3, 3A,
                4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 and Schedule to the Cement
                Control Order, 1987, shall be omitted:
                Provided that such deletion shall not affect –
                (a)   the previous operation of the said paragraphs
                      or anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
                (b)   any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
                      accrued or incurred under the said paragraphs;
                      or
                (c)   any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred
                      in respect of any offence committed against the
                      said paragraphs; or
                (d)   any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
                      respect of any such right, privilege, obligation,
                      liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as
                      aforesaid, and
                (e)   any such investigation, legal proceeding
                      or remedy may be instituted, continued, or
                      enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or
                      punishment may be imposed as if the said
                      paragraph had not been omitted.
                                                      [No. 1-5|89-Cem.]
                                                  R. K. SINHA, Jt. Secy.
                Note: The principal order was notified vide S.O.
                4590-IDRA|18G|67 dt. 23rd December 1967.”
     15.5. Further, by notification dated 07.08.1990, the delegation of
           powers to the State Government to regulate retail distribution
           of cement through licenses or permit was expressly rescinded.
           As a result, State-level licensing and regulatory controls
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       over cement distribution also stood withdrawn. For ease of
       reference, the same reads as under:
          “MINISTRY OF FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLIES
                    (Department of Civil Supplies)
                                 ORDER
                   New Delhi, the 7th August, 1990
          S.O. 624(E). – In exercise of the powers conferred by
          Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10
          of 1955), the Central Government makes the following
          Order to amend Order No. S.O. 681(E) dated the
          30th November 1974 issued by the erstwhile Ministry
          of Industry and Civil Supplies (Department of Civil
          Supplies and Cooperation), as follows: -
          (i) that the delegation of powers under clause (d)
          of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential
          Commodities Act, 1955 in so far as it relates to the
          regulation of retail cement distribution by licences or
          permits shall stand rescinded with immediate effect;
          (ii) that all orders (hereinafter referred to as the said
          orders) issued by a State Government or a Union
          Territory Administration in exercise of the powers
          delegated to them by the aforesaid Order shall stand
          modified to the extent specified in (i) above.
          Provided that such modification shall not affect-
          (a)    the previous operation of the said Order or
                 anything duly done or suffered thereunder;
          (or)
          (b)    any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
                 accrued or incurred under the said Order; or
          (c)    any penalty or punishment incurred in respect of
                 any offence committed against the said order; or
          (d)    any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
                 respect of any such right, privilege, obligation,
                 liability, penalty or punishment as aforesaid,
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                       Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


                   And any such investigation, legal proceeding or
                   remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and
                   any such penalty or punishment may be imposed as
                   if the said Order has not been modified.
                                               [F.No. 26(3)/90-ECR&E]
                                             B.N. BAHADUR, Jt. Secy.”
16. In the present case, the alleged offence is stated to have occurred
    on 24.03.1994. On that date, neither the Cement Control Order, 1967
    nor the Maharashtra State licensing regime under the 1973 Order
    operated so as to attract penal consequences under Section 7 of the
    E.C. Act. Significantly, the prosecution has failed to place on record
    any subsisting control order, notification, or statutory restriction in
    force on the relevant date, violation of which could constitute an
    offence under Section 3 of the E.C. Act.
17. Therefore, the prosecution launched against the appellants under the
    E.C. Act was wholly misconceived. Both the trial Court and the High
    Court failed to examine the legal effect of decontrol and proceeded
    solely on an appreciation of evidence, ignoring the absence of a
    statutory foundation for the offence. Such an approach strikes at the
    root of the conviction and renders the same unsustainable in law.
18. The legal position is no longer res integra. In Kolhapur Canesugar
    Works Ltd. v. Union of India9, this Court authoritatively held that
    where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a
    saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must
    lapse. The relevant observation reads as under:
            “The position is well known that at common law, the normal
            effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to
            obliterate it from the statute book as completely as if it had
            never been passed, and the statute must be considered
            as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is
            engrafted by the provisions of Section 6(1). If a provision of
            a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause
            in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop
            where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not
            been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot


9   (2000) 2 SCC 536
158                                                          [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                         Supreme Court Reports


          be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in
          Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus
          the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the
          past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case
          where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its
          place another provision dealing with the same contingency
          is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending
          proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the
          intention of the Legislature is that the pending proceeding
          shall not continue but a fresh proceeding for the same
          purpose may be initiated under the new provision.”
19. Applying the aforesaid principle, in the absence of any subsisting
    statutory control or saving provision operative on the date of the
    alleged incident, the prosecution of the appellants under the E.C.
    Act is legally untenable. On this ground alone, the conviction and
    sentence imposed upon the appellants are liable to be set aside.
20. In view of the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary for this Court to
    examine the remaining contentions raised on behalf of the appellants.
21. Before parting with the matter, we deem it appropriate to record certain
    observations. This case is illustrative of a prosecution founded on
    an incorrect appreciation of the statutory framework. The gravamen
    of the allegation against the appellants was unauthorised purchase,
    possession and storage of cement allegedly procured through
    Government or controlled supply channels meant exclusively for
    public works.
22. It must however be clarified that although regulatory control over
    cement stood rescinded at the time of the alleged offence, and the
    appellants could not, therefore, be prosecuted under the provisions
    of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, acts such as diversion of
    Government-supplied cement meant for public works, dishonest
    retention thereof, or unauthorised dealing in such Government
    property may still attract penal consequences under the Indian Penal
    Code, depending upon the nature of the evidence led and the specific
    ingredients of the offences that are established.
23. In the present case, the prosecution examined seventeen witnesses
    including truck drivers, officers of the Public Works Department, and
    police officials forming part of the raiding party. The Courts below
    have concurrently recorded findings that cement earmarked for
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                        159

                     Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.


     Government work and supplied at concessional rates was diverted
     from the Government godown and found stored in premises connected
     with the appellants, without any lawful authority.
24. Both the trial Court and the High Court further held that the appellants
    failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation or documentary
    justification for such possession. These findings are essentially
    factual and are supported by the evidence on record.
25. Nevertheless, in the absence of any subsisting statutory order under
    Section 3 of the E.C. Act on the date of the alleged occurrence, a
    conviction under Section 7 thereof is legally impermissible. That
    said, this was a case where the investigating agency ought to have
    invoked appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code, having
    regard to the nature of the allegations and the evidence collected.
26. In a given case, where the facts proved disclose commission of a
    minor offence, the trial Court is empowered under Section 222 of
    the CrPC (corresponding to Section 245 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
    Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) to record a conviction for such minor offence
    even in the absence of a specific charge, provided the essential
    ingredients thereof are established beyond reasonable doubt and
    no prejudice is caused to the accused.
27. The prosecution, however, did not culminate in any such exercise, nor
    can the High Court, in an appeal against conviction under a distinct
    statutory offence, substitute the conviction by invoking provisions of
    the Indian Penal Code for the first time. The lapse, therefore, lies
    squarely at the door of the investigating agency.
28. With the above observations, the Criminal Appeals are allowed. The
    judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below
    are set aside. The bail bonds, if any, executed by the appellants
    shall stand cancelled and the fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded
    to them.
29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

     Result of the case: Appeals allowed.




     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan