MANOHARANversusSIVARAJAN & ORS.

                   [2013] 12 S.C.R. 471

                       MANOHARAN                                A
                              v.
                    SIVARAJAN & ORS.
             (Civil Appeal No.10581 of 2013)
                   NOVEMBER 25, 2013
                                                                B
       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA AND
             V. GOPALA GOWDA, JJ.]

    Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:.
                                                                c
      s.149 - Deficiency in court fee - Suit - Application by
plaintiff-appellant for extension of time to pay balance court
fee - Rejected by trial court- High Court rejecting appellant's
application for condonation of delay in filing regular first
appeal - Held: s. 149 prescribes a discretionary power which 0
empowers the court to allow a party to make up the deficiency
of court fee payable on plaint etc. - It is also a usual practice
that court provides an opportunity to the party to pay court fee
within a stipulated time - Further, subject to submission of an
affidavit by appellant of his income, court fee could have been E
waived or provided by District Legal Services Authority -
Appellant deserved waiver of court fee so that he could contest
his claim on merits which involved his substantive right -
 Trial court erred in rejecting the case of appellant due to non-
payment of court fee - Delay in filing regular first appeal,
 having been explained, High Court erred in rejecting the F
 application for con(i9nation of delay in filing the appeal -
Judgments and decrees of trial court and High Court, set
 aside - Delay by appellant in· payment of court fee is
 condoned - Case remanded to trial cdurt for payment of court
 fee - Liberty given to appellant to approach District Legal G
 Service Authority/Taluk Legal SeNice Committee for grant of
 legal aid for sanction of court fee - Trial court shall adjudicate
 on rights of parties on merits - Legal Services Authorities Act,

                             471                                 H
    472       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A 1987 - s.12(h) - Kera/a State Legal Services Authorities
  Rules, 1998 - r.12 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Arts. 39-A
  rlw Art.21- Social justice - Court fee.
          Constitution of India, 1950:
B      Art.39-A - Equal justice and free legal aid - Application
  of plaintiff for extension of time to pay balance court fee,
  rejected by trial court - Held: Art. 39A is equally applicable
  to district judiciary - It is the duty of courts to see that justice
  is meted out to people irrespective of their socio economic
C and cultural rights or gender identity -· Art. 39A provides for
  holistic approach in imparting justice to litigating parties - It
  not only includes providing free legal aid via appointment of
  counsel for the litigants, but also includes ensuring that justice
  is not denied to litigating parties due to financial difficulties -
D Social justice.
        The appellant filed a suit with I.he averments that he
   had obtained a loan of Rs.2,20,000/- from respondent no.
   1 and executed a sale deed with respect to the land in
E question in favour of respondent no. 1, who in turn
  executed an agreement of re-conveyance deed in favour
  of the appellant in respect of the said property; that
  respondent no. 1 instead of issuing a deed of re-
  conveyance, sold the property to respondents nos. 2 and
  3. The appellant, therefore, sought a decree for
F mandatory injunction, for declaring the sale deed
  executed by respondent no. 1 in favour of respondents
  nos. 2 and 3 as null and void and for execution of
  reconveyance deed in his favour. The suit was valued at
  Rs.3,03,967 and the court fee was assessed as Rs.
G 28,797/-. The appellant paid 1/10th of the court fee.
  However, the application of the appellant for extension
  of time to pay the balance court fee was rejected by the
  trial court. The appellant filed a regular first appeal with
  an application for condonation of delay in filing the
H appeal. The High Court rejected the application for
        MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                      473


condonation of delay.                                              A
     In the instant appeal filed by the plaintiff, the points
that arose for consideration were: (i) Whether the Sub-
Judge was justified in rejecting the suit for non- payment
of court fee? (ii) Was the appellant entitled to condonation       B
of delay for non- payment of court fee before the Sub-
Judge? (iii) Whether the High Court was right in rejecting
the application for condonation of delay in filing the
regular first appeal by the appellant? and (iv) What
Order?
                                                                   c
    Allowing the appeal, the Court

    HELD:

Point no. 1
                                                                   D
     1.1. Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
prescribes a discretionary power which empowers the
court to allow a party to make up the deficiency of court
fee payable on plaint, appeals, applications, review of
judgment etc. This Section also empowers the court to              E
retrospectively validate insufficiency of stamp duties etc.
It is also a usual practice that the court provides an
opportunity to the party to pay court fee within a
stipulated time on failure of which the court dismisses the
appeal. [para 8] [479-A-C]                                         F

     1.2. In the instant case, it is the claim of the appellant
that he was unable to pay the requisite amount of court fee
due to financial constraints. It is the usual practice of the
court to use this discretion in favour of the litigating parties   G
unless there are manifest grounds of mala fide. However,
no opportunity was given by the Sub-Judge for payment
of court fee by the appellant. Therefore, the decision of the
Sub.Judge is wrong and is liable to be set aside and is,
accordingly, set aside. [para 8] [479-C-D, E-F]
                                                                   H
    474     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A Point No.2

       2.1 In Kameshwar Prasad Singh's case, this Court has
   held that power to condone the delay in approaching the
  court has been conferred upon the courts to enable them
8 to do substantial justice to parties by disposing the cases
  on merits. In the case in hand, the appellant had moved
  the court claiming his substantive right to his property.
  The original suit filed by him did not deserve the dismissal
  for non- payment of court fee. He rather deserved more
  compassionate attention from the court of Sub.Judge in
C the light of the directive principle laid down in Art. 39A of
  the Constitution of India which is equally applicable to
  district judiciary. It is the duty of the courts to see that
  justice is meted out to people irrespective of their socio
  economic and cultural rights or gender identity. [para 9-
D 10] [479-F-G; 483-F-G]

        State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr.
                      =
    2000 (3) SCR 764 (2000) 9 sec 94 - relied on.

E      2.2. Further, s.12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities
  Act, 1987 provides that every person enumerated therein
  who has to file or defend a case, shall be entitled to legal
  services under the Act. Rule 12 of the Kerala State Legal
  Services Authorities Rules, 1998 states that any person
  whose annual income from all sources does not exceed
F Rupees Twelve Thousand shall be entitled to legal
  services under clause (h) of s. 12 of the Act. Therefore,
  subject to the submission of an affidavit by the appellant
  of his income, the court fee could have been waive or
  provided by the District Legal Services Authority, instead
G of rejection of the suit. [para 11] [483-H; 484-A, C·E]
      2.3. Art. 39A provides for holistic approach in
  imparting justice to the litigating parties. It not only
  includes providing free legal aid via appointment of
H counsel for the litigants, but also includes ensuring that
        MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                   475

justice is not denied to litigating parties due to financial   A
difficulties. [para 13) [485-0-E]
    State of Maharashtra V. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and
                                    =
Others 1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 733 (1995) 5 SCC 730 -
referred to.                                                   B
    2.4. Therefore, in the light of the legal principle laid
down by this Court, the appellant deserved waiver of
court fee so that he could contest his claim on merits
which involved his substantive right. The Sub-Judge
erred in rejecting the case of the appellant due to non- C
payment of court fee. The findings and the decision of the
Sub-Judge is set aside and the delay by the appellant in
payment of court fee which resulted in rejection of his suit
is condoned. [para 13) [485-E-G]
Point No. 3                                                  D

     3.1. The High Court's opinion that the appellant has
not given any ground for delay in filing the regular first
appeal is not sustainable since the appellant has
categorically claimed that he was not aware of the rejection   E
of the suit of the appellant for delayed payment of court
fee by the sub Judge, and has explained the delay. There
is no reason in rejecting the application filed by the
appellantforcondonation of delay in filing the appeal before
the High Court. [para 6, 16) [478-D-E; 487-E]                  F
     Muneesh Devi v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. and Ors.
2013 (9) SCALE 640 - referred to.
Point No. 4
     4. The judgments and decree of both the trial court G
 and the High Court are set aside and the case is
 remanded to the trial court for payment of court fee. If for
 any reason, it is not possible for the appellant to pay the
 court fee, he is at liberty to approach the jurisdictional
 District Legal Service Authority and Taluk Legal Services H
    476       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A Committee for grant of legal aid for sanction of court fee
  amount payable on the suit before the trial court. If such
  application is filed, the same shall be considered so as
  to get the right of the appellant adjudicated by the trial
  court by securing equal justice as provided under Art. 39A
B of the Constitution of India read with the provision of
  s.12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act and Kerala
  State Legal Services Authorities Rules. The trial court
  shall adjudicate on the rights of the parties on merits and
  dispose of the matter expeditiously. [para 18) [488-A-D]
c                        Case Law Reference:
          2013 (9) SCALE 640                        para 9
          1995 (2) Suppl. SCR 733                   para 12
D         2000 (3) SCR 764                          para 14
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTIN : Civil Appeal No.
    10581 of 2013.
      From the Judgment and order dated 21.03.2012 of the
E High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in RFA No 678 of 2011.
         Basanth R., M. Gireesh Kumar, Sriram P., Vijay Kumar for
    the Appellant.
      Dr. K.P. Kylasanatha Pillay, Dilip Pillai, B. V. Deepak, Asha
F Joseph, Giffara S., P.A. Noor Muhamed for the respondents.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          V. GOPALA GOWDA J. 1. Leave granted.
        2. This appeal is filed by the appellant questioning the
G correctness of the judgment and final Order dated 21.03.2012
  passed by the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in RFA No.
  678 of 2011 urging various facts and legal contentions in
  justification of his claim.

H         3.Necessary relevant facts are stated hereunder to
         MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                       477
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
appreciate the case of the appellant and also to find out whether    A
the appellant is entitled for the relief as prayed in this appeal.
      The appellant approached the respondent no. 1 - a money
lender, for a loan of 2,20,000/-. The respondent no. 1 agreed
to give him the loan in return of execution of a sale deed with B
respect to 3 cents of land in re-survey No. 111113-1 in Block
No. 12 of Maranalloor village by the appellant in his favour. It
was agreed upon between the parties that the respondent no.
1 will reconvey the property in favour of the appellant on
repayment of the loan. The appellant accordingly executed sale C
deed No. 575 of 2001 at sub Registrar's office at
 Ooruttambalam with respect to 3 cents of land in Re-survey
 No.111 /13-1 in Block no.12 of Maranalloor village in favour of
 respondent no.1. The respondent no. 1 executed an agreement
 of re-conveyance deed in favour of the appellant regarding the
 above mentioned property on the same day.                       D

     4. The learned senior counsel, Mr. Basanth R. appearing
on behalf of the appellant argued that the appellant approached
the respondent no.1 several times with money for re-conveying
the property in favour of the appellant as was agreed upon           E
between them but the respondent no. 1 evaded from doing so.

     5. It is also the case of the appellant that respondent no.1,
instead of issuing a deed of re-conveyance, sold the property
to Respondent nos. 2 and 3 without the knowledge of the
appellant. The appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent F
no.1 requesting him to appear before the sub Registrar's office
for the execution of re-conveyance deed regarding the plaint
schedule property to which the respondent no. 1 did not oblige.
The appellant then filed a suit being OS No. 141/2007 before
the Court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara for mandatory injunction, G
for declaration of the sale deed executed by Respondent no.1
in favour of Respondent nos. 2 and 3 as null and void, for
 execution of re-conveyance deed in his favour and also for
consequential reliefs. The suit was valued at 3,03,967/- and the
 court fee was valued at 28, 797 /-. The appellant paid 1/10th of H
    478        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 12 S.C.R.

A the court fee i.e., 2880/- at the time of filing the suit. The Court
   of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara granted injunction in favour of the
   appellant restraining the respondents from carrying out new
  construction activities including the parts of the plaint schedule
   property until further orders.
B
        6. The court of sub Judge, Neyyattinkara heard the
  application for extension of time sought by the appellant for
  paying the balance court fee. However, the application was
  rejected and the file was closed by the learned sub Judge. The
  appellant then filed Regular First Appeal No. 678 of 2011 along
C with an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
  The High Court dismissed the application for condonation of
  delay on the ground that the delay in filing the appeal was not
  explained by the appellant and consequently, dismissed the
  Regular First Appeal filed by the appellant. The High Court's
D opinion that the appellant has not given any ground for delay in
  filing the Regular First Appeal is not sustainable since the
  appellant has categorically claimed that he was not aware of
  the rejection of the suit of the appellant for delayed payment of
  court fee by the learned sub Judge.
E
         7. In the light of the facts and circumstances of the case,
    the following points would arise for our consideration:

          1.    Whether the learned sub Judge was justified in
                rejecting the suit for non- payment of court fee?
F
          2.    Was the appellant entitled to condonation of delay
                for non- payment of court fee by the learned sub
                Judge?

G         3.    Whether the High Court was right in rejecting the
                application for condonation of delay filed by the
                appellant against the decision of the learned sub
                judge who rejected the suit of the appellant for non-
                payment of court fee?
H         4.    What Order?
         MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                     479
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
Answer to Point no. 1                                             A

      8. Section 149 of the Civil Procedure Code prescribes a
discretionary power which empowers the Court to allow a party
to make up the deficiency of court fee payable on plaint,
appeals, applications, review of judgment etc. This Section also 8
empowers the Court to retrospectively validate insufficiency of
stamp duties etc. It is also a· usual practice that the Court
provides an opportunity to the party to pay court fee within a
stipulated time on failure of which the Court dismisses the
 appeal. In the present case, the appellant filed an application C
 for extension of time for remitting the balance court fee which
 was rejected by the learned sub Judge. It is the claim of the
 appellant that he was unable to pay the requisite amount of
 court fee due to financial difficulties. It is the usual practice of
 the court to use this discretion in favour of the litigating parties
 unless there are manifest grounds of mala fide. The Court, while D
 extending the time for or exempting from the payment of court
 fee, must ensure bona fide of such discretionary power.
  Concealment of material fact while filing application for
  extension of date for payment of court fee can be a ground for
  dismissal. However, in the present case, no opportunity was E
  given by the learned sub Judge for payment of court fee by the
  appellant which he was unable to pay due to financial
  constraints. Hence, the decision of the learned sub Judge is
  wrong and is liable to be set aside and accordingly set aside.
                                                                   F
 Answer to Point no.2

     9. In the case of State of Bihar & Ors. v. Kameshwar
 Prasad Singh & Anr., 1 it was held that power to condone the
 delay in approaching the Court has been conferred upon the
 Courts to enable them to do substantial justice to parties by     G
 disposing the cases on merit. The relevant paragraphs of the
 case read as under:

       "11. Power to condone the delay in approaching the Court
 1.   (2000J 9 sec 94.                                             H
    480       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A         has been conferred upon the Courts to enable them to do
          substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on
          merits. This Court in Collector, Land Acquisition,
          Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)1LL.J 500 SC held that the
          expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the legislature
B         in the Limitation Act is adequately elastic to enable the
          Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
          subserves the ends of justice-that being the life purpose
          for the existence of the institution of Courts. It was further
          observed that a liberal approach is adopted on principle
c         as it is realised that:
          1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
          an appeal late.
          2. Refusing to condone delay c;an result in a meritorious
D         matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
          of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
          condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause
          would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
          3. 'Every day's delay must be explained' does not mean
E
          that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every
          hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be
          applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

          4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
F         are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
          deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim
          to have vested right in injustice being done because of a
          non-deliberate delay.

G         5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned
          deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on
          account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit
          by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

      6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
H     account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
    MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                    481
        [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice    A
and is expected to do so.

xxx                xxx              xxx
12. After referring to the various judgments reported in New
India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra [1976] 2 SCR 8
266, Brij lnder Singh v. Kanshi Ram (1918)1LR 45 P.C.
94, Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari [1969]1 SCR
1006, Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirma/a
Devi [1979] 118 ITR 507(SC), Lala Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan (1970] 2 SCR 90, State of Kera/a v. E.K. C
Kuriyipe 1981 (Supp) SCC 72, Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath
(1982)3 SCC 366a, O.P. Kathpa/ia v. Lakhmir Singh AIR
 1984 SC 1744, Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji
 (1987) ILLJ 500 SC, Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra 1987
 Supp(1)SCC 399, G. Ramegowda, Major v. Sp. Land D
 Acquisition Officer (1988] 3 SCR 198, Scheduled Caste
 Co-op. Land Owning Society Ltd. v. Union of India AIR
 1991 SC 730, Binod Bihari Singh v. Union of India AIR
 1993 SC 1245, Shakambari & Co. v. Union of India AIR
 1992 SC 2090, Ram Kishan v. U.P. SRTC 1994 E
 Supp(2)SCC 507 and Warlu v. Gangotribai AIR 1994 SC
 466, this Court in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani
 2002(143) ELT 249(SC) held ;

'. ..... The expression 'sufficient cause' should, therefore,
be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process F
approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient
case for explaining every day's delay. The factors which
are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of
pragmatic approach injustice oriented process. The Court
should decide the matters on merits unless the case is G
 hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to
determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private
 litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient
 cause. The Government at appropriate level should
 constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any H
    482       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 12 S.C.R.

A         legal principles are involved for decision by the Courts or
          whether cases require adjustment and should authorize the
          officers to take a decision to give appropriate permission
          for settlement. In the event of decision to file the appeal
          needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer
B         responsible to file the appeal and he should be made
          personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State ·
          cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The
          individual would always be quick in taking the decision
          whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal
c         or application since he is a person legally injured while
          State is an impersonal machinery working through its
          officers or servants.'

          To the same effect is the judgment of this Court in Special
          Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kera/a v. K. V. Ayisumma
D         AIR 1996 SC 2750.
       13. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab (1995)6 SCC 614
       this Court under the peculiar circumstances of the case
      condoned the delay in approaching this Court of about 31
E     years. in N. Ba/akrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy
      2008(228)ELT 162(SC) this Court held that the purpose
      of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights. It is founded
      on public policy fixing a life span for the legal remedy for
      the ·general welfare. The primary function of a Court is to
F     adjudicate disputes between the parties and to advance
      substantial justice. The time limit fixed for approaching the
      Court in different situations is not because on the expiry
      of such time a bad cause would transform into a good
      cause. The object of providing legal remedy is to repair
      the damage caused by reason of legal injury. If the
G
      explanation given does not smack mala tides or is not
      shown to have been put forth as a part of a dilatory strategy,
      the Court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. In
      this context it was observed in 2008(228) ELT 162(SC) :
H                It is axiomatic that condonation of G!elay is a matter
        MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                         483
            [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
                                                                      A
            of discretion of the Court. Section 5 of the
            Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can
            be exercised only if the delay is within a certain
            limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of
            the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes
                                                                      8
            delay of the shortest range may be uncontainable
            due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas
            in certain other cases, delay of a very long range
            can be condoned as the explanation thereof is
            satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation
            as sufficient, it is the result of positive exercise of   C
            discretion and normally the superior Court should
            not disturb such finding, much less in revisional
            jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was
            on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or
            perverse. But it is a different matter when the first     D
            Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases,
            the superior Court would be free to consider the
            cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to
            such superior Court to come to its own finding even
            untrammelled by the conclusion of the lower Court."       E

      10. In the case in hand, it is clear from the evidence on
record that the appellant could not pay court fee due to financial
difficulty because of which his suit got rejected. It is also
pertinent to note that the appellant had moved the Court F
claiming his substantive right to his property. The appellant
faced with the situation like this, did not deserve the dismissal
of the original suit by the Court for non- payment of court fee.
He rather deserved more compassionate attention from the
Court of sub Judge in the light of the directive principle laid down G
in Article 39A of the Constitution of India which is equally
applicable to district judiciary. It is the duty of the courts to see
that justice is meted out to people irrespective of their socio
economic and cultural rights or gender identity.

     11. Further, Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities     H
    484       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 12 S.C.R.


A Act, 1987 provides that every person who has to file or defend
  a case shall be entitled to legal services under this Act if that
  person is:

          "in receipt of annual income less than rupees nine thousand
          or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the
B
          State Government if the case is before a court other than
          the Supreme Court, and less than rupees twelve thousand
          or such other higher amount as may be prescribed by the
          Central Government, if the case is before the Supreme
          Court"
c
        Further, Section 12 of the Kerala State Legal Services
    Authorities Rules, 1998 states that:

          "12. Any person whose annual income from all sources
D         does not exceed Rupees Twelve Thousand shall be
          entitled to legal services under clause (h) of Section 12 of
          the Act".

       Therefore, subject to the submission of an affidavit of his
  income, the court fee of the appellant could have been waivered
E or provided by the District Legal Services Authority, instead of
  rejection of the suit.

       12. Further, in the case of State of Maharashtra V.
    Manubhai Pragaji Vashi and Others, 2 it has been held that:
F
          "17 ....... we have to consider the combined effect of
          Article 21 and Article 39A of the Constitution of India. The
          right to free legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed
          fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The
          preamble to the Constitution of India assures 'justice,
G         social, economic and political'. Article 39A of the
          Constitution provides 'equal justice' and 'free legal aid'.
          The State shall secure that the operation of the legal
          system promotes justice. It means justice according to law.
H 2.   (1995) s sec 730
         MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                          485
             [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.]
    In a democratic polity, governed by rule of law, it should A
    be the main concern of the State, to have a proper legal
    system. Article 39A mandates that the State shall provide
    free legal aid by suitable legislation or schemes or in any
    other way to ensure that opportunities for securing justice
    are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or              B
    other disabilities. The principles contained in Article
    39A are fundamental and cast a duty on the State to secure
    that the operation of the legal system promotes justice, on
    the basis of equal opportunities and further mandates to
    provide free legal aid in any way-by legislation or                 c
    otherwise, so that justice is not denied to any citizen by
    reason of economic or other disabilities. The crucial words
    are (the obligation of the State) to provide free legal aid
     'by suitable legislation or by schemes' of 'in any other
     way', so that opportunities for securing justice are not           0
     denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other
     disabilities. (Emphasis supplied) ....... "

      13. Further, Article 39A of the Constitution of India provides
for holistic approach in imparting justice to the litigating parties.
It not only includes providing free legal aid via appointment of        E
counsel for the litigants, but also includes ensuring that justice
is not denied to litigating parties due to financial difficulties.
Therefore, in the light of the legal principle laid down by this
Court, the appellant deserved waiver of court fee so that he
could contest his claim on merit which involved his substantive         F
right. The Court of sub Judge erred in rejecting the case of the
appellant due to non- payment of court fee. Hence, we set aside
the findings and the decision of the Court of sub Judge and
condone the delay of the appellant in non-payment of court fee
which resulted in rejection of his suit.                                G

Answer to Point no. 3

     14. Having answered Point nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the
appellant, we are inclined to answer point no. 3 as well in his
favour.                                                                 H
    486        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2013] 12 S.C.R.

A        In the case of Muneesh Devi v. U.P. Power Corporation
    Ltd. and Ors., 3 it was held as under:

           "15. In the application filed by her for condonation of delay,
           the Appellant made copious references to the civil suit, the
B          writ petition and the special leave petition filed by her and
           the fact that the complaint filed by her was admitted after
           considering the issue of limitation. She also pleaded that
           the cause for claiming compensation was continuing. The
           National Commission completely ignored the fact that the
           Appellant is not well educated and she had throughout
c          relied upon the legal advice tendered to her. She first filed
           civil suit which, as mentioned above, was dismissed due
          to non payment of deficient court fees. She then filed writ
           petition before the High Court and special leave petition
           before this Court for issue of a mandamus to the
D          Respondents to pay the amount of compensation, but did
          not succeed. It can reasonably be presumed that
          substantial time was consumed in availing these remedies.
           It was neither the pleaded case of Respondent No. 1 nor
          any material was produced before the National
E         Commission to show that in pursuing remedies before the
          judicial forums, the Appellant had not acted bona fide.
          Therefore, it was an eminently fit case for exercise of power
          under Section 24-A(2) of the Act. Unfortunately, the National
          Commission rejected the Appellant's prayer for
F         condonation of delay on a totally flimsy ground that she had
          not been able to substantiate the assertion about her having
          made representation to the Respondents for grant of
          compensation."

G        15. In the case in hand, the High Court, vide its impugned
    judgment dated 21.03.2012 held that the appellant has not
    provided sufficient grounds for delay in filing the appeal. This
    decision of the High Court is unsustainable in law. The appellant
    has categorically stated that he went to his advocate's office
H   3.   2013 (9) SCALE 640.
         MANOHARAN v. SIVARAJAN & ORS.                        487
             [V. GO PALA GOWDA, ." .]
at Neyyattinkara on 24.05.2011 to enquire about the status of         A
the suit. His advocate informed him that the learned sub Judge
has rejected the suit on 11.8.2008 for non-payment of balance
court fee. The advocate claimed that he has informed the same
to the appellant through a postal card but the appellant claims
that the same has not reached him and he was under the                B
impression that his application for extension of time for payment
of court fee will be allowed by the learned sub Judge. He further
 claimed that he had applied for procurement of the certified
 copy of the decision of the learned sub Judge on the same day.

      16. The learned senior counsel Mr. K.P. Kylasantha Pillay,      C
appearing on behalf of the respondents alleged that the appeal
of the appellant before this court is based on wrong and
frivolous grounds. The material produced by them in support
of their contention is totally based on the merit of the case.
Since, we are not deciding the merit of the case, the material        D
produced by the respondents in support of their contention
becomes irrelevant. We have condoned the delay in paying the
court fee by the appellant while answering point nos. 1 and 2.
We see no reason in rejecting the application filed by the
appellant for condonation of delay in filing the appeal before        E
the High Court as well.

     17. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court is not sustainable and is
liable to be set aside as per the principle laid down by this Court   F
in as much the High Court erred in rejecting the application for
condonation of delay filed by the appellant. We accordingly,
condone the delay in filing the appeal in the High Court as well.

Answer to Point no. 4
                                                                      G
     18. In view of the reasons assigned while answering point
 nos. 1,2 and 3 in favour of the appellant, the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court is set aside and the
application filed by the appellant for condonation of delay is
allowed. Therefore, we allow the appeal by setting aside the          H
    488      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 12 S.C.R.

A judgments and decree of both the trial court and the High Court
  and remand the case back to the trial court for payment of court
  fee within 8 ,weeks. If for any reason, it is not possible for the
  appellant to pay the court fee, in such event, he is at liberty to
  approach the jurisdictional district legal service authority and
B Taluk Legal Services Committee seeking for grant of legal aid
  for sanction of court fee amount paya61e on the suit before the
  trial court. If such application is filed, the same shall be
  considered by such committee and the same shall be facilitated
  to the appellant to get the right of the appellant adjudicated by
c the trial court by securing equal justice as provided under Article
  39A of the Constitution of India read with the provision of
  Section 12(h) of the Legal Services Authorities Act read with
  Regulation of Kerala State. We further direct the trial court to
  adjudicate on the rights of the parties on merit and dispose of
  the matter as expeditiously as possible.
0
         19. The appeal is allowed in terms of the observations and
    directions given as above to the trial court. There will be no
    order as to costs.
    R.P.                                           Appeal Allowed.