Supreme Court of India
MANOHAR LALversusCOMMISSIONER OF POLICE & ORS.
- Citation
- 2026 INSC 234
- Decided
- 12 March 2026
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- K MAHESHWARI
Holding
The dismissal order was quashed because the authority failed to record a valid, reasoned satisfaction that an inquiry was not reasonably practicable, and the appellant was reinstated with continuity of service and limited back wages.
Summary
The appellant, a police constable, was dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution without a departmental inquiry, on the ground that it was not reasonably practicable to hold one due to alleged threat, intimidation and possible tampering of evidence. The appellant challenged the dismissal before the CAT, the High Court and finally the Supreme Court, arguing that the authority’s satisfaction was unsupported by material and violated the procedural safeguards under the Delhi Police Act and Rules. The Court examined the scope of clause (b), the requirement that reasons be recorded in writing and be based on objective facts, and the jurisprudence of Tulsiram Patel and related cases. It found that the disciplinary authority relied merely on unsubstantiated presumption and failed to satisfy the statutory and constitutional standards. Consequently, the dismissal order was held arbitrary, set aside, and the appellant was ordered reinstated with continuity of service and limited back wages. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- The validity of dismissing a police constable without a departmental inquiry under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) when the authority's satisfaction is not based on concrete material.
- Whether the reasons recorded by the disciplinary authority satisfy the requirement of being reasonable, valid, justified and in writing as mandated by Article 311(2) proviso (b) and the Tulsiram Patel precedent.
- The applicability of Sections 21 and 22 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 to the dismissal without inquiry.
- The entitlement of the appellant to reinstatement and the quantum of back wages payable.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.311(2)
- Delhi Police Act, 1978s. Sec.21, s. Sec.22
- Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Matter pertains to dismissal of police constable without conducting departmental inquiry, holding that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) – Dismissal, removal or in civil capacities under the Union or a State – Exercise of the power u/Art.311 – Registration of FIR against the appellant- constable posted in the Special Cell for the offence of robbery and thereafter arrested and taken in custody – While he was in custody the order of
Subjects
DismissalPolice constableDepartmental inquiryReasonably practicableSpecial CellThreat intimidation inducementTampering of evidenceQuashment of dismissal order
Judgment
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 358 : 2026 INSC 234
Manohar Lal
v.
Commissioner of Police & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 13860 of 2024)
12 March 2026
[J.K. Maheshwari* and Atul S. Chandurkar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to dismissal of police constable without conducting
departmental inquiry, holding that it was not reasonably practicable
to hold an inquiry.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) –
Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed
in civil capacities under the Union or a State – Exercise of the
power u/Art.311 – Registration of FIR against the appellant-
constable posted in the Special Cell for the offence of robbery
and thereafter arrested and taken in custody – While he was
in custody the order of dismissal passed in exercise of the
power u/Art.311(2) second proviso clause (b) holding that it
would not be ‘reasonably practicable’ to conduct a regular
departmental enquiry on account of reasonable belief of threat,
intimidation and inducement to the victim and thereby creating
the possibility of tampering of the vital evidence – Appellant
filed application seeking quashment of his dismissal order,
however rejected by the tribunal – Writ petition thereagainst
also dismissed by the High Court – Correctness:
Held: It is vivid from the analysis of the intent of Art.311(2) that
an employee holding a post in Union or State ought not to be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by
which he was appointed – Person shall be dismissed or removed or
reduced in rank after an inquiry supplying the charges if any against
him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect
of those charges – Applicability of the said clause is restricted in
a situation wherein his conduct led to his conviction of criminal
* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 359
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
charges or where the authority empowered who dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank records reason in writing upon satisfaction that
it is not ‘reasonably practicable’ to hold an enquiry against him –
Where such power has been exercised by the President or the
Governor it may be in the interest of security of the State or if not
expedient to hold such an enquiry, then exceptional power under
clause (c) of second proviso to Art.311 ought to be exercised – In
case such a decision invoking the extraordinary power is taken by
the competent authority, the scope of judicial review is available
to the Constitutional Courts wherein the reasons as assigned for
satisfaction of the authority must be reasonable, valid, justified and in
writing – Satisfaction as recorded must be the objective satisfaction
on the basis of material brought on record which ordinarily the
disciplinary authority may take as a prudent person, otherwise,
dispensing with the enquiry not permissible in law – On facts, the
power exercised by the authority is completely without application
of mind, thus, the question of recording of satisfaction as affirmed
by the appellate authority, the CAT and the High Court does not
arise – Thus, the order dispensing with the regular procedure of
inquiry is arbitrary and consequently the order of dismissal of the
appellant to be quashed and the orders of the CAT and the High
Court affirming the said dismissal order stand set aside – Order
passed by the CAT and the High Court set aside and the order
of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by the appellate
authority quashed – In consequence, the appellant to be reinstated
with continuity of service, being entitled for all consequential benefits
notionally – Since, the appellant found involved in a criminal case,
back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement restricted
to 50%. [Paras 40-43]
Case Law Cited
Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel and Others [1985] Supp.
2 SCR 131 : (1985) 3 SCC 398 – relied on.
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors. [1990] Supp. 3 SCR
354 : (1991) 1 SCC 362 – held applicable.
Ex. Const. Chhote Lal v. Union of India & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC
196; Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2005) 11 SCC
525; Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 13 SCC 581; State
of Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh [2007] 11 SCR 752 : (2007) 15
SCC 217; Reena Rani v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 215;
360 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Risal Singh v. State of Haryana [2014] 7 SCR 544 : (2014) 13
SCC 244; Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2005) 11
SCC 525 – referred to.
List of Acts
Constitution of India; Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1980; Delhi Police Act, 1978.
List of Keywords
Dismissal; Police constable; Without conducting departmental
inquiry; Not reasonably practicable to hold inquiry; Special Cell;
Reasonable belief of threat, intimidation and inducement to victim;
Tampering of the vital evidence; Quashment of dismissal order.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13860
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2023 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 1309 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., Sandeep Choudhary, Ram Niwas Buri,
Basudeb Biswas, Naresh Sharma, Ms. Sreepriya K, Praveen Jain.
Advs. for the Respondent(s):
Brijender Chahar, A.S.G., Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Sanjay Kumar
Tyagi, Mili Baxi, Rajat Nair, Vibhu Shanker Mishra, Aaditya Vikram.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
J.K. Maheshwari, J.
1) The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 02.02.2023
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter
‘High Court’) disposing of the writ petition filed by the appellant
questioning the order of dismissal from service dated 18.07.2017
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 361
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
passed by Deputy Commissioner of Police (hereinafter ‘DCP’), New
Delhi, the Order of Appellate Authority dated 30.07.2018 and the
Order dated 29.11.2022 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal,
Principal Bench at New Delhi (hereinafter ‘CAT’) in OA No. 744 of
2020.
2) The appellant was dismissed from service by the DCP, Delhi vide
order dated 18.07.2017, in exercise of the power under clause
(b) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India
without conducting departmental inquiry. The reason assigned for
not resorting to the normal procedure prescribed under Delhi Police
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter ‘1980 Rules’),
was that Shri Govind Sharma, Assistant Commissioner of Police
(hereinafter ‘ACP’) in the preliminary enquiry found that it would
not be ‘reasonably practicable’ to conduct a regular departmental
enquiry on account of reasonable belief of threat, intimidation and
inducement to the victim and thereby creating the possibility of
tampering of the vital evidence.
3) The appeal against the said order was dismissed by the Special
Commissioner of Police, Delhi vide order dated 30.07.2018 accepting
the reasons as indicated in the order of dismissal.
4) Being dissatisfied, the appellant filed OA No. 744 of 2020 before
CAT seeking quashment of his dismissal order and the order of
the appellate authority. The CAT referred to the stand as taken in
the counter affidavit of the State, relied upon some judgments and
declined to interfere, dismissing the Original Application filed by
the appellant vide order dated 29.11.2022. Writ Petition (Civil) No.
1309 of 2023 filed before the High Court of Delhi by the appellant
was dismissed, accepting the same reasoning as taken by the DCP.
5) Ms. V. Mohana, learned senior counsel, appearing on behalf of
the appellant, referring to Section 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978
(hereinafter ‘1978 Act’) contends that the power of punishment
conferred upon the competent authority is not absolute; it is subject
to the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India and the
1980 Rules referred above. Referring to Rule 6, she contended that
punishment mentioned at Serial Nos. (i) to (vii) of Rule 5 therein are
deemed to be ‘major penalties’ and the competent authority can award
the same after regular departmental inquiry. It is contended that as
per Rule 14(2), a punishment of major penalty ought to be awarded
362 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
by the appointing authority only after the regular departmental inquiry.
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India contemplates that if a person
is a member of a civil service of the Union or all India Service or
a Civil Service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or
a State, he shall not be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges
against him and has been afforded reasonable opportunity of being
heard. The first proviso contemplates that in case the penalty is
required to be imposed on the basis of evidence adduced during the
inquiry, it would not be necessary to afford an opportunity of making
representation on the proposed penalty. Clause (b) of second proviso
states that where the authority empowered to remove a person is
satisfied for some reason to be recorded in writing, to the effect that
holding an inquiry is not ‘reasonably practicable’, the orders can be
passed without adhering to the general principle contemplated by
Article 311(2).
6) In reference to above, learned senior counsel submits that after
registration of FIR No. 390 of 2017 on 28.06.2017, the appellant
was taken into custody on 29.06.2017 and released on bail on
14.10.2017. In the meanwhile, the competent authority, vide order
dated 18.07.2017, in exercise of power under clause (b) of second
proviso of Article 311 (2), indicating that possibility of traumatizing
the witnesses may not be ruled out, dismissed him from service.
It is forcefully contended that while the appellant was in custody,
reason as assigned of intimidating or traumatizing the witnesses are
flimsy. In absence of any convincing material, exercise of such extra-
ordinary power ignoring the procedure prescribed under the 1980
Rules is not permissible otherwise it would amount to misuse of the
power by the competent authority. In support of these contentions,
learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of this
Court in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel and Others1,
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors.2, Ex. Const. Chhote
Lal v. Union of India & Ors.3, Sudesh Kumar v. State of Haryana
1 (1985) 3 SCC 398
2 (1991) 1 SCC 362
3 (2000) 10 SCC 196
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 363
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
and Ors.4, Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab5, State of Punjab v.
Harbhajan Singh6, Reena Rani v. State of Haryana7, and Risal
Singh v. State of Haryana8.
7) It is urged that the dismissal order passed by the competent authority
and confirmed by the appellate authority is not legally sustainable
and the CAT as well as the High Court have committed grave error
in refusing to entertain the Original Application and the Writ Petition
challenging the same. Therefore, the order of dismissal is liable to
be quashed and set-aside.
8) Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General Mr. Brijender Chahar,
representing the State, inter alia, relied upon the preliminary inquiry
of the ACP and the documents collected, DD entries of information
and proceedings and other relevant material in support of his
contentions. As per him, these documents reflect that the complainant
and witnesses could have been traumatized by the egregious act
of appellant and his associates who are in the police department.
Possibility of their association with criminals and to approach
the complainant or witnesses to intimidate or to induce them for
withdrawing from the case or to turn them hostile during trial cannot
be ruled out. In light of such apprehension, power exercised by the
competent authority for not proceeding with the normal procedure of
departmental inquiry is within the scope of its authority. It is contended
that the stand as taken by the Department has been accepted by
the CAT and the High Court; therefore, interference is not warranted.
9) After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we find that since the
power of punishment of the competent authority has been conferred
upon it vide Section 21 and the procedure as prescribed under Section
22 of the 1978 Act, they are relevant, hence, reproduced as under :
“21. Powers of punishment.— (1) Subject to the
provisions of article 311 of the Constitution and the rules,
the Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner of
Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional Deputy
4 (2005) 11 SCC 525
5 (2006) 13 SCC 581
6 (2007) 15 SCC 217
7 (2012) 10 SCC 215
8 (2014) 13 SCC 244
364 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police Training
College or of the Police Training School or any other
officer of equivalent rank, may award to any police officer
of subordinate rank any of the following punishments,
namely:—
(a) dismissal;
(b) removal from service;
(c) reduction in rank;
(d) forfeiture of approved service;
(e) reduction in pay;
(f) withholding of increment; and
(g) fine not exceeding one month’s pay.
(2) Subject to the rules—
(a) any police officer specified in sub-section (1) may
award the punishment of censure to any police officer of
subordinate rank;
(b) the Assistant Commissioner of Police may award the
punishment of censure to police officers of, or below, the
rank of Sub-Inspectors of Police;
(c) any police officer of, and above, the rank of Inspector
may award punishment drill not exceeding fifteen days
or fatigue duty or any other punitive duty to constables.
(3) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall affect
any police officer’s liability for prosecution and punishment
for any offence committed by him.
(4) The Commissioner of Police, Additional Commissioner
of Police, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Additional
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Principal of the Police
Training College or of the Police Training School,
Assistant Commissioner of Police, or any other police
officer of equivalent rank may suspend any police officer
of subordinate rank who is reasonably suspected to be
guilty of misconduct, pending an investigation or enquiry
into such misconduct.
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 365
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
(5) An Inspector of Police may suspend any police
officer below the rank of Sub-Inspector of Police, who is
reasonably suspected to be guilty of misconduct, pending
an investigation or enquiry into such misconduct.
22. Procedure for awarding punishments.—When
any officer passes an order of awarding a punishment of
dismissal, removal from service, reduction in rank, forfeiture
of service, reduction in pay, withholding of increments or
fine, he shall record such order or cause the same to be
recorded together with the reasons therefor, in accordance
with the rules.”
From perusal of above provisions, it is clear that subject to Article
311 of Constitution of India, Section 21 confers power upon the
authorities prescribed therein to impose various types of punishments
as specified in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (1) upon a police
officer of subordinate rank.
10) Further, Section 22 governs the procedure for awarding the
punishment of dismissal, removal and reduction of rank and casts
obligation upon the officer passing an order of punishment to record
the reasons for such order in accordance with the rules.
11) In this context, Rules 5 and 6 of 1980 Rules governing the procedure
as applicable to punishment orders, are reproduced as thus:–
“5. Authorised punishments - The Delhi Police Act, 1978
prescribed the following penalties :
(i) Dismissal, (ii) Removal from service, (iii) Reduction in
rank [for a specified period], (iv) Forfeiture of approved
service, (v) Reduction in pay, (vi) Withholding of increments,
(vii) Fine not exceeding one month’s pay, (viii) Censure,
(ix) Punishment drill not exceeding 15 days or fatigue duty
or any other punishment duty to Constable only.
6. Classification of punishments and authorities
competent to award them - (i) Punishments mentioned
at Serial Nos. (i) to (vii) above shall be deemed ‘major
punishment’ and may be awarded by an officer not below
the rank of the appointing authority or above after a regular
departmental enquiry.
366 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
(ii) Punishment mentioned at Serial No. (viii) shall be
called ‘minor punishment’ and may be awarded by the
authorities specified in sub-section (i) of Section 21 of the
Delhi Police Act, 1978 after serving a show cause notice
giving reasonable time to the defaulter and considering
his written reply as well as oral deposition, if any for which
opportunity shall be afforded on request.
Authority competent to Rank to whom it can be
award awarded
(i) Deputy Commissioner of Inspector and below
Police and above
(ii) Assistant Commissioner Constable to Sub-Inspector
of Police
(iii) The punishment mentioned at Serial No. (ix) above
may be called Orderly Room punishment and shall be
awarded after the defaulter has been marched and heard
in Orderly Room by the Officer of and above the rank of
Inspector as laid down in Section 21 (3) (c) of the Delhi
Police Act, 1978.”
The present case relates to the punishment of dismissal. Therefore,
as per classification contained in Rule 6, it is a major penalty, which
can be inflicted after a regular departmental inquiry by a competent
authority as specified therein. The manner and procedure for
awarding the punishment is prescribed in Rule 14 and procedure
for such regular departmental inquiry that has to be observed for
awarding said punishment is contained in Rule 16. As such, in
absence of the applicability of clause (b) of second proviso to Article
311(2), the procedure contemplates that Sections 21 and 22 and
the rules aforementioned ought to be followed for dismissal of an
employee.
12) In the case at hand, since the order of dismissal of the appellant has
been passed in exercise of the power under clause (b) of second
proviso to Article 311(2) of Constitution of India, the said provision
is relevant to understand its ambit and scope, hence, reproduced
as under:
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 367
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of
persons employed in civil capacities under the Union
or a State —
(1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the
Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State
or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be
dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that
by which he was appointed.
(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in
which he has been informed of the charges against him
and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges
[Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during
such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such
person any opportunity of making representation on the
penalty proposed:
Provided further that this clause shall not apply—
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced
in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the
State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.
(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question
arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such
inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon
of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such
person or to reduce him in rank shall be final.”
368 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
13) Upon perusal of the above, it is clear that as per Article 311(2) a
member of the civil service of the Union or a State may be dismissed
or removed or reduced in rank by the appointing authority after
a regular inquiry on charges which have been informed to him,
affording him a reasonable opportunity. As per first proviso thereto,
in case an inquiry is conducted for the purpose of imposing penalty,
it is not necessary to afford an opportunity to the appellant at the
stage of penalty.
14) Clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) restricts the
applicability of Article 311(2) in a specific situation: (i) if the appointing
authority is satisfied that there should be deviation from mandate
of Article 311(2) because adherence to the same is not ‘reasonably
practicable’; and (ii) such reasons are to be recorded in writing.
Similarly, when such power is to be exercised under clause (c) of
the second proviso by the President or the Governor, they may, in
the interest of security of the State or if it is not expedient to hold
such inquiry, deviate from the applicable procedure.
15) Be that as it may, the present case relates to clause (b) of the second
proviso to Article 311(2), therefore, we need to discuss in detail the
applicability of the said provision in the facts of this case.
16) It is trite law that the decision of the appointing authority on the
issue of recording reasons in writing on its satisfaction as to why
holding an inquiry is not reasonably practicable may be subject to
judicial review under Article 226 by High Court or under Article 32 by
the Supreme Court. This Court in the Constitution Bench judgment
rendered in the case of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) reiterated the legal
positions and explained the same. The High Court in the impugned
judgment has relied upon paragraph 101 of the said judgment.
Learned senior counsel for the appellant contended before us that
subsequent paragraphs, in particular, paragraphs 130, 133 and
138, which enunciates the law while interpreting Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India, have not been considered. Therefore, for
ready reference, we reproduce all the aforesaid paragraphs as thus:
“101. Not only, therefore, can the principles of natural
justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can
even be excluded. There are well-defined exceptions
to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also to the audi
alteram partem rule. The nemo judex in causa sua rule
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 369
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
is subject to the doctrine of necessity and yields to it as
pointed out by this Court in J. Mohapatra & Co. v. State
of Orissa [(1984) 4 SCC 103 : (1985) 1 SCR 322, 334-5] .
So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned, both
in England and in India, it is well established that where
a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of
prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right
can also be excluded where the nature of the action to
be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the
relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion; nor
can the audi alteram partem rule be invoked if importing
it would have the effect of paralysing the administrative
process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency
of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Maneka
Gandhi case [(1978) 1 SCC 248 : (1978) 2 SCR 621, 676]
at p. 681. If legislation and the necessities of a situation
can exclude the principles of natural justice including the
audi alteram partem rule, a fortiori so can a provision of
the Constitution, for a constitutional provision has a far
greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory provision.
In the present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly
excluded by the opening words of the second proviso and
particularly its keywords “this clause shall not apply”. As
pointed out above, clause (2) of Article 311 embodies in
express words the audi alteram partem rule. This principle
of natural justice having been expressly excluded by a
constitutional provision, namely, the second proviso to
clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing
it by a side-door to provide once again the same inquiry
which the constitutional provision has expressly prohibited.
Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an
extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the
situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying
it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In such a case
the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. This
is, however, the only scope which Article 14 can have in
relation to the second proviso, but to hold that once the
second proviso is properly applied and clause (2) of Article
311 excluded. Article 14 will step in to take the place of
370 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
clause (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening
words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the intention
of the makers of the Constitution. The second proviso is
based on public policy and is in public interest and for
public good and the Constitution-makers who inserted it
in Article 311(2) were the best persons to decide whether
such an exclusionary provision should be there and the
situations in which this provision should apply.
130. The condition precedent for the application of clause
(b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is
not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated
by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that
the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not
“impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary
“practicable” means “Capable of being put into practice,
carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done;
feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning
“possible to practice or perform: capable of being put into
practice, done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the
words used are not “not practicable” but “not reasonably
practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner:
to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable
to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context
of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is
not a total or absolute impracticability which is required
by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the
inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable
man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation.
It is not possible to enumerate the cases in which it
would not be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry,
but some instances by way of illustration may, however,
be given. It would not be reasonably practicable to hold
an inquiry where the government servant, particularly
through or together with his associates, so terrorizes,
threatens or intimidates witnesses who are going to give
evidence against him with fear of reprisal as to prevent
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 371
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
them from doing so or where the government servant
by himself or together with or through others threatens,
intimidates and terrorizes the officer who is the disciplinary
authority or members of his family so that he is afraid to
hold the inquiry or direct it to be held. It would also not
be reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry where an
atmosphere of violence or of general indiscipline and
insubordination prevails, and it is immaterial whether
the concerned government servant is or is not a party to
bringing about such an atmosphere. In this connection, we
must bear in mind that numbers coerce and terrify while
an individual may not. The reasonable practicability of
holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made
by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on
the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the
disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause
(3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary
authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is
not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly
or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to
avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s
case against the government servant is weak and must
fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary
authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court
so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in
such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing
with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The
case of Arjun Chaubey v. Union of India [(1984) 2 SCC
578 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 290 : (1984) 3 SCR 302] is an
instance in point. In that case, the appellant was working
as a senior clerk in the office of the Chief Commercial
Superintendent, Northern Railway, Varanasi. The Senior
Commercial Officer wrote a letter to the appellant calling
upon him to submit his explanation with regard to twelve
charges of gross indiscipline mostly relating to the Deputy
Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted
his explanation and on the very next day the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent served a second notice on the
372 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
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appellant saying that his explanation was not convincing
and that another chance was being given to him to offer his
explanation with respect to those charges. The appellant
submitted his further explanation but on the very next day
the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an
order dismissing him on the ground that he was not fit to
be retained in service. This Court struck down the order
holding that seven out of twelve charges related to the
conduct of the appellant with the Deputy Chief Commercial
Superintendent who was the disciplinary authority and
that if an inquiry were to be held, the principal witness
for the Department would have been the Deputy Chief
Commercial Superintendent himself, resulting in the same
person being the main accuser, the chief witness and also
the judge of the matter.
138. Where a government servant is dismissed, removed
or reduced in rank by applying clause (b) or an analogous
provision of the service rules and he approaches either
the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article
32, the court will interfere on grounds well established in
law for the exercise of power of judicial review in matters
where administrative discretion is exercised. It will consider
whether clause (b) or an analogous provision in the service
rules was properly applied or not. The finality given by
clause (3) of Article 311 to the disciplinary authority’s
decision that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry is not binding upon the court. The court will
also examine the charge of mala fides, if any, made in the
writ petition. In examining the relevancy of the reasons,
the court will consider the situation which according to
the disciplinary authority made it come to the conclusion
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.
If the court finds that the reasons are irrelevant, then the
recording of its satisfaction by the disciplinary authority
would be an abuse of power conferred upon it by clause (b)
and would take the case out of the purview of that clause
and the impugned order of penalty would stand invalidated.
In considering the relevancy of the reasons given by the
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 373
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
disciplinary authority the court will not, however, sit in
judgment over them like a court of first appeal. In order
to decide whether the reasons are germane to clause (b),
the court must put itself in the place of the disciplinary
authority and consider what in the then prevailing situation
a reasonable man acting in a reasonable way would have
done. The matter will have to be judged in the light of
the then prevailing situation and not as if the disciplinary
authority was deciding the question whether the inquiry
should be dispensed with or not in the cool and detached
atmosphere of a court-room, removed in time from the
situation in question. Where two views are possible, the
court will decline to interfere.”
17) Upon perusal of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the
case of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it is luculent that the constitutional
provision has a far greater and all-pervading sanctity than a statutory
provision, therefore, second proviso restricts application of Article
311(2) only in the circumstances as contemplated under Clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of the second proviso. This clause uses the word “this
clause shall not apply”, therefore, Article 311(2) shall not apply in
the contingencies in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the second proviso.
The intention thereof has been expressed indicating that there is no
scope for reintroduction of principles contained in Article 311(2) by a
side door which the constitutional provision has expressly excluded.
It is further clarified in the said judgement that if the second proviso
is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation
to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action of so applying
would be mala fide and therefore void. This Court indicated that in
such cases the invalidating factor may be referrable to the Article
14 distinguishing between a situation where the proviso has been
properly applied and one where it has been improperly applied.
Otherwise, if Article 14 is applied in a manner to take the place of
clause (2) that would mean to nullify the effect of opening words
of the second proviso and frustrate the intention of makers of the
Constitution. It is said that the second proviso is based on public
policy and is in public interest and for public good.
18) The wording as used in clause (b) of the second proviso indicates
the satisfaction of the Disciplinary Authority by using the word “it
374 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
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is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by
clause 2 of Article 311. The Court emphasised the meaning of “not
reasonably practicable” as juxtaposed against not “impracticable”. It
is intended that the requirement to hold an inquiry is not practicable
in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of
the prevailing situation. The Court contemplated certain situations
therein and said that a common man must bear in mind that numbers
may coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The reasonable
practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be
made by the disciplinary authority holding the post and it is he who
must visualize what is happening at the ground-zero. The Court
clarified that the disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with
a departmental inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives
or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the
Department’s case against the government servant is weak and
must fail. In this connection, referring Article 311(3), it is held that
the finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority is not
binding upon the Courts and the scope of judicial review is open to
strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order
imposing penalty.
19) Further, the Court emphasised the words used in clause (b) of second
proviso that the disciplinary authority should record its reasons in
writing for its satisfaction that holding an inquiry is not reasonably
practicable. In case such reason is not recorded in writing or not
valid and justifiable, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the
order of penalty flowing therefrom would be void and unconstitutional.
Emphasising the scope of judicial review, it is said that in the matters
where administrative discretion is exercised, it is open to assail
either under Article 226 before High Court or under Article 32 before
this Court. Referring clause 3 of Article 311 and reiterating that the
decision of disciplinary authority indicating why it is not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry is not binding on Court and the scope
of judicial review is open. In the said contingency, the Court will
examine the charges of mala fides if any made in the Writ Petition. It
is emphasised that the Court, while exercising judicial review, would
not sit as an appellate court but it shall consider the situation due to
which, according to the disciplinary authority, it was not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry. While examining the relevance of the
reasoning, the Court ought to place itself as a disciplinary authority
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 375
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
and consider whether in the prevailing situation, a reasonable man
acting in a reasonable way, would have taken the same decision as
taken by the disciplinary authority. If the Court finds that the reasons
are irrelevant, then satisfaction of the disciplinary authority may be
held to be an abuse of power. In that situation, it would be open
to the Court to take the case out of purview of that clause and the
order of penalty would stand invalidated.
20) In view of the foregoing conclusions of the Constitution bench in
Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it can be safely observed that despite the
use of the words “this clause shall not apply” in the second proviso,
it shall not make power of Article 311(2) inapplicable. In fact, second
proviso to Article 311 is an exception for dispensing with the inquiry
on satisfaction by recording the reasons in writing by such authority.
21) In view of the analysis of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in
Tulsiram Patel (Supra), we have examined the impugned judgement
passed by the High Court wherein in paragraph 19, while referring
to the judgment of Sudesh Kumar vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
(2005) 11 SCC 525 in respect of the principle of audi alteram partem
and also referring to paragraph 101 of Tulsiram Patel (Supra), it has
been observed by the High Court that the appellate authority had
heard the appellant before affirming the decision of the disciplinary
authority, it appears that the judgment of Sudesh Kumar (Supra)
has not been appreciated in its true spirit by the High Court.
22) In our view, the reasoning as given by the High Court is completely
misplaced, in particular, when the Court is examining the scope and
applicability of clause (b) to the second proviso of Article 311(2),
the reasoning assigned by the disciplinary authority ought to be
relevant for dispensing with an inquiry which is the issue involved
in the present case. Merely indicating that the reasons provided in
writing have already been held justified by the CAT would not be
sufficient in the context of law laid down by the judgment of Tulsiram
Patel (Supra) merely observing that opportunity of hearing has been
afforded by the appellate authority.
23) This case was heard on 04.02.2026. At the time of hearing, learned
ASG appearing on behalf of the State vociferously contended that the
reasoning to dispense with the inquiry finds its place in the preliminary
inquiry report of the ACP whereby it was found that the complainant/
witnesses have been traumatised, threatened or intimidated by the
376 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
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action of the criminals specially the police personnel involved therein
and due to the close association of the police personnel with the
hard-core criminals, there was every possibility that the appellant
may approach the complainant/witnesses through his associates to
threaten and intimidate them.
24) In this context, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the
appellant is that after lodging the FIR on 28.06.2017, the appellant
was sent to custody on 29.6.2017 and was released on bail on
14.10.2017. In the meanwhile, the dismissal order dated 18.07.2017
was passed. Therefore, we deemed it appropriate to call for the said
preliminary inquiry report which had not been placed before us for
consideration.
25) On production of the said preliminary inquiry report, we have
examined the contents thereof. In the said report, the ACP has
collected the information/documents in respect of the investigation
of Constable Manohar Lal, No. 362/Special Cell, PIS No. 28070974
(the appellant herein). He has also recorded the statement of the
complainant, SI Hardeep Singh and other relevant persons. The
details of the appointments and posting were collected from all
concerned offices. Thereafter the details of the incidence were
recorded. During preliminary inquiry, the ACP collected documents
viz DD entries of information and proceedings of FIR No. 390/2017,
arrest memo, personal search memo, disclosure memo, pointing out
memo, seizure memos of mobile phone, recovery memos, PC remand,
TIP Proceedings and other miscellaneous facts and documents. In
the report, the ACP has recorded the statements of complainant
Maniram, IO Hardeep Singh, HC Kuldeep Singh and Ct. Devender,
viz. reproduced as under:
“a) Complainant Maniram s/o Late Ram Prasad r/o Vill.
Sisahi, PS Rasoolabad, Distt Kanpur, UP, Aged 62 years –
In his statement, he corroborated the facts as mentioned
in the FIR and his joining investigation, participating of
TIP and identification of Ct. Manohar Lal No. 362/Spl. Cell
as one of the accused who had come to his godown on
27/06/17, at about 6.00 PM and made enquiry about the
owner and details of goods/articles stored in godown. He
also came back at around 8.30 – 9.00 PM to godown with
a tempo and car. He also participated in forcibly breaking
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 377
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
open the room where logs of sandalwood were kept and
loading approx. 1355 Kg of sandalwood in tempo. He also
took away SIM of his mobile phone with the help of other
accused persons.
b) Statement of IO, SI Hardeep Singh D-5776, PIS No.
16150006, PS Bhalswa Dairy, mobile number-8510901900-
In his statement he stated that on receipt of complaint
of Mr. Maniram s/o Late Ram Prasad r/o Vill. Sisahi, PS
Rasoolabad, Distt Kanpur, UP above case corroborated the
facts as mentioned in the FIR NO. 390/17 dated 28/06/17
u/s 419/457/380/392/412/34 IPC PS was registered in PS
Bhalswa Dairy. He also stated that during investigation he
served notice u/s 160 of Cr.P.C. to Ct Manohar Lal 362/
Spl. Cell and on 30/06/2017, on the basis of sufficient
evidences, he was arrested in this case. He prepared
arrest memo and personal search. He had also recorded
the disclosure memo, prepared pointing out memos and
recovered case property on the instance of Ct. Manohar
Lal No. 362/Spl. Cell. He also stated that Ct. Manohar Lal
No. 362/Spl. Cell refused to participate in TIP proceedings
and during further investigation, the complainant identified
Ct. Manohar Lal No. 362/Spl. Cell as one of the accused
persons.
c) Statement of HC Kuldeep Singh No. 254/NW, PIS
No 28981354, P.S-Bhalswa Dairy, New Delhi. In his
statement, he has stated that on 30/06/2014, he alongwith
Constable Devender joined investigation of his case. On
30/06/2017, Constable Manohar Lal No. 362/Spl Cell joined
investigation and on the basis of sufficient evidences, SI
Hardeep Singh arrested him and prepared arrest memo,
personal search memo, disclosure statement, pointing
out memo and recovery memo of 14 jute bags containing
680.35 kgs of Sandalwood and he has signed on relevant
documents as true.
d) Statement of Ct Devender no 1227/NW, PIS No
29101653, P.S- Bhalswa Dairy, New Delhi. In his statement,
he has stated that on 30/06/2017, he alongwith Head
Constable Kuldeep Singh joined investigation of this
378 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
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case. On 30/06/2014, Constable Manohar Lal No. 362/
Spl Cell joined investigation and on the basis of sufficient
evidences, SI Hardeep Singh arrested him and prepared
arrest memo, personal search memo, bags containing
680.35 kgs of Sandalwood and he has signed on relevant
documents as true.”
26) While concluding in the preliminary inquiry, ACP observed as thus:
“From the above noted facts, information, documents
and statements, it is clearly established that Ct. Manohar
Lal No. 362/Spl. Cell, PIS No. 28070974 while posted in
Special Cell and on Earned Leaves, along with other police
personnel and public persons is found involved in robbery
case has shown grave misconduct, high handedness and
had brought bad name to the entire force of Delhi Police
by having acted in a manner highly unbecoming of a
police personnel.
From the preliminary enquiry conducted, it is revealed
that the complainant/witnesses of the case has been
traumatized by the egregious act of Ct. Manohar Lal
No. 362/Spl. Cell and his associates. It appears that Ct.
Manohar Lal No. 362/Spl. Cell, still has close association
with criminals and there is every possibility that he may
approach the complainant through his associates to
threaten, intimate or induce him to withdraw from the case
or turn hostile during the trial.”
27) On perusal of conclusion of the preliminary report, it reveals that
the complainant/witnesses had been traumatized by the egregious
acts of the appellant and his associates. It has been recorded that
the appellant had close association with criminals and there was
every possibility that he might approach the complainant through
his associates to threaten, intimidate or induce him to withdraw from
the case or turn hostile during the trial.
28) After perusal of the statements of the complainant-Mani ram, SI
Hardeep Singh, HC Kuldeep Singh and Constable Devender Singh
reproduced above in the preliminary report, it can be seen that no
instance of traumatising the complainant or witnesses have been
stated by any witness in their statements. Whether the act as alleged
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 379
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
in the FIR is egregious in nature, would be a subject matter of trial.
No material showing connection of the appellant and his associates
with criminals which may reasonably demonstrate that there is a
possibility of the complainant or witnesses being approached through
his associates with an intent to threaten, intimidate or induce them
to withdraw from the case or turn hostile is on record. In absence
of any material, in our view, it is merely a presumption of the ACP
who conducted the preliminary enquiry and it cannot form the basis
of a reasonable apprehension which may be sufficient to dispense
with the regular disciplinary inquiry.
29) The DCP while passing the order of dismissal on 18.07.2017 recorded
the following reasons:
“Ordinarily a departmental enquiry should be conducted
before imposing major punishment including dismissal
against the defaulter but the facts and circumstances of
the present case and the preliminary enquiry report of Sh.
Govind Sharma, ACP/SR are such that it would not be
reasonably practicable to conduct a regular departmental
enquiry against the defaulter as there is a reasonable
belief of threat, intimidation and inducement to the victim
and thereby creating the possibility of tempering of the
vital evidence. Therefore, holding the regular departmental
enquiry in this case shall create fear in the mind of the
complainant, witness/es and discourage him/them from
deposing against the defaulter during the enquiry. Further,
an extended enquiry would only cause more trauma to
the complainant/victim. It is under these given set of
compelling circumstances that action under Article 311(2)
(b) of The Constitution of India has been invoked against
Ct. Manohar lal, No.362/Spl.Cell in this case.
Therefore, I, Sanjeev Kumar Yadav, Deputy Commissioner
of Police, Special Cell, New Delhi do hereby order
to dismiss Ct. Manohar Lal, No.362/Spl.Cell, PIS No.
28070974 from service with immediate effect, under Article
311(2)(b) of The Constitution of India. His suspension
period from 30.06.2017 (date of his arrest) till the date
of issue of this order is decided as period “Not Spent on
Duty” for all intents and purposes and the same will not
be regularized in any manner.”
380 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
30) From the order of dismissal passed by the DCP, it is clear that
he has relied upon the preliminary inquiry report of the ACP and
recorded its satisfaction that holding an enquiry is not ‘reasonably
practicable’ and therefore, determined that this case is a fit case to
apply the exclusion as contained in clause (b) of second proviso to
Article 311 (2).
31) After appreciating the reasoning given in the report of the ACP as
per the above discussion, in our view, in the statement of witnesses
no incident of traumatising the complainant and witnesses have
been recorded, therefore, nothing is available on record to accept
the plea of threatening, intimidation or inducement to any witness to
turn hostile. The disciplinary authority proceeded on the presumption
of the ACP who conducted preliminary enquiry without any material
and concluded that holding a regular enquiry is not reasonably
practicable. Analysing the purport of the proviso and the interpretation
made in the judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) it was the duty of
the disciplinary authority to satisfy himself that such reasoning as
indicated in the preliminary enquiry report is based on some material,
sufficient to dispense with an enquiry. In absence of the same, merely
belief or a presumption is not sufficient to record such finding and to
deviate from the normal procedure. It is not out of place to mention
that the order of dismissal was passed on 18.07.2017. The appellant
was taken into custody on 29.06.2017 and he was only be released
on bail on 14.10.2017. In such a situation it is clear that while he
was in custody the order of dismissal was passed. Therefore, it
was incumbent upon the ACP holding the preliminary enquiry to
indicate any instances of threat from custody to the complainant or
to intimidate witnesses brought during investigation. In the preliminary
enquiry report none of the witnesses have indicated about threat or
intimidation or possibility of threat to turn those witnesses hostile,
therefore, we have no hesitation to say that the order passed by
the disciplinary authority dispensing with the enquiry as required is
without application of mind and cannot be sustained. In fact, it is
the duty of the disciplinary authority to record satisfaction how and
in what manner holding an enquiry is not reasonably practicable.In
our view, the authority has completely failed to understand the letter
and spirit of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) while passing the order that too
without any basis to dispense with normal procedure and directed
dismissal which cannot be countenanced.
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 381
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
32) In the similar set of facts, the relevance of the material placed for
recording the satisfaction by the Disciplinary Authority has been
considered by this Court in the case of Jaswant Singh (Supra). In
the said case, particularly in paragraph 5, the Court referred all the
detailed facts and also relied upon the observations in Tulsiram Patel
(Supra). The reasoning as given in the said judgement applies in the
facts of this case also, the relevant para 5 is reproduced as thus:
“5. The impugned order of April 7, 1981 itself contains the
reasons for dispensing with the inquiry contemplated by
Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Paragraph 3 of the said
order, which we have extracted earlier, gives two reasons
in support of the satisfaction that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold a departmental enquiry against the
appellant. These are (i) the appellant has thrown threats
that he with the help of other police employees will not
allow holding of any departmental enquiry against him and
(ii) he and his associates will not hesitate to cause physical
injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry officer. Now
as stated earlier after the two revision applications were
allowed on October 13, 1980, the appellant had rejoined
service as Head Constable on March 5, 1981 but he was
immediately placed under suspension. Thereafter, two
show cause notices dated April 4, 1981 were issued against
him calling upon him to reply thereto within 10 days after
the receipt thereof. Before the service of these notices the
incident of alleged attempt to commit suicide took place
on the morning of April 6, 1981 at about 11.00 a.m. In that
incident the appellant sustained an injury on his right arm
with a knife. He was, therefore, hospitalised and while he
was in hospital the two show cause notices were served
on him at about 10.00 p.m. on April 6, 1981. Before the
appellant could reply to the said show cause notices
respondent 3 passed the impugned order on the very
next day i.e. April 7, 1981. Now the earlier departmental
enquiries were duly conducted against the appellant and
there is no allegation that the department had found any
difficulty in examining witnesses in the said inquiries.
After the revision applications were allowed the show
cause notices were issued and 10 days time was given to
382 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
the appellant to put in his replies thereto. We, therefore,
enquired from the learned counsel for the respondents to
point out what impelled respondent 3 to take a decision
that it was necessary to forthwith terminate the services
of the appellant without holding an inquiry as required by
Article 311(2). The learned counsel for the respondents
could only point out clause (iv)(a) of sub-para 29(A) of the
counter which reads as under:
“The order dated April 7, 1981 was passed as the petitioner’s
activities were objectionable. He was instigating his fellow
police officials to cause indiscipline, show insubordination
and exhibit disloyalty, spreading discontentment and
hatred, etc. and his retention in service was adjudged
harmful.”
This is no more than a mere reproduction of paragraph
3 of the impugned order. Our attention was not drawn to
any material existing on the date of the impugned order
in support of the allegation contained in paragraph 3
thereof that the appellant had thrown threats that he and
his companions will not allow holding of any departmental
enquiry against him and that they would not hesitate to
cause physical injury to the witnesses as well as the enquiry
officer if any such attempt was made. It was incumbent
on the respondents to disclose to the court the material
in existence at the date of the passing of the impugned
order in support of the subjective satisfaction recorded
by respondent 3 in the impugned order. Clause (b) of
the second proviso to Article 311(2) can be invoked only
when the authority is satisfied from the material placed
before him that it is not reasonably practicable to hold
a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the following
observation at page 270 of Tulsiram case [(1985) 3 SCC
398 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 672 : 1985 Supp 2 SCR 131] :
(SCC p. 504, para 130)
“A disciplinary authority is not expected to
dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or
arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely
in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 383
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
because the department’s case against the
government servant is weak and must fail.”
The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry
cannot, therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of
the concerned authority. When the satisfaction of the
concerned authority is questioned in a court of law, it is
incumbent on those who support the order to show that
the satisfaction is based on certain objective facts and is
not the outcome of the whim or caprice of the concerned
officer. In the counter filed by respondent 3 it is contended
that the appellant, instead of replying to the show cause
notices, instigated his fellow police officials to disobey the
superiors. It is also said that he threw threats to beat up
the witnesses and the Inquiry Officer if any departmental
inquiry was held against him. No particulars are given.
Besides it is difficult to understand how he could have given
threats, etc. when he was in hospital. It is not shown on
what material respondent 3 came to the conclusion that the
appellant had thrown threats as alleged in paragraph 3 of
the impugned order. On a close scrutiny of the impugned
order it seems the satisfaction was based on the ground that
he was instigating his colleagues and was holding meetings
with other police officials with a view to spreading hatred
and dissatisfaction towards his superiors. This allegation
is based on his alleged activities at Jullundur on April 3,
1981 reported by SHO/GRP, Jullundur. That report is not
forthcoming. It is no one’s contention that the said SHO
was threatened. Respondent 3’s counter also does not
reveal if he had verified the correctness of the information.
To put it tersely the subjective satisfaction recorded in
paragraph 3 of the impugned order is not fortified by any
independent material to justify the dispensing with of the
inquiry envisaged by Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that on this short ground
alone the impugned order cannot be sustained.”
33) It is not out of place to say that the judgment of Tulsiram Patel
(Supra) has been appreciated by the Department and resultantly,
the Commissioner of Police has issued a circular dated 31.12.1998.
Analysis as made hereinabove, particularly in paragraphs 17, 18
384 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
and 19, have been truly introduced in the circular of the department.
The relevant portion of the said circular is reproduced for ready
reference as thus: -
“Instances have come to notice where provisions of Article
311(2)(b) of the Constitution were inappropriately invoked.
This article provides that no person as mentioned in 311(2)
(b) shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank
except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of
the charge against him and given a reasonable opportunity
of being heard in respect of these charges.
Provided that where it is proposed after such enquiry to
impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be
imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such
enquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such person
any opportunity of making representation on the penalty
proposed. Provided further that this clause shall not apply
where an authority empowered to dismiss or to remove a
person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some
reason to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry.
Clause (3) of Article 311 provides that if in respect of
such person as aforesaid a question arises whether it is
reasonably practicable to hold such enquiry as it referred
to in clause (2) the decision thereon of the authority
empowered to dismiss or to remove such person or to
reduce him in rank shall be final.
From the above it is clear that a civil servant is not be
dismissed, removed or reduced in rank similarly under
Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India but after holding
regular departmental enquiry against him. No doubt the
above provisions confers the power of infliction of above
penalties on the disciplinary authority but while doing
so circumstances will have to be mentioned in order to
show as to how it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the departmental action. In a number of authorities the
Court/Tribunal have evaluated the reasons given by the
disciplinary authority to see if really it was impracticable
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 385
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
to hold the enquiry and for those reasons are indifferent
and vague. Reliance may be placed in the judgment of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Tulsi Ram
Patel AIR 1985 SC 1416 which reads as under:
“It would not be reasonably practicable to hold an enquiry
where the government servant, particularly through or
together with his associates, so terrorizes, threatens or
intimidates witnesses who are going to give evidence
against him with fear of reprisal as to present them for doing
so or where the government servant by himself or together
with or through others threatens, intimidates and terrorizes
the officer who is the disciplinary authority or members of
his family so that he is afraid to hold the enquiry or direct
it to be held. It would also not be reasonable practicable
to hold the enquiry where an atmosphere of violation or
of great indiscipline and insubordination prevails and it is
immaterial where the concerned government servant is or
is not a party to bringing such an atmosphere.
In this connection, we must bear in mind that numbers
coerce and terrify while an individual may not. The
reasonable practicability or holding an inquiry is a matter
of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority.
Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what
is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is
best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes
the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question
final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense
with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of
ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding
of an enquiry or because the Department’s case against
the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality
given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article
311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of
judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court
will strike-down the order dispensing with the enquiry as
also the order imposing penalty.”
Power under Article 311(2) is not be used a short cut.
386 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
The police officers involved in the cases of Rape or
Dacoity or any such heinous offence have been dismissed
straightway under Article 311(2)(b) despite the fact that
criminal cases have been registered. Such dismissal
without holding D.Es. are illegal because in such cases
D.E. can be conveniently held.
It is once again emphasized that the Disciplinary Authority
should not take resort to Article 311(2)(b) lightly but only in
those cases where it is not reasonably practicable to hold
the enquiry. Whenever the disciplinary authority comes to
the conclusion that it is not reasonably practicable to hold
an enquiry he must record at length cogent and legally
tenable reasons for coming to such conclusion. In the
absence of valid reasons, duly reduced in writing, no such
order of dismissal etc. with resort to Article 311(2)(b) can
be sustained in law.
This circular supersedes the earlier circular No.25551-
631/29.12.93.”
34) The said circular was in supersession of all earlier circulars. A further
clarification was issued by the department on 11.09.2007 which
was in vogue on the date of passing of the order of dismissal. The
relevant portion of the clarificatory circular is also reproduced as thus:
“As analysis has been done by PHQ in 38 cases pertaining
to the period between 1.1.2000 to 31.12.2005 where
action under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution of India
was taken against the defaulters. The analysis shows
that out of the 38 cases, the action of the department has
been upheld by CAT only in two cases and out of these
two cases, in only one case the action was upheld by the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi. Most of these cases have
been remanded back to the Department by the Tribunal
for initiating department enquiry.
Though some cases are still pending in the Hon’ble
High Court for decision. In a majority of the cases,
Disciplinary Authorities have resorted to Article 311(2)
(b) on assumptions and conjectures. No speaking orders
were passed based on and supported by material/facts
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 387
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
on record for dispensing with prior enquiry. Orders for
dismissal were passed arbitrarily violating Article 311 and
the principles of natural justice.
Henceforth, it has been decided that whenever any
Disciplinary Authority intends to invoke Article 311(2)(b) of
the Constitution of India, he must keep in mind the judgment
in the case of UOI v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 SC 1416.
Only in cases where Disciplinary Authority is personally
satisfied on the basis of material available on the file that
the case is of such a nature that it is not practicable to
hold an enquiry in view of threat, inducement, intimidation,
affiliation with criminals etc and keeping in view the specific
circumstances of the case it is not possible that PWs will
depose against the defaulter and disciplinary authority has
no option but to resort to Article 311(2)(b) should such an
action be taken. Prior to such an order, a PE has to be
conducted and it is essential to being on record all such
facts. It has also been decided that before passing an order
under Article 311(2)(b) of the Constitution, Disciplinary
Authority has to take prior concurrence of Spl. CP/Admn.
This has the approval of C.P. Delhi.”
35) In the case at hand after registration of the FIR when the appellant
was in custody the order of dismissal was passed. He was released
only thereafter. As such, without indicating any instance of intimidation,
traumatising, threatening or persuading the complainant or the
witness to turn hostile from inside the jail, the belief or presumption
as recorded by the disciplinary authority is not sufficient to bring
the present case within the exception to Article 311(2) by applying
clause (b) of second proviso thereto. Thus, in our view, the reasoning
contemplated in the judgment of Jaswant Singh (Supra) applies in
the case at hand.
36) It is relevant to note that applying the judgment of Tulsiram Patel
(Supra), various cases have been decided by this Court indicating
what may be a sufficient reason and how and in what circumstances
holding a departmental enquiry is not reasonably practicable, and
the scope of judicial review in such cases. In the judgement of this
Court in Ex. Constable Chhote Lal (Supra) the Court held as thus:
388 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
“4. Having examined the rival contentions of the parties and
bearing in mind the law laid down by this Court indicating
the circumstances under which the inquiry under Article
311(2), second proviso, clause (b) of the Constitution can
be dispensed with and applying the same to the facts
and circumstances and the reasons advanced by the
authorities in arriving at the decision, we have no hesitation
to come to the conclusion that the order dispensing with
the departmental inquiry is not in accordance with law and
necessarily the order of dismissal cannot be sustained.
We accordingly set aside the order of dismissal passed
against the appellant and permit the departmental authority
to hold an inquiry if so desired, in accordance with law and
come to the conclusion in the said proceeding.
5. Normally, an order of dismissal on being set aside, the
employee can claim back wages, but in this case we are not
inclined to grant back wages to the employee concerned,
more so, in view of the nature of charges against him.”
37) In the case of Tarsem Singh (Supra) this Court has observed that the
power of dispensing with the constitutional remedy of a delinquent,
should not be exercised lightly or arbitrarily, or out of ulterior motive
with the intent to avoid holding an enquiry. In the said case in paras
10 and 14, this Court observed as thus:
“10. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a
constitutional right conferred upon a delinquent cannot be
dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive
or merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry. The
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
has taken us through certain documents for the purpose
of showing that ultimately the police on investigation did
not find any case against the appellant in respect of the
purported FIR lodged against him under Section 377 IPC.
However, it may not be necessary for us to go into the
said question.
xxx xxx xxx
14. In view of the fact that no material had been placed
by the respondents herein to satisfy the Court that it was
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 389
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
necessary to dispense with a formal enquiry in terms
of proviso (b) appended to Clause (2) of Article 311 of
the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the
impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set
aside accordingly. The appellant is directed to be reinstated
in service. However, in view of our aforementioned
findings, it would be open to the respondents to initiate
a departmental enquiry against the appellant if they so
desire. Payment of back wages shall abide by the result
of such enquiry. Such an enquiry, if any, must be initiated
as expeditiously as possible and not later than two months
from the date of communication of this order.”
38) This Court in the case of Risal Singh (Supra), emphasised that
while assigning the reason in writing it is imperative that such
reason must be plausible and based on definite material. In the
said case, the Court relied upon on para 130 on the judgment of
Tulsiram Patel (Supra) and referring the same concluded in paras
9 and 10 as thus:
“9. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid authorities,
the irresistible conclusion is that the order passed by
the Superintendent of Police dispensing with the inquiry
is totally unsustainable and is hereby annulled. As the
foundation founders, the order of the High Court giving the
stamp of approval to the ultimate order without addressing
the lis from a proper perspective is also indefensible and
resultantly, the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary
authority has to pave the path of extinction.
10. Consequently, we allow the appeal and set aside the
order passed by the High Court and that of the disciplinary
authority. The appellant shall be deemed to be in service
till the date of superannuation. As he has attained the age
of superannuation in the meantime, he shall be entitled to
all consequential benefits. The arrears shall be computed
and paid to the appellant within a period of three months
hence. Needless to say, the respondents are not precluded
from initiating any disciplinary proceedings, if advised in
law. As the lis has been pending before the Court, the
period that has been spent in Court shall be excluded
390 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
for the purpose of limitation for initiating the disciplinary
proceedings as per rules. However, we may hasten to
clarify that our observations herein should not be construed
as a mandate to the authorities to initiate the proceeding
against the appellant. We may further proceed to add
that the State Government shall conduct itself as a model
employer and act with the objectivity which is expected
from it. There shall be no order as to costs.”
39) In the case of Reena Rani (Supra) this Court has again applied
the law laid down in the judgment of Tulsiram Patel (Supra) and
Jaswant Singh (Supra) and held that the order of dismissal did
not disclose the reasons explaining why it was not reasonably
practicable to hold a regular departmental enquiry and applicability
of the proviso in such a case is not justified. The Court in para 7 in
the said judgment observed as under: -
“7. In the order of dismissal, the Superintendent of
Police has not disclosed any reason as to why it was
not reasonably practicable to hold regular departmental
enquiry. The learned Additional Advocate General fairly
stated that the order of dismissal does not contain the
reasons as to why it was not reasonably practicable to hold
regular departmental enquiry against the appellant. He also
admitted that no other record has been made available to
him which would have revealed that the Superintendent
of Police had recorded reasons for forming an opinion
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold regular
departmental enquiry for proving the particular charge(s)
against the appellant.”
40) On overall analysis of the intent of Article 311(2), it is vivid that an
employee holding a post in Union or State ought not to be dismissed
or removed by an authority subordinate to the one by which he was
appointed. It is further specified that a person shall be dismissed or
removed or reduced in rank after an inquiry supplying the charges if
any against him and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard
in respect of those charges. The applicability of the said clause is
restricted in a situation wherein his conduct led to his conviction of
criminal charges or where the authority empowered who dismissed,
removed or reduced in rank records reason in writing upon satisfaction
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 391
Manohar Lal v. Commissioner of Police & Ors.
that it is not ‘reasonably practicable’ to hold an enquiry against him.
In addition, where such power has been exercised by the President
or the Governor it may be in the interest of security of the State or if
not expedient to hold such an enquiry, then exceptional power under
clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311 ought to be exercised.
41) In case such a decision invoking the extraordinary power is taken
by the competent authority in light of the judgment Tulsiram Patel
(Supra) within the parameter as discussed, the scope of judicial
review is available to the Constitutional Courts wherein the reasons
as assigned for satisfaction of the authority must be reasonable,
valid, justified and in writing. In addition, the satisfaction as recorded
must be the objective satisfaction on the basis of material brought
on record which ordinarily the disciplinary authority may take as
a prudent person. Otherwise, dispensing with the enquiry is not
permissible in law. In the present case, Section 21 of the 1978 Act
confers power of punishment and Section 22 prescribes the procedure
for awarding such punishment. The procedure as contemplated has
been elaborated under the 1980 Rules. In the present case, in our
view, the power exercised by the authority is completely without
application of mind, thus, the question of recording of satisfaction
as affirmed by the appellate authority, the CAT and the High Court
does not arise. Therefore, we can hold that the order dispensing with
the regular procedure of inquiry is arbitrary and consequently the
order of dismissal of the appellant is liable to be quashed and the
orders of the CAT and the High Court affirming the said dismissal
order stand set aside.
42) In light of the above discussion, the irresistible conclusion is to
set aside the order passed by the CAT and the High Court and to
quash the order of dismissal passed by the DCP and confirmed by
the appellate authority. In consequence, the appellant shall forthwith
be reinstated with continuity of service. He shall be entitled for all
consequential benefits notionally. Since, the appellant is allegedly
found involved in a criminal case, therefore, in the facts of the
case, back wages from the date of dismissal till reinstatement are
restricted to 50%.
43) The setting aside of the order passed under Article 311(2) proviso
(b) of the Constitution and direction for reinstatement shall be
392 [2026] 3 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
without prejudice to the right of the respondent to take recourse
as permissible by initiating a departmental enquiry in accordance
with law. Accordingly, and with the aforesaid directions, the present
appeal stands allowed to the extent indicated. Parties to bear their
own costs.
44) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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