MANOHAR LAL SHARMAversusSANJAY LEELA BHANSALI & ORS.

                        [2017] H 'S.C.R. 111



                   MANOHAR LAL SHARMA                                    A
                                    v.
              SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI & ORS.
              (Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 191 of2017)
                       NOVEMBER 28, 2017                                 B

      [DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND
             DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.J
      Constitution of India:
       Art.32 - Writ petition (PIL) - Seeking direction of the court C
not to exhibit a fl Im "'Padmavati" in other countries without obtaining
the requisite certificate from Central Board of Film Certification
 (CBFC) and further to direct CBI lo register an FIR ulss. 7 of
 Cinematograph Act 1'l11! ss. l 53A. 295, 295A, 499 and 500 !PC rlw.
s 4 of Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986 -
                                                                         0
Held: The petition is liable ta he dismissed - As the scrutiny of the
film is pending before CBFC, the prayers made by the petitioner
have no foundation - As regards registration of FIR hy CBI is
concerned, police has no role in respect of ss. 499 and 500 !PC -
So far as other offences are concerned, no offence is made out -
 Thus, there is no basis to direct registration of an FIR.               E
       Art.19(l)(a) - Freedom of Speech and Expression - No right
is i1bsolute, but the fetters for enjoying the rights should be
reasonable - The co11rt has to see what kinds of fetters are being
imposed and the impact of the same - A sto1y told on celluloid or a
play enacted on a stage or a novel articulated in a broad and large      F
canvas or epic spoken with eloquence. or a poem sung with passion                  .,
                                                                             . J. . . .
or recited with rhythm has many a layer of ji·eedom of expression
o/ thought that req11ired innovation, skill craftsmanship and
individ11al originality - The creative instinct is respected and has
the inherent protective right i.e. artistic licence.- Artistic licence
has to be put on high pedestal, b11t t~e same has to be judged           G
objectively on case to case basis.
      Public Interest Litigation:
      The hunger for publicity or some other hidden motive should
not propel one to file a PIL - They sully the temple of justice and H
                                111
112            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       (2017] I l S.C.R.


A     intend to crea(e dents in justice dispensation sysrem - Such petition
      should not be filed to abuse others - The presenr case is abuse of
      Public interest Litigation.
            Pleadings:
            Constituents of pleadings - Held: When a writ petition
B     mentions date$ af events, they constitute part of the pleadings.
             Nature of pleadings - Held: Neither laxity nor lack of sobriety
      in pleadings is countenanced in law - Rambling of irrelewmt facts
      indicates u11co11trol/ed and imprecise thinking, and on certain
      occasions reflects a maladroit design to state certain things which
c     are meant to sensationalize the matter - It is the duty of the Court to
      take strong exception to such aspects in a pleading - The pleadings
      in the presellt case are absolutely scurrilous, vexatious and
      untenable in lctH'.
            Dismissing the petition, the Court
D
             HELD: l. Writ petitions arc being filed even before the
      Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), which is the statutory
      authority, takes a decision. This is a most unfortunate situation
      showing how public interest litigation can be abused. The hunger
      for publicity or some other hidden motive should not propel one
E     to file such petitions. They sully the temple of justice and intend
      to create dent~ in justice dispensation system. That apart, a
      petition is not to be filed to abuse others. (Para 8Jll17-GJ
            2.1 When a matter is pending or going to be dealt with by
      the CBFC, no one who is holding any post of public responsibility
F     should comment on how the application for certification is to be
      processed. Thi1t tantamounts to creating a sense of prejudice in
      the mind of the CBFC. The CBFC is expected to take decisions
      with utmost objectivity as per the provisions contained in the
      Cinernatograph Act, 1952, the rules framed thereunder and the
      guidelines. If the Court cannot prc-j udgc the matter before the
G
      CBFC takes a decision, how anyone in public office can pre-judge
      the issue and make public utterances. [Para 911117-H; 118-A-BJ
           2.2 The Court is governed by the basic tenets of the rule of
      law. When the matter is pending for grant of cerUfica\ion, if

H
 MANOHAR LAL SHARMA v. SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI &                           113
                    ORS.

responsible people in power or public offices comment on the             A
issue of certification pending consideration before the statutory
authority, that is a violation of the rule of law. All concerned shall
be guided by the basic premise of the rule of law and ought not to
venture into violating the same. [Para 91[ 118-C-D]
      3.1 The pleadings in the present petition arc ahsolutcly B
scnrrilons, vexatious and untenable in law, and accordingly, they
arc struck off the record. The nature of pleadings in th< 11rescnt
petition have the effect of potentiality that can erode I he
fundamental conception of pleadings in a Court of Law. Neither
laxity nor lack of sobriety in pleadings is countenanced in law.
The assertions in a petition cannot show carelessness throwing c
all sense of propriety to the winds. Rambling of irrelevant facts
only indicates Uf!Controllcd and imprecise thinking and exposes·
the inability of the counsel. On certain occasions, it reflects a
maladroit design to state certain things which arc meant to
sensationalize the matter which has the roots in keen appetite D
for publicity. \Vhcn these aspects arc portrayed in a nonchalant
manner in a petition, it is the duty of the Court to take strong
exception to the same and deal it with iron hands. [Paras 2, 81[ 115-
G-H; 116-A]
       3.2 When a writ petition is filed and the dates of events arc     E
mentioned, they definitely constitute a part of the pleadings. It
cannot be said that they do not form part of the pleadings.
Therefore, keeping in view the nature of the pleadings, the
narrations made in pages B to E (marked as 'X' in the paper
books) arc struck off and further directed that such pleadings
shrill not be included anywhere in future, and shall not be              F
mentioned anywhere else. [Para 4][116-E-F]
      4. Respondent No. 1 has submitted that for the present,
the first respondent has no intention to exhibit the film in
question, in certain countries having an international market,
pending consideration of the application by the CBFC under the G
Act. Respondent No. 2, has taken strong exception to the
approach of the petitioner, in making scurrilous allegations in
the petition which defames the respondent. The concern
expressed by the respondents are valid because the scrutiny of
the film is still pending for consideration before the CBFC. H
114            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2017] l I S.C.R.


A     Succinctly put, the prayer made in the petition in this regard has
      no foundation and it is bound to tloundcr and thus, the prayer
      loses its foundation. (Para 6]( 117-C-D)
            5. Prayer is for issuance of direction to respondent No. 5 -
      CBI to register an FIR against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and their
B     team members for offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act
      read wilh Sccthms 153A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the Penal
      Code read with Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of
      Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986. As far as Sections 499 and 500 of
      the IPC arc eol)ccrned, police has no role. As far as the other
      offences arc collcerned, it is unfathomable how any offence is
c     made out. There is no basis for this Court to direct registration
      of an FIR and the prayer is absolutely misconceived. [Para 7] [117-
      D-F]     .
          6.1 A story t&ld on celluloid or a play enacted on a stage or
   a novel articulated in a broad and large canvas or epic spoken
D .with eloquence or a poem sung with passion or recited with rhythm
   has many a layer of freedom of expression of thought that requires
   innovation, skill, craftsmanship and, above all, individual
   originality foun<lcd on the gift of imagination or reality transformed
   into imagination or vice versa. The platform can be different and
E that is why, the creative instinct is respected and has the inherent
   protective right from wilhin which is called artistic licence. The
   artistic licence should be put on a high pedestal but the same has
   to be judged objectively on case to case basis. [Para 10](118-E-
   F; 119-F[

F           Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v. State of
            Maharashtra and others (2015) 6 SCC 1 : [2015] 7
            SCR 853; Sudhir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of
            Police and another (1970) 1 SCC 149 : (1970] 3 SCR
            360; State of U.P. v. lalai Singh Yadav (1976) 4 SCC
            213 : (1~77] 1 SCR 616 - relied on.
G
            6.2 It is settled in LUw that no right is absolute but the fetters
      for enjoying the rights should be absolutely reasonable more so
      when it relates to the right to freedom of speech and expression
      and right to liberty. The Court has to sec what kinds of fetters
      arc being imposed and the impact of the same. [Para 16)(121-C]
H
  MANOHAR LAL SHARMA v. SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI &                                  115
                     ORS.

                          Case Law Reference                                     A
 [20 15) 7 SCR 853                  relied on                  Para 10
 [1970) 3 SCR 360                   relied on                  Para 12
 [1977] 1 SCR 616                   relied on                     Para 13
         CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition
                                                                                 B
  (Criminal)No.191 of2017.
         Under Article 32 of the Constitution oflndia.
         Petitioner-in-Person
         Manindcr Singh, P. S. Narasirnha,ASGs, Harish N. Salv.e, Shyam
  Divan, Sr. Advs., Ms. Suman, Mahesh Agmwal, Akshay Patil, Vivek C
  Jain, Rajesh Kumar, Ms. Aastha Mehta, E. C. Agrawala, Abhishek
  Malhotra, Ms. Liz Mathew, Angad Duggal, Ms. Deepa Trigunayat, Advs.
  for the appearing parties.
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          DIPAK MISRA, CJI I. The instant writ petition has been D
. preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India giving it the
  nomenclature of public interest litigation basically with twin prayers that
  a film titled .. Padmavati" should not be exhibited in other countries without
  obtaining the requisite certificate from the Central Board of Film
  Certification (CBFC) under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (for brevity,
   'the Act') and the Rules and guidelines framed thereunder and further E
  to issue a writ of mandamus to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI),
  respondent No. 5 herein, to register an FIR against the respondent Nos.
   I and 2 and their team members for offence punishable under Section 7
  of the Act read with Sections I 53A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the
  Indian Penal Code read with Section 4 of the Indecent Representation
                                                                                 F
   of Women (Prohibition)Act, 1986 and to investigate and prosecute them
   in accordance.with law.
        2. lt needs to be stated at the outset that the reliefs sought are not
 only extremely ambitious but also the nature of pleadings in the petition
 have the effect of potentiality that can erode the fundamental conception
 of pleadings in a Court of Law. It needs to be stated that neither laxity       G
 nor lack of sobriety in pleadings is countenanced in law. The assertions
 in a petition cannot show carelessness throwing all sense of propriety to
 the winds. Rambling of irrelevant facts only indicates uncontrolled and
 imprecise thinking and exposes the inability of the counsel. On certain
 occasions, it reflects a maladroit design to state certain things which are     H
116             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] 1 l S.C.R.



A     meant to sensationalize the matter which has the roots in keen appetite
      for publicity. When these aspects are portrayed in a nonchalant manner
      in a petition, it is the duty of the Court to take strong exception to the
      same and deal it with iron hands.
             3.. We hav~ heard Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma, petitioner-in-person,
B     Mr. Harish N. Salve, learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. Mahesh
      Agarwal, learned counsel. appearing for the respondent no. I, and Mr.
      Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 2. We have
      also taken assistance of Mr. Manindcr Singh and Mr. P.S. Narasimha,
      learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union oflndia.

c             4. Having stated so, we may now tum to the controversy. When
      the matter was called, Mr. Sal w, learned senior counsel, who has entered
      appearance for the respondent No. 1, drew our attention to the dates of
      events as contained in pages B to E of the petition. Be it noted, a similar
      inatter was filed in a different manner by the same petitioner, forming
      the subject matter of Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 186/2017 wherein this
D     Cou1t has directed that such pleadings arc unwarranted. Resultantly, in
      that case, a substantial portion of the pleadings was struck off. Despite
      this, the same have been reiterated in the present petition. Mr. Manohar
      Lal Sharma, petitioner-in-person, would submit that they arc not a part
      of the pleadings. We arc absolutely shocked by such an approach and
E     submission. When a writ petition is filed and the dates of events are
      mentioned, they definitely constitute a part of the pleadings. It cannot be
      said that they do not form part of the pleadings. This contention is
      absolutely untenable. Therefore, keeping in view the nature of the
      pleadings, we strike off the narrations made in pages B to E (marked as
      ·x·  in the paper book), and further direct that such pleadings shall not be
F     included anywhere in future, and shall not be mentioned anywhere else.
             5. On the last occasion, while dealing with the writ petition filed
      by the petitioner, we had clearly stated that when the grant of certificate
      is pending before the CBFC, any kind of comment or adjudication by
      this Court would be pre-judging the matter. We may fruitfully reproduce
G     a passage from the order dated 20. l l .2017 passed in Writ Petition
      (Criminal) No. 186/2017:-
             "ln the course of hearing, we have been apprised that the film in
             question, i.e., 'Padmavati' has not yet received the Certificate
             from the Central Board of Film Certification.
H
  MANOHAR LAL SHARMA v. SANJAY LEELA BHANSAL! &                                  117
              ORS. [D!PAK MISRA, CJ!]

        In view of the aforesaid, our interference in the writ petition will     A
        tantamount to pre-judging the matter which we are not inclined to
        do. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of."
        6. What is submitted by Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma at this juncture
 is that the first respondent is planning to exhibit the film in question in
 certain countries which have an international market. Mr. Salve has B
 submitted that for the present, the first respondent has no intention to do
 any such thing, pending consideration of the application by the CBFC
 under the Act. Mr. Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
 respondent No. 2, has taken strong exception to the approach of the
 petitioner, in making scurrilous allegations in the petition which defames ·
 the respondent. We appreciate the concern expressed by the learned C
 counsel for the respondents because the scrutiny of the film is still pending
 for consideration before the CBFC. Succinctly put, the prayer made in
 the petition in this regard has no foundation and it is bound to flounder
 and we so hold. Thus, the prayer loses its foundation.
        7. The controversy docs not end there.As stated earlier, the further     D
 prayer is for issuance of direction to the respondent no. 5 - CBI to
 register an FIR against respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and their team members
 for offence punishable under Section 7 of the Act read with Sections
 !53A, 295, 295A, 499 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section
 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition)Act, 1986. As            E
 far as Sections 499 and 500 of the !PC is concerned, police has no role.
 As far as the other offences are concerned, it is unfathomable how any
 offence is made out. There is no basis for this Court to direct registration
 of an FIR and we have no hesitation in stating that the prayer is absolutely
 misconceived.
                                                                                 F
          8. At this stage, we arc obligated to state that writ petitions arc
  being filed even before the CBFC, which is the statutory authority, takes
  a decision. This is a most unfortunate situation showing how public interest
  litigation can be abused. The hunger for publicity or some other hidden
  motive should not propel one to file such petitions. They sully the temple
. ofjustice <llld intend to create dents in justice dispensation system. That    G
  apart, a petition is not to be filed to abuse others. The pleadings, as we
  have stated earlier, are absolutely scwTilous, vexatious and untenable in
  law, and we, accordingly, strike them off the record.
       9. We must say in quite promptitude that when a matter is pending
 or going to be dealt with by the CBFC, no one who is holding any post of H
118             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2017] ll S.C.R.



A     public responsibility should comment on how the application for
      certification is to be proces>ed. That tantamounts to creating a sense of
      prejudice in the mmd of the CBFC. The CBFC is expected to take
      decisions wi\h utmost objectivity as per the provisions contained in the
      Act, the rules framed thereunder and the guidelines. If the Court cannot
      pre-judge the matter before the CBFC takes a decision, we fail to
B
      comprehend how anyone in public office can prc-j udgc. the issue and
      make public utterances. They arc not supposed to do so, and this position
      in law is accepted and acceded to by Mr. Maninder Singh and Mr. P.S.
      Narasimha, learned Additional Solicitors General, whose assistance we
      have sought. It should be borne in mind that we arc governed by the
c     basic tenets of the rule oflaw. When the matter is pending for grant of
      certification, if responsible peopl-c in power or public offices comment
      on the issue of certification pending consideration before the statutory
      authority, that is a violation of the rule of law. All concerned shall be
      guided by the basic premise of the rule of law and ought not to venture .
      into violating the same. We say nothing more and nothing less, for the
D
      present.
      10. Another aspect needs to be highlighted. A story told on celluloid or a
      play enacted on a stage or a novel articulated in a broad and large canvas
      or epic spo!>en with eloquence or a poem sung with passion or recited
      with rhythm has many a layer of freedom of expression of thought that
E     requires innovation, skill, craftsmanship and, above all, individual originality
      founded on the gift of imagination or reality transformed into imagination
      or vice versa. The platform can be different and that is why, the creative
      instinct is respected and has the inherent protective right from within
      which is called artistic licence. In this regard, we may profitably reproduce
F     a passage from Devidas Ra111aclla11dra T11/japurkar v. State of
      Malwra.slltra a11d others':-
             "As for as the words "poetic licence", are concerned, it can never
             remotely mean a licence as used or under.stood in the language of
             law. There is no authority who gives a licence to a poet. These
G            arc words from the realm of literature. The poet assumes his own
             freedom which is allowed to him by the fundamental concept of
             poetry. He is free to depart from reality; fly away from grammar;
             walk in glory by not following systematic metres; coin words at
             his own will; use archaic words to convey thoughts or attribute
      •r201s16 sec 1
H
MANOHAR LAL SHARMA v. SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI &                                  119
            ORS. [DIPAK MISRA. CJI]

     meanings: hide ideas beyond myths which can be absolutely A
     unrealistic; totally pave a path where neither rhyme nor rhythm
     prevail; can put serious ideas in satires. ifferisms, notorious
     repartees; take aid of analogies, metaphors, similes in his own
     style, compare like "life with sandwiches that is consumed
     everyday" or "life is like peeling of an onion", or "society is like a
                                                                            B
     stew": define ideas that can balloon into the sky never to come
     down; cause violence to logic at his own fancy; escape to the
     sphere of figurative truism; get engrossed in the "universal eye
     for resemblance", and one can do nothing except writing a critical
     appreciation in his own manner and according to his understanding.
     When a poet says "I saw eternity yesterday night", no reader c
     would understand the term "eternity" in its prosaic sense. The
     Hamlctian question has many a layer; each is free to confer a
     meaning: be it traditional or modern or individualistic. No one can
     stop a dramatist or a poet or a writer to write freely expressing
     his thoughts, and similarly none can stop the critics to give their
                                                                            0
     comments whatever its worth. One may concentrate on Classical
     facets and one may think at a metaphysical level or concentrate
     on.Romanticism as is understood in the poems ofKeats, Byron or
      Shelley or one may dwell on Nature and write poems like William
     Wordsworth whose poems, say some, arc didactic. One may also
     venture to compose like Alexander Pope or Dryden or get into E
      individual modernism like Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot or Pablo Neruda.
      That is fundamentally what is meant by poetic licence."
       We may categorically state that the artistic licence should be put
on a high pedestal but the same has to be judged objectively on case to
case basis.                                     ·                              F
      1 I. In a Grammar of Politics, Harold J. Laski has stated:
      " ... My freedoms are avenues of choice through which I may, as
      I deem fit, construct for myself my own course of conduct. And
      the freedoms I must possess to enjoy a general liberty arc those
      which, in their sum. will constitute the path through which my best      G
      self is capable of attainment. That is not to say it will be attained.
      lt is to say only that I alone can make that best self. and that
      without those freedoms I have not the means of manufacture at
      my disposal."
                                                                               H
120            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2017] l l S.C.R.


A          12. In S111l/1ir Kumar Saha v. Commissioner of Police and
      another, the Collrt has observed:-
            "The freedom of the individual is of utmost importance in any
            civilized sqciety. It is a human right. Under our Constitution it is a
            guaranteed right. It can be deprived of only by due process of
B           law. The power to detain is an exceptional power to be used under
            exceptional circumstances."
            13. InStateofU.P. v. LalaiSingh Yadav 3, Krishna Iyer. J opined:-
      "Rights and responsibilities are a complex system and the framers of
      our Constitution, aware of the grammar of anarchy, wrote down
c     reasonable restrictions on libertarian exercise of freedoms."
              14. Recently, in Nac/1iketa Wal/1ekur v. Ce11tn1/ Board of Film
      Certijicatio11 & A11r', the Court has held:-
            "The thrust of the matter is whether this Court should entertain
            the writ petition and pass an order ofinjunction directing the CBFC
D
            to delete the clip and further not to get the movie released in
            theaters on 17"' November, 2017. It is worthy to mention that
            freedom of speech and expression is sacrosanct and the said right
            should not be ordinarily interfered with. That apart, when the
            respondent No.I, CBFC, has granted the certificate and only
E           something with regard to the petitioner, which was shown in the
            media, is being reflected in the film, this Court should restrain
            itself in not entertaining the writ petition or granting injunction."
            Andagain:-
            "Be it noted, a film or a drama or a novel or a book is a creation of
F
            art. An artist has his own freedom to express himself in a manner
            which is not prohibited in law and such prohibitions are not read
            by implication to crucify the rights of expressive mind. The human
            history records that there arc many authors who express their
            thoughts according to the choice of their words, phrases,
G            expressions and also create characters who may look absolutely
             different than an ordinary man would conceive of. A thought
            ·provoking film should never mean that it has to be didactic or in

      '(1970) 1 sec t49
      '(1976) 4 sec 213
H     •w.P.(C)No. lll9of20l7
 MANOHAR LAL SHARMA v. SANJAY LEELA BHANSALI &                                        121
             ORS. [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]

        any way puritanical. It can be expressive and provoking the                   A
        conscious or the sub-conscious thoughts of the viewer. If there
        has to be any limitation. that has to be as per the prescription in
        law."
     15. When we say so, we arc also reminded of the line spoken by
Benjamin Cardozo'. which is to the following effect:-                                 B
        "Complete freedom - unfettered and undirected - there never
is.'~


        16. It is settled in law that no right is absolute but the fetters for
enjoying the rights should be absolutely reasonable more so when it relates
to the right to freedom of speech and expression and right to liberty. The            c
Court has to see what kinds of fetters are being imposed and the impact
of the same. ·
       17. Ordinarily, we would have imposed costs. As the petitioner-
in-person is a practising counsel in this Court, we refrain from doing so.
However, we caution him to be careful in future.                                      D
      18. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the writ petition is dismissed
with no order as to costs.


Kalpana K. Tripathy                                           Pet it ion dismissed.




'CARDOZO, Benjamin N., The Growth of the Law (New Haven: Yale University
Pres8, 1924), p.61                                       .