MANNU SAOversusSTATE OF BIHAR
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 420
- Decided
- 22 July 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- B S CHAUHAN
Holding
The conviction under sections 302 and 201 IPC stands as the prosecution satisfied the requirements of circumstantial evidence and motive is not essential for conviction.
Summary
Mannu Sao was convicted under IPC sections 302 and 201 for murdering his wife, Bimla Devi, whose body was found burnt. He claimed she had committed suicide by self‑immolation, but the post‑mortem showed death by throttling before the burns. The trial and High Courts upheld the conviction based on a chain of circumstantial evidence, including the medical report, the appellant's inconsistent statements under Section 313 CrPC, and the lack of any credible defence. The Supreme Court affirmed that motive is not essential if the prosecution proves the case beyond reasonable doubt and that a statement under Section 313 can be considered but not as sole evidence. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The prosecution must establish a complete chain of circumstantial evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
- Whether the appellant's claim of suicide is credible in light of medical evidence.
- The evidentiary weight of a statement recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC.
- Whether motive is a necessary element for conviction under sections 302 and 201 IPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 201, s. 302
Subjects
Judgment
[2010] 8 S.C.R. 811
MANNU SAO A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 1165 of 2009)
JULY 22, 2010
B
[DR. 8.5. CHAUHAN- AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 302 and 201 - Murder- Causing
disappearance of evidence of offence - Accused's case that
he found his wife lying in burnt condition and thereafter, she C
expired - Conviction and sentence ulss. 302 and 201 by
courts below - Interference with - Held: Not called for- In the
case of circumstantial evidence, besides the entire
prosecution case, the statement made by accused u/s. 313
Cr.P. C. can be important - Accused admitted in clear terms D
that deceased was his wife and she died of burn injuries -
However, stated that she committed suicide by burning herself
- Accused a/so stated that victim was still alive and her burnt
body was lying outside the cabin - He sought help of a
person to take victim to the doctor but the person was not E
examined nor his name referred in the statement u/s. 313 -
Medical evidence that death was caused by strangulating and
then the body was burnt - Motive suggested by prosecution
reasonable - Also it is difficult to believe that a person would
commit suicide without any provocation or incident F
immediately preceding the occurrence - Circumstances
proved by prosecution are of a conclusive nature - Evidence
- Criminal law - Motive.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 197"3:s.313 - Essential
features of -Explained. G
According to the prosecution case, the appellant
lodged a report in the police station that he was living
with his wife-BO in his cabin. On the fateful day, the
811 H
812 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A appellant found BO lying in serious burnt condition in
front of his cabin. The appellant sought help of BB to take
BO to the doctor. Howev~r, BO expired. PW 3-doctor
conducted the postmortem. He opined that BO expired
on account of throttling and ante-mortem injuries and
B thereafter burn injuries were caused. Thereupon a case
for offences punishable u/ss. 302 and 201 IPC was
registered. The trial court convicted the appellant u/ss.
302 and 201 IPC. He was awarded rigorous imprisonment
for life u/s. 302 IPC and three years rigorous
c imprisonment u/s. 201 IPC. The liigh Court upheld the
order of the trial court. Therefore, the accused filed the
instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
D HELD: 1.1. It is a case of circumstantial evidence as
there was no eye-witness to the occurrence. An accused
can be punished if he is found guilty even in cases of
circumstantial evidence, provided, the prosecution is able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt, complete chain of
E events and circumstances which definitely points
towards the involvement and guilt of the suspect or
accused, as the case may be. The accused will not be
entitled to acquittal merely because there is no eye-
witness to the case. An accused can be convicted on the
F basis of circumstantial evidence subject to satisfaction
of accepted principles in that regard. [Para 3) [821-B-C]
Sharad v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622,
referred to.
G 1.2. It is not a circumstance or some of the
circumstances which by itself, would assist the court to
base a conviction, but all circumstances put forth against
the accused once are established beyond reasonable
doubt then conviction must follow and all inordinate
H circumstances would be used for corroborating the case
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 813
of the prosecution. It is of similar significance for the A
court to examine whether the requirements to be
established in a case of circumstantial evidence are
satisfied in the case before it or not. The cases of
circumstantial evidence have to be dealt with greater care
and by microscopic examination of the documentary and 8
oral evidence on record. It is then alone that the court will
be in a position to arrive at a conclusion upon proper
analysis of the evidence in relation to the ingredients of
an offence. [Paras 6 and 7] [823-G-H; 824-A-C]
Anant Lagu v. State of Bombay AIR 1960 SC 500;
c
Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State of Orissa AIR 2003 SC 3915,
referred to.
2.1. In the case of circumstantial evidence,
particularly, besides the entire case of the prosecution, D
even the statement of the accused made under section
313 of Cr.P.C. can be of substantial help. The object of
recording the statement of the accused under section 313
of the Code is to put all incriminating evidence against
the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to E
explain such incriminating circumstances appearing
against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the
same time, also to permit him to put forward his own
version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his
involvement or otherwise in the crime. The court has
F
been empowered to examine the accused but only after
the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a
mandatory obligation upon the court and besides
ensuring the compliance thereof the court has to keep in
mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his
conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain G
silence coupled with simpliciter denial or in the
alternative to explain his version and. reasons, for his
alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is
the statement which the accused makes without fear or
right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, H
814 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 OJ 8 S.C.R.
A if the statements made are false, the court is entitled to
draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders,
as may be called for, in accordance with law. The primary
purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the
court and the accused and to put to the accused every
B important incriminating piece of evidence and grant him
an opportunity to answer and explain. [Paras 7 and 8]
[824-A-H; 825-A-B]
2.2. The statement of the accused can be used to test
the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission,
C if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into
consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not
strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section
313 (4) explicitly provide that the answers given by the
accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry
D or trial and put as evidence against the accused in any
other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which such
answers may tend to show he has committed. In other
words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the
Code but has its own limitations. Courts may rely on a
E portion of the statement of the accused and find him
guilty in consideration of the other evidence .against him
led by the prosecution; however, such statements made
under this Section should not be considered in isolation
but in conjunction with the evidence adduced by the
F prosecution. Another important caution that courts have
declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the
accused cannot be based merely on the statement made
under Section 313 of the Code as it cannot be regarded
as a substantive piece of evidence. The statement made
G by the accused is capable of being used in the trial
though to a limited extent. But the law also places an
obligation upon the court to take into consideration the
stand of the accused in his statement and consider the
same objectively and in its entirety. [Paras 8 and 10] [825-
H 8-F; 827-D-E]
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 815
Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v State of Bombay AIR A
1953 SC 247; Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 12
SCC 341; Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya
Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468, referred to.
3.1. It is clear that the appellant did not dispute the
B
factum of the deceased being his wife and she had died
because of burn injuries. However, his version was that
she committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her and
burning herself. While according to the prosecution
primarily relying upon the statement of PW3-doctor, it C
was a case of causing death of the deceased by
strangulating and then burning the body of the
deceased. Even the trial court noticed and discussed
these facts. The findings of facts and appreciation of
evidence by the trial court was not interfered by the High
Court and, in fact, it recorded its concurrence by D
reiterating these findings. [Paras 12 and 15] [828-C~E;
831-G]
3.2. Some emphasis was placed on the fact that PW-
2 a co-villager, in his evidence, stated that he did not know E
about the occurrence and had signed on the report at the
behest of the Investigating Officer. The accused could
hardly derive any advantage from this because this
witness was to primarily prove the death of the deceased
after she had been burnt. Even according to the F
prosecution he was not an eye-witness and there was
nothing much which he woltld contradict, as the
prosecution had mainly relied upon the statement of PW3
and PW4. [Para 16] [831-H; 832-A-B]
3.3. PW3-doctor, who had performed the postmort~m G
upon the deceased's body, wrote that deceased was
killed by throttling or strangulating and thereafter she
suffered the burn injuries. In the cross-examination of
PW-3, nothing material could be pointed out which would
H
816 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A help the case of the accused. The accused admitted that
the deceased was his wife and was living with him in the
cabin. On the basis of the record, the High Court also
noticed the fact that deceased had separated from her
earlier husband and was living with the accused who
B was also staying away from his family. The villagers
objected to the accused living with the deceased in that
manner. In these circumstances, the onus to explain the
cause of death of the deceased was upon the husband.
He offered an explanation that she had committed suicide
c by burning herself but this explanation has been
disbelieved. The husband on his own stated that when
he noticed that the deceased was still alive and her burnt
body was lying just outside their cabin in the chilly
plantation, he took the help of BB. He neither referred the
name of BB in his statement under section 313 Cr.PC.
0
nor did he examine him as a witness. In the normal
course, thus, it will have to be presumed that if this
witness was produced and examined in court, he might
have spoken the truth which was not suitable or
favourable to the accused. For reasons best known and
E which remained unexplained, BB was not examined
though the accused, in his statement under section 313
of Cr.P.C. in answer to the last question, stated that he
was innocent and would give in writing wflatever he
wanted to say. Despite this, no defence was led by the
F appellant. [Para 16] [831-H; 832-A-H]
3.4. PW1 stated in his examination-in-chief that the
tube well of the accused was located north of his 'khalian'
in village M and that the deceased was living with the
G accused and when about 10.00 A.M. on the date of
occurrence, he had gone there, he saw the deceased in
a burnt condition. According to him, the police came and
prepared an inquest report which was signed by him. The
statement of PW 1 is that of the truthful witness and he
H
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 817
did not try to add or subtract anything in his statement A
what he stated before the police during investigation. In
face of his statement, the relevancy of PW2 being
declared hostile is hardly of any consequence. Strangely,
even to PW 1 a question was not posed in his cross
examination that one BB was present at the site from B
whom the accused had sought help to take the deceased
to the hospital. [Para 16] [832-H; 833-A-C]
3.5. The evidence of PW 3-doctor that death was due
to xphyxia, shock and hemorrhage as a result of C
throttling and the injuries stated, clearly satisfies the
conditions in a case of circumstantial evidence. The
circumstances proved by the prosecution are of a
conclusive nature and they do exclude the possibility of
any other view which could be taken rationally and
reasonably. The fact of the matter is that the deceased D
died while living with the appellant and he ought to
explain his conduct and he was expected to render some
explanation which was reasonably possible in the facts
and circumstances of the case in regard to cause of her
death. [Paras 17 and 18] [833-G-H] E
4. The motive is not absolutely essential to be
established for securing conviction of an accused who
committed the offence, provided the prosecution was
able to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. In
the instant case, the deceased left her earlier husband
and was living with the appellant, who was also staying
away from his family in the cabin in his agricultural fields,
where that incident occurred. There was definite protest
raised by the villagers to their living together. The G
statement of PW4 is relevant. Even the medical evidence
showed that the deceased was strangulated or throttled
before her body was burnt. The social embarrassment
could be a plausible motive for the appellant to commit
the crime. Furthermore, the appellant took an incorrect,
H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R..
A if not a false stand before the court that the incident
occurred in his absence. His conduct in naming BB from
whom he sought help to take the deceased to the
hospital also does not appear to be correct. The appellant
made no effort whatsoever to examine any witness to
B establish the fact. He admitted that the deceased died in
front of his eyes and he did nothing except reporting the
matter to the police at a subsequent stage. The motive
suggested by the prosecution appears to be reasonable
and is in consonance with the behaviour of a person
c placed in a situation like the appellant and it is also
difficult to believe that a person would commit suicide
without any provocation or incident i~mediately
preceding the occurrence. Both the courts rightly
disbelieved the explanation rendered by .the appellant
and there is no reason to take a different view. [Para 19)
0
[834-D-H; 835-B-H]
Bhimapa Chandappa Hosamani v. State of Karnataka
(2006) 1.1 sec 323, referred to.
E 5. There is no infirmity in law or otherwise in the
judgment. The finding of guilt as well as the order of
sentence also does ·not call for any interference. [Para 20)
[835-D]
Case Law Reference:
F
AIR 1984 SC 1622 Referred to. Para 5
AIR 1960 SC 500 Referred to. Para 5
AIR 2003 SC 3915 Referred to. Para 6
G Referred to. Para 8
AIR 1953 SC 247
c2001) 12 sec 341 Referred to. Para 9
AIR 1953 SC 468 Referred to. Para 10
H c2006) 11 sec 323 Referred to. Para 18
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 819
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal A
No. 1165 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2008 of the
High Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 62
of 1988.
B
A.K. Srivastav and Sanjay Verma (for Ambhoj Kumar
Sinha) for the Appellant.
Chandan Kumar (for Gopal Singh) for the Respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. On 14th December, 1985
at about 11.00 A.M. a fardbeyan was recorded by Sub-
Inspector of the Police Station, Nalanda at the behest of Manu
Sao who informed that he is living with his wife Bimla Devi in D
his cabin at his agricultural lands in village Mohanpur. He was
carrying on agricultural activity as he was possessed of
agricultural land. On that very date at about 9.00 A.M., he had
gone over to Nalanda for some personal work and after he
returned to his cabin at about 10.00 A.M., he found his wife E
Bimla Devi lying in burnt condition in amidst chilly plantation in
front of his cabin. There were serious burn injuries on her body,
however, Manu Sau found her somewhat alive at that time and
he asked one Bhola Babu for help to take her to a doctor for
treatment. By the time, she could be lifted to be taken for F
treatment, she died. In tf!lese circumstances, while he was
planning to go to the police station, the Sub-Inspector Hirdya
Narain Singh came there who was subsequently examined as
PW4. The Investigating Officer started the inquest proceedings
and the dead body was sent for postmortem to Sadar Hospital, G
Biharsharif. The postmortem was conducted and the report
Ex.4 was prepared on 14th December, 1985. It was noticed
that she had suffered from burn injuries, both her eyes were
closed and the tongue was protruding. Keeping in view the
postmortem report, the Investigating Officer had a suspicion in H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 ~.C.R.
A mind and thereafter an FIR was recorded with reference to the
postmortem report, it was found that Simla Devi had died on
account of throttling and ante-mortem injuries and, with an
intention to cause disappearance of evidence, the body was
burnt. The F.l.R. was Ext.5 and a case under Section 302 and
B 201 of the Indian Penal Code (herein after referred to as 'IPC')
was registered. The suspect of commission of this crime was
found to be Mannu Sao himself, the appellant herein. The
Investigating Officer recorded the statement of the witnesses
including that of the doctor and presented the charge-sheet
c before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The appellant was
charged with both the afore-stated offences. He pleaded
innocence and was subjected to trial. The prosecution only
examined four witnesses PW1 and PW2 co-villagers, PW3 Dr.
Sidhu Bhushan Singh and PW4 Hirdya Narain Singh,
D Investigating Officer. The learned Trial Court, vide its judgment
dated 21st December, 1987, convicted the accused for both
the offences and awarded the punishment rigorous
imprisonment for life under Section 302, IPC and three years
rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 IPC. Both the
sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This judgment of
E the Trial Court was challenged before the High Court of Patna,
though unsuccessfully. The High Court concurred with the
finding of facts recorded by the Court and it sustained the
finding of guilt as well as order of sentence awarded by the Trail
Court. Vide judgment of the High Court dated 11th September,
F 2008 thus giving rise to the present appeal.
2. While impugning the judgment under appeal, the
contention raised before us is that the case being that of
circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has not established
G complete chain of events and circumstances leading to the
commission of the crime and involvement of the appellant. It
was further contended that there was no motive as to why the
appellant should have committed the crime and lastly, that it was
a clear case of suicide by the deceased and there was no
H material evidence on record to arrive at the conclusion stated
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 821
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
in the judgments under appeal. A
3. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that it is a case
of circumstantial evidence as there was no eye witness to the
occurrence. It is a settled principle of law that an accused can
· be punished if he is found guilty even in cases of circumstantial B
evidence, provided, the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt, complete chain of events and circumstances
which definitely points towards the involvement and guilt of the
suspect or aGcused, as the case may be. The accused will not
be entitled to acquittal merely because there is no eye-witness C
to the case. It is also equally true that an accused can be
convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence subject to
satisfaction of accepted principles in that regard.
4. Three Judge Bench in the case of Sharad v. State of
Maharashtra, [AIR 1984 SC 1622] held as under: D
"152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High
Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature,
character and essential proof required in a criminal case
which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most E
fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant
v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1 • This case has been
uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large
number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the
cases of Tufai/ (alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh
and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra. It may be useful
F
to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant
case:
"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence
is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which G
the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first
instance be fully established, and all the facts so
established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should
be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a
chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show
B that within all human probability the act must have been
done by the accused."
153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against
an accused can be said to be fully established:
c
( 1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
D circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may
be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal
distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or
should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
E
(Cri) p. 1047]
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict
and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be'
F is long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
G they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty, ·
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency,
H (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 823
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the one to be proved, and A
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclus.ion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have been
B
done by the accused.
154. These five golden principles, if we may say so,
constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence."
c
5. In the cases of circumstantial evidence, this Court has
even held accused guilty where the medical evidence did not
support the case of the prosecution. In Anant Lagu v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 500] where the deceased died of
poisoning, the Court held that as there were various factors D
which militate against a successful isolation of the poison and
its recognition. It further noticed that while circumstances often
speak with unerring certainty, the autopsy and the chemical
analysis taken by them may be most misleading. No doubt, due
weightage must be given to the negative findings at such
E
examination which .the man of medicine performs and the
limitations under which he works, his failure should not be taken
as an end of the case, for on good and probative circumstances
an irresistible inference of guilt can be drawn.
6. Similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court in the F
case of Dayanidhi Bisoi v. State of Orissa, [AIR 2003 SC
3915], where in a case of circumstantial evidence the Court
even confirmed the death sentence as being rarest of rare
cases. The Court clearly held that it is not a circumstance or
some of the circumstances which by itself, would assist the G
Court to base a conviction but all circumstances put forth against
the accused once are established beyond reasonable doubt
then conviction must follow and all the inordinate circumstances
would be used for corroborating the case of the prosecution.
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A 7. It is of similar significance for the Court to examine
whether the requirements to be established in a case of
circumstantial evidence are satisfied in the case before it or
not. The cases of circumstantial evidence have to be dealt with
greater care and by microscopic examination of the
s documentary and oral evidence on record. It is then alone that
the Court will be in a position to arrive at a conclusion upon
proper analysis of the evidence in relation to the ingredients of
an offence. In the case of circumstantial evidence, particularly,
besides the entire case of the prosecution, even the statement
c of the accused made under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. can be of
substantial help.
8. Let us examine the essential features of this Section 313
Cr.P.C. and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments,
which are the guiding factors for proper application and
D consequences which shall flow from the provisions of Section
313 of the Code. As already noticed, the object of recording
the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code
is to put all incriminating evidence against the accused so as
to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating
E circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the
prosecution. At the same time, also to permit him to put forward
his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his
involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been 1
empowered to examine the accused but only after the
F prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory
obligation upon the Court and besides ensuring the compliance
thereof the Cour1 has to keep in mind that the accused gets a
fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the
accused to maintain silence coupled with simplicitor denial or
G in the alternative to explain his version and reasons, for his
alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the
statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the
other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements
made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences
H and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 825
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a A
direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put
to the accused every important incriminating piece of evidence
and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such
a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be
considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences B
such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial.
Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept
and now it has attained, more or Jess, certainty in the field of
criminal jurisprudence. The statement of the accused can be
used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the c
admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into
consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly
evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313 (4)
explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may
be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put as
0
evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for
any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he
has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per
the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The
Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused
E
and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against
him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made
under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. Another
important caution that Courts have declared in the
pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be F
based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the
Code as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of
evidence. In the case of Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v
State of Bombay, [AIR 1953 SC 247], the Court held as under:
G
"3 ........ As the appellant admitted that he was in charge
of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point.
The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring
to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as
supporting the prosecution case concerning the H
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A possession of the godown. The contention that the
Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the
accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part
does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section
342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and
s part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The
accused admitted that he was in charge of the godown,
he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown.
He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This
part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution
c evidence and had no intimate connection with the
statement concerning the possession of the godown."
9. On similar lines reference can be made in quite a recent
judgment of this Court in the case of Ajay Singh v. State of
Maharashtra, [(2007) 12 SCC 341] where the Court held as
D under:
"11. So far as the prosecution case that kerosene was
found on the accused's dress is concerned, it is to be
noted that no question in this regard was put to the
E accused while he was examined under Section 313 of the
Code.
12. The purpose of Section 313 of the Code is set out in
its opening words - "for the purpose of enabling the
accused personally to explain any circumstances
F appearing in the evidence against him". In Hate Singh
Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat it has been laid
down by Bose, J. (AIR p. 469, para 8) that the statements
of the accused persons recorded under Section 313 of the
Code "are among the most important matters to be
G considered at the trial". It was pointed out that:
"8 ... The statements of the accused recorded by the
committing Magistrates and the Sessions Judge are
intended in India to take the place of what in England and
H in America he would be free to state in his own way in the
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 827
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
witness box [and that] they have to be received in A
evidence and treated as evidence and be duly considered
at the trial."
This position remains unaltered even after the insertion of
Section 315 in the Code and any statement under Section
B
313 has to be considered in the same way as if Section
315 is not there.
13. The object of examination under this section is to give
the accused an opportunity to explain the case made
against him. This statement can be taken into c
consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there
is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case if such statement
discharges the onus."
D
10. The statement made by the accused is capable of
being used in the trial though to a limited extent. But the law
also places an obligation upon the Court to take into
consideration the stand of the accused in his statement and
consider the same objectively and in its entirety. This principle
E
of law has been stated by this Court in the case of Hate Singh
Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat [AIR 1953 SC 468].
11. Let us now examine the relevant part of the statement
made by the accused under Section 313 of the Code as it
would to some extent narrow the controversy before the Court. F
The appellant had clearly and in unambiguous terms admitted
that the deceased was his wife and she died of burn injuries.
The questions put to the accused were very few and the two
important questions which were put to the accused by the Court
and his answers read as under: G
"Question:- It is the case of the prosecution that after
committing murder you in order to disappear the evidence
of the murder set the dead body on fire and also tried to
disappear the same to screen yourself from punishment.
H
828 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A Ans:- No.
Question:- You had stated in the information that your wife
Bimla Devi had died being burnt due to fire. In postmortem
examination it has beeri found that her death has been
caused by throttling her neck. What have you to say?
B
Ans:- I had given information to the police regarding
burning. She has not been murdered. Her death has been
caused due to throttling her neck is wrong."
c 12. As already noticed from the above answers, it is clear
that the appellant does not dispute the factum of the deceased
being his wife and had died because of burn injuries. However,
his version is that she committed a suicide by pouring kerosene
on her and burning herself. While according to the prosecution
D primarily relying upon the statement of PW3, it was a case of
causing death of the deceased by strangulating and then
burning the body of the deceased. Even the learned Trial Court
had noticed and discussed these facts and as well as noticed
the admission and argument of the learned Counsel appearing
E for the accused before that Court. It will be useful to refer to
those findings in paragraph 8 and 9 of the Trial Court
Judgment:-
"8. This case is based on circumstantial evidence as there
is no eye witness of the occurrence, which had taken place
F in the cabin belonging to the accused. So far the
occurrence is concerned, the stand of the accused had
been in the beginning that his wife Bimla Devi had
committed suicide during his absence by sprinkling K.Oil.
Before I proceed to discuss the evidence brought on the
G record by the prosecution as well as the circumstances, I
find it necessary in the outset to mention some of the facts
which are not denied nor disputed in this case. The learned
defence counsel has not disputed the fact that the
deceased, Bimla Devi was the wife (concubine) of the
H
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 829
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
accused, Manu Sao, and that the accused was living with A
her in his cabin at village Mohanpur. It is also not disputed
that the woman had died and had burnt injury on her
person. U.D. case on the statement of Manu Sao as
informant, was institute which was converted into a case
under section 302/301 l.P.C. on the written. report of the B
officer-in-charge on the receipt of the post-mortem report
(Ext.2) on the dead body of Bimla Devi.
9. From Ext.6, it appears that the officer-in-charge, P.W.4,
had gone to the place of occurrence on hearing rumour C
after making station diary entry regarding a woman lying
burnt at village Mohanpur near the cabin of the accused.
P.W.4 Hirdya Narain Singh, the officer-in-charge, who had
gone to the place of occurrence had found the dead body
of a woman lying in a chilly field near the cabin of the
informant and she had burnt injury. Manu Sao, accused, D
had maintained that till 9.30 A.M. and when he returned at
10.30 A.M. he found his wife Bimla Devi lying burnt in a
chili field near his cabin and had also seen trace of K. oil.
extending from well near the cabin up to the door of the
cabin ........ " E
13. In light of the above undisputed position, now let us
proceed to examine whether complete chain of events has
been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
F
14. This aspect of the case wa~ also squarely dealt with
by the learned Trial Court which had the benefit of recording
the entire evidence noticed the demeanour and conduct of the
witnesses as well as the expert witnesses satisfactorily. In para
19 and 20, these circumstances have been noticed by the Trial
Court in an appropriate manner. We may refer to them: G
"19. It is true that there is no eye witness account but there
are circumstances which ·prove beyond 'doubt that the
accused had killed his wife and in order to escape
punishment and in order to disappear the evidence of H
830 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 8 S.C.R.
A death set fire to the dead body and gave out that his wife
committed suicide by burning in between 9 A.M. to 10.30
A.M. on 14.12.1985.
20. The following circumstances clearly show that the
accused committed the crime:
B
(1) He was found in the cabin with his wife when the
throttling was done. The evidence of throttling according
to P.W.3 taken place in the right (sic) of 13/14.12.1985.
c (2) The accused furnished false information in his
fardbeyan propounding a case of suicide of his wife by
setting fire, on the basis of which an U.D. case was
instituted. The deceased Simla Devi had died due to
throttling which can be attributed to the accused and not
D due to burn injury which was post-mortem.
(3} The accused did not give any information to the
police about the occurrence and police on its own
information had gone to the place of occurrence where
Manu Sao (accused) gave out that his wife has committed
E suicide. If this be so, then he ought to have immediately
informed the police. The fact that he had informed one
Bhola Paswan about it also cannot be believed because
he has not been examined to prove this part of the defence ·
version.
F
(4) From the inquest report as well as from the evidence
of the doctor, P.W. 3 it is clear that tongue of the deceased
was found protruding and swollen. There was fracture of
right parietal skull bone and the Larynx and treachea
G congested. There was no possibility of pressing of neck
by the deceased herself as P.W. 3 has negatived such a
situation.
(5) The motive for the occurrence is also not far to seek.
It is in the l'lvidence that the castmen of the accused were
H against the keeping of Simla Devi by the accused. It is
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 831
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
urged by the learned counsel for the defence that the A
possibility of the hand of the father of the deceased woman
and his family member cannot be ruled out. There is
nothing on the record to show that there was at any time
protest by the father of the deceased rather there is
evidence on record to show that the accused conduct was B
constantly opposed by his own castmen.
(6) If the woman had burnt herself for which evidence
created by the husband (accused) then how could she
inflict injury on her person and how there could be trolling C
(sic) which the doctor had found during the post-mortem
examination.
(7) The learned defence counsel urged that the fard-
beyan of the accused recorded by police inadmissible and
this cannot be used against him as this statement was D
made to a police officer. This case has not been instituted
on the basis of the fardbeyan of the accused rather on the
statement and written information of the P.W. 4. The written
report of the U.D. case and the information given by Manu
Sao cannot be equated with first information of confession E
by the accused. I his (sic) statement was made by him
when he was not accused rather an informant. Therefore,
I find no substance in the above argument. Moreover,
accused has also not denied his earlier statement and has
even in this statement under section 313 Cr.P.C. admitted F
to have given information regarding suicide by his wife by
setting fire."
15. These findings of facts and appreciation of evidence
by the Trial Court was not interfered by the High Court and in
fact, it recorded its conccurrence by reiterating these findings. ·G
16. Some emphasis was placed on the fact that PW2 a
co-villager, in his evidence, had said that he did not know about
the occurrence and he had signed on the report Ext.1/1 at the
behest of the Investigating Officer. The accused can hardly H
832 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A derive any advantage from this because this witness was to
primarily prove the death of the deceased after she had been
burnt. Even according to the prosecution he was not an eye-
witness and there was nothing much which he would contradict,
as the prosecution had mainly relied upon the statement of
B PW3 and PW4. The most important witness of the present
case was PW3 Dr. Sidhu Bhushan Singh who had performed
the postmortem upon the deceased's body and had written that
she had been killed by throttling or strangulating and thereafter
she suffered the burn injuries. In the cross-examination of this
C witness, nothing material could be pointed out which would help
the case of the accused. The accused has admitted the
deceased was his wife and was living with him in the cabin.
On the basis of the record, the High Court has also noticed the
fact that deceased had separated from her earlier husband and
D was living with the accused who was also staying away from
his family. The villagers had objected to the accused living with
the deceased in that manner. In these circumstances, the onus
to explain the cause of death of the deceased was upon the
husband. He did offer an explanation that she had committed
suicide by burning herself but this explanation has been
·E disbelieved. Another very material factor is that as per his own
statement when he noticed that the deceased was still alive and
her burnt body was lying just outside cabin in the chilly
plantation, he had taken the help of Bhola Babu. The name of
this person he neither referred in his statement under Section
F 313 Cr.PC. nor he examined this person as a witness. In the
normal course, thus, it will have to be presumed that if this
witness was produced and examined in Court, he might have
spoken the truth which was not suitable or favourable to the
accused. For reasons best known and which remained
G unexplained, this witness was not examined though in his
statement under- Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in answer to the last
question he had stated that he was innocent and would give in
writing whatever he wanted to say. Despite this, no defence
was led by the appellant. PW1 stated in his examination-in-chief
H that the tube well of the accused Manu Sao was located north
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 833
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of his khalian in village Mohanpur and that Simla Devi was living A
with the accused and when about 10.00 A.M. on the date of
occurrence, he had gone there he had seen Bimla Devi in a
burnt condition. According to him, the police had come and
prepared an inquest report which was signed by him. The
statement o'f this witness is that of the truthful witness and he B
has not tried to add or subtract anything in his statement what
he stated before the police during investigation. In face of his
statement, the relevancy of PW2 being declared hostile is
hardly of any consequence. Strangely, even to this witness even
a question was not posed in his cross examination that one c
Bhola Babu was present at the site from whom the accused
had sought help to take the deceased to the hospital.
17. Resultantly and in any case nothing worth noticing much
less favourable to the accused came in his cross-examination.
PW3 Dr. Sidhu Bhushan Singh expressed his opinion as to the D
accused of death as follows:
"In my opinion death was due to xphyxia (sic) shock and
haemarrage (sic) as a result of throttling (sic) and above
mentioned injuries. Time elapsed since death was 12 to E
16 hours. The bruise on the right forehead region was
possible by hard blunt substance."
18. The above evidence clearly satisfies the conditions
stated by this Court, which need to be satisfied in a case of
circumstantial evidence in the case of Sharad (supra). The F
circumstances proved by the prosecution are of a conclusive
nature and they do exclude the possibility of any other view
which could be taken rationally and reasonably. The fact of the
matter is that the deceased died while living with the appellant
and he ought to explain his conduct and he was expected to G
render some explanation which was reasonably possible in the
facts and circumstances of the case in regard to cause of her
death.
19. Lastly, now we should revert to the discussion on as H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A to what was the motive of the appellant to kill the deceased. It
has come in evidence that the deceased had left her earlier
husband and was living with the appellant, who was also
staying away from his family in the cabin in his agricultural fields,
where that i:icident occurred. There was definite protest raised
B by the villagers to their living together. The statement of PW4
in this regard is of relevance. Besides this, even the medical
evidence had shown that the deceased was strangulated or
throttled before her body was burnt. The social embarrassment
could be a plausible motive for the appellant to commit the
c crime. Furthermore, the appellant took an incorrect, if not a false
stand before the Court that the incident occurred in his
absence. His conduct in naming Bhola Babu from whom he had
sought help to take the deceased to the hospital also does not
appeared to be correct. Appellant made no effort whatsoever
to examine any witness to establish this fact. The appellant has
0
admitted that the deceased died in front of his eyes and he did
nothing except reporting the matter to the police at a
subsequent stage. With the development of law, now it is a
settled principle that motive is not absolutely essential to be
established for securing conviction of an accused who has
E committed the offence, provided the prosecution has been able
to prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. In the present
case, the motive suggested by the prosecution appears to be
reasonable and is in consonance with the behaviour of a person
placed in a situation like the appellant and it is also difficult to
F believe that a person would commit suicide without any
provocation or incident immediately preceding the occurrence.
The explanation rendered by the appellant has correctly been
disbelieved by both the Courts as we see no reason to take a
different view. Furthermore, in the case of Bhimapa
G Chandappa Hosamani v. State of Karnataka, [(2006) 11 SCC
323], this Court has taken the view that it is not always
mandatory for the prosecution to establish motive as it is just
one of the ingredients for convicting an accused, the Court held
as under:
H
MANNU SAO v. STATE OF BIHAR 835
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
"13. The trial court as well as the High Court have not A
accepted the evidence regarding existence of motive as
alleged by PW 1 in the first information report. In fact she
herself in the course of her deposition denied the existence
of such a motive. The High Court has agreed with the view
of the trial court on this issue. It is well settled that in order B
to bring home the guilt of an accused, it is not necessary
for the prosecution to prove the motive. The existence of
motive is only one of the circumstances to be kept in mind
while appreciating the evidence adduced by the
prosecution. If the evidence of the witnesses appears to c
be truthful and convincing, failure to prove the motive is not
fatal to the case of the prosecution. The law on this aspect
is well settled."
20. In view of the above reasoning, we do not find any
infirmity in law or otherwise in the judgment under appeal. The D
finding of guilty as well as the order of sentence also do not
call for any interference. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dimissed.
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