Holding

The ex‑parte interim residence order is unsustainable because the parties did not share a household, and the order withdrawing the appeal to the High Court is without justification; both orders are set aside and the appeals are allowed.

Summary

The appellant, Manmohan Attavar, contested an ex‑parte interim order of the Karnataka High Court that allowed the respondent, Neelam Manmohan Attavar, to occupy his Bengaluru premises under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The respondent claimed to be the appellant’s wife/companion and sought a residence order, but she had never actually lived with the appellant in the disputed house. The Supreme Court examined the definitions of “domestic relationship” (s.2(f)) and “shared household” (s.2(s)) and held that the statutory entitlement to residence arises only when the parties have lived together in a shared household, which was not the case here. Consequently, the interim residence order was set aside. The Court also found no justification for the High Court Single Judge’s order withdrawing the appeal from the appellate court to the High Court, and that order was likewise set aside. Both appeals were allowed, restoring the appellant’s rights over the property.

Issues considered

Whether an interim residence order under Sections 17 and 19 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 could be validly passed when the parties have not lived together in a shared household.
Whether the High Court Single Judge was justified in withdrawing the appeal proceedings from the appellate court to the High Court.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 327, s. 407, s. 410, s. 482
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005s. 12, s. 17, s. 19, s. 29, s. 2(f), s. 2(s)

Subjects

Domestic Violence ActResidence orderShared householdDomestic relationshipInterim reliefEx‑parte orderCivil appealCriminal Procedure Code

Judgment

[2017) 6 S.C.R. 356

A MANMOHAN ATTAVAR
v.
NEELAM MANMOHAN ATTAVAR
(Civil Appeal No. 2500 of2017)
.B JULY 14,2017
[R. F. NARIMAN AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.)
Protection of women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 -
ss. 2(/), 2(s), 17 and 19 - Residence orders - Right to reside in a
C shared household - Respondent-lady aged 62 years claiming to be
wife/companion of appellant aged 80 years - interim order passed
by the High Court permitting the lady to occupy the premises
belonging to the appellant, Sustainability of - Held: Not sustainable
- 'Domestic relationship' as defined u/s. 2(/) refers to two persons
who have lived together in a 'shared household' - On facts,
D respondent never stayed with the appellant in the premises in which
she was directed to be inducted - In order for the respondent to
succeed, it was necessary that the two parties had lived in a domestic
relationship in the household - It is not as if the respondent has
been subsequently excluded from the enjoyment of the property or
· E thrown out by the appellant in an alleged relationship which goes
back 20 years - They fell apart even as per the respondent more
than 7 years ago - Wife of the appellant was alive at that time -
Thus, the interim order set aside - Furthermore, there was no reason
for the proceedings to be withdrawn from appellate court to High
Court itself
F
Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A reading of the sections 17 and 19 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 show
that it creates an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right
of residence under the "shared household" irrespective of her
G having any legal interests in the same. The direction, inter alia,
can include an order restraining dispossession or a direction to
remove himself on being satisfied that domestic violence had
taken place. [Para 15) [363-C]

H
356
MANMOHAN ATTAVAR v. NEELAM MANMOHAN ATTAVAR 357

1.2 The facts of the instant case are that the respondent A
has never stayed with the appellant in the premises in which she
has been directed to be inducted. This is an admitted position
even in answer to a court query by the respondent during the
course of hearing. The "domestic relationship" as defined under
Section 2 (t) refers to two persons who have lived together in a
B
"shared household". A "shared household" has been defined
under Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In order for the respondent to
succeed, it was necessary that the two parties had lived in a
domestic relationship in the household. However, the parties
never lived together in the property in question. It is not as if the
respondent has been subsequently excluded from the enjoyment C
of the property or thrown out by the appellant in an alleged
relationship which goes back 20 years. They fell apart even as
per the respondent more than 7 years ago. Till 22.2.2010 even
the wife of the appellant was alive. For the purpose of record that
as per the appellant, he is a Christian and thus, there could be no D
question of visiting any temple and marrying the respondent by
applying "kumkum", and that too when the wife of the appellant
was alive. In view thereof, the nature of the ex-parte order passed
on 19.9.2016 permitting the respondent to occupy the premises
of the appellant cannot be sustained and is set aside. [Paras 17,
18) [364-A-D) E
1.3 A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Single
Judge found the remedy sought for by the respondent to be
"misconceived". However, the Judge found it appropriate to treat
the petition as one u/s. 407 Cr.P.C. The Single Judge expressed
the view that the appellate court ought to have called upon the F
respondent to argue the appeal rather than spend time on interim
reliefs, which was not maintainable in the face of the earlier order
resulting in a predictable order. The said observations cannot be
appreciated when the respondent herself sought once again to
press for interim relief and applications to adduce additional
evidence. The ASJ can hardly be faulted on this account. The G
Single Judge also gave latitude to the respondent on account of
her appearing in person whereby she may not have documented
the bits and pieces of her past with the intention of initiating the

H
358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A proceedings which she was pursuing. In the view thereof, the
appeal was withdrawn to the High Court itself. [Paras 19, 20)
(364-F-H ; 365-A]
1.4 The submission for the appellant that there was no
reason for the proceedings to be withdrawn from the appellate
B court to the High Court itself, is accepted. There is not only
absence of the reason for the same but it would also result in the
deprivation of valuable rights of the appellant against the order
of an appellate authority and thus, an additional forum for scrutiny
was being negated. The reasoning of the Single Judge cannot be
C accepted nor can the appellate authority be faulted with, on·any
account which could have necessitated such withdrawal of the
proceedings to the High Court. Further, in terms with the
concession made by the counsel for the appellant in court that in
the scenario the matter can be entrusted to any ASJ in Bangalore,
the Chief Justice of the High Court is requested to nominate
D ASJ for the same. Thus, the order dated 24.10.2016 is set aside.
[Paras 23-26) [365-E-G]
A.R.Antulay v. Ram Naik [1988) 1 Suppl. SCR 1
1988 (2) sec 602 - referred to.
Case Law Reference
E
[1988) 1 Suppl. SCR 1 referred to Para 21

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2500
of2017.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.09.2016 of the High
Court ofKamataka at Bengaluru in Writ Petition No. 49153 of2016
(GM-RES)].
WITH
G C.A. No.2502 of2017.
B.H. Marlapalle, Sr. Adv. Balaji Srinivasan, Ms.Vaishnavi
Subrahmanyam, Ms.Pratiksha Mishra, Abhishek Bharti, Arunava
Mukherjee, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Neelam Manmohan Attavar, Respondent-in-person.
H
MANMOHAN ATTAVAR v. NEELAM MANMOHAN ATTAVAR 359

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. 1. The appellant is 84 years old
and the respondent is 62 years old. The respondent seeks to establish
her status as the wife/companion of the appellant who has been left high
and dry by the appellant while on the other hand the appellant categorically
denies any such status. B
2. The admitted facts are that the respondent was married to
one Shri Harish Chander Chhabra. That marriage did not work out and
ultimately a consent decree for divorce was obtained on 10.10.1996.
Even in the interregnum period, the respondent claims to have developed
a relationship with the appellant starting from their introduction in 1987. c
It is her case that there was continuous interaction between the two an.d
the appellant even proposed to her in December 1993. The appellant
earned a National Award on 16.10.1996. The respondent also claims to
have been requested to travel with the appellant to Bangalore on
30.10.1996. The appellant's wife was alive when the respondent claims
that the appellant took her to No.38/1, Jayanagar, Bengaluru and that D
the appellant's wife was apparently also aware of the relationship between
the two parties. The respondent claims that she resigned from the job
with ICAR at the behest of the appellant. On 10.1.1998, the respondent
claims that the appellant applied "kumkum" to her forehead and soon
thereafter he was conferred with the Padma Shri Award and the E
respondent accompanied the appellant for the felicitation ceremony on
21.3.1998.
3. It is the respondent's claim that from 2002-2008 the respondent
was made to stay in different residences hired by the appellant. But
apparently the relationship soured. The endeavors for reconciliation, F
however, did not succeed. The wife of the appellant was incidentally
alive at that time and she passed away on 22.2.2010. The endeavor,
prior to this, by the respondent seeking remedy for what she claims to be
her neglect, through the Women and Child Welfare Department of State _
of Kamataka, also did not succeed.
G
4. The respondent claims to have made various efforts by
approaching authorities and high dignitaries apart from police authorities
but to no avail.
5. The respondent initiated proceedings under Section 12 of The
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter H
360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A referred to as 'the D.V. Act') on 16.9.2013 being Criminal Misc. Petition
No.179 of 2013. This case is stated to have been re-numbered as Cr!.
Misc. Application No.139 of2015. The endeavor of the appellant seeking
quashing of these proceedings before the High Court vi de Criminal Writ
Petition No.6126/2013 under Section 482 of the Ctiminal Procedure Code,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Cr.P.C.) did not succeed and petition
B
was dismissed on 2.1.2015. The trial went on and at the request of the
respondent made under Section 410 of the Cr.P.C., the application was
transferred from the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate-VI to the
Court of Metropolitan Magistrate-II at Bangalore. This application was
finally dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 30. 7.2015.
c 6. The respondent, aggrieved by the said order, filed Criminal
Appeal No.1070/2015 under Section 29 of the D.V. Act on 18.8.2015
which was assigned to the learned Addi. Sessions Judge presiding over
Court 67. The interim relief prayed for in this petition was, however,
rejected by the learned Addi. Sessions Judge on 5.11.2015.
D 7. The respondent again sought a_ transfer from that court and
the appeal was transferred to the Court of the learned Additional Sessions
Judge presiding over Court No.53 vi de order dated 16.2.2016. A second
application was filed by the respondent for stay of the impugned order
for interim maintenance. The respondent was once again aggrieved by
E the conduct of the proceedings during the hearing of the interim application
and submitted a complaint to the High Court ofKarnataka. In terms of
an administrative order of the Registrar General of the High Court, the
application was called upon to be decided on or before 30.4.2016. The
application was rejected on 21.4.2016 as being not maintainable. The
applications filed for additional evidence by the respondent also met an.
F adverse fate.
8. It is in the aforesaid scenario that the respondent filed Writ
petition No.49153 of2016 under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
oflndia before the High Court ofKarnataka praying for the transfer of
Criminal Appeal No. I 070 of2015 to the High Court itself on the ground
G that the order forrejection of the applications for additional evidence did
not inspire faith.
9. Learned Single Judge of the High Court by an ex-parte order
dated 19.9.2016, while issuing notice in the petition, stayed all further
proceedings and permitted the respondent to occupy the premises
H
MANMOHAN ATTAVAR v. NEELAM MANMOHAN 361
ATTAVAR [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.)

No.38/1, 30'h Cross, 3rd Main, 7'h Block Jayanagar, Bengalum, 560082 A
belonging to the appellant. This interim order is subject matter of
challenge before us in SLP (C) No. 32783/2016 now numbered as Civil
Appeal No.2500 of2017.
I 0. On service being effected on the appellant, the writ petition
was opposed along with the prayer for vacation of the ex-parte order. It B
is the case of the appellant that instead of deciding the Interlocutory
Application, the appellant was compelled to pay a lump sum amount of
Rs.30,000/- as a onetime payment. This order is stated to have been
challenged in SLP No.33150 of 2016. In fact the declining of interim
relief by the appellate court was not even specifically challenged before
the High Court and yet the High Court granted an ex parte order.
c

11. Learned Single Judge vide the subsequent order dated
24. I 0.2016 sought to withdraw the appeal proceedings from the learned
Addi. Sessions Judge to the High Court itself and this order has been
assailed in SLP No.32534/2016 now numbered as Civil Appeal No.2502 D
of2017.

12. We have heard the contenti.ons of the learned senior counsel
for the appellant and have also heard the respondent appearing in person,
quite elaborately. Written "submissions were filed both by the appellant
and by the respondent. We have noticed that a large part of the submissions
E
of the respondent relate to the merits of the claim as to why the learned
Metropolitan Magistrate fell into error while dismissing the application
filed by the respondent on 30.7.2015 under Section 12 of the D.V. Act.

13. We may note at this stage itself that it would neither be
advisable nor proper to dwell into the controversy on merits because the F
appeal filed by the respondent is yet to be decided. Any observations by
us at this stage could affect either of the parties in the appeal proceedings.
The controversy before us is in a very narrow compass. We thus set
forth the controversy - · ·

( i) Whether an interim order could have been passed on 19. 9.2016 G
permitting the respondent to occupy the premises of the
appellant;

(ii) Whether the learned Single Judge was right in withdrawing
the proceedings pending before the learned Addi. Sessions
H
362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A Judge to the High Court vide the impugned order dated
24.10.2016.
14. Insofar as the first question is concerned, reliance has been
placed by the respondent on the provisions of the D.V. Act and the
desirability to constrl:re the provisions liberally in favour of women seeking
B relief, as it is in the nature of a social legislation meant for protection of
women's rights. In order to appreciate the controversy, we reproduce
the relevant provisions as under:-
"17. Right to reside in a shared household.-
(!) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
c the time being in force, every woman in a domestic relationship
shall have the right to reside in the shared household, whether
or not she has any right, title or beneficial interest in the same.
(2) The aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from
the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in
D accordance with the procedure established by law.

19. Residence orders.-( I) While disposing of an application
under sub-section (I) of section 12, the Magistrate may, on
being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass a
E
residence order - (a) restraining the respondent from
dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing the possession
of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or
not the respondent has a legal or equitable interest in the shared
household;
F
(b) directing the respondent to remove himself from the shared
household;
(c) restraining the respondent or any of his relatives from
entering any portion of the shared household in which the
aggrieved person resides;
G
(d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing off
the shared household or encumbering the same;
(e) restraining the respondent from renouncing his rights in the
shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate; or
H
MANMOHAN ATTAVAR v. NEELAM MANMOHAN 363
ATTAVAR [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

(f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate A
accommodation for the aggrieved person as enjoyed by her in
the shared household or to pay rent for the same, if the
circumstances so require:
Provided that no order under clause ( b) shall be passed against
any person who is a woman. B
,,

15. A reading of the aforesaid provisions show that it creates an
entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the
"shared household" irrespective of her having any legal interests in the
same. The direction, inter alia, can include an order restraining c
dispossession or a direction to remove himself on being satisfied that
domestic violence had taken place.
16. The factual matrix of the present.case is such that one would
have to look to the definition clauses relevant for the determination of
the controversy contained in Section 2 as under: D
"2(f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two
persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a
shared household, when they are related by consanguinity,
marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage,
adoption or are family members living together as a joint family; E

2(s) "shared household" means a household where the person
aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship
either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a F
household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the
aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by
either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or
the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest
or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the
joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of G
whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right,
title or interest in the shared household.
,,

H
364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A 17. The facts of the 'present case are that the respondent has
never stayed with the appellant in the premises in which she has been
directed to be inducted. This is an admitted position even in answer to a
court query by the respondent during the course of hearing. The "domestic
relationship" as defined under Section 2 (f) of the D.V. Act refers to
two persons who have lived together in a "shared household''. A "shared
B
household" has been defined under Section 2(s) of the D.V. Act. In
order for the respondent to succeed, it was necessary that the two parties
had lived in a domestic relationship in the household. However, the parties
have never lived together in the property in question. It is not as if the
respondent has been subsequently excluded from the enjoyment of the
c property or thrown out by the appellant in an alleged relationship which
goes back 20 years. They fell apart even as per the respondent more
than 7 years ago. We may also note that till 22.2.20 I 0 even the wife of
the appellant was alive. We may note for the purpose of record that as
per the appellant, he is a Christian and thus there could be no question of
visiting any temple and marrying the respondent by applying "kumkum'',
D
and that too when the wife of the appellant was alive.
18. We are thus unequivocally of the view that the nature of the
ex-parte order passed on 19 .9.2016 permitting the respondent to occupy
the premises of the appellant cannot be sustained and has to be set aside
and consequently Civil Appeal No.2500of2017 is liable to be allowed.
E
19. Now turning to the second controversy, a perusal of the
impugned order shows that the learned Single Judge found the remedy
sought for by the respondent to be "misconceived''. However, the learned
Judge found it appropriate to treat the petition as one under Section 407
of the Cr.P.C. The learned Single Judge has expressed the view that the
F appellate court ought to have called upon the respondent to argue the
appeal rather than spend time on interim reliefs, which was not
maintainable in the face of the earlier order resulting in a predictable
order.
20. We fail to appreciate the aforesaid observations when the
.G respondent herself sought once again to press for interim relief and
·"----. · app'lications to adduce additional evidence. Learned ASJ can hardly be
faulted on this account. The learned Single Judge has also given latitude
to the respondent on account of her appearing in person whereby she

H
MANMOHAN ATTAVAR v. NEELAM MANMOHAN 365
ATTAVAR [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

may not have documented the bits. and pieces of her past with the intention A
of initiating the proceedings which she was pursuing. In the conspectus
of the same, the appeal has been withdrawn to the High Court itself.
21. The grievance of the appellant against this order is that the
valuable rights of the appellant of an additional fornm to ventilate his
grievance would be lost as against any decision in appeal. A remedy of B
revision under Section 327 of the Cr.P.C. would be available or a writ
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this behalf
reliance has been placed on what is claimed to be a settled legal position,
more particularly, the Constitutional Bench Judgment of7 Judges of this
Court in A.R.Antulay vs. Ram Naik 1•
c
22. It is also the contention of the appellant that such transfer
cannot take place at the whims and fancy of the respondent. The
respondent, whenever she fails to obtain a favourable order, chooses to
file proceedings for transfer whether it be before the MM or before the
appellate court. It is submitted that this approach ought not to be
encouraged. D
23. On examination of the issue, we tend to agree with the
submission of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that there was
no reason for the proceedings to be withdrawn from the appellate court
to the High Court itself. There is not only absence of the reason for the
same but it would also result in the deprivation of valuable rights of the E
appellant against the order of an appellate authority and thus an additional
fornm for scrutiny was being negated.
24. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned
Single Judge nor can we fault the appellate authority on any account
which could have necessitated such withdrawal of the proceedings to F
the High Court.
25. We may also note the concession made by the learned senior
counsel for the appellant in court that in the scenario the matter can be
entrusted to any ASJ in Bangalore as there are a large number of the
same holding court. G
26. We thus set aside even the order dated 24.10.2016 and allow
Civil Appeal No.2502/2017. We request the learned Chief Justice of the
High Court on the administrative side to nominate any of the ASJs in
1
(I988) 2 sec 602
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 6 S.C.R.

A Bangalore to hear the appeal of the respondent and the appellate authority
shall endeavor to conclude the proceedings as expeditiously as possible.
27. The appeals are accordingly allowed leaving the parties to
bear their own costs with the hope that there would be an early eri.d to
this contentious dispute between the two parties.
B

Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed.