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Supreme Court of India

MANJUNATH CHENNABASAPA MADALLIversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

Citation
2007 INSC 155
Decided
19 February 2007
Disposal
Appeal(s) allowed

Holding

The conviction under Section 302 IPC cannot be sustained on the circumstantial evidence presented; the appeal is allowed and the conviction is set aside.

Summary

Manjunath Chennabasapa Madalli was convicted by the trial court for the murder of his wife Sumithra under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, based largely on circumstantial evidence and an alleged dying declaration. The Karnataka High Court set aside the 498A conviction but upheld the murder conviction. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the case beyond reasonable doubt solely on circumstantial evidence and whether the alleged dying declaration could be relied upon. The Court reiterated the stringent tests for conviction on circumstantial evidence, noting that the only highlighted facts were the unnatural death and a purported dying declaration, which was not actually recorded. Finding the evidence insufficient and the dying declaration non‑existent, the Court held that the conviction could not be sustained and set it aside, allowing the appeal.

Issues considered

  • Whether the prosecution proved the murder charge under Section 302 IPC beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
  • Whether Section 498A IPC was applicable in the present facts.
  • Whether the alleged dying declaration recorded by the Tehsildar could be treated as competent evidence.

Legislation cited

Subjects

circumstantial evidencemurderIPC 302IPC 498Adying declarationreasonable doubtdowry deathIndian criminal law

Judgment

                       MANJUNATH CHENNABASAPA MADALLI                                  A
--'>
                                       v.
                             STATE OF KARNA TAKA

                                   FEBRUARY 19, 2007

                    [DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND S.H. KAPADIA, JJ.]                        B


             Penal Code, 1860-ss. 302 & 498A-Homicidal death of wife-Case
        based on circumstantial evidence-Circumstance of unnatural death-Dying
        declaration purportedly recorded by Tehsildar-Trial Court convicted C
        husband under s.498A & 302 !PC-High Court set aside conviction under
       s.498A but maintained conviction under s.302 !PC-On appeal, held: Mere
       fact that wife died an unnatural death cannot by itself be a circumstance
       against husband particularly when s. 498-A has been held to be
       inapplicable-Conclusion of Courts below that there was dying declaration
       is also not factually correct-Hence conviction set aside.                 D
              Evidence-Circumstantial evidence-Appreciation of-Held: Where a
       case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt can be
       justified only when all incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be
       incompatible with the innocence of accused or guilt of any other person-
       Circumstances from which inference as to guilt of the accused is drawn have     E
       to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely
       connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those
       circumstances.

             According to the prosecution, Appellant ill-treated his wife to extract
       additional dowry. While she was staying at her parental place, Appellant visited F
       that place and had a quarrel with her and other relatives. He stayed at the
       house of in-laws and that night allegedly assaulted his wife with an iron
       implement resulting in her death. Trial Court on the basis of circumstantial
       evidence convicted the Appellant under s.498A & 302 IPC. High Court set
       aside the conviction under s.498A but maintained the conviction under s.302 G
       IPC

              In appeal to this Court the question which arose for consideration is
       whether the prosecutfon on the basis of circumstantial evidence has proved
       its case against the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
                                            795                                        fl
    796                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2007] 2 S.C.R.
                                                                                                   ,,..
A         Allowing the appeal, the Court                                               (       -
          HELD: 1.1. Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence,
    the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts
    and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the
    accused or the guilt of any other person. [Para 10) [799-G; 800-A)
B
         1.2. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the
    accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be
    shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred
    from those circumstances. [Para 10) [800-B)

c        · 1.3. The conditions precedent, before conviction could be based on
    circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are: (a) the
    circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be
    fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must' or 'should' and not
    'may be' established; (b) the facts so established should be consistent only
    with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
D
    be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; (c)
    the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; (d) they
    should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and (e)
    there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
    ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and
E   must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the
    accused. (Para 17) (802-C-F)

          Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (1977) SC 1063; Eradu and
    Ors. v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State of
    Ka~nataka AIR (1983) SC 446; State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors., AIR (1985)
F   SC 1224; Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350; Ashok
    Kumar Chatterjee v. State of MP., AIR (1989) SC 1890; Bhagat Ram v. State
    of Punjab, AIR (1954) SC 621; C. Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P.,
    [1996) 10 SCC 193; Padala Veera Reddyv. State ofA.P. and Ors., AIR (1990)
    SC 79; Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
    AIR (1952) SC 343; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR
G
    (1984) SC 1622; State ofRajasthan v. Rajaram, [2003) 8 SCC 180 and State
    of Haryana v. Jagbir Singh, [2003) 11 SCC 261, relied on.                              k



          State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) Crl.LJ 1104, referred
    to.
H
                         MANJUNATHCHENNABASAPAMADALL!v.STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,l]
                                                                                            797

-   "        c

                 to.
                         "Wills Circumstantial Evidence- Chapter VI" by Alfred Wills- referred     A

                       2. In the instant case, the only circumstance which was highlighted by
                 the trial Court and the High Court was that there was unnatural death and
                 additionally the so called dying declaration purported to have been recorded
                 by the then Tehsildar (PW-16). The mere fact that the deceased had died an        B
                 unnatural death cannot by itself be a circumstance against the accused
                 particularly when Section 498-A has been held to be inapplicable. Additionally,
                 the conclusion that there was dying declaration is also not factually correct.
                 The trial Court itself has referred to the evidence of PW-16 who categorically
                 stated that though he was requested to record the dying declaration the same
                 could not be recorded as the doctor was of the opinion that the deceased was
                                                                                                   c
                 not in a fit condition to give her statement. Thereafter, no statement was
                 recorded. In fact he was called to attend the inquest. Above being the position
                 the conviction as recorded by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court is
         /
                 indefensible and is set aside. [Para 19] (802-G, H; 803-A-CJ
                                                                                                   D
                         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 223 of
                 2007.

                      From the Judgment and Order dated 8.6.2005 of the High Court of
                 Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1715/2002.
                                                                                                   E
                         Praneet Ranjan for the Appellant.

                         Sanjay R. Hegde, Vikrant Yadav and Shashidhar for the Respondent.

                         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

                         Dr. ARIJIT PASA YAT, J. I. Leave granted.
                                                                                                   F

                      2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division
                 Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant.
                 The appellant was found guilty of offence punishable under Sections 498-A
                 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') by the trial court G
                 and was sentenced to undergo R.I. for two years and life respectively. Fine
    _j
                 was also imposed with default stipulation.

                       3. The High Court set aside the conviction for the offence punishable
                 under Section 498-A !PC but maintained the conviction under Section 302 !PC
                                                                                                   H
     798                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2007] 2 S.C.R.

A and consequently the sentence.                                                      -t -
           4. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:

          Sumithra (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'), as the daughter of
   Siddamma (PW-I) and sister ofHosakerappa (PW-6) as well as grand daughter
B ofHanumawwa (PW-7). She was married to the accused about one year back
   to the date 'of incident. After the marriage, Sumithra went to the house of her
   husband to lead a happy family life. Though initially they led a happy married
   life, bickerings started between the accused and his wife as he started abusing
   and ill-treating her on the pretext that she does not know how to do the
   house-hold work. However, this was only a pretext to extract additional dowry
c  from the parents of the deceased. As per the customs during Gowri Festival,
  the deceased was brought to her parental place to celebrate the festival and
  at that time, the deceased who was pregnant had complained about the ill-
  treatment 1i1eted out to her by her husband. As such, the parents, grand-
  mother an~ other relatives asked the deceased to stay back in their house.
D The    accused started visiting the house of PWs I and 7 and was insisting
  upon the deceased to come back to his village. On such a visit viz., on
  9.3.200 I, the accused again came to the house and picked up a quarrel with
  the deceased and her mother and other relatives and insisted that she should
  be sent on that day itself. The relatives informed him that as Sumithra was
  pregnant, after performing certain ceremonies including 'Srimantha', she would
E be sent back later. The accused stayed in the house of the in-laws that night.
  On the next day i.e. on 10.3.2001, after taking the night meals, the accused
  and the deceased slept inside the room whereas, the mother, brother and other
  relatives slept outside the hall. In the night around 3.00 a.m., they heard cries
  coming from the room· and when they went inside, they saw the accused
F running    away and Sumithra lying unconscious on the ground with bleeding
  injuries on her head. Immediately, she was shifted to Government Hospital,
  Gadag and then to KIMS Hospital. However, in spite of the medical treatment,
  she breathed her last on 13.3.2001. In the meantime, on 11.3.2001 itself Head
  Constable (PW-18) and SHO of Gadag Rural Police station on getting the
  medico legal intimation that one Sumithra was admitted in the hospital and
G that she was assaulted by her husband with an iron implement, he went to
  the h~spital and made enquiry and found that Sumithra, the injured was not
  in a position to give any statement. As such, he recorded the statement of          I-

  Siddamma (PW-I) who was present in the hospital and treating the same as
  first information, came back to the Police Station and registered a case in
H
           MANJUNA THCHENNABASAPAMADALL!r. STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASAYAT,J.] 799

      Crime no. 50/200 I for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 504 and A
      307 !PC, registering the FIR. He again went back to the hospital and there,
      as per the advise of the Doctor, shifted the injured to KIMS Hospital, Hubli.
      He again deputed and sent requisition for recording of the dying declaration
      by the authorised Taluka Executive Magistrate, but the same could not be
      recorded as Sumithra was in coma. As already noted, at KIMS Hospital, Hubli, B
      in spite of the treatment the injured Sumithra breathed her last. After her
      death, the offence punishable under Section 307 !PC was altered to Section
      302 of !PC and further investigation was continued.
 t
            5. During the investigation, spot mahazar, inquest proceedings were
      undertaken. Statement of witnesses, which threw light on the incident, were C
      recorded. The dead body was subjected to autopsy. Search for the accused
      was carried out and he was apprehended on 14.3:2001. After securing all the
      necessary reports and on completion of the investigation, charge sheet was
      filed against the accused.

              6. On committal and on the basis of the charge sheet materials, the D
       accused was charged for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
     · 302 !PC. As the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried, he was
·,     tried under S.C.No.37/2001.

             7. The trial Court found the evidence to be credible and notwithstanding
      the fact that the vital witness i.e. the motl)er of the deceased (PW-I) 'had E
      resiled from the statement given during investigation, held that the residual
      evidence was sufficient to hold the accused guilty. Accused was accordingly
      convicted and sentenced as aforenoted. It was held that the circumstantial
      evidence pressed into service was sufficient to establish the accusations. The
      High Court in essence affirmed the conclusions, but altered the conviction. F

           8. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted
     that there was practically no evidence whatsoever and even the so-called
     circumstances highlighted by the trial Court and the High Court do not lead
     to a conclusion that the accused was guilty of the offence as alleged.
                                                                                          G
          9. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the
     judgments of the courts below.

            I 0. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case
     rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified
                                                                                          H
                                                                                                  j. -
                                                                                            - )



                 I   >

    800                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2007) 2 S.C.R.

A   only when all the incrimin;__jng facts and circumstances are found to be
    incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other
    person. (See Hukam Singh v. State ofRajas than, AIR ( 1977) SC I 063; Eradu
    and Ors. v. State of Hyderabad, AIR (1956) SC 316; Earabhadrappa v. State
    of Karna/aka, AIR (1983) SC 446; State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi and Ors., AIR
B   (1985) SC 1224; Ba/winder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350;
    Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of MP., AIR (1989) SC 1890. The
    circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn
    have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be
    closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those
    circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR (1954) SC 621, it was
C   laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from
    circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to
    negative the innocence of the accused and bring the offences home beyond
    any reasonable doubt.

         I I. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C.
D   Chenga Reddy and Ors. v. State of A.P., [1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has
    been observed thus:

                     "In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that    -1

                 the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should
                 be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature.
E                Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should
                 be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further the proved
          -~,
                 circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the
                 guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence ....".

                12. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State ofA.P. and Ors., AIR (1990) SC 79,
F it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such
    evidence must satisfy the following tests:

                 "(I) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to
                 be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;

G                (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
                 pointing towards guilt of the accused;
                                                                                             L
                 (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively should form a chain so
                 complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all
                 human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none
H
          MANJUNATHCHENNABASAPAMADALLll'. STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASA YAT,J.] 801

            else; and                                                               A
            (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
            complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than
            that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only
            be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent
            with his innocence.                                                    B
           13. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, (1992) Crl.LJ 1104, it was
     pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence
 i   and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one
     in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the
     circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and C
     the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only
     with the hypothesis of guilt.

            14. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book "Wills' Circumstantial Evidence"
     (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the
     case of circumstantial evidence: (I) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal D
     inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected"
     with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party
·-   who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3)
     in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence
     must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify E
     the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the
     innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other
     reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, (5) if there be any reasonable
     doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted".

            15. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on F
     circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touch-stone of law
     relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the this Court as far back as
     in 1952.

          16. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya
     Pradesh, AIR (1952) SC 343, wherein it was observed thus:          G
                "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
            circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of
            guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established
            and all the facts so established should be consistent only with7 the H
    802                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2007] 2 S. C.R.

A           hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances
            should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be
            such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be
            proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far
            complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion
            consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as
B           to show that within all human probability the act must have been done
            by the accused."

          17. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand
    Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR (1984) SC 1622. Therein, while dealing
C   with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that onus was on the prosecution
    to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in prosecution
    cannot be cured by false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the
    words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial
    evidence, must be fully established. They a;e:

D           (I) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
            drawn should be fully established. The circumstances concerned 'must'
            or 'should' and not 'may be' established;

            (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
            hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not
E           be hplainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is
            guilty;

            (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

            (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to
            be proved; and
F
            (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
            reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
            of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act
            must have been done by the accused.

G         18. These aspects were highlighted in State of Rajasthan v. Rajaram,
    (2003] 8 sec 180 and Stale of HG/yana V. Jagbir Singh, (2003] 1I sec 261.
                                                                                       L
             '
           19. In the instant case, the only circumstance which was highlighted by
    the trial. Court and the High Court was that there was unnatural death and
H   additionally the so called dying declaration purported to have been recorded
          MANJUNATHCHENNABASAPAMADALLI v. STATEOFKARNATAKA[PASA YAT,J.] 803

     by the then Tehsildar (PW-16). The mere fact that the deceased had died an A
     unnatural death cannot by itself be a circumstance against the accused
     particularly when Section 498-A has been held to be inapplicable. Additionally,
     the conclusion that there was dying declaration is also not factually correct.
     The trial Court itself has referred to the evidence of PW-16 who categorically
     stated that though he was requested to record the dying declaration the same B
     could not be recorded as the doctor was of the opinion that the deceased was
     not in a fit condition to give her statement. Thereafter, no statement was
     recorded. In fact he was called to attend the inquest.
)

          20. Above being the position the conviction as recorded by the trial
     Court and upheld by the High Court is indefensible and is set aside.      C
          21. The appeal is allowed.

     B.B.B.                                                     Appeal allowed.




.'


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