Holding

Section 482 CrPC preserves the High Court's inherent jurisdiction, which may be exercised sparingly to quash an FIR only where the complaint makes no allegation of the specific offence, leading to quashing of the FIR for Section 498A but not for Section 406, and no quashing is permissible once a charge‑sheet is filed.

Summary

Manjula Sinha filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of an FIR registered under Sections 498A and 406 IPC. The Allahabad High Court dismissed the petition, directing that she not be arrested and imposing a maintenance condition. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the scope of the High Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482, emphasizing that it is not a new power and must be exercised sparingly to prevent abuse of process and to secure justice. The Court held that the FIR could be quashed only with respect to the alleged offence under Section 498A, as the complaint made no specific allegation against the appellant, but could not be quashed for the offence under Section 406. In the second appeal, where a charge‑sheet had already been filed and charges framed, the Court ruled that the question of quashing the FIR did not arise. Consequently, Appeal No. 860/2007 was partly allowed and Appeal No. 861/2007 was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court can quash an FIR under Section 482 CrPC when the complaint does not allege the specific offence of Section 498A.
Whether the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 can be exercised to quash proceedings relating to offences under Section 406 IPC.
Whether an FIR can be quashed after a charge‑sheet has been filed and charges framed.
The proper scope and limits of the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 406, s. 498A

Subjects

Section 482inherent jurisdictionquashing FIRdowry harassmentcriminal breach of trustCriminal Procedure CodeIndian Penal Codeabuse of process

Judgment

_/

MANJULA SINHA A
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

JULY 11, 2007

[DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T, C.K. THAKKER AND B
LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-s. 482-Jurisdiction under-Scope
and exercise of-Proceedings uls 498 A and 406 !PC in two cases-Petition
for quashing of FIR-Dismissal of-Jn first case plea that in view of FIR na C
case made out agains! thl appellant-Jn second case charges framed-Held:
The powers undet the provision are wide and hence to be exercised
sparingly-It should be exercised ex debito justitiae-ln the first case as no
case made out uls 498A, proceedings were liable to be quashed-However
allegations as regards s. 406 existing, hence power u/s 482 could not be D
exercised-Jn the second case since the charges have been framed, question
of quashing of FIR does not arise-P~nal Code, 1860-ss. 498 A and 406.

Jurisdiction-Inherent Jurisdiction-Purpose-Exercise of-When-
Discussed
E
High Court-Exercise ofits jurisdiction-Held: High Court being higheSt
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision
in a case where the facts are incomplete and hazy, when evidence has not
been collected and produced before Court and when issues involved are of
magnitude.
F
Maxim- 'qando lex aliquid alicui' concedit, concedens videtur et id
- · sine quo res ipsae esse non potest '.

In Criminal Appeal No. 860/2007, on the basis of a complaint
proceedings u/ss. 498A and 406 IPC were initiated. Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
was filed before High Court for quashing the proceedings. High Court rejected G
the same.

In Criminal Appeal No. 86112007 in proceeding u/ss. 498A and 406
IPC, chargesheet had been filed. A Petition u/s 482 Cr.P.C. was filed for
301 H
)--
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 8 S.C.R.

A quashing of FIR. The same was dismissed by High Court.
Hence the present appeals.

Partly allowing Appeal No. 860/2007 and dismissing the Appeal No. 861/
2007, the Court
B
HELD: 1.1. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the
High Court It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before
the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the
+ -
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order
under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
C otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to
lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for
all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers
apart from express pr~visions of law which are necessary for proper discharge
D of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves
inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal,
possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their
constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a

E
., wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex
aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non
potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which
it cannot exist). tpara 8] (305-C, D, E]

1.2. While exercising powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the court does
not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the
F section though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in
the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito just~tiae to do real and
substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority
of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to
G abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which
would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the
powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or
quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
H (Para 8) (305-F, G, HJ
MAN JU LA SINHA v. STATE OF U.P. 303
J° •·
1.3 The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the A
--(
Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution
in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise
of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be
exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest
court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision
in a case, where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the B
evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in
.. ) their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-
fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing tl:e proceeding at any
stage. (Para 9) (306-A, B, C)
c
Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 and Raghubir Saran
(Dr.) v. State ofBihar, AIR 1964 SC 1, referred to.

1.4. On a reading of the complaint, it is clear that there is no allegation D
-~
so far as the respondent is concerned, so far as it relates to a case covered
,._ under Section 498-A IPC. There is no allegation of any torture for dowry so
far as the present appellant is concerned. The position is different so far as
the allegations in relation to Section 406 IPC is concerned. (Para 10)

1.5. There are allegations contained in the FIR relating to the E
applicability of Section 406 IPC. If ultimately the prosecution is unable to
substantiate the plea, the results would follow. It is a case where the power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised so far as the allegations
relating to Section 4~6 IPC are concerned. But as noted, the position is
different so far as Section 498-A IPC is concerned. Therefore proceedings
.... ...,. stand quashed so far as it relates to the offence punishable under Section
F
498-A IPC. (Para 11 J (306-E, FJ

2. In Criminal Appeal No. 861 of2007, application filed before the High
Court related to alleged commission of offences punishable under Section
498-A and 406 of IPC. Undisputedly the charge sheet has been filed and the G
same was not in question. Charges have also been framed and, therefore, the
question of quashing the FIR does not arise. (Para 151 (306-H; 307-A)

- ;;, CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal no. 860 of
2007.
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment & Order dated 17.05.2005, 5. l .2006 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in Crl. Misc. Writ Petition No. 5133 of 2005 and
Crl. M.A. Nos. 23 of2006 respectively.

WITH

B Crl.A. No. 861 of2007.

P.S. Mishra, Sr. ~dv., Madhu Shanna, D.K. Jha, Upendra Mishra, Ravi ~-
Chandra Baksh and S. Chandra Shekhar for the Appellant. -~

Pavan Kumar, S.K. Singh, Rajiv Ranjan, Sahdev Singh and Javed M. Rao
c for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. ARIJIT PASAYA T, J. I. Leave granted.

D 2. Appellant calls in question legality of the order passed by a Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing petition filed for quashing the >-
First lnfonnation Report (in short the 'FIR') dated 30th April, 2005 registered -<
as Crime No. 124 of2005 for alleged commission of offences punishable under
Section 498 A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, (in short the 'IPC') in Police
Station in Sector 39, Noida, District Goutam Budha Nagar.
E
3. On the basis of complaint filed, proceedings were initiated. The
legality of proceedings was questioned before the High Court by a petition
filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the
'Cr.P.C.'). The main stand before the High Court was that even on a bare
. reading of the FIR, it is clear that alleged commission of offence was not made
F out so far as the appellant is concerned. .,--•

4. The High Court found that the application was to be rejected as no
ground was made out for quashing the proceedings. It however directed that
the appellant shall not be arrested till submission of the police report. Further
condition was stipulated that the appellant has to pay Rs.1000/- per month
G
towards maintenance to the respondent No.4. The order was passed purportedly
following the principles set out in this Court in Bodhisattwa Gautanm v.
Subhra Chakrabarti, AIR (1996) SC 922. )( .,.__

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel submitted that even if
H detailed reading of the complaint is made, ingredients of the alleged offences
MANJULASINHAv. STATEOFU.P. [PASAYAT,J.) J05

v are not made out so far as the appellant is concerned. The appellant is the A
step mother of the husband of the complainant. She was staying separately.

6. It is further submitted that if the articles are identified same shall be
returned and therefore the proceedings should not continue.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the order passed by B
the High Court.

_,; 8. Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court.
It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the
enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the
inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order C
under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to
otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay
down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for
all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers D
---. apart from express provisions oflaw which are necessary for proper discharge
~ of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent
powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in
_ the absence of any express provision, as inherent in the!r constitution, all E
such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course
of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the Jaw
gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While
exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court
of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has F
to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It
is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so G
as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be
an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in
. , injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance
of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007) 8 S.C.R.

A 9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power
requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that
its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The
inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The
B High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case, where the entire facts are incomplete
and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced
before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of
magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient
material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases
C in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing
the proceeding at any stage. [See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary, [1992] 4
SCC 305, and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, AIR (1964) SC I].

IO. On a reading of the complaint which appears at page 23 of the paper
book, it is clear that there is no allegation so far as the. respondent is
D concerned, so far as it relates to a case covered under Section 498-A IPC.
~-·
There is no allegation of any torture for dowry so far as the present appellant
is concerned. The position is different so far as the allegations in relation to
Section 406 IPC is concerned.

E 11. There are allegations contained in the FIR relating to the applicability
of Section 406 IPC. If ultimately _the prosecution is unable to substantiate the
plea, the results would follow. It is a case where the power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised so far as the allegations relating to Section 406
IPC are concerned. But as noted, the position is differ~nt so far as Section
498-A IPC is concerned. Therefore proceedings stand quashed so far as it
F relates to the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC.

12. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case.

13. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above.
G
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 861 OF 2007 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)
No.1714 of2006)

14. Leave granted.

H 15. Application filed before the High Court related to alleged commission
MANJULASINHAv. STATEOFU.P.(PASAYAT,J.) 307
of offences punishable under Section 498-A and 406 of IPC. Undisputedly the A
charge sheet has been filed and the same was not in question. Charges have
also been framed and, therefore, the question of quashing the FIR does not
arise.

16. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
B
K.K.T. C.A.No. 860/2007 partly allowed and
C.A. No. 861/2007 dismissed.
_)

. ).