MANI@ UDATTU MAN & ORS.versusSTATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 259
- Decided
- 25 February 2009
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the mother’s testimony was reliable, the doctrine *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus* is not a mandatory rule in India, and the convictions under Section 302 IPC stand.
Summary
The appellants, a group of seven men, formed an unlawful assembly armed with knives and murdered Prabha, the son of PW‑1, after threatening him at the mother’s house. PW‑1, the mother, testified that the accused had previously killed her other son Babu and later threatened and killed Prabha; her testimony was corroborated by the police complaint and medical evidence. Although other prosecution witnesses turned hostile, the trial court convicted the seven accused under Section 302 IPC (and related sections), and the High Court upheld the convictions. The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the mother’s testimony should be rejected under the doctrine of *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus* and that the earlier acquittal of the accused in Babu’s murder case undermined their credibility. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine does not compel wholesale rejection of a witness’s evidence, that normal discrepancies do not destroy credibility, and that PW‑1’s testimony was trustworthy and sufficient to sustain the convictions. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.
Issues considered
- The credibility of an interested eye‑witness (the mother) when other witnesses have turned hostile.
- Whether the doctrine *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus* applies to reject all testimony of a witness who is found partially untruthful.
- The effect of a prior acquittal of the accused in a related murder case on the credibility of their testimony in the present case.
- The distinction between normal and material discrepancies in assessing witness evidence.
- Whether a conviction can be sustained on the basis of a single reliable witness corroborated by documentary and medical evidence.
Legislation cited
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 147, s. 148, s. 302, s. 320
Subjects
Judgment
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 338 ,
'
A MANI@ UDATTU MAN & ORS.
v.
STATE REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 382-384 of 2009)
FEBRUARY 25, 2009
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASA YAT AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302 - Murder - Accused forming
c unlawful assembly - and armed with dangerous weapons
inflicted fatal injuries to deceased - Previous enmity between
parties - Accused also threatened family members of
deceased - Incident witnessed by mother of deceased -
Conviction uls. 302 by courts below on basis of evidence of
mother even though other prosecution witnesses resiled from
"'
D their statement - Justification of - Held: Justified - Evidence
of mother was trustworthy, and rightly acted upon - It cannot
be said that the mother falsely implicated the accused.
' Maxims - Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus - Meaning of
- Applicability in India - Stated.
E
Criminal law- Duty of court- To separate grain from chaff
- Administration of justice. -r
Evidence - Normal discrepancies and material
discrepancies - Distinction between.
F Prosecution case was that accused persons were
implicated in the murder case of B-son of PW1 and were
acquitted. Thereafter, accused persons armed with
knives came to the house of PW1 and threatened to kill
P, other son of PW-1. Next day accused came to the ...._
•
G house of PW-1, chased P. and killed him. PW-1 and PW-
2-daughter-in-law, followed the accused. They witnessed
the incident. The courts below convicted all the accused
except 8th accused u/s. 302 IPC .Hence the present
appeals.
H 338
t
___.... MANI @UDATTU MAN & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY 339
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
Y'
Dismissing the appeal, the Court A
HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, in the examination of
PW1, it has been stated that, in the morning the accused
armed with knives had come and threatened to kill P and
that is the night when P came. She told him that he
should go and hide himself and on the next day, in the B
morning, the accused armed with knives came and on
seeing them P ran and accused followed him and PW1
- alongwith her daughter-in-law PW2 followed and after
running for some distance, A2 and A 1 cut the deceased
on his head with the Knife and A3, A4, AG, AS, A7 cut P c
on the shoulder and other parts of the body and AS was
holding P by his legs and these facts appear to
corroborate the contents of the complaint lodged by PW1
in the Police Station. The evidence of PW1 in the cross
examination when compared with the complaint,
- corroborates it and strengthens the prosecution version. D
On examining complaint it is evident that the evidence of
PW1 that all the accused are known to her and that all
the accused were armed with the M01 series knives.
Therefore, on the basis of the evidence of PW1 being
trustworthy and believable has been rightly acted upon. E
[Para 5) [345-E-H; 346-A-B]
1.2. Merely because the accused were investigated
in the case of B, the evidence of PW1 cannot be
, disregarded. It is seen from the evidence of PW1 that
PW1's other son B had been killed and the accused in F
the instant case was implicated there also and were
acquitted. PW1 also stated that 5-6 months after the death
of B her son P was killed. On considering the evidence
of PW1 that she knew the accused from their childhood
and that due to the enmity of the accused with her G
children, they killed her sons and that on 8.3.2001 the
........ . accused armed with knives came to her house and
threatened to kill P and that she informed this to P and
that the next day, the accused came to her house, chased
P and killed her, it cannot be said that just because the
accused were set free in the case of B, PW1 with the H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R. .._
~
A wrong intention implicated the accused in the instant
case. Just because the eye witness to the incident is
related to the deceased, the evidence of the said eye
witness cannot be disregarded. When the evidence of the
interested witnesses is corroborated by the medical
evidence, then the entire evidence of the interested
B
witnesses ought not be rejected on that ground. [Para 6]
[346-C-H; 347-A]
Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC
366; Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State of Punjab AIR 1956
SC 460; Sohrab slo Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of
-
c Madhya Pradesh 1972 (3) SCC 751; Ugar Ahfr and Ors. v.
The State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277; Zwinglee Ariel v. State
of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 15; Ba/aka Singh and Ors.
v. The State of Punjab 1975 (4) SCC 511; State of Rajasthan
v. Smt Ka/ki and Anr. 1981 (2) SCC 752; Krishna Mochi and
D Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. 2002 (6) SCC 81; Sucha Singh v.
State of Punjab 2003 (7) SCC 643; Zahira H. Sheikh v. State
of Gujarat 2004 (4) SCC 158; Ram Udgar Singh v. State of
Bihar 2004(10) SCC 443; Gorle S. Naidu v. State of Andhra
-
Pradesh 2003 (12) SCC 449; Gubba/a Venugopalswamy v.
E State of Andhra Pradesh 2004 (10) SCC 120; Syed /bahim
v. State of A.P. 2006 (10) SCC 601; Ba/akram and Ors vs.
State of U.P. AIR 1974 SC 2165 and Ushamubalu Sakdu vs.
State of Maharashtra AIR 1976 SC 557, relied on.
Case Law Reference: '
F AIR 1957 SC 366 Relied on. Para 4
AIR 1956 SC 460 Relied on. Para 4
sec
1972 (3) 751 Relied on. Para 4
AIR 1965 SC 277 Relied on. Para 4
AIR 1954 SC 15 Relied on. Para 4
G sec
1975 (4) 511 Relied on. Para 4
. .,_
sec
1981 (2) 752 Relied on. Para 4
sec
2002 (6) 81 Relied on. Para 4
sec
2003 (7) 643 Relied on. Para 4
sec
2004 (4) 158 Relied on. Para 4
H sec
2004(10) 443 Relied on. Para 4
__... MANI @ UDATIU MAN & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY 341
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
.,,
2003 (12) sec 449 Relied on. Para 4 A
2004 (10) sec 120 Relied on. Para 4
2006 (10) sec 601 Relied on. Para 4
AIR 1974 SC 2165 Relied on. Para 6
AIR 1976 SC 557 Relied on. Para 6
CRIMINAL AP PELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal B
Nos: 382-384 of 2009.
From the Judgment & Order dated 27.7.06 of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras Criminal Appeal Nos. 279, 438
& 446/2004.
.,. c
Prasanthi Prasad for the Appellants .
S. Thananjayan for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted. D
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division
Bench of the Madras High Court dismissing the appeal field by
the appellants who were convicted for offences punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC').
The 8th accused was acquitted of the charges under Sections E
148 and 302 IPC. Of the seven accused persons who were
convicted by the VII Additional Sessions Judge, two separate
appeals were filed.
3. Prosecution version as unfolded during trial is as follows:
PW-1 who is Murugammal the mother of the Prabha F
(hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased') in this case has stated
that her second son Babu had already been murdered by the
accused in this case namely Ali, Cheyya Babu, Udattumani,
Muthukumar, Jayaraman, Karikadi Moideen and others and that
on 8.3.2001 at 11.00 P.M in the night all the aforesaid accused G
-°'(
• armed with knife came to her house and with the intention to
-
murder her son Prabha, threatened him and that later on
9.3.2001 at 5.30 a.m. in the morning all the accused in this case
armed with knives came to her house and that on seeing them
she sent away her son Prabha from the house and that the H
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
~
A accused had chased him and that she also followed them along "
with her daughter-in-law. After crossing DH Road and Mutha Tamil
Nagar, they ran for some distance and that at that spot the
accused Ali and Udattumani attacked her son Prabha with knives
and inflicted out injuries on his head, and the accused Cheyya,
Muthukumar, Kovil Babu, Jayaraman and Karikattai Moideen
B
inflicted out injuries on the neck, shoulder, hands legs and several
parts of the body indiscriminately, and the accused logu caught
Prabha by the legs and rest of the accused together ran away
from these and that her son was lying in the pool of blood and
succumbed to his injuries and that later, she and her daughter-
c in-law went to Kodunkaiyoor Police Station and lodged the Ex.P-
1 complaint and the knives exhibited in this Court were used by .....
the accused to murder her son and the said 7 knives were the
M.0.1 series.
As per the chargesheet filed by the SHO of P-6
D Kodunkaiyoor Police Station, Chennai, againstthe accused, the
accused Prabha was residing within the limits of the
Kodungayoor Plice Station, and that the accused were also
residing in the same area. The accused had previous enmity due
to which they had murdered Babu, the brother of Prabha, and
E that the family members of the accused were being threatened
and due to this reason, all the accused with the common intention
of committing the murder of Prabha, formed an unlawful
assembles and armed with dangerous weapons like knife sword
etc. on 9.3.2001 at 5.30 p.m stealthily entered the house of
Prabha at 10 Netaji Lane, Nehru Nagar, Kodunkaiyoor, knowing
F
that Prabha was present. On seeing them, Prabha escaped
through the temple side, and all the accused chased Prabha, and
entered the compound of Sekhar's house situated near the tea
stall situated nearly, and indiscriminately attacked Prabha and
caused injuries with the knife on the head, neck, face, chest,
G shoulder, hands and legs of Prabha. Due to the said injuries,
Prabha died at the spot, and, therefore, it was stated that he . .,...
-
accused are guilty for offences under Sections 147, 148 read
with Section 302 IPC. When the accused were produced before
the X Judicial Magistrate, all the copies of the documents relating
H to the case were handed to them free of charge. The matter was
-- ,.
MANI@ UOATIU MAN & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
then committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge.
343
A
After hearing the arguments from both sides and
considering the documents and evidence, the accused were
charged under Section 148 read with Section 320 IPC and on
being questioned the accused pleaded not guilty and
demanded trial. B
To establish the charge against the accused, the
prosecution, examined fifteen witnesses and exhibited P-1 to
P-28 and marked M.0.1 to M.0.16.
Placing reliance on the evidence of PW.1, the conviction c
was recorded though PWs. 2 to 8 resiled from their statement
·- during investigation. Before the High Court the stand was that
since almost all the prosecution witnesses who were turned
as eye-witnesses did not support the prosecution version, the
conviction should not have been recorded. D
Discarding this plea, the High Court noticed that the
evidenc::e of PW1 was sufficient to hold all the persons guilty.
Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed. The stand taken
before the High Court was reiterated. The present appqal is
by A1, A3, A4 and A7. Learned counsel for the respondent E
supported the judgment of the trial Court and the High Court.
4. It is the duty of Court to separate grain from chaff.
' Where chaff can be separated from grain, it would be open to
-
the Court to convict an accused notwithstanding the fact that
evidence has been found to be deficient, or to be note wholly F
credible. Falsity of material particular would not ruin it from the
beginning to end. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus"
has no application In India and the witness or witnesses cannot
be branded as liar(s). The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus" has not received general acceptance nor has this G
- ~ maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a
rule of caution. All that it amounts to, is that in such cases
testimony may be disregarded, ancf not that It must be
disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question pf
weight of evidence which a Court may apply in a given set of H
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 3 S.C.R.
A circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a mandatory
rule of evidence. (See Nisar Alli v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
[AIR 1957 SC 366]. In a given case, it is always open to a
Court to differentiate accused who had been acquitted from
those who were convicted where there are a number of
B accused persons. (See Gurucharan Singh and Anr. v. State
of Punjab [AIR 1956 SC 460]. The doctrine is a dangerous
one specially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were
to be rejected, because witness was evidently speaking an
untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of
c criminal justice would come to a dead-stop. Witnesses just
cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in
the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as
to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and
merely because in some respects the Court considers the
same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of
0
a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that
it must be disregarded in all respect as well. The evidence
has to be shifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a
sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a
witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or
E at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See
Sohrab s/o Beli Nayata and Anr. v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh [1972 (3) SCC 751] and Ugar Ahir and Ors. v. The
State of Bihar [AIR 1965 SC 277). An attempt has to be made
to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate ·
F grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not
feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because grain and
chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation
an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing
-
essential details presented by the prosecution completely from
G the context and the background against which they are made,
the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence
in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh [AIR
1954 SC 15] and Ba/aka Singh and Ors. v. The State of
Punjab [1975 (4) SCC 511]. As observed by this Court in
H State of Rajasthan v. Smt Ka/ki and Anr. [1981 (2) SCC
MANI @ UDATTU MAN & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY 345
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,.-
752], normal discrepancies in evidence are those which are A
due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory
due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock
and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always
there however honest and truthful a witness may be. Material
discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected B
of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which
a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies
do not corrode the credibility of a party's case, material
discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted in
Krishna Mochi and Ors. v. State of Bihar etc. [2002 (6) SCC c
81] and in Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab [2003 (7) SCC
643]. It was further illuminated in the Zahira H. Sheikh v. State
of Gujarat [2004 (4) SCC 158], Ram Udgar Singh v. State of
Bihar [2004(10) SCC 443], Gorle S. Naidu v. State of Andhra
Pradesh [2003 (12) SCC 449], Gubbala Venugopalswamy v. D
-~
State of Andhra Pradesh [2004 (10) SCC 120] and in Syed
lbahim v. State of A.P. [2006 (10) SCC 601].
5. In the examination of PW1, it has been stated that on
8.3.2001, in the morning the accused armed with knives had
come and threatened to kill Prahha and that is the night when E
Prabha came. She told him that he should go and hide himself
and late on 09.03.2001 at 5.30 AM. in the morning, the
accused armed with knives came and on seeing them Prabha
_) ran and accused followed him and PW1 alongwith her
- daughter-in-law PW2 followed and after running for some F
distance, A2 Ali and A 1 Mani cut the deceased on his head
with the Knife and A3 Cheyya, A4 Muthukumar and A6, Motilal
Babu, A5, Jayaraman, A7 Muhammed cut Prabha on the
shoulder and other parts of the body and AS was holding
Prabha by his legs, and these facts appear to corroborate the G
)
contents of the complaint lodged by PW1 in the Police Station.
The evidence of PW1 in the cross examination that on
08.03.2001 the accused had come and threatened Prabha
and that when Prabha had come in the night she had warned
him and that the next day when the accused came she shouted
H
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 3 S.C.R.
A to Prabha to escape and that she had followed etc, when
compared with the complaint, corroborates it and strengthens
the prosecution version. On examining Ex.P-1 complaint it is
evident that the evidence of PW1 that all the accused are
known to her and that all the accused were armed with the
B M01 series knives. Therefore, on the basis of the evidence of
PW1 being trustworthy and believable has been rightly acted
upon.
6. With regard to the argument of the accused that, in the
murder case of Babu the brother of deceased Prabha, the
C accused in the present case were also implicated and
questioned, and due to that PW1, the mother of Babu and
Prabha implicated the accused falsely in the present, case
also and that accused cannot be convicted on the basis of
PW1 's evidence. Merely because the accused were
D investigated in the case of Babu, the evidence of PW1 cannot
be disregarded. In this context reference may be made to
Balakram & Ors vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1974 SC 2165) and
Ushamubalu Sakdu Vs. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1976 SC
557). It is seen from the evidence of PW1 that PW1 's other
E son Babu had been killed and the accused in the present
case was implicated there also and were acquitted. PW1 has
also stated that 5-6 months after the death of Babu, her son
Prabha was killed. On considering the evidence of PW1 that
she knew the accused from their childhood and that due to the L
F enmity of the accused with her children, they killed her sons
and that on 8.3.2001 the accused armed with knives came to
her house and threatened to kill Prabha and that she informed
this to Prabha and that the next day, the accused came to her
-
house, chased Prabha and killed her, it cannot be said that
just because the accused were set free in the case of Babu,
G PW1 has with the wrong intention implicated the accused in
the present case. In the first case relied upon by the
prosecution, it has been held that just because the eye witness
to the incident is related to the deceased, the evidence of the
H said eye witness cannot be disregarded. It is seen from the
-\
MANI@ UDATTU MAN & ORS. v. STATE REP. BY 347
INSPECTOR OF POLICE [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
decision of the second case that when the evidence of the A
interested witnesses in corroborated by the medical evidence,
then the entire evidence of the interested witnesses ought not
be rejected on that ground.
7. We find no merit in the appeals filed by the accused- 8
appellant and accordingly, the appeals are dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
" '
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