Supreme Court of India
MANGAT RAMversusSTATE OF HARYANA
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 214
- Decided
- 27 March 2014
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- K S RADHAKRISHNAN
Holding
The prosecution failed to establish either cruelty under Section 498A or abetment under Section 306, and the presumption under Section 113A could not be invoked, leading to the setting aside of the convictions.
Summary
The appellant, Mangat Ram, was convicted under Sections 498A and 306 of the IPC for allegedly subjecting his wife to cruelty and abetting her suicide after she died from burn injuries at their matrimonial home. The trial and High Courts held that the husband’s failure to keep his wife with him at his posting and alleged dowry demands amounted to cruelty and that the death was a suicide. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the prosecution had proved the elements of cruelty under Section 498A and the abetment required under Section 306, and whether the statutory presumption of Section 113A of the Evidence Act could be invoked. The Court found no credible evidence of dowry demand, no proof of wilful conduct likely to drive the wife to suicide, and held that the death could plausibly be accidental given the wife’s long‑standing epilepsy. Consequently, the convictions under both sections were set aside and the appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether the prosecution proved the elements of cruelty under Section 498A IPC against the appellant
- Whether the appellant abetted the wife’s death, satisfying the requirements of Section 306 IPC
- Whether the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act can be applied in the present facts
- Whether the death was accidental or a suicide, considering the deceased’s epilepsy
- Whether the alleged dowry demand against the appellant was established
Legislation cited
- Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113A
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 107, s. 304-B, s. 306, s. 498A
Subjects
dowrycrueltyabetment of suicideSection 498ASection 306epilepsyaccidental deathinter-caste marriage
Judgment
[2014] 4 S.C.R. 988
A MANGAT RAM
v.
STATE OF HARYANA
(Criminal Appeal No. 696 of 2009)
MARCH 27, 2014
B
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN AND VIKRAMAJIT SEN, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss.498A and 306 - Married woman
died of burn injuries at her matrimonial home few months after
C marriage, while appellant-husband was away at his place of
work - No evidence to show whether it was an accidental death
or whether the deceased had committed suicide - Conviction
of appellant-husband ulss.498A and 306 - Justification - Held:
Not justified - Circumstances of the case as pointed out by
D the prosecution totally insufficient to hold that the appellant
had abetted his wife to commit suicide and the circumstances
enumerated u/s. 113A of the Evidence Act also not satisfied -
Every reason to believe that, in the instant case, the death
was accidental - Possibility of accidental death, since
E deceased was suffering from Epilepsy, cannot be ruled out -
Evidently, deceased was in the kitchen and, might be, during
cooking she might have suffered Epileptic symptoms and fell
down on the gas stove and might have caught fire, resulting
in her ultimate death - DW2, AS/, the Investigating Officer of
F the case, deposed that he had recorded the statements of the
deceased wherein she had stated that she was suffering from
Epilepsy for the last three years before the incident and that
on the incident date, while she was preparing meals on stove,
she had an attack of fits and fell on the stove and caught fire
- Deceased had also deposed at that time that her husband
G was away at duty when the incident occurred - The trial Court
as well as the High Court did not properly appreciate the
scope of ss. 498-A and 306 /PC - Alleged dowry demand of
Rs. 10, 0001- and the demand of scooter, stated to have been
H 988
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 989
made by the appellant, not established - The fact that A
appellant had left deceased in the matrimonial home in the
company of his parents would not amount to abetment to
commit suicide - The prosecution did not succeed in
establishing the offence u/ss.498-A and 306 /PC against the
appellant -Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113A. B
The wife of appellant died of burn injuries at her
matrimonial home, while the appellant was away at the
place of his work. There was no evidence to show
whether it was an accidental death or whether the C
deceased had committed suicide. The marriage between
the appellant and the deceased was an inter-caste love
marriage and, the incident occurred after few months of
marriage. The trial Court came to the conclusion that an
offence under Section 498-A IPC was made out against
the appellant. Further, it held that an offence under D
Section 306 IPC was also made out against the appellant,
though no charge was framed under that section. The
High Court affirmed the conviction. Hence the present
appeal.
E
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. The trial Court as well as the High Court
have not properly appreciated the scope of Sections 498·
A and 306 IPC. Taking into consideration all aspects of
the matter, it is clear that the prosecution has not
F
succeeded in establishing the offence under Section 498-
A and Section 306 IPC against the appellant.
Consequently, the conviction and sentence awarded by
the trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, are set
aside. [Paras 22, 29] [1006-F; 1011-F-G] G
State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi
(1984) 1 SCC 596: 1984 (2) SCR 50; State of Punjab and
others v. Surinder Kumar and others (1992) 1 SCC 489: 1991
(3) Suppl. SCR 553 and Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and H
990 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A another v. State of Gujarat and others (2004) 4 sec 158:
2004 (3) SCR 1050 - referred to.
2. In order to establish the ingredients of Section 498-
A IPC, the prosecution examined PW4, the maternal
grand-father of the deceased, who had brought her up,
8
on the demise of her parents. PW4 deposed that the
accused persons had demanded a dowry of Rs.10,000/-
and a scooter and, on 14.8.1993, PW4 gave Rs.10,000/-
in cash to the accused and had also promised to make
C arrangement for the purchase of a scooter. PW5, a distant
relative of PW4, also stated that after 15-20 days of the
marriage, the deceased came along with the accused to
the residence of PW4 and, at that time, the deceased had •
told PW4 and others that the accused was harassing her
since she had not brought dowry. PW5 also deposed that
D articles like cooler, fridge, sofa, double bed were given
to the accused by way of dowry. PWs 4 and 5 had
deposed that a demand of dowry was made not only by
the appellant, but also by his parents and sister. The trial
Court recorded a clear finding that the prosecution had
E failed to bring home the guilt as against the parents and
sister of the appellant under Section 498A, 304-8 IPC,
which was not questioned by the prosecution. However,
if that part of the evidence of PWs 4 and 5 could not be
believed against the rest of the accused, then it could not
F be put against the appellant alone, especially when PWs
4 and 5 had stated that the demand for dowry was mad~
by all the accused on 13.8.1993. The evidence of PWs 4
and 5 has to be appteciated in the light of the fact that
they were against the inter-caste marriage, since the
G appellant belonged to Scheduled Caste community and
the deceased belonged to Aggarwal community, a
forward community. Alleged dowry demand of Rs.10,000/
- and the demand of scooter, stated to have been made
by the accused, could not b~ established not only against
H the other three accused persons, but also against the
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 991
appellant as well. [Paras 8, 9] (999-A, F-H; 1000-A-D, G- A
H; 1003-A]
3.1. When the deceased sustained burn injuries, the
appellant was not at home. The trial Court itself said that
there was no such evidence on the file that she was B
subjected to cruelty or harassment, but adopted a
strange reasoning to hold that the conduct of appellant
in keeping and leaving the deceased at his parental home
amounted to causing cruelty and harassment to the
deceased. Another perverse reasoning of the trial Court C
which, according to the trial Court, led to the act of
suicide, was that the deceased had committed suicide
out of frustration and discontentment and due to the
reason that her maternal grandfather did not reach for her
rescue. In the letters sent by the deceased to her
maternal grand father PW4, there is absolutely no D
indication of any harassment or dowry demand by the
accused. The letters only indicate that she was home-sick
and wanted very much to see her grand father. [Paras 11,
12, 13, 14] (1001-B-C; 1002-D, G-H; 1003-A]
E
3.2. The picture that emerges from the conduct of the
deceased was that she was very home-sick at her
matrimonial home and was very much attached to PW4
and her friends and relatives at her home. The accused
being a Police Constable had to serve at various places F
away from his village and, then necessarily he had to
leave his wife at his home in the ~are and protection of
his parents. Not taking the wife along with him, itself was,
however, commented upon by the trial Court stating that
the accused had left his wife, an educated girl belonging G
to a business community, in a village and in the house
of a lower community people, whose way of life, whose
way of talking, whose way of behaviour would not be at
par with the family members of the deceased. On this
reasoning, the trial Court concluded that the deceased
H
992 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A was feeling perplexed, agitated and expected that the
accused would take her at his place of posting, rather
than leaving in a village in the company of rustic persons
which, according to the Court, led to discontentment and
unhappiness. One fails to understand how a judicially
a
B trained mind would come out with sucH reasoning.
[Paras 16, 17] [1004-8-E]
3.3. The failure of a married person to take his wife
along with him to the place where he is working or
posted, would not amount to cruelty leading to abetment
C of committing suicide by the wife. Taking wife to place of
posting depends upon several factors, like the
convenience of both, availability of accommodation and
so many factors. In the instant case, the appellant had left
the wife in the matrimonial home in the company of his
D parents and one fails to see how that action would
amount to abetment to commit suicide. Surprisingly, the
High Court found fault with the appellant for leaving the
deceased "at the mercy of his parents". [Paras 18, 19]
[1005-A-c,· F]
E
3.4. A woman may attempt to commit suicide due to
various reasons, such as, depression, financial
difficulties, disappointment in love, tired of domestic
worries, acute or chronic ailments and so on and need
F not be due to abetment. The reasoning of the High Court
that no prudent man will commit suicide unless abetted
to do so by someone else, is a perverse reasoning. [Para
20] [1006-C]
4. Explanation to Section 498-A IPC gives the
G meaning of 'cruelty', which consists of two clauses. To
attract Section 498-A, the prosecution has to establish
the wilful conduct on the part of the accused and that
conduct is of such a nature as is likely to drive the wife
to commit suicide. The failure to take one's wife to his
H place of posting, would not amount to a wilful conduct
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 993
of such a· nature which is likely to drive a woman to A
commit suicide. A married woman left at the parental
home by the husband would not by itself amount to a
wilful conduct to fall within the expression of 'cruelty',
especially when the husband is having such a job for
which he has to be away at the place of .his posting. It B
cannot be said that a wife left in a village life "in the
company of rustic persons", borrowing language used
by the trial Court, wou1d amount to wilful conduct of such
a nature to fall within the expression of 'cruelty'. Both the
trial Court as well as the High Court completely c
misunderstood the scope of Section 498-A IPC read with
its explanation. Clearly, no off~ce under Section 498-A
has been made out against the accused appellant. [Para
23] [1007 -C-F]
5. The trial Court found that no offence under D
Section 304-B IPC has been made out against the
appellant, but it convicted him under Section 306 IPC,
even though no charge had been framed on that section
against the accused. The scope and ambit of Section 306
IPC has not been properly appreciated by the Courts E
below. [Para 24] [1007-G-H]
6.1. The mere fact that if a married woman commits
suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage,
the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act F
would not automatically apply. So far as the present case
is concerned, the prosecution has not succeeded in
showing that there was a dowry demand, nor the
reasoning adopted by the Courts below would be
sufficient enough to draw a presumption so as to fall G
under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Section 113A
gives discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption
having regard to all other circumstances of the case,
which means that where the allegation is of cruelty, it can
consider the nature of cruelty to which the woman was
H
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A subjected, having regard to the meaning of the word
'cruelty' in Section 498-A IPC. [Para 26] [1008-H; 1009-A,
C-D, G]
6.2. The circumstances of the case pointed out by the
prosecution are totally insufficient to hold that the
8 accused had abetted his wife to commit suicide and the
circumstances enumerated under Section 113A of the
Evidence Act have also not been satisfied. [Para 27]
[1010-A]
C Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004) 12 SCC 257: 2004
(2) SCR 678 and Pinakin Mahipatray Rawat v. State of
Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 4~ • relied on.
7. There is every reason to believe that, in the instant
case, the death was accidental, for the following reasons.
D
Though not proved in her dying declaration, it
has come out in evidence that the deceased
was suffering from Epilepsy for the last three
years i.e. before 15.3.1993, the date of incident.
This fact is fortified by the evidence of the
E
Doctor, who was examined as DW1. He
deposed that the deceased was suffering from
Epilepsy and was under his treatment from
23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993. The evidence of DW1
was brushed aside by the trial Court on the
F ground that he was n-ot a Psychiatrist.
Epilepsy is not a Psychiatrist problem. It is a
disease of nerves system and a MD (Medicine)
could treat the patient of Epilepsy. The
reasoning given by the trial Court for brushing
G aside the evidence of DW1 cannot be
sustained. Therefore, the possibility of an
accidental death, since she was suffering from
Epilepsy, cannot be ruled out. Evidently, she
was in the kitchen and, might be, during
H cooking she might have suffered Epileptic
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 995
symptoms and fell down on the gas stove and A
might have caught fire, resulting her ultimate
death.
DW2, ASI, the Investigating Officer of the case,
deposed that he had recorded the statements
of the deceased wherein she had stated that 8
she was suffering from Epilepsy for the last
three years before the incident and that on
15.9.1993 while she was preparing meals on
stove, she had an attack of fits and fell on the
stove and caught fire. She had also deposed C
at that time that her husband was away at duty
at Madhliban, Kamal. The evidence of DW2
has to be appreciated in the light of overall
facts and circumstances of the case. [Para 28)
[1010-F-H; 1011-A-E] D
Case Law Reference:
1984 (2) SCR 50 referred to Para 4
1991 (3) Suppl. SCR 553 referred to Para 4 E
2004 (3) SCR 1050 referred to Para 4
2004 (2) SCR 678 relied on Para 26
(2013) 1o sec 48 relied on Para 27
F
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 696 of 2009.
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.05.2008 of the
High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal G
Appeal No. 592-SB of 1997.
Satinder S. Gulati (for Kamaldeep Gulati) for the Appellant.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J. 1. The appellant Mangat
Ram, a member of SC community, married the deceased
Seema, a member of the Aggarwal community on 13.7.1993
at Ambala. Few months after the marriage, on 15.9.1993,
according to the prosecution, the appellant sprinkled kerosene
8 oil on the body of the deceased and set her on fire, having failed
to meet the dowry demand. On hearing the hue and cry,
neighbours assembled and took her to the Civil Hospital,
Gohana and, later, she was shifted to the Medical College and
Hospital, Rohtak, where she died on 17.9.1993. The appellant,
C along with his parents and sister, were charge-sheeted for the
offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 304-8 IPC.
2. The prosecution, in order to bring home the offences,
examined PWs 1 to 7 and also produced various documents.
On the side of defence, DWs 1 to 5 were examined and the
D accused appellant got himself examined as DW6. After the
evidence was closed, the accused was questioned under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), who
denied all the incriminating statements made against him. The
trial Court, after appreciating the oral and documentary
E evidence, came to the conclusion that an offence under Section
498-A IPC was made out against the appellant, but not against
the other three accused persons. The trial Court also found that
no offence under Section 304-8 IPC was made out against the
accused persons, including the appellant. However, it was held
F that an offence under Section 306 IPC was made out against
the appellant, though no charge was framed under that section.
After holding the appellant guilty, the trial Court convicted the
appellant under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced him to
undergo imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine .of
G Rs.1,000/-, in default, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment
(RI) for six months. The appellant was also convicted under
Section 306 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
a period of seven years and to pay a fine of Rs.4,000/-, in
default, to further undergo RI for two years.
H
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 997
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
3. Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence awarded by A
the trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 592-
SB of 1997, which wherT came up for hearing before the
Division Bench of the High Court on 3.5.2007, the Court
passed the following order:
B
"Present: Mrs. Ritu Punj, DAG, Haryana
Mrs. Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, Advocate is
appointed as Amicus Curiae.
Heard c
Dismissed, reasons to follow."
4. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
SLP (Criminal) No. 7578 of 2007 which was later converted
into Criminal Appeal No. 182 of 2008. The criminal appeal D
came up for hearing before this Court on 25.1.2008 and this
Court deprecated the practice of the High Court in disposing
of the criminal appeals without recording reasons in support of
its decision. Placing reliance on the judgments of this Court in
State of Punjab and others v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi (1984) E
1 SCC 596, State of Punjab and others v. Surinder Kumar
and others (1992) 1 SCC 489 and Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh
and another v. State of Gujarat and others (2004) 4 sec 158,
this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed
the High Court to hear the appeal on merits. F
5. The High Court then considered the criminal appeal and
dismissed the same on merits vide its judgment dated
27 .5.2008 confirming the conviction and sentence awarded
against the accused by the trial Court. Aggrieved by the same, G
this appeal has been preferred.
6. Mr. Satinder S. Gulati, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant. took us elaborately through the oral and
documentary evidence adduced by the parties and submitted
that the judgment of the trial Court as well as the High Court is H
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A based on conjunctures, full of contradictions and surmises and
there is no evidence to substantiate the charges levelled against
the accused. Learned counsel submitted that there was a
complete misreading of the oral and documentary evidence
and, at every stage, the Courts'below adopted its own strange
B reasoning which was not brought out from the deposition of the
witnesses. Learned counsel pointed out that, throughout the
judgment of the trial Court as well as the High Court, one can
notice that the Courts below were prejudiced to the accused
for having entered into an inter-caste marriage and opined that
c the plight of such marriages would be discontentment and
unhappiness. Learned counsel pointed out that there is sufficient
evidence to conclude that the deceased was suffering from
Epilepsy for the last few years of the incident and that death
might have been caused by accident and, in any view, it was
not a homicidal death. Further, it was pointed out that the
0
prosecution could not 'prove that the appellant was at home
when the incident had happened. Learned counsel also
submitted that the trial Court has committed an error in altering
the offence to that of Section 306 IPC after finding the accused
not guilty under Section 304-B IPC. Learned counsel pointed
E out that the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-8 as
well as Section 306 IPC are entirely different and the trial Court
has committed a grave error in convicting the appellant under
Section 306 IPC. Learned counsel also pointed out that there
is absolutely no evidence of dowry demand and the conviction
F recorded under Section 498-A IPC is also without any material.
In support of his various contentions, learned counsel also made
reference to few judgments of this Court, which vile will deal in
the latter part of this judgment.
G 7. We did not have the advantage of hearing any counsel
on the side of the State, even though, the hearing was going
on for a couple of days. Learned counsel appearing for the
appellant took us through the depositions of the witnesses
examined on the side of the prosecution as well as the defence.
H as also the documentary evidence placed before the Court.
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 999
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
8. We may first examine whether an offence under Section A
498-A IPC has been made out against the appellant.
Admittedly, the marriage between the appellant and the
deceased was an inter-caste love marriage and, after few
months of the marriage, she died of burn injuries on 17.9.1993
at her matrimonial home. The question is whether immediately B
before and during the period between the date of marriage and
the date of incident, was there any dowry demand on the side
of the accused. In order to establish the ingredients of Section
498-A IPC, the prosecution examined PW4, the maternal grand-
father of the deceased, who had brought up her on the demise c
of her parents. On a plain reading of the deposition of PW4, it
is clear that he was against the inter-caste marriage of her
grand-daughter with the appellant, who belonged to the
Scheduled Caste community, while the deceased belonged to
the Aggarwal community. PW4, in his cross-examination, stated
0
that he had agreed for the marriage since the deceased was
adamant to marry the appellant. PW4 also stated that he had
not participated in Tikka ceremony held in the house of accused
appellant. Further, it was also stated that he had not contacted
any other member of the family of the accused before the
E
marriage. PW4, in the cross-examination, stated that he had
gone to Madhuban prior to the marriage to dissuade the
appellant from entering into such a marriage and, for the said
purpose, he met the DSP, Madhuban, who then called Mangat
Ram, but he was adamant to marry Seema. We have to
appreciate the evidence of PW4 in the light of the fact that he F
was totally against the inter-caste marriage between the
accused and the deceased. PW4 also deposed that the
accused persons had demanded a dowry of Rs.10,000/- and
a scooter and, on 14.8.1993, PW4 gave Rs.10,000/- in cash
to the accused and had also promised to make arrangement G
for the purchase of a scooter.
9. PW5, a distant relative of PW4, also stated that after
15-20 days of the marriage, the deceased came along with the
accused to the residence of PW4 and, at that time, the H
1000 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A deceased had told PW4 and others that the accused was
harassing her since she had not brought dowry. PW5 also
deposed that articles like cooler, fridge, sofa, double bed were
given to the accused by way of dowry. PWs 4 and 5 had
deposed that a demand of dowry was made not only by the
B accused Mangat Ram, but also by his parents and sister. The
trial Court recorded a clear finding that the prosecution had
failed to bring home the guilt as against the parents and sister
of the accused under Section 498A, 304-B IPC, which was not
questioned by the prosecution. However, if that part of the
C evidence of PWs 4 and 5 could not be believed against the
rest of the accused, then we fail to see how it could be put
against the accused alone, especially when PWs 4 and 5 had
stated that the demand for dowry was made by all the accused
on 13.8.1993. The evidence of PWs 4 and 5 has to be
appreciated in the light of the fact that they were against the
0
inter-caste marriage, since the appellant belonged to
Scheduled Caste community and the deceased belonged to
Aggarwal community, a forward community. Alleged dowry
demand of Rs.10,000/- and the demand of scooter, stated to
have been made by the accused, could not be established not
E only against the other three accused persons, but also against
the appellant as well.
10. We may now examine, apart from the dowry demand,
had the appellant treated the deceased with cruelty and abetted
F the deceased in committing suicide. We have alre~dy found
on facts that the prosecution could not establish that there was
any dowry demand from the side of the appellant. Once it is
so found, then we have to examine what was the cruelty meted
out to the deceased so as to provoke her to end her life. It has
G come out in evidence that when the deceased sustained burn
injuries, the accused was not at home. In this connection, we
may refer to para 25 of the trial Court judgment, which reads
as follows:
"25. Secondly, Seema died un-natural death. The most
H
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1001
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
crucial point which the prosecution was bound to establish, A
whether Seema was subjected to cruelty and harassment
on account of paucity of dowry or there was a fresh
demand of dowry, there is no such evidence on the file that
she was subjected to cruelty and harassment. Bidhi Chand
and Avinash Chander both appeared. They did not stat~ B
that Seema was subjected to cruelty and harassment for
paucity of dowry given at the time of marriage ........ "
[Emphasis Supplied]
11. The trial Court itself says that there was no such C
evidence on the file that she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment. ·But, in para 26 of its judgment, the trial Court,
adopted a strange reasoning to hold that the accused had
treated the deceased with cruelty, which is as follows:
D
"26. .. ..... An educated girl of business community was left
in a village life and in the house of a lower community
people whose way of living, whose way of talking, whose
way of behaviour is not at par with the family members of
Seema, since deceased. As such, Seema was feeling
E
perplexed agitated. She expected from Mangat Ram that
she must be kept with him at his place of posting and not
to be left in a village life in the company of rustic persons
and that appeared the cause of discontentment and
unhappiness. It has been experienced that such marriage
F
meets ill fate, like the present one. From statement of Bidhi
Chand and letters Ex.PE and PF an inference can be
easily drawn that Seema was fully unhappy and dis-
contended from the behaviour of Mangat Ram accused,
since he had left her in village life at the mercy· of her
mother-in-law Jiwni and that is why, she had been calling G
her grand maternal father to come for her rescue, but Bidhi
Chand, as explained by him, could not rush to village
Baroda because his son and his wife met with an accident
at Chandigarh and he went there."
1-'
''
1002 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R. ,·
A [Emphasis Supplied]
12. Further, in para 31, the trial Court has stated that the
conduct of Mangat Ram keeping and leaving Seema in Baroda
at his home amounted to causing cruelty and harassment to
B Seema. In para 32, the trial Court has also recorded a very
strange reasoning, which is as follows:
"32. Accused was very safely entered into defence and led
defence evidence that Seema had been suffering from
epilepsy prior to her marriage. In case, if this fact would
C have been in the knowledge of Mangat Ram, he would
have never solemnised marriage with Seema. After
enjoying sex with her, he must have deserted this
lady ........... "
0 13. We fail to see how the Court can come to the
conclusion that having known the deceased was suffering from
Epilepsy, he would not have married the deceased. If the
Court's reasoning is accepted, then nobody would or could
marry a person having Epilepsy. Another perverse reasoning
E of the trial Court which, according to the trial Court, led to the
act of suicide, is as follows:
"33. ...... She has been brought up by her grand maternal
father Bidhi Chand and he contracted a love marriage with
her. But in spite of that, he quenched his lust of sex by
F enjoying Seema and then left her in a rustic life of village.
Seema. out of frustration and !;iscontentment, wanted to
get rid of that life. When her maternal grand father did not
reach for her rescue, she being fully harassed, sprinkled
kerosene oil on her body and took her life ................ "
G·
[Emphasis Supplied]
14. The underlined portion indicates that the deceased had
committed suicide out of frustration and discontentment and
due to the reason that her maternal grandfather did not reach
H for her rescue. Reference to few letters sent by the deceased'
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1003
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
to her maternal grand father in this respect is apposite. In her A
letter dated 18.8.1993 (Annexure P-17) to PW4, there is
absolutely no indication of any harassment or dowry demand
by the accused. The letter would only indicate that she was
home-sick and wanted very much to see her grand father, the
operative porfr:m of the same reads as follows : B
" .... But you should come it is very important work. If you
will not come on 25th or ·26th then I will give my life.
Therefore both of you should come. Even if-Somnath
mama will say no for you to go to Baroda but both of you
should come, it is important work. If you will not come then
c
your daughter will give her life. What more should I write
you are wise enough. If there is any mistake in the letter
then forgive me. I sent a letter to Bandoi also. That day we
reached Baroda at 3 O'clock. Both of us wish Namaste to
all of you. Give love to Rahul, Sahul. I miss all of you a lot. 0
Daddyji after getting my letter come to Baroda on 25th or
26th immediately, it is important work. If you will not come
I will give my life therefore you and mamaji should come. I
am closing my letter. I am writing again that Daddyji you
should come. It is very important work. If you will not come E
on 25th or 26th then on 27th you will get a telephone call
of my death ..... "
15. Reference may also be made to another letter dated
11.9.1997 sent by her to PW4. In that letter also, there was no F
complaint of any harassment or dowry demand. On the other
hand, the letter would further reemphasize that she was home-
sick and very much wanted to see her maternal grand father,
the operative portion of the letter reads as follows:
" .... Daddyji you may not come for a night but you should G
come to meet me for an hour or two. It is very important
work. Daddyji you keep on replying to my letter I feel very
happy. I miss Rahul, Sahul, Raju, Sonu, Shalu and Rachit,
Sapna, Aarti and all of you. I keep on crying the whole day
and whole night by remembering you. I want to meet all of H
1004 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A you. Nanaji come to Baroda immediately after reading my
letter on 17th or 18th date, it is very important work. If you
love me then you should come. Daddy if you will not come
even after reading my letter then I take your vow that I will
give my life. Reply to the letter on getting it. From my side
B and from my mother in law's side and from Mangat's side
we wish Namaste to all of you. Give love to children. Writer
of letter your daughter. (Seema)"
16. The picture that emerges from the conduct of the
deceased was that she was very home-sick at her matrimonial
C home and was very much attached to PW4 and her friends and
relatives at her home. The accused being a Police Constable
had to serve at various places away from his village and, then
necessarily he had to leave his wife at his home in the care
and protection of his parents. Not taking the wife along with him,
D itself was, however, commented upon by the trial Court stating
that the accused had left his wife, an educated girl belonging
to a business community, in a village and in the.house of a
lower community people, whose way of life, whose way of
talking, whose way of behaviour would not be at par with the
E family members of the deceased. On this reasoning, the trial
Court concluded that the deceased was feeling perplexed,
agitated and expected that the accused would take her at his
place of posting, rather than leaving in a village in the company
of rustic persons which, according to the Court, led to
F discontentment and unhappiness.
17. We fail to understand 'how a judicially trained mind
would come out with such a reasoning and, at least, we
expected that the High Court would have set right that perverse
G reasoning, but we are surprised to note that the High Court
adopted yet another strange reasoning, w~ich reads as follows:'
"When deceased had contracted marriage with the
appellant-accused on her own accord against the wish of
her maternal grandfather then, deceased was not expected ,
H to commit suicide because she was to stay with the
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1005
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
appellant-accused. On the other hand, appellant-accused A
being employee had not kept the deceased with him at the
place of his posting. Deceased was staying with the
parents of the appellant-accused. So, actions of the
appellant-accused abetted the deceased to commit
suicide." B
18. We fail to see how the failure of a married person to
take his wife along with him to the place where he is working
or posted, would amount to cruelty leading to abetment of
committing suicide by the wife. Taking wife to place of posting
depends upon several factors, like the convenience of both,
c
availability of accommodation and so many factors. In the
instant case, the accused had left the wife in the matrimonial
home in the company of his parents and we fail to see how that
action would amount to abetment to commit suicide.
D
19. We may point out that the High Court itself after placing
reliance on the letters - Exh. PE and PF - written by the
deceased to her maternal grandfather, has noted that there was
no reference at all in these letters of the demand of dowry by
the accused, but stated that the deceased was lJnhappy and E
upset over the behaviour of the accused, having left her in the
company of his parents. We have gone through those letters
and, in those letters, there is nothing to show that the deceased
was upset by the behaviour of the accused. On the other hand,
the letters only expose that the deceased was extremely home F
sick and wanted the company of her maternal grandfather. We
are surprised to note that the High Court found fault with the
accused for leaving the deceased "at the mercy of his parents".
Again, the High Court made another strange reasoning, which
reads as follows:
G
"Immediately after marriage, two letters were written in the
months of August and September, 1993. Appellant-
accused being employee should have kept the deceased
with him. No prudent man is to commit suicide unless
abetted to do so. Actions of the appellant-accused H
1006 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A amounts to cruelty compelling the deceased to commit
suicide. Conviction under Section 306 IPC was rightly
recorded by the trial Court. No question of interference. If
husband is given a benefit of doubt on the allegation that
no direct evidence, no circumstantial evidence, when the
B marriage was inter-caste, then what type of evidence
deceased or complainant was to collect."
[Emphasis Supplied]
20. 'Ne find it difficult to comprehend the reasoning of the
C High Court that "no prudent man is to commit suicide unless
abetted to do so." A woman may attempt to commit suicide
due to various reasons, such as, depression, financial
difficulties, tlisappointment in love, tired of domestic worries,
acute or chronic ailments and so on and need not be due to
D abetment. The reasoning of the High Court that no prudent man
will commit suicide unless abetted to do so by someone else,
is a perverse reasoning.
21. We fail to see how the High Court can say that the
E accused being a police man should have kept his wife with him
at his workplace. Further, the High Court then posed a wrong
question to itself stating that if there is no direct evidence, no
circumstantial evidence, then what type of evidence the
deceased or complainant was to collect, when the marriage is
F inter~caste, a logic we fail to digest.
22. We are sorry to state that the trial Court as well as the
High Court have not properly appreciated the scope of Sections
498-A and 306 IPC. Section 498-A IPC, is extracted below for
an easy reference:
G
"498-A. Whoever, being the husband or the relative
of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to
cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable
to fine.
H
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1007
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
•
Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, A
'cruelty' means-
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health
(whether mental or physical) of the woman; or B
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment
is with a view to coercing her or any person related
to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property
or valuable security is on account of failure by her C
or any person related to her to meet such demand."
· 23. Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of
'cruelty', which consists of two clauses. To attract Section 498-
A, the prosecution has to establish the wilful conduct on the part
of the accused and that conduct is of such a nature as is likely D
to drive the wife to commit suicide. We fail to see how the
failure to take one's wife to his place of posting, would amount
to a wilful conduct of such a nature which is likely to drive a
woman to commit suicide. We fail to see how a married woman
left at the parental home by the husband would by itself amount
E
to a wilful conduct to fall within the expression of 'cruelty',
especially when the husband is having such a job for which he
has to be away at the place of his posting. We also fail to see
how a wife left in a village life "in the -:;ompany of rustic persons",
borrowing language used by the trial Court, would amount to
wilful conduct of such a nature to fall within the expression of F
'cruelty'. In our view, both the trial Court as well as the High Court
have completely misunderstood the scope of Section 498-A
IPC read with its explanation and we are clearly of the view that
no offence under Section 498-A has been made out against
the accused appellant. G
24. We have already indicated that the trial Court has found
that no offence under Section 304-B IPC has been made out
against the accused, but it convicted the accused under
Section 306 IPC, even though no charge had been framed on
H
1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2014] 4 S.C.R.
A that section against the accused. The scope and ambit of
Section 306 IPC has not been properly appreciated by the
Courts below. Section 306 IPC reads as under:
"306. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
B imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."
Abetment of suicide is confined to the case of persons who
aid or abet the commission of the suicide. In the matter of an
offence under Section 306 IPC, abetment must attract the
C definition thereof in Section 107 IPC. Abetment is constituted
by instigating a person to commit an offence or engaging in a
conspiracy to commit, aid or intentional aiding a person to
commit it. It would be evident from a plain reading of Section
306 read with Section 107 IPC that, in order to make out the
D offence of abetment or suicide, necessary proof required is that
the culprit is either instigating the victim to commit suicide or
has engaged himself in a conspiracy with others for the
commission of suicide, or has intentionally aided by act or
illegal omission in the commission of suicide.
E
25. In the instant case, of course, the wife died few months
after the marriage and the presumption under Section 113A of
the Evidence Act could be raised. Section 113A of the
Evidence Act reads as follows:
F "113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a
married woman.- when the question is whether the
commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by
her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown
that she had committed suicide within a period of seven
years from the date of her marriage and that her husband
G
or such relative of her husband and subjected her to
cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the
other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
husband."
H
MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1009
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
26. We are of the view that the mere fact that if a married A
woman commits suicide within a period of seven years of her
marriage, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence
Act would not automatically apply. The legislative mandate is
that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her
marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her B
husband has subjected her to cruelty, the presumption as
defined under Section 498-A IPC, may attract, having regard
to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide has
been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her
husband. The term "the Court may presume, having regard to c
all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had
been abetted by her husband" would indicate that the
presumption is discretionary. So far as the present case is
concerned, we have already indicated that the prosecution has
not succeeded in showing that there was a dowry demand, nor
0
the reasoning adopted by the Courts below would be sufficient
enough to draw a presumption so as to fall under Section 113A
of the Evidence Act. In this connection, we may refer to the
judgment of this Court in Hans Raj v. State of Haryana (2004)
12 sec 257, wherein this Court has examined the scope of
E
Section 113A of the Evidence Act and Sections 306, 107, 498-
A etc. and held that, unlike Section 1'138 of the Evidence Act,
a statutory presumption does not arise by operation of law
merely on the proof of circumstances enumerated in Section
113A of the Evidence Act. This Court held that, under Section
113A of the Evidence Act, the prosecution has to first establish F
that the woman concerned committed suicide within a period
of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her
husband has subject her to cruelty. Even though those facts are
established, the Court is not bound to presume that suicide has
been abetted by her husband. Section 113A, therefore, gives G
discretion to the Court to raise such a presumption having
regard to all other circumstances of the case, which means that
where the allegation is of cruelty, it can consider the nature of
cruelty to which the woman was subjected, having regard to the
meaning of the word 'cruelty' in Section 498-A IPC. H
1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A 27. We are of the view that the circumstances of the case
pointed out by the prosecution are totally insufficient to hold that
the accused had abetted his wife to commit suicide and the
circumstances enumerated under Section 113A of the Evidence
Act have also not been satisfied. In Pinakin Mahipatray Rawat
B v. State of Gujarat (2013) 10 SCC 48, this Court has examined
the scope of Section 113A of the Evidence Act, wherein this
Court has reiterated the legal position that the legislative
mandate of Section 113A of the Evidence Act is that if a woman
commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is
c shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had
subjected her to cruelty, as per the presumption defined in
Section 498-A IPC, the Court may presume, having regard to
all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been
abetted by the husband or such person. The Court held that,
though a presumption could be drawn, the burden of proof of
0
showing that such an offence has been committed by the
accused under Section 498-A IPC is on the prosecution. The
Court held that the burden is on the prosecution to establish
the fact that the deceased committed suicide and the accused
abetted the suicide. In the instant case, there is no evidence
E to show whether it was an accidental death or whether the
deceased had committed suicide.
28. We have every reason to believe that, in the instant
case, the death was accidental, for the following reasons.
F
Though not proved in her dying declaration, it has
come out in evidence that the deceased was
suffering from Epilepsy for the last three years i.e.
before 15.3.1993, the date of incident. This fact is
fortified by the evidence of Dr. Kuldeep, who was
G
examined as DW1. He deposed that the deceased
was suffering from Epilepsy and was under his
treatment from 23.12.1992 to 2.4.1993 at Kuldeep
Hospital, Ambala City. His evidence was brushed
aside by the trial Court on the ground that Dr.
H
"MANGAT RAM v. STATE OF HARYANA 1011
[K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.]
Kuldeep was not a Psychiatrist. It may be noted that A
Epilepsy is not a Psychiatrist problem. It is a
disease of nerves system and a MD (Medicine)
could treat the patient of Epilepsy. The reasoning
given by the trial Court for brushing aside the
evidence of DW1 cannot be sustained. Therefore, B
the possibility of an accidental death, since she was
suffering from Epilepsy, cannot be ruled out.
Evidently, she was in the kitchen and, might be,
during cooking she might have suffered Epileptic
symptoms and fell down on the gas stove and might c
have caught fire, resulting her ultimate death.
DW2, ASI Ram Mohan, the Investigating Officer of
the case, deposed that he had recorded the
statements of the deceased wherein she had stated
that she was suffering from Epilepsy for the last D
three years before the incident and that on
15.9.1993 while she was preparing meals on stove,
she had an attack of fits and fell on the stove and
caught fire. She had also deposed at that time that
her husband was away at duty at Madhuban, Kamal. E
In our view, the evidence of DW2 has to be
appreciated in the light of overall facts and
circumstances of the case.
29. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, we F
are of the view that the prosecution has not succeeded in
establishing the offence under Section 498-A and Section 306
IPC against the appellant. Consequently, the appeal is allowed
and the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court and
confirmed by the High Court, are set aside.
G
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeal allowed.
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