MANDIR SHREE SITARAMJI @ SHREE SITARAM BHANDARversusLAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2005 INSC 381
- Decided
- 24 August 2005
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S N VARIAVA
Holding
The acquisition is for planned development of Delhi, Part VII does not apply, and Section 48 does not allow withdrawal once possession is taken.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a challenge to a 1975 notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, which sought to acquire about 300 bighas of land, including the appellants' 68 acres, for "planned development of Delhi." The appellants argued that the acquisition was actually for a cooperative society and that the government’s scheme allowing withdrawal of acquisition under Section 48 should apply, rendering the acquisition void for non‑compliance with Part VII provisions. The respondents contended that the acquisition was part of the larger 1959 scheme for Delhi’s planned development and that Part VII did not apply, and that the scheme and Section 48 could not be invoked once possession had been taken. The Court held that the acquisition was indeed for planned development of Delhi, not for the cooperative society, so Part VII provisions were inapplicable; the scheme applied only to owners in possession and could not override the acquisition, and Section 48 does not permit withdrawal after possession. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- The acquisition was for "planned development of Delhi" or for a cooperative society, determining the applicability of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act.
- Whether the government’s scheme and letters permitting development by the parties allow withdrawal of the acquisition under Section 48.
- Whether Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act permits withdrawal of acquisition after possession has been taken.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 39, s. 4, s. 40, s. 41, s. 48, s. 5A, s. 6
Subjects
Judgment
MANDIR SHREE SITARAMJJ @ SHREE SITARAM BHANDAR A
v.
LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR AND ORS.
AUGUST 24, 2005
[S.N. VARIAVA AND TARUN CHATTERJEE, JJ.] B
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :
Section 4, Part Vll-Acquisition of land for planned development of
Delhi-Portion of the acquired property allotted to Cooperative Societies-
Chal!enge to acquisition for non-compliance with provisions of Part Vll-
c
Held, entire acquisition was for 'planned development of Delhi '-Even if
appellant's land was allotted to society after acquisition, it would not mean
tha{ acquisition was for society-Hence there was no need to comply with
provision of Part-VII.
D
Section 48-Acquisition of land-Withdrawal of-Plea ofappellant that
Government formulated a scheme by which parties were permitted to develop
their own land and acquisition of land of such parties be withdrawn
Substainability of-Held: Not sustainable, as scheme applicable to persons
who own and possess the land-Possession of appellant's land had already
been taken thus not applicable to land of appellant-Even under Section 48, E
once possession was taken, the Governn1ent could not withdraw from the
acquisition.
On 13.11.1959, a Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition
Act was issued for acquisition of app. 35,000 acres of land for "planned F
development of Delhi". Amongst the lands sought to be acquired, were
Appellants' land of app. 68 acres. Large number of persons including
appellant challenged the Notification and this court quashed the Notification
Another Notification dated 13.3.1975 proposing to acquire app. 300 bighas
for "planned development of Delhi" was issued. The Appellants again
. challenged the proposed acquisition by filing a Writ Petition which was
dismissed.
G
In appeal to this court, Appellants contended that the acquisition is
not for "planned development of Delhi" but for a cooperative society; and
that the provisions of Part Vil of the Land Acquisition Act have not been H
969
970 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A complied with and therefore the acquisition is bad and should be set aside;
that the Government has formulated a scheme by which parties are
permitted to develop their own land and hence appellants may be permitted
to develop the land in accordance with the norms given by Delhi
Development Authority and for this reason also the acquisition should be
B quashed.
Respondents contended that the acquisition was effectively of 35000
acres of land in pursuance of Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959
and land all around Appellant's land was acquired in pursuance of the
earlier Notification; that when there is acquisition of such a large area of
C land, it is not possible to specify in detail what the exact purpose of
acquisition is; that Delhi Development Authority, for whom the land has
been acquired, cannot develop 35000 acres on its own and therefore, it has
become necessary to give various portions of land to various societies for
the purposes of development however it does not mean that the acquisition
D is for the purposes of those societies.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1. There is no merit in the challenge to the proposed
acquisition on the ground that the acquisition was for the purposes of the
E society. The subsequent Notification is merely a follow up of the earlier
Notification. The entire acquisition is for "planned development of Delhi".
The Appellants' land is in the midst of the 35000 acres which have been
acquired pursuant to the Notification under Section 4 issued in 1959. The
Society is to be allotted some land and even if Appellants' land is allotted
to this Society, after acquisition, it will not mean that the acquisition was
F for this Society. Therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Land
Acquisition Act need not have been complied with. (974-D, E)
Shri Mandir Sita Ramji v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., [1975) 1 SCR
597 and Ajlatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1975) 4 SCC 285, referred to.
G 2. Perusal of scheme shows that it only applies in respect of persons/
agencies who own and possess the land. In this case possession of the land
had already been taken. The scheme also categorically states that the
scheme would not take away the rights of the Delhi Development Authority
to acquire for development of Delhi. Thus the scheme was not applicable
H to lands of the Appellants. Even under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition
.
•,
MAND!R SHREE SIT ARAMJI ·f! SH REE SITA RAM BHANDAR ,., !,AND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR lVARIA VA. J] 971
Act once possession is taken the Government cannot withdraw from the A
acquisition. There is no substance in this contention also. (976-D, E]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5273 of2005.
From the Judgment and Order dated 21/22.8.2003 of the Delhi High
Court in C. W.P. No. 623 of 1977.
B
Mohan Parasaran, Additional Solicitor General, T.R. Andhyarujina,
K.K. Venugopal, Bhaskar P. Gupta, Prabhjit Jauhar, S.S. Jauhar, Saurabh
Kirpal, Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya, Ms. Rachana Srivastava,
Sanjay Poddar, Ajatshatru, Raghunath Kapur, Vijay K. Verma, Abhijit C
Chatterjee, S. Sukumaran, M.P. Singh and K. Rajeev for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.N. VARIA VA, J. : Leave granted.
D
Heard parties.
This Appeal has been tiled against the Judgment dated 21/22 August,
2003 passed by the High Court of Delhi.
Briefly stated the facts as follows: E
On 13th November, 1959 a Notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act was issued for acquisition of app. 35,000 acres of land. The
said acquisition was for "planned development of Delhi". Amongst the lands,
sought to be acquired, were Appellants' land of app. 68 acres. Clause 2(d) F
of the said Notification exempted lands of "Religious Institutions".
This acquisition was challenged by a number of parties including the
Appellants. The Writ Petition tiled by the Appellants was allowed by a Single
Judge of the Delhi High Court on the ground that the Appellants were not
heard in respect of their objections tiled under Section 5A of the Land G
Acquisition Act. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed the
Appeal and dismissed the Writ Petition. The Appeal tiled by the Appellants
in this Court was allowed by the Judgment reported in Shri Mandir Sita Ramji
v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors., [1975] I SCR 597. This Court held that there
had oeen no enquiry as to whether or not the Appellants' land belonged to H
972 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A a religious institution. Therefore, this Court quashed the Section 6 Notification
and remitted the matter back to the Land Acquisition Collector to enquire into
the objection of the Appellants.
It appears that the Government then decided not to pursue the earlier
B Section 4 Notification in respect of the Appellants' land. Another Notification
dated 13th March, 1975 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,
proposing to acquire app. 300 bighas for "planned development of Delhi" was
issued. The Appellants again challenged the proposed acquisition by tiling a
Writ Petition. The Writ Petition was dismissed by the impugned order.
C On behalf of the Respondents, it has been submitted that the Appellants
are not entitled to maintain this Appeal as they have already sold off the land
to a third party. It is submitted that the Appellants no longer have any right,
title or interest in the said land. This has been denied by the Appellants who
claim that they have only entered into a development agreement. In our view,
D it is not necessary for us to go into this controversy. It is preferable to decide
the challenge to the acquisition proceedings on their own merits. We have,
therefore, left this question open and heard the parties on the challenge to the
acquisition.
On behalf of the Appellants, it was submitted that the acquisition is not
E for "planned development of Delhi". It was submitted that on 9th May, 1972
an Agreement has been entered into between the President of India on one
hand and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Cooperative Hcusing
Building Societies on the other. It is submitted that the Agreement is to allot
to this Cooperative Society app. 217 bighas and 8 biswas of land. It is
F submitted that this is the land of the Appellants. It is submitted that in
pursuance of this Agreement a sum of Rs. 26,37,245 has been received from
the society. It is submitted that the acquisition is actually for the society yet
it purports to show as if it is for "Planned development of Delhi". It is
submitted that as the acquisition is for a cooperative society, the provisions
of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act and particularly Sections 39, 40 and
G 41 should have been complied with. It is submitted that those provisions have
not been complied with and therefore the acquisition is bad and should be
set aside.
On the other, on behalf of the Respondents it is submitted that the
H acquisition was effectively of35000 acres ofland in pursuance of Notification
MANDIRSHREE SITARAMJ! '(i,.SHREESTTARAM BHANDAR "·LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTOR [VARlAVA,J.] 973
under Section 4 issued in 1959. It was submitted that because of the orders A
of this Court, the Appellants' land got excluded from the earlier Notification.
It was submitted that land all around Appellants' land was acquired in
pursuance of the earlier Notification. It was submitted that in order to avoid
any further complication and delay the second Notification under Section 4
was issued on 13th March, 1975. It was submitted that the acquisition of B
Appellants' land was for purposes of "planned development of Delhi" and
not for any Co-operative Society. It is submitted that acquisition for "planned
development of Delhi" has been upheld by a Constitution Bench of this Court
in the case of Ajlatoon v Lt. Governor of Delhi, [1975] 4 SCC 285. It is
pointed out that the Constitution Bench has in this Judgment upheld acquisition
inter alia on the ground that when there is acquisition of such a large area c
of land, it is not possible to specify in detail what the exact purpose of
acquisition is. It was pointed out that an argument identical to the one now
made has been negatived in that Judgment. Reliance was placed on para 24
of the Judgment which reads as under:
D
"24. It was contended by Dr. Singhvi that the acquisition was really
for the co-operative housing societies which are companies within
the definition of the word 'company' in Section 3(e) of the Act, and,
therefore, the provisions of Part Vil of the Act should have been
complied with. Both the learned Single Judge and the Division
Bench of the High Court were of the view that the acquisition was E
not for company. We see no reason to differ from their view. The
mere fact that after the acquisition the Government proposed to hand
over, or, in fact, handed over, a portion of the property acquired for
development to the co-operative housing societies would not make
the acquisition one for 'company'. Nor are we satisfied that there is F
any merit in the contention that compensation to be paid for the
acquisition came from the consideration paid by the co-operative
societies. In the light of the averments in the counter affidavit filed
in the writ petitions here, it is difficult to hold that it was co-
operatives which provided the fund for the acquisition. Merely
because the Government allotted a part of the property to co- G
operative societies for development, it would not follow that the
acquisition was for co-operative societies and, therefore, Part VII of
the Act was attracted."
lt is submitted that the Delhi Development Authority, for whom the land H
974 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A has been acquired, cannot develop 35000 acres on its own. It was submitted
that it, therefore, becomes necessary to give various portions of land to various
societies for the purposes of development. It was submitted that merely
because land is given to societies does not mean that the acquisition is for
the purposes of those societies. It was submitted that the Agreement dated 9th
B May, 1972 does not specify that the land to be allotted to that society is the
Appellants' land. It was submitted that the Agreement is merely to allot some
land out of the 35,000 acres being acquired. It is submitted that the
Constitution Bench of this Court has approved such a course of action.
In support of this submission, it was also pointed out that the planned
C development can only be in accordance with the Delhi Development Act and
that this permitted the authority to allot land to various co-operative societies
for the purposes of development.
We have considered the submissions of both the sides. In our view, there
D is no merit in the challenge to the proposed acquisition on the ground that
the acquisition was for the purposes of the society covered by Agreement
dated 9th May, 1972. The subsequent Notification is merely a follow up of
the earlier Notification. The entire acquisition is for "planned development
of Delhi". To be remembered that Appellants' land is in the midst of the 35000
acres which have been acquired pursuant to the Notification under Section
E 4 issued in 1959. The Agreement dated 19th May, 1972 does not specify that
it is the Appellants' land which is to be allotted to that Society. The Society
is to be allotted some land and even if Appellants' land is allotted to this
Society, after acquisition, it will not mean that the acquisition was for this
Society. Therefore, the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act
F need not have been complied with.
It was next submitted, on behalf of the Appellants, that the Government
has formulated a scheme by which parties are permitted to develop their own
land. It was submitted that the acquisition of land of such parties was to be
withdrawn as per the policy. In this behalf, reliance was placed upon a letter
G dated 3rd March, 1987 from the office of the Prime Minister, wherein it is
stated that the Appellants may be permitted to develop the land in accordance
with the norms given by Delhi Development Authority. Reliance was also
placed upon a letter dated 4th April, 1991 from the Director, Delhi Development
Authority, to one Shri Acharya Arun Dev (whom the Appellants claim to be
H their power of attorney holder) wherein also the Appellants' proposal to allot
MANDIRSHREE SITARAMJl ·'.!· SHREESlTARAM BHANDAR v LAND ACQUISITION COLLECTORfVARJAVA.J.J 975
the land to them for development was stated to be approved. Reliance was A
also placed upon a letter dated 17th September, 1991 from the Additional
Secretary to the Minister of Urban Development as well as minutes of a
meeting held on 23rd September, 1991 in the chambers of the Lt. Governor
to consider the Appellants proposal to develop the lands themselves. Relying
on these documents, it was submitted that the Governments had decided to B
withdraw from the acquisition. It was submitted that the Government should
be held bound by its commitment to so withdraw. It was submitted that for
this reason also the acquisition should be quashed.
As against this, on behalf of the Respondents, it is pointed out that this
very ground had been considered by the Delhi High Court on an earlier c
occasion. It was pointed out that after looking into the relevant records the
Delhi High Court had recorded in paras 18 and 19 of its Judgments as follows:
"18. It also appears that there was a decision relating to denotification
of land in favour of one Sita Ram Bhandar Trust. File thereof had D
been called for by the Prime Minister who ordered that no land was
to be denotified without the previous approval of the Cabinet/Prime
minister. When this file was sent to the Ministry, based on the
decision contained in respect of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust, follo\ving
noting was recorded in respect of the land in question on 17th June,
1999. E
"Notes from page 38/N onwards may kindly be seen: The case of
Denotification of village Kotla Mahigiran, Tehsil Mehrauli, New
Delhi was examined without calling a fresh report upto date position
of the case from DDA. The then Minister (UD) has ordered (P-41/ F
N) for the denotification of the land.
2. Subsequently, DDA has informed that out of 615 Bigha acquired
by the Govt. physical possession of land measuring 600 Bigha has
already been taken over by the DDA.
G
3. In the mean time the file relating to denotification ofland in favour
of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has been called for by the Prime Minister
and the PM has ordered that no land is to be denotified without the
previous approval of the Cabinet/PM. In view of this no further
action is required in this case. Submitted please. H
976 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.
A 19. This file was placed before the Minister. It may be mentioned
that in the meantime new incumbent· had taken charge. This new
Minister took the following decision on the basis of aforesaid noting
dated 17th June, 1999.
"The file of Sita Ram Bhandar Trust has since been received back
B
from the PMO and PM's instructions not to denotify the land have
been noted.
2. On the Trust's file, I have recorded my observations. These
observations apply in this case as well. There is no justification for
c denotifying land, particularly when 600 bighas have already been
acquired and taken over."
This could not be denied by the Appellants. It is thus clear that letters
and minutes relied upon are mere recommendations. No decision to release
D from acquisition had been taken. In any event the Prime Minister had turned
out this proposal.
Even otherwise, we have seen the scheme sought to be relied upon. We
find from the scheme that \t only applies in respect of persons/agencies who
own and possess the land. In this case possession of the land had already been
E taken. The scheme also categorically states that the scheme would not take
away the rights of the Delhi Development Authority to acquire for development
of Delhi. Thus the scheme was not applicable to lands of the Appellants. Even
·•
under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act once possession is taken the
Government cannot withdraw from the acquisition. We thus see no substance
F in this contention also.
In view of the above, we see no merit in this Appeal. The Appeal stands
dismissed with no orders as to costs.
D.G. Appeal dismissed.
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