MAN SINGH AND ORS.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

    662



A
                             MAN SINGH AND ORS.
                                      v.
                         STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS.

                              AUGUST 23, 1985
B
      [V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]

          Constitution of India 1950, Articles 14, 19(l)(g) & 21.

         Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of licence) Act, 1976
    Sections'3 & 5.
             '
c        Cycle Rickshaw - Licence - Grant of - Vehicle to be plied by
    owner himself - Whether - Valid - Constitutional.

          Statutory Interpretation.

         Validity of statute - Determination of - Duty of court -
D
    Consider the degree of encroachment of citizen's right - Reason-
    ableness can be determined on surrounding    circumstances   and
    contemporaneous legislation.

         The ' Petitioners in the Writ Petition ply cycle rickshaws
    which they hire for the day from the owners of those vehicles.
E
    They carry on that activity for about eight months in the year
    and then return to the region to which they belong. For the hire
    of cycle rickshaws they pay the owners a certain sum for the day
    retaining the balance of the day's income to themselves. They are
    not in a position to purchase any cycle rickshaws. Unless they
    hire the vehicles they cannot carry on that activity. Oppressed
F
    by poverty this arrangement of cycle rickshaw hire has been
    resorted to with the owners who through. such exploitation obtain
    an unduly handsome return on the paltry investment made in the
    purchase of the cycle rickshaws.

         The Punjab Legislature, enacted the Punjab' Cycle Rickshaws
    (Re.gulation of Licence) Act, 1976 and s. 3 thereof provided that
G
    no owner of a cycle rickshaw shall be granted any licence in
    respect of his cycle rickshaw nor his licence shall be renewed by
    any municipal authority after the cODlllencement of the Act, unless
    the cycle-rickshaw is to be plied by such owner himself• Sec. 5

H
                        MAN SINGH v. STATE                    663


of the Act provided for penal punishment of any person found to      A
be in possession of a cycle-rickshaw without a lincence conform-
ing to the provisions of the Act.

     The constitutional validity of the Pilnjab Cycle Rickshaw
(Regulation of Licence) Act, 1976 was challenged and this Court
in H/e Azad Rickshaw Plil1ers Union v. State of l'lmjab, [1981) 1    B
s.c.a. 366, framed the following scheme:
     (a) Every rickshaw puller in Amritsar or other IDllnicipality
who had been a licencee within one year of the coming into force
of the Act shall be entitled to apply to the Municipal
Connissioner for a certificate.or other document to the effect       c
that he had been a licencee for rickshaw pulling.

       (b) The Municipal Commissioner will verify the records and
will grant the necessary certificate or other document within one
11Klnth from the date of the application.
                                                                     D
     ( c) On receipt of the. Municipal certificate the rickshaw
puller will apply to the Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
(Small Loans) under the Guarantee scheme of 1971 for advance of a
loan upto Rs. 900.

      (d) The loan 811Klunt shall be repaid by the rickshaw puller
in 15 11K>nthly instalments. If there are delayed payments of        E
instalments of loan, higher rate of interest will be recoverable.

     (e) When the rickshaw pullers during the agricultural season
go to work in their fields, they shall nominate other rickshaw
pullers without employment to ply the rickshawa during that
season.The Municipal Commissioner, i f satisfied that the nomins-    F
tion made ia bons fide will issue licence to such pullers, or
nominees of the liceii&ed rickshaw pullers, in the agricultural
sea.son.

     The petitioners in their Writ Petitions contended that the
1976 enactment resulted in making their conditions much worse,       G
for whereas formerly they could at least ply the cycle rickshaw&
on hiring them from the owners for a sum, they were unable to do
so now, especially as they did not have the funds, nor possessed
the arrangements for obtaining a loan for the purpose, and as
they were not permanent residents of Amritsar, no one was
prepared to stand surety for the S11K>Unt they sought to borrow      H
froa the Banks. It was further contended that this scheme of this
    664               SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


    Court in H/s Azad RicJrshair Puller's Onion v. State of Punjab had
A   not been implemented by the Amritsar Municipal Corporation and
    consequently the provisions of the Punjab Act of 1976 had conti-
    nued to operate with unabated severity to their detriment, and
    that it be declared ultra vires as an unconstitutional violation
    of the fond8J•ental right under sub.cl.(g) of cl.(l) of Article 19
    of the Constitution to carry on occupation or business. As a
B   similar restriction is not imposed on taxi drivers, cart load
    carriers, three wheeler auto rickshaw drivers and other vehicles
    plying for public hire the Punjab Act violates the fundamental
    rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The
    scheme propounded by the Court has failed because the Municipal
    Administration did not make any real attempt to implement it.
c        The Writ Petitions were contested by the Amritsar Municipal
    Corporation. It was contended that the cost of a cycle rickshaw
    being about Rs.1200 a person with substantial financial resources
    would purchase a number of cycle rickshaws and hire them out to
    rickshaw pullers at Rs. 8 per day irrespective of the income
    earned by the rickshaw puller, thus earning over 150 per cent
    interest over his investment. To protect poor and needy rickshaw
D   pullers from such exploitation, the Legislature enacted the
    Punjab Act of 1976 to enable rickshaw pullers to escape the
    clutches of middlemen. Between the enforcement of the Punjab Act
    and the formulation of the scheme in Azad llicbhaw Puller's
    Union the Corporation renewed more than nine thousand licences in
    favour of individual rickshaw pullera, who were owners of the
E   rickshaws plied by them. No limit on the number of cycle
    rickshaws to be plied had been imposed by the Municipal
    Corporation.

         On tile question: (1) Whether the Punjab Act of 1976 is an
    instance of incomplete legislation and cannot serve the purpose
F   for which it was intended and because of the prohibitions and
    restraints incorporated in it, it constitutes an unreasonable
    restriction on the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-cl.(g)
    of cl.(l) of Art. 19 of the constitution and also violates
    Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (2) Whether the scheme
    framed.by this Court in Azad Rickshaw Puller's Union is incapable
G   of proper implementation, and therefore of no legal effect.

          Dismissing the Writ Petitions,

         llEUJ: 1. (a) The Punjab Cycle Rickshaw& (Regulation of
    Licence) Act 1976 cannot be regarded as an unreasonable restric-
H   tion on the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Art. 21
    read with sub-cl.(g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the
    Constitution. [680 A]
                        MAN SINGH v. STATE                       665


      (b) The Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation of Licence) Act        A
of 1976 regulatea the issue of licenses in respect of cycle
rickshaws plying in any municipal area in the State of Punjab.
It eseentially provides that no owner of a cycle rickshaw will be
granted a license in reapect of his cycle rickshaw unleas the
vehicle is plied by the owner himself. The inteution of the
statute is to ensure the plying of cycle rickshaws by rickshaw          B
pullers who are owners of the vehicle thus eliminating the
middleman who owns the vehicle. [675 E]

     (c) The true test of the validity of a statute must be the
effect and consequence of its operation on the fundamental right
of the citizen. The. object underlying the legislation embodies         c
the intent of the legislature in enacting it., but in construing
its validity in the context of a citizen's fundamental right the
question before the Court always must be whether its impact on
the fundamental right can be regarded as a reasonable restriction
on the exercise of the right. The focal point during such
examination is the fundamental right, and the duty of the Court         D
must be .to consider the quality and degree of the encroachment
made by the operation of the statute on the citizen's exercise.of
that right. [676 D-E]

        llaneka Gllndhi v. Union of India,      [1978] 2 s.c.a. 621,
11..c.• Cooper v. Union of India, [1970] 3 s.c.R.53C, referred to.
                                                                        E
     In the instant case, s. 3 of the Punjab Act of 1976 has the
effect of making it possible for the rickshaw puller to. ply the
rickshaw as owner of the vehicle and thereby to be the full owner
of the income earned by him., No longer will he be obliged to part
with an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another
who owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is a beneficial legislation        F
bringing directly home to the rickshaw puller the entire fruit of
his daily toil. The enactment is intended as a social welfare
measure against the _exploitation of the poor 8nd unemployed by
rapacious cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior
financial resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil of
rickshaw pullers. The legislation constitutes . a reasonable            G
restriction on the riliht of such rickshaw owners to carry on the
busiuess of hiring out cycle rickshaw inas11111ch as .the exercise of
the right is excluded by legislation designed for the ecoDOlllic
and social welfare of rickshaw pullers, who constitute'a signifi-
cant sector of the people, - a secto.r so pressed by poverty and
straitened by the economic misery of their situation thaf the           H
                            /


    666              SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


    guarantee of their full      day's   wages   to    them   seems   amply
A
    justified. (676 F-677 BJ.

           2.(a) The scheme framed by this Court in Azad Rickshaw
    l'liller's Union is a good scheme, capable of implementation, and
    productive of the objective for which it was designed. If it has
    not been successfully implemented so far, it is in the main
B
    largely on account of circumstances which could have been
    avoided" Inherently there is no feature in the scheme which
    operates against its effectiveness. If the scheme has not succee-
    ded as- was intended by the Court, it is largely because appropri-
    ate action was not taken by the parties concerned to implement
    it, [680 DJ
c         (b) It is permissible to judge the reasonableness of a law,,.
    on the basis of the · surrounding circumstances as well as of
    contemporaneous legislation enacted as part of a single scheme.
    [678 D] .

         'l'be Lord Krialma Sugar Milla Ltd. & Anr, v. The Union of
    India & Anr. [1960] 1 s.c.R. 39, referred to.
D
         (c) The PUnjab Act confers on the State Government by s. 7,
    power to frame appropriate rules in support of and for the
    furtherance of the object of the Act. In the event of the scheme
    being altered or modified by its authors to a degree incompatible
    with the true operation and success of the PUnjab Act, the
E
    situation can always be met by the State Government framing
    suitable rules under s. 7 of the Act. The State Government is
    not only empowered to do so; it is under an obligation to frame
    rules appropriate to the successful implementation of the legis-
    lative goal. [679 F]
F
          (d) The Municipal Corporation should determine the maxlnnw
    number of licenses which should be granted for plying cycle
    rickshaws within its jurisdictional limits, keeping in mind the
    needs of the travelling public on the one hand and the danger of
    uneconomic plying on the other. Every rickabaw puller proposing
    to take advantage of the scheme should apply to the Municipal
G
    Connissioner for a certificate, the period within which such
    applications may be filed being notified by the Municipal Corpo-
    ration from time to time. All the applications will be consider-
    ed, in the serial order in which they are received, for the grant
    of certificate on the basis of which the rickshaw puller ,may take
    further steps envisaged in the scheme for the grant of financial
H
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE (PATHAK, J.]             667


assistance enabling him to purchase a cycle rickshaw for plying     A
by him. The issue of the certificate shall be subject to the
following _conditiona: [680 H-681 BJ

     l. Each certificate shall be granted in reapect of one
cycle rickshaw only. [681 CJ
                                                                    B
     2. The number of certificatea issued shall not exceed the
maximum, if any, fixed by the Municipal Corporation as the total
strength of the cycle rickshaws allowed to ply within its
jurisdictional limits. [681 D]

     3. No person shall be granted more than one such certi-        c
ficate. [681 E]

      4. Preference shall be given in the matter of granting
certificates to those rickshaw pullers who had plied a cycle
rickshaw for one year before .the Punjab Act came into force.
[mE]                                                                D
     ORIGINAL JURISDICTION    Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 5728-
6308 of 1982.

     (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

     V.M. Tarkunde and S.M. Ashri for the Petitioners.              E

     Naunit Lal and S.K. Bagga for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     PATHAK, J. The petitioners in these writ petitions ply         F
cycle rickshaws in Amritsar which they hire for the day from the
owners of those vehicles. Most of the petitioners belong to other
districts of Punjab and also come from the neighbouring States of
Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. They carry
on that activity for about eight months in the year and then
return to the regions to which they belong. They observe this       G
practice year af.ter year. For the hire of cycle rickshaws they
pay the owners a certain. sum for the day, retaining the balance
of the day's income to themselves. lt is alleged by the
petitioners that they are not in a position to purchase any cycle
rickshaws and that unless they hire the vehicles they cannot
carry on that activity.                                             H

     Over the years there has been considerable agitation in the
State of Punjab against the practice of the owners of cycle
    668               SUPJ.UIME COURT REPORTS     [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A   rickshaws hiring people of the poorest stratum in society to ply
    the cycle rickshaws. for public passenger traffic and to charge
    them for each day's use of the vehicles. It is said that
    oppressed by their poverty ·the petitioners and those similarly
    placed are obliged to enter into this arrangement with cycle
    rickshaw owners, "ho through such exploitation are able quite
    often to obtain an unduly handsome return on the paltry invest-
    ment made in the purchase of the cycle rickshaws. The ·agitation
    led the State Government to consider measures for enabling the
    pullers of cycle rickshaws to extricate themselves from such
    exploitation,   and it was thought desirable that the cycle
    rickshaw pullers should own their own vehicles, and the State
    Government should arrange interest free loans for them to enable
c   them to purchase cycle rickshaws. With this object in mind, the
    Punjab Legislature enacted the Punjab Cycle Rickshaws (Regulation
    of Licence) Act, 1976.

          S. 3 provided:

                "Licence for cycle-rickshaws.- (1) Not\lithstanding
D               anything. contained to the contrary in the Punjab
                Municipal Act, 19.11, or any rule or order or bye-law
                made thereunder or any other law for the time being in
                force, no owner of a cycle-rickshaw shall be granted
                any licence in respect of his cycle-rickshaw nor his
                licence shall be renewed by any municipal authority
E               after the commencement of this Act unless the
                cycle-rickshaw is to be plied by such owner himself,"

    And s. 5 declared:-

                "Penalties.- (1) Any person who is found to be, in
F               possession of a cycle-rickshaw without a licence
                conforming to the provisions of this Act or plies or
                causes it to be plied by a person without a valid
                driver's licence issued under any law for the time
                being in force or plies or causes to be plied a
                cycle-rickshaw not meant to be plied for hire without
G               painting the body thereof in yellow shall be
                punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three
                months ...

         The petitioners considered that the enactment had resulted
    in making their conditions much worse for whereas formerly they
H   could at least ply the cycle-rickshaws or hiring them from the
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE [PATHAK, J.]               669


owners for a sum, they were unable to do so now, specially as         A
they did not have the funds, nor possessed the arrangements for
obtaining a loan for the purpose. It was pointed out that as the
petitioners were not permanent residents of Amritsar, no one was
prepared to stand surety for the amount which they sought to
borrow form the Banks, that inas111Uch as the Banks at Amritsar had
been unable to recover about eighty per cent. of the amount loaned    B
by the~ they had decided to deny this facility to cycle-rickshaw
pullers, and that, therefore, they were not in a position to
purchase cycle-rickshaw. In the circumstances, a number of cycle-
rickshaw pullers filed Civil Writ Petition No. 563 of 1979 Nanak
Chand & Ors. v. State of l'Unjab & Ors. and Writ Petition No. 839
of 1979 Azad Rickshaw PUllers Union (Regd.) Ch. Town Hall,            c
Amritsar & Ors. v. The State of l'Unjab & Ors. [1981] 1 SCR 366.

     Meanwhile, and to the same end, the Municipal Corporation of
Delhi had amended the Cycle-rickshaw Bye-laws of 1960. After
amendment, bye-law 3 read as follows:-
                                                                      D
           "3 (1) No person shall keep or ply for hire a cycle
           rickshaw in Delhi· unless he. himself is the owner
           thereof and holds a licence granted in that behalf by
           the Commissioner on payment of the fee that may, from
           time to time, be fixed under sub-section (2) of
           section 430 provided that no person shall be granted
           more than one such licence.                                E

           (2) No person shall drive a cycle rickshaw for hire
           unless he holds a driving licence granted in that
           behalf by the Commissioner on payment of the fee that
           may, from time to time be fixed under sub-section (2)
           of Section 430,"                                           F

The bye-laws framed by the Delhi Municipal Corporation were
challenged by cycle rickshaw pullers in Writ Petition No. 841 of
1980 Nanltu & Ors. v. Delhi Administration & Ors. [ 1981] 1 SCR
373.
                                                                      G
     The two Writ Petitions Nos. 563 and 839 of 1979 filed by the
cycle rickshaw pullers of Amritsar were disposed of by this Court
on August 5, 1980 by a judgment in which the Court decided not to
enter into the question of the constitutional validity of the
PUnjab Act but, on the contrary, to frame a scheme   in furtherance
of the Act and for the purpose of giving effect to it. Likewise       H
    670                SUPREME COURT REPORTS      [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A
    on the same day this Court disposed of Wirt Petitions Nos. 841 of
    1980 and 728 of 1980 pertaining to the cycle rickshaw pullers of
    Delhi, and the judgment proceeded ·on the same lines as in
    Amritsar Writ Petitions.

          The scheme propounded by the Court in Azad Rickshaw Pullers
B
    Union (supra) was intended to be "a self-working, specific scheme
    which makes the statutory ban not a negative, self-defeating
    interdict, but a positive economic manwnission", and to apply to
    the entire State of Punjab. Its principle features may be set
    forth here.

         1. Every richshaw puller who had been a licensee in the
c   Amritsar or other municipality within one year of the coming into
    force of the Pilnjab Act of 1976 would be entitled to apply to the
    Municipal· Commissioner within one month from the date of the
    judgment (August 5, 1980) for a certificate testifying that he
    had held a licence for rickshaw pulling withln that period. The
    Municipal Commissioner would, after verification from the
D
    records, grant the certificate within one month of the date of
    application, taking a liberal attitude in the matter of issuing
    the certificate.

          2. On receipt of the certificate or other document the
    rickshaw puller could apply to the Credit Guarantee Corporation
    of India. (Small Loans) under the Guarantee Scheme of 1971,
E
    requesting the Corporation to stand guarantee to the Punjab
    National Bank or other mutually agreed upon schedule bank for
    advance of a loan upto Rs.900 (or for a larger sum if the price
    of a cycle rickshaw was more than Rs.900).

         3. The rickshaw puller would deposit a sum of Rs.50 with
F   the Bank as a condition of· eligibility for obtaining the loan,
    and the balance of the loan would be guaranteed by the aforesaid
    Corporation. Upon fulfilment of those conditions, the Bank would
    advance the sum required for the purchase of a cycle rickshaw to
    the manufacturer or vendor indicated by the rickshaw puller.

G        4. Upon taking delivery of the cycle rickshaw and producing
    before the Bank the voucher evidencing purchase and deli very
    along with the rickshaw, if needed, for physical verification
    within one week of taking such delivery, and thereafter whenever
    directed, the rickshaw puller would execute the necessary docu-
    ments required by the Bank in order to hypothecate the vehicle in
H   favour of the Bank.
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE [PATHAK, J • ]             671


     5. The rate of interest payable by the rickshaw puller to        A
the Bank would be governed ·by the Scheme framed by the State
Government for loans to rickshaw pullers.

     6. The loan would be repaid by the rickshaw puller in 15
monthly installllents. lf payment of the instalments is delayed,
higher rates of interest would be recoverable in accordance with      B
the 1971 scheme. In the event of the instalment being duly paid,
the Government would reimburse the rickshaw puller with the total
amount of interest.

      7. Some further facilities for the rickshaw pullers would
be included within the Scheme. For. example: (1) The Rickshaw         C
Puller. Union would be permltted by the Municipality to set .up and
run a workshop for repair and allied work and a service station
for the ·cycle ric.kshaws. · Sufficient place would be allowed in
suitable places for rickshaw stands and for the safe ¥.eeping of
rickshaws subject to moderate charges. (2) Where during the
agricultural season and rickshaw puller nominated other unemploy-     D
ed persons to ply the rickshaws during that season the Municipal
Commissioner, on satisfaction that the nomination was made bona
fide, would issue licences to the nominees for the duration of
the agricultural season-.

     8.   If group insurance of the life of the rickshaw pullers
and of their rickshaws was feasible the Municipal Commissioner        E
would prepare a scheme in that behalf in consultation with the
Rickshaw Puller Unions.

     9. Likewise, the Municipal Commissioner would also draw up
a project whereby cycle rickshaws would be replaced by scooters
in successive phases so that the rick.shaw pullers could              F ·
ultimately become scooter drive~s owning thier own scooters.

     The scheme formulated by the Court in Nanlru & Ors. (supra)
for the Delhi Cycle Rickshaw pullers contained the same features.
The Delhi Administration had imposed a ceiling on the total
number of cycle rickshaws permissible on the road within its          G
territory, and .the Court directed the .Delhi Administration to
consider applications by rickshaw pullers for licenses on their
merits, including consideration of the period during which. the
applicants had carried on such activity.

     In 1982 the present writ petitions were filed by a number of     H
rick.shaw pullers of Amritsar, who complained that the scheme
    672              SUPREME COURT REPORTS        [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.


A   propounded by this Court had not been implemented by the Amrtisar
    Municipal Corporation and in the result the provisions of the
    Punjab Act of 1976 had continued to operate with unabated
    severity to their detriment. They pray that the Punjab Act be
    declared ultra vires as an unconstitutional violation of their
    fundamental right under sub-cl. (g) of cl. (1) of Article 19 of
B   the constitution to carr,r on their occupation or business. They
    a.lso contend that as a similar restriction is not imposed on taxi
    drivers, cart load carriers, three wheeler auto-rickshaw drivers
    and other vehicles plying for public hire the Punjab Act violates
    the fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed by Articles
    14 and 16 of the constitution. In this connection they also point
    out that 20,000 cycle rickshaws are being allowed to ply in
C   Ahmedabad, Agra, Kanpur, Varanasi, Patna, Calcutta and Nagpur,
    cities with a population not less than that of Amritsar, by
    rickshaw pullers who do not own the vehicles plied by them. The
    petitioners say that the Scheme propounded by the court has
    failed because the Municipal Administration did not make any real
    attempt to implement it.

o        In opposing the writ petitions the Amritsar'Municipal Cor-
    poration affirms that the cost of a cycle rickshaws being about
    Rs.1200 a person with substantial financial resources would
    purchase a number of cycle rickshaws and hire them out to
    rickshaw pullers at Rs .8 per day irrespective of the income
    earned by the rickshaw puller, thus earning over 150 per cent
E   interest over his investment after taking into account expendi-
    ture incurred in petty repairs. To protect poor and needy rick-
    shaw pullers from such exploitation the PUbjab Legislature •had
    enacted the aforesaid fun jab Act of 197 6 to enable rickshaw
    pullers to escape from the clutches of such middle-men. It was
    asserted that with the Punjab Act coming into force a large
F   number of rickshaw pullers had ·taken advantage of the Act and
    purchased their own cycle rickshmis under the PUnjab Government
    Scheme by securing loans from the Banks. It seems that beween
    the enforcement of the Punjab Act and the formulation of the
    scheme by this Court in Azad Rickshaw Pllllers Union (supra) ,the
    Amritsar Municipal Corporation had already renewed more than nine
G   thousand licences in favour of individual rickshaw pullers, who
    were owners of the rickshaws plied by them. No limit on the
    number of cylce rickshaws to be plied had been imposed by the
    Municipal Corporation. According to the Amritsar Municipal
    Corporation the individual rickshaw pullers failed to apply to
    the Municipal Corporation for the requisite certificates enabling
H   them under the Scheme to apply to a schedule Bank for a loan. It
                  MAN SINGH v. STATE [PATHAK, J •]              673

                                                                       A
   transpires, however, that the Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union deposi-
   ted 1170 applications, purporting to be from individual rickshaw
  pullers, with the Amritssr Municipal Corporation for certificates
  in accordance with the terms of the Scheme and this, it was ssid,
  was done between the first week of August, 1980 and the first
  week of September, 1980. It is alleged by the petitioner that        B
   these applications have remained pending with the Municipsl
  Corporation ever since and no certificate has yet been issued
  pursuant to any of those applications. The material on the
   record, however, discloses that on September. 16, 1980 the
  Municipal Corporation wrote to the Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union
  asking it to direct the individual applicants to furnish the         c
  license numbers qf the previous rickshaw driving licenses issued
  within one year of the coming into force of the Punjab Act of
  1976 in order to enable the Municipal Corporation to verify from
  its records that the respective applicants were entitled to the
  certificate. The Municipal Corporation has stated on affidavit
  that the names and addresses of the applicants set forth in many     D
  of the applications were illegible, some of them were not even
  signed or bore the impression of the applicant's thumb mark, that
  some of the applications had been submitted in duplicate or
  triplicate in order to obtain more than one certificate for the
  ssme applicant, that all the applications were made on the
  printed form of the Azad Rickshaw Pullers Union, and in the
  circumstances it became necessary for the Municipal Corporation      E
  to ask that Union to direct the applicants to furnish the license
  numbers of their rickshaw driving licenses so that the certi-
  ficates could be issued without delay. It is pointed out that the
  ssid Union wrote back on October 3, 1980 that as it had not been
  possible for the rickshaw pullers to preserve the old licenses
  they could only make a statement that they had been plying           F
  rickshaws .in the psst and the Municipsl Corporation should verify
  from its records whether the applications were in order. It is
  stated that none of the applicants presented himself nor produced
  any licenses or license number thereafter. The Municipsl
  Corporation wrote on December l, 1980 agsin to the said Union for
  the information required from the applicants so that further         G
  action could be taken in the matter. It is said that nothing was
  done by the applicants or by the said Union ·and ultimately the
  Municipal Corporation, after waiting for a considerable time for
  a response from the applicants, decided to att....Pt to trace out
  the oomes of the applicants from its old records. The task,· it
  appears, took a considerable time, and according to the Municipal    H
  Corporation it was hampered by the fact that the names and
· addresses of the applicants were not clearly legible on the
    674               SUPREME COURT REPORTS        [1985] SUPP;2 s.c.R.

A   applications and in some ·cases the addresses were incomplete. The
    Municipal Corporation affirm that notwithstanding the lack of
    cooperation from the applicants it was able to prepare as many as
    785 certificates by November 22, 1983 and a letter was written by
    the Municipal Corporation to the said Union asking the applicants
    to collect· their certificates. It is alleged that none of the
B   applicants turned up. According to the Municipal Corporation the
    applicants are merely pawns in the hands of the previous owners
    of the cycle. rickshaws and are being manipulated by them.

         · It also appears that the ·Municipal Corporation received a
    let·ter dated September 1, 1980 from the Azad Rickshaw PUllers
    Union for ··permission to use the rickshaw stand alrP.ady situate at
c   the General Bus Stand, Amritsar as a rickshaw repairing workshop.
    There was 1a further letter dated September 17, 1980 from the Azad
    Rickshaw PUller Union for allotment of land ·for rickshaw sheds
    and rickshaw stands to ·enable the rickshaw pullers to keep their
    rickshaws in safe custody during their leisure hours and during
    the night. 'The allotment of land was requested in five different
    localities 'of the city so that a corresponding number of sheds
D
    could be >raised, the land required for each shed being 10,000
    square 'meters. On October 4, 1980 the Municipal Corporation
    replied that there was no vacant land at the places mentioned by
    the said Union and that land at some other suitable places may be
    suggested~ By a letter dated December 1, 1980 the Municipal Cor-
    poration reminded the said Union that it should suggest alterna-
E   tive places for providing sheds for the rickshaws. It is alleged
    that thereafter there was no reply. There are other affidavits on
    the recor'ds, some of them having been filed by other rickshaw
    puller Unions of Amritsar alleging that some rickshaw pullers had
    already availed of the ~efit of the Scheme propounded by this
    Court and were plying rickshaws on loans taken from the. Banks.
F   Then there are applications for intervention by Rickshaw PUllers
    Union belonging to other Municipalities in PUbjab which suggest
    that ·the Municipal Comnittee concerned, purporting to act under
    the Scheme 'propounded by this Court, have entered upon a course
    of rampant corruption, granting a number of certificates to a
    single applicant behind whom st;and the old rickshaw owners who
G   are thua J)erverting the scheme for their own greedy ends. In
    other words,' the original rickshaw owners are attempting,
    through false applications made in the name of fictitious
    persons, to secure certificates enabling them to put a number of
    vehicles on the road. Further affidavits have been filed in
    support· of the writ petition testifying to the. difficulty in
H   obtaining certificates from the Municipal Corporation and there-
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE [PAillAK, J.]              675.


after loans from the Banks and to the . impossibility of pJying       A'
riCkshilws without proper arrangements for safely parking them for
the night. There are allegations on both sides, the petitioners.
bei0g accused of having been set up by the original owners of the.
vehicles in order to have the Punjab Act of 1976 struck down by
the Court and on the other side the Municipal Corporation being
accused of unwillingness to work the Scheme propounded by the         B
Court.

     Two questions arise before us. The first is .whether the
Punjab Act of 1976 is an instance of incomplete legislation and
cannot serve the purpose for which it was intended and in the
circumstances, because of the prohibitions and restraints incor-      C
porated in it, it constitutes an unreasonable restriction on the
fundamental rights of the petitioners guaranteed under su)>-cl.(g)
of cl.(l) ot Art.19 of the Constitution and also violates Arti-
cles 14 and 16 ·of the .Constitution. The second question· is
whether the scheme framed by this Court in Azad llictsh& Plillers
Union (supra) is incapable of proper. implementation, and there-      D
fore of no legal effect.

    ·The Punjab Act of 1976 regulates the issue of licenses in
respect of. cycle rickshaws plying in any IWnicipal area in the
State of Punjab. It contains very few provisions, and essentially
provides that no owner of a cycle rickshaw will be granted a          E
license in respect of his cycle rickshaw .;,,iess the vehicle is
plied by the owner himself. The intention of the statute is to
ensure the plying of cycle rickshaws by rickshaw pullers who are
owners of the vehicle, thus eliminating the middlemen who owns
the vehicle.

     The petitioners contend that s.3 of the Pilnjab Act ~titu-       F
tea an unreasonable restrict.ion on their fundamental ,right under
sub-cl. (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 of the Constitutiori to
carry on their occupation of plying cycle rickshaws because the
exercise of that right has been made dependent upon ·their owning
the cycle rickshaws piled by them. It is urged that the ~onsti-
tutional validity of the impugned legislation canno.t be sustained     G
on the basis of an administrative scheme which. has not· been
sanctioned by it, and there is nothing in, the PUnjab Act itself
which enables rickshaw pullers to acquire proprietary rights in
cycle rickshaws plied by them. It is urged that while the object
of the statute has been expressed in s.3 of the PUnjab Act, there
is nothing in the Act which provides the machinery for achieving
that object. It is not sufficient, it is said, to provide that        H
    676               SUPREME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A
    the rickshaw puller should own the cycle rickshaw which he plies.
    The statute should have provided the mechanics of a system which
    would have enabled rickshaw pullers, in their abject poverty, to
    become the owners of such vehicles. No such provision having been
    made .in the statute, it is submitted, the Act represents at best
B   a declaration of policy and nothing more. Our attention has been
    invited to the observations of this .Court in Maneka Gandhi v.
    Union of IDdia [1978] 2 s.c.R. 621, where it has been elaborately
    explained that Article 21 must be read with Article 19 in adjudg-
    ing the constitutional validity of an Act, and in doing so the
    consequences brought about by the impugned legislation, and of
    the action under it, on the citizen must constitute the test of
c   its validity rather than the object of the Legislature or the
    form of action. Reference was made in this connection to the law
    laid down in R.c. Cooper v. Union of India [1970] 3 s.c.R. 530,
    and other cases. It cannot be disputed, it seems to us, that the
    true test of the validity of a statute must be the effect and
    consequence of its operation on the fundamental right of the
    citizen. The object underlying the legislation embodies the
D   intent of the Legislature in enacting it, but in construing its
    validity in the context of a citizen's fundamental right the
    question before the Court always must be whether its impact on
    that fundamental right can be regarded as a reasonable restric-
    tion on the exercise of the right. The focal point . during such
    examination is the fundamental right, and the duty of the Court
E   must .be to consider the quality and degree of the encroachment
    made by the operation of the statute on the citizen's exercise of
    that right.

          In the instant case, s.3 of the Punjab Act has the effect of
    making it possible for the rickshaw puller to ply the rickshaw as
F   owner of the ·vehicle and thereby to be the full owner of the
    income earned by him. No longer will he be obliged to part with
    an appreciable portion of that income in favour of another who
    owns the vehicle. The Punjab Act is beneficial legislation bring-
    ing directly home to the rickshaw puller the entire fruit of his
    daily toil. The enactment is intended as a s.ocial welfare measure
G   against the exploitation of the poor and unemployed by rapacious
    cycle rickshaw owners who by reason of their superior financial
    resources fatten their wealth from the sweated toil or rickshaw      •
    pullers. Even if we look at the imp!lgned legislation from the
    point of view of its impact of the fundamental right of rickshaw
    owners who give them on hire to rickshaw pullers for plying, it
H   is plain that the legislation constitutes a reasonable restric-
    tion on the. right of such rickshaw owners to carry on the
                 MAN SI/'IGH v. STATE [PATHAK, J.]               677


business of hiring out cycle rickshaws inaslllllch as the exercise
of the right is excluded by legislation designed for the economic
and social welfare of rickshaw pullers, who, constitute a signi-
ficant sector. of the people, a sector so pressed by poverty and
straitened by the economic misery of their situation that the
guarantee of their full day's wages to them seems amply justi-
fied,                                                                   B

       On the question whether the PUnjab Act is incomplete in
 itself and, as it stands, has the effect of disabling rickshaw
pullers from carrying on he occupation of plying cycle rickshaws
because of ·the condition of ownership in the cycle rickshaws, the
Court is entitled to consider the ,factual matrix in which the          C
Punjab Act was enacted for the purpose of determining its vali-
dity. The record of the case discloses that for several years a
powerful movement has raged aimed at freeing the rickshaw pullers
 from exploitation by cycle ricksha.w owners. The owner is usually
 a person of sufficient wealth enabling him to acquire a number of
cycle rickshaws. The rickshaw puller, on the contrary, is a needy       I:
person, beaten by poverty and compelled to ply the rickshaw on
 terms dictated by the owner, who taking advantage of the
desperate plight of the rickshaw puller is in a position to
demand a wholly disproportionate hire charge for the use of the
vehicle. The labour and toil, and the sweat and strain, involved
 in P',illing the cycle rickshaw works, in a few years,, serious        E
 injury to the health and stamina and life-span of the rickshaw
 puller. He lllllSt toil the whole day long in order to earn a small
income, most of which he lllllSt hand over to the owner in payment
of t._l\e hire charge. In .the circumstances, the Government prepared
a scheme as early as 1970 to enable the rickshaw puller to extri-
cate himself from the shackles of a system which, for several
decades,· had debased and condemned him to a lamentable existence.      F
The object >1as to assure him a life where the entire fruit of bis
labour and industry would accrue to his own benefit. We have on
 the ro?cord before us a cirC1.1lar No. IDAJ/1734/73 dated August 6,
1973 issued by the Jullunder Circle of the Punjab National Bank.
From the very beginning, the scheme extended a number of
concessions to rickshaw pullers, and as it stood in 1973 it             G
provided for loans by the Banks to rickshaw pullers. The loana
were intended for such individuals who did not already own any
rickshaw and who had been issued a certificate to ply a rickshaw
·by the 1111nicipal authority• The loan wss intended for the
purchase of a neW cycle rickshaw and extended to 90% of the total
cost of rickshaw or Rs.700 whichever was lower. The rickshaw
purchased with the loan was to be hypothecated to the bank and          H
        678              SL'l'REME COURT REPORTS     [1985j SUPP.2 s.c.R.


A       registered with the municipal authority in the name of the
        borrower as owner and the bank as financier. The advances would
        be covered by a guarantee extended under the Credit Guarantee
        Corporation of India (Small Loans) Guarantee Scheme, 1971. The
        scheme contained further details relating to payment of interest,
        the documentation required, the mods of disbursement, the terms
B       of repayment of . the loan auc{ so on. It was in this factual
        context and in order to give statutory recognition to the object
        underlying the scheme that the Punjab Act in 1976 was enacted.

             But learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the
        validity of s.3 of the Punjab Act cannot be sustained on the
        basis of a scheme which can be varied it will by the authors of
C       the scheme during the operation of the Punjab Act. The scheme, it
        is said, may be altered to a degree where it ceases to be identi-
        fiable with the object of the impugned legislation. Reliance is
        placed by learned counsel on '1be Lord Krislma Sugar Kills Ltd. &
        Anr. v• 1he Union of India & Anr. [1960) 1 s.c.R. 39. In that
        case, the Court laid down that it was permissible to judge the
        reasonableness of a law on the basis of the surrounding circum-
D       stances as well as of contemporaneous legislation enacted as part
        of a single scheme. But it also laid down the limitations circum-
        scribing that principle. Subba Rao, J said:

                    "But I am clear in my mind that the validity of an Act
                   ·shall not be made to depend upon another Act
E                 . unconnected with the impugned Act or power conferred
                    thereunder, which might, if properly exercised,
                    off-set the evil tendency or the vice of the impugned
                    Act. If the validity of an Act is made to depend upon
                   such a foundation, a super-structure will_ have been
                   built on shifting sands. To do that is to destroy the
F                  stability of legislation      and to introduce an
                   uncertain element therein. If two or more Acts were
                   parts of the same scheme of plan, to impelment the
                   same or cormnon objective, or if the impugned Act,
                   though   it was not originally conceived at the time
                  'when the earlier Act was passed, was only as extension
    G               or a further step by the legislature for implementing
                    the object of the earlier Act or if the legislature by
                    express reference incorporated in the impugned Act the
                  ·provisions of the earlier Act, it would be permissible
                    to rely upon the said provisions of ·the earlier Act,
                   .not because they formed. part of the prevailing
    H
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE [PATHAK, J.]                 679

                                                                       A
          conditions but because either the earlier Act, formed
          part of the impugned Act by reference or both of them
          formed part .of the same legislative plan •

           ...............................-· ..... ".............. .
                                                                       E
           But to go beyond this is to destroy the stability of
           legislation and to introduce an uncertain element. To
           go further and to depend upon a notification of a
           transitory nature issued under an unconnected Act is
           to place the statute in a fluid state. In such a
           situation its validity would depend upon a statutory
           order of temporary duration; it would change colour
                                                                       c
           with the changing attitudes of arr authority empowered
           to issue the order."

      .These are valuable dicta, valid whenever the constitutional-
ity of a statute falls to be examined in the context of contem-
                                                                       D
poraneous legislation. In the present case, however, the Punjab
Act was enacted with an eye .to a scheme already existing and in
operation. The .scheme supplied the mechanics for the operation of
the l'Unjab Act. The two were not unconnected. They were closely
connected and, indeed, constituted an integrated plan. The appre-
hension that the validity of the Act is dependent on the continu-
                                                                       E
ed operation of the scheme which was open to subse- quent modi-
fication at the will of its authors has no foundation. The· conse-
quences of such modification can be taken care of. The Pilnjab Act
confers on the State Government, by s. 7, power to frame appro-
priate rules in support of and for the furtherance of the object
of the Act. In the event of the scheme being altered or modified
by its authors to a degree incompatible with the true operation
and success of the Punjab Act, the situation can always be met by      F
the State Government framing suitable rules under s.7 of the Act.
The State Government is not only empowered to do so; it is under
an obligation to frame rules appropriate to the successful imple-
mentation of the legislative goal. It seems to us that in a
situation which calls for adjustment from time to time in view of
varying economic and social factors, a sufficient degree of            G
flexibility is needed, and consequently it was appropriate for
the Legislature to leave the ,..,,;sure of control to the rule
11)3king power of the State Government. That in truth is one of the
primary reasons for delegated legislation. So long as the rules
so made serve the object of the Act and fall within the
 limitations implied thereby no fault can be found with them•
    680              SUl'REME COURT REPORTS       [1985] SUPP.2 s.c.R.

A        In our judgment, the impuged legislation cannot be regarded
    as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental rights of the
    petitioner under Article 21 read with sub.cl. (g) of clause 1 of
    Article 19 of the Constitution.

         An attempt was made by learned counsel for the petitioners
B   to show that s.3 of the Punjab Act created an invidious
    distinction between rickshaw pullers snd those who carried on the
    occupation of plying other vehicles, such as taxi--cabs, on hire.
    We see no comparison. The pathetic conditions in which rickshaw
    pullers pursue their burdensome vocation places them in a class
    apart from others in their right to ameliorative and protective
    treatment from the State. This challenge must also fail.
c
          Towards the end, we wish to express the view that the scheme
    framed by this Court in Azad Rickslunr Pullers Union (supra) is a
    good scheme, capable of implementation, and productive of the
    object for which it was designed. If it has not been successfully
    implemented so far, it is in the main largely on account of cir-
D   cumstances which could have been avoided. Inherently, we see no
    feature in the scheme which operates against its effectiveness.
    If the scheme has not succeeded as was intended 1ly the Court, it
    is largely because appropriate action was not taken by the
    parties concerned to implement it. A large number of applications
    were made through the Azad Rickshaw Plillers Union to the Munici-
    pal cOrpOration for the grant of certificates enabling the
E   rickshaw pullers to obtain loans from the Banks. The Municipal
    Corporation was anxious to ensure that fraud was not practised on
    the scheme by existing rickshaw owners who could be tempted to
    apply for certificates in fictitious names and secure benefits
    which should have been confined to rickshaw pullers as owners of
    the vehicles. The 1170 applications made through the Azad
F   Rickshaw Plillers Union could not be related immediately to bona
    fide individual rickshaw pullers, and in the absence of the
    further material sought by the Municipal Corporation from the
    rickshaw pullers it would naturally have taken considerable time
     to take action on those applications. It seems to us that a fresh ·
    opportunity should be provided to ricksha-• pullers to avail of
G    the scheme fonwlated by this Court. A fundamental condition for
    benefiting from the scheme is that a rickshaw puller should have
    beeo,a licensee in the Amritsar or other municipality within one
    year of the coming into force of the Plinjab Act. we think that
     the .range of eligibility should not be confined by that limita-
     tion. We think it desirable that the Municipal Corporation should
H    determine the max11Illlll number of licenses which should be granted
                 MAN SINGH v. STATE (PATHAK, J •]                681

                                                                        A
for plying cycle rickshaws within its jurisdictional limits,
keeping in mind the needs of the travelling public on the one
band and the danger of uneconomic plying on the other. Every
rickshaw puller proposing to take advantage of the scheme should
apply to the Municipal Commissioner for a certificate, the period
within which such applications may be filed being notified· by the      B
Municipal Corporation from time to time as the need arises. All
the applications will be considered, in the serial order i.n which
they are received, for the grant of a certificate on the basis of
which rickshaw puller may take further steps envisaged in the
scheme for the grant of financial assistance enabling him to
purchase a cycle rickshaw for plying by him. The issue of such          c
certificate shall be subject to the following conditions:

      1. Each certificate shall be granted in respect of one cycle
rickshaw only.

     2. The number of certificates issued shall not ~xceed the
maximum, if any, fixed by the Manicipal Corporation as the total        D
strength of the cycle rickshaws allowed to ply within its juris-
dictional limits.

     3. No person     shall   be   granted   more   than   one   such
certificate.

      4. Preference shall be given in the matter of granting                E
certificates to those rickshaw pullers who have plied a cycle
rickshaw for one year before the l'Unjab Act came into force.

     On receipt of the certificates, the rickshaw pullers may
take further steps .for the purpose of securing. financial
assistance iri accordance with the terms of the scheme.
                                                                        F
      We are unable to hold that the l'Unjab Act of 1976 is ultra
vires and that the scheme propounded by. this 'Court in Azad
llick8baw Pullers Union (supra) is unworkable and ineffective. We
believe that given appropriate compliance the scheme will provide
adequate relief to the rickshaw pullers and constitute an effec-
tive supplementary code fulfilling the object-of ttie l'Unjab Act.
                                                                        G
     In the circumstances, we dismiss these writ petitions, but
without any order as to.costs.




N.V.K.                                        Petitions dismissed.