MAJATI SUBBARAOversusP.K.K. KRISHNA RAO (DECEASED) BY LRS.

                    MAJATI SUBBARAO                                          .A
                            v.
         P.K.K. KRISHNA RAO (DECEASED) BY LRS.

                        SEPTEMBER 19, 1989

            [M.H. KANIA AND KULDIP SINGH, JJ.]                               B

      A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960--
Sections 10, 12 and 13-Eviction of tenant on ground of denial of
landlords title-When arises.

      The appellant-tenant was in occupation of the premises and carry-      C
ing on business. The original respondent who was the owner of the said
premises filed an eviction petition against the appellant on the ground of
bona fide requirement as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business
by starting a photo studio in the said premises. The appellant disputed
the correctness of the claim and alleged that the property in which the
said premises were situated was the absolute endowed property of             D
which the original respondent was the de facto trustee and as such he
had no personal or proprietary interest in the said property to evict the
appellant on the ground of personal use and occupation. The respon-
dent asserted that he' was the absolute owner of the said premises. The
Rent Controller passed a decree for eviction on the ground that the
bona fide requirement of the respondent-landlord wrs made out and            E
also on the ground that the appellant had denied the title of the respon-
dent which denial was not bona fide. The appellant filed an appeal
before the Appellate Authority which was dismissed upholding the
order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller. The appellant prefer-
red a revision petition to the High Court and a Single Judge of the High
Court also upheld. the order of eviction. The appellant came in an           F
appeal to this Court by special leave.

      It was contended for the appellant that in orde_r to constitute a
ground for eviction the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the
eviction petition and a denial of title in the course of eviction petition
would not constitute a ground for eviction. The contention on behalf of G
the respondent was that the denial of the landlord's title was· not the
only ground pleaded for eviction but it was also contended that the
appellant was liable to be evicted as the respondent wanted the said
premises for his personal bona fide use and occupation.

      Dismissing the appeal by special leave, this Court,                    H
                                   153
        154        SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

            HELD: The A.P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to consolidate
    A
      the law relating to regulation of leasing of buildings, control of rent
      thereof and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State
      of Andhra Pradesh. Section IO of the A.P. Rent Act deals with eviction
      of tenants. Sub-Section (I) of that section prohibits eviction of tenants
      except in accordance with the provisions of that section or sections 12
    B and 13 of that Act. [156D-E]

               It is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or appeal can
        take into account events which are subsequent to the filing of the
        suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief appropria-
        tely. [157F]
    c         Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, Judgments today (1989) 1 S.C. 147,
        not applicable.

            The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one
      or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts.
    D Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord
      under the definitions of the terms landlord and tenant contained in the
      Rent Acts, remains a landlord and the tenant remains a tenant, because
      of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means or
      includes 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the
      tenancy in his favour'. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts
!   E is that either by way of a non-obstante clause or by necessary implica-
      tion these enactments have done away with the law contained in section
      108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of
      the lessor and the lessee. [158D-E]

              Maharaja of Jaypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi, 46 I.A. 109;
    F   A.I.R. [1919] P.C. 1 and V. Dhanapal Chattiar. v. Yesodai Ammal,
        [1980] 1 S.C.R. 334, referred to.

           Sada Ram and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, A.I.R. 1970 Punjab &
      Haryana Sll; Shiv Prashad v. Smt. Shila Rani, A.I.R. 1974 H.P. 22
      and Machavaram Venkate Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayane Rao
    G Sarada and another, [1978] l R.C.J. 368, relied upon.
              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2732
        of 1980.

           From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.1980 of the Andhra
    H Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. No. 7974 of 1979.
                 M. SUBBARAO v. P.K.K.RAO [KANIA, J.]                  155

      A. V. Rangam for the Appellant.
                                                                             A
     C. Setharamaiah, P.K. Rao, V.A. Babu and K.R. Nagaraja for
the Respondents.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                             B
      KANIA, J. This is an appeal by Special Leave against the judg-
ment of a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in
Civil Revision Petition No. 7974 of 1979. The appellant before us is the
tenant and the original respondent is the landlord who is dead and is
represented by his legal representatives.

      The premises in question are in Eluru Town in Andhra Pradesh.
                                                                             c
The appellant is carrying on business in the name and style of Sri
 Panduranga Engineering Company. According to the original respon-
 qent (who will hereinafter be referred to as "the respondent") he was
 the owner of the building in which the said premises situated and
 hence, the owner of the said premises. The respondent filed an evic-        D
tion petition against the appellant on the ground of bona fide require-
ment as he wanted to set up his eldest son in business by starting a
photo studio in the said premisc;s. The appellant disputed the cor-
rectness of the said claim. The appellant in his counter to the eviction
petition, inter alia, alleged that the said property in which the said
premises were situated was the absolute endowed property of                  E
Punyamurthulavari Choultry of which the original respondent was the
de facto trustee and that the original respondent had no personal or
proprietary interest in the said property. He asserted that the said
property belonged to the said Choultry and that the original respon-
dent had no manner of right to evict the appellant on the ground of
personal use and occupation. The appellant asserted that the said pre-       F
mises were not the individual property of the original respondent but
trust property. The respondent filed a rejoinder denying that the said
premises were the endowed property or that the said property was a
part of Punyamurthulavari Chultry. He asserted that he was the abso-
lute owner of the said property which was purchased by his father
under a registered sale deed dated 29th June, 1908. The respondent           G
submitted that the appellant ha\! denied his title and, as the said denial
was not bona fide, the appellant was liable to be evicted also on the
ground of denial of title of the landlord. The Rent Controller passed a
decree for eviction on the ground that the bona fide requirement of the
landlord-respondent was made out and also on the ground that the
appellant-tenant had denied the title of respondent-landlord which           H
    156,.        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   denial was not bona fide. The appellant preferred an appeal against
    the said decision to the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority,
    however, dismissed the appeal upholding both the grounds of eviction
    found by the Rent Controller. Against this decision, the appellant
    preferred a revision petition to the High Court. The High Court in its
    impugned judgment upheld the order of eviction only on the ground of
B   denial of title· which was not a bona fide denial. It is this decision of the
    High Court which is challenged before us.

           The finding that the denial of title was not bona fide, is essen-
    tially a finding of fact and, fairly enough, no dispute has been raised by
    learned counsel for the appellant in respect of that finding. It is, how-
    ever, submitted by him that in order to constitute a ground for eviction
c   the denial of title must be anterior to the filing of the eviction petition
    and a denial oftitle in the cour'se of eviction petition would not consti-
    tute a ground for eviction. He drew our attention to the provisions of
    section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Evic.-
    tion) Control Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the A.P. Rent
D   Act"). The A.P. Rent Act was enacted with a view to consolidate the
    law relating to regulation of leasing of buildings, control of rent
    thereof and prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants in the State
    of Andhra Pradesh. Section 10 of the A.P. Rent Act deals with evic-
    tion of tenants. Sub-section (1) of that section prohibits eviction of
    tenants except in accordance with the provisions of that section or
E   sections 12 and 13 of that Act. The relevant part of sub-section (2) of
    section 10 of the A.P. Rent Act runs as follows:

                 "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to
                 the controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Control-
                 ler, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of
F                showing cause against the application, is satisfied;

                         0)x                  x                x                x
                        (ii) x                x                x                x
                       (iii) x                x                x                x
                       (iv) x                 x                x                x
G                       ~)x                   x                x                x
                       (vi) that the tenant has denied the title of the land-
                       lord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and that
                       such denial or claim was not bona fide,

                      the Controller shall make an order directing the
H               tenant to put the la~dlord in possession of the building and
                  M. SUBBARAO v. P.K.K.RAO !KANIA, J.!                  157

             if the controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order
                                                                               A
             rejecting the application."

 It was urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the ground for
 eviction must come into existence before the application to the Rent
 Controller for eviction is made and hence, a denial of title which can
 be relied upon by the landlord-respondent for eviction must be·               B
 anterior to the eviction petition.

        In support of his contention, Mr. Rangam, learned counsel for
  the appellant placed reliance on the decision of a Bench of this Court
  in Kundan Mal v. Gurudutta, Judgments Today (1989) 1 S.C. 147. In
  that case it has been observed that in providing disclaimer as a ground
  for eviction of a tenant in clause (f) of section 13(1) of the Rajasthan
                                                                                c
  Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 the Legislature
  decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of section 111 of
  the Transfer of Property Act. The principle of forfeiture on disclaimer
  is founded on the rule that a man cannot approbate and reprobate at
  the same time. Since the consequence of applying the rule is very b
  serious, it must be held that the denial of title to has to be clear and in
  unequivocal terms. In our view, this decision is hardly of any assis-
  tance to learned counsel. The principle laid down in that case is that, in
  order to constitute a ground for eviction, the denial of title has to be
  clear and in unequivocal terms. In the present case, the facts found
  show that the denial of title of the respondent by the appellant was in clear E
  and unequivocal terms. Although it is observed in the said judgment
  that in providing this ground for eviction, the -Legislature of the State
  of Rajasthan decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of
  section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the judgment nowhere
  lays down that the denial of title must be anterior to the eviction
  petition nor does it say' that the provisions relating to eviction of F
  tenants under the Transfer of Property Act are applicable to the evic-
  tion of tenants under the Rajasthan Rent Act. In this connection we
  may point out that it' is well settled that the Court hearing a suit or
  appeal can take into account events which are subsequent to the filing
  of the suit in order to give appropriate relief or mould the relief
  appropriately, Moreover, it is significant that in the present case, the G
  denial of the landlord's title was not the only ground pleaded in sup-
  port of the claim for eviction but it was also contended by the respon-
  dent that the appellant was liable to be evicted as the respondent
. wanted the said premises for his personal bona fide use and
  occupation.
                                                                                H
    158         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1989] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

         It was argued by learned counsel for the appellant that even
   accepting that there was a denial of title by the appellant and the result
   would be only that the respondent-landlord became entitled to forfeit
   the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfei-
   ture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was
   submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage
B .of a denial of title by the tenant in the very proceedings for eviction in
   the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior
   to the eviction proceedings. In support of this argument learned
   counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v.
   Rukmani Pattamahdevi, 46 I.A. 109; AIR 1919 P.C. 1. In our view,
   this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v.
   Yesodai Amma/, [1980] 1 SCR 334 a Constitution Bench of this Court
c  comprising seven-learned Judges held that in the matter of determina-
   tion of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap
   his relf!tionship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to
   quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord
   can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the
D grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after
   the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the
   definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the Rent Acts, remains
   a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provi-
   sion made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing
   in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Yet
E another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a
   non obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have
   done away with the law contained in section 108 of the Transfer of
   Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the
   lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Trans-
   fer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination
F of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of
   the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because
   during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover pos-
   session of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlod becomes
   entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions
    laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession
G merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing
    so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy.
    In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlord's title by the
    tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under section
    10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier.,
    In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title
H must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A.P. Rent
                M. SUBBARAO v. P.K.K.RAO [KANIA, J.]                    159

Act is knocked out. In our opiiiion, the argument of learned counsel          A
for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find; on the ot,her
hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that e(en a
denial of the landlord's title by a tenant in a written statement in an
eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for
eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a
written statement containing the denial has been filed (See: Sada Ram
                                                                              B
and Others v. Gajjan Shiama, AIR 1970 Punjab & Haryana 511; Shiv
Parshad v. Smt. Shila Rani, AIR 1974 H.P. 22 and Machavaram Ven-
kata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana Rao Sarada ·and another,
(1978] 1 R.C.J. 368. As observed by the Punjab ano Haryana High
Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be
taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a       c
subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unneces-
sary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged
to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of
forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in
the written statement.
                                                                              D
      It was submitted by learned counsel. for the appellant that, in any
event, the respondent failed to apply for amendment of his plaint and
incorporate the ground of denial of title therein as he was bound to do
so in order to get relief on that ground which had arisen after the
eviction petition was filed. We agree that normally this would have
been so but, in the present case, we find that the Trial Court, namely,       E
the Rent Controller, framed an issue as to whether the tenant's denial
of the landlord's title to the schedule property including the said pre-
mises was bona fide. The parties went to trial on this clear issue and
the appellant had full knowledge of the ground alleged against him. It
was open to him to have objected to the framing of this issue on the
ground that it was not alleged in the eviction petition that the appellant    F
had denied the title of the respondent and that the denial of title was
bona fide. If he had done that the respondent could have well applied
for an amendment of the eviction petition to incorporate that ground.
Having failed to raise that contention at that stage it is not open now to
the appellant to say that the eviction decree could not be passed
against him as the ground of denial of title was not pleaded in the           G
eviction petition. No other argument have been advanced before us.

      In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissal with costs.

S.K.A.                                                   A,ppeal dismissed.