Holding

The High Court erred in reviewing the merits of the Collector’s appointment; judicial review under Article 226 is confined to the decision‑making process, and the Collector’s appointment of the appellant stands.

Summary

The appellant Mahavir Singh was appointed Lambardar of Village Thurana by the District Collector under the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, which consider factors such as hereditary claim, land ownership, service to the State, character and age. Respondent No.1, Khiali Ram, challenged the appointment before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which set aside the Collector's decision and directed that the respondent be appointed, holding him more meritorious. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by examining the comparative merits of the candidates, as judicial review is limited to the correctness of the decision‑making process, not the substantive merit of the appointment. The Court found that the Collector had duly complied with Rule 15, observed natural‑justice requirements, and considered all relevant factors, including the appellant’s experience, age and character. It also clarified that a Lambardar is not a civil servant within the meaning of Article 309. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appellant’s appointment was restored.

Issues considered

The scope of judicial review under Article 226 with respect to the merits of an appointment under the Punjab Land Revenue Rules
Whether the Collector’s decision complied with the procedural and substantive requirements of Rules 15 and 16 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules
Whether the post of Lambardar falls within the definition of a civil post under Article 309 of the Constitution
Whether equity or the respondent’s alleged superior merit can be a ground for the High Court to overturn the Collector’s appointment

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 309
Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887s. 28
Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961s. 7

Subjects

Judicial reviewArticle 226AppointmentLambardarPunjab Land Revenue RulesMeritEquityArticle 309High Court jurisdictionNatural justice

Judgment

[2008] 17 S.C.R. 534

A MAHAVIR SINGH
v.
KHIALI RAM & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 7252 of 2008)
DECEMBER 12, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

CONSTITUTION OF /NOIA, 1950:
Article 226 - Power of High Court to review the order of
C appointing authority - High Court setting aside appointment
of Lambardar (Village Headman) made by Collector and
directing appointment of writ petitioner - HELD: Court while
exercising power of judicial review has a limited jurisdiction
and is ordinarily concerned with correctness of decision
0 making process and not merit of the decision - In the instant
case, High Court has not found that Collector, in analyzing '
the comparative merits of two candidates, committed any error
in his decision making process - Equity also does not lie in
favour of the writ petitioner- Even otherwise, when respective
merits of candidates is taken into consideration, equity has
-
E no role to play - Judgment of High Court set aside -. Equity
- Punjab Land Revenue Rules - rr. 15 and 16.
PUNJAB LAND R~VENUE RULES:
rr. 15 and 16 - Appointment of Lambardar (Village
F Headman) - Criteria - HELD: Collector being the appointing
authority has considered the relevant factors and comparative
merits of candidates in terms of r. 15 - High Court erred in +
setting aside the appointment made by Collector and in
directing appointment of writ petitioner - Punjab Land
Revenue Act, 1887 - s.28.
G r. 16 - Lambardar (Village Headman) - Nature of
appointment - HELD: Holder of post of Lambardar is not a
government servant - He does not hold a civil post within the
meaning of Article 309 of the Constitution - His main income

H
is the amount of commission which he receives out of
534
--
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. 535
~
/

revenue collected - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 309. A
Respondent no. 1, who along with the appellant was
-;. " short-listed as a candidate for the post of Lambardar
(Village Headman), challenged, by way of writ petition in
the High Court, the order of the Collector appointing the
appellant to the said post. The High Court allowed the 8
writ petition and directed that respondent no. 1 be
appointed to the post of Lambardar as in its opinion he
was more meritorious than the appellant.
... In the instant appeal it was primarily contended for
the appellant that the High Court committed a serious c
error as it, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, entered into the
.... merit of respective candidates .
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. Although the post of Lambardar is
governed by the provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue D
Act and the Rules framed thereunder, holder of the said
post is not a government servant. He does not hold a civil
~
~
post within the meaning of Article 309 of the Constitution
of India. He although is paid a fixed sum but his main
income is the amount of commission which he receives
E
out of the revenue collected. Apart from collection of
revenue, he has other functions to perform including
rendition of assistance to the investigating officer when
a crime is committed in the village. [Para 12) [541-F-H;
542-A]
Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd edition 2005, page 2616, F
-t referred to.
......
1.2. The District Collector is the appointing authority.
He considered the respective merits of the candidates in
great details, including the factor that the appellant was
more experienced in Lambardari work as he was the son G,
of a deceased Lambardar and used to help him in the
work. The Collector also found the appellant being 36
-). years of age to be more suitable than respondent No. 1
who was aged 62 years at the relevant time. So far as
~ \
character of the respective candidates is concerned, all H
\

-
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.
e
,.
'>

A were found to have been possessing good character.
Similar opinion was expressed in respect of land and
j _,,,.
property. The Collector drew his conclusion, upon taking
into consideration the factors which were all relevant for
the purpose of appointment to the post of 'Lambardar'.
[para 13] [542-A-F]
B
· Lt. Malik Abbas Khan v. Ghulam Haidar 1940 Lahore
Law Times 25; Kalyan Singh v. Haidar 1928 Lahore Law
Times 33; Lila Ram v. Asa Ram 1955 Lahore Law Times
A
29 and Jai Dayal v. Mohar Singh 1962 P.L.J. 64, referred ~

c to. 2. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is basically :._"

concerned with the correctness of the decision making
process and not the merit of the decision. It has not been
found by the High Court that the Collector in expressing
D his opinion as regards comparative merit of appellant vis-
a-vis respondent No. 1 committed an error in his decision
making process. The principles of natural justice have ;.
been complied with. Procedure laid down in the Rules --.,
has also been complied with. The Collector also
E acknowledged that respondent No. 1 had rendered the
services to the State as a member of the Armed 'Forces.
He took into consideration that the views of the
respectables of the village were in favour of appellant as
also the fact that he had participated in the collection work
of the village and helped the government officials at the
F time of their visit. Further, the Naib Tehsildar and the
Circule Revenue Officer had also recommended i-
._
appellant's name. There cannot be any doubt or dispute
whatsoever that a writ court could interfere with a finding
of factwhen the same inter alia is found to be perverse.
G However, no such finding has been arrived at by the High
Court. [Para 16 and 18] [544-A-B; 547-Bl
Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan (1990) 1 SCC
.;,..~ •
305; H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-
Assessing Authority, Kamal and Others v. Mis. Gopi Nath & ~
H Sons and Others 1992 Supp (1) SCC 312; State of U.P. v. )-
MAHAVIR SINGH-v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. 537

Committee of Management of S.K.M. Inter College 1995 A
Supp (2) SCC 535 and Durga Devi v. State of H.P. (1997) 4

-""-"' sec 575, relied on.
Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1983) 2
sec· 442, held inapplicable.
3. It cannot be said that the equity lies in favour of B
respondent No. 1. Even otherwise, when respective merit
of the candidates is taken into consideration, equity has
~.._
hardly any role to play. [Para 19] [547-D]
4. The judgment of the High Court being wholly
unsustainable is set aside. [Para 20] [547-E] c
Case Law Reference:
1940 Lahore Law Times 25 referred to para 14
1928 Lahore Law Times 33 referred to para 14
1955 Lahore Law Times 29 referred to para 14
D
1962 P.L.J. 64 referred to para 14
(1990) 1 sec 305 relied on para 17
....i
1992 Supp (1) sec 312 relied on para 17
~
1995 Supp (2) ·sec 535 relied on para 17
(1997) 4 sec 575 relied on para 17 E
(1983) 2 sec 442 held inapplicable para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
7252 of 2008.
From the final Judgment dated 9.11.2006 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No. F
-t 5582 of 2006.
.....
S.S. Sanyal, R.K. Gupta, S.K. Gupta, Arun Yadav and
Shekhar Kumar for the Appellant.
V.C. Mahajan, R.K. Rathore and Kuldip Singh for the
Respondents. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
-) S.8. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Appointment of a Lambardar,. who is a Village
Headman and is inter alia engaged in the job of collection of H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R. e
A revenue on commission basis, is governed by the provisions
of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887; Section 28 whereof
.,.. >r
reads as under:
•
"28. Rules respecting ~anungos and village officers - (1)
The State Government may make rules to regulate the
B appointments, duti~s. emoluments, punishment,
· ~uspension and removal of kanungos and village officers."
3. Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said rule making
power, the State of Punjab framed the Punjab Land Revenue _j.._
Rules (for short "the Rules"). Criterion for appointment in the
c post of Lambardar is laid down in Rule 15 and that of his
discharge is laid down in Rule 16 thereof. Rule 15 enumerates
the factors which are required to be taken into consideration
for the purpose of appointment in the said post being:
"(a) his hereditary claims;
D (b) the property in the estate possessed by the candidate
to secure the recovery of land-revenue;
(c) services rendered to the State by himself or by his ~
family;
(d) his personal influence, character, ability an,d freedom
E from indebtedness;"
4. The District Colleetor of Hisar undertook the process of
appointment of Lambardar for the Village Thurana in his District
in terms of the said Rules. ·
5. Indisputably, six persons had applied for the said post.
F However, Appellant and Respondent No. 1 as also one Ram
Kumar were found fit to be considered for appointment to the -t- ..-·
,._
said post. Upon consideration of the respective merit of the
. said candidates and in particular that of the appellant and the
respondent No. 1 herein, appellant was appointed being· a more
G meritorious candidate than others, stating:
" ... He is of 36 years of age having good personality and
he has work experience of Namberdari. For the purpose
of security of the Govt. money, he has 8 kanals 18 marlas A.-
agricultural land and plot whigh is sufficient for the purpose
H of security. He has good credibility in the village. The
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. [SB. SINHA, J.] 539

respectable of the village also want to appoint him as A
Namberdar. He actively participated in the collective work
""'- ~
of the village and help the Govt. Officials at the time of visit.
The Naib Tehsildar and Tehsildar, Hansi have also
recommended the name of Sh. Mahavir Singh for the
appointment on the post of Namberdar... "
B
6. For arriving at the aforementioned findings, the factors
relevant therefor, viz., the educational qualification, age,
,.l
experience in work of Lambardari, relation in village· and
character, land and property, illegal possession and dues, etc.
had been taken into consideration.
c
7. Respondent No. 1 filed a writ petition thereagainst
before the Punjab and Haryana High Court, Chandigarh which
was marked as Civil Writ Petition No. 5582 of 2006. By reason
of the impugned judgment and order dated 9.11.2006, a
Division Bench of the said Court inter alia opining that the
respondent No. 1 herein was a more meritorious candidate, D
reversed the said decision of the District Collector holding that
~ Respondent No. 1 was also a graduate having work ·experience
of 15 years in the Armed Forces and character certificate
having been issued in his favour by the Head Master of
Government Girls Primary School and the Sarpanch of Village E
Thurana and moreover having served in the Armed Forces that
he was a dedicated and disciplined person and enjoys a good
reputation.
8. Before the High Court a contention was raised by the
appellant that the respondent No. 1 was guilty of encroachment F
of land wherefor he was being proceeded against under
1 Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation)
~
Act, 1961 in respect whereof, the following comments were
made:
"... It is suffice to say that these proceedings appear to be
G
motivated, having been filed after initiation of procedure
for appointment to the post of Lambardar. .. "
-)_ The appointment of the appellant, on the said findings, was
directed to be set aside by the High Court, stating:
"Respondent No.4 does not have better claim on account H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
e
A of inheritance as the office of Lambardar is not a hereditary
office. It appears that the competent authority has totally
f. k
ignored the comparative merits of the petitioner as well as
respondent No.4. As per the qualification the petitioner has
certainly an edge over respondent No.4. No doubt, the
choice of the competent authority in the appointment of
B
Lambardar should not ordinarily be interfered with, but from
the facts of the present case, it is quite evident that the
authorities have totally ignored the merits of one of the
~
candidates, therefore, interference is necessitated.
In view of the above, we fin·d that the petitioner would
c be the best suitable candidate for the post of Lambardar
as: he has experience of being the member of disciplined
force and is more meritorious. Accordingly, the presentwrit
petition is allowed and it is directed that the petitioner be
appointed as Lambardar of Village Thurana."
D 9. Mr. S.S. Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of appellant, in support of this appeal, would submit:
(i) As the father of the appellant was a Lambardar and }-
he had been helping him in carrying out his functions
in that capacity, he had experience.
E' (ii) Appelfant being younger in age than respondent No.
1, he was a better candidate.
(iii) Appellant is a graduate of a University, whereas
respondent No. 1 was merely a deemed graduate
for the purpose of Class 'C' post having served the
F Army for a period of fifteen years.
(iv) Respondent No. 1 having been convicted for
+ .....
~

unauthorisedly occupying the land of Gram
Panchayat Thurana under Section 7 of the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961, he
G could not have been appointed in the post of the
Lambardar.
(v) The High Court committed a serious error insofar
),-
as it, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article :
226 of the Constifution of India, entered into the
H merit of the respective candidates, which is beyond
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 541

its domain. A
..._~ 10. Mr. V.C. Mahajan, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of respondent No. 1, contended:
~(i) The relevant factors as laid down under the Rules
having not been complied with by the District
Collector, the High Court in exercise of its writ B
jurisdiction could have interfered therewith.
(ii) A finding of fact arrived at by a statutory authority,
if perverse, is liable to be interfered with by the
·High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. c
(iii) In any event, the respondent No. 1 being a retired
military personnel, the equity also lies in his favour.
(iv) The fact that the respondent No. 1 has been
convicted for commission of an offence under
Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands D
(Regulation) Act, 1961, having been raised for the
..j first time before the High Court, no cognizance
~
thereof should be taken by this Court.
11. 'Lambardar' is defined in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd
edition 2005, page 2616 as a 'headman of a village or of a E
patti or section of a village'. It is furthermore stated: ·
"... The cultivator who either on his own account, or as the
representative of other meIT)bers of the village, pays the
government dues and is registered in the Collector's roll
according to his number: as the representative of the rest F
'..Jo
-1 he may hold the office by descent or by election ..;·
12. Although the post of Lambardar is governed by the
provisions of the Punjab Land Revenue Act and the Rules
framed thereunder, holder of the said post is not a government
servant. He does not hold a civil post within the meaning of G
Article 309 of the Constitution of India. He although is paid a
sum of Rs. 500/- as a fixed sum but his main income is the
-). amount of commission which he receives out of the amount of

~
. revenue collected. Apart from collection of revenue, he has
other functions to perform including rendition of assistance to
H
542 SUPREME ~OURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.
e
A an investigating officer when a crime is committed in a village.
13. The District Collector is the appointing authority. He #-".Joo
considered the respective merits of the candidates in great
details. As indicated hereinbefore, the factor that the appellant
is son of a deceased Lambardar and he used to help him in
B the work of 'Lambdari' during his life time was taken into
consideration.
Candidature of Ram Kumar was not taken into
consideration being a matriculate. The Collector took into ..I,,
(
consideration the fact that the respondent No. 1. is also a
c graduate keeping in view the services rendered by him in the
Armed Forces. As regards age, he found the appellant to be
more suitable being 36 years whereas the respondent No. 1
was aged 62 years at the relevant time.
As regards experience.of the work of Lambardari, he found
that· the appellant was more experienced in the work of
D
Lambardari. It was, however, noticed that the respondent No.
1 is a retired official from the Indian Armed Force and he has
served the nation for 2~ years and as such good experience >-· -r
in the military works. ·
So far as character of the respective candidates is
E
concerned, all were found to have been possessing good
character. Similar opinion was expressed in respect of land and
property.
The Collector drew his conclusion, as noticed hereinbefore,
upon taking into consideration the. aforementioned factors
F which were all relevant for the purpose of recruitment to the post
of 'Lambardar'. The High Court in its impugned judgment did +
i-, '
not enter into the question as to whether the said findings of
the Collector were right or wrong. It did not also take into
consideration the nature of jurisdiction the High Court exercises
G under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters.
14. It is now a well-settled principle of law, keeping in view
the decisions in regard to the appointment of Lambardar in the
>,~
State of Punjab, that age of a candidate is a relevant factor.
In Lt. Malik Abbas Khan v. Ghu/am Haidar [1940 Lahore
H Law Times 25], it was stated:
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIAU RAM & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 543

" ... It is certainly not wise, save in very exceptional A
circumstances, to appoint for the first time, an inamkhor
. . . *' or zaildar whose age is 60 or more."
In Kalyan Singh v. Haidar (1928 Lahore Law Times 33],
the Financial Commissioner held that ordinarily the Collector's
choice appointing a Zaildar or Sufedpost should not be B
interfered with even though the appellate authority believes that
his choice was not the best choice.
.. Similar view was expressed in Lila Ram v. Asa Ram
[1955 Lahore Law Times 29) in the following terms:
"... While it is now an established principJe that there should c
be no interference with the choice made by the Collector,
it does not follow that where the Collector's order is based
on a misrepresentation of facts, there should still be no
interference."
In Jai Dayal v. Mohar Singh [1962 P.L.J. 64], it was held 0

.. .~
that even a panch or sarpanch can carry out the job of both the
offices together, stating:
"Another aspect from which the issu~ may be considered
is to see whether a Lambardar is eligible for election.as
a Panch or Sarpanch. Section 6(5) of the Gram Panchayat E
Act, 1952, enumerates the conditions which should be
fulfilled before a person is entitled to stand for election as,
( or continue, to be a Sarpanch or Panch. The only relevant
provisions of this section are that a person, who is not
qualified to be elected as a member of the Legislative
Assembly or is a whole-time salaried servant of any Local F
-t
.... Authority or State or the Union of India, shall not be entitled
to stand for election as a Sarpanch or Panch. It is clearly
laid down in section 2 of Punjab Act No.7 of 1952 that a
person shall not be disqualified for being a member of the
Punjab State Legislature by reason only of the fact that he G
is a Lambardar. Further, while it may be true to say that a
Lambardar holds a civil post under the State, it cannot be
-,A
said that he is a whole-time salaried servant of the State."

• 15. Keeping in view the aforementioned backdrop, the
---'\

correctness of the judgment of the High Court may have to be H
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A considered.
16. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under ,,..,..
Article 226 of the Constitution of India is basically coricerned
- with the correctness of the decision making process and not
the merit of the decision. It has not been found by the High Court
B that Collector in expressing his opinion as regards comparative
merit of appellant vis-a-vis respondent No. 1 committed an error
in his decision making process. The _principles _of natural justice
have been complied with. Procedure laid down in the Rules had ~--

also been complied with. It is also not correct to say, as has
been contended by Mr. Mahajan that the Collector had not taken )...
c info consideration the services rendered by the respondent No.
1 to the State. He did acknowledge that the respondent No. 1
had rendered the services to the State as a member of the
Armed Forces. The Collector also took into consideration that
the views of the respectables of the village were in favour of
D appellant as also the fact that he had participated in the
collection work of the village and helped the government
officials at the time of their visit. He furthermore took- into ).--
consideration the fact that the Naib Tehsildar, Hansi had also 41
recommended his name. Even the Circle Revenue Officer had
recommended therefor.
E
17. It is, therefore, not a case where the finding of the
Collector can be said to be perverse. It has also not been
established that the said statutory authority while taking a
decision failed to take into consideration the relevant factors
or based its decision on extraneous considerations or on
F
irrelevant factors not germane therefor.
+
In Dalpat Abasaheb Solunke v. B.S. Mahajan [(1990) 1 ~

SCC 305], this Court held:
"12. It will thus appear that apart from the fact that
the High Court has rolled the cases of the two appointees
G
in one, though their appointments are not assailable on the
same grounds, the court has also found it necessary to sit
in appeal over the decision of the Selection Committee ~- -
and to embark upon deciding the relative merits of the
I
candidates. It is needless to emphasise that it is not the
H \-
function of the court to hear appeals over the decisions of
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 545

the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative A
,. 1 merits of the candidates. Whether a candidate is fit for a
particular post or not has to be decided by the duly
constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise
on the subject. The court has no such expertise. The
decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with B
only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material
irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its
..._ procedure vitiating the selection, or proved ma/a tides
affecting the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the
present case the University had constituted the Committee
in due compliance with the relevant statutes. The c
-
'
Committee consisted of experts and it selected the
candidates after going through all the relevant material
before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made
and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called
comparative merits of the candidates as assessed by the D
court, the High Court went wrong and exceeded its

- """'
jurisdiction."
In H.B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-
Assessing Authority, Kamal and Others v. Mis. Gopi Nath &
Sons and Others [1992 Supp (1) SCC 312], this Court held: E
"8. But here what was assailed was the correctness
of findings as if 6efore an appellate forum. Judicial review,
it is trite, is not directed against the decision but is confined
to the decision making process. Judicial review cannot
extend to the examination of the correctness or
F
reasonableness of a decision as a matter of fact. The
i purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual
......
receives fair treatment and not to en~ure that the authority
after according fair treatment reaches, on a matter which
it is authorised by law to decide, a conclusion which is
correct in the eyes of the Court. Judicial review is not an G
appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which
. the decision is made. It will be erroneous to think that the
~,,4
Court sits in judgment not only on the correctness of the
- ·decision making process but also on the correctness of
the decision itself." H

' ..
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A In State of U.P. v. Committee of Management of S.K.M.
Inter College [1995 Supp (2) SCC 535], this Court held: t "
"10. It is settled law that the High Court exercising
the power under Article 226 of the Constitution is not like
an appellate authority to consider the dispute. It has to see
B whether the impugned order is based on records or
whether the authorities have applied their own mind to the
relevant facts. It is seen that clauses (v) and (vi) of sub-
section (3) of Section 16-0 specifically enumerate the
grounds which clearly applied to the facts in this case.
Therefore, when the facts do exist on record and the
c Government have applied their mind to those facts and
came to the conclusion that from the facts so collected
they were satisfied that the Committee had contravened
clauses (v) and (vi) of sub-section (3) of Section 16-0, they
have rightly exercised the power under sub-section (4) of
0 Section 16-0. We are of the view that the High Court has
traversed the controversy as a court of appeal and
committed manifest error of law in interfering with the
order."
In Durga Devi v. State of H.P. [(1997) 4 SCC 575], this
E Court held:
"4. In the instant case, as would be seen from the
perusal of the impugned order, the selection of the
appellants has been quashed by the Tribunal by itself
scrutinising the comparative merits of the candidates and
F fitness for the post as if the Tribunal was sitting as an
appellate authority over the Selection Committee. The
selection of the candidates was not quashed on any other
ground. The Tribunal fell in error in arrogating to itself the
power to judge the comparative merits of the candidates
and consider the fitness and suitability for appointment.
G That was the function of the Selection Committee. The
observations of this Court in Oalpat Abasaheb Solunke
case are squarely attracted to the facts of the present
case. The order ofthe Tribunal under the circumstances
cannot be sustained. The appeal succeeds and is allowed.
H

....
MAHAVIR SINGH v. KHIALI RAM & ORS. [S.B. SINHA, J.] 547

-- The impugned order dated 10-12-1992 is quashed and the A
matter is remitted to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal on
-y 1
other points in accordance with the law after hearing the
parties."
18. There cannot be any doubt or dispute whatsoever that
a writ court could interfere with a finding of fact when the same B
inter alia is found to be perverse. However, neither any such

. finding has been arrived at by the High Court nor do we find
any and as such the decision of this Court relied upon by Mr.
Mahajan in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh
[(1983) 2 SCC 442] cannot be said to have any application
whatsoever in this case.
c
The High Court furthermore failed to take into consideration
that while exercising its power of judicial review, it exercises a
limited jurisdiction. The court, it is well-settled, is ordinarily
concerned with the decision making process and not the merit
of the decision. D

.. --t
19. It also cannot be said that the equity lies in favour of
the respondent No. 1. Even otherwise, when respective merit
of the candidates is taken into consideration, equity has hardly
any role to play.
E
20. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment of the
High Court being wholly unsustainable is set aside. The appeal
is allowed. The Collector, Hisar is directed to restore the
services of the appellant forthwith. No costs.
RP. Appea1 allowed.

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