Supreme Court of India
MAHAVIR & ORS.versusUNION OF INDIA & ANR.
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 877
- Decided
- 8 September 2017
- Disposal
- Dismissed
Holding
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be used to revive stale or dead compensation claims, and the petition is barred by delay and laches.
Summary
Petitioners Mahavir and others claimed that compensation for 100 acres of land acquired in the Raisina‑Lutyens zone in 1911‑12 had never been paid and sought relief under Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement Act, 2013, which deems acquisition proceedings lapsed if an award was made five years before the Act and compensation remained unpaid. The petition was filed more than a century after the acquisition. The Supreme Court held that the claim was barred by inordinate delay and laches, and that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked to revive dead or stale claims. Consequently, the petition was dismissed with costs.
Issues considered
- The applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to revive a compensation claim where the award was made over 100 years ago.
- Whether the petition is barred by delay and laches.
- Whether the court can restrain construction or creation of third‑party interests on the disputed land.
- The relevance of interest provisions under Section 34 of the 2013 Act.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 12, s. 18, s. 6
- Limitation Act, 1963
- Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Settlement Act, 2013s. 24, s. 31, s. 34
Subjects
delaylachesland acquisitioncompensationSection 24stale claimlimitationabuse of process
Judgment
[2017] l l S.C.R. 553
MAHAVIR & ORS. A
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
(Special Leave Petition (C) No. 26281 of 2017)
SEPTEMBER 08, 2017 B
[ARUN MISHRA AND
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.)
Delay!Laches:
Writ petition u/Art. 226 of Constitution - Taking plea that the C
compensation for the 100 acres .land acquired in Raisina Lutyen :v
zone of New Delhi which had taken place in 1911-12, had not been
paid and therefore, in view of s.24 of Right to Fair Compensation
Act of 2013, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed -
Petitioners also prayed for restraint on construction activity <ind
0
from creation of third party interest - High Court dismissed .the
petition - On Special Leave Petition, held: The case is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and /aches - A stale claim aft~r
105 years of acquisition cannot be entertained - The provisions of
s.24(2) of 2013 Act cannot be invoked in cases of dead claims or
stale claims - The claims are also clouded and hence become E
doubtful - Law does not permit examination of barred or totally
fraudulent claims - Provisions of law cannot be permitted to the
defrauded or misused - In the present case law has not on(v been
misused but also abused - Therefore, the petition is liable tiJ be
dismissed with costs of Rs. 50, 0001- - Right to Fair Cof1!pensation
F
and Transparency in Lal1d Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement
Act, 2013 - s.24 - Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Rabindranath Bose & Ors. V; Union of India & Ors.
(1970) 1 SCC 84 : [1970] 2 SCR 697 - followed.
Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Chennai v. M Meiyappan G
& Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 309 : [2010] 12 SCR 1184;
Jasveer Singh & Am: v. State of Uttar Pradesh .& Ors.
(2017) 6 SCC 787; U.P State Jal Nigam & Am: v.
Jaswant Singh & A111: (2006) 11 SCC 464 : [2006) 8
Suppl. SCR 916; Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-operative
H
553
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 11 S.C.R.
A Milk Prodr1cers Societies Union Ltd. (2007) 9 SCC 109 :
[2007) 5 SCR 729; State of Karnataka v. Laxuman
(2005) 8 sec 709 : [2005) 4 Suppl. SCR 535; Addi.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v.
Thakoredt.is. Major and Ors. (1997) 11 SCC 412 -
relied on.
B
Delhi Dev(!lopment Authority v. Sukhbir Singh (2016)
16 SCC 258 : [2016) 5 SCR 227; Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirima/ Solanki (2014)
3 SCC 18~ : [2014) 1 SCR 783; Hissar improvement
Trust v. Sm/. Rukmani Devi and Am: AIR 1990 SC 2033;
c Shri Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of UP & Ors. AIR
1996 SC il74 : (1995) 3 Suppl. SCR 584 - held
inapplicable.
Case Law Reference
D (2016) 5 SCR 2l7 held inapplicable Para8
[2014) l SCR 7ll3 held inapplicable Paras
AIR 1990 SC 2033 held inapplicable Para 10
[1995) 3 Suppl. $CR 584 held inapplicable Para 11
E (2010) 12 SCR 11184 relied on Para 14
c2011) 6 sec 7817 relied on Para 14
[2006) 8 Suppl. SCR 916 relied on Para 15
[1970] 2 SCR 6917 followed Para 16
F [2007] 5 SCR 729 relied on Para 17
[2005) 4 Suppl. SCR 535 relied on Para 18
(1997) 11 sec 412 relied on Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition
G (Civil)No.26281 of2017
From the Jud~ent and Order dated I 0.04.2017 of the High Court
of Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 129 of2017.
Dr. Surat Sin!Pi, Brajesh Kumar Singh, Amit P. Shaunak, Saurabh
Agarwal, Advs. for the Petitioners.
H
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNJON OF INDIA & ANR. 555
The following Order of the Court was delivered: A
ORDER
l. Delay condoned.
2. There is a gross abuse of the process of law reflected in the
instant case. In Raisena, Lutyen's zone of New Delhi the acquisition B
took place and awards were passed thereto in 1911-1912. A writ petition
was filed by the petitioners before the High Court after I 05 years later,
urging that compensation has not been paid; due to operation· of the
provisions of Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement Act,
2013 (for short, "the 2013 Act"), the land acquisition has lapsed. c
3. In the writ petition filed by the petitioners in the High Court
they claimed to be the fourth Generation ofNathu son ofKaalu. It was
averred that Government passed the award Nos.55 and 56 in the year
1911-1912. The predecessors in interest of the petitioners were cultivators
in the capacity of Gair Morusi tenants. As per the prevalent policy, at the D
relevant time, cultivators and tenants were entitled to 50 per cent of the
compensation. About 100 acres of the land of the predecessors had
been acquired in the village Raisina. A declaration under section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, "the Act'') was issued. Nathu and
Kaalu were held entitled to compensation in the award Nos.55 and 56 E
which was passed. In the awards P-2 and P-3, which have been placed
on record, the year 1911 and 1912 had been mentioned, not the actual
date on which said awards had been passed.
4. It was further averred in the petition that the predecessors of
the petitioners have not taken the compensation. The petitioners were
F
running from pillar to post to get their rights and they have approached
various political leaders/authorities for their help but it was to no avail.
Now, the Act of 2013 has come into force. The provisions of section
24(2) of the 2013 Act provides that where an award under section 11 of
the Act has been made before five years or more but compensation has
not been paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. G
5. It was further averred that though, the physical possession had
been taken by the Government and passed over to the Government
offices and leased out to private parties as such, the award Nos.55 and
56 are illegal and inoperative and the land acquisition process stands
lapsed. H
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] ll S.C.R.
A 6. It was t)irther submitted that Government would allot the land
in question and create third party interest. If that is done, petitioners
shall suffer irreparable loss and damage. Thus, the Government should
be restrained from creating third party interest. Certain occupants are
raising construction and third party interest are likely to be created and
therefore order Jinaintaining status quohas to be made regarding the
B
nature, title and possession of the land including restraint on constmction
activity. Prayer has also been made to restore the land of the petitioners'
ancestors to petit~oners and alternatively to provide a similar land with
the same market value to them.
Section 24 of the Act of 2013 is extracted hereunder:
c
24. Land acquisition process under Act No.I of 1894 shall be
deemed t'il have lapsed in certain cases,-
( l) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act in any case
of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land
o AcquisitionAct. 1894,-
(a) where po award under section l l of the said LandAcquisition
Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the
determination of compensation shall apply; or
(b) wherelan award under said section 11 has been made, when
E such proc~edings shall continue under the provisions of the said
Land Acquisition Act, as ifthe said Act has not been repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (I}, in case
of land ~quisition proceedings initiated under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 ( 1 of 1894), where an award under the
F said section l l has been made five years or more prior to the
commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the
land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid
the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the
appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the
proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with
G
the provislons of this Act:
Provided that where an award has been made and
compensation in respect of a majority ofland holdings has not
been depdsited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all
beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under
H
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 557
section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to A
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
7. The High Court while dismissing the writ petition by the
impugned order had observed:
"4) The question is perhaps a unique one -i.e. the parties claim
to be aggrieved to approach this Court, waking up like Rip Van B
Winkle in Indian parlance or what may be called a 'Kumbkarna'
lapse of time. In other words, is it open to the petitioner or a set
of petitioners to resuscitate grievance several generations later
to claim the protection of a later law? Such claims were never
under contemplation when the acquisition was resorted to. c
5) It is not disputed that the lands over which the petitioner lays
claim were a part ofRaisina village which was acquired and on
which much of Lutyens Delhi has been built. In these
circumstances as to whether indeed the petitioner's ancestors
were paid compensation or not can be made a subject of inquiry D
over I 04 years later having regard to a Inter enactment and right
which flow directly from it. In the opinion of the Court, the award
clearly has to be neg-utive. The petitioners are asking this Court
to infer and conclude that in the absence of some indication from
the records made available by them that their ancestors did not
ever receive any compensation. No contemporary record in the E
form of letters, protest by them or any other communication
stating that compensation was not disbursed or reference to civil
proceedings for the release of the amounts or seeking decree
have been relied upon by the petitioners. In these circumstances,
if the petitioners are to be allowed to raise such grievances the F
courts would be open to claims from each succeeding generntion,
which may say that the previous generation had not received
their just dues. Such claims cannot be adjudicated, as they are
barred."
8. The petitioners in the petition have referred to the decision of G
this Com1 in Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh(2016) 16
SCC 258. In the aforesaid case, possession was taken over in 2000 and
the compensation was deposited by the DDA with the Land Acquisition
Collector in the year 2002. There was a dispute as to who will receive
compensation, therefore, compensation could neither be paid nor tendered.
H
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 11 S.C.R.
"
A In said case, reliance was placed upon the decision in Pune Municipal
Corporation v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki(2014) 3 SCC 183.
This Court held that the deposit in court was not made as per sections
31 {2) of the Act, Hence proceedings lapsed by virtue of section 24 of
the 2013 Act. '
B Section 31 and Section 34 of the Act are extracted hereunder:
"31. Payrent of compensation or deposit of same in court.-
( l) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall
tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the
persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and
c shall pay It to them unless prevented by some one or more of the
contingencies mentioned in the next subsection.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or ifthere be no person
competeqt to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to
the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment
D of it, the c;::ollector shall deposit the amount of the compensation
in the court to which a reference under Section 18 would be
submittedf
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive
such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
E
Provided, also that no person who has rc:ceived the amount
otherwise then under protest shall be entitled to make any
application under section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability
of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any
F
compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the
person lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwilhstanding anything in this section. the Collector may,
with the sanction of [appropriate Government) instead ofawarding
a money compensation in respect of any land, make any
G airnngement with a person having a limited interest in such land,
either by !he grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of
land revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such
other wa)' as may be equitable having regard to the interests of
the parties concerned.
H
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 559
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing subsection shall be construed to A
interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into
any arrangement with any person interested in the land and
competent to contract in respect thereof.
xxxxxxxxx
xxxxxxxxx B
34. Payment of interest- When the amount of such compensation
is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the
land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest
thereon at the rate of [nine per centum] per annum from the
time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid ~r c
deposited.
[Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof i.s not
paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on
which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fiftetn per
centum per annum shall be pay~ble from the date of expiry of D
the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or
part thereof which has not been paid or deposited befa-e the
date of such.expiry.]"
9. Section 31 (I) of the Act requires tender of compensation which
is tendered in terms of section 12 of the Act. Section 12 provides a mode E
of informing claimants as to compensation. Section 31 (2) of the Act
requires Collector to deposit amount in court in case it is not received by
the persons interested or there is some dispute. Under the Act, the deposit
is required only with a view to avoiding liability to pay interest. Deposit
in the Court is not a payment made to the owner. It is only to avoid
F
liability to pay interest that too at higher rates on the failure of deposit.
Once it is deposited the liability to pay interest ceases. Section 34 of the
Act makes it clear that if the compensation is not deposited on or before
taking the possession of the land, interest at the rate of nine per cent
shall follow from the time of so taking the possession until compensation
so paid or deposited in the court. The proviso to section 34 makes it G
clear that in case it is not so deposited in court as per section 3 I (I)
within a period ofone year from the date of taking possession interest at
the rate of I 5 per cent per annum shall be payable. Thus, it is clearly
provided under section 34 that interest at the rate of 15 per cent per
annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one
H
560 SUPRijME COURT REPORTS [2017] 11 S.C.R.
A year till it is so p:jid or deposited. As soon as the deposit is made under
Section 31(2) of the Act. liability ceases to make the payment ofintercst
on the compensalion amount so deposited.
I 0. This cpurt in Hissar Improvement Trust v. Smt. Rukmani
Devi andAnr. Alll 1990 SC 2033 has considered the purport of section
B 31 and 34 and laid down that in case the amount is not deposited in the
court as per the prpvisions of section 31 of the Act, interest is liable to be
paid as provided in section 34. However, it is clear that due to non-
deposit of the amount under section 31, acquisition would not lapse under
the Act. This court has laid down thus:
c "5.lt cannot be gainsaid that interest is due and payable to the
landowner in the event of the compensation not being paid or
deposited in time in Court. Before taking possession of the land,
the Collector has to pay or deposit the amount awarded, as stated
in Section3 l, failing with he is liable to pay interest as provided
in Section,34.
D
6............. .
7. We make it clear that insofar as the landowner is concerned,
his right to be compensated is enforceable against the State. lt is
the liability of the Collector in terms ofthe relevant provisions to
E pay the amount awarded, together with interest in the event of
the amounl not being paid in time. The liability of the appellant-
Trust arising under its agreement with the Government for
payment in respect of the property acquired is a matter on which
we expres~ no view."
11. This court in Shri Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. &
F
01:1".AlR 1996 SC 274, dealt with the award of interest under section
34. This court has observed that liability to pay the interest arises when
the possession of\he acquired land was taken and the amount was not
deposited. In case delay was due to petitions filed by the claimants in the
High Court and Supreme Court and the compensation has been deposited
G thereafter, payment of interest at the higher rate cannot be directed in
view of the provisitms contained in section 34. This court observed:
3. Shri B.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel for the appellants,
contended that the award was made on March 22, 1983, though
the acquisition was made in September 1976. Therefore, the
H appellants ~hould be compensated by payment of interest@ 12
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 56 l
per cent per annum. In support of his contention, he placed A
reliance on the decision of this Court in Ram Chand and Ors. v.
Union of India and Ors. (l 994) 1 SCC 44 : (1993 AIR SeW
.3479) and in particular on paragraph 16 of the judgment. It is
seen that in Ram ehander's case even after the dismissal of the
writ petitions by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi
B
[ 1975] 4 sec 285 : (AIR 1974 SC 2077), no action was taken
. by the Land Acquisition Officer to pass the award. Thus, till
1980-81 no award was made in respect ofany of the acquisitions.
Under these circumstances, this Court had directed the
Government to pay interest@ Ii per cent on the amount awarded
to compensate the loss caused to the appellants therein. In this C
case it is seen that though the notification was issued in September
1976, the writ petitions came to be filed in the High Court
immediately thereafter in 1977 in the High Court and obviously
further proceedings were stayed. Accordingly, the Land
Acquisition Officer delayed the award. After the dismissal of D
the writ petitions, the appellants came to this Court and obtained
status quo. Obviously, the Land Acquisition Officer was not in a
position to pass the award immediately. Thereafter it would appear
that he passed the award on March 22,1983. Section 34 of the
Act obligates the State to pay interest from the date of taking
possession under the unamended Act Ceil 6 percent and after the E
Amendment Act 68of1984 at different rates mentioned therein.
The liability of the State to pay interest ceases with the deposit
made as per Section 34 of the Act. Further liability would arise
only when the court on reference under Section 18 enhances
the compensation under Section 28 of the Act. Similarly, in an
. appeal under Section 54 of the Act if the appellate court further F
increases the compensation, then again similar obligation under
Section 28 arises.
4. In the light of the operation of the respective provisions of
Sections 34 and 28 of the Act. it would be difficult to direct
payment of interest. In fact, Section 23(1-A) is s set off for loss G
in cases of delayed awards to compensate the person entitled to
receive compensation; otherwise. a person who is responsible
for the delay in disposal of the acquisition proceedings will be
paid premium for dilatory tactics. It is stated by the learned
Counsel for the respondents that the amount of interest was also H
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] II S.C.R.
A calculated and total amount was deposited in the account of the
appellants by the Land Acquisition Officer after passing the
award, j.e., on November 15, 1976 in a sum of Rs. 20,48,615.
Under these circumstances, the liability to pay interest would
arise when possession of the acquired land was taken and the
amount was not deposited. In view of the fact that compensation
B
was de~osited as soon as the award was passed, we do not
think that it is a case for us to interfere at this stage. (emphasis
supplied)
We need not go further in the case as to the effect of section 34
of the Act.
c
12. In tho instant case, no relief can be granted on the basis of
decision of the Sukhbir Singh( supra) in which decision of this Court in
P1me Municipal Corporation(supra) bas been relied on or any other
decision following Pune Municipal Co1poration(supra) referred to in
the decision of this Court in Sukhbir Singh(supra).
D
13. In the instant case, the case is liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay apd lacbes. By no stretch ofthe imagination, the principles
enumerated in Section 24 of the Act of2013 can be permitted to invoke.
We are not inclined to entertain such a stale claim after I 05 years of
acquisition.
E
14. The catena of decisions of this court indicates that delay and
!aches are enough to destroy the remedy as laid down by this court in
Tamil Nadu Housing Board, Che1111ai v. M Meiyappan & Ors.(2010)
14 SCC 309, anti Jasveer Singh & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 787.
F
15. In U.P. State Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr.
(2006) 11 sec 464 this court bas observed that in determining whether
there has been del,'ly so as to amount to !aches in case: petitioner/claimant
is aware of the violation of the right, where a remedy by his conduct
tantamount to wajver of it or where, by his conduct or neglect, though
G not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards
to be asserted. ln,such cases lapse of time and delay are most material.
Upon these considerations rests the doctrine oflaches.
16. The Constitution Bench of this court in Rabi11dranath Bose
H & Ors. v. Union ef India & 010-.(1970) 1 SCC 84 has observed:
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 563
"'32 ... we are of the view that no relief should be given to A
petitioners who, without any reasonable explanation, approach
this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution after inordinate
delay. The highest Court in this land has been given Original
Jurisdiction to entertain petitions under Article 32 of the
Constitution. It could not have been the intention that this Court
B
would go into stale demands after a lapse of years. It is said that
Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right. So it is. but it does not
follow from this that it was the intention ofthe Constitution makers
that this Court should discard all principles and grant relief in
petitions filed after inordinate delay." (emphasis supplied)
17. This court in Dharappa v. Bijapur Co-operative Milk C
Producers Societies Union Ltd.(2007) 9 SCC 109 considered the
question of delay and !aches in the matter of raising the dispute under
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. Though no limitation period is prescribed
under the Industrial Disputes Act, this court has held that if on account
of delay, a dispute has become stale or ceases to exist, the reference D
should be rejected. It is also held that lapse of time results in losing the
remedy and the right as well. The delay would be fatal if it has resulted
in material evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered
unavailable. When belated claims are considered as stale and non-existing
for the purpose of refusing or rejecting a reference under section I 0( 1)( c)
or in spite ofno period oflimitation is prescribed this court laid that it will E
be illogical to hold that the amendment to the l.D. Act inserting section
10(4-a) prescribing the time limit of six months should be interpreted as
reviving all stale and dead claims. This court has further observed that
section 10(4-A) clearly requires that a workman who wants to directly
approach the Labour Court, should do so within six months from the F
date of communication of the order. This court has laid down that when
a new remedy or rcliefis provided by a statute, such a transitional provision
is made to ensure that persons who are given a special right, do not lose
it for want of adequate time to enforce it, though they have a cause of
action or right as on the date when the new remedy or relief comes into
effect. This court has further observed that section 10(4-A) does not, G
therefore, revive non-existing or stale or dead claims but only ensures
that claims which were live, to be filed, by applying the six-month rule in
section 10(4-A). This court has laid down thus:
"29. This Court while dealing with Sections lO(l)(c) and (d) of
the ID Act, has repeatedly held that though the Act does not H
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] ll S.C.R.
A provide a period oflimitation for raising a dispute under Section
JO{l)(cj or (d). if on account of delay. a dispute has become
stale or ceases to exist. the reference should be rejected. It has
also held that lapse of time results in losing the remedy and the
right as Well. The delay would be fatal ifit has resulted in material
evidence relevant to adjudication being lost or rendered
B
unavailable (vi de Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. K.P. Madhavankutty;
Balbir Singh v. Punjab Roadways8; Asst!. Executive Engineer
v. Shivalinga9 and S.M. Nilajkarv. Telecom Distt. Manager! 0).
When belated claims are considered as stale and non-existing
for the pl)rpose ofrefusing or rejecting a reference under Section
c JO(l)(c) cpr(d). in spite ofno periodoflimitation being prescribed,
it will be illogical to hold that the amendment to the Act inserting
Section 10(4-Al prescribing a time-limit of six months. should be
interpretitd as reviving all stale and dead claims.
30. The opject of Section 10(4-A) is to enable workmen to apply
D directly to the Labour Court for adjudication of disputes relating
to termination, without going through the laborious process of
seeking ll reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act. The
legislative intent was not to revive stale or non-existing claims.
Section 10(4-A) clearly requires that a workman who wants to
directly approach the Labour Court should do so within six months
E from the date of communication of the order. Then come the
words "or the date of commencement of the Industrial Disputes
(Karnat~a Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later", The
reason for these words is obvious. In cases where the cause of
action arose prior to 7-4-1988, some additional time had to be
F provided tb make the provisions effective. Let us take the example
of a workman who had received the terminal ion order on 10-10-
1987. If Section 10(4-A), which came into effect on 7-4-1988,
had merely stated that the application had to be filed within six
months from the date of communication, he had to file the
application before 10-4-1988, that is hardly three days from the
G date when the amendment came into effect. The legislature
thought that workmen should be given some reasonable time to
know abo11t the new provision and take steps to approach the
Labour CC!urt. Therefore, all workmen who were communicated
orders of termination within six months prior to 7-4-1988 were
H given the l;>enefit of uniform six months' time from 7-4-1988,
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 565
irrespective of the date of expiry of six months. When a new A
remedy or relief is provided by a statute. such a transitional
provision is made to ensure that persons who are given a special
right, do not lose it for want of adequate time to enforce it. though
they have a cause of action or right as on the date when the new
remedy or relief comes into effect.
B
31. Section l 014-A) does not therefore revive non-existing or
stale or dead claims but only ensures that claims which were
live. by applying the six-month mle in Section l 0(4-A)as on the
date when the. section came into effect, have a minimum of six
months' time to approach the Labour Court. That is ensured by
adding the words "or the elate ofcommencement of the Industrial c
Disputes (KarnatakaAmendment)Act, 1987, whichever is later"
.to the words "within six months from the date of communication
to him of the order of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination". In other words ;ill those who were colnmunicated ·
orders of termination during a period of six months prior to 7-4- D
1988 were deemed to have been communicated such orders of
termination as on 7-4-1988 for the purpose of seeking remedy.
Therefore, the words "within six months from the date of
commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Karnataka
Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later" only enables those
who had been communicated order of termination within six E
months prior to 7-4-1988, to apply under Section 10(4-A)."
(emphasis supplied)
18. This court in State of Karnataka v. Laxuman(2005) 8 SCC
709 considered the question where no time limit is fixed under section F
18(3) of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended in Karnataka State).
No time limit was fixed by the statute to apply before the court but since
the application is to the court, though under a special enactment of Article
137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted
aild the application has to be made within three years of the application
relying on the Addi. Special Land Acquisition Officer. Bangalore v. G
Thakoredas, Major, and Ors. (l 997) 11 SCC 412. This court has
observed:
"9. As can be seen, no time for applying to the court in terms of
subsection (3) is fixed by the statute. But since the application is
to the court, though under a special enactment, Article 13 7, the H
•
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] l I S.C.R.
A residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963, would be attracted
and the application has to be made within three years of the
application for making a reference or the expiry of90 days after
the application. The position is settled by the decision of this
Court in Addi. Sp!. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredasl. It
was held: (SCC p. 414, para 3)
B
"3. Admittedly, the cause of action for seeking a reference
had arisen on the date of service of the award under Section
12(2) of the Act. Within 90 days from the date of the service
of the qotice, the respondents made the application requesting
the Deputy Commissioner to refer the cases to the civil court
c under Section 18. Under the amended subsection (3 )(a) of the
Act, the Deputy Commissioner shall, within 90 days from 1-9-
1970 make a reference under Section 18 to the civil court which
he failed to do. Consequently, by operation of subsection 3(b)
with the expiry of the aforestated 90 days, the cause of action
D had acqrued to the respondents to make an application to the
civil court with a prayer to direct the Deputy Commissioner to
make a reference. There is no period of limitation prescribed
in subsc;ction (3)(b) to make that application but it should be
done within limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the
Limitation Act. Since no article expressly prescribed the
E limitation to make such application, the residuary article under
Article )37 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act gets attracted.
Thus, it could be seen that in the absence of any special period
of limitation prescribed by clause (b) of sub-section (3) of
Section 18 of the Act, the application should have been made
F within three years from the date of expiry of90 days prescribed
in Section 18(3)(b) i.e. the date on which cause ofaction had
accrued to the respondent claimant. Since the application had
been ad~ittedly made beyond three years, it was clearly barred
by limitation. Since, the High Court relied upon the case in
Municipal Council2 which has stood overruled, the order of
G· the High Court is unsustainable."
This position is also supported by the reasoning in Kerala
SEB v. T.P. Kunhaliurnma3. It may be seen that under the
Central Act sans the Karnataka amendment there was no right
to approach the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction to
H
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 567
compel a reference and no time-limit was also fixed for making A
such an approach. All that was required of a claimant was to
make an application for reference within six weeks of the award
or the notice of the award, as the case may be. But obviously
the State Legislature thought it necessary to provide a time-
frame for the claimant to make his claim for enhanced
B
compensation and for ensuring an expeditious disposal of the
application for reference by the authority under the Act fixing
a time within which he is to act and conferring an additional
right on the claimant to approach the civil court on satisfying
the condition precedent of having made an application for
reference within the time prescribed. c
I 0. A statute can, even while conferring a right, provide also
for a repose. The Limitation Act is not an equitable piece of
legislation but is a statute of repose. The right undoubtedly
available to a litigant becomes unenforceable if the litigant docs
not approach the"court within the time prescribed. It is in this D
context that it has been said that the law is for the diligent. The
law expects a litigant to seek the enforcement of a right
available to him within a reasonable time of the arising of the
cause of action and that reasonable time is reflected by the
various articles of the LimitationAct."
E
19. The court is duty bound to prevent the abuse of the process of
law in the cases which have been concluded several decades before, in
our considered opinion, the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act
cannot be invoked in such cases of dead claims or stale claims. There
are several numbers of cases coming to this court in which matters had
been contested up to this court questioning the acquisition and the petitions F
have been dismissed by this court, and acquisition has attained finality,
possession was taken, the award passed. Notice had been issued under
Section 12(2) of the Act tendering the awarded amount but it has not
been collected by the claimants/land owners deliberately or they had
refused to collect it and are not ready and willing to accept it and,
G
thereafter, it has been deposited in the name and account of the owners
in the treasury which i·s also deposited as per the State Government's
instructions issued time to time relating to how Government money is to
be dealt with. The act of failure to deposit money under section 31 after
possession is taken only imposes liability to pay higher interest under
section 34. The acquisition would not lapse under the Act. H
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] ll S.C.R.
A 20. In our opinion. the cases in which there is deliberate action of
the owners for not collecting the compensation and they do not want to
receive it, section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not come to their rescue as
provisions are to help those persons who are deprived of compensation
but not for those who deliberately had not received it and litigated for
decades for quashing of proceedings avoiding to receive compensation
B
by willful act. The failure to deposit in court under section 31 ( l) in such
cases would at~ract only interest as envisaged under section 34 of the
Act and the provisions of section 24 cannot be so invoked in such cases.
21. In the instant case, the claim has been made not only belatedly,
but neither the petitioners nor their previous three generations had ever
c approached any of the authorities in writing for claiming compensation.
No representation had ever been filed with any authority, none has been
annexed and there is no averment made in the petition that any such
representation had ever been filed. The claim appears not only stale and
dead but extremely clouded. This we are mentioning as additional reasons,
D as such claims not only suffer from delay and !aches but courts are not
supposed to entertain such claims. Besides such claims become doubtful,
cannot be received for consideration being barred due to delay and !aches.
22. The High Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot
be permitted to be raised in the court, and cannot be adjudicated as they
E are barred. The tligh Court has rightly observed that such claims cannot
be a subject matter of inquiry after the lapse of a reasonable period of
time and beneficial provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act are not
available to such incumbents. In ow· opinion, Section 24 cannot revive
those claims that arc dead and stale.
F 23. The High Court has observed that Raisina is a part of the
Lutyens zone ofDelhi. It is prime ofNew Delhi and Government offices
etc. are located. The petitioners asked the High Court to infer and
conclude that in the absence of some indication of the record being
made available by them that their ancestors have not ever received any
compensation. How the petitioners came to know that their ancestors
G had not received compensation has not been disclosed in the petition.
The High Court has rightly declined to entertain such claims. The protective
umbrella of section 24 is not available to barred claims. If such claims
are entertained under section 24, it would be very-very difficult to
distinguish with the frivolous claim that may be made even after tampering
the records etc. or due to non-availability of such record after so much
H
MAHAVIR & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 569
lapse of time. Once right had been lost due to delay and !aches or A
otherwise, it cannot be revived under provisions of section 24 of the Act
of 2013. The intendment of Act 2013 is not to revive stale and dead
claims and in the concluded case y;hen rights have been finally lost. If
there is delay and !aches or claim is otherwise barred. it is not revived
under section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The provision docs not operate to
B
revive legally barred claims.
The provision of Section 24 does not invalidate courts judgments/
orders in which right have been finally lost or due to inaction is barred.
Law docs not permit examination of barred or totally fraudulent claims.
The provisions of the law cannot be permitted to be defrauded or misused.
Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act cannot be invoked in such· cases. The c
High Court has rightly declined to entertain the writ petitions filed by the
petitioners. It is not conceivable how the petitioners could file such a
petition in a laconic manner relating to the prime locality at New Delhi
that too for hundreds of acres with the delay of more than I 00 years.
24. The prayel's that have been made in writ petition are not only D
misconceived, there is an attempt to stop the ongoing construction activity.
It has also been mentioned that Government offices etc. have come up
and the Government has leased property to private parties also but still,
the prayer has been made to stop the construction activity. It passes
comprehension how such relief could ever be asked for. No authority E
had ever been approached by the petitioners or by their ancestors. As
such the petition is aimed at the total misuse of the process oflaw. Even
for a moment, such a petition could not have been received for
consideration.
25. We have seen in a large number of cases that the acquisition F
had attained finality, compensation had been tendered but not received
and development had also taken place. Petitions are being filed in the
couits under the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act that they
have not been paid any compensation. In fact, if there is any such
grievance, they themselves are responsible for not collecting the
compensation that was offered and tendered to them. The provision of G
section 24 is not intended to apply and extend help in such cases.
26. We arc not at all inclined to entertain the instant petition. The
Special leave petition is liable to be dismissed, and the same is hereby
dismissed with cost as in the facts and circumstances of the case we
find that there is not only misuse but an abuse of the process of law. H
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [4017] II S.C.R.
A Therefore, we irrwose the costs ofRs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand
Only) which is to be deposited by the petitioners with the Supreme Court
Bar Association in the welfare fund of Advocates within four weeks
from today and compliance be reported to this Court.
Kalpana K. Tripathy SLP dismissed.
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