Holding

Regulation 104(1) and (3) are within the Board’s delegated authority and are constitutionally valid; the High Court’s declaration of them as ultra‑vires and unreasonable is reversed.

Summary

A batch of 39 candidates filed writ petitions challenging Regulation 104(1) and (3) of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards Regulations, 1977, which barred inspection, disclosure and re‑valuation of answer books after results were announced. The Bombay High Court split the petitions into two groups, declaring clause (3) ultra‑vires and unreasonable, and later also striking down clause (1) on similar grounds. The State Board appealed. The Supreme Court held that the Board’s power under Section 36 of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards Act, 1965, legitimately includes the authority to make such regulations; the prohibition on inspection and re‑valuation does not breach natural‑justice principles, is not ultra‑vires, and is not unreasonable. Consequently, the High Court judgments were set aside and the writ petitions dismissed.

Issues considered

The validity of clause (3) of Regulation 104 prohibiting inspection and disclosure of answer books.
The validity of clause (1) of Regulation 104 prohibiting re‑valuation of answer books.
Whether the regulations are ‘bye‑laws’ subject to the reasonableness test.
Whether the principles of natural justice apply to the verification process under the regulations.

Legislation cited

Bombay General Clauses Act, 1904s. 39
Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards Act, 1965s. 19, s. 36, s. 38

Subjects

education lawexamination regulationsright to inspectionre‑valuationnatural justicedelegated legislationultra viresreasonablenessbye‑lawMaharashtra State BoardRegulation 104

Judgment

MAHARASHTRA s·TATE BOARD OF SbCONDARY
AND HIGHER SECONDARY EDUCATION
ANDANR.

v•
..
PARITOSH BHUPESH KUMAR SHETH ET
B
July 17, 1984

[D.A. DESAI AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.)

Education laws-Right to demand by an exam/nee an inspection, verifica-
tion and revaluation of answer books-Constitutional validity of Regulation c
I 04(3) of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Boards
Regulations, 1977 negativing such righu-Princip/e of natural justice under
education laws, explained-Delegated legislation and Court.• power to interpre1-
Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards Act, 1965 Sections 19
and 36-Rules of interpretation of Rules and RegulaJion.v, explained.
D
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 36 of the Maharashtra
Second3ry and Higher Secondary Boards Act, 1965, the State Board has
framed the Maharashtra Secondary and .Higher Secondary Education Boards'
Regulations 1977. These regulations were sanctioned by the State Govern-
ment uader sub-section 3 of section 36 on I Ith July, 1977 and came inlo
E
force on lSth June. 1971. These regulations were applied to the SecondJry
School Certificate examination and Higher Secondary Certificate examination
held in October, 1977 and thereafter Regulation 104 refers to verific.:!tion of
marks obtained by a candidate in a subject. Clause (1) thereof restricts
verification to checking whether all the answers have been ~xamined
and that there has been no mistake in the totalling of marks for each F
question in that ~ubject and transferring marks co1rectly on the first cover
page of the answer book and. whether the supplements attached to the
answer book mentioned by the candidate are in tact. Clause ( 1) al~o speaks
of revaluation and prohibits revaluation of the answer books or supplements.
Clause (3) of the said regulation also speaks of right to claim revaluation by G
an examinee and is to the effect : "no candidate sh~ll claim, or be e~titled to
revaluation of his anwer or disclosure or inspection of the answer books or
other documents as these are treated by the Divisional Board as most
confidential.
H
~ number t;tf ~sqccessfql and disappointed ca~did~tes wtio h~d
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] ] S.C.R.
A appeared for the Higher Secondary Certificate and Secondary School
Certificate public examinations conducted by the Divisional Boards function~
ing under the supervision and control of the Mabara~htra State Board of
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education filed a batch of 39 Writ
Petitions in the High Court of Bombay challenging the validity of Clauses
(J) and (3) of regulation 104 of lhc Maharashtra Secondary and Higher
B Secondary Education Boards Regulations 1977 and seeking the issuance of
writs directing the Board to allow them disclosure and inspection of their
answer books in the public examination, the results whereof had already
been published and to conduct a revaluation of fUCh of the answer papers as
the petitioners may d~mand after the inspection.
c
The writ petitioners had based their challengs against the validity of
clauses (1) and (3) of Regulation 104 on three main grounds :-(1) The
Impugned clauses were violative of the principles of natural justice; (2) Both
clnuses (1) and (3) were ultra vires and void on the ground of their being in
excess of the regulation making powers conferred on the 81)aid by Section
D 36 of the Act; and (3) The impugned provisions contained in clauses (I) and
(3) were highly unreasonable and since the regulations fra11_1ed by the Board
are in the nature of bye-laws, they are liable to be struck down on the
ground of unreasonableness.

The High Court divided the Writ Petitions into two groups; the first
E group consisting of cases where the right of inspection alone was claimed
and second group compr1s1ng of cases where the petitioners had
claimed also a further right to demand a revaluation of the answer papers.
The High Court allowed the petitions· by two separate judgments one in
rrspect of the first group holding that clause (3) of regulation 104 which
Jays down that no candidate shall be tntitled to disclosure or inspection of
F the anS\\'f'r books or other documents as these are to be treated as most
confidential is ultra vires on the ground of its being in excess of the regula-
lion making power of the Board and by another judgment in the second
group holding that the provisions contained in clause (1) of regulation 104
that, no revaluation of fhc answer books or supplements shall be done is
ultra vires the regulation making power conferred by section 36 and is also
illegal and void on the ground of its being manifestly unreasonable.
Aggrieved by these judgments rendered in the two groups of cases the
appellant Bqard preferred these appeals after obtaining Special Leave of the
Court.

H Allowing the appeals, the Court

f!ELD: t:t. Regulation 104(3) of the Maharashtra Secondary and
STATE EDN, BOARD v. P. B. KUMARSHETH 31

Higher Secondary Baard Regulations 1977 is valid. The process of evalua- A
tion of answer papers or subsequent verification of marks under clause (3)
of regulation 104 does not attract the principles of na1ural justice since 'no
decision making process which brings about adverse civil consequences to the
examinees js involved. Non-disclosure or disallowance of the right of
inspection of the answer books as well as denial of the right to ask for a
revaluation to examinees who are dissatisfied with the results do not visit B
them with adverse civil consequences. There is no substance in the contention
that every adverse verific.ation involves a condcmration of the examin~es
behind their back and hence constitutes a clear violation of principles of·
natural justice.[62E, 4 ID-E, F-G]

I :2. The principles of natural justice cannot be extended beyond C
reasonable and rational limits and cannot be carried into such absurd lengths
as to make it necessary that candidates who have taken a public examination
should be allov.'ed to participate in the proces of evaluation of their
performances or to verify the correctne&s of the e''a\uation made by the
examiners by themselves conducting an inspection of 1hc answer books and
determining whether there has been a proper and fair valuation of the D
• answers by the examiners. [41 H; 42A]

Union of India v. M.L. Kapur, [1974] 1 S.C.R. 797; referred to.

2:1. The question whether a particular piece of deligated legislation
whether a rule or regulation. or other type of statutory instrument_,;is in E
excess of· the power of subordinate Jcghlation conferred on the delegate has
to be determined with reference only to the. specific provisions contained in
the relevant statute conferring the power to make the rule, regulation. etc.
and also the object and purpose of the Act as can be gathered fron1 the
various provisions of the enactment. (43 A-B]
F
2:2. The Court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the
Jegisl ature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve
the object and purposes of the Act and it carinot sit in judgment over the
wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the
regulation n1aking body and declare a regulation to be ultra viri:s merely on
the ground that, in_ the view of the Court the impugned provisions will not
help to serve the objoct and purpose of the Act. So long as the body
G
entrusted with the task of fram\ng the rules or regulations acts within the
scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regula-
tions made by it have a rational nexus with the ·object and purpose of the
stat~te, the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or effica-
tiousness of such rules or regulations. It is excluSively within the province
of the legislature and its delegate to determine as a matter of policy, how
tho provisio~s of the statµte 9an best be implemented and what measures~ '"
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] l s.c.R.

A substantive as well as pr~cedural would have to be . incorporated in the
rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and
purposes of the Act. It is not for the Court to examine the merits or
demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny has to be limited to the
question as to whether the impugned regulations fall within the scope of the
regulation making power conferred on the delegate by the statute. [43 C-F]
B
3: I. The view taken by the High Court that clause (J) of the regulation
104 is ultra vires on the ground of its being in excess of the regulation-
making power conferred on the Board is not correct. [45-B]

3:2. Any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a rule or regulation
C will not render 1t ultra vires and the Court cannot strike it down on the
grbund, that, in its opinion. it is not a wise or prudent. but is even a foolish
one, and that it will not really serve to effectuate the purposes of tbe Act. The
legislature and its deleg·1tes are the sole repositories of the power to decide
what policy should be pursued in relation to matters covGred by the Act and
there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the particular
D provision im,pugned before it can be said to suffer from any legal infirmity,
in the sense of its being wholly beyond the scope of the regulation-making
power or its being inconsistent with any of the provisions of the parent
enactment or in violation of any of the limitations imposed by the Constitu·
tion. None of these vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present case.
[46E-F]
E
3:3. The provisions of sections 19 and 36 of the Act make it clear
that a duty is cast on the State Board to formulate its policy as to how the
examinations are to be conducted, how the valuation of the performances of
the candidates is to be made and by what procedure the re ults are to be
finalised, compiled and released. It is perfectly within the competence of the
F Board, rather, it was its plain duty, to apply its mind and deci~e as a matter
of policy relating to the conduct of the examination as to whether disclosure
and inspection of the an~wer book~ should be allowed to the candidates,
whether and to what extent verification of the result should be permitted
after the results hcive been announced and whether any right to claim
revaluation of the answer book should be recognised or provided f0r. All
G
these are undoubtedly matters which have an intimate nexus with the objects
and purposes of the enactment and are, therefore, within the ambit of the
general power to make regu·ntions conferred by sub-section 1 of section 36,
and also within the scope of clauses (cj, (f) and (g) of 5Ub-section 2 of the
said section. [44F-H; 45 A-B]
II
4:1. Clause (3) or Regulatioe 10'4 is not in the nature of a bye-law
~Qcl it is not an unreasonable provision. [46 H]
- STATE EDN. BOARD 1'· P.B. KUMARSH£TH

4:2. While the power to rpake regulations for the purpose of carrying
into effect the provisions of the Act, is conferred on the Boar_d by section
36, section 38 confers a distinct power of making bye-laws. The legislature,
33

A

while ea<1cting sections 36 and 38 mast be assumed to have been fully aware
of the niceties of 1be legal position governing the distinction between rules/
regtilations properly so called and bye.Jaws. When .the statute cont<_:tins a
clear indication that the distinct regulation making power conferred under B
section 36 was not intended as a power merely to fram ebyelaws, it is not
open to the Court to ignore the same and treat the regulations made under
l
-..·
section 36 as mere bye-laws in order to bring them within the scope of
justiciability by applying the test of reasonableness. [47 E-G]

4·3. Regulations made by the Board under section 36 are in the nature c
of stalutory rules _and they have the full rigour and force of sub-ordinate
legislation made by a delegate duly empowered in that behalf by the
legislature. [49 D-E]

Sophy Kelly v. The State, 69 Bombay, L.R. 186 overruled.
D
5:1. The provisions contained in a statutory enactment or in rules/
regulaticns framed thereunder have to be so construed as to be in harmony
with each other and where under a specific section or rule a particular
subject has received special treatment, such special provision will exclude
the applicabiliiy of any general provision which might otherwise cover the
said topic. [52 B·C] E

5:2. Regulation 102(2), if properly construed in the setting in "Yhicb
it occurs only confers a suo f!!O!u power on the Divisional Board to amend
the result of the examination in respect of any candidate or candidates on
its being found that such resulr has been affected by error, malpractice,
fraud, improper conduct, etc. The error referred to in the said provision h:u1 F
in the context to be understood as being limited to an errora rising in con<>e-
qucncc of malpractic{', fraud, improper conduct or other similar matter of
»• whatsoever nature. Clauses (t) and (3) of Regula\ion 104 must be read
together and not in isolation. Clause (3) of regulation 104 contains is fact a
mandate to the Divisional Boards to treat the answer books and documents
as confidential and lays down that no candid:Lte shall be entitled to claim G
disclosure or inspection of the said confidential books and docum.ents.
Therefore, the High Court ought not to have invoked the doctrine of
i1nplicd power and obligation, in the instant case, for the purpose of holding
that bec::use the right of verification has been conferred in clause (1) of
regulation 104, there is an implied po\ver in the examinees to demand
H
di~closure and inspection and a corresponding implied obligation on the
p.irt of the Board 10 cause such a demand. [52 c.o, H; 53 A; C·D]

\
A
34 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ (1985] 1 S.C.R.

5:3. Unless it can be said that a bye-law is manifestly unjust,
capricioUSj inequitable or partial in i·s operation, even a bye-law cannot be
struck down by a Court on the ground of unreasonableness merely because
-
'

the Court thinks that it goes further than is necessary or that it does not
incorporate certain provisions which, in the opinion of the Court, would
have been fair and wholesC'me. The responsible representative body eat rusted
B with the power to make bye.Jaws must ordinarily be presumed to know
what is necessary, reasonable, just and fair. The Court should be extremely
reluctant to substitute its opinions and views as what is wise, prudent and
proper in relation to academic n1atters in preference to those formulated by
professional men possessing _technical expertise and rich experience of actual
day-to-day working of educational instit~tions and the departments controlling
c them. The Court cannot make a pedantic and purely idealistic approach to
the problems of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root
problems inVolvrd in the working of the system and unmindful of the
consequences which would emanate, if a purely idealistic view as opposed
to a pragmatic one were to be propounded The Court shoi.lld also, as far

D
as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, •
rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system
unworkable in practice. (53 F-H; 55 A]

Trustees of the Port of Madras v. Aminchand Pyarelal and Ors. [19 76]
SCR 721 referred to.

E Kruse v. John;on [1898] 2 Q.B. and Slattery v. Naylor [1888] i3 A.C.
446 quoted with approval.

6: J. \Vhat constitutes fair play depends. upon the facts and circum-
stances relating to each particular given situation. If it is found that every
possible precaution has been taken and all necessary safeguards provided to
-
F ensure that the answer books inclusive of supplements are kept in safe
custody so as to elirninale the danger of tbeir being tampered with and that
the evaluation is done by the examiners by applyiQ.g unifonn standards
with checks and cross checks at different stages and lhat measures for
detection of malpractice, etc. have also been effectively adopted, in such
cases, it will not be correct on the part of the Courts to strike down the
G provisions prohibiting revaluation on the ground that it violates the rules of
fair play. Furtht:r, the candidates have taken the examination with full
awareness of the provisions contained in the regulations and in the declara ..
tions made by them in the form of application for admission to the examina..
tion they have solemnly stated that they fully agree to abide by the
regulations issued by the Board. [59 A·C; 60 F-G]
H
6:2. That the University of Bombay and some other Universities have
STATE EPN. BOARD I'. KUMARSHET!l (B. Eradi, J.) 35

made provisions permitting candidates to demand revaluation, has little A
relevance for the purpose of deciding about the legai validity of the
impugned regula,tions framed by the Board. Io the public interest, the·
results of public cxan1inJtions published should have some finality attached to
them. If inspection, verification, in t~e presence of the candidates and
and revaluation are to be allowed as of right it may lead to gross delays and
indefinite uncertainty pnrticularly in regard to the relative ranking etc. of B
the candidates, besides leading to utter confusion on account of the enormity
of the labour and time involved in the process. [60 H; 61 A-D]

-· CIVIL APPEL.LATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1653 to
1691 of 1980
c
Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated
the 28th & 29 July, 1980 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition
Nos. 1906, 1772, 1799, 1838, 1885, 1923, 1925, 1926,1928, 1996-1998,
2005, 2060-65, 2076, 2099-2102, 2110, 2127, 1909, 1864, 1965, 1889,
1890, 1924, 1927, 2003, 2044, 2098, 2176, 2177, 2178 and 2179 of
~W D
R, P. Bhatt, So/i J. Sorabjee, Ravi Kulkarni, Ravinder Narain,
A. N. Hasker, D. N. Misra and Mrs. A. K. Verma for the Appellants.

S. S. Khanduja and Satya Prakash for the Respondents.
11
Dr. N. M. Ghatate for Respondent in CA. 1658/80.

P. H Parekh and Miss Nisha Shrivastava for Respondents in
CA. Nos. 1659 and 1684 of 1980.

V. N. Ganpule and Mrs. V. D. Khanna, for Respondent in CA. F
1685 of 1980.

The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by

BALAKRISHNA ERAPI, J. It is common experience that whenever
the results of Public examinations conducted by School Boards and
Universities or by other bodies like the Public Service Commission G
a, e announced, amidst the rejoicings of successfull candidates who
have secured the grade of marks anticipated by them, it also inevi-
tably brings with it a long trail of disppointmen!s and frustrations. as
the direct outcome of the non-fructu1tion of hopes and expectations
harboured in the minds of the examinees based on the candidates
o\vn assessment of their performance and merit. Labouring under H
a feeling that there has not been a proper evaluation of their perfor-
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) ! S.C.R.

A mance in the examination, they would naturally like to have a revalua-
tion of the answer books and even a personal inspection and
verification of the answer books for finding out whether there has
been a proper evaluation of the answers to all questions, whether
the totalling of marks has been correctly done and whether there
has been any tampering with the scat numbe" written on the answer
B books and the supplementary sheets. The question canvassed before
us in these appeals is whether, under law, a candidate has a right to
demand such an inspection, verification and revaluation of answer '
books end whether tho statutory regulations framed by the Maha-
rashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education
governing the subject insofar as they categorically state that there
c shall be no such right can be said to' be ultra vi res, unreasonable
and void.

A number of such disappointed candidates who had appeared
for the Higher Secondary Certificate and Secondary School Certi-
D ficate public examinations conducted by the Divisional Boards
functioning under the supervision and control of the Maharashtra
State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education-here-
inafter called 'the Board' -filed a batch of 39 Writ Petitions in the
High Court of Bombay challenging the validity of Regulation 104
E (3) of the Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Education
Boards Regulations 1977 and,seeking the issuance of writs directing
the Board appellant herein-to allow to the petitioners disclosure and
inspection of their answer books in the Public examination, the
results whereof had already been published and to conduct a revalua-
tion of such of the answer papers as the petitioners may demand
J! after the inspection. The High Court divided the Writ Petitions into
two groups, the first group consisting of cases where the right of
inspection.alone was claimed and the second group comprising of
cases where the petitioners had claimed also the further right to
demand a revaluation of the answer papers. Though all the Writ
Petitions were heard together by a Division Bench consisting of
G V. s. Deshpande and V. A. Mohta, JJ, the two groups were disposed
of by separate judgments delivered on behalf of the Bench on the
same day-28th July 1980. The first group of Writ Petition• was
disposed of by a judgment delivered by Deshpande, J speaking on
behalf of the Division Bench. Therein it was held that clause (3)
\
of Regulation 104 which lays down that no candidate shall be entitled
to disclosure or inspection of the answer books or other documents
as these are to be treated as most confidential is ultra vires on th~
S'fATE EDN. llOARD v P.il. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 37
ground of its being in excess of the regulation-making power of the A
Board. In the opinion of the Divisio;; Bench, the said provision
cannot be said to serve any purpose of the Act, but is, on the
contrary, "defeasive" of the same. It was further held that the
impugned clause (3) of Regulation 10.4 to the extent to which it
prohibits disclosure and inspection of the answer books and other
connected documents on the ground of confidentiality is unreasonable B
and liable to be struck down on that ground also. Accordingly, the
High Court declared clause (3) of Regulation 14 to be void and
allowed the flr.;t group of Writ Petitions by dire.cting the Board to
allow inspection of the answer books asked for by the petitioners
and to take consequential action under clauses (4) to (6) of Regu- c
lati n 104 when found necessary.

The main judgment in the second group of Writ Petitions was
delivered by Mohta, J, holding that the provision contained in clause
([) of Regulation I 04 that no revaluation of the answer books or
supplement shall be done is ultra vires the regulation-making power D
conferred by Section 36 and is also illegal and void on the ground
of its being manifestly unreasonable. In the view of the learned
Judge, inspection and disclosure will serve no purpose in case the
further right of revaluation was denied and inasmuch as the right to
disclosure and inspection had been recognised by the judgment
just then delivered in the first group of Writ Petitions, the conclu- E ,
sion had necessarily to follow that the Board was obliged to permit
revaluation as well. On this reasoning, Regulation 104 (!) inso-

- far as it prohibits revaluation was declared void and a direction
was issued to the Board that in the case of those examinees
who had applied for reva1u~tion, such facility should also be allowed.
By a separate judgment, Deshpande, J, expressed serious doubts and F
reservations as to whether a further right of revaluation could be
spelt out from the rc3ulations, but finally agreed with the conclusion
expr.:ssed by his colleague stating thus : "rather than allow my doubts
to prevail and dissent, I prefer to agree with him in the above
circumstances". Aggrieved by these judgments rendered in the two
G
groups of cases, the Board has preferred these appeals before this
Court after obtaining special leave.

The Maharashtra Secondary and Higher Secondary Boards
Act, 1965 (for short, "the Act") has ooen passed to provide for the
establishment of a State Board and Divisional Boards to regulate
certain. matters pertaining to secondary and higher secondary edu- H
cat10n m the State. Section 3 (1) provides that the State Goyern-
,.
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) l s.c.R. ''
A ment shall, by notification in the official gazette, establish a Board
for the whole State by the name 'Maharashtra State Board of
\
Secondary and Higher Secondary Education'. By sub-section (2) of +-
the same Section, it is further provided that the State Government
shall, likewise, establish a Board for each of the three divisions
under such name as may be specified in the notiJ1cation. The appel-
B lant Board is the State Board constituted under sub-section ll) of
Section 3.

The powers and duties of the State Board have been enume-
rated in clauses (a) to (r) of Section 18 of the Act. Clause (a) states
that it shall be the duty of the Board to advise the State Govern-
c ment on matters of policy relating to Secondary or Higher Seconda1y
education in general. Thus under the scheme of the Act, the Board
is to discharge an important role in fornmlating policies on all
matters relating to Secondary and Higher Secondary education.
Clause (f) empowers the Board to prescribe the general conditions
D governing admission of regular and private candidates to the final
examination and to specify the c•mditions regarding the attendance
and character on the fullilment of which a candidate shall have a
right to be admitted to and to appear at any such examination.

Section 19 deals with the powers and duties of a Divisional
E Board. Under clause (f) it is the duty of the Divisional Board to
conduct in the area of its jurisdiction the final examination Jn
behalf of the State Board. Clause (g) empowers the Divisional
Board to appoint paper setters, translators, examiners, moderators,

F
supervisors and other necessary personnel for conducting the final
examination in tho area of its jurisdiction, for evaluation of candi-
dates' performance and for compiling and release of the results in
accordance with such instrnctions as the State Board may from time to
-
•
time issue. Under clause (h) it is within the power of the Divisional
Board to admit candidates for the final examination according to the
regulations made by the State Board in this behalf. Clause (m)
vests the Divisional Board with power to generally evaluate the
G performance of students in all examinations in secondary schools and
junior colleges including the final examination and make necessary
recommendations to the State Board in that behalf.

Section 36 (1) of the Act empowers the State Board to make
'regulations' for the purpose ·of carrying into effect the provisions of
H
tbe Act. Sub-section (2) states that, without prejudice to generality
of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for any of the
STATE EON. BOARD v. P. D. KUMARSHEnI (B. Eradi, J.) 39

m:1tters enumerated in clauses (a) to (n) thereof. Clauses (c), (d), A
1f) and (g) which alone are relevant for ou1 present purpose are
reproduced below :-

"(c) the general conditions governing admission of
regular and private candidates for the final examinations,
and any particular conditions regarding attendance and B
character, on the fulfilment of which a candidate shall have
a right to be admitted to and to appear at any such
• examination;"

"(d) the marks required for passing in any subject and
the final examination ,as a whole, and for exemption, credit c
and distinction in any subjecl;''

"(f) the arrangements for the conduct of final exa-
minations by the Divisional Boards and publication of
results;"
D
'\g) the appointment of examiners, their powe1s and
duties in relation to the final examinations and their
1
re1nuneration;'

Sub·scction (3) lays down that no regulation made under this
section shall have effect until the same has been sanctioned by the E
·State Government.

- Section 38 has conferred on the State Board a distinct power
to make 'bye-laws' consistent with the Act and the regulations made
thereunder. Such bye-laws are to proyide for the procedure to be
followeJ at the meetings of the Board and the Divisional Boards
F
and the Committees appointed by any of them and the numbers of
inc1nbers required to form a quorum at such meetings and any other
matters solely concerning the Boards and their Committees not
provided for by the Act and the regulations made thereunder.
G
Three Divisional Boards have been set up in Maharashtra by
the State Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section
3'and these Boards are in charge of the Poona Division, Aurangabad
Division and Vidharbha Division respectively. These three Divi-
sional JJoards conduct two public examinations, namely, the Higher
Secondary Certificate examination-"H.S.C. examination"-which is H
conducted at the end of the higher secondary education course and
4() SUPREME COiJRt REPORTS (198)] 1 S.C R.

A the Secondary School Certificate examination-" S.S.C. examina-
tion"-conducted at the end of the secondary school education
course.

In exercise of the nowers conferred by Section 36 of the Act,
the State Board has framed the Maharashtra Secondary and H'gher
B Secondary Education Boards Regulations 1977. These regulations
were sanctioned by the State Government under sub-section (3) of
Section 36 and were published on the 11th July, 1977. They are to be
deemed to have come into force on 15th June 19 77. These regulations
were applied to the Secondary School Certificate examination and
Higher Secondary Certificate examination held in October, 1977 and
c thereafter. The regulations consist of 3 parts. Part I contains the
provisions common to Secondary School Certificate (S.S.C.) and
Higher Secondary Certificate (H.S.C.) examinations; Part II contains
regulations pertaining to S.S.C. examination only and Part III those
pertaining exclusively to the Higher Secondary Certificate examina-
D tion. Regulation 104 with which we are concerned occurs in Part llI
and clauses (1) to (3) thereof which alone are relevant for the
purposes of this case require to be reproduced here :

"104. VERIFICATION OF MARKS OBTAINED BY A
CANDIDATE IN A SUBJECT.
E
(I) Any candidate who has appeared at the Higher
Secondary Certificate examination may apply to
the Divisional Secretary for verification of marks
in ahy particular subject. The verification wiil be
restricted to checking whether all the answers
F have been examined and that there has been no
mistake in the totalliug of marks for each question
in that subject and transferring marks correctly
on the first cover page of tho answer-book and
whether the supplements attached to the answer
.G book mentioned by the candidate are in tact. No
revaluation of the answer-book or supplements
shall be done.
r
(2) Such an application must be made by the candi·
date through the head of the junior college which
H
presented him for the examination, within two
weeks of the declaration of the examination results
StAtE El:JN. BOARD v. P. il. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 41

and must be'accompanied by a fee of Rs. 10/- for A
each subject.

(3) No candidate shall claim, or be entitled to revalua-
tion of his answers or disclosure or inspection of
the answer-books or other documents as these are
treated by the Divisional Board as most confiden- B
tial.''

Before the High Court, the Wr; t Petitioners had based their
challenge against the validity of clauses (l) and (3) of Regulation
104 on three main grounds. The first ground of attack was that the
impugned clauses were violative of the principles of natural justice. c
Secondly, it was urged that both clauses (I) and (3) were ultra vires
and void on the ground of their being in excess of the regulation-
making powers conferred on the Board by Section 36 of the Act.
The third ground of challenge was that the impugned provisions
contained in clauses ( l) and (3) were highly unreasonable and since
D
the regulations framed by the Board are in the nature of bye-laws,
they are liable to be struck down on the ground of unreasonableness.

Though the main plank of the arguments advanced on behalf
of the petitioners before t.he High Court appears to have been the
plea of violation of principles of natural justice, the said contention
E
did not find favour with the learned Judges of the Division Bench.
The High Court rejected the contention advanced on behalf of the
petitioners that non-disclosure or di<allowance of the right of inspec-
tion of the answer-books as well as denial of the right to ask for a
revaluation to examinees who are dissatisfied w;th the results visits
them with adverse civil consequences. The further argument that F
every adve.se "verification" involves a condemnation of the exami-
nees behind their back and hence constitutes a clear violation of
principles of natural justice was also not accepted by the High Court.
In our opinion, the High Court was perfectly right in taking this
view and in holding that (the "process of evaluation of answer
papers or of subsequent verification of marks" under clause (3) of G
Regulation 104 does not attract the principles of natural justice since
no decision making process which brings about adverse civil conse-
quences to the examinees in involved. The principles of natural
justice cannot be extended beyond reasonable and rational limits and
cannot be carried to such absurd lengths.as to make it necessary that
candidates who have taken a public examination should be allowed H
to participate in the process of evaluation of their performances or
42 SUPREME COURT REPoRtS [J 985] 1 S.C.R•

A to verify the correctness of the evaluation made by the examiners by
themselves conducting an inspection of the answer-books and deter-
mining whether there has been a proper and fair valuition of the
answers by the examiners As succinctly put by Mathew, J in his
judgment in the Union of India v. M.L. Kapur, (1), "it is not
expedient to extend the horizon of natural justice involved in the
B Audi alteram partem rule to the twilight zone of mere expectations,
however great they might be". The challenge levelled against the
validity of clause (3) of Regulation l.J4 based on the plea of viola-
tion of natural justice was, therefore, rightly rejected by the High
Court.
c The High Court in its judgment in the first group of cases then
went on to consider the next two grounds of challenge put forward
by the petitioners. namely, that clause (3) is ultra vires on the ground
of its being in excess of the regulation making powers of the Board
and that in any event it is void on the ground of unreasonableness.
Both'these grounds of challenge were upheld by the High Court and,
I>
in consequence thereof, clause (3) of Regulation 104 has been struck
down by the learned Judges as illegal, ultra vires and void. After
giving our careful consideration to the arguments advanced by the
learned counsel appearing on both sides, we have unhesitatingly
come to the conclusion that the view so taken by the High Court is
E wholly erroneous and unsustainable.

We shall first take up for consideration the contention that
clause (3) of Regulation 104 is ultra vires the regulation-making
powers of the Board. The point urged by the petitioners before the
High Court was that the prohibition against the inspection or dis-
F closure of the answer papers and other documents and the declara-
tion made in the impugned clause that they are "treated by the
Divisional Board as confidential documents" do not serve any of the
purposes of the Act and hence these provisions are ultra vires. The
High Court was of the view that the said contention of the reti-
tioners .had to be examined against the back-drop of the fact
G disclosed by some of the records produced before it that in the past
there had been a few instances where some students possessing in-
ferior merits had succeeded in passing off the answer papers of other
brilliant students as their own by tampering with seat numbers or
otherwise and the verification process contemplated under Regula-
tion 104 had failed to detect the mischief. In our opinion, this
H
(I) [1974] 1 S.C.R. 797.
STATE EON. BOARD I'. P. B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 43

approach made by the High Court was not correct or proper because
the question whether a particular piece of delegated · Jegislation-
whether a rule or regulation or other type of statutory instrument-is
in excess of the power of subordinate legislation conferred on the.
delegate has 'to be determined with reference only to the specific
provisions contained in the relevant statute conferring the power to
make the rule, regulation, etc. and also the object and purpose of B
the Act as can be gathered from the various provisions of the enact-
ment. It would be wholly wrong for the court to substitute its own
opinion for that of the legislature or its delegate as to what principle
or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and
to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of
c
the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a
regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view
of the Court, the impugned provisons will not help to serve the
object and purpose of the Act. So long as the body entrusted with
the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the scope of
the anthority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regula- D
tions made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose
of the Statute, the court should not concern itself with the wisdom
or efficaciousness of such rules or reg,tlations. It is exclusively within
the province of the legislature and its delegate to determine, as a
matter of policy, bow the provisions of the Statute can best be imple-
mented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural would E
have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficac.ous
achivement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the
Court to examine the merits or demerits of such a policy because
its scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the
impugned regulations fall within.the scope of the regulation-making
power conferred on the delegated by the Statute. Though this legal F
position is well·established by a long series of decisions of this
Court, we have considered it necessary to reiterate it in view of the
manifestly erroneous approach made by the High Court to the
consideration of the question as to whether the impugned clause (3)
of Regulation 104 is ultra vires. In the light of the aforesaid princi·
pies, we shall now proceed to consider the challenge levelled against G
the validity of the Regulation 104 (3).

As already noticec\, the power to make regulations is conferred
on the Board by Section 36 of the Act. Sub-section (l) of the said
Section lays down that the Board may make regulations for the H
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act. Sub·
44 SUPREME cot!Rt REPOltts tl985] I s.c.k.
A section (2) enumerates, in clause (a) to (n) the various matters for
which the provisions may be made by such regulations, the said
enumeration being without prejudice to the generality of the power
conferred by sub-section ( [). We have already extracted clauses
(c), (d), (f) and (g) which deal with the conditions governing
admission of candidates for the final examinasions, the arrangement
B for the conduct of final examinations by the Divisional Boards and
for publication of results, and the appointment of examiners, their
powers and duties in relation to the final examinations, etc. These
topics are comprehensive enough to cover the prescription of the
procedure for finalising the results of the examination based on the
evaluation of the answers of the candidates who have appeared for
c the examinations, as well as the laying down of the restrictive provi-
sions relating to verification of marks, prohibition against disclosure
and inspection of answer books and denial of any right or claim for
evaluation. We fail to see how it can be said that these are not
matters pertaining to the conduct of the final examination and the
D publication of the results of such examination. Further, Section
19 of the Act which sets out the powers and duties of a Divisional
Board 'lays down in clauses (f) and (g) that the Board shall have
the power and is under a duty to conduct in the area of its jurisdic-
tion the final examination on behalf ·of the State Board and to
E appomt paper-setters, examiners, etc, for conducting the final
examination in the area of its jurisdiction, for evaluation of candi-
dates, performances and for compiling and release of results in
accordance with such instructions as the State Board may from time
to time issue. It is thus clear that the conduct of the final examina-
tion and the evaluation of the Cl}ndidates' performance and the
F comJliling and release of results are all to be carried out by the
divisional Board in accordance with the instructions to be issued by
the State Board from time to time. It is, therefore, manifest that
a duty is cast on the State Board to formulate its policy as to how
the examinations are to be conducted, how the evaluation of the
perfdrmances of the candidates is to be made and by what procedure
G the results are to be finalised, 'compiled and released. In our
opinion, it was perfectly within .the competence of the Board, rather
it was its plain duty, to apply rts mmd and decide as a matter of
policy relating to the conduct of the examination as to whether
disclosure and ·inspection of the answer books should be allowed to
the candidates, whether and to what extent verification of the result
11 should be permitted after the results have already been announced
and whether any right to claim revaluation of the answer books
;TA1E IDN. BOARD v. P.B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 45

should be recognised or provided for. All these are undoubtedly A
matters which have an intimate nexus with the objects and purposes
of the enactmont and are, thoceforo, w:thin tho ambit of the general
power to make regulations conferred under Sob-section (l) of
Section 36. In addition. these matters fall also within the scope of
clause (cl, (f) and (g) of sub-section (2) of the said Section. We do
not, therefore, find it possible ·to accept as correct the view expressed B
by the fiigh Court that clause (3) of Regulation 104 is ultra vires
on the ground of its being in excess of the regulation-making pmver
conferred on the Board. lnstead of confming itself to a considora-
tion whether the impugned regulations fall within the four corners
of the Statute and -particularly of Section 36 thereof which confers
the power to make regulations, the High Court embarked upon an_
c
investigation as to whether the prohibition against disclosure and
inspection of answer books and other documents imposed by
the impugned clause (3) of Regulation 104 would, in practice,
effectively serve the purpose of the Act ensuring fair play to the
examinees) The High Court was of the opinion that in deciding
D
the question as to whether the impugned clause was ultra vircs, the
Court had to bear in mind "the glaring deficiencies" found to exist
in the working of the system inspite of all the elaborate precau!io-
nary measures taken for preventing such lapses which were detailed
in the affidavit in reply and "the far-reaching implications of the
said deficiencies on the future of the examinees" and it went on E
to observe that "the nexus or absence thereof between the purposes
of the Act or the purpose of the examination and the prohibition
against inspection in the impugned clause can be discovered only
by reference to these factors". Then the High Court proceeded to
make following further observations :
F

"The exarninee is the person affected by miscalculation
of totals, 01nissions to examiiv! any answer, misplacement
of the supplementaries of the answer books and misplace-
ment or tampering with the said record in any manner, if
any. Adverse result creates suspicion in his mind about G
the possil:Jle errors in the system and his claim to inspection
against this background must be held to be reasonable and
calculated to observe the purposes of the examination as
also the over-all purposes of the Act. This enables him
to verify if his suspicions are ill or well founded. Existence
of so·ne over-riding factors alone can Justify. denial of hi~. H
.
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R
A The High Court concluded tl1e discussion by stating : "Such
confidentiality cannot be found to be serving any purpose of the
Act merely because it was acquiesced in the past or accepted with-
out challenge. According to Mr. Sctalvad, authority to treat these
documents confidential is implicit in the very power to hold the
examination itself, it be'ng necessary to _secure effective achievement
B
of the process. This is too. broad a statement to admit of any
scrutiny. No such power can, however, be implied unless its indis-
pensibility of treating the question papers and names of the question
setters and examiners confidential, up to a certain stage can easily
be appreciated. Th•:ir premature disclosure or exposure may defeat
c the purpose of examinations and make a mockery of its very
conception. It is, however difficult to see any purpose of continuing
to keep them confidential at any rate after the declaration of the
results."

In our opmton, the aforesaid approach made by the High
D Court is wholly incorrect and fallacious. The Court cannot sit in
judgment over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the legislature
and the nbordinate regulation-making body. It may be a wise
policy which will fully effectuate the purpose of the enactment or it
may be lacking in effectiveness and hence calling for revision and
improvement. But any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in
E a rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires and the Court cannot
strike it down on the ground that, in its opinion, it is not a wise
or prudent policy, but is even a foolish one, and that it will not
really serve to effectuate the purposes of the Act. The legislature
and its delegate are the sole repositories of the power to decide what
policy should be pursued in relation to matters covered by the
F Act and there is no scope for interference by the Court unless the
particular provision impugned before it can be said to suffer from
any legal infirmity, in the sense of its being wholly beyond the
scope of the regulation-making power or its being inconsistent with
any of the provisions of the parent enactment or in violation of any
of the Ii mitations imposed by the Constitution. None of these
G vitiating factors are shown to exist in the present case and hence
there was no scope at all for the High Court to invalidate the
provision contained in clause (3) of Regulation 104 as ultra vires
on the grounds of its being in excess of the regulation-making power
conferred on the Board. Equally untenable, in our opinion, is the
next and last ground by the High Court for striking down clause
H
(3) of Regulation I 04 as unreasonable, namely, that it is in the
nature of a bye-law and is ultra vires on the LQ:ound of its being an
STATE EDN. BOARD v. P.B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 4?

unreasonable provision. It is clear from the scheme of the Act and A
more particularly, Section 18, 19 and 34 that the legislature has
laid down in broad terms its policy to provide for the estarlishment
of a State Board and Divisional Boards to regulate matters pertaining
to secondary and higher secondary education and it has authorised
the State Government in the first instance and subsequently the
Board to enunciate the details for carrying into effect the purposes B
of the Act by framing regulations. It is a common legislative
practice that the legislature may choose to lay down only the general
policy and !ea,•e to its delegate to make detailed provisions for
carying into effect the said policy and effectuate the purposes of the
Statute by framing rules/regulations which are in the nature of c
subordinate legislation. Sec. 3(39) of the Bombay General Clauses
Act, 1904, which ·defines the 'rule' states: Rule shall mecn a rule
made in exercise of the power under any enactment and shall include /
any regulation made under a rule or under any enactment." It is
important to notice that a distinct power o_f making bye-laws has
been conferred by the Act on the State Board under Section 38. D
The legislature has thus maintained in the Statute in question a clear
distinction between 'bye-laws' and 'regulations'. The bye-laws
to be framed under Section 38 are to relate only to procedural
matters concerning the holding of meetings of State Board, n;vi-
sional Boards and the Committee, the quorum required, etc More
important matters affecting the rights of parties and laying down the E
manner in which the provisions of the Act are to be carried into

- effect have been reserved to be provided for by regulations made
under Section 36. The legislature, while enacting Sections 36 and
38, must be assumed to have been fully aware of the niceties of the
legal position governing the distinction between rules/regulations
properly so called and bye-laws. Wheri the statute contains a clear F
• indication that the distinct regulation-making power conferred under
Section 36 was not intended as a power merely to frame bye-laws,
it is not open to the Court to ignore the same and· treat the regula-
tions made under Section 36 as mere bye·laws in order to bring
them within the scope of justiciability by applying the test of
. reasonableness • G
- It is also relevant to notice in this context the nature and
composition of the body on which the regulation-making p wer has
been conferred by the Act. The composition of the State Board
is set out in Section 5. It will be seen therefrom that the Board
is to have as ex-officio members the Director ()f Education of the H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] l S.C.R.
A State Government, the Director of Higher Education of the State
Government, the Chairmen of the Divisional Boards, the dire<'tor of
Technical Education of the State, the Director of Agriculture, the
Director of the State Institute of Education. Then there is a class
of elected members consisting of one representative from each
University in the State elected by the Academic Council of the
B
University, two members elected by th" Maharashtra Legislative
Assembly from amongst its members and one member elected
by the Maharashtra Legislative Council from amongst its mem-

c
bers, Next comes the category of .nominated members belonging
to five different categories described in clauses (i) to (v) under
class (C) in the Section, aggregating 21 in alL It will be seen from
these clauses that these nom;nated members are to be drawn from
--
amongst Principals, Headmasters, Headmistresses, teachers of Junior
Colleges and Secondary Schools, representatives of managing bodies
of secondary schools and junior colleges, p~rsons having special
knowledge or practical experience in matters connected with primary,
D secondary or higher secondary ·education. The State Board is thus
comprised of members who can be reasonably expected to possess
intimate knowledge, practical know-how, expertise and experience
in all matters pertaining to the field of education-school and
collegiate-and it is to such a highly responsible body of professional
men that the legislature has en"trusted the task of framing regulations
E laying down the details of policy of working out the provisions of
the Act are to be carried into effect. Section 37(i) lays down that
the first regulations shall be made by the State Government and
they shall continue to be in force until the new regulations are made
by the Board under Section 36. There is also the further safeguard
provided in sub-section (3) of Section 36 that no regulation made
-
F
under that Section shall have the effect until the same has been
sanctioned by the State Government. Even more significant is the
•
the provision contained in sub-section (2) of Section 37 conferring
a concurrent power on the State Government to make any new
regulations in respect of any of the matters referred to in Section
36 and thereby modify or repeal either wholly or in part the regula-
G
tions made by the State Board. The said sub-section is in the folio·
wing terms : -·-
"37. (2) If it shall at any time appear to the State
Government that it is expedient to make any new regula-
tions in respect of any of the matters referred to in Section
H 36 or that any regulations referred to in sub-section (i) or
111ade by the State Board under section 36 need to be mod;-
STATE EDN. BOARD V• P.B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi. J.) 49

lied or repealed, either wholly or in part, the State Govern- A
ment may after consultation with the State Board and by
notification in the Official Gazette, make such regulations,
or modify or repeal any such regulations, either wholly or
in part. The regulations so made, modified or repealed
shall take effect from such date as the State Government
may in such notification specify or if no such date is speci- B
fied, from the date of publication of the said notification
in the Official Gazette, except as respects anything done or
- omitted to be done before such date."

In our opinion, there cannot be a clearer indication of the c
intention of the legislature regarding the true character of the regu-
lations which are to be made either under Section 36 o.r under the
provisions of either sub-section (I) or sub-section (2) of the Section
37, namely, that they are in the nature of subordinate legislation
having the force of rule framed under a Statute amplifying and
supplementing its profuions by laying down how the legislative D
policy is to be carried into effect with respect to different situations
that may arise in the implementation of the object and purposes of
Statute. Viewed in this setting, we are unhesitatingly of the opinion
that the regulations made by the Board under Section 36 are in
the nature of statutory rules and they have the full vigour and force
of subordinate legislation made by a delegate duly empowered in E
that behalf by the legislature. In support of its conclusion that the
Regulations framed under Section 36 are only in the nature of bye-
laws, the Division Bench of the High Court has strongly relied on an
earlier ruling of the same court in Sophy Kelly v. The State,{')
where another Division Bench has expressed the view that the earlier F
set of regulations framed under Section 36 of the Act are.only in
the nature of bye-laws. In arriving at the .said conclusion, the
I
Court is not seen to have adverted to most of the crucial aspects
pointed out by us in the ·preceding paiagraphs. We are unable to
accept the said decision as laying down correct law .
-. In the light of what we have stated above, the constitutionality
G

of the impugned regulations has to be adjudged only by a three-
fold test, namely, (I) whether the provis'ons of such regulations
fall within 1he scope and ambit of the power conferred by the statute
on the delegate; (2) whether the rules/regulations framed by the
H
( 1l 69 Bomb L.R. 186-
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] l s.c-n.

A delegate are to any extent inconsistent with the provisions of thf
parents enactment and lastly (3) whether they infringe any of the
fundemental rights or other restrictions or limitations imposed by
the Constitution. We have already held that the High Court was
in error in holding that the provisions of clause (3) of Regulation
!04 do not serve the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of

B
the Act and are ultra 'ires on the ground of their being in excess of
the regulation-making power conferred by Section 36. The Writ
Petitioners had no case before the High Court that the impugned
clauses of the regulations were liable to be invalidated on the appli-
--
cation of second and third tests. Besides the contention that the,
impugned regulations were ultra vires the power conferred under
c Section 36(1), the only other point urged was that they were in the
nature of bye-laws and were liable to be struck down on the ground
of unreasonableness.
...
In view of the conclusion expressed by us that the regulations
cannot be regarded as mere bye-laws, the contention raised on
D alleged unreasonableness does not really call for consideration.
However, since the High Court has discussed the said aspect at
great length in its (wo judgments and fairly elaborate arguments were
also advanced before us by the learned advocates appearing on both
sides, we think it is only fair and proper that we should briefly
express our views on the merits of the question concerning the
E reasonableness of impugned regulation. The reason which weighed <

with the High Court for declaring that clause (3) of Regulation 104, '
which states that no candidate should be entitled to claim disclosure
and inspection of the answer hooks and other connected documents
and that they are to be treated as confidential suffers from the vice
F of unreasonableness is that denial of the right of disclosure and
inspection is 'defeasive' of the right of verification conferred on the
examinees under sub-clause (I) of the same clause as well as the
riuht
0
flowing from sub-clause (2) of Regulation I 02 whereby
.
the
Divisional Board is invested with the power to amend the result of
any candidate in an examination where it is found that the "esult
G
has been affected by error, mal-practice, fraud, etc. Dealing with
this aspect, the High Court has observed as follows in paras 46 and
47 of its judgment :

"We, however, do not think that mere absence of any
positive provision for inspection can be decisive of exami-
H
nees' claim thereto. The Board itself is conscious of the
fa!Jiability of its system, and the possibility of inadvertant
STATE EDN. BOARD v. P.B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 51

or deliberate errors and malpractices. It has, therefore,
provided correctives against such errors in Regulations 102
and 104. Right of verification and power of correction ·or
the results, conferred under these regulations must be
assumed to have been intended to be effective. Experience
of a few years, !lowever, has revealed several deficiencies in
the functioning of the system and demonstrated how the B
said system of verification and powers_ of correction can
become ineffective. Entire reliance on the Board's adminis-
tration even for the ministerial part of these functions may
reduce these provisions to a dead letter. These rights and
powers can be better effectuated by enabling the examinee, (
to have himself inspection of the papers. Such a right
indeed is implicit in the right of verification. The power
to correct the errors and amend result contemplated under
Regulations 104 and 102 also imply an obligation to faci-
litate tracing of such errors and malpractices and provide
• effective machinery for their detection. This includes an [
implied obligation to give inspection of the answer papers
to the interested person such as the examinee. The mal-
practices involved in passing off papers written by one as
that of others and manipulations· and tampering and the
frauds involved therein, cannot be effectively detected nnd
remedied unless, among others, the examinee himself is
enabled to inspect the answer papers. This is indispensible
even for verifying the daim as to the presence or absence
of any examinee. The right of inspection thus is the integral

r. part of right of verification and obligation to trace and
correct the errors as implied in Regulations 102 and 104.
Doctrine of implied power and obligation and right and
duties make up for the absence of positive provisions.

47. It is true that such right of inspection does not
• seem to have been recognised under any system of examina-
tion in India and its recognition is bound to unsettle the
age old practice followed and notions entertained. The
decision is bound to have effects ·on examination in several
other fields, apart from the one contemplated by the Board
or Universities. Consequences on administration also are
bound to be far-reachin.g, necessitating setting up some
additional machinery, and may prove to be time consuming
and expensive. We, however, find that such right of ins-
pection has now become indispensible for effectuating the
52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985) 1 S.C.R.

A underlying purpose of examination. None of these consi-
derations appear to us to be, therefore; relevent."

We consider that the above approach made by the High
Court is totally fallacious and is vitiated by its failure to follow the
B well-established doctrine of interpretation that the provisions cont-
. ained in a statutory enactment or in rules/regulations framed there- ...
under have to be so construed as to be in harmony with each other .
and. that where under a specific section or rule a particular subject
has received special. treatment, such special provision will exclude
the' applicability of any general provision which might otherwise
c cover the said topic. Regulation 102 (2), if properly construed in
the setting in which it occurs, only confers a suo molll power on the
Divisional Board to amend the result of the examination in respect
of any candidate or candidates on its being found that such result
has been affected by error, malpractice; fraud, improper conduct,
etc. The 'error' referred to in the said provision has, in the context,
D · to he understood as being limited to an error arising in consequence
of malpractice, fraud, improper conduct or other similar matter of
whatsoever nature. We are unable to understand this provision as
conferring any right on ait examinee to demand a disclosure, inspec-
tion or verification of his answer books · or other related documents.
E All scope for donbt or speculation in relation to this matter has, how-
ever, been eliminated by the provision contained in Regulation 104
which specifically deals with the subject ofverifieation of marks obtained
by a candidate. Clause (!) of the said regulation states that any
candidate who has ~ppeared at the H.S.C. examination may apply
to Divisional Secretary for verification of marks, particularly in any
F subject, but such verification will be restricted to check whether all
.. the answers have been examined and whether any mistake has been
committed in totalling of marks in !hot subject or in transferring
marks-·correctly on the !st cover page of the answer book as well as
whether the supplements attached to the answer books as mentioned
by , the candidates are in tact. Clause (3) of the said Regulation
G imposes the further limitation that no ' candidate shall claim or be
entitled to revaluation of his answer book or disclosure or inspection
of the answer book or further documents as these are to be treaied
'---'--- by the Divisional Boards as most confidential. It is obvious that
clauses (I) and (3) have to be read together and not in isolation
from each other as has apparently been done by the High Court.
H The right of verificiation conferred by clause (I) is subject to the
limitation'contained in the same clause that no revaluation of the
stATC EDN. DOAkD v. P.D. KUMARSIIETU (B. Eradi, J.) 53
answer books or supplements shall be done and the further restriction A
imposed b.' clau .e (3), prohibiting disclosure or inspection of the
0

answer bGoks. .:;:;: Hish Court seems to have construed the last
. poet ion of clause ,3) as implying that the confidentiality of the
answer book is to be declared by some order of the Divisional Board
and it has proceeded to hold that since no such order was brought to
.. · the notic~ of the Court there was no basis for treating the answer
books as confidential. In our opinion, this interpretation of the
B

conoluding word3 of clause {3) is incorrect. What is laid down
thorein is th1t the answer books and other documents are to be
treated by the Divisional Boards as most confidential. In other words
thi> clause of the regulation contains a mandate to the Divisional
Boards to treat the answer book and documents as confidential and
c
Jays down that no candiate shall be entiiled to claim. disclosure or
inspection of the said cofidential books and documents. We are
also of the opinion that the High Court was in error in invokmg the
'doctrine of implied power and obligation' for the purpose of holding
that because the right of verification has been conferred by clause D
(I) of Regulation 104, there is an implied power in the examinee•
to demand disclosure and inspection and a corresponding implied
obligation on the part of the Board to accede to such a demand.
There is no scope at all for invoking any such implied power or
imputing to the regulation-making authority an intention to confer
such power by implication when there 1s an express provision con· E
tained in the very same regulation clause (3) which clearly manifests
the contrary.intention and states in categorical terms that there shall
be no claim or entitlement for disocloure or inspection of the answer
books.

The legal position is now well-established that even a bye· F·
law cannot be struck down by the Court on the ground of unreason.
ableness m~rely because the Court thinks that it goes further than
"ii ncce~sary" · or that it does not incorporate certain provisi6ns
which, in the opinion of the court, would have been fair and whole-
some. The Court cannot say that a bye.law is unreasonable merely
because the judges do not approve of it. Unless it can be said that G.
a bye law is manifestly unjust, capricious, inequitable, or partial in its
operation, it cannot be invalidated by the Court on the· ground of.
unreasonableness. The responsible representative body entrusted
with the power to make by Jaws must ordinarily be presumed to know
what is necessary, reasonable, 1just and fair. In this connection we
m>y usefully extract the following off-quoted observations of Lord H.
'
54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] I s.c.k.

A Russell of Killowen in Kruse v. Jolznson,i''

"When the Court is called upon to consider the bye-
laws of public representative bodies clothed with the ample
authority which I have described, accompanied by the
checks and safeguards which I have mentio;1cd, I think the
B consideration of such bye· laws ought to be approached from
a different standpoint. They ought to be supported if
possible. They ought to be, as has been said, 'benevolently
interpreted' and credit ought to be given to those who have
to administer them that they· will be reasonable adminis-
tered.'1
c
"The learned Chief Justice said further that there may
be

'cases in which it would be the duty of the court
to condemn by-laws made under such authority
D as these were made (by a county council) as invalid be·
cause unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If
for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in
their operation as betweel\ different classes; if they we 1e
manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they invol-
ved such oppressive or gratuitous interfernce with the rights
E
of those subject to them as could find no justification in the
minds of reasonable men, the court might well say, 'Parlia-
ment never inte,1ded to give authority to make such rules;
they are unreasonable and ultra vires.' But it is in this and
·this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of reason-
F aleness c r unreasonableness can properly be regarded. A bye-
law is not umeasonable merely because particular judges
may think that it goes further than .is prudent or necessary
or convenient or because it is not accompanied by an excep-
tion which some judges may think ought to be there'."

G We may a)so• .. ref/d'w:ith' advantage to the well· known decision
of the ~Ri/~y 'Council in Slattery v. Naylor (2 ) where it has
been laid do\vn that when considering whether a bye-law is reason-
able or not, the Court would need a strong case to be made against
it and would decline to determine whether it would have been wiser

H (1) [1898] Z Q,B.
(Z) [1888] 1 l A.C. 446
STATE EON. BOA'RD p, P.H. KUMARSI·lEftt \n. i:,1uu•, ,,, 1

or more prudent to make the bye-law less absolute or will it hold the A
...• bvc·law to be unreas01;ablc because considerations which the court
;ould itself have regardod in framing such a bye-law have been
over looked or relected by its framers. The principles laid down as
aforesaid in Kruse v. Johnson and Stattery v. Naylor have been
cited with approval and applied by this Coun in Trustees of the Port
of Madras v. Aminchand Pyarelal & Ors., (1)
•
B

As already noticed, one of the principal factors which appears
to have weigh,·d 'with the High Court is that in certain stray instances
(specific instances referred to in the Judgment are only about three in
number), errors or ircegularities had gone unnoticed in the past even c
-- after verification of the concemed answer books had been conducted
according to the existing procedure and it was only after further
scruriny made either oa orders of court or in the wake of contentions
raised in petitions filed before a court that such errors or irregularities
were ultimately discovered. In this connction we consider it necessary
to recall the observations made by Krishna Iyer, Jin R. S. Joshi v. D
Ajit Mills that "a law has to be adjudged for its constitutionality
by the generality of cases it covers, not by the freaks and exceptions
it martyrs". It is seen from the affidavits that form part of the
recorcl of this case that the three Divisional Boands conduct the H.
s.C. examinations twice every year, i.e. in March and October
E
every year. The number of candidates who appeared for the H.S.C.
examination in March 1980 was 1, 15, 364. Likewise, the S.S.C.
P~blic examination is also conducted by the Divisional Boards twice
during the year, and the number of candidates appearing in the said
examination is very much larger than the number appearing in the
H.S.C examination. From the fisures furnished by the Board, it is
F
seen. that there is a progressive incraese from year to year in the
number of candidates appearing in both these public examinations.
In March 19i0, a total number of 2, 99, 267 had appeared in the S.S.
_C. examination. Considering the enormity of the task of evaluation
discharged by the Board through the examiners appointed by it, it is
really a matter for satisfaction that proved instances of crro;s and G
irregularities have been so few as to be counted on one's fingers.
Instead of viewing the matter from this correct perspective, we regret
to find tho fact that the High Court laid undue and exaggerated stress
on some stray instance and made it a basis for reaching the conclu-
sion that reasonable fair play to the candidates cau be assured only if
H
(J) (l 976) (!) SCR 721
56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] I s.c.R.

A the right of disclosure and personal inspection is allowed to the
candidates as part of the process of verification. This appro~ch does
not appeal to us as legally correct or soud. We do not find it pos;ible
• to uphold the view expressed by the High Court that clause (3) of
Regulation 104 which disentitles the examinees to claim disclosure
and inspection of the answer books and declares those docum:nts to
B be confidential is "defeasive of the corrective powers of the Board
under Regulations 102 and 104 and the right of verification under
Regulation 104 (!) as also destructive of the confidence of public in
the efficacy of the system." The reasons which prompted the High
Court to reach the afore-mentioned conclusion are to be found in the
following observations occurring in para 33 of the Judgment of
c
Deshpande, J :

"33. On the other hand, access of the student to the
answer books would enable him to verify (l) if the papers
are his own. and (2) supplementary answer papers are
D duly tagged, and (3) all answers are evaluated and (4) totals
are correct, and (5) marks of his practicals or internal
assesments· are included thGTein and (6) and his adverse
results arc not due to any error or manipulations. This will
at once not only make the verification process under
Regulation 104 (I) effective and real, but facilitate Board's
E exercising its powers to trace errors and malpractices and
amend the result preventing frustration of the ,tudents. The
purpose of the Act can be served thus better by permitting
inspection than by preventing it. In other words, the
confidentiality, rather than serve any purpose of the Act
goes to defeat it firstly by making the functioning of the
F system dependent entirely on the staff, and, secondly
by making process under Regulations 102 (3), (4) and (104)
( l) ineffective for want of assistance of the examinee him-
self."

In making the above observations, the High Court ;has
G ignored the cardinal principle that it is not within t,he legitimate
domain of the Court to determine whether the purpose of a statute
an be served better by adopting any policy different from what has
~een laid down by the legislature or its delegate and to strike down
as unreasonable, a bye-law (assuming for the purpose of d1scuss1on
H that the impugned regulation is a bye-law) merely on the ground
that the policy enuciated !heroin does not meet with the approval of
StAtE EDN. BOARD v. 1>.B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 57

the court in regard to its efficaciousness for implementation of the A
object and purposes of the Act.

In the light of foregoing discussion, we hold that the
conclusion recorded by the Court that clause (3) of Regulation 104
is liable to be struck down on the ground of unreasonableness is
totally incorrect and unsustainable. B

That takes us to the question concerning the validity of the
provision contained in clauses (I) and (3) of Regulation 104, which
provides that no revaluation of the answer books or supplemer.ts
shall be done and that no candidate shall claim or be entitled to
claim a revaluation of his answer books. This aspect has been c
dealt with in the separate judgment of the Division Bench delivered
by Mohta, J. On perusal of the judgment, it will be seen that the
entire reasoning therein is based on the conclusion. recorded in the
judgment of Deshpande, J delivered in the first group of cases, that
the provision contained in clauses (I) and (3) of Regulation 104
prohibiting the disclosure and inspection of answer books is liable D
•
to be struck down on the ground of unreasonableness as well as on
the ground of its being ultra vires the scope of the rule making
power conferred by Section 36 (I) of the Act. Making this as the
starting point of his reasoning, Mohta, J has proceeded to observe
that the "logical end of permitting inspection and disclosure of
answer books and other documents is to permit revaluation" and E
that "no useful purpose will be served by having inspection and
disclosure in case further right of revaluation is denied". Based on
such an approach, the learned Judge has proceeded to state that
there was "no justification whatsoever to restrict the obligation of
cozrecting of mistake only to verification and exclude revaluation
F
from the operation of Regulation I 02." Accordingly, it was held
that clau•es (I) and (3) of Regulation 104 insofar as they prohibit
revaluation, are also voidon the ground of unreasonableness.

As already noticed, the other learned Judge (Deshpande, J)
has written a separate short judgment in this group of cases expres- G
sing his doubts and reservations concerning the correctness of the
conclusion reached by his colleague but he has finally wound up
his judgment stating that even though we was diffident of spelling out
a right of revaluation from any of the provisions contained in the
regulations he would prefer to agree with the judgment prepared by
Mohta, J "rather than allow my views to prevail and dissent". H
Having regard to the substantial nature and general importance of
$$ StiPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 1 s.c.R

A tho question and the repercussions that would inevitably be produced
by the recognition of the right to demand revaluation in public
examinations of every kind conducted by Universities, School Edu-
cation Boards and even bodies like the Union and State Public
Service Commission, it would have been much more appropriate if
B the learned Judge (Deshpande. J) had independently discussed the
question in all its aspects in accordance with his own light or referred
the matter to a larger Bench or to a third Judge a> the case may be
if he felt that the view propounded in the judgment prepared by
his colleague was of doubtful correctness. However that may be,
we have already held that the reasons stated by the Division Bench
c in its Judgment in the first group of cases for holding that clause
(3) of Regulation 104 insofar as it prohibits disclosure and inspec-
tion of answer books and treating them as confidential documents
is ultra vires on the ground of its being in excess of the regulation-
m aking power of the Board and is also void on the ground of
nnrensonableness are all incorrect and unsustainable. The validity
D of the prohibition against disclosure and inspection having been thus
upheld by us, the entirety of the reasoning contained in the judgment
of Mehta. J in support of his conclusion invalidating prohibition
again5t revaluation contained in clauses (I) and (3) of Regulation •
losos its foundation. The view expressed by the learned Judge that
E Regulation 102 (2) which confers on the Board a su1 moto power of
amending the results where it is found that such a result has been
affected by any error, malpractice, fraud, improper conduct, etc.,
will be rendered nugatory and ineffective by the prohibition on
revaluation is fallacious and unsound. While discussing the scope
of the said regulation, we have pointed out that its purpose and
F effect is only to confer a suo moto power on the Board to correct
errors in cases where irregularities like malpractices, misconduct,
fraud, etc. are found out and it does not confer any right on the
examinees to de1nand any correction of the r~sults. In the scheme
of the regulations after the publication of the results, the only right
which the examinees have in relation to this matter is to ask for a
G verification of the results under clause (I) of Regulation 104 and
the scope of such verification is subject to the limitations imposed in
the said clause as well as in clause (3) of the very same regulation.

We are unable to agree with the further reason stated by the
High Court that since "every student has a right to receive fair play
H
in examination and get appropriate marks matching his performance"
it will be a denial of the right to such fair play if there is to be a
STATE EDN. BOARD v. P.B. KUMA~SHHTH (B. Eradi, J.) 59

prohibition on the right to demand revaluation and unless a right to A
revaluation is recognised and permitted tl:ere is an infringement of
rules of fair play. What constitute> fair play depends upon the
facts and circumstances relating to each particular given situation. lf
it is found that every possible precaution has been taken and a\l
necessary safeguards provided to ensure that the answer books
inclusive of supplements are kept in safe custody so as to eliminate B
the danger of their being tampered with and that the evaluation is
done by the examiners applying uniform standards with checks and
crosschecks at different stages and that measures for detection of
malpractice, etc. have also been effectively adopted, in such cases
r it will not be correct on the part of the Courts to strike down the
provision prohibiting revaluation on the ground that it violates the c
rules of fair play. It is unfortunate that the High Court has not
set out in detail in either of its two judgments the elaborate procedure
laid down and followed by the Board and the Divisional Boards
relating to the conduct of the examinations, the evaluation of the
answer books and the compilation and announcement of the results.
D
From the affidavit filed on behalf of the Board in the High Court,
it is seen that from the initial stage of the issuance of the hall tickets
to the intending candidates right upto the announcement of the
results, a well-organised system of verification, checks and counter-
checks has been evolved by the Board and every step has been taken
to eliminate the possibility of human error on the part of the exam-
E
iners and malpractices on the part of examinees as well as the
examiners in an effective fashion. The examination centres of the
Board are spread all over the length and breadth of each Division
and arrangements are made for vigilant supervision under the
overall supervision of a Deputy Chief Conductor. in charge of every
sub-centre and at the conclusion of the time set for examination in F
each paper including the main answer book all the answer books
and the supplements have to be tied up by the candidate securely
and returned to the Supervisor. But before they are returned to the
Supe,rvisor, each candidate has to write out the title page of main
answer books in the cages provided for the said particulars, the
number of supplements attached to the main answer book. Tho G
Supervisor is enjoined to verify whether the number so written
tallies with the actual number of supplements, handed over by the
candidate together with his main answer book. After th~ return of
a\l the answer books to the Deputy Chief Conductor, a tally is
taken of the answer ooks including supplements used by the candi-
H
dates by the Stationery Supervisor who is posted by the Board at
60 SUPREME COURT REi'ORts [J985j l s.c R.
A each ~ub-centre. This enables the supervisory staff at a sub-centre
to venfy and ensure that all answer books and supplements issued
to the candidates . have been turned in and received by the super-
visory staff. At this stage of checking and double-checking, if any
seat number has been duplicated on the answer books by mistake
or by way of deliberate malpractice it ·;an be easily detected and
B corrective measures taken by the Deputy Chief Conductor or the
Chief Conductor. The answer books are then sent by the Deputy
Chief Conductor to the Chief Conductor in charge of the main
centre. He sorts out the answer books according to the instructions
issued by the Board and sends them to the examiners whose names
c had been furnished in advance except in the case of the science , ··1.
subjects, Illmely, "mathematics and statistics, physics, chemistry
and biology''. The answer books in the science subjects are· for·
warded by the Chief Conductor under proper guard to camps in
Pune already notified to the Chief Conductors. The further proce-
dure followed in relation to the valuation of the answer books has
D been explaimd in paragraphs 22 to 26 of the counter affidavit dated
10th July 1980 ftled in the High Court by the Joint Secretary to the •
Pune Divisional Board of Secondary Education. We do not consider
it necessary to burden this judgment with a recapitulation of all the
details furnished in those paragraphs, and it would suffice to state
that the procedure evolved by the Board for ensuring fairness and
E accuracy in evaluation of the answer books has made the system as
fool·proof as can be possible and it meets with our entire satisfaction
and approval. Viewed against this background, we do not find it
possible to agree with th' views expressed by the High Court that

F
the denial of the right to demand a revaluation constitutes a denial
of fair play and is unreasohable. The Board is a very responsible
body. The candidates have taken the examination with full aware-
-
ness of the provisions contained in the Regulations and in the
declaration made in the form of application for admission to the
examination they have solemnly stated that they fully agree to abide
by the regulations issued by the Board. In the circumstances, when
we find that all safeguards against errors and malpractiees have
G been provided for, there cannot be said to be any denial of fair play
to the examinees by reason of the prohibition against asking for
revaluation. -
•

The High Court has relied upon the fact that the University of
H Bombay and some other Universities have recently made provisions
permitting candidates to demand revaluation. In our opinion, this
STATE EON. BOARD v. P. B. KUMARSHETH (B. Eradi, J.) 61

has· little relevance for the purpose of deciding about the legal A
validity of the impugned regulations framed by the Board. We do
not know under what drcunistances, the University of Bombay has
decided to recognise a right in tbe examinees to demand a revalua-
tion. As far as the Board is concerned it has set out in the counter
affidavit the enormity of the task with which it is already faced,
namely, of completing twice during each year the process of evalua- B
• ti on and release of results of some 3 lakhs of candidates appearing
for the S.S.C. and H.S.C. examinations to be held In an interval of
only a few months from one another. If the car.didates are at all to
be given inspection of their answer books or the revaluation of the
answer papers is to be done in the presence of the candidates, the
process is bound to be extremely time consuming and if such a c
request is made by even about ten percept of the candidates who
will be 30.000 in number, it would involve several thousands of man .
hours and is bound to throw the entire system out 0f gear. Further,
, it is in the public interest that the results of Public examinations
when published should have some finality attached to them. If
inspection, verification in the presence of the candidates and revalua- D
tion are to be allowed as of right, it may lead to gross and indefinite
uncertainty, particularly in regard to the relative ranking, etc. of the
candidates, besides leading to utter confusion on account of the
enormity of the labour and time involved in the process.
E
As pointed out by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
- Fatehchand Himmatlal and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, etc. "the
test of reasonableness is not applied in vacuum but in the contest of
life's realities", 1977 (2) SCR 828. If the principle laid down by the
High Court is to be regarded as correct, its applicability cannot be
restricted to examinations conducted by School Educational Boards F
alone but would extend even to all competitive examinations
conducted by the Union and State Public Service Commissions. The
resultant legal position emerging fron1 the High Court Judgn1ent
is that every candidate who has appeared for any such examination
and who is dissatisfied with his results would, as an inherent part
of his right to 'fair play' be entitled to demand a disclosure and G
personal inspection of his answer scripts and would have a further
right to ask for revaluation of his answer papers. The inevitable
consequence would be that there will be no certainty at all regarding
the results of the competitive examination for an indefinite period of
time until all such requests have been compiled with and the results
of the verificatio11 and revaluation have been broul;!ht into account, H
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 1 S.C.R.
A Far from advancing public interest and fair play to the other
candidates in general, any such interpretation of the legal position
wo.uld be wholly defe.sive of the same. As h•Ls bec.1 repeatedly
pomted out by this court, the Court should be extremely reluctant to
substitute its own views as to what is wise, prudent and proper in
relation to academic matters in preference to those formulated by
B professional men possessing technical expertise and rich experience
of actnal day-to-day working of educational institutions and the
depa1tments con trolling them. It will b' wholly wrong for the court '
to make a'pedantic and purely idealistic approach to the problems
of this nature, isolated from the actual realities and grass root prob- ,
c !ems involved in the working of the system and unmindful of the
consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as
opposed to a pr•gmatic one were to be propounded. It is equally
important that the Court sh.1uld also, as far as possible, avoid any
decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law
which would bring about the result of rendering the system unwork-.
D able in practice. It is unfortunate. that this principle has not been
adequately kept in mind by the High Court while deciding the
instant case.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the High
Court was in error in striking down clauses (I) and (3) of Regulation
E 104 as illegal, unreasonable and void. We uphold the validity of
these provisions.
In the result, both the Judgments of the High Court are set
aside and the two groups of Writ Petitions which were allowed
under those judgments will now stand dismissed. These appeals are
F accordingly allowed. The appellant will get its costs from the.
respondents.
Appeals allowed. ,
S.R.