Holding

The amendment is prospective, the appellant’s acceptance created an agreement forfeiting his right to a tribunal, and the Board of Revenue’s refund order cannot be set aside as it would revive an illegal compensation award.

Summary

Maharaja Chintamani Saran Nath Sahdeo, a proprietor of mines and minerals, received compensation under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 calculated at three times his net annual income and later accepted an additional payment calculated at ten times the income. The Member, Board of Revenue later reopened the case and ordered a refund of the excess amount, claiming the amendment of 1974 made the compensation rate limited to three times. The Supreme Court held that the amendment was prospective, that the appellant’s acceptance of the earlier compensation created an implied agreement under Section 25(4)(a) thereby forfeiting his right to refer the matter to a tribunal, and that although the Board of Revenue lacked jurisdiction to issue the refund order, setting it aside would revive an illegal compensation award. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The jurisdiction of the Member, Board of Revenue to order refund of excess compensation
Whether the 1974 amendment to the Bihar Land Reforms Act is retrospective or prospective
Whether the appellant’s acceptance of compensation amounts to an agreement under Section 25(4)(a) and bars referral to a tribunal under Section 25(4)(b)
Whether compensation assessment can be revised after payment under Sections 30 and 30‑A of the Act

Legislation cited

Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950s. 24, s. 25, s. 27, s. 30, s. 30-A
Public Demand Recovery Act

Subjects

CompensationBihar Land Reforms ActRetrospective legislationJurisdictionBoard of RevenueImplied agreementTribunalSection 30Section 30-AProspective amendment

Judgment

A MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SAHDEO
v.
STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

OCTOBER 7, 1999

B [M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]

Bihar Land Refomzs Act, 1950 : Sections 24, 25 and 32-Appellant
received compensation at 3 times the net annual income-Appellant claimed
compensation at 15 times-Agreed on 10 times of the net annual in-
0 come-Received additional compensation by order of Compensation Of-
ficer-Member, Board of Revenue reopened the case and directed for refund
of the additional compensation-Notice for refund issued-Appellant's chal-
lenge to refund notice dismissed by the High Court-On appeal, Held : Ap-
pellant having accepted compensation at 3 times amounted to an agreement
D between the appellant and the State-Appellant forfeited his right to ask for
referring the matter to Tribunal under Section 25(4)(b}-Compensation Of-
ficer could not have revised the final assessment roll when payment was
received without any objection-Unamended Section 25 was applicable to the
present case which allowed compensation at three times the net annual in-
E come-Member, Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to reopen the
case-However, the order of the Member, Board of Revenue not quashed as
it would revive the illegal order of awarding compensation at 10 times.

The appellant was a proprietor in interest in· an estate including
the subsisting lease of mines and minerals vested in the State of Bihar
F within the meaning of Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. As a consequence
of the proceeding for payment of compensation under the Act, a payment
for a sum of Rs. 4,29,527.50 was made to the appellant under Section 32
of the Act. Later, after a year, the said assessment roll was revised and
the compensation was assessed as Rs. 46,66,014.76 calculated at three
times of net annual income (including the earlier payment) was also
G received by the appellant. Dissatisfied with the compensation, the appel-
lant claimed compensation at 15 times of the net annual income. After a
settlement with the respondent No. 4 i.e., the Additional Collector, the
appellant agreed to receive compensation at ten times of net annual
income. Accordingly, an additional compensation of Rs. 25,87 300 was
H paid to the appellant. In 1982, the respondent No. 2 i.e., Memb~r, Board
518
MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE 519

of Revenue reopened the compensation case of the appellant suo moto A
and held the compensation so computed to be contrary to Section 25(4)
of the Act as the said section prescribed compensation only at three times
the net income. It also directed respondent No. 3 to refund the excess
amount of Rs. 25,87,300. Accordingly notice was issued followed by a
certificate case on which the appellant approached the High Court. The
High Court held that in view of the appellant's accepting compensation
B
at three times without protest, the case could not have been reopened as
there was an implied agreement between the parties in terms of Section
25 (4)(a) of the Act. According to the High Court, unamended provisions
of Section 25 of the Act were applicable to the present case and application
of amended Section 25 providing for compensation at ten times was C
without any justification. The High Court also held that setting aside of
the order of the Member, Board of Revenue on the ground of its being
I without jurisdiction will result in restoring an illegal order. Hence the
'
(
present appeal.

The appellant contended that the Act did not empower the Member,
D
Board of Revenue to exercise any power and therefore, the order of
Member, Board of Revenue directing the subordinate authority to take
action for recovery of the additional compensation which was paid at ten

-
times was illegal.
' E
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The first assessment roll dated 12.5.1978 was revised and
a fresh roll was prepared on 3.9.1979 as it was found that some rights of the
appellant were excluded. The final assessment roll in form 'G' dated F
3.11.1979 which included three times net income from mines and minerals
under Section 25 was accepted by the appellant and by letter dated
19.11.1979, Additional Collector was informed that no objection would be
filed against from 'G'. An affidavit was also filed by the appellant stating
that any excess amount paid to him would be recoverable if and when
directed by Public Demand Recovery Act from the appellant. Thus it is clear G
that the appellant had accepted the amount without any protest and, there-
fore, the High Court rightly held that it was an agreement between the
appellant and the State as per clause (a) of sub-section (4) of Section 25 of
the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950. Under the sub-section in absence of an
agre!!ment the question of referring the dispute to Tribunal would arise. As H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A in the present appeal there was a clear agreement between the parties and
the appellant forfeited his right for asking the matter to be referred under
Section 25(4)(b) to Tribunal for arbitration and question of granting com·
pensation at more than ten times could not arise. [532-C; D; E; Fl

1.2. Before amendment under Section 25 computation of compensa·
B tion payable for mines and minerals could be fixed by agreement under
Section 25(4)(a) of the Act failing which it was to be referred under Section
25(4)(b) to the Tribunal and the Tribunal could award compensation at the
rate not less than three and not more than twenty times of the net income
from royalties as may appear to the Tribunal to be fair and equitable. In
C view of the amendment of sub-section (4) to Section 25 of the Act, Com pen·
sation Officer had to determine the amount of such compensation in ac·
cordance with the rates prescribed under Section 24(1)(1). The maximum
limit for such compensation as provided under Section 24(1)(1) was three
times of net income. [529-A; BJ

D 1.3. In sub-section (2) of Section 1 the Legislature clearly stated that
the Act would come into force at once i.e., from the date of publication in the
Gazette. Neither in Section 6 or any other Section of the amending Act it was
mentioned that the Act would have retrospective effect. If it is held that the
Act would have retrospective effect it would go against the intention of the
E legislature. Thus the rate of compensation shall have to be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the Act which was in force at the time
-
compensation was payable i.e., the un-amended sub-section (4) of Section
25. Moreover, the amending Act affects the substantive right of the appel·
lant, therefore, it would have prospective operation. There is also no express
or implied provision in the amending Act to indicate that the Act will have
F retrospective effect. [531-C; EJ

Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhary, [1957] SCR 488;
Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., [1994] 4 SCC
602 and Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy& Ors., (1997] 4 SCC 647,reliedon.
G
Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation 2nd Edition p. 214, referred
to.

1.4. If the order of the Member, Board of Revenue is set aside, result
would be that the notice directing the appellant to refund the additional
H amount of compensation assessed at ten times of net income would have to
MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE 521

be quashed. In other words, the earlier re-assessment of compensation made A
by giving ten times of net income would revive. If under the law the appellant
is not entitled to get compensation more than three times of the net income
it would amount to restoring an illegal order. [523-G; HJ

Gadde Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,
[1996] 2 SCR 172 and Mohammad Swalleh & Ors. v. II/rd Addi. District B
Judge, Meemt & Anr., [1988] 1 SCR 841, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5451 of
1995.

From the Judgmeµt and Order dated 5/9.5.90 of the Patna High C
Court in L.P.A. No. 133 of 1989.

S.B. Sanyal, Rudreshwar Singh and R.P. Wadhwani for the Appel-
lant.

H.L. Agrawal, Rajesh (for B.B. Singh) for the Respondents. D

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

I PHUKAN, J. This is an appeal against the judgment and order dated
] 9.5.90 passed by the Division Bench of Patna High Court, Ranchi Bench
in L.P.A. No. 133 of 1989 (R). By impugned judgment the Division Bench
E
in the appeal refused to interfere with the judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge dated 13.9.87 passed in Civil Writ No. 540/83 (R.).

The admitted facts are as follows :
F
The appellant herein was the proprietor within the meaning of Bihar
Land Reforms Act, ~950 (for short the Act) in the interest in the estate
including the subsisting lease of mines and minerals vested in the State of
Bihar under the Act. A proceeding for payment of compensation was
initiated under Chapter-V of the Act in the compensation Case No. l/r/8
of 1951. The assessment roll dated 12.5.1978 was published under Section G
28 of the Act for a sum of Rs. 4,29,527.50 paise. Payment was made under
Section 32 of the Act to the appellant in the form of bond which was
accepted.

The assessment roll was revised and a fresh roll was prepared on H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 3.11.1979 and compensation was assessed as Rs. 46,66,014.76 paise calcu-
lated at three times of net annual income. This amount also included the •
<
earlier amount of Rs. 4,29,527.50 paid and received by the appellant in the
form of bond.

The appellant made a grievance to the Government regarding the
B compensation assessed and claimed at 15 times the net income but there-
after Additional Collector, respondent No. 4 who was the Compensation
Office, asked the appellant to file an affidavit if he was ready and willing
to accept compensation for mines and minerals at ten times of net annual
income which was duly agreed to by the appellant on 6.8.1982. Accordingly,
C a fresh compensation assessment roll was prepared and additional com-
pensation of Rs. 25,87,300 was paid to the appellant through his agent.

The Member Board of Revenue-respondent No. 2 in March, 1982
took suo moto action, reopened the compensation case of the appellant
and held that compensation so computed was contrary to Section 25( 4) of
D the Act which prescribed only three times the net income and directed the
Deputy Commissioner-respondent No. 3 to issue notice to the appellant
for refund of the excess amount of Rs. 25,87,300. Accordingly the notice
was issued followed by a certificate case and being aggrieved the appellant
approached the High Court.
E
The appellant took a plea that the Member Board of Revenue was
not authorised under the Act to pass impugned order and if the authority
was of the opinion that any excess amount was paid, an appeal under
Section 27 of the Act could have been filed.
F
Before the High Court respondent pleaded that under Section 25 of
the compensation on account of mines and minerals was paid and
determined at three times of the amount of net income and, therefore,
determination at ten times was under the Amending Act, 1974, wholly
without jurisdiCtion. It is further pleaded that the appellant received the
G compensation as earlier determined without any protest and, therefore,
excess amount was liable to be refunded. According to the respondents the
Member Board of Revenue had power of superintendence, direction and
control and, therefore, the order was legally and validly passed.

H It may be stated that the Act was amended including Section 25 by
MAHARAJACHINTAMANISARAN NATHSAHDEOv. STATE[PHUKAN,J.] 523

Bihar Land Reforms (Validation and Amendment) Act, 1974 (The Bihar A
Act No. 15 of 1974) (for short the amending Act). A question arose before
the High Court as to whether the amending Act would have retrospective
effect. The High Court decided that un-amended provisions of Section 25
of the Act would apply to the present case. The High Court was of the
view that the appellant having accepted compensation without protest in
the year 1970 vide form 'G' the matter could not have been re-opened as
B
there was implied agreement between the parties in terms of Section
25(4)(a) of the Act. It was also held that under Section 30(A) no fresh
compensation assessment roll could have been prepared as no further
interests had vested in the Government. Regarding orders of the Member
Board of Revenue, the High Court held that if the order is set aside on c
the ground that it was without jurisdiction it will result in restoring an
illegal order, therefore, refused to interfere in the matter.

We have heard Shri S.B. Sanyal, learned Senior counsel for the
appellant and Shri H.L. Agrawal, learned Senior counsel for the respon-
dents. D
The first point urged on behalf of the appellant was that the Act did
not empower the Member of Board of Revenue to exercise any p~wer and,
therefore, the order of the Member of Board of Revenue directing the
subordinate authority to take action for recovery of the additional compen- E
· sation which was paid @ ten times was illegal. The learned counsel for the
respondent urged that under Bihar Practice and Procedural Manual, Mem-
ber of Board of Revenue had power of Superintendence, direction and
control in such matters.
F
But in the Act, authorities and their powers have been specified and
we do not find any provision which vests power on the Board of Revenue,
so we have to proceed on the assumption that the Board of Revenue has
no power.

Therefore, the question is whether the order of the Member of Board G
. of Revenue should be quashed on this ground. If the order is set aside,
result would be that the notice directing the appellant to refund the
additional amount of compensation assessed at ten times of net income
would have to be quashed. In other words, the earlier re-assessment of
compensation made by giving ten times of net income would revive. If H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A under the law the appellant is not entitled to get compensation more than
three times of the net income it would amount to restoring an illegal order.

In Gadde Venkateswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and
Others, AIR (1966) SC 828 = (1966) 2 SCR 172 this Court considered the
action of the State Government under Andhra Pradesh Panchayats
B Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959 and came to the conclusion that the
Government had no power under Section 72 of the Act to review an order
made under Section 62 of the Act but refused to interfere with the orders
of the High Court on the ground that if High Court had quashed the said
order, it would have restored an illegal order and, therefore, the High
c Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdictional power.

In Mohammad Swalleh and Others v. /llrd Addi. District Judge,
Meerut and Another, AIR (1988) SC 94 = [1988) 1 SCR 841, similar view
was also expressed by this Court. In that case the order passed by the
D Prescribed Authority under U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Evic-
tion Act, 1947 was set aside by the District Judge in appeal though the
appeal did not lie. The High Court came to the finding that the order of
the Prescribed Authority was invalid and improper but the District Judge
had no power to sit in appeal. The High Court did not interfere with the
E Orders of the District Judge. The order of the High Court was affirmed
by this Court on the ground that though technically the appellant had a
point regarding the jurisdiction of the District Judge but the order of the
Prescribed Authority itself being bad, refusal of the High Court to exercise
powers under Article 226 no exception can be taken.

F Therefore, in view of the above ratio laid down by this Court, ..ye hold
that even if the Member of Board of Revenue had no power to issue
direction for giving notice for refund of the excess amount paid, no
exception can be taken to the said order if it is found that legally the
appellant was paid excess compensation under the Act.

G Therefore, the question is whether under the provisions of the Act
the appellant is entitled to get compensation @ of three times or ten times
of the net income.

We extract below the relevant portion of Sections 24, 25, 30 and
H 30(A) of the Act before amendment of 1974 and also sub-Section (2) of
MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.] 525

Section 1 and Section 6 of the amending Act, 1974 : A
"24 - Rates of compensation. After the net income has been
computed under Section 23, the Compensation Officer shall for
the purpose of preparing the Compensation Assessment-roll
proceed or determine the amount of compensation to be payable
in respect of the transference to the State of the interests of each B
(intermediary) as follows :

( 1) in the case of a proprietor or tenure-holder of a permanent
or resumable tenure, the compensation payable shall be
determined In accordance with the following table, namely : c
Amount of net Rate of compensation
income. payable.

(a) where the net Twenty times
income so computed such net income D
does not exceed
Rs. 500.

E
(1) Where the net Three times such net
income so computed income but in any
exceeds Rs. 1,00,000. case not less than
the maximum amount
under item (k) above.
F
To the amount thus determined shall be added :

(* *) the amount of compensation payable to a proprietor or
tenure-holder in respect of mines and minerals as determined
under Section 25.''
G
"25 - Computation of compensation payable for mines and minerals'.
(1) The Compensation Officer shall prepare in the prescribed form
and in the prescribed manner Compensation Assessment-roll con-
taining in respect of every (intermediary) in receipt of royalties on
account of mines and minerals o~ directly working mines comprised H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A in the estate or tenure :
(a) his gross income and net income from such royalties;

·····································································
·····································································
B
(4) After the net income from royalties has been computed under
sub-sections (2) and (3), the Compensation Officer shall
proceed to determine the amount of compensation to be
payable to the (intermediary) in the manner and in accord-
ance with the principles hereinafter set out, that is to say :
c
(a) where the amount of compensation can fixed by agreement, it
shall be determined in accordance with such agreement;

(b) where no such agreement is reached within the prescribed
period, the Compensation Officer shall refer the question of
D
the determination of the amount of compensation to a tribunal
to be appointed by the State Government in this behalf;

(c) for the purpose aforesaid, the Tribunal to be appointed by
the State Government shall consist of a District Judge;
E
(d) the State Government shall nominate a Mining Expert to
assist the Tribunal;

(e) at the commencement of the proceeding before the Tribunal,
the State Government and the (intermediary) shall state what
F in their respective opinion is a fair amount of compensation;

(f) the Tribunal in giving its award shall have regard to the
provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) and to the opinion of
the Mining Expert, with regard to the extent of the mining
operations carried on and of the minerals obtained, and
G
/1 determine the amount of compe_nsation to be payable to the
(intermediary) at such rate which shall be not less than three
and not more than twenty times of the net income from
royalties as may appear to the tribunal to be fair and equitable;

H (g) every award made by the Tribunal under this sub- section
MAHARAJA CHINTAMANl SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.] 527

shall be (final) and shall be communicated to the Compen- A
sation Officer who made the reference and thereupon he shall
proceed to complete the Compensation Assessment-roll
accordingly."

"30 - Comction by Compensation Officer and bona fide mistakes.
B
(1) A Compensation Officer may, on application, or of his own
motion, at any time before payment of compensation in ac-
cordance with a Compensation Assessment-roll under Sec-
tion 32, correct any entry fo the Compensation
Assessment -roll as finally published in respect of any (inter- C
mediary) to whom such Compensation Assessment-roll re-
lates or any entry in such Compensation Assessment-roll
which he is satisfied has .been made owning to a bona fide
mistake or is necessary as a result of succession to or transfer
of the interest of (an intermediary) or any other person whose
name appears in such roll as a person entitled to compensa- D
tion:

Provided that no such correction shall be made if an appeal
affecting such entry has been presented under Section 27.

(2) No correction of any entry in the Compensation Assessment- E
roll as finally published in respect of any (intermediary) to
whom such Compensation Assessment-roll relates shall be
made under sub-section (1) unless the Compensation Officer
has first published a draft of such correction and sent by
registered post, with acknowledgment due, a copy of such F
draft to the (intermediary) to whom such correction relates
and has finally published such correction after considering
and disposing of any objections which may have been made
to any such correction in the manner provided in the last four
preceding sections."
G
"30-A - Fresh preparation of Compensation Assessment-roll
where new interest are discovered. Where the Compensation
Assessment -roll of an intermediary in respect of his interest
which have vested in the State has been prepared and finally
published under the provisions of the Act, and where sub- H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A sequent to the final publication of such Compensation As-
sessment roll it is discovered that further interest of such
intermediary have vested in the State, then, notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, the Compensation Officer
shall prepare a fresh Compensation Assessment-roll under
Section 19 or Section 25, after taking into consideration the
B total interest of such intermediary including the interests
subsequently discovered in the manner provided in the last
five preceding sections :

Provided that the amount of the compensation in the fresh
c Compensation Assessment-roll shall be reduced by the
amount of any compensation which may have been paid to
the intermediary before the preparation of such assessment-
roll :

Provided further that in case the amount of compensation
D which has been paid to the intermediary before the prepara-
tion of the fresh Compensation Assessment-roll exceeds the
amount of compensation to which such intermediary would
be entitled under the fresh Compensation Assessment-roll the
excess amount shall be recoverable from the intermediary as
E public demand."

We shall next refer the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 1 and
Section 6 of the Amending Act, 1974.

"l - ........... .
F
(2) - It shall come into force at once."

"6 - Amendment of Section 25 of the Bihar Act No. 30 of 1950 :
In place of the sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the above Act
following sub-se;;tion shall be substituted :
G
(4) After the net income from royalties has been computed
under sub-sections (2) and (3), the Compensation Officer .
shall proceed to determine the amount of compensation to be
payable to the intermediary in accordance with the rates
H prescribed under sub-section (1) of Section 24."
MAHARAJA CHI NT AMAN! SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.] 529

Before amendment under Section 25 computation of compensation A
payable for mines and minerals could -be fixed by agreement under Section
· 25(4)(a) failing which it was to be referred under Section 25(4)(b) to the
Tribunal and the Tribunal could award compensation at the rate not less
than three and not more than twenty times of net income from royalties as
may appear to the Tribunal to be fair and equitable. In view of the
amendment of sub-section (4) to Section 25 of the Act, Compensation
B
Officer had to determine the amount of such compensation in accordance
with the rates prescribed under section 24(1)(1). The maximum limit for
such compensation as provided under Section 24(1)(1) was three times of
net income.
c
·- Whether the maximum limit of rate of compensation would be twenty
times under Section 25(4)(b) by the Tribunal or three times of net income
from royalties under Section 6 of the Amending Act of 1974 would depend
on interpretation, whether the amending Act of 1974 has got retrospective
effect.
D
Mr. Sanyal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged
that in view of rule of interpretation as settled by this Court in catena
decisions the only view that could be taken is that the amending Act would
apply prospectively. The learned counsel has further urged that if it is held
to be retrospective, the vested right of the appellant would be taken away E
which is not permissible under law.

In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and in the alter-
native Mr. Agrawal, the learned counsel for the respondent has urged that
the amending Act being substituted legislation would have retrospective
effect. F

In Garikapatti Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhury, [1957] SCR 488,
.
Chief Justice S.R. Das speaking for the Court observed as follows :

"The golden rule of construction is that, in the absence of anything G
in the enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation,
it cannot be so construed as to have the effect of altering the law
applicable to a claim in litigation at the time when the Act was
passed."

We may also refer to Francis Bennion's Statutory Interpretation, 2nd H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
, A Edn., at p. 214 wherein the learned author commented as follows :
"The essential idea of a legal system is that current law should •
govern current activities. Elsewhere in this work a particular Act
is likened to a floodlight switched on or off, and the general body
of law to the circumambient air. Clumsy though these images are,
B
they show the inappropriateness of retrospective laws. If we do
something today, we feel that the law applying to it should be the
law in force today, not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Such,
we believe, is the nature of law. Dislike of ex post facto law is
enshrined in the United States Constitution and in the Constitu-
c tions of many American States, which forbid it. The true principle
is that Lex prospicit non respicit (law looks forward not back). As
Willes, J. said, retrospective legislation is 'contrary to the general
-
principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to
be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with
D future acts, and ought not to change the character of past trans-
actions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law."

This Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Others v. State of
Maharashtra and Others, [1994] 4 SCC 602 has culled out the principles
E with regard to the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its
retrospective operation as follows :

(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be
prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either
F expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which
merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is tex-
tually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its ap-
plication, should not be given an extended meaning and
should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.

G (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature,
whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal
even though remedial is substantive in nature.

(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such
H right exists in procedural law.
MAHARAJA CHINTAMANI SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE [PHUKAN, J.] 531
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied A
retrospectively where the result would be to create new dis-
abilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of
transactions already accomplished.

(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also
creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be a
prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either
expressly or· by necessary implication."

We are unable to accept the contention of the respondent-State that
Section 6 of the Amending Act of 1974 is retrospective. In sub-section (2) c
- of Section 1 the legislature clearly stated that Act would come into force
at once i.e., from the date of publication in the Gazette. Neither in Section
6 or any other section of the amending Act it was mentioned that the Act
would have retrospective effect. If we hold that the Act would have
retrospective effect it would go against the intention of the legislation.
D
Applying the Golden Rule of construction as stated by this Court in
Garikapatti Veeraya (Supra) in the amending Act there was nothing to show
that the Act would have retrospective effect. As "the essential idea of a
legal system is. that current law should govern current activities''. We hold
that rate of compensation shall have to be determined in accordance with E
the provisions of the Act which was in force at the time compensation was
payable i.e., un-amended sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act would
apply. Moreover, the amending Act affects the substantive right of the
appellant, therefore, it would have prospective operation. There is also no
express or implied provisions in the amending Act to indicate that the Act
will have retrospective effect. We, therefore, hold that the amending Act F
would apply prospectively.

The High Court rightly proceeded on the basis that un-amended
Section 25 of the Act would apply to the facts of the present appeal and,
therefore, we agree with the finding of the High Court.
G
The contention of the learned counsel, Mr. Agrawal in respect of
legislation by substitution has no force inasmuch as same rule of construc-
tion has to be applied while dealing with such a legislation. We may also
-' refer to the decision of this Court in Union of India v. C. Rania Swamy and
Others, [1997] 4 SCC 647. In this case a new rule namely Rule 16-A was. H,
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A inserted in All India Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefits) Rules,
1958. In respect of this substituted rule this Court held that the effect of
rule being substituted by new rule clearly was the old rule, which stood
substituted, could under no circumstances have any application at least
from the date when it ceased to exist.

B But that does not mean that under the unamended provisions the
appellant could claim the benefit of Section 25(4)(b). The provisions of
Section 25(4)(b) would come into play only if the appellant's case does not
fall under Section 25(4)(a).

C Now, the first assessment roll dated 12.5.1978 was revised and a fresh
roll was prepared on 3.9.1979 as it was found that some rights of the
appellant were excluded. The final assessment roll in from 'G' dated
3.11.1979 which included three times net income from mines and minerals
-
under Section 25 was accepted by the appellant and by the letter dated
19.11.1979, Additional Collector, was informed "I am not to file any
D objection against form 'G' prepared by your honour." An affidavit was also
filed by the appellant stating that any excess amount paid to him would be
recoverable if and when detected by Public Demand Recovery Act ~rom
the appellant. Thus it is clear that the appellant accepted the amount
without any protest and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that it was
E an agreement between the appellant and the State as per Clause (a) of
sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act. Under the sub-section in absence
of an agreement the question of referring the dispute to Tribunal would
arise. As in the present appeal there was a clear agreement between the
parties the appellant forfeited his right for asking the matter to be referred
under Section 25(4)(b) to Tribunal for arbitration and question of granting
F compensation @ more than ten time could not arise,

The legislature clearly stated that payment of compensation should
reach its finality. Therefore, the restriction imposed by Section 30 and 30-A
for re-opening the final assessment roll does not apply. Under Section 30
G of the Act the Compensation Officer was empowered to correct the
assessment roll but before payment of compensation if he was satisfied that
there was a bona fide mistake or it was necessary to do so as a result of
succession to or transfer of the interest of an intermediary or any other
person, whose name appeared in such roll as a person entitled for com-
pensation. This section does not apply to the facts of the present appeal
H inasmuch as the aforesaid conditions do not apply.
MAHARAJA CHI NT AMAN I SARAN NATH SAHDEO v. STATE [PHU KAN, J.] 533

Section 30-A empowers the Compensation Officer to prepare a fresh A
assessment roll if it was discovered that further interests of such inter-
mediary has vested in the State. It was not so in the present appeal.

Therefore, we hold that by exercising powers under Section 30 or
30-A, the Compensation Officer could not have revised the final assess-
ment roll after payment was received without any objection by the appel- B
lant.

After acceptance of compensation as stated above the appellant
approached the authority "to revise calculation chart after taking into
account 15 times of the income from mines and minerals and after adjust-
ment of the previous order of payment for balance as provided in para 1 c
of Section 30-A." The contention of the appellant before authority was
compensation @ three times had been assessed without agreement.

The appellant did not dispute the calculation made in the final
assessment roll and what was disputed was the rate of compensation on
the ground that there was no agreement. We have already held that there D
was a deemed agreement by acceptance of the amount of compensation by
the appellant. Prayer of the appellant before the authority for invoking
Section 30-A of the Act was not at all tenable as this power could ·be
exercised only on discovery of further interest of the intermediary.

It has been urged before us by Mr. Sanyal that final assessment roll
E
was prepared without complying with Rule 18(2) in form 'F' which is a step
prior to preparation of final assessment roll. As the petitioner accepted the
final assessment roll such plea could not be taken up by the petitioner,
therefore, this contention has no force.
F
For what has been stated above we hold that the order of the learned
Member of Board of Revenue directing the action to be taken for refund
of the excess compensation was valid and proper though he had no
jurisdiction to pass the order. In the event it is set aside it would amount
to reviving an invalid order of payment of excess compensation to the
appellant. G
For the reasons stated above the appeal is liable to be dismissed
which we hereby do but no order as to costs.

R.C.K. Appeal dismissed.