MAHARAJ SINGH & ORS.versusKARAN SINGH (DEAD) THR. LRS. & ORS.

                 [2024] 7 S.C.R. 396 : 2024 INSC 491

                       Maharaj Singh & Ors.
                                v.
                 Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.
                       (Civil Appeal No. 6782 of 2013)
                                  09 July 2024
                [Abhay S. Oka* and Sanjay Karol,JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       Can the contention that the suit agreement was sham and bogus
       and not intended to be acted upon be allowed to be raised
       notwithstanding Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act; Was the
       suit agreement sham and bogus and not intended to be acted upon;
       Were the second to fourth defendants bona fide purchasers for
       value without notice of the suit agreement; Whether, in view of the
       decision of Supreme Court in B. Vijaya Bharathi, the plaintiffs were
       not entitled to a decree of specific performance in the absence of
       any prayer for cancellation of the two subsequent sale deeds; Do
       the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act create a bar on the
       execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement; Whether
       the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree of specific performance.

                                   Headnotes†
       Specific Relief Act, 1963 – s.19(b) – Relief against parties and
       persons claiming under them by subsequent title – Defendants-
       subsequent purchasers claimed under the sale deeds executed
       after the execution of the suit agreement, if can be subjected
       to decree of specific performance – Plea of the defendants that
       in view of the decision in B. Vijaya Bharathi case, plaintiffs
       not entitled to decree of specific performance in the absence
       of prayer for cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds:
       Held: In two Judges bench decision in B. Vijaya Bharathi, the
       attention of the Bench was not invited to binding precedent of larger
       bench in Lala Durga Prasad & Ors. – Hence, the decision in the
       case of B. Vijaya Bharathi is not a binding precedent and there
       was no requirement to make a prayer in the plaint for cancellation
       or setting aside the subsequent sale deeds – Furthermore, in view
       of s.19(b), the defendants claiming under the sale deeds executed
       after the execution of the suit agreement can be subjected to a
       decree of specific performance as the suit agreement can be
* Author
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                               397

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


     enforced specifically against such defendants unless they are
     bona-fide purchasers without the notice of the original contract –
     When, the defendants-subsequent purchasers fail to prove that
     they entered into the sale deed in good faith and without notice
     of the suit agreement, in view of s.19(b), a decree for specific
     performance can be passed against such defendants – Therefore,
     in such a case where s.19(b) is applicable, under the decree of
     specific performance, the subsequent purchasers can be directed
     to execute the sale deed along with the original vendor – There is
     no necessity to pray for the cancellation of the subsequent sale
     deeds – There are concurrent findings of the three Courts on the
     issue of the readiness and willingness shown by the first plaintiff –
     No reason to disturb the said findings – However, as the second
     plaintiff was not interested in getting the specific performance, the
     decree ought to have been restricted to the undivided one-half share
     in the suit property in favour of only the first plaintiff – Impugned
     decree modified. [Paras 15, 16, 19-21]
     Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.91, 92:
     Held: s.91 excludes oral evidence of the terms of the written
     document by requiring those terms to be proved by the document
     itself – s.92 excludes oral evidence for contradicting, varying, adding
     to or subtracting to such terms – These sections do not prevent
     parties from adducing evidence on the issue of whether the parties
     to the documents had agreed to contract on the terms set forth in the
     document – In the present case, the contention that the deceased-
     first defendant was addicted to vices was never raised in the written
     statements and the same has come by way of an afterthought in
     the evidence of the mother of the first defendant – Moreover, the
     stand of the defendants in their written statement is that the suit
     agreement was forged – Therefore, on facts, the contention that
     the suit agreement was got executed from the first defendant with
     the object to deter him from selling the suit property to meet the
     demands of his bad lifestyle cannot be accepted – Hence, the suit
     agreement cannot be held as bogus or sham. [Para 12]
     Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976 –
     Registration Act, 1908 – s.17(2)(v) – Transfer of property Act,
     1882 – s.3(1) – Defendants-subsequent purchasers claimed
     under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit
     agreement – Whether they were bona-fide purchasers who
     paid consideration in good faith without the notice of the
     suit agreement:
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       Held: No – Under the 1976 Amendment Act, clause (v) of S.17(2)
       of the Registration Act 1908 was amended making an agreement
       for the sale of immovable property, a compulsorily registerable
       document in the State – In view of explanation 1 to s.3 of the TP
       Act, the second to fourth defendants shall be deemed to have
       knowledge of the suit agreement, which was duly registered – It
       cannot be said that they had no knowledge of the suit agreement
       in view of the constructive notice or they paid money in good faith
       to the first Defendant – Therefore, the second to fourth defendants
       were not bona-fide purchasers who paid consideration in good faith
       without the notice of the suit agreement. [Para 13]
       Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
       Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001)
       (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 – s.154-B(1) – Transfer of
       property Act, 1882 – s.54 – s.154-B(1), if created a bar on the
       execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement:
       Held: s.154-B(1) prohibits the sale or transfer of agricultural lands
       to a person who is not an agriculturalist – In view of s.54 of the TP
       Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer the property subject
       matter of the agreement to the purchaser – It does not create any
       interest in the property subject matter of the agreement – Therefore,
       the embargo created by sub-section (1) of s.154-B will apply only
       to the execution of the sale deed and not to the execution of the
       agreement for sale. [Para 17]
       Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
       Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification order, 2001)
       (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 – s.154-B(2)(h) – Whether the
       vendor and the persons claiming through him can be directed
       to apply for permission in accordance with s.154-B(2)(h) to
       sell and whether a decree for execution of the sale deed can
       be made contingent upon the grant of permission to sell:
       Held: s.154-B(2)(h) permits the sale of agricultural land to a non-
       agriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for
       the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h) – In the
       present case, defendants shall join the first plaintiff in applying
       to the State Government/Competent Authority for the grant of
       permission u/s.154-B(2)(h) to sell the one half-undivided share in
       the suit land to the first plaintiff – It shall be the obligation of the
       defendants to apply for the permission and to do all such things
       which are necessary to get the permission – Further directions
       issued. [Paras 17, 21]
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                            399

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


                              Case Law Cited
     B.Vijaya Bharathi v. P. Savitri & Ors. [2017] 7 SCR 746 : (2018)
     11 SCC 761 – not a binding precedent.
     Lala Durga Prasad & Ors. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors. [1954] 1
     SCR 360 : (1953) 2 SCC 509 – relied on.
     Tyagaraja Mudaliyar and Anr. v. Vedathanni ILR (1936) 59 Mad
     446 : (1935) SCC OnLine PC 68; Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao
     Deshmukh v. Appasaheb Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar & Ors. [1980]
     1 SCR 161 : (1979) 4 SCC 60; Rojasara Ramjibhai Dahyabhai
     v. Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai and Another [1986] 2 SCR 447 :
     (1986) 3 SCC 300 – referred to.

                                List of Acts
     Specific Relief Act, 1963; Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
     Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and Modification
     order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003; Evidence Act, 1872;
     Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 1976;
     Registration Act, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

                             List of Keywords
     Specific performance; Suit for specific performance; Decree of
     specific performance; Suit agreement; Sale deed; Agreement for
     sale; Subsequent purchasers; Subsequent sale deeds; Absence
     of prayer for cancellation or setting aside of the subsequent sale
     deeds in the plaint; Bona-fide purchasers; Bona fide purchasers for
     value without notice of the suit agreement; Defendants not bona-
     fide purchasers; Consideration not paid in good faith; Notice of the
     suit agreement; Knowledge of suit agreement; Constructive notice;
     Suit agreement not sham and bogus; Sale deeds executed after
     the execution of the suit agreement; Original vendor; Subsequent
     purchasers to execute the sale deed along with original vendor;
     Readiness and willingness; Sale of agricultural land to a non-
     agriculturalist; Binding precedent; Binding precedent of larger
     bench.

                            Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6782 of 2013
     From the Judgment and Order dated 21.04.2010 of the High Court
     of Uttarakhand at Nainital in SA No. 206 of 2001 (old No. 42 of 1994)
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                           Appearances for Parties
       Ashok Kumar Sharma, Sr. Adv., Vanshdeep Dalmia, Ms. Anisha Jain,
       Advs. for the Appellants.
       Sumit Kumar, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Krishnam Mishra, Param Kumar
       Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment
       Abhay S. Oka, J.
1.     This appeal is at the instance of the original third, second, and
       fourth defendants. The first and second respondents are the original
       plaintiffs. The third respondent is the mother of the deceased original
       first defendant. For convenience, we are referring to the parties
       according to their status in the suit.
       FACTUAL ASPECT
2.     Reference to a few factual aspects will be necessary. The first
       defendant executed a registered agreement for sale dated 7th
       December 1981 by which he agreed to sell his Bhumidhari land
       measuring 2.90 acres of Khasra no. 48 (for short, ‘the suit property’)
       at village-Jauniwala, Tehsil-Kashipur, District-Nainital in favour of the
       plaintiffs for the consideration of Rs. 20,300/-. There was a recital in
       the registered agreement dated 7th December 1981 (for short, ‘the
       suit agreement’) that the first defendant had received a sum of Rs.
       7,000/- as advance and the balance consideration was payable at
       the time of execution of the sale deed. The first defendant agreed
       to execute the sale deed within three years from the date of the suit
       agreement. According to the plaintiffs’ case, requests were made
       orally and by sending notices to the first defendant to execute the
       sale deed. It is pleaded in the plaint that the first defendant refused
       to accept notices.
3.     On 6th September 1983, the first defendant sold 1.60 acres out of
       the suit property to the second and third defendants by a registered
       sale deed. By another sale deed dated 12th December 1983, the
       first defendant sold the remaining part of the suit property to the
       second to fourth defendants. We must note that the suit was filed on
       17th December 1983, and the averments regarding the subsequent
       alienations were incorporated by the amendment made to the plaint
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                          401

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


     in terms of the order dated 28th July 1984. The case made out in the
     plaint is that the subsequent sale deeds are collusive. The prayer
     in the suit was for specific performance of the suit agreement with
     a direction to the defendants to hand over possession of the suit
     property to the plaintiffs and to execute a sale deed in respect of
     the suit property in their favour.
4.   The defendants, including the legal representative (Smt. Bhagwati
     Devi) of the original first defendant, filed separate written statements.
     In the written statement filed by the legal representative of the first
     defendant, it was contended that the suit agreement was fictitious.
     In the written statement filed by the second and third defendants,
     it was pleaded that the suit agreement is a forged document which
     was never to be acted upon. It is pointed out that the first plaintiff
     - Karan Singh, and the first defendant were relatives. The plaintiffs
     never paid any money to the first defendant.
5.   The first plaintiff was examined as a witness. The second plaintiff,
     Murari Singh, did not support the first plaintiff. He deposed in favour
     of the defendants. He stated on oath that the suit agreement was
     made only to ensure that the first defendant did not alienate the
     suit land. He stated that the first defendant was his relative. He
     stated that the first plaintiff was related to him and was a well-known
     person. The first plaintiff’s name was included as the purchaser in
     the suit agreement to deter the first defendant. He stated that he
     and the first plaintiff never demanded execution of the sale deed
     from the first defendant. The second plaintiff proceeded to state
     that he had not filed the suit, and the signature shown to him on
     the vakalatnama was of someone else. Subsequently, the second
     plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that the first defendant had several
     bad habits and, therefore, there was an apprehension that he would
     sell the suit property.
     FINDINGS OF THE COURTS
6.   The Trial Court held that the execution of the suit agreement was
     proved. Relying upon Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
     (for short, ‘the Evidence Act’), the learned Trial Judge held that
     evidence contrary to the contents of the suit agreement could not
     be adduced and was not admissible in evidence. The learned Trial
     Judge held that in view of the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Civil
     Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1976, which came into force
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       on 31st December 1976, an agreement for sale was compulsorily
       registrable in the State at the relevant time. Therefore, the learned
       Trial Judge held that in view of the explanation to Section 3 of the
       Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the TP Act’), the second to
       fourth defendants shall be deemed to have a notice of the execution
       of the suit agreement. The learned Judge held that it was a duty
       of the second to fourth defendants to take a search in the office of
       the Sub-Registrar to ascertain whether there was any prior transfer.
       Therefore, the learned Trial judge held that the second to fourth
       defendants could not be held to be bona fide purchasers for value
       received. The finding on the issue of readiness and willingness
       was also recorded in favour of the plaintiffs. Therefore, the Trial
       Court passed a decree for the specific performance, directing all
       the defendants to execute the sale deed and deliver possession
       of the suit property to the plaintiffs. In an appeal preferred by the
       second to fourth defendants, the Additional District Judge, Nainital,
       confirmed all the findings of the Trial Court. The Additional District
       Judge dismissed the appeal. A second appeal was preferred by the
       second to fourth respondents. The second appeal has been dismissed
       by the impugned judgment.
       ORDERS OF THIS COURT
7.     On 26th October 2010, this Court issued notice. The order of this
       Court reads thus:
            “Mr. K.B. Sinha, senior advocate appearing for the
            petitioners submits that after coming into force of the
            Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and
            Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaptation and Modification
            Order, 2001) (Amendment) Act, 2003, the sale of the
            suit land in terms of the decrees of the Court would be
            violative of the provisions of the Act because the plaintiff
            is not an agriculturist.
            Issue notice.
            In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of operation of the
            impugned decree.”
       On 12th August 2013, leave was granted. This Court granted a stay
       to the operation of the impugned decrees on 26th October 2010.
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                            403

       Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


      SUBMISSIONS
8.    The learned senior counsel appearing for the second to fourth
      defendants submitted that the three Courts refused to consider
      the submission that the suit agreement was sham and bogus. By
      pointing out Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, he urged that
      the provisions did not prevent the defendants from leading evidence
      to show that the suit agreement was bogus or sham. He relied on
      the Privy Council’s decision in the case of Tyagaraja Mudaliyar
      and Anr. v. Vedathanni1. He submitted that Sections 91 and 92
      of the Evidence Act do not exclude evidence on the question of
      whether the parties had agreed to contract on the terms set forth
      in the document. He also relied upon a decision of this Court in the
      case of Krishnabai Bhritar Ganpatrao Deshmukh v. Appasaheb
      Tuljaramarao Nimbalkar & Ors.2. He submitted that it was brought
      on record in the depositions of the second plaintiff who was the uncle
      of the first defendant, and Bhagwati Devi, the mother of the first
      defendant, that the first defendant had many vices. Bhagwati Devi
      was apprehensive that the first defendant would sell the property
      to fund his bad lifestyle. The second plaintiff, Murari Singh, was
      her brother; therefore, she approached Murari Singh to prevent the
      first defendant from selling the suit property. The second plaintiff,
      Murari Singh, brought his friend, the first plaintiff. Thereafter, the suit
      agreement was executed to deter the first defendant from selling the
      property. He submitted the specific contention that the suit agreement
      was a sham document which was not to be acted upon has been
      brushed aside by the three Courts.
9.    He submitted that the first plaintiff filed the suit within a few days
      after the first defendant executed a sale deed on 12th December
      1983 in favour of the second to fourth defendants. The learned senior
      counsel further submitted that the second to fourth defendants are
      bona-fide purchasers as the suit agreement is sham and bogus.
      He submitted that the defence that the plaintiffs were not ready and
      willing to perform their part of the suit agreement is also available
      to the defendants claiming to be subsequent purchasers through
      the vendor. The learned senior counsel relied upon a decision of



1    ILR (1936) 59 Mad 446 : 1935 SCC OnLine PC 68
2    [1980] 1 SCR 161 : (1979) 4 SCC 60
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       this Court in the case of B. Vijaya Bharathi v. P. Savitri & Ors.3,
       and submitted that the plaintiffs are disentitled to relief of specific
       performance as they have not prayed in the plaint for setting aside
       or cancelling the subsequent sale deeds. Learned senior counsel
       also relied upon Section 154-B of the Uttaranchal (The Uttar Pradesh
       Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950) (Adaption and
       Modification order, 2001) (Amendment) Ordinance, 2003 (for short,
       ‘the Zamindari Abolition Act”). He submitted that as the 1st plaintiff
       is not an agriculturist within the meaning of Section 3(a) thereof, in
       view of Section 154-B, a sale deed cannot be executed in terms of
       the suit agreement. He also pointed out that the legal representatives
       of the first respondent (first Plaintiff) have not chosen to contest the
       appeal despite service of notice. Therefore, they are not interested
       in contesting the appeal.
       QUESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
10. After having considered the submissions of the learned counsel
    appearing for the appellants, we find that the following questions
    arise:
       a)   Can the contention that the suit agreement was sham and
            bogus and not intended to be acted upon be allowed to be
            raised notwithstanding Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act?
       b)   Was the suit agreement sham and bogus and not intended to
            be acted upon?
       c)   Were the second to fourth defendants bona fide purchasers
            for value without notice of the suit agreement?
       d)   Whether, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of
            B. Vijaya Bharathi3, the plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree
            of specific performance in the absence of any prayer for
            cancellation of the two subsequent sale deeds?
       e)   Do the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act create a bar on
            the execution of the sale deed in terms of the suit agreement?
       f)   Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a decree of specific
            performance?



3   [2017] 7 SCR 746 : (2018) 11 SCC 761
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                         405

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


     FIRST TWO QUESTIONS – (a) AND (b)
11. Now, we come to the first two questions. Right from the decision
    of the Privy Council in the case of Tyagaraja Mudaliyar1 the law is
    well settled. Section 91 of the Evidence Act excludes oral evidence
    of the terms of the written document by requiring those terms to be
    proved by the document itself. Section 92 excludes oral evidence
    for contradicting, varying, adding to or subtracting to such terms.
    These two sections do not prevent parties from adducing evidence
    on the issue of whether the parties to the documents had agreed
    to contract on the terms set forth in the document.
12. Coming to the facts of the case, firstly, we must refer to the pleadings
    of the legal representative of the first defendant. In paragraph 11 of
    her written statement, she raised the following contention:
           “…………………………………………………
           11. That the real facts are that plaintiff Murari Singh is
           the brother of answering respondent and Karan Singh
           is his friend. So, under fear and making the pressure on
           Preetam Singh, a fictitious agreement was prepared by
           plaintiff Murari Singh without any consideration in order
           to deter late Preetam Singh, so that the should not sale
           the land. Neither this agreement was acted upon nor was
           disclosed any time. The said amount for consideration,
           written in the agreement, is shown at very low price from
           the market price.
           …………………………………………………”
     Thus, the legal representative of the first defendant did not plead that
     the first defendant was addicted to several vices and that to prevent
     him from selling the suit property for supporting his bad lifestyle, the
     suit agreement was executed. It is merely stated that the second
     plaintiff prepared a fictitious agreement without any consideration
     to deter the first defendant from selling the land. It is not pleaded
     that as the first plaintiff was an influential person, he was brought
     into the picture to deter the first defendant. The second and third
     defendants filed a written statement. The contention raised by them
     in the written statement is entirely different. In paragraph 12 of the
     written statement, they pleaded thus:
           “…………………………………………………
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            12. That the alleged agreement to sale dated 17.12.1981
            is a forged document and was never acted upon. The
            plaintiff no. 1 and Sh. Pritam Singh are relative to each
            other. The plaintiffs are the resident of some other districts.
            They never paid any money. They got prepared a forged
            documents colluding with some persons of their party.
            The agreement to sale is illegal and the plaintiffs are not
            entitled of any relief on the basis of this forged document.
            …………………………………………………”
       The legal representative of the first defendant did not dispute that the
       first defendant signed the agreement. However, the other defendants
       raised a contention that the suit agreement was a forged document.
       The second to fourth defendants did not plead anything about the
       object of getting the agreement for sale executed from the first
       defendant. The case that the first defendant was addicted to vices
       and that with a view to deter him from selling the suit property, the
       agreement for sale was executed, was pleaded for the first time by
       the mother of the first defendant in her evidence. Even the allegation
       that the first plaintiff was joined as a purchaser to put pressure on the
       deceased - the first defendant was made by her for the first time in
       her evidence. Thus, the contention that the deceased-first defendant
       was addicted to vices was never raised in the written statements and
       the same has come by way of an afterthought in the evidence of the
       mother of the first defendant. Moreover, the stand of the second to
       fourth defendants in their written statement is that the suit agreement
       was forged and was prepared by the plaintiffs and some persons
       of their party. Therefore, in the facts of the case, it is very difficult
       to accept the contention that the suit agreement was got executed
       from the first defendant with the object to deter him from selling the
       suit property to meet the demands of his bad lifestyle. Hence, the
       suit agreement cannot be held as bogus or sham.
       ON QUESTION – (c)
13. The three Courts concurrently found that under the Uttar Pradesh
    Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 1976, clause (v) of Section
    17(2) of the Registration Act 1908 was amended, which made an
    agreement for the sale of an immovable property, a compulsorily
    registerable document in the State. On this aspect, no arguments have
    been canvassed by the appellants. Therefore, in view of explanation
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                               407

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


     1 to Section 3 of the TP Act, the second to fourth defendants shall be
     deemed to have knowledge of the suit agreement, which was duly
     registered. It cannot be said that the second to fourth defendants
     had no knowledge of the suit agreement in view of the constructive
     notice. It is not their case that they took a search in the office of the
     Sub-Registrar before getting the sale deeds in their favour. Hence,
     it cannot be said that they paid money in good faith to the first
     Defendant. Therefore, the second to fourth defendants can never
     be held to be bona-fide purchasers who have paid consideration in
     good faith without the notice of the suit agreement.
     ON QUESTION (d)
14. Now, we deal with another argument that the plaintiffs ought to have
    prayed in the suit to cancel the subsequent sale deeds executed by
    the first defendant. On this aspect, the law has been laid down by
    a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of Lala
    Durga Prasad & Ors. v. Lala Deep Chand & Ors.4,. Paragraphs
    40 to 42 of the said decision read thus:
            “40. First, we reach the position that the title to the property
            has validly passed from the vendor and resides in the
            subsequent transferee. The sale to him is not void but
            only voidable at the option of the earlier “contractor”. As
            the title no longer rests in the vendor it would be illogical
            from a conveyancing point of view to compel him to convey
            to the plaintiff unless steps are taken to revest the title
            in him either by cancellation of the subsequent sale or
            by reconveyance from the subsequent purchaser to him.
            We do not know of any case in which a reconveyance to
            the vendor was ordered but Sulaiman, C.J. adopted the
            other course in Kali Charan Singh v. Janak Deo Singh
            [Kali Charan Singh v. Janak Deo Singh, AIR 1932 All 694 :
            1932 SCC OnLine All 154] . He directed cancellation of
            the subsequent sale and conveyance to the plaintiff by the
            vendor in accordance with the contract of sale of which
            the plaintiff sought specific performance. But though this
            sounds logical the objection to it is that it might bring
            in its train complications between the vendor and the


4   [1954] 1 SCR 360 : (1953) 2 SCC 509
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          subsequent purchaser. There may be covenants in the
          deed between them which it would be inequitable to disturb
          by cancellation of their deed. Accordingly, we do not think
          that is a desirable solution.
          41. We are not enamoured of the next alternative either,
          namely, conveyance by the subsequent purchaser alone
          to the plaintiff. It is true that would have the effect of
          vesting the title to the property in the plaintiff but it might
          be inequitable to compel the subsequent transferee to
          enter into terms and covenants in the vendor’s agreement
          with the plaintiff to which he would never have agreed
          had he been a free agent; and if the original contract is
          varied by altering or omitting such terms the court will be
          remaking the contract, a thing it has no power to do; and
          in any case it will no longer be specifically enforcing the
          original contract but another and different one.
          42. In our opinion, the proper form of decree is to
          direct specific performance of the contract between
          the vendor and the plaintiff and direct the subsequent
          transferee to join in the conveyance so as to pass on
          the title which resides in him to the plaintiff. He does
          not join in any special covenants made between the
          plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass on his
          title to the plaintiff. This was the course followed by
          the Calcutta High Court in Kafiladdin v. Samiraddin
          [Kafiladdin v. Samiraddin, AIR 1931 Cal 67 : 1930
          SCC OnLine Cal 46] and appears to be the English
          practice. See Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn.,
          p.90, Para207; also Potter v. Sanders [Potter v. Sanders,
          (1846) 6 Hare 1 : 67 ER 1057] . We direct accordingly.”
                                                    (emphasis added)
15. Reliance is placed by the appellants on the decision of this Court in
    the case of B. Vijaya Bharathi3. In paragraph 17 of the said decision,
    this Court held thus:
          “17. It must also be noted that though aware of two
          conveyances of the same property, the plaintiff did
          not ask for their cancellation. This again, would stand
          in the way of a decree of specific performance for
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                          409

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


           unless the sale made by Defendant 1 to Defendant
           2, and thereafter by Defendant 2 to Defendant 3 are
           set aside, no decree for specific performance could
           possibly follow. While Mr Rao may be right in stating that
           mere delay without more would not disentitle his client to
           the relief of specific performance, for the reasons stated
           above, we find that this is not such a case. The High Court
           was clearly right in finding that the bar of Section 16(c)
           was squarely attracted on the facts of the present case,
           and that therefore, the fact that Defendants 2 and 3 may
           not be bona fide purchasers would not come in the way of
           stating that such suit must be dismissed at the threshold
           because of lack of readiness and willingness, which is
           a basic condition for the grant of specific performance.”
                                                   (emphasis added)
     A bench of two Hon’ble Judges has rendered this decision.
     Unfortunately, the attention of the Bench was not invited to binding
     precedent in the form of a decision of a larger bench in the case of
     Lala Durga Prasad & Ors.4. Hence, the decision in the case of B.
     Vijaya Bharathi3 is not a binding precedent. Therefore, there was
     no requirement to make a prayer in the plaint for cancellation or
     setting aside the subsequent sale deeds.
16. Clause (a) to (c) of Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act read thus:
           “19. Relief against parties and persons claiming under
           them by subsequent title.— Except as otherwise provided
           by this Chapter, specific performance of a contract may
           be enforced against—
                (a) either party thereto;
                (b) any other person claiming under him by a
                title arising subsequently to the contract, except
                a transferee for value who has paid his money
                in good faith and without notice of the original
                contract;
                (c) any person claiming under a title which, though
                prior to the contract and known to the plaintiff, might
                have been displaced by the defendant;
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                 (d)…………………………………………………
                 (e)…………………………………………………”
                                                    (emphasis added)
       In view of clause (b) of Section 19, the defendants who are claiming
       under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit
       agreement can be subjected to a decree of specific performance
       as the suit agreement can be enforced specifically against such
       defendants unless they are bona-fide purchasers without the notice
       of the original contract. When, in a given case, the defendants, who
       are subsequent purchasers, fail to prove that they entered into the
       sale deed in good faith and without notice of the suit agreement,
       in view of Section 19(b), a decree for specific performance can be
       passed against such defendants. Therefore, in such a case where
       Section 19(b) is applicable, under the decree of specific performance,
       the subsequent purchasers can be directed to execute the sale deed
       along with the original vendor. There is no necessity to pray for the
       cancellation of the subsequent sale deeds.
       ON QUESTION – (e)
17. We have perused Section 154-B of the Zamindari Abolition Act.
    Sub-section (1) prohibits the sale or transfer of agricultural lands
    to a person who is not an agriculturalist. Clause (h) of sub-section
    (2) of Section 154-B permits the sale of agricultural land to a non-
    agriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for the
    purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h). What is prohibited
    is the sale of agricultural land to a non-agriculturalist. In view of
    Section 54 of the TP Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer
    the property subject matter of the agreement to the purchaser. It
    does not create any interest in the property subject matter of the
    agreement. Therefore, the embargo created by sub-section (1) of
    Section 154-B will apply only to the execution of the sale deed and
    not to the execution of the agreement for sale.
18. Now the question is whether the vendor and the persons claiming
    through him can be directed to apply for permission in accordance
    with clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 154-B to sell and whether
    a decree for execution of the sale deed can be made contingent
    upon the grant of permission to sell. The law on this aspect is no
    longer res integra. In the case of Rojasara Ramjibhai Dahyabhai
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                           411

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


     v. Jani Narottamdas Lallubhai and another5, in paragraphs 12 to
     14, this Court held thus:
            “12. Although Rana Mohabat Singh having failed to fulfil
            the terms of his contract with the appellant and execute a
            sale deed in his favour might have rendered the contract
            between them incapable of performance, but with the
            extinction of the title of Rana Mohabat Singh and the
            conferral of the rights of an occupant on the appellant,
            the property became transferable subject, of course, to
            the express covenant on the part of the appellant to do all
            things necessary to give effect to the agreement. Here, the
            suit banakhat (Ex. 25) embodies an express covenant to
            that effect. There is always in such contracts an implied
            covenant on the part of the vendor to do all things
            necessary to give effect to the agreement, including
            the obtaining of the permission for the transfer of the
            property. The principles on which a term of this nature
            may be implied in contracts are well-settled. It is enough
            to refer to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 8, 3rd Edn.,
            p. 121 where the principles are summarised as follows:
            “In construing a contract, a term or condition not expressly
            stated may, under certain circumstances be implied by
            the court, if it is clear from the nature of the transaction
            or from something actually found in the document that
            the contracting parties must have intended such a term
            or condition to be a part of the agreement between them.
            Such an implication must in all cases be founded on
            the presumed intention of the parties and upon reason,
            and will only be made when it is necessary in order to
            give the transaction that efficacy that both parties must
            have intended it to have, and to prevent such a failure
            of consideration as could not have been within the
            contemplation of the parties.”
            Chitty on Contracts Vol. 1, 23rd Edn., paras 694-95 points
            out that a term would be implied if it is necessary in the
            business sense, to give efficacy to the contract.


5   [1986] 2 SCR 447 : (1986) 3 SCC 300
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       13. In this context, reference may be made to the decision
       of the Privy Council in Motilal v. Nanhelal [AIR 1930 PC
       287 : (1930) 57 IA 333] . There, the facts were these. In that
       case, the plaintiff Mst Jankibai entered into an agreement
       to purchase from Rajbahadur Seth Jiwandas of Jabalpur
       four annas proprietary share of Mauja Raisalpur together
       with the sir and khudkast lands appurtenant thereto, with
       cultivating rights in the sir lands. The property was subject
       to the provisions of the Central Provinces Tenancy Act,
       1920. She filed a suit for specific performance of the said
       contract. The Privy Council held that the contract was for a
       transfer of the sir lands without reservation of the right of
       occupancy, and that the sanction of the Revenue Officer
       to the transfer was necessary under Section 50(1) of the
       Act, which was in these terms:
       “50. (1) If a proprietor desires to transfer the proprietary
       rights in any portion of his sir land without reservation of
       the right of occupancy specified in Section 49, he may
       apply to a revenue-officer and, if such revenue-officer
       is satisfied that the transferor is not wholly or mainly an
       agriculturist, or that the property is self-acquired or has
       been acquired within the twenty years last preceding, he
       shall sanction the transfer.”
       14. It was contended before the Privy Council that a decree
       for specific performance of the agreement of sale could not
       be made, because such performance would necessitate an
       application by or on behalf of the vendor to the Revenue
       Officer for sanction to transfer the cultivating rights in the
       sir land, and that the court had no jurisdiction to require
       the vendor to make such an application. In repelling the
       contention, the Privy Council observed that in view of their
       construction of the agreement, namely, that the vendor
       agreed to transfer the cultivating rights in the sir land:
       “There was, in Their Lordships’ opinion, an implied
       covenant on the part of the vendor to do all things necessary
       to effect such transfer, which would include an application
       to the Revenue Officer to sanction the transfer.”
       It was further observed that it was not necessary for their
       Lordships to decide whether in that case the application for
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                           413

      Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


           sanction to transfer must succeed, but that it was material
           to mention that no facts were brought to their Lordships’
           notice which would go to show that there was any reason
           why such sanction should not be granted. After making the
           said observations, the Privy Council held that in those
           circumstances the court had jurisdiction to enforce the
           contract under the Specific Relief Act, 1877 and Order
           21, Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 by a
           decree ordering the vendor to apply for sanction and
           to execute a conveyance on receipt of such sanction.
           The decision of the Privy Council in Motilal v. Nanhelal
           [AIR 1930 PC 287 : (1930) 57 IA 333] therefore is an
           authority for the proposition that if the vendor agrees
           to sell the property which can be transferred only with
           the sanction of some government authority, the court
           has jurisdiction to order the vendor to apply to the
           authority within a specified period, and if the sanction
           is forthcoming to convey to the purchaser within a
           certain time. See also Chandnee Widya Vati Madden v.
           C.L. Katial [AIR 1964 SC 978 : (1964) 2 SCR 495] and
           R.C. Chandiok v. Chuni Lal Sabharwal [(1970) 3 SCC
           140 : AIR 1971 SC 1238 : (1971) 2 SCR 573] where this
           Court following the Privy Council decision in Motilal
           v. Nanhelal case [AIR 1930 PC 287 : (1930) 57 IA 333]
           reiterated the same principle.”
                                                     (emphasis added)
     Hence, a decree enjoining the defendants to obtain permission to sell
     the suit property can be passed as it is their implied obligation to do
     so. A decree for the specific performance can be passed contingent
     upon the grant of the permission.
     ON QUESTION – (f)
19. Now, the question is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree
    for specific performance. In his deposition, the first plaintiff has proved
    the service of notice of demand to the first defendant. The suit is filed
    within limitation, and the defendants did not raise a plea of delay and
    laches. There are concurrent findings of the three Courts on the issue
    of the readiness and willingness shown by the first plaintiff. There
    is no reason to disturb the said findings. Now, the question is, what
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       is the effect of the failure of the second plaintiff to support the first
       plaintiff and his conduct of supporting the defendants? In the facts
       of the case, the answer lies in the submissions made by the second
       to fourth defendants before the High Court. In paragraph 9 of the
       judgment, the High Court has recorded the following submissions
       made by the counsel for the second to fourth defendants:
             “9. The learned senior counsel for the appellants
             submitted that the plaintiff no.2 Murari Singh did not
             file the suit nor had signed the vakalatnama and that
             the said plaintiff had admitted this fact in his deposition,
             consequently, the suit was not maintainable. It was further
             submitted that the percentage of share between the
             plaintiffs were not defined in the agreement to sell
             and, consequently, under Section 45 of the Transfer
             of Property Act, the plaintiffs would be deemed to
             have equal shares, namely, 50 percent. The learned
             senior counsel for the appellants contended that
             since Murari Singh did not institute the suit, the
             decree for specific performance for the whole land,
             which was undivided could not have been decreed
             by the trial court and, consequently, to that extent,
             the decree passed by the trial court was erroneous.
             ………………………………………………………”
                                                        (emphasis added)
20. In our view, as the second plaintiff was not interested in getting the
    specific performance, the decree ought to have been restricted to
    the undivided one-half share in the suit property in favour of only
    the first plaintiff.
21. Accordingly, we partly allow the appeal by passing the following order:
       (a)   We modify the impugned decree by directing the legal
             representative of the first defendant and second to fourth
             defendants to execute a sale deed in favour of the first plaintiff
             (Karan Singh) only to the extent of one half undivided share
             in the suit property;
       (b)   The defendants shall join the first plaintiff in applying to the State
             Government/Competent Authority for the grant of permission
             under clause (h) of sub-section (2) of Section 154-B of the
[2024] 7 S.C.R.                                                              415

         Maharaj Singh & Ors. v. Karan Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors.


             Zamindari Abolition Act to sell the one half-undivided share in
             the suit land to the first plaintiff within two months from today.
             It shall be the obligation of the defendants to apply for the
             permission and to do all such things which are necessary to
             get the permission;
     (c)      If the defendants or any of them do not sign and file the
             application with relevant documents within the period mentioned
             above of two months, the executing Court shall appoint a Court
             Commissioner to sign and file the application on their behalf and
             to do all such things which are necessary to get the permission;
     (d)     If the application for grant of permission is rejected, it will be
             open to the first plaintiff to challenge the order of rejection in
             accordance with law. If the application for grant of permission
             is finally rejected, there shall be a decree for refund of the
             sum of Rs. 7,000/- against the legal representative of the first
             defendant together with interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent
             per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the realisation.
             However, her liability shall be restricted to the extent of the
             estate of the first defendant inherited by her;
     (e)     If the State Government grants permission, the sale deed shall
             be executed in terms of clause (a) by all the defendants within
             three months from the date of grant of the permission;
     (f)     The suit stands dismissed as far as the second plaintiff is
             concerned;
     (g)     The impugned decree stands modified accordingly;
     (h)     Even if a sale deed is executed in favour of the first plaintiff in
             respect of the one-half undivided share in the suit property, he
             will not be entitled to seek possession in the execution of this
             decree as he will be at liberty to file a suit for general partition;
     (i)     Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed with no orders as to cost.

     Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey