MAHADEVAPPAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

                         [2019] 1 S.C.R. 39                              39


                         MAHADEVAPPA                                     A
                                  v.
  STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1261 of 2008)
                        JANUARY 07, 2019                                 B
[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
       Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A r/w s.302 – Dowry death – Death
by burn injuries – Prosecution case was that the appellant-husband
poured kerosene on his wife and set her on fire which resulted in
                                                                         C
her death – Trial court held that prosecution was not able to prove
the charge of demand of dowry against the appellant and also that
the deceased suffered homicidal death and ordered his acquittal –
High Court reversed the order of acquittal and convicted the
appellant under ss.498A and 302 – Appeal against conviction –
Held: The evidence of the four prosecution witnesses clearly proved      D
that the appellant was addicted to consuming liquor – He used to
demand money from the deceased and her parents quite often and
also at times used to ill-treat and assault the deceased – There was
no reason to discard the evidence of the parents of the deceased
who were the most natural and material witnesses to speak on such
                                                                         E
issues – In such circumstances, the daughter - a newly married girl
would always like to first disclose her domestic problems to her
mother and father and then to her close relatives because they have
access to her and are always helpful in solving her problems – The
acts and the behavior of the appellant (husband) towards his wife
soon after their marriage which eventually culminated in her death       F
within seven years from the date of their marriage squarely fell
within the meaning of s.498-A Explanations (a) and (b) of IPC –
Further, it was a case of homicidal death and not a case of accidental
death – Appellant was the only person present at the time of incident
in the house with the deceased – The explanation by the appellant
                                                                         G
that the deceased’s sari accidentally caught fire when she was boiling
the water on the oven was not convincing – In the absence of any
plausible explanation given by the appellant and the circumstances,
the manner in which the incident occurred and material seized from
the room i.e. kerosene oil bottle, it was proved beyond reasonable
                                                                         H
                                 39
40           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A    doubt that the appellant was responsible for causing death of the
     deceased – Evidence of four prosecution witnesses fully proved the
     case of the prosecution – Interference with the order of conviction
     not called for – Crime against women.
           Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B           HELD: 1. A perusal of the evidence of the four prosecution
     witnesses clearly proved that firstly the appellant was addicted
     to consuming liquor, Secondly, he used to demand money from
     the deceased and her parents quite often; and thirdly, he also at
     times used to ill-treat and assault the deceased. The incident of
C    ill-treatment and demand of money did not occur once but on
     many a times and it started soon after the marriage which
     continued till deceased’s death. There is no reason to discard
     the evidence of the father and mother of the deceased who are
     the most natural and material witnesses to speak on such issues.
     Indeed, in such circumstances, the daughter - a newly married
D    girl would always like to first disclose her domestic problems to
     her mother and father and then to her close relatives because
     they have access to her and are always helpful in solving her
     problems. There was no contradiction on any of the material
     issues in the evidence of these four witnesses despite they being
E    subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defense. That apart,
     why should a mother and a father speak lie unless there are
     justifiable reasons behind it. Not only that, even their relatives
     supported their version. Therefore, the acts and the behavior of
     the appellant (husband) towards his wife soon after their marriage
     which eventually culminated in her death within seven years from
F    the date of their marriage squarely fell within the meaning of
     Section 498-A Explanations (a) and (b) of IPC. [Paras 30, 31, 32,
     33][47-E-H; 48-A-B]
           2.1 The victim-deceased died due to pouring of Kerosene
     oil and setting her body on fire and this act could be done only by
G    the appellant and by no one else. It is proved by the following
     circumstances. First, the incident in question occurred in the
     house when only the deceased and the appellant were present.
     In other words, the appellant was the only person present at the
     time of incident in the house with the deceased. In these
H    circumstances, it was the appellant who could give some plausible
MAHADEVAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC                        41
                  PROSECUTOR

explanation as to how and in what manner the incident in question       A
occurred. The explanation given by the appellant was that the
deceased’s sari accidentally caught fire when she was boiling the
water on the oven. This story of the appellant cannot be believed.
Second, the evidence of I.O., Post-Mortem Report, FSL report
and the evidence of doctor (PW-6) has proved that kerosene oil
                                                                        B
was found on the body of deceased and second, one bottle of
kerosene oil was also lying in the room. The presence of kerosene
oil on the body of deceased would indicate that the kerosene oil
was poured on her body. Since the appellant was the only person
present in the room (kitchen), it was he who could do it. Third,
the presence of broken bangles found in the room suggest that           C
the deceased must have struggled with the appellant to save
herself which resulted in breaking of her bangles. Fourth, had it
been a case of catching of simple fire from the oven, then in such
event, the smell of kerosene oil from the body of the deceased
would not have been found on her body. Fifth, it is nobody’s case
                                                                        D
that the deceased tried to commit suicide by pouring kerosene
oil on her and then put herself on fire. Sixth, the relations between
the appellant and deceased were not cordial. The appellant always
used to demand money from the deceased which she was not in a
position to give to the appellant. Seventh, had this been a case of
accident as suggested by the defense then burn injuries sustained       E
by the deceased would have been more on the lower part of her
body rather on the upper part of the body because according to
defense, the deceased was near to oven when her sari caught
fire. The post-mortem report, however, showed that the burn
injuries were more on her upper part and her blouse was found
                                                                        F
burnt. [Paras 38-46][48-F-H; 49-A-G]
      2.2 In the absence of any plausible explanation given by
the appellant and the one which was suggested but not having
been proved and further keeping in view the circumstances, the
manner in which the incident occurred and material seized from
the room i.e. kerosene oil bottle, it is proved beyond reasonable       G
doubt that the appellant was responsible for causing death of the
deceased. In other words, her death was homicidal and not
accidental. The evidence of four prosecution witnesses fully
proved the case of the prosecution. In this view of the matter,
                                                                        H
42            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A    even if, some witnesses might have turned hostile, yet it would
     be of no significance and nor it would adversely affect the case of
     the prosecution. [Paras 47, 49][49-G-H; 50-A, B-C]
           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal no.
     1261 of 2008.
B          From the Judgment and Order dated 03.01.2007 of the High
     Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1040 of 2000.
          Mallikarjun S. Mylar, Manjunath, Ms.Umme Salma, Ms. E. R.
     Sumathy Advs. for the Appellant.

C         Joseph Aristotle S., Mrs.Priya Aristotle, Shiva P., Ms. Aruna
     Hannah Dutta, Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Advs. for the Respondent.
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. 1. This appeal is filed against
     the final judgment and order dated 03.01.2007 passed by the High Court
D    of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.1040 of 2000 whereby
     the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the respondent/State herein.
           2. It is necessary to set out the facts hereinbelow in detail to
     appreciate the issues arising in this appeal.
            3. The appellant (accused) was married to Rukmini Bai (deceased)
E
     on 04.06.1994. On the same day, the younger sister of Rukmani Bai,
     namely, Sonabai was also married to the appellant’s younger brother-
     Bhimanand. Both the marriages were performed in Lokeshwar Temple
     at a place called Lokapur.
            4. After marriage, the appellant, who was serving as a Constable
F    in the Police Station, Kaladagi in the District Bagalkot went to Kaladagi
     with Rukmini Bai. So far as the appellant’s younger brother was
     concerned, he was working as a Constable in CRPF at Nagaland. He
     also proceeded to Nagaland with his wife.
           5. On 02.10.1995, father of Rukmini Bai - Eknath (PW-1) received
G    a wireless message that Rukmini Bai was admitted to Government
     Hospital at Bagalkot for burn injuries. On receipt of the message, Eknath
     and some elder persons of the village immediately left for Bagalkot. On
     reaching the hospital, Eknath found the condition of Rukmini Bai- her
     daughter to be very critical.
H
MAHADEVAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC                               43
    PROSECUTOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

       6. When Eknath asked from Rukmini Bai the cause of sustaining           A
injuries by her, she first started crying on seeing him and then said that
her husband (appellant) had poured kerosene oil on her body and set her
on fire. Later eventually around 6.15 p.m. on the same day, Rukmini Bai
succumbed to her injuries while in the hospital.
       7. Eknath (PW-1) - then lodged the FIR in PS Kaladagi on the            B
same day against the appellant (FIR No.99/95) for commission of
offences under Sections 498(A) read with Section 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”). The Investigating Officer
registered the FIR and started investigation. He recorded the statements
of several persons, got the post mortem of the dead body, obtained F.S.L.
Report and after completion of the investigation and collecting necessary      C
evidence, filed the charge-sheet against the appellant. The case was
then committed to the Sessions Court for trial.
       8. The Sessions Judge by judgment/order dated 31.05.2000
acquitted the appellant of all the charges. It was held that the prosecution
was not able to prove the charge of demand of dowry against the                D
appellant. It was also held that the prosecution was also not able to
prove that Rukmini Bai suffered homicidal death. In other words, the
Sessions Judge held that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was
not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under
Section 498-A IPC and the murder punishable under Section 302 IPC.             E
       9. The State felt aggrieved by the appellant’s acquittal and filed
appeal in the High Court of Karnataka seeking leave to appeal questioning
the legality and correctness of the order of the acquittal passed by the
Sessions Judge.
        10. By impugned order, the High Court granted leave to file appeal     F
and later allowed the State’s appeal. The High Court by impugned order
reversed the order of the acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge and
convicted the appellant for commission of offences punishable under
Sections 498-A and 302 IPC. The High Court held that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, in clear terms, proved both the charges,           G
namely, the demand of dowry and murder beyond reasonable doubt
against the appellant and, therefore, the appellant was liable to be
convicted under Section 302 read with Section 498-A of IPC. The High
Court, accordingly, sentenced the appellant to undergo life imprisonment.
It is against this judgment/order of the High Court, the appellant (accused)
has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.               H
44            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A          11. Heard Mr. Mallikarjun S. Mylar, learned counsel for the
     appellant and Mr. Joseph Aristotle S., learned counsel for the respondent.
            12. Mr. Mallikarjun S. Mylar, learned counsel for the appellant
     (accused), while assailing the legality and correctness of the impugned
     order, contended that no case was made out by the State before the
B    High Court for reversing the judgment of the Sessions Judge. It was his
     submission that the High Court should have upheld the order of the
     Sessions Judge, which rightly acquitted the appellant holding that the
     charges leveled against the appellant were not proved.
            13. Learned counsel further contended that this being a case of
C    reversal, this Court is entitled to re-appreciate the entire evidence for
     coming to its own conclusion with a view to find out as to whether the
     evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to hold the appellant
     guilty for commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
     302 IPC.
D           14. Learned counsel then took us to the entire ocular evidence
     and made sincere attempt by pointing out the circumstances occurring
     prior to the date of incidence and the manner in which those incidents
     occurred with a view to show that on such evidence adduced by the
     prosecution, no case of demand of dowry could be made out against the
     appellant within the meaning of Section 498-A IPC nor a charge of
E    commission of murder of Rukmini Bai punishable under Section 302
     IPC was made out.
            15. In other words, his submission was that the view taken by the
     Sessions Judge acquitting the appellant from both the charges deserves
     to be restored as against the view taken by the High Court, which wrongly
F    held the appellant guilty for commission of the offences.
            16. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent (State) supported
     the impugned order and argued that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
     It was his submission that the Sessions Judge failed to properly appreciate
     the evidence adduced by the prosecution as a result of which wrong
G    conclusion of acquittal was arrived at by the Sessions Judge whereas,
     according to learned counsel, the High Court was right in its approach in
     appreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that both the
     charges, i.e., demand of dowry and murder were made out against the
     appellant.
H
MAHADEVAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC                                 45
    PROSECUTOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on                A
appreciating the entire evidence, we are inclined to agree with the
reasoning and the conclusion of the High Court.
      18. In our view, the High Court was right in holding that a case of
the appellant’s conviction under Section 498-A and Section 302 IPC
was made out by the prosecution beyond the reasonable doubt and,                 B
therefore, the appellant has to be convicted and accordingly sentenced
for commission of twin offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
302 IPC.
       19. On appreciating the evidence and on perusal of the record of
the case, we find that it is not in dispute that Rukmini Bai died within 17      C
months of her marriage with the appellant (date of marriage is 4.6.1994
and the date of her death is 2.10.1995). It is also not in dispute that
Rukmini Bai was not suffering from any kind of ailment and was a
healthy woman. It is also not in dispute that the death occurred due to
severe burn injuries suffered by her on 02.10.1995.
                                                                                 D
       20. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration is, first
whether the appellant at any point of time made any demand of dowry
to Rukmini Bai or/and to her parents; and secondly, whether Rukmini
Bai’s death was “homicidal” or “accidental” in nature.
       21. In other words, the question arises for consideration is whether      E
Rukmini Bai’s death can be regarded as “dowry death” attracting Section
498-A IPC or/ and secondly, whether her death was “homicidal”
attracting Section 302 IPC or it was “accidental death”.
       22. PW-1 is the father of the deceased- Rukmini Bai. He deposed
in his evidence that the appellant was working as a Constable in the             F
State Police Department. He was addicted to consuming alcohol daily.
He often visited to the house of PW-1 in fully drunken condition. He
deposed that Rukmini Bai had told him and his wife (mother of Rukmini
Bai) that under the influence of alcohol, the appellant used to insist Rukmini
Bai that she should also consume liquor and dance before him undressed.
He also deposed that Rukmini Bai had told him many a times that the              G
appellant used to harass and ill-treat her off and on in the house. He also
deposed that Rukmini Bai also used to tell him that the appellant also
used to beat her while he was under the influence of liquor and used to
insist her to go to her parental house to bring Rs.4000/- to Rs.5000/-
from her parents for him. He further deposed that on two occasions, he
                                                                                 H
46             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A    managed to send Rs.2000/- for the appellant through Rukmini Bai but
     third time, he declined due to his poor financial capacity to send more
     money. He deposed that Rukmini Bai once told him that she apprehends
     danger to her life when she is alone with the appellant and, therefore,
     she would like to come back and stay with her parents in their house. He
     deposed that with the intervention of elder members of the village,
B
     Rukmini Bai was persuaded to go back and stay with the appellant for
     which she agreed.
            23. He deposed that Rukmini Bai on returning to her matrimonial
     house found that the appellant was not mending his ways, and continued
     with his bad habits. She had therefore sent a letter to her father mentioning
C    the incidents of ill-treatment meted out to her by the appellant. He also
     deposed that on receipt of the letter from Rukmini Bai, his wife- Savitribai
     and his elder brother’s wife-Droupadi had gone to the appellant’s house
     but the appellant abused both the ladies and did not permit them to meet
     Rukmini Bai. He deposed that the appellant on that day went to the
D    extent of beating the two ladies with his shoes. The two ladies then went
     to the Police Station and requested the in-charge of the police station to
     advise the appellant to behave properly with his wife. On return back to
     home, both the ladies told the incident to their elder brother who then
     contacted Rukmini Bai when she told him to send Rs.3000/- for the
     appellant failing which allow her to come back to her father’s house.
E
            24. PW-1 further deposed that after eight days, a message came
     to him at his residence that Rukmini Bai has suffered extensive burns on
     her body and is admitted in the hospital for treatment. He, therefore,
     immediately left for the hospital along with his relatives and friends. On
     reaching there, he met Rukmini Bai when she told him that it was the
F    appellant who poured kerosene oil on her body, due to which she suffered
     injuries.
            25. PW-4 (Savitribai) is the mother of deceased. On perusal of
     her deposition, we find that she has corroborated the evidence of PW-1
     which we have detailed above on all material issues. In other words,
G    PW-4 also has given the same version of the appellant which PW-1 has
     given in his deposition including about the behavior of the appellant and
     the way he had ill-treated Rukmini Bai all along till her death.
          26. We, therefore, need not repeat in verbatim the deposition of
     PW-4 except to state that her deposition is also on the same lines on
H
MAHADEVAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC                             47
    PROSECUTOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

which PW-1 has given his statement and it fully corroborates with the        A
version of PW-1 on all material issues about the appellant without any
contradiction between the two versions.
       27. Now, we come to the evidence of PW-5. He is another son-
in-law of PW-1. His name is Bhimappa. He is brother of the appellant.
He was married to PW-1’s another daughter-Sonabai. His marriage was          B
also performed on the same day on which the appellant was got married
to Rukmini Bai.
      28. He also deposed that the appellant used to ill-treat Rukmini
Bai and at times beat her also. He deposed that one of his relatives-
Krishnappa when he visited Rukmini Bai’s house, she complained to            C
him about the bad behavior of the appellant towards her. This was told
to him by Krishnappa.
       29. Now, we come to the evidence of PW-17 (Kristappa). He is
a close relative of Eknath (PW-1) - father of the deceased. He deposed
that once he went to Rukmini Bai’s residence and when he was on his          D
way to a Temple at Tulasigeri, Rukmini Bai met him and complained
against the appellant and told him to convey to her father (PW-1) to
send money for the appellant.
       30. On a perusal of the evidence of the aforementioned four
prosecution witnesses, it proves in clear terms that firstly the appellant   E
was addicted to consuming liquor, Secondly, he used to demand money
from the deceased and her parents quite often; and thirdly, he also at
times used to ill-treat and assault the deceased. The incident of ill-
treatment and demand of money did not occur once but on many a times
and it started soon after the marriage which continued till Rukmini Bai’s
death.                                                                       F
       31. In our opinion, there is no reason to discard the evidence of
the father and mother of the deceased who are the most natural and
material witnesses to speak on such issues. Indeed, in such circumstances,
the daughter - a newly married girl would always like to first disclose
her domestic problems to her mother and father and then to her close         G
relatives because they have access to her and are always helpful in
solving her problems.
       32. We have not been able to notice any kind of contradiction on
any of the material issues in the evidence of these four witnesses despite
                                                                             H
48             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A    they being subjected to lengthy cross-examination by the defense. That
     apart, why should a mother and a father speak lie unless there are
     justifiable reasons behind it. We do not find any such reason in this case.
     Not only that, even their relatives, i.e., Bhimappa and Kristappa supported
     their version.
B           33. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the acts and the behavior
     of the appellant (husband) towards his wife-Rukmini Bai soon after
     their marriage which eventually culminated in Rukmini Bai’s death within
     seven years from the date of their marriage squarely fell within the
     meaning of Section 498-A Explanations (a) and (b) of IPC.
C          34. This takes us to examine the other question as to whether the
     death of Rukmini Bai was homicidal or accidental.
            35. The evidence on record has proved that the incident in question
     occurred in the morning around 8 a.m. in the house of the deceased. It
     has also come in evidence that at that time, there were only two persons
D    in the house, i.e., the deceased and the appellant.
           36. The case of the prosecution was that it was the appellant,
     who poured kerosene oil on his wife- Rukmini Bai when she was in
     kitchen and set her on fire, whereas the case of the appellant was that it
     was a case of an accidental death. It was suggested that when Rukmini
E    Bai was boiling the water on the oven in the kitchen, her nylon sari
     accidentally came in contact with the fire, which resulted in her death.
            37. In order to examine this question, the manner in which the
     incident occured and the surroundings prevailing in the room at the time
     of incident are important. The nature of burn injuries sustained by the
F    deceased is also equally important.
           38. Having perused the evidence, we are of the considered opinion
     that Rukmini Bai died due to pouring of Kerosene oil and setting her
     body on fire and this act could be done only by the appellant and by no
     one else. In other words, it was a case of homicidal death and not a
     case of accidental death. It is proved by the following circumstances.
G
            39. First, it is not in dispute that the incident in question occurred
     in the house when only the deceased and the appellant were present. In
     other words, the appellant was the only person present at the time of
     incident in the house with the deceased.
H
MAHADEVAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA REP. BY PUBLIC                                 49
    PROSECUTOR [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]

      40. In these circumstances, it was the appellant who could give            A
some plausible explanation as to how and in what manner the incident in
question occurred. As mentioned above, the explanation given by the
appellant was that Rukmini Bai’s sari accidentally caught fire when she
was boiling the water on the oven. In our opinion, this story of the appellant
cannot be believed.
                                                                                 B
      41. Second, the evidence of I.O., Post-Mortem Report, FSL report
and the evidence of doctor (PW-6) has proved that kerosene oil was
found on the body of deceased and second, one bottle of kerosene oil
was also lying in the room. The presence of kerosene oil on the body of
deceased would indicate that the kerosene oil was poured on her body.
Since the appellant was the only person present in the room (kitchen), it        C
was he who could do it.
       42. Third, the presence of broken bangles found in the room suggest
that the deceased must have struggled with the appellant to save herself
which resulted in breaking of her bangles.
                                                                                 D
      43. Fourth, had it been a case of catching of simple fire from the
oven, then in such event, the smell of kerosene oil from the body of the
deceased would not have been found on her body.
      44. Fifth, it is nobody’s case that the deceased tried to commit
suicide by pouring kerosene oil on her and then put herself on fire.             E
      45. Sixth, the relations between the appellant and deceased were
not cordial. The appellant always used to demand money from the
deceased which she was not in a position to give to the appellant.
       46. Seventh, had this been a case of accident as suggested by the
defense then burn injuries sustained by the deceased would have been             F
more on the lower part of her body rather on the upper part of the body
because according to defense, the deceased was near to oven when her
sari caught fire. The post-mortem report, however, showed that the burn
injuries were more on her upper part and her blouse was found burnt.
       47. In the absence of any plausible explanation given by the              G
appellant and the one which was suggested but not having been proved
and further keeping in view the circumstances, the manner in which the
incident occurred and material seized from the room i.e. kerosene oil
bottle, it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was
                                                                                 H
50              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 1 S.C.R.


A    responsible for causing death of Rukmini Bai. In other words, Rukmini
     Bai’s death was homicidal and not accidental.
             48. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that some of the
     witnesses of the prosecution did not support their case, and turned hostile.
     It is for this reason, learned counsel submitted that the prosecution case
B    should be discarded.
            49. We do not agree to this submission of the learned counsel for
     the appellant. The evidence of four prosecution witnesses which we
     have detailed above fully proves the case of the prosecution. In this
     view of the matter, even if, some witnesses might have turned hostile,
C    yet it would be of no significance and nor it would adversely affect the
     case of the prosecution. It is more so when the witnesses which we
     have referred above did not turn hostile and were, therefore, rightly
     believed by the High Court.
           50. In view of the foregoing discussion, we agree with the reasons
D    and the conclusion of the High Court. As a result, the appeal fails and is
     accordingly dismissed.


     Devika Gujral                                                Appeal dismissed.


E




F




G




H