MAGEBA BRIDGE PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITEDversusM/S TRADE CENTRE

                     [2026] 8 S.C.R. 480 : 2026 INSC 839

                 Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited
                                  v.
                           M/s Trade Centre
                          (Civil Appeal No. 10658 of 2026)
                                     12 August 2026
              [J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran,* JJ.]


                                Issue for Consideration
           The High Court in the First Appeal accepted the Memorandum
           of Registration exhibited by the plaintiff and decreed the suit for
           recovery of money. The appellant herein, who was the defendant,
           contented that the suit claim was barred by limitation. Whether
           the suit claim was barred by limitation.

                                        Headnotes†
           Limitation Act, 1963 – s.14 – Partnership Act, 1932 – s.69(2) –
           A suit for recovery of money filed by the respondent-
           plaintiff was dismissed by the trial Court – It was found
           that the plaintiff’s status as a registered partnership firm
           was not proved – In an appeal, Appellate Court accepted
           the Memorandum of Registration exhibited by the plaintiff
           and decreed the suit – The appellant herein, who was the
           defendant, contented that the suit claim was barred by
           limitation and also on valid proof having not been produced
           with respect to the registration of the plaintiff-firm:
           Held: On a perusal of the impugned judgment, it is clear that there
           was sufficient evidence to find the registration of the respondent-
           firm – There is no reason to uphold the order of the Trial Court
           rejecting the suit, finding the plaintiff to be not a partnership firm –
           As far as issue of limitation is concerned, the recovery sought
           is on the strength of the bills raised, with respect to the supplies
           made by the respondent to the appellant – Be that as it may, the
           respondent claimed that the cause of action arose on 03.06.2008
           when there was an admission of debt and part payment – The
           order of the Company Court that the petition filed before it was
           affirmed on 07.02.2009 and filed on 10.02.2009 – The suit was
           filed with the cause of action arising on 03.06.2008; when a
           demand was raised by the respondent, on 01.08.2008; when it
* Author
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                                481

     Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited v. M/s Trade Centre


      was responded by Annexure P-18 and on 02.09.2008; when part
      payment was made – However, Annexure P-18 indicates that there
      was no acknowledgment of debt and the payment made was not
      a part payment but the payment with respect to three invoices,
      admitted as remaining due, by the appellant/defendant – It is to
      be specifically noticed that the appellant had agreed to provide
      security only for two bills i.e., TC/152/05-06 and TC/153/05-06
      dated 30.01.2006 before the Company Court – To surpass the
      limitation to file a suit for recovery of money as covered by the bills
      dated 30.01.2006, it should have been filed before 29.01.2009 –
      Even if the date on which the Company Petition was filed, is taken
      for the purpose of determining limitation, reckoning the period
      spent in prosecuting the Company Petition u/s.14 of the Limitation
      Act, the date of filing the Company Petition i.e., 10.02.2009, falls
      outside the limitation period – As for the other bills, the last of
      them is dated 06.03.2007, which remains unpaid and the suit
      was filed on 05.06.2010 after the limitation expired – There is no
      reason to sustain the order of the High Court in the First Appeal
      and, hence, reverse the same to the extent of granting the relief
      of recovery – The claim for recovery is hit by limitation – The suit,
      hence, stands dismissed. [Paras 4, 6-8, 15, 16, 18]

                                Case Law Cited
      Kalpraj Dharamshi and Anr. v. Kotak Investments Advisor Limited
      and Anr. [2021] 2 SCR 677 : (2021) 10 SCC 401; Yeswant Deorao
      Deshmukh v. Walchand Ramchand Kothari [1950] 1 SCR 852 :
      1950 SCC 766; Jignesh Shah and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr.
      [2019] 12 SCR 678 : (2019) 10 SCC 750 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
      Partnership Act, 1932; Limitation Act, 1963; Code of Civil
      Procedure, 1908.

                               List of Keywords
      Section 69(2) of Partnership Act, 1932; Registration of partnership
      firm; Memorandum of Registration; Order XLI Rule 27(1) CPC;
      Additional evidence; Suit for recovery of money; Running account;
      Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963; Exclusion of time; Bona fide
      prosecution of proceeding; Company Court; Acknowledgment of
      debt; Part-payment; Cause of action.
482                                                           [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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                             Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10658
       of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.03.2025 of the High
       Court at Calcutta in FA No. 15 of 2023

                          Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Nikhil Nayyar, Sr. Adv., Dhananjay Baijal, Tilak Singh, Kshitij
       Maheshwari, Akshar Bhatt.

       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Manish Goswami, Sr. Adv., Kaushik Chatterjee, Ms. Reena
       Pandey, Anurag Pandey.

                 Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                  Judgment

       K. Vinod Chandran, J.

       Leave granted.
2.     A suit filed by the respondent was dismissed finding that the plaintiff’s
       status as a registered partnership firm was not proved before the Trial
       Court; the suit being hit by Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership
       Act, 1932. An appeal was filed contending that the Trial Court ignored
       the legal effect of Exhibit-8, a Memorandum of Registration exhibited
       by the plaintiff, conclusively proving the registration of the firm. The
       First Appellate Court accepted the same, and after considering the
       merits of the matter decreed the suit, directing the defendant to pay
       the appellant a sum of Rs.24,36,105/- along with interest @ 6% per
       annum from the date of filing of the suit till realization of the amount.
       The appellant herein, who was the defendant, is challenging the
       judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court, primarily
       on the contention that the suit claim was barred by limitation and
       also on valid proof having not been produced with respect to the
       registration of the plaintiff-firm. We refer to the parties from their
       status in this appeal.
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                             483

     Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited v. M/s Trade Centre


3.    We have heard Sri Nikhil Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel for the
      appellant and Sri Manish Goswami, learned Senior Counsel for the
      respondent.
4.    On a perusal of the impugned judgment, we are inclined to hold
      that there was sufficient evidence to find the registration of the
      respondent-firm. Exhibit-8 also produced herein, is a memorandum
      issued by the Registrar of Firms, West Bengal, acknowledging receipt
      of documents and it is also an intimation that the documents have
      been filed/recorded/registered pursuant to the Indian Partnership
      Act, 1932. It also indicates the Registration No.L73931 allotted to
      the respondent-firm, clearly showing that the firm was registered
      at least on 14.05.2010; the date revealed from Exhibit-8. The court
      also went on to look at the document produced under Order XLI
      Rule 27(1) and found it to be a certified copy of Form-VIII of the
      Registrar of Firms, duly certified by the Registrar of Firms, West
      Bengal, whereby it was reiterated that the Registration number of
      plaintiff-firm is L73931, as it appears from Exhibit-8 and date of
      registration 14.05.2010 is also in consonance.
5.    In addition to the finding that Exhibit-8 by itself proved the registration,
      it was also held that the application to produce additional document
      has to be allowed since it would further the cause of justice and
      enable the court to pronounce judgment especially since the
      document produced corroborates Exhibit P8.
6.    We find no reason to uphold the order of the Trial Court rejecting
      the suit, finding the plaintiff to be not a partnership firm.
7.    Now we come to the issue of limitation. The suit as we noticed
      is for recovery of money and the plaint is produced at Annexure
      P-27. The recovery sought is on the strength of the bills raised, with
      respect to the supplies made by the respondent to the appellant
      totalling Rs.23,41,693/-. The bills upon which the claim was raised
      were shown with the details of date, invoice number, particulars,
      weight and amount, in the body of the plaint and the Schedule; in
      a tabular form. Immediately, we have to notice that the suit is filed
      on the strength of the bills raised against the defendant and not
      based on any running account, though, the parties are said to be
      having numerous transactions. Though, the transactions with the
      respondent is admitted by the appellant before the Company Court
      also, where the respondent had first approached for winding up, and
484                                                          [2026] 8 S.C.R.

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        in the suit, the appellant resisted the monetary claim on the ground
        that one of his employees had fraudulently created documents to
        show receipt of goods, as allegedly raised by the respondents,
        except with respect to two bills which were admitted and paid up
        on receipt of notice.
8.      Be that as it may, the respondent claimed that the cause of action
        arose on 03.06.2008 when there was an admission of debt and
        part payment. The ground of limitation is resisted on the strength
        of the admission made on 02.09.2008, when part payment was
        made, also with reference to Annexure P-18 dated 01.08.2008,
        the communication addressed by the appellant in response to the
        demand raised by the respondent.
9.      It is also argued that the Company Court, before whom the respondent
        had filed an application for winding up within the limitation period,
        had permitted the suit to be filed within three months from the date
        of disposal of the Company Petition.
10.     Before we look into the question of limitation, which is a mixed
        question of law and facts, we have to peruse the relevant decisions,
        a host of which were placed before us by both sides.
11.     The respondent/plaintiff relies on Kalpraj Dharamshi and Anr. v.
        Kotak Investments Advisor Limited and Anr.1, wherein on an
        application by the corporate debtor, Corporate Insolvency Resolution
        Process was initiated and the Resolution Professional appointed,
        invited resolution plans. The appellant before this Court, submitted
        its Resolution Plan after the last date as specified by the RP, who
        invited all the applicants to file a Revised Resolution Plan which led
        to the appellant’s plan being accepted. The respondent before this
        Court who had applied on time and had also furnished a Revised
        Resolution Plan, challenged the acceptance of the appellant’s
        Resolution Plan before the High Court. The High Court disposed
        of the writ petition finding an alternate and efficacious remedy of
        filing an appeal before the NCLAT. Going by the date on which the
        appellant received the order of the NCLT, the appeal was delayed
        by 16 days. The argument that the writ court was not a wrong forum,
        was not accepted. This Court held so in Paragraph 64 of the said
        decision as under: -


1     (2021) 10 SCC 401
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                             485

       Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited v. M/s Trade Centre


               “64. Thus, this Court relying on the earlier judgments
               in Bhudan Singh v. Nabi Bux [Bhudan Singh v. Nabi
               Bux, (1969) 2 SCC 481], J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric
               Sohan [J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12
               SCC 175: (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 656] and Consolidated
               Engg. Enterprises [Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v.
               Irrigation Deptt., (2008) 7 SCC 169] observed, that the
               object of enacting the legislation is to advance public
               welfare. The entire legislative process is influenced
               by considerations of justice and reason. Justice and
               reason constitute the great general legislative intent
               in every piece of legislation. It has been held by this
               Court, that in the absence of some other indication that
               the harsh or ridiculous effect was actually intended by
               the legislature, there is little reason to believe, that it
               represents the legislative intent. It is further observed,
               that the provisions contained in Sections 5 and 14 of
               the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief, where a
               person has committed some mistake. In J. Kumaradasan
               Nair [J. Kumaradasan Nair v. Iric Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC
               175 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 656] , it has been observed,
               that when sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Limitation
               Act per se is not applicable, the same would not mean,
               that the principles akin thereto would not be applicable.”
12.     It was also found that the petitioner had pleaded breach of principles
        of natural justice since, before the NCLT the matter was heard by
        a Member (Judicial) sitting single, while the order was passed by a
        Division Bench. The delayed appeal before the NCLAT was found
        to be possible of consideration since the appellant was bona fide
        prosecuting a remedy before the High Court, with due diligence.
13.     Apposite would also be reference to Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh v.
        Walchand Ramchand Kothari2, which is almost on similar lines.
        Therein the question was as to whether the period spent in pursuing
        an insolvency proceedings can be reckoned as the period eligible
        for condonation under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, when a
        delayed execution petition is filed. It was categorically held that


2     1950 SCC 766
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        “There could be no exclusion of the time occupied by the insolvency
        proceedings which clearly was not for the purpose of obtaining the
        same relief (sic). The eventual recovery in such a proceeding was
        held to be a ‘mere consequence or result’. The relief was found to
        be different and so was the procedure widely divergent. In Jignesh
        Shah and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr.3 a converse situation
        was considered. The filing of a civil suit was projected as a ground
        for the delayed winding up petition filed before the High Court, which
        was sought to be transferred to the NCLT. It was categorically held
        that the filing of a suit for recovery based upon a cause of action,
        that is within limitation cannot in any manner impact the separate
        and independent remedy of a winding up proceeding. The converse
        position applies squarely to this case that the initiation of a winding
        up proceeding, which may or may not enable recovery, will not impact
        the limitation for the separate remedy of suit for recovery of money.
14.     We are of the opinion that on the facts of this case Yeswant Deorao
        Deshmukh2 & Jignesh Shah3 apply squarely. In this context,
        we also have to notice that the Company Petition filed was not
        entertained since it was found that, though slightly delayed, the
        appellant issued a reply alleging that the substantial part of the claim
        made by the respondent, was apparently ‘at the behest and with
        the connivance of the erstwhile associates of our company’ (sic).
        Hence, there was a clear dispute raised and it was in the context of
        the appellant having undertaken to provide security for two bills i.e.
        TC/152 and TC/153, which were found in their accounts too, that the
        respondent was relegated to the civil remedy, further directing that
        deposit of Rs.12,38,000/- covered by the bills bearing Nos.TC/152
        and TC/153 be secured before the Civil Court within 3 weeks; to
        facilitate which, the company proceeding was kept in abeyance till
        the security is furnished, failing which the Company Petition was
        entitled to be revived for the sum of Rs.12,38,000/- with interest @
        8% per annum. The acceptance of the bills was not an admission,
        giving up the plea of limitation. There was also no extension of
        limitation by the Company Court, which in any event, the Court was
        not competent so to do. Hence, the clear finding was that there is
        no scope of winding up of the appellant, the demand having been



3    (2019) 10 SCC 750
[2026] 8 S.C.R.                                                           487

      Mageba Bridge Products Private Limited v. M/s Trade Centre


      disputed by the appellant. The decisions of this Court with respect
      to finding a clear distinction between a winding up proceeding and
      a suit for recovery of money simpliciter, applies squarely.
15.   Be that as it may, we have to notice from the order of the Company
      Court that the petition filed before it was affirmed on 07.02.2009
      and filed on 10.02.2009. The suit was filed with the cause of
      action arising on 03.06.2008; when a demand was raised by the
      respondent, on 01.08.2008; when it was responded by Annexure
      P-18 and on 02.09.2008; when part payment was made. However,
      Annexure P-18 indicates that there was no acknowledgment of debt
      and the payment made was not a part payment but the payment
      with respect to three invoices, admitted as remaining due, by the
      appellant/defendant. The appellant by Annexure P-18 admitted TC
      No.32/07-08, TC No.33/07-08 and TC No.64/07-08, which was paid
      by the appellant, one of which; TC No.64/07-08 dated 24.08.2007,
      did not even figure in the schedule of the claim, as revealed from
      the plaint, which stood already paid on 12.12.2007 before the notice
      of demand was issued.
16.   It is also to be specifically noticed that the appellant had agreed to
      provide security only for two bills i.e., TC/152/05-06 and TC/153/05-
      06 dated 30.01.2006 before the Company Court. To surpass the
      limitation to file a suit for recovery of money as covered by the bills
      dated 30.01.2006, it should have been filed before 29.01.2009. Even
      if the date on which the Company Petition was filed, is taken for
      the purpose of determining limitation, reckoning the period spent in
      prosecuting the Company Petition under Section 14 of the Limitation
      Act, the date of filing the Company Petition i.e., 10.02.2009, falls
      outside the limitation period making academic the discussion on
      whether Section 14 can be applied or not, at least with respect to the
      said bills. As for the other bills, the last of them is dated 06.03.2007,
      which remains unpaid and the suit was filed on 05.06.2010 after
      the limitation expired; to find which Yeswant Deorao Deshmukh2
      and Jignesh Shah3 are relevant.
17.   We categorically find that Annexure P-18 did not acknowledge the
      debt as sought to be recovered by the respondent, evidenced by
      the bills, more fully described in the schedule to the plaint. The suit
      as we found was filed on the strength of the invoices raised and not
      on the basis of a running account. The mere deduction shown with
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       respect to the payment of the admitted bills, in the schedule to the
       plaint, will not make it a running account. The notice of demand, the
       reply issued or the payment made on admission of two bills, with
       disputes raised with respect to the other bills, demolishes the case
       set up by the respondent-plaintiff on cause of action as emanating
       from the plaint.
18.    We find absolutely no reason to sustain the order of the High Court
       in the First Appeal and, hence, reverse the same to the extent of
       granting the relief of recovery, despite our finding that the suit was
       properly instituted by a partnership firm, whose registration has
       been proved in accordance with law. The claim for recovery is hit
       by limitation. The suit, hence, stands dismissed for that reason.
19.    The appeal stands allowed.
20.    Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan