Holding

The suit is maintainable; Section 257 does not bar a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction when the land is grazing land, and the civil court has jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code.

Summary

The villagers of Kanardipura filed a suit in representative capacity under Order I Rule 8 of the CPC seeking declaration of title, permanent injunction and possession of land they claimed was grazing (Charnoi) land, not a grove. The Board of Revenue had earlier settled the land as a grove in favour of Kalu Singh’s heirs under the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, and a patta was issued to them. The trial court held the land was grazing land and decreed in favour of the villagers; the lower appellate court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed, holding the suit barred by Section 257 of the Land Revenue Code. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the suit was maintainable, that Section 257 does not bar a civil suit for declaration of title and injunction when the land is grazing land, and that the civil court has jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Code. The matter was remitted to the High Court to decide afresh on the villagers’ rights.

Issues considered

Whether a suit filed by villagers in representative capacity is barred by Section 257 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959.
Whether the civil court has jurisdiction under Section 111 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code to entertain a suit for declaration of title and injunction concerning grazing land.
Whether the land in question is a grove or grazing (Charnoi) land for the purpose of determining the applicability of revenue provisions.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order I Rule 8
Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951
M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959s. 111, s. 257

Subjects

land revenuegrazing landcivil suitrepresentative capacitySection 257Section 111jurisdictioninjunctiondeclaration of titleMadhya Pradesh

Judgment

I
A MADHO SINGH AND ORS.
v.
MONI SINGH (D) BY LRS. AND ORS.

AUGUST 30, 2004
B [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

MP. Land Revenue Code, 1959:

Ss. 111 and 257-Grazing land-Settled by Board of Revenue in "(

c favour of an individual as groves-Villagers not party to the proceedings
,
filed suit in representative capacity before Civil Court for declaration of
title and permanent injunction-Plea that suit was barred bys. 257-Held,
suit was maintainable and was the only remedy available to plaintiffS-
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-0rder 1, Rule 8.
D
In a dispute between the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents
and the revenue authorities, certain land was settled finally by the
Board of Revenue in favour of the former as groves. When the villagers
came to know of this, some of them filed a suit before the Civil Court
in a representative capacity for declaration of title and permanent
E injunction stating that the suit land was grazing land for the village
people and the respondents-defendants bad no title thereto. The suit
was decreed by the trial court but was dismissed by the first appellate
court. The second appeal of the plantiffs was dism_issed by the High
Court holding that when a judicial order was passed by the Board of
F Revenue under the provisions of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959,
the suit was barred by s. 257 of the Code. The High Court also held .
that the proceedings bad been initiated under the M.B. Zamindari
Abolition Act, and were set at rest by a final order passed by the Board
of Revenue and as such the suit before the civil court was not
G maintainable. ""
In the appeal field by the plaintiffs it was contended that in the
revenue records the suit land was shown as grazing land on which the
villagers had right to graze their cattle, therefore, the suit for declaration
.( (
H and permanent injunction was filed in a competent court since such I~

960
MADHO SINGH v. MONI SINGH (THAKKER, J.] 961
> a question could only be dedded by a civil court, and in view of s.111 A
of the Code, bar of s.257 would not apply•

.Allowing the appeal, the Court

9.ELD : In the proceedings initiated by the predecessor-in- B
interest of the respondents against the revenue authorities, the appellants
were not made parties. Since the land was grazing land and not grove,
it affected the rights of the appellants as also the village people. They,
therefore, approached the civil court by instituting the suit for
declaration of title and permanent injunction as also for possession. C
The suit was maintainable and was the only remedy available to the
plaintiffs. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the villagers had
right to graze cattle. The High Court could not have held the suit to
be barred by Section 257 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code nor could
it have recorded a finding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs in
representative capacity was not maintainable. [964-E-H) D

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5555 of
2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.8.2002 of the Madhya E
Pradesh High Court in S.A. No. 302 of 1982.

B.S. Banthia, for the Appellants.

Ashok K. Srivastava, Satish K. Agnihotri (NP) for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THAKKER, J. : Leave granted.

The appellants herein have challenged the order passed by the High G
Court ofM.P. (Indore Bench) on 23rd August, 2002 in Second Appeal No.
302 of 1982. By the said order, the High Court confirmed the order passed
by the Second Additional Judge to the Code of District Judge, Shajapur
dated 25th February, 1982, by which it set aside the Judgment and decree
dated 19th October 1974 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Shajapur.
H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A The case of the appellants is that at village Kanardipura Tehsil
Shajapur, there was a land bearing Khasra Nos. 294/1, 317, 319, 320 and
321. It was in possession of one Kalu Singh S/o. Bheru Singh. A dispute
arose between Kalu Singh on the one hand and Revenue Authorities on
the other about the nature of the land. The case of Kalu Singh was that
B his late father Bheru Singh was the owner of the land and was in possession
thereof. His name was recorded as proprietor. After coming into force of
the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition Act, 1951 the land remained grove
and hence exempted from the provisions of the Act. Kalu Singh, therefore,
could possess the land. Proceedings were initiated by Kalu Singh against
C the State but he lost before Tehsildar, Collector as well as Commissioner.
He finally approached the Board of Revenue and the Board vide its order
dated 2nd December 1959, allowed the revision and set aside the orders
passed by the authorities below. A direction was issued by the Board to
the Collector to determine the terms and conditions on which the land
D would be settled and groves would continue in possession of Kalu Singh.
In pursuance of the said order, Patta was issued in favour the respondents
on 14th March, 1968.

When the appellants came to know about the grant of land to the
respondents, eight villagers of vi II age Kanardipura filed a suit for declaration
E of title, permanent injunction as also for the possession of the suit land.
It was a suit filed by the villagers in a representative capacity under Order
I, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The suit was contested
by the respondents-defendants. The trial court, after appreciating the
evidence, oral and documentary, held that the suit land was not grove, but
F it was Charnoi land i.e. grazing land for village people. In view of the said
finding, the trial court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to declaration.
Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed. It was declared
that the defendants had got neither title over the land nor they could stop
the grazing of animals of the plaintiffs and villagers of Kanardipura over
G the suit land. Permanent injunction was, therefore, issued against the
defendants restraining them from creating obstruction of any kind in the
feeding of animals of the plaintiffs and village people. Being aggrieved by
the decree passed by the trial court, the respondents preferred an appeal
which was allowed by the lower appellate court against which the
H appellants approached the High Court. The Second Appeal was admitted
MADHO SINGH v. MON! SINGH [TIIAKKER, J.] 963

for final hearing on a substantial question of law framed as under : A
"Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, lower
appellate Court, by upsetting the decree of the Trial Court has
committed an error of law in dismissing the plaintiffs suit by not
properly considering the evidence and material on record and also B
by not properly considering the provisions of M.B. Zamindari
Abolition Act relating to the controversy in suit, especially when
the respondent-defendants who are the sons of Zamindar have
based their claim on the basis of the patta given by their father"?

The High Court after hearing the parties and perusing the record, C
dismissed the appeal upholding the judgment of the lower appellate court
observing that the suit filed by the residents was "misconceived". The High
Court noted that the suit was filed in a representative capacity but observed
that when a judicial order was passed by the Board of Revenue under the
provisions of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 (hereinafter referred to D
as 'the Code') in favour ofa private party, it cannot be made subject matter
of a civil suit at the instance of a person or persons who had no personal
> interest in the matter. The High Court also held that the suit was barred
by Section 257 of the Code. In the opinion of the High Court, the
proceedings were exclusively governed by the Code and to be dealt with E
by Revenue Authorities and the orders passed by them could not be
challenged by filing a substantive suit by a body of individuals who had
no interest in the suit land inasmuch as their personal proprietory rights
were not infringed. The High Court also observed that the proceedings had
been initiated under the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act and the final order
passed by the Board of Revenue. Such issue could not be gone into in a F
suit particularly when the State did not challenge that order. The suit was,
in the opinion of the High Court, not maintainable and it was an attempt
on the part of the plaintiffs to challenge the order passed by the Board in
favour of the defendants which could not have been done in the light of
Section 257 of the Code. The appeal was accordingly dismissed. G
We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel
for the appellants submitted that the order passed by the High Court is
illegal and contrary to law. The counsel submitted that the High Court
ought not to have held that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Section 257 of the Code. It was stated. that it in the revenue records, the
land in question was shown to be Charnoi i.e. grazing land and village
people had right to graze cattle on the said land. A suit for declaration and
permanent injunction was, therefore, filed in a competent court. Such a
question can only be decided by a civil court and the bar of Section 257
B of the Code would not apply. It was also submitted that the High Court
has not considered the provisions of Section 111 of the Code which deals
with jurisdiction of civil court. It was also submitted that a question which
was formulated by the High Court, no where mentioned as to jurisdiction
of the court and disposal of appeal by the High Court on that ground was
C not legal and lawful. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves
to be allowed and the order passed by the High Court deserves to be set
aside.

Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the
order passed by the High Court. He submitted that the court considered
D the provisions of the Code and also of the M.B. Zamindari Abolition Act
and the High Court held that a civil court had no jurisdiction. The said order
requires no interference.

Considering the rival submissions of th.! parties, in our opinion, the
E appeal deserves to be allowed. It is not in dispute between the parties that
in the proceedings initiated by Kalu Singh against the Revenue Authorities,
the appellants herein were not made parties. Three authorities rejected the
claim of Kalu Singh but the Board of Revenue upheld the claim and
directions were issued to the Collector. That had happened in 1959. In
1968, consequential order was passed by the Collector. Since the land was
F Charnoi (grazing) land and not grove, it affected the rights of the appellants
as also of the village people. They, therefore, approached the civil court
by instituting a suit in a representative capacity invoking Order I, Rule 8
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The suit was for declaration of title and
permanent injunction as also for possession. Such a suit was maintainable
G and was the only remedy available to the plaintiffs. The trial court decreed
the suit holding that the villagers had right to graze cattle. The High Court
could not have held the suit to be barred by Section 257 of the Code nor
it could have recorded a finding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs in
representative capacity was not maintainable. The High Court, in our
H opinion, also committed an error of law in considering the merits of the
MADHO SINGH v. MON! SINGH [THAKKER, J.] 965

matter after coming to a conclusion in the Second Appeal, albeit incorrect, A
that a civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter.

For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the order passed by the
High Court deserves to be quashed and set aside by remitting the matter
to the High Court to consider the right of the village people on the basis B
that a civil court has jurisdiction in the matter. The High Court will now
decide the matter afresh holding the suit maintainable and will take an
appropriate decision in accordance with law. The appeal is accordingly
.. allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order
as to costs.
c
R.P. Appeal allowed.

>