Holding

A sub‑tenant is not entitled to apply for proprietary rights under the Act; the Compensation Officer lacked jurisdiction and the order is a nullity.

Summary

The appellant, Madan Kishore, claimed that as a sub‑tenant he was entitled to acquire proprietary rights over land under the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Reforms Act, 1953, and that a Compensation Officer had validly conferred such rights on him. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of the Act, particularly sections 11 and 14, and held that only a tenant (not a sub‑tenant) may apply for acquisition of proprietary rights, the phrase "tenant other than a sub‑tenant" expressly excluding sub‑tenants. The Court also affirmed the lower courts' finding that the appellant could not prove he was a sub‑tenant, and therefore he could not invoke the Act. Consequently, the Compensation Officer’s order conferring proprietary rights was without jurisdiction and a nullity. The appeal was dismissed, and the suit for declaration of title and possession was upheld as timely.

Issues considered

Whether a sub‑tenant is entitled to file an application for conferment of proprietary rights under the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Reforms Act, 1953.
Whether the Compensation Officer had jurisdiction to confer proprietary rights on a sub‑tenant.
Whether the order of the Compensation Officer conferring proprietary rights on the appellant is a nullity.
Whether the suit is barred by limitation.
Whether the purchaser (defendant No.2) is a bona‑fide purchaser for value without notice.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. 65

Subjects

sub‑tenantproprietary rightsland reformsHimachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Reforms Actcompensation officerjurisdictionnullitylimitationbona fide purchaser

Judgment

[2008] 12 S.C.R. 1154

A MADAN KISHORE .,..- .,
v.
MAJOR SUDHIR SEWAL AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No.7179 of 2001)
SEPTEMBER 2, 2008
B
[TARUN CHATTERJEE AND HARJIT SINGH BEOI, JJ.]
I -.
Land Reforms:
Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and
c Reforms Act, 1953 - ss. 11 and 14 - Acquisition of proprietary
rights under the·Act - Entitlement of sub-tenant - Held: Sub-
tenant is not entitled under the Act to claim proprietary rights
_before the Compensation Officer nor a sub-tenant would be
entitled to file any application for such conferment of the right
D before him.
The question which arose for consideration in the ~
present appeal was as to whether a sub-tenant is entitled
"'
to file an application for conferment of proprietary rights
under the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed
E Estates and Reforms Act, 1953.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD:1.1. On a plain reading and on consideration
of the scheme of the Himachal Pradesh Abolition of Big
F Landed Estates and Reforms Act, 1953, it would be
f. ~
pellucid that it was only the tenant who could make an
application under the Act for acquiring proprietary rights
in respect of the suit land. The scheme of the Act does
not indicate that any right was conferred by the Act on
G the sub-tenant to acquire any proprietary rights in respect
of the suit land under the Act. A reading of the provisions ,..
made in ss. 11 and 14 of the Act would clearly show that
the Legislature has specifically excluded the sub-tenant
from making any application for acquiring proprietary
H 1154
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1155
SEWAL & ORS.

rights under the Act because by using the expression in A
ss. 11 and 14 of the Act, namely, "a tenant other than a sub-
tenant", would clearly mean that the sub-tenant was
specifically excluded from making such application before
the Compensation Officer. A sub-tenant is not entitled
under the Act to claim proprietary rights before the B
Compensation Officer nor a sub-tenant would be entitled
to file any application for such conferment of the right
before him. [Paras 14, 15] [1163,C-F; 1165,B]
1.2. There is another aspect of the matter. In the
present case, the final Court of fact, on consideration of C
the evidence, oral and documentary, on record, came to- •
the conclusion that the defendant No. 1/appellant could
not prove to be a sub-tenant in respect of the suit land.
This finding of factwas affirmed by the High Court by the
impugned judgment in the second appeal, which cannot D
be upset since, no infirmity has been found for which it
can be held that such findings are perverse or arbitrary.
Therefore, even assuming that a sub-tenant is entitled to
make a claim before the Compensation Officer for
acquiring proprietary rights in respect of the suit land E
under the Act, even then, defendant No. 1/appellant, not -~ .
being a sub-tenant, as found by the First Appellate Court
and affirmed by the High Court in the· second appeal,
could not at all apply for conferment or acquisition of
proprietary rights in respect of the suit land under the
Act._The High Court was perfectly justified in holding that F
the said order of the Compensation Officer was without
jurisdiction and that the Compensation Officer was
lacking jurisdiction in holding that the defendant No. 1/
appellant could be conferred proprietary rights in respect
... of the suit land under the Act. [Paras 16, 17, 18] [1165,C- G
D; 1165,E-F; 1165,H; 1166,A]
Smt. Dev Lata. v. Alam etc. (1975) ILR -40 - approved.
Ayudh Raj & Ors. v. Moti S/o Mussadi AIR (1991) SC
· 1600 - relied on. H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008] 12 S.C.R.

A , State of Punjab & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh Ashok Kumar
AIR (1991) SC 2219; TVijendradas &Anr v. M. Subramanian
& Ors. (2007) 8 SCC 751 and A. VPapayya Sastry & Ors. v
Govt. of A.P & Ors (2007) 4 SCC 221 - distinguished.
Case Law Reference
B
(1975) ILR 40 approved Para .14 r 't
AIR (1991) SC 1600 relied on Para 18
AIR (1991) SC 2219 distinguished Para 19°- "'

c (2001) a sec 151 distinguished Para 21
(2007) 4 sec 221 distinguished Para 21
· CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7179
of 2001 ··

o From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.6.1997 of
the High Court of Judicature of Himachal Pradesh at Shima in
Ragular Second Appeal No. 281 of 1998
Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Appellant.
E Devendra Singh, Dr. Sushil Balwada and Ghanshyam for
the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J 1. This appeal by special leave
F is directed against the judgment and decree passed by a
;- I
learned Judge of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Regular
Second Appeal No. 281 of 1988 reversing the judgment and
decree dated 19th of May, 1988 passed by the Additional District
Judge, Nahan and the judgment and decree dated 30th of March,
·1985 passed by the Subordinate Judge (First Class - Paonta ·
G Sahib, Dist. Sirmaur), whereby ttie Second Appeal filed by the
plaintiffs/respondents was allowed and thereby, the suit filed by
them was decreed. Be it mentioned herein, the original plaintiff
died during the pendency of the suit and his heirs and legal
representatives were substituted in his place.
H
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1157
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]
"- ...
2. The case made out by the original plaintiff (since A
deceased) in his plaint, may be summarized as follows :-
One, Randeep Singh, was the owner of the land measuring
83 bighas, 7 biswas comprising in Khata Nos. 11/38 to 11/41
in village Amboa, Tehsil - Paunta Sahib, Dist. Sirmaur. The
said land was under the tenancy of Kundan Singh, Guiab Rai B
'
A -+ and Jaishi Ram, sons of Sukh Dayal to the extent of 113rd share
each. After the death of Kundan Singh, Guiab Rai and Jaishi
Ram, the tenancy rights were inherited by their heirs and legal
representatives. Bhanu Pratap Singh, son of Kundan Singh,
was residing, at the relevant point of time, in Nigeria, whereas c
Jagdarshan Lal, son of Guiab Rai, was in Government service
in Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, the above-mentioned land was
given in management to the defendant No.1 /appellant-Madan
Kishore who cultivated the same for and on behalf of all the
heirs and legal representatives of the aforementioned tenants. D
1' Out of the aforesaid land, comprised in Khasra Nos. 102, 104,
~
208 and 277, as described in the Jamabandi for the year 1974-
75, (hereinafter referred to as the i§suit land() is the land,
which is under dispute. After coming into force of the Himachal
Pradesh Abolition of Big Landed Estates and Reforms Act, E
1953 (in short the i§Act("), the defendant No.1/appellant got
himself recorded as sub-tenant in respect of the suit land and
on the basis of such entry in the record of rights obtained
proprietary rights thereof on 23rd of March, 1967. After obtaining
~~
the proprietary rights, some land, out of the suit land, was sold F
by the defendant No.1 /appellant to defe.ndant No. 2/respondent.
Defendant No.1/appellant also created mortgage in respect of
the remaining suit land in favour of defendant No. 3/respondent.
Jagdarshan Lal (since deceased) who was the original plaintiff

.. in the suit and in his place his heirs and legal representatives
were brought on record came to know about the wrongful entry
in the revenue record in the name of the appellant in 1978.
G

Jagdarshan Lal, the original plaintiff (since deceased) further
pleaded that the defendant No.1/appellant was holding the suit
land as a trustee and licensee on his behalf and could not have
H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

r~- ..
A acquired proprietary rights in respect of the suit land under the
Act and the sale and mortgage effected by him in favour of
defendant Nos. 2 and 3/respondents was null and void and
such transfer was not binding either on the deceased plaintiff
or on them being his heirs and legal representatives. As noted
s . herein earlier, the original plaintiff Jagdarshal lar died dudng ~I

the pendency C>f the suit and the present respondents· in this +-- "'2
Court, being his sons, daughters and widow were substituted
in his place. Upon the aforesaid allegations made in the plaint,
the original plaintiff (since deceased} had filed a suit for ~
c declaration of title and for possession in respect of the suit land
against the appellant and others.
r
3. The defendant No.1/appellant entered app.earance and
1--
contested the suit by filing a written statement denying the
material allegatio"ns made in the plaint. In the written statement,
D the appellant, however, admitted that the suit land aJong with
some other land was originally under the tenancy of Kundan 1'
t
-<'
Singh, Guiab Rai and Jaishl Ram, but he denied the exclusive I

possession of Jagdarshan Lal (since -deceased),' <?riginal t
plaintiff, over the suit land or that the same was given to him by-
E deceased Jagdarshari Lal as a trustee or licensee. It was further
averred by the appellant i~_his written statement that Jagdarshan
r
Lal was residing in Uttar Pradesh and he had inducted defendant
No.1/appellant as a sub-tenant ln respect of the suit land and
that on coming into force of the Act; he acqu!red proprietary
J
F rights in respect of the same.in 1967. He also pleaded in his I'-
'lo-
written statement that a-part of the suit landwas sold by him for
consideration to defendant No.2, while
·--~ .
the
. remaining part. of
I
.
the suit land was mortgaged by defendant No.1 /appellaQ! to
defendant No. 3/respondent. A plea· of adverse possession
was also taken in the written statement by the appellant. -, t
G
Accordingly, defendant No. 1/appellant sought for dismissal of -
the suit.
4. Defendant No. 2/respondent, in-his written statement,
pleaded that since he was a bonafide purchaser for value J
H without notice, it could not be said that he had not acquired
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1159
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]
)--.
right, title and interest in the suit land. Plea of limitation and A
maintainability of suit was also raised. Accordingly, defendant
No.2/respondent also pleaded dismissal of the suit
5. So far as the case of the defendant No.3/respondent in
his written statement was concerned, he had advanced loan to
defendant No. 1/appellant in respect of the suit land after B
-t·
" verification of the revenue record and the possession of
defendant No. 1 at the spot. According to him, neither the
plaintiffs/respondents nor their predecessors in interest ever
objected to the creation of mortgage in his favour by defendant
No. 1/appellant and, therefore, he was entitled to recover the c
balance amount of loan by auction of the suit land. Accordingly,
defendant No. 3 also sought for dismissal of the suit. On the
pleadings, as mentioned above, the Trial Court framed the
following issues :-
D
i) Whether defendant No. 1 was in possession of the
suit land as IMAMAT DAR, IZZATDAR or
TRUSTEE for and on behalf of the plaintiff as
alleged. If so, to what effect?
ii) If Issue No. 1 is proved, whether the plaintiff is E
entitled to the possession of the suit land covered
by Patta?
iii) Whether the defendant No. 1 was in possession of
the suit land as a tenant under the plaintiff and the
....... Patta was granted accordingly? F

iv) If issue No. 3 is not proved, whether the defendant
No. 1 is in adverse possession of the suit land after
the grant of Patta in his favour?

~-
v) Whether suit is within time? G
vi) Whether the suit is not maintainable?
vii) Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his act and
conduct from filing the present suit?
H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.
.)---"-

A viii) If Issue No. 3 and 4 are· not proved, whether
defendant No. 3 is entitled to recover the suit amount
from the owners of the suit land?
ix) Whether defendant No. 2 is a bonafide purchaser,
if so to what effect?"
B
6. So far as Issue Nos. (i), (ii) and (v) are concerned, the
Trial Court found these issues against the plaintiffs/respondents,
whereas, Issue No. (iii) and (vi) were found to be in favour of
defendant No. 1/appellant. So far as Issue No. (vii) is concerned,
c it was decided against the defendants and Issue Nos. (iv) and
(ix) were held to have become redundant in view of the findings
on Issue Nos. (i) to (iii). In respect of Issue No. (viii), defendant
No. 3 /respondent was held to be entitled to recover the amount
from defendant No. 1/appellant. Upon the aforesaid issues being
decided, the Trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs/
D
respondents, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court in
...,,
appeal.
7. Before us, the learned counsel appearing for the
appeHant, at the first instance, submitted that since Kundan ·
E Singh; Guiab Rai and Jaishi Ram (since deceased) were
admittedly the occupancy tenants of the suit land and on their
death the suit land was inherited by defendant No. 1/appellant,
Bhanu Pratap, Anand Kishore and Jugal Kishore. He had also
drawn our attention to the fact that it was an admitted position
F that Bhanu Pratap, son ofKundan Singh was residing in Nigeria
·"- j

since long and that deceased Jagdarshan Lal was serving in
Uttar Pradesh and, therefore, defendant No. 1/appellant used
to look after the suit land on behalf of all the tenants and that
being the position., it cannot _be said that the entries in the
revenue record in the name of defendant No.1/appellant could
G
be saidto·be wrong. The case put forward by defendant No. 1/
appellant was that of a sub-tenancy· and alternatively it was
contended by the learned counsel for the defendant No. 1/
appellant that sinceJhe Patta was granted in favour of defendant
No.1 by the Compensation Officer under the Act, therefore, he
H
I,

MA.DAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1161
\
,.
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]
...,,,
had acquired the proprietary rights over the suit land and also A
the title by way of adverse possession.
8. The submissions so put forward, as noted herein earlier:
were contested by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the plaintiffs/respondents.
B
'1'- 9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties
appearing before us and after going through the judgment under
appeal as well as the judgments of the courts below and the
materials on record including the oral and documentary
evidence, we are not in a position to upset the judgment of the c
High Court in the second appeal although the concurrent
judgments of the courts below were set aside by the High Court
in the exercise of its power under Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
10. It is not in dispute that proprietary rights conferred on D
1
defendant No. 1/appellant in respect of the suit land were in
terms of Section 27 (4) of the Act.
11. The first question that needs to be decided is whether
a sub-tenant under the Act is entitled to file an application for
conferring proprietary rights under the Act in respect of the suit E
land. To answer this question, it would be appropriate for us to
look into the scheme of the Act and certain relevant provisions
of the same.

12. Chapter Ill of the Act deals with acquisition of
). ·""' proprietary rights by tenants. Section 11 of the Act confers a
F

right only on the tenant of the land to acquire interest of
landowner. Section 11 reads as under :
"(1) Notwithstanding any laW; custom or contract lo the
,,. contrary a tenant other than a sub-tenant shall, on G
application made to the compensation officer at any time
after the commencement of this Act, be entitled to
acquire, on payment of compensation, the right, title and
interest of the landowner in the land of the tenancy held
by him under the landowner; H
f
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
....
[2008) 12 S.C.R.

y
A Provided that a tenant not having ....................................
(2) .........................................................
(3) ........................................................
(4) The tenant may pay the amount of compensation as
B determined by the compensation officer under sub- + ·-.
section (3) either in one lump sum or in such number of "'
instalments not exceeding ten as may be determined by ,.\;
the Compensation Officer during a period not exceeding I
'.._
five years; and such compensation shall be paid on such '
c date or dates as may be fixed by the Compensation
Officer in this behalf.
(5) ................................................
(6) On and from the date of the grant of the certificate
D under sub-section (5) the tenant shall become the owner
·:'f
of the land comprised in the tenancy and the right, title r
and interest of the landowner in the said land shall
determine.
(?). .....................................
E
(8). ......................................"
\.
13. Section 13 of the Act deals with total compensation
payable by a tenant. Now comes Section 14 of the Act which
deals with acquisition by the tenant of the rights of the landowner
F ,jo.. J,
in a portion of the lands of tenancy in certain circumstances.
Section 14 is as under :
;

"(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 11, a
tenant other than a sub-tenant who holds a tenancy
G exceeding twelve acres in area may at any time after the
-Ir-
commencement of this Act, make an application to the
Compensation Officer for surrender to the landowner an
area equal -
(a) in the case of occupancy tenant, to one-fourth ~
H of the lands of the tenancy; and

. .'=
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1163
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]

(b) in other cases, to three-eighths of the lands of A
the tenancy.
(2) When an application for surrender has been made
under sub-section (1) of the Compensation Officer
shall demarcate the area surrendered in favour of
the landowner from the rest of the lands of the tenancy 8
and deliver possession of the same to the landowner.
(3) Upon such delivery of possession the tenant shall
forthwith become the owner in respect of the rest of
the lands of the tenancy and the right, title and interest c
of the landowner in the said lands shall determine."
14: On a plain reading and on consideration of the scheme
of the Act, it would be pellucid that it was only the tenant who
could make an application under the Act for acquiring proprietary
rights in respect of the suit land. In our view, the scheme of the D
Act and the aforesaid relevant provisions do not indicate that
any right was conferred by the Act on the sub-tenant to acquire
any proprietary rights in respect of the suit land under the Act.
A reading of the provisions made in Sections 11 and 14 of the
Act would clearly show that the Legislature has specifically E
excluded the sub-tenant from making any application for
acquiring proprietary rights under the Act because by using the
expression in Sections 11 and 14 of the Act, namely, j§a tenant
other than a sub-tenant(, would clearly mean that the sub-
tenant was specifically excluded from making such application F
before the Compensation Officer. However, an argument was
advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant for the purpose
of submitting that defendant No. 1/appellant, who was claiming
to be a sub-tenant, would be entitled to make such application
under the Act before the Compensation Officer in view of the G
expression used by the Legislature in Section 27(4) of the Act,
namely, i§such tenant who cultivates such land(. We are not
in a position to accept this submission of the learned counsel
for the appellant for the simple reason that a Division Bench of
the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Smt. Dev Lata H
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 12 S.C.R.

I

A Vs. Alam etc; [1975 ILR 40], has explained the meaning of the y ~·

expression used under Section 27(4), namely, i§such tenant
who cultivates such land(. in a lucid manner, which we feel
appropriate to reproduce hereunder :-
"Why did the statute refer to ;§such tenant who cultivates
B such land( in Section 27(4) when in Section 11 and
,;
Section 14 it refers to a tenant holding land in tenancy Jr
and does describe him by reference to the criterion of
9ultivation. An analysis of the scheme set out in Section
27 explains why. Section 27(2) contemplates two
c categories of land, land which is under the personal
>-
cultivation of the landowner and land which is not under
his personal cultivation. To the former Section 27 does
not apply It applies to the latter. It will be noticed that the
Statute does not make this test relevant in Section 11
D and Section 14. The criterion for applying Section 27 is
that the land must not be under the personal cultivation -"'(
of the landowner. The right, title and interest of the
landowner in such land vests in the State Government
and is transferred by the State Government to the tenant
E who cultivates the land. The word ;§who cultivates such
land( are descriptive of the tenant, and indicate the '
tenant who holds the land. Section 27, as I have said ~
before, refers to land which is not under the personal
cultivation of the landowner but is cultivated by the tenant.
F It is true that when a tenant sub-lets the land to another,
,.._,
it is the sub-tenant who is in actual cultivatory possession. ~
Possession in fact is not with the tenant. But looked at in
contradistinction to the landowner it is the tenant who will
be said to cultivate the land when the landowner cannot
be described as cultivating it. I am unable to hold that
G
reference in Section 27(4) was intended to a sub-tenant. ~
1'>
Chapter Ill is concerned entirely with the transfer of rights
from landowners to tenants."
15. Having considered the discussions made by R.S.
H Pathak,J. (as His Lordship then was) as quoted hereinabove,
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1165
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]

in detail and in depth and after considering the scheme of the · A
Act and the relevant provisions, as discussed herein earlier,
we do not find any reason to differ with the views expressed by
His Lordship in the aforesaid decision. Accordingly, we are in
full agreement with the views expressed by the High Court that
a sub-tenant is not entitled under the Act to claim proprietary B .

- rights before the Compensation Officer nor a sub-tenant would
be entitled to file any application for such conferment of the
right before him.
16. There is another aspect of the matter. The first Court
of fact, on consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, · C
on record, came to the conclusion that the defendant No. 1/
appellant could not prove to be a sub-tenant in respect of the
suit land. This finding of fact was affirmed by the High Court by
the impugned judgment in the se.cond appeal, which cannot be
upset until and unless we come to the conclusion that such D
")-· finding of fact was perverse or arbitrary. For this purpose, we
looked into the evidence and other materials on record and we
are satisfied that the finding of fact arrived at by the final Court
of fact and affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal,
cannot be interfered with, as we do not find any infirmity for E
which we can hold that such findings are perverse or arbitrary.
17. Therefore, even assuming that a sub-tenant is entitled
to make a claim before the Compensation Officer for acquiring
proprietary rights in respect of the suit land under the Act, even
then, defendant No. 1/appellant, not being a sub-tenant, as F
found by the First Appellate Court and affirmed by the High
Court in the second appeal, could not at all apply for conferment
or acquisition of proprietary rights in respect of the suit land
under the Act.
G
18. The next question that needs to be decided is whether
the order conferring proprietary rights on defendant no. 1/
appellant by the Compensation Officer in respect of the suit
land was without jurisdiction and, therefore, it was a nullity or
not. In our view, the High Court was perfectly justified in holding H
1166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 12 S.C.R.

A that the said order of the Compensation Officer was without -.,. . - '
jurisdiction and that the Compensation Officer was lacking
jurisdiction in holding that the defendant No. 1/appellant could
be conferred proprietary rights in respect of the suit land under
the Act. While holdin.g that the order of the Compensation Officer
B conferring proprietary rights on the defendant no. 1/appellant
was without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity, reliance could ..Jr--
be straightway placed on a decision of this Court in the case
of Ayudh Raj & Ors. vs. Moti Sid Mussadi [AIR 1991 SC
1600], in which the High Court had also placed reliance on the
c impugned judgment. In this case, the same Act was under
consideration. This Court held in that decision that the order
passed by the Compensation Officer lacked jurisdiction and,
therefore, it was a nullity and no order need be passed by the
Civil Court to set aside such type of order before seeking
declaration of title and possession of the suit land. It is not in
0
dispute that if this position is accepted, the suit filed by the
predecessor in interest of the respondents was in time as the
suit was for possession based on title and, therefore, could be
governed byArticle 65 of the Limitation Act.
E 19. For the reasons aforesaid, we are in agreement with
the judgment of the High Court holding that the suit was filed
within the period of limitation but before we conclude on the
question of limitation of the filing of the suit, we may refer to a
decision of this Court in the case of State of Punjab & Ors. vs.
F Gurdev Singh Ashok Kumar [AIR 1991 SC 2219] as the same
was relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant to show > ..
that the suit was barred by limitation.
20. In our view, that decision is not applicable to the facts
and circumstances of the present case. That suit was filed for
G declaration that the dismissal of the respondent was wrongful
or ultra vires. While dealing with this fact, this Court in para 8 -it.
observed as follows:-
"lt will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved
by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court
H
MADAN KISHORE v. MAJOR SUDHIR 1167
SEWAL & ORS. [TARUN CHATTERJEE, J]

"' ~
for relief of declaration that the order against him is A
inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach
the Court within the prescribed period of /imitation. If the
statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the
declaration sought for"
21. In view of our findings arrived at herein earlier that the B
.... order passed by the Compensation Officer was a nullity and
nonest in the eyes of law and, therefore, without jurisdiction, we
do not think that this decision could be applied in the facts and
circumstances as stated herein earlier. So far as the other two
decisions, namely, T. Vijendradas & Anr. vs.· M. Subramanian c
& Ors. [2007 (8) SCC 751] and A. VPapayya Sastry & Ors. vs.
Govt. of A.P & Ors. [2007 (4) sec 221] are concerned, we do
not think that these decisions can have any application to the
facts and circumstances of the present case. There is no quarrel
about the proposition that if there was any case of fraud, the D
)- question for setting aside the order which was passed on fraud
either on the court or on the party could not arise at all.
Accordingly, the aforesaid two decisions cannot come in the
aid to decide the present controversy raised before us.

22. So far as the case of bona fide purchase for value E
without notice as made out by defendant no.1/appellant is
• concerned, there is no infirmity in the finding of the High Court
that defendant no.2/respondent could not be said to be a· bona
fide purchaser for value without notice and, therefore, the sale
made by defendant no.1/appellant in favour of defendant No. 2/ F
~
>-
respondent was not binding on the plaintiffs/respondents. So far
as the case of defendant no.3 is concerned, we are in agreement
with the findings of the High Court holding that a case of mortgage
·as pleaded by defendant no.3/respondent could not be accepted
in the absence of any finding to that effect. G
*" 23. For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the view that the
appeal has no merit and accordingly it is dismissed without
any order as to costs.

B.B.B. Appeal dismissed. H