M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA

                        [2012) 6 S.C.R. 592


A               M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA
                                  v.
                     STATE OF KARNATAKA
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 79 of 2010)
                           JULY 24, 2012
B
        [SWATANTER KUMAR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
                IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.)

        PENAL CODE, 1860:
c      s. 302 - Murder - Conviction and sentence of life
  imprisonment awarded by courts below - Held: The dying
  declaration made by the deceased, the evidence of the eye-
  witness, the recovery of the knife at the instance of the
  accused, the serological report, the evidence of the father of
0 the deceased that there was previous animosity between the
  deceased and the accused, make a complete chain of
  events, pointing unexceptionally towards the guilt of the
  accused - Prosecution has proved its case beyond any
  reasonable doubt - There is no reason to interfere with the
E concurrent judgments of conviction and order of sentence
  passed by the courts below.

        EVIDENCE ACT, 1872:

F      s. 32(1) - Dying declaration recorded by police -
  Evidentiary value of - Explained - Held: In the instant case,
  the dying declaration was made after due certification of
  fitness by the doctor and was recorded by a police officer in
  discharge of his normal functions - The statement was made
G by the deceased voluntarily and was a truthful description of
  the events - His version is fully supported by the witness who
  had accompanied him at all relevant times, right from inflicting
  of the injuries till the time of his death.

                                592
H
    M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF               593
                 KARNATAKA
     EVIDENCE:                                                   A

      Hostile witness - Evidentiary value of - Held: Court can
 even take into consideration the part of the statement of a
 hostile witness which supports the case of the prosecution.

     FIR                                                         B

     Lodging of FIR - Held: It is not necessary that an eye
 witness alone can lode the FIR - It can be lodged by any
 person and even by telephonic information - In the instant
 case, there was no inordinate delay in lodging the FIR.·        c
       The appellant was prosecuted for committing the
  murder of one 'K'. The prosecution case, as disclosed in
  the statement of the deceased recorded by the Head
  Constable (PW-2) in the hospital, was that the appellant-
  accused had enmity with him; that at 7.45 P.M. on              0
  14.2.2003, when PW-3 and he were proceeding to have
. meals, the appellant met them on the way and, stating that
  he would do away with the deceased, stabbed him with
  the knife on his stomach; that when he fell down, the
  accused further assaulted him with a glass bottle on his       E
  head and face; that PW-3 got him admitted in the hospital.
  The victim died the following morning at 7.00 A.M. The
  trial court convicted the accused u/s 302 IPC and
  sentenced him to life imprisonment. The High Court
  confirmed the conviction and the sentence.                     F

     Dismissing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1.1 There was no inordinate delay in lodging
 the FIR. The incident occurred at 7.45 p.m. on 14.2.2003.
 People had gathered at the place of the incident and            G
 PW3, who was accompanying the deceased at the
 relevant time, had taken him to the hospital. The doctor
 on duty, after having seen the injured, reported the matter
 to the police and then the FIR was lodged at 11.30 p.m.
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    594       SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   on the same day. The conduct of both the doctor on duty
    and PW3 was very normal. They had cared first to take
    steps to give medical aid to the injured and make every
    effort to save the deceased. [para 8] [601-A-D]

8       1.2 It is a settled principle of law that an FIR can be
    lodged by any person, even by telephonic information. It
    is not necessary that an eye-witness alone can lodge the
    FIR. [para 8] [601-E-F]

       2.1 The mere fact that one of the witnesses produced
C by the prosecution had been declared hostile and did not
  support its case would not be fatal to the case of the
  prosecution, particularly when the prosecution has been
  able to prove its case by other cogent and reliable
  evidence. In the instant case, the prosecution has not
D only proved its case by independent witnesses, eye-
  witnesses, medical evidence and the report of the FSL,
  but has also established its case beyond reasonable
  doubt on the strength of the dying declaration. [para 9]
  [601-G-H; 602-A-B]
E
         Atmaram & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2012) 5
    SCC 738; Jodhraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan 2007 (5) SCR
          =
    850 (2007) 15 SCC 294; and Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das
    & Anr. v. State of Assam 2010 (11) SCR 493 = (2010) 10 SCC
    37 4 - referred to
F
       2.2 The court can even take into consideration the
  part of the statement of a hostile witness which supports
  the case of the prosecution. Therefore, it cannot be said
  that whenever prosecution witnesses are declared
G hostile, it must prove fatal to the case of the prosecution.
  [para 1O] [602-D]

       Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC
  327; Govindaraju @ Govinda v. State by Sriramapuram
H Police Station and Anr. (2012) 4 SCC 722 - referred to.
   M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF              595
                KARNATAKA

      3.1 As regards the admissibility and evidentiary value A
of the dying declaration, the factum of death of the
deceased has been proved. PW3 has given the eye-
version of the occurrence. He had taken injured to the
 hospital and has categorically stated that on his way to
 the hospital, the deceased was conscious, though in B
 great pain. After reaching the hospital, the duty doctor,
 who could not be examined as a witness because she
 had left the service, had informed about admission of an
 injured person in the hospital to Head Constable, PW2,
 who came to the hospital and after getting the certification ·C
 from the duty doctor in regard to fitness of the deceased
 to make a statement, had recorded the statement of the
 deceased u/s 161 of the CrPC. This statement became the
 dying declaration of the deceased because he expired on
 the very next day, i.e. 15.2.2003 in the morning. According
                                                               0
 to the said dying declaration, the appellant had clearly
 stated that he would murder the deceased; he thereafter
·he took out the knife and stabbed the deceased. Still not
 satisfied with this assault, the appellant went to the
 nearby shop and brought a bottle and spilled the liquid
 all over his head and then inflicted bleeding injury on his E
 forehead. The deceased in his statement has
 categorically and with clarity stated that the accused had
 inflicted both injuries upon his body. These injuries
 proved fatal leading to the death of the deceased. [para
 11] [602-E-H; 603-A-D]                                        F

     3.2 Clause (1) of s. 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872
makes the statement of the deceased admissible, which
has been generally described as dying declaration. Once
such statement has been made voluntarily, and if it is        G
reliable and is not an attempt by the deceased to cover
up the truth or falsely implicate a person, then the courts
can safely rely on such dying declaration and it can form
the basis of conviction. More so, where the version given
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    596       SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A   by the deceased as dying declaration is supported and
    corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no
    reason for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such
    dying declaration. [para 12 and 16] [603-E-F; 609-0]

B       Bhajju @ Karan Singh v. State of M. P. (2012) 4 SCC
    327; and Surinder Kumar v. State of Haryana 2001 (12) SCR
    12 05 = (2011) 10 sec 173 - relied on

        Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2010 (15) SCR
    673   =(2010) 14 SCC 444; and Lax man v. State of
C · Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 - referred to.

       3.3 In the instant case, the dying declaration was
  made after due certification of fitness by the doctor and
  was recorded by a police officer in discharge of his
D normal functions. The statement was made by the
  deceased voluntarily and was a truthful description of the
  events. This version is fully supported by PW3, the
  witness who had accompanied the deceased at all
  relevant times, right from inflicting of the injuries till the
E time of his death. The serological report, Ex.P16, duly
  established that the blood group on the knife used for the
  assault and that of the deceased was O+. This knife had
  been recovered as per Mahazar Ext. P-12 by the PSI (PW-
  11) in furtherance to the voluntary statement of the
F appellant in presence of PW14, the Panch. The father of
  the deceased (PW5) has also clearly stated that there was
  previous animosity between the deceased and the
  appellant. Thus, the complete chain of events, pointing
  unexceptionally towards the guilt of the appellant has
  been established by the prosecution thereby proving its
G case beyond any reasonable doubt. There is no reason
  to interfere with the concurrent judgments of conviction
  and order of sentence passed by the Courts below. [para
  17-18] [609-E-H; 610-A-B]

H
  M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                    597
               KARNATAKA
                     Case Law Reference:                            A

    (2012) 5 sec 738           referred to           Para 9

    2007 (5) SCR 850           referred to           Para 9

    2010 (11) SCR 493          referred to           Para 9
                                                                    B
    (2012) 4 sec 327           referred to           Para 10

    (2012) 4 sec 122           referred to           Para 10

    2001 (12) SCR 1205         relied on             para 12
                                                                    c
    2010 (15) SCR 673          referred to           para 13

    (2002) s sec 11 o          referred to           para 13

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 79 of 2010.                                                     D
     From the Judgment & Order dated 04.12.2007 of the High
Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1656
of 2004.

    Aishwarya Bhati, Karan Sharma for the Appellant.                E

    Anitha Shenoy for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The present appeal is                   F
directed against the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka,
Bangalore, dated 4th December, 2007 confirming the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence passed by the Fast Track
(Sessions) Judge-Ill, Bangalore City, dated 26th October and
28th October, 2004, respectively convicting the appellant under     G
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, the 'IPC')
and awarding him sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life
and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default thereto to undergo further
rigorous imprisonment for a period of three and a half years.
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    598     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A       2. The facts leading to the demise of the deceased Kuppa
    can be stated as follows:

          Head Constable Sadashivaiah, PW2, received an
    intimation at about 10.30 p.m-. in the night of 14th February,
B   2003 from the doctor on duty at the Victoria Hospital stating
    that a badly injured person had been admitted to the Victoria
    Hospital. After receiving this information, PW2 proceeded to
    Victoria Hospital and approached the duty doctor, Dr. Girija.
    The said police officer found the deceased in a sound state of
C   mind and the duty doctor duly endorsed regarding fitness of the
    deceased to make a statement. Accordingly, the Head
    Constable recorded the statement of the deceased Kuppa and
    the same was exhibited as Ex.P2. Wh~n PW2 was examined
    as a witness in the Court, he identified the MLC report, Ex.P3
    and also identified the endorsement of the duty doctor on the
D   said dying declaration regarding fitness of the injured as Ex.P2
    (b). After recording the statement, the same was handed over
    to the PSI Shivanna for further investigation. According to the
    statement of the deceased, as recorded by PW2, there was
    previous animosity between him and the appellant and on 14th
E   February, 2003 at 7.45 p.m. when he and PW3 were
    proceeding to have meals and go to their house after the day's
    work, they met the appellant who said that he would do away
    with the deceased and stabbed him with knife on his stomach
    due to which he fell down. Even thereafter, the accused did not
F   spare him and repeatedly assaulted him with glass bottles on
    his head and face, causing grievous injuries. Anthoni, PW3,
    took him to the hospital and got him admitted.

      3. PW3 has stated in his statement before the Court that
G on 14th February, 2003 at about 7.15 p.m., he and the
  deceased were proceeding towards hotel for tiffin, at Double
  Road, Lal Bagh when they were near the MP Stores, the
  appellant was standing there. Looking at Kuppa, the appellant
  had started abusing Kuppa and uttered that he would commit
H
   M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                   599
       KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]

murder!of Kuppa. Immediately thereafter, the appellant started      A
assaulting Kuppa on the right side of his stomach with a knife
and caused grievous injuries. Kuppa fell down, meanwhile, the
appellant assaulted him with a bottle on the forehead and ran
away. The people had gathered there. Then, he had taken
Kuppa to the hospital and got him admitted. This witness duly       B
identified the knife, M0-1 used by the appellant as well as the
broken glass pieces of the bottle marked as M0-2. He even
identified the T-shirt that Kuppa was wearing on the day of the
incident which was blood-stained marked as M0-3. Moreover,
he identified the towel as M0-4 and the blood-stained pant of       c
Kuppa as M0-5. This witness stated that he knew both the
deceased and the accused for the last more than 12 years.
According to this witness, the street light was there at the time
of the incident.

     4. Unfortunately, Kuppa succumbed to his injuries and died     D
in the hospital on 15th February, 2003 at 7.00 a.m. Dr. Naveen
(PW1) informed the police and prepared the death memo,
Ex.P1. Dr. Udayashankar (PW8) performed the post-mortem
on the body of the deceased and noticed the injuries of the
deceased and the cause of death as follows: -                       E

     "Injuries :-

     External examination :-Length of the body is 170 ems. Well
     built. Dark brown complexioh. Rigor mortis is present all
     over the body and liver mortis faintly present on the back.    F
     Hospital bandage is present over lower chest and
     abdomen, intravenous injection mark present over left
     forearm. Face is smeared with dried blood stains and also
     both palms foot.
                                                                    G
     External injuries: 1. Surgically sutured shaped wound
     present over the vertex. Long limb measures 6 ems. Short
     limb measures 5 ems. On removal of the sutures, they are
     cut wounds, skull deep.
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    600       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         Scalp skull : External injuries described. Extra vasation of
          blood present around corresponding external injuries. Skull
          intact. Membranes pale.

          Brain - Pale."
B         "Opinion as to cause of death :-

          Death was due to shock and haemorrage consequent to
          injuries sustained."

C         5. We may also notice here that Dr. K.M. Chennakeshava
    (PW13) was examined to identify the signature and writing of
    Dr. Girija who had endorsed the dying declaration as she had
    left the Victoria Hospital and had gone to America prior to the
    time when the matter came up for recording of evidence in the
D   Court. PW9, Nanjunappa, the Officer from the Forensic Science
    Laboratory (FSL) had identified MOs1 to 5 and 7 and stated
    that they contained blood stains and MOs 3 to 5 and 7 were
    containing blood having 'O' positive group which was the blood
    group of the deceased.

E        6. Besides the above, the prosecution, in order to establish
    its case, had examined 15 witnesses and exhibited Exhibits
    P1 to P20. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the
    appellant was examined and in his statement under Section
    313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), he took
F   the stand of complete denial and stated nothing more.

       7. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant
  contended that there was inordinate delay in lodging the First
  Information Report (FIR) and in any case, the FIR having been
  lodged by a person who was not an eye-witness, would render
G the same inadmissible. Then it is contended that PW7 had been
  declared hostile as he did not support the case of the
  prosecution and further that the dying declaration recorded by
  the police is inadmissible and cannot be made the sole basis
  for conviction of the appellant. The contention, therefore, is that
H
   M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                      601
       KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
the appellant is entitled to acquittal.                                A
      8. We find no merit in either of these contentions raised
on behalf of the appellant. Firstly, there was no inordinate delay
in lodging the FIR. The incident occurred at 7.45 p.m. on 14th
February, 2003. People had gathered at the place of the
incident arn;I PW3, who was accompanying the deceased at
                                                                       8
the relevant time, had taken him to the hospital. The doctor on
duty, after having seen the injured person, had reported the
matter to the police and then the FIR was lodged. This FIR,
Ex.P.10, was lodged at 11.30 p.m. on the same day. We do
not think that there had been any inordinate delay in lodging          C
the FIR. The conduct of both the doctor on duty and PW3 was
very normal. The priority for PW3 was not to go to the police
station and lodge the FIR but to take the deceased, who was
seriously injured at that time, to the hospital at the earliest. He
did the latter and correctly so. The doctor had cared first to take    D
steps to give medical aid to the injured and make every effort
 to save the deceased rather than calling the police
 instantaneously. However, without any undue delay, the doctor
 informed the police. The police came to the hospital and it was
 only after the concerned police officer (PW2) had met th~ duty        E
 doctor and seen the injured and recorded his statement that
 the FIR was registered. It is a settled principle of law that an
 FIR can be lodged by any person, even by telephonic
 information. It is not necessary that an eye-witness alone can
 lodge the FIR. In view of these facts, no court can hold that there   F
 is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR by accepting the
 contention raised on behalf of the appellant.

     9. Coming to the first leg of the second submission raised
by the learned counsel for the appellant, the contention is that
PW7, who was stated to be an eye-witness did not completely            G
support the case of the prosecution, when he was examined
before the court. The mere fact that one of the witnesses
produced by the prosecution had been declared hostile and did
not support the case of the prosecution would not be fatal to
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    602     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A the case of the prosecution, particularly when the prosecution
  has been able to prove its case by other cogent and reliable
  evidence. In the present case, the prosecution has not only
  proved its case by independent witnesses, eye-witnesses,
  medical evidence and the report of the FSL, but has also
B established its case beyond reasonable doubt on the strength
  of the dying declaration of the deceased himself. Reference in
  this regard can be made to the decisions of this Court in
  Atmaram & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(2012) 5 SCC
  738]; Jodhraj Singh v. State of Rajasthan [(2007) 15 SCC
C 294]; and Sambhu Das @ Bijoy Das & Anr. v. State of Assam
  [(2010) 10 sec 374].

       10. We may notice, at this stage that the court can even
  take into consideration the part of the statement of a hostile
  witness which supports the case of the prosecution. Therefore,
D it cannot be said that whenever prosecution witnesses are
  declared hostile, it must prove fatal to the case of the
  prosecution. Reference in this regard can be made to the
  judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajju @ Karan Singh v.
  State of M.P. (2012) 4 SCC 327; Govindaraju@ Govinda v.
E State by Sriramapuram Police Station and Anr. (2012) 4 SCC
  722.
       11. Coming to the admissibility and evidentiary value of
  the dying declaration made by the deceased, the factum of
  death of the deceased has been proved. PW3 has given the
F eye-version of the occurrence. He was a witness to the hurling
  of abuses as well as inflicting of both the fatal injuries by the
  appellant - one by knife and the other with a glass bottle on the
  forehead of the deceased. He had taken injured-Kuppa to the
  hospital and has categorically stated that on his way to the
G hospital, the deceased was conscious, though in great pain.
  After reaching the hospital, the duty doctor, Dr. Girija, who could
  not be examined as a witness because she had left the service,
  had informed about admission of an injured person in the

H
   M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                       603
       KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
hospital to Head Constable, PW2, who came to the hospital               A
and after getting the certification from the duty doctor in regard
to fitness of the deceased to make a statement, had recorded
the statement of the deceased under Section 161 of the CrPC.
This statement became the dying declaration of the deceased
because he expired on the very next day, i.e. 15th February,            B
2003 in the morning. According to the said dying declaration,
tbe appellal"!t had clearly stated that he would murder him
whereafter he took out the knife and stabbed the deceased.
Still not satisfied with this assault,
                                  I
                                       the appellant went to the shop
of one Kaka and brought a bottle and spilled the liquid all over        C
his head and then inflicted bleeding injury on his forehead. The
deceased in his statement has categorically and with clarity
stated that the accused K.D. Saravana had inflicted both injuries
 upon his body. These injuries proved fatal leading to the death
of the deceased.
                                                                  D
      12. We may refer to some of the judgments of this Court
in regard to the admissibility and evidentiary value of a dying
declaration. In the case of Bhajju (supra), this Court clearly
stated that Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 was an
exception to the general rule against admissibility of hearsay E
evidence. Clause (1) of Section 32 makes statement of the
deceased admissible, which has been generally described as
dying declaration. The court, in no uncertain terms, held that it
cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that dying
declaration could not form the sole basis of conviction unless F
it was corroborated by other evidence. The dying declaration,
if found reliable, could form the basis of conviction. Similar
principle was stated by this Court in the case of Surinder Kumar
v. State of Haryana .(2011) 10 SCC 173 wherein the Court,
though referred to the above principle, but on facts and because G
of the fact that the dying declaration in the said case was found
to be shrouded by suspicious circumstances and no witness
in support thereof had been examined, acquitted the accused.
However, the Court observed that when a dying declaration is

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    604       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012) 6 S.C.R.


A   true and voluntary, there is no impediment in basing the
    conviction on such a declaration, without corrol5oration.
        13. In the case of Chirra Shivraj v. State of Andhra
  Pradesh (2010) 14 SCC 444, the Court added a caution that
  a mechanical approach in relying upon the dying declaration
8 just because it is there, 15 extremely dangerous. The court has
  to examine a dying declaration scrupulously with a microscopic
  eye to find out whether the dying declaration is voluntary, truthful,
  made in a conscious state of mind and without being influenced
  by other persons and where these ingredients are satisfied, the
C Court expressed the view that it cannot be said that on the sole
  basis of a dying declaration, the order of conviction could not
  be passed.
       14. In the case of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002)6
D SCC 710, the Court while dealing with the argument that the
  dying declaration must be recorded by a magistrate and the
  certificate of fitness was an essential feature, made the
  following observations. The court answered both these
  questions as follows:
E         "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying
          declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity,
          when the party is at the point of death and when every hope
          of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is
          silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful
F         consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the
          same, great caution must be exercised in considering tile
          weight to be given to this species of evidence on account
          of the existence of many circumstances which may affect
          their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed
G         is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept
          the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the
          requirements of oath and cross-examination are
          dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-
          examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration
H
M. SARVANA@ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                       605
    KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of        A
 the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court,
 however, has always to be on guard to see that the
 statement of the deceased was not as a result of either
 tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court
 also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit            8
 state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and
 identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order
 to satisfy whet,her the deceased was in a fit mental
 condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the
 medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the         C
 deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the
 declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it
  be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as
 to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying
  declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be
  oral or in writing and any adequate method of                     0
  communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise
 will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite.
  In most cases, however, such statements are made orally
  before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone
  like a Magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is     E
  recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a
  Magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure
  authenticity it is usual to call a Magistrate, if available for
  recording the statement of a man about to die. There is
  no requirement of law that a dying declaration must               F
  necessarily be made to a Magistrate and when such
  statement is recorded by a Magistrate there is no
  specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently,
  what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such
  statement necessarily depends on the facts and                    G
  circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially
  required is that the person who records a dying declaration
 must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of
  mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the Magistrate
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    606      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         that the declarant was fit to make the statement even
          without examination by the doctor the declaration can be
          acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same
          to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by' the doctor is
          essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and
B         truthful nature of the declaration can be established
          otherwise."
         15. In Govindaraju @ Govinda v. State of Sriramapuram
    P.S. & Anr. [(2012) 4 SCC 722], the court inter alia discussed
    the law related to dying declaration with some elaboration: -
c         "23. Now, we come to the second submission raised on
          behalf of the appellant that the material witness has not
          been examined and the reliance cannot be placed upon
          the sole testimony of the police witness (eyewitness).
D         24. It is a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is
          not the number of witnesses that matters but it is the
          substance. It is also not necessary to examine a large
          number of witnesses if the prosecution can bring home the
          guilt of the accused even with a limited number of
E         witnesses. In Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand (2003)
          2 SCC 401, this Court had classified the oral testimony
          of the witnesses into three categories:
                (a) wholly reliable;

F               (b) wholly unreliable; and
                (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.
          In the third category of witnesses, the court has to be
          cautious and see if the statement of such witness is
          corroborated, either by the other witnesses or by other
G
          documentary or expert evidence.
          25. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where
          there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidenc~ has to
          be accepted with caution and after testing it on the
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M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                  607
    KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
 touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or          A
 evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole
 witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit
 into the chain of events that have been stated by the
 prosecution. When the prosecution relies upon the
 testimony of a sole eyewitness, then such evidence .has        B
 to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of such.
 witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the
 evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other
 witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement
  as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These       C
  are the few principles which the Court has stated
  consistently and with certainty.
 26. Reference in this regard can be made to Joseph v.
 State of Kera/a (2003) 1 SCC 465 and Tika Ram v. State
 of M.P. (2007) 15 SCC 760. Even· in Jhapsa Kabari v.           D
 State of Bihar (2001) 10 SCC 94, this Court took the view
 thatif the presence ofa witness is doubtful, it becomes a
 case of conviction based on the testimony of a solitary
 witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction
 on the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said     E
 witness is reliable and trustworthy.
 27. In Jhapsa Kabari (supra), this Court noted the fact that
 simply because one of the witnesses (a fourteen-year-old
 boy) did not name the wife of the deceased in the
 fardbeyan, it would not in any way affect the testimony of     F
 the eyewitness i.e. the wife of the decea~ed, who had given
 a graphic account of the attack on her husband and her
 brother-in-law by the accused persons. Where the
 statement of an eyewitness is found to be reliable,
 trustworthy and consistent with the course of events, the      G
 conviction can be based on her sole testimony. There is
 no bar in basing the conviction of an accused on the
 testimony of a solitary witness as long as the said witness
 is reliable and trustworthy.
                                                                H
    608       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2012] 6 S.C.R.


A         28. In the present case, the sole eyewitness is stated to
          be a police officer i.e. PW 1. The entire case hinges upon
          the trustworthiness, reliability or otherwise of the testimony
          of this witness. The contention raised on behalf of the
          appellant is that the police officer, being the sole
B         eyewitness, would be an interested witness, and in that
          situation, the possibility of a police officer falsely
          implicating innocent persons cannot be ruled out.
          29. Therefore, the first question that arises for consideration
          is whether a police officer can be a sole witness. If so, then
c         with particular reference to the facts of the present case,
          where he alone had witnessed the occurrence as per the
          case of the prosecution.
          30. It cannot be stated as a rule that a police officer can
          or cannot be a sole eyewitness in a criminal case. It will
D
          always qepend upon the facts of a given case. If the
          testimony of such a witness is reliable, trustworthy, cogent
          and duly corroborated by other witnesses or admissible
          evidence, then the statement of such witness cannot be
          discarded only on the ground that he is a police officer and
E         may have some interest in success of the case. It is only
          when his interest in the success of the case is motivated
          by overzealousness to an extent of his involving innocent
          people; in that event, no credibility can be attached to the
          statement of such witness.
F
          31. This Court in Girja Prasad (2007) 7 SCC 625 while
          particularly referring to the evidence of a police officer said
          that it is not the law that police witnesses should not be
          relied upon and their evidence cannot be accepted unless
          it is corroborated in material particulars by other
G
          independent evidence. The presumption applies as much
          in favour of a police officer as any other person. There is
          also no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can
          be recorded on the testimony of a police officer even if such

H
  M. SARVANA @ K.D. SARAVANA v. STATE OF                       609
      KARNATAKA [SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
    evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of        A
     prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their
     evidence. If such a presumption is raised against the
     police officers without exception, it will be an attitude which
   . could neither do credit to the magistracy nor good to the
     public, it can only bring down the prestige of the police         8
     administration."
      16. The dying declaration is the last statement made by a
person at a stage when he in serious apprehension of his death
and expects no chances of his survival. At such time, it is
expected that a person will speak the truth and only the truth.        C
Normally in such situations the courts attach the intrinsic value
of truthfulness to such statement. Once such statement has been
made voluntarily, it is reliable and is not an attempt by the
deceased to cover up the truth or falsely implicate a person,
then the courts can safely rely on such dying declaration and it       o
can form the basis of conviction. More so, where the version
given by the deceased as dying. declaration is supported and
corroborated by other prosecution evidence, there is no reason
for the courts to doubt the truthfulness of such dying declaration.
      17. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the dying        E
declaration was made after due certification of fitness by the
doctor and was recorded by a police officer in discharge of his
normal functions. The statement was made by the deceased
voluntarily and was a truthful description of the events. This
version is fully supported by PW3, the witness who had                 F
accompanied the deceased at all relevant times, right from
inflicting of the injury till the time of his death. The serological
report, Ex.P16, duly established that the blood group on the
knife used for the assault and that of the deceased was O+.
This knife had been recovered vide Mahazar Ex.P-12 by PW11             G
Srinivasa PSI in furthera~ce to the voluntary statement of the
appellant in presence of PW14, the Panch. The father of the
deceased, PW5, has also clearly stated that there was previous
animosity between the deceased and the appellant. In other
                                                                       H
    61 O    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012) 6 S.C.R.


A   words, the complete chain of events, pointing unexceptionally
    towards the guilt of the appellant has been established by the
    prosecution thereby proving the case of the prosecution beyond
    any reasonable doubt.
      18. Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the concurrent
B judgments of conviction and order of sentence passed by the
  Courts below. The appeal, therefore, is dismissed.

    R.P.                                      Appeal dismissed.